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## THE WARS OF THE ODRYSIAN KINGDOM AGAINST PHILIP II 352-339 BC

*Abstract:* The paper trace the dynamism of the complex military and political relations between the Odrysian state and Philip II, which are often the subject of brisk polemics in historiography. The military campaigns of the Macedonian ruler in 352/351, 347/3346 and 342/341 BC, which resulted in a considerable weakening of the Odrysian kingdom, are investigated successively and in detail. The successes of Philip II, however, are not the sought reliable evidence about the existence of a stable Macedonian military and administrative rule in the lands between the Haemus, the Aegean Sea and the Propontis, as some researchers are inclined to believe. The Odrysian state continued to exist even under the successors of Philip II, Alexander the Great and the diadochos Lysimachos.

The spring and summer of 352 **BS**, similar to preceding years, proved to abound in important military and political events in which the figures of the Odrysian kings and of Philip II occupied a prominent position. At the end of 353 **BC** or in the spring and summer of 352 **BC**, Kersebleptes undertook active campaigns to the west, against the lands of the successors of Berisades, where Ketriporis and his brother Monounios were reliably known. It seems that a good pretext for these activities of Kersebleptes was some conflict between them, mentioned for the last time in the sources in two brief passages in the speech of Demosthenes *Against Aristocrates*, delivered in the year of the archon Aristodemos, and more specifically in July or August 352 **BC**.<sup>1</sup> The reason which prompted Demosthenes to write this speech was the mis-

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1 Demosth. *C. Arist.*, 179, 189 (Weil); М.Л. Тонев, *Демостеновата реч срещу Аристократа и нейната стойност като извор за историята на Тракия* ИИД, 14-15, 1937, с. 38-39; P. Carlier, *Demosthenes*. Paris, 1990, 106.

sion of someone by the name of Aristomachos of Allopekonesos in Athens in the spring of the same year 352 BC, with the aim of convincing its politicians that only the mercenary general of Kersebleptes - Charidemos - was capable of opposing successfully the already powerful Philip II. For the purpose, Kersebleptes and Charidemos had to form an alliance with Athens.<sup>2</sup> There is no doubt that Kersebleptes wished to secure his arrears in the Propontis and Chersonesos through such an agreement, in order to concentrate his efforts westward,<sup>3</sup> all the more that in the spring and summer of 352 BC Philip II was busy with operations in Thessaly and succeeded in defeating in the decisive battle the 20,000-strong army of the Phokians, led by their strategos - autocrator Onomarchos.<sup>4</sup> The victory of the Macedonians was won owing to the skilful interactions of the phalanx and the cavalry, in which Thracian mercenaries also took part. However, Philip's attempt to cross the Thermopylae failed. Nevertheless, his control over Thessaly and especially over Amphipolis, Methone in the Thermi Bay and Pagasai, which were in his hands, were in Kazarov's words "three severe blows for the Athenian power in the seas, which ruled over the Aegean Sea unrestricted until that time."<sup>5</sup>

In this situation Kersebleptes decided to exercise a strategic pressure in the region between the Bistonian lake and the Pangaion Mountain, i.e. the lands between the mouths of the Nestos and Strymon rivers. That was in fact the territory of Berisades and his heirs, or as Aristotle mentions specifically in connection with the practice of hunting with falcons in the marshes of "Thrace of Kerdipolis" or "Thrace above Amphipolis". This seems to be a Grecized form of the name, because even Theophrastes has mentioned the curious fact that draught animals refused to eat barley in the "land of Kerdipolis" because of its bad smell.<sup>6</sup> In the past Dittenberger located the cited area most generally in the lands to the east of Amphipolis.<sup>7</sup>

2 Demosth. C. Arist., 6, 13-15, 191, 193-194, Ал. Фол, *Тракия и Балканите през ранноелинистическата епоха*. София 1975, 179

3 К. Йорданов, *Филип II в Егеида и Тракия (357-353 г. пр. Хр.)* – Милано 1995, 3 (in press)

4 Diod. 16, 35, 4-6, 16, 61,2 (Vogel); Paus. 10,2,5 (Jones), Iust. 8,2,3-4 (Ruehl); N.G.L. Hammond, *A History of Greece to 322 BC*. Oxford, 1987<sup>3</sup>, 544.

5 Г.И. Казаров, *Цар Филип II Македонски, История на Македония до 336 пр. Христа*, София 1922, 135.

6 Arist. De animal hist 620 A 34 - 620 B5 (Dithmeyer); (Ps)Arist. De Mirab. auscult. 118 (Appelt); Theopomp De odor., 2,4 (Wittmer); Мл. Тонев, *Приноси към историята на траките* in *Беломорски преглед I*, 1942, 198.

7 Dittenberger. W. Ketrispolis von Thrakien - Hermes, 14, 1879. 298-301.

The growing political and economic potential of Ketrporis after 356 BC is best seen from his issues of bronze coins with their specific iconographic and stylistic features. On the obverse there is usually the head of Dionysos with an ivy wreath, with a kantharos and tyrsos clearly discernible on the reverse. There is no doubt or hesitations in the whole numismatic literature known to me about the fact that the coin issues of Ketrporis came from the mints on the island of Thasos. The interesting thing in the concrete case is that - according to Youroukova<sup>8</sup> - this coinage exceeded considerably in quantitative terms that of the remaining Thracian rulers in the 5th and the first quarter of the 4th century BC. The other no less important conclusion is that Thasos and Ketrporis were political forces of equal standing, united around the idea of opposing their common adversary.

Internal strifes, however, rendered the good intentions meaningless to a considerable extent. If Pompeius Trogus is to be believed, because he apparently drew his information from a reliable source as Theopompos, who was badly excerpted, abridged and even more clumsily reconstructed in his epitomist Iustinus, a dispute broke out among the heirs of Bersades. Having failed to resolve the dispute, they appealed to Philip - not because of his fairness, but guided by the shared fear that he might take the side of one of them. According to the already established stereotype, Philip did not wait for a second invitation and appeared suddenly with a well ordered army as if he was going to war, not as an arbitrator. He took the kingdom of both of them - not as an arbitrator, but as a bandit who did not shirk from deception and crime. Even Höck<sup>9</sup> expressed the assumption that the two brothers, Thracian kings, were the sons of Bersades - Ketrporis and Monounios, which seems to be the most plausible hypothesis. It is difficult to state with certainty when the heirs of Bersades were forced to step down from the political scene, but that hardly took place before the end of 352 BC.<sup>10</sup> Some scholars are inclined to see in that military and political move of Philip II the beginning of his Thracian campaign in 352 and 351 BC.<sup>11</sup>

8 Й. Юркова, *Монетите на тракийските племена и владетели* in *Монети съкровища от българските земи*, София 1992, 68-70

9 Iust. 8. 3, 14-16; A. Höck, *Das Odryenreich in Thrakien in fünften und vierten Jahrhundert v. Chr.* - *Hermes*, 6, 1891, 108, Ю. Тодоров, *Тракийските царе*. - *ГСУ-ИФФ*, 29, 7, 1933, 54.

10 Bury, J. B., M. Russel *A History of Greece*. New York, 1975<sup>4</sup>, 425

11 Ellis, J. R. Philip's Thracian campaign of 353-352 BS- *Classical Philology*, 72, 1977, 32-39

The conflict between Kersebleptes and Amadokos may also be attributed approximately to that time. According to a fragment from Book Eleven of *Philippica* by Theopompos, which is well complemented by the scholia to Aeschines, Philip acquired loyal allies: Amadokos and the inhabitants of Byzantion and Perinthos.<sup>12</sup> The prevalent opinion in the specialized literature is that the events should be dated to 352/351 BC.<sup>13</sup> Ellis<sup>14</sup> is inclined to accept that Amadokos became Philip's ally towards the end of his campaign in Thrace, i.e. in 351 BC, when he had the real opportunity of establishing some effective control in the western part of Thrace - between Strymon and Nestos.

It can be claimed with a growing conviction that Amadokos possessed a considerable economic and political potential to oppose not only in the diplomatic field the Theban military commander Pammenes and Philip II accompanying him in the summer of 354 BC.

According to the text of Demosthenes in his speech *Against Aristocrates*, Amadokos prevented the Macedonian ruler from advancing further south than Maroneia and he retreated without involving Kersebleptes and the people of Karchia in a conflict with Athens.<sup>15</sup>

In the period after 359 BC until about 351 BC, Amadokos minted bronze coins on the obverse of which there was a double axe with a caduceus horizontally above it. The inscription AMA[T]OKO is clearly visible on both sides of the double axe. On the reverse there is a grape vine with five hanging grapes in a square frame. Numismatists are convinced that this type of bronze coins of Amadokos (Amatokos) II were minted in Maroneia.<sup>16</sup> S. Topalov recently published bronze coins of Amadokos (Amatokos) II, which - according to him - were minted between 359 and 356 BC. The author describes several specimens discovered in the region of the villages of Apriltsi and Dinkata near Pazardjik, another coin from the region of Plovdiv, as well as specimens from the village of Vetren near Pazardjik. He concludes that the highest concentration of coins of Amadokos (Amatokos) was near

12 Theopomp., Fr. 101; Schol. ad Aeschin. 2, 81 (Müller); А. Фол, *Проучания върху гръцките извори за древна тракия*, IV, Теопомп: *Гръцка история и История на Филип (II Македонски)*, ГС:У-ИФ, 69, 1980, 18, 32, 40.

13 Ю. Тодоров, *Op. cit.*, 54; Мл. Тонев, *Приноси ...*, 216-226; Archibald, Z. H. *Tracians and Scythians in CAN VI*2, 1994, pp. 467-468.

14 J. R. Ellis, *Macedonia and North-West Greece*. - In: *CAN VI*2, 754

15 Demosth. C. Arist., 183; Мл. Тонев, *Приноси ...*, 207.

16 Й. Юркова, *Op. Cit.*, 66-67.

Vetren, or generally in the Pazardjik region and the western part of Plovdiv district.<sup>17</sup> Topalov challenges the view that the coins of Amadokos (Amatokos) II minted in Maroneia were inscribed with the names not of the city magistrates but of other magistrates. It seems more likely that these were persons having political and administrative links with the closest circles around the ruler.<sup>18</sup> The possibility that the coinage of Amadokos (Amatokos) II did not take place in Maroneia or only in Maroneia, but predominantly in local Thracian mints, because the coins had their own shape and weight, including the unminted flans, will remain open - at least for the time being - for discussion in the literature.<sup>19</sup> The forthcoming publication of a large number of coin issues from Ainos, Kypsela, Chersonesos and Maroneia, and of the Odrysian rulers Hebrizelmis, Kotys I, Kersebleptes, Amadokos (Amatokos) II and of Teres II, Seuthes III, Philip II, Alexander the Great and Lysimachos, discovered near the village of Vetren in the Pazardjik district, would seem to bring greater precision - if not a solution - concerning this important problem. Incidentally, some preliminary publications<sup>20</sup> already yielded promising results and confirmed the existence of autonomous Thracian mints that satisfied the economic and political needs of the Odrysian rulers. The possibility of such a historical interpretation grew considerably after the publication of the inscription discovered in the late 1990 in the area of Vetren, believed to have originated from the Odrysian royal court at the time of the successors of Kotys I. The inscription confirmed the rights of the citizens of the emporion Pistiros, which had already been granted to them by that ruler. The preserved lines of the inscription mention the citizens of the Greek cities of Maroneia and Apollonia, located between Philippi and Amphipolis, and those on the island of Thasos. In all probability, the emporion Pistiros was named after the city close to the mouth of the Nestos river, mentioned by Herodotus while tracing the march of the

17 Ст. Топалов, *Одриското царство от края на I до средата на IV в. пр. н. е. Приноси към проучването на монетосечнето и историята му*, София 1994, 45-52, 57-60.

18 М. Гачева, *Тракийските владетели и гръцките полиси по северното егейското крайбрежие*, Нумизматика №1, 1988, 12; Ст. Топалов, *Ор. cit.*, 60-61, 66.

19 Ст. Топалов, *Ор. cit.*, 60-61, 66.

20 Domaradzki, M. Pistiros - centre commercial et politique dans la vallee de Maritza (Thrace). - *Archeologia*, XLIV (Warszawa), 1993, 35-57; Й. Юркова, *Монетите на Котис I в. Пистирос. Изложба цар Котис I. Тракийската държава. Емпорион Пистирос*, Каталог, Септември 1994, 8-10

army of Xerxes against Hellas in 480 BC.<sup>21</sup> In the badly preserved end of the inscription (line 41) there is a clear AM-, which has given grounds to Domaradzki<sup>22</sup> to assume that it stood for Amatokos II who guaranteed to the citizens of the emporion legal inviolability during disputes that arose. It seems to me that this idea seems to be perfectly plausible, at least for the time being, and it is yet to find further confirmation when coin hoards found in the Vetren area (the emporion Pistiros) will be published.

The complicated political situation in the Odrysian kingdom and especially the conflict between Kersebleptes and Amadokos, which was about to end with the unification of the state, prompted Philip to more intensive activity. A pretext was easily found, if it was sought at all. According to the cited scholion to Aeschines, Amadokos was forced to turn to his former adversary Philip for help, because he was pressed by Kersebleptes. The Macedonian king came to the rescue of Byzantion and Perinthos, which had old territorial disputes with the Odrysae, as well as to "the Thracian Amadokos" who was already fighting against "the king of a part of Thrace" - Kersebleptes. The evidence has been reconfirmed through the already cited fragment from Book Eleven of Theopompos, preserved owing to Harpokration, from which it becomes clear that Amadokos fought together with Philip against Kersebleptes.<sup>23</sup> The information obviously came from the headquarters of Philip's army, the close environment of the ruler or the royal court. In almost all studies devoted to these events it is pointed out that Philip undertook his first more important march into Thrace also due to the Athenian operations in the Hellespontos, specifying that this took place around the middle of the archontic 352/351 BC, or more precisely in November 352 BC.<sup>24</sup> To the best of my knowledge, there is only one exception in the specialized literature, explaining that Philip II undertook his second march in 351 BC as the second stage in his plans to conquer Thrace.<sup>25</sup> Philip II also made the most of the

21 Hdt., 7, 110, 1 (Feix); Velkov, V., L. Domaradska. Kotys I (383/2-359) et l'emporion de Pistiros en Thrace. - ВСН, 118, 1994, 5-6.

22 М. Домарадски, *Емпорион Пистирос в Тракия*, in *Поселищен живот в древна Тракия*. Юмбол. 1994, 45.

23 E. Badian, *Philip and Thrace*. - In: *Pulpuđeva*, 4. Sofia, 1983, 45.

24 N.G. L. Hammond, G. T. Griffith. *A History of Macedonia*. II. 550-336 BC Oxford, 1979, 281-282; G. Sawkwell, *Philip of Macedon*. London-Boston, 1978, 77, 80; J. Bleicken, *Die athenische Demokratie*. München-Wien-Zürich, 1994, 78.

25 Хр. Данов. *Към външната политика на Македония, Тракия и Гърция през II и в началото на III в. пр. н. е.* Studia Balcanica, 2, 1970. 48.

moods against Kersebleptes on the part of Byzantion and Perinthos, which had old territorial disputes with the Odrysian kings.<sup>26</sup> Amadokos, pressed by the Odrysian king, quite naturally took the side of the king of Macedon. The Macedonian troops, among which there were mercenaries as well,<sup>27</sup> penetrated to the Propontis relatively easily and reached one of the Odrysian royal residences and capital cities: Heraion Teichos. In the words of Demosthenes, in the beginning of his third Olynthian speech in 349 BC,<sup>28</sup> there is the implication that for three or four years Philip was in Thrace and besieged the cited residence. This took place in the month of Maimakterion, i.e. November-December 352 BC.<sup>29</sup> In a brief passage of his first Olynthian speech, Demosthenes explains that Philip fell seriously ill during the siege of the Odrysian stronghold, and even rumours about his death spread in Athens.<sup>30</sup>

Kersebleptes was apparently in a difficult situation and he sought his counter-arguments through his old ties with Athens, which sent 40 Trieres to the Hellespontos with a certain delay - in the middle of the archon's year, i.e. at the very end of 352 or in the beginning of 351 BC. The Odrysian also relied on the aid of the strategos-autocrator of the Phokians - Phalaikos, who was the nephew of Philip's adversary Onomarchos.<sup>31</sup> The sons of Kersebleptes were sent to Delphi to conclude an alliance with Phalaikos, as can be seen from an honorary decision in the sanctuary of 351 BC, but this document had a diplomatic and not a military or political effect, hence in practice it did not threaten Philip in the least.

The success of the Athenian strategos Chares against Philip's mercenary Adaios, who had reached Kypsela, should probably also be attributed to the time when Philip II fell ill - late autumn or winter of 352 BC. The place of the battle is not reliably known, because the 3rd century BC fragment of Damoxenes, cited in Athenaeus, is not entirely reliable and trustworthy, according to M. Tonev's analysis.<sup>32</sup> Elsewhere

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26 M. Errington, *Geschichte Makedoniens*. Von den Anfängen bis zum Untergang des Königreiches. München, 1986, 52.

27 И. П. Маринович, *Греческое наемничество III в. до н. е. и кризис полиса*, Москва 1975, 94.

28 Hammond, N. G. L. *A History of Greece ...*, 548-549.

29 Demosth., Olynth., 3, 4-5 (Croiset); Мл. Тонев, *Приноси...*, 216-217; P. Carlier, *Op. cit.*, 107.

30 Demosth., Olynth., 1, 13; E. Badian, *Op. cit.*, 61, P. Carlier, *Op. cit.*, 121-124.

31 Г. И. Кацаров. *Op. cit.*, 137.

32 Athen. 11, 469a (Kaibel); Мл. Тонев, *Приноси...*, 208



Athenaeus explains that this strategos of Philip was called Adaios the Rooster, explaining that the nickname was known from a comedy by Heraklides, from which only isolated phrases have been preserved, describing how Chares caught Philip's rooster at dawn and killed it to make a feast for the Athenians. The information in Athenaeus can be dated back to Theopompos and Duris from Samos, and it is considered to be sufficiently significant.<sup>33</sup> This victory was celebrated in Athens with a public feast at the victor's expense. There is an assumption in the specialized literature that the military campaign against Chares and Adaios the Rooster were waged in the region between Neapolis and Philippi.<sup>34</sup>

In two preserved fragments of Book Nine of Theopompos' *Philippica* there is a reference to Droggilon as a Thracian chorion and to Kobris - as a Thracian polis. The settlements are mentioned in connection with Philip's operations in Thrace in 352/351 BC and they even traced his movements along and to the side of his main itinerary: the future Via Egnatia. While Mastaira should be sought in the area of the village of Mladinovo near Svilengrad, Kobris - defined by (Pseudo-)Skymnos as the emporion of the Kardians - was localized on the western coast of the Thracian Chersonesos, near the neck of the Peninsula.<sup>35</sup> This evidence confirms the scale of the Macedonian incursion, which Kersebleptes could not resist for a long time. In the spring of 351 BC, after the Athenians became convinced that Philip was alive and well, that he continued his operations in Thrace and seriously threatened their interests in the Propontis, they sent Charidemos to the region with ten ships with incomplete crew and five talents of silver, but that help naturally proved to be insufficient.<sup>36</sup> Philip's allies from Byzantion also acted energetically and laid their hands on Chalkedon and Selymbria, thus creating considerable difficulties both for the strategic and for the trade interests of Athens in the Straits.<sup>37</sup> Pressed from all sides, Kersebleptes was forced to make peace, to return the disputed territories to Byzan-

33 Athen. 12, 532 e-f, Theopomp. Fr. 249; Duris. Fr. 35 (Jacoby). N.W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers from the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus*. Oxford, 1933, 145; В. Н. Юрко, *Отношения Афин с Фракией и Македонией в отражении древнегреческой комедии* in EIRENE. *Studia Graeca et Latina*, XX. Praha, 1982, 31-42.

34 N.G.L. Hammond, G. T. Griffith. *Op. cit.*, 281 s.

35 Theopomp., Fr. 83, 84; (Ps)Skyl., 67 (Müller); А. Фол, *Проучвания...* IV, 18-19, 32.

36 Demosthenes. Olynth. 3, 5; Мл. Тонев, *Приноси...*, 217, 226.

37 Demosth., 15, 26 (Croiset); Т. И. Кацаров, *Op. cit.*, 137

tion and Perinthos, and even to give one of his four sons as hostage in Pella<sup>38</sup> However, that peace could hardly be interpreted as a severe defeat for the Odrysae and even less to claim that Kersebleptes was no longer a serious adversary (?!) of Philip II.<sup>39</sup> In all probability, the military clashes between Philip II and Kersebleptes ended in the summer of 351 BC and peace was concluded, because in the speech of Demosthenes entitled *About the Freedom of the Rhodians*, delivered in the winter of 351/350 BC, this conflict was no longer mentioned<sup>40</sup> The result of this temporary agreement between Philip and Kersebleptes was convenient to both sides. Philip was satisfied, because he had weakened the military and political potential of Kersebleptes, having acquired allies - Perinthos, Byzantion and Amadokos - and he had dealt a serious blow on the economic position of Athens in the Propontis and the Straits. It was hardly possible to achieve more, because the Macedonian lacked important points of support for a broader onset in the Propontis and in the Thracian Chersonesos. He was yet to cope with the difficult task of dealing a blow while at the same time stabilizing his positions in the Chalkidike Peninsula. On the other hand, Kersebleptes must also have been at least a little satisfied, because he had succeeded in overcoming a major military and political trial, and in preserving the independence of the Odrysian state, albeit at the price of concessions and giving one of his sons as a hostage in the Macedonian capital. His and residence Hieron capital city Oros also survived, rising as an acropolis in the area of the Thracian Chersonesos, according to Strabo<sup>41</sup> It appears, therefore, that Amadokos also stepped down from the political scene, being a strong adversary of Kersebleptes.

There is an opinion in the specialized literature that while Philip fought in Thrace, Illyrians and Paiones were getting ready to invade Macedonia and to help their old allies from 356 BC.<sup>42</sup> The data in the written tradition about such a war of Philip II with his neighbours to the north and northwest are most general, but they should not be ignored. In the beginning of his first speech against Philip, delivered by

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38 A. Hoek, *Die Söhne des Kersebleptes von Thrakien*, *Hermes*, 33, 1898, 630-631, *Elis. J.R. Op. cit.*, 38-39; P. Carlier, *Op. cit.*, 108

39 E. Badian, *Op. cit.*, 62.

40 Ml. Tonev, *Приноси.....* 220-221.

41 Strabo, 7, Fr. 55 (Meineke).

42 G. I. Kacarov, *Op. cit.*, 138; Ю. Тодоров, *Op. cit.*, 54

Demosthenes in 351 BC. there is a description of the imminent threat over Olynthos and of the circumstance that the Macedonian army is threatening Illyrians and Paiones. The most cherished wish of these people - the rhetor pathetically exclaims - is to be independent, not slaves.<sup>43</sup> It seems that Philip indeed engaged in some military operations in the autumn of 351 BC, because Iustinus reports, albeit briefly, about the building of some fortifications or fortresses in that land,<sup>44</sup> and several surviving fragments of Book 21 of Theopompos, which may be dated to the archontic year 351/350 BC, mention individual Illyrian settlements and tribes.

In the cited speech by Demosthenes there is a reproach of the Athenians that they did not act energetically and did not form military forces - albeit not very big - to be used to fight Philip in Thrace all the time. It was also necessary to find the financial resources required to maintain these military units.<sup>45</sup>

In the 351-348 BC period both Philip and the Odrysian Kingdom were getting ready for the inevitable confrontation between them. Both sides were clearly aware of the importance of the preliminary preparations, consolidation and expansion of their strategic positions. Philip succeeded in achieving a certain advantage in that race. He was a menace to Olynthos as early as in 351 BC, because the latter ignored previous agreements with him and concluded an alliance with Athens. The Macedonian had another important pretext to threaten Olynthos, because his stepbrothers Arrhidaios and Menelaos, claimants to the throne, hid there. Philip naturally asked the citizens of Olynthos to hand him his stepbrothers, but that claim was refused. This meant that even the formal pretext for war was found.<sup>46</sup> In his three Olynthian speeches Demosthenes constantly urged the Athenians to help the city in its predicament. It was only in 349 that Chares was again dispatched with an army of 2,000 mercenaries and 30 Trieres to help Chalkidike.<sup>47</sup> In 350 BC Philip consolidated his positions in Epirus, and in 349 BC he captured Stageira. In the autumn of the same year, Philip II coped

43 Demosthenes. Philip. 1, 13, 23 (Croiset); Мл. Тонев, *Op. cit.*, 220; Е. Петрова, *Пајонските племина и пајонското кралство во II и I милениум пред н. е.*, Macedoniae Acta Archaeologia, vol. 12. Skopje, 1991, 20-21.

44 Iust. 8, 3, 7, Г. И. Кацаров, *Op. cit.*, 138.

45 Demosthenes. Philip 1,34.43; P. Carlier, *Op. cit.*, 110

46 Schol. Dem. Olynth. 1.15 (Weil); Iust. 8, 3, 10; P. Carlier, *Op. cit.*, 121-122.

47 E. Badian, *Op. cit.*, 63; G. T. Griffith, *Philip as a general and the Macedonian army*, in. *Philip of Macedon*. Athens, 1980, 73, 76

with the rebellious tyrants from Pherae and imposed his power in Thessaly<sup>48</sup> During the archontic year 349/348 BC, Olynthos was besieged. After different problems, including bribes and treachery, and after two defeats in the battlefield, the Olynthians were doomed. Philip accelerated the capturing of the city by bribing the cavalry leaders in the city - Lasthenes and Euthykrates. During a prearranged outing they not only handed over the cavalry to the Macedonians, but also helped them enter the city. Philip punished the resisting Olynthians by plundering and destroying the city, sending the survivors to slavery.<sup>49</sup> The event is reliably dated to the autumn of 348 BC.

Kazarov assumes that at the time of Philip's operations in the Chalkidike Peninsula, the siege and capturing of Olynthos, Kersebleptes tried to shed his dependence on Macedonia, but failed to achieve any success.<sup>50</sup> The idea remains purely speculative, because there is no reference to similar moves or to any real political and military operations of the Odrysians in the preserved fragments of 23 books by Theopompos, those by Ephoros or in the speeches of their contemporaries Aeschines, Demosthenes and Isocrates.

In 347 BC, the Athenians had to defend their last territories in the Aegeis and the Propontis, having sustained heavy losses during the clashes for more than ten years. Aeschines specifically mentions the great number of ships lost or sunk, in addition to no less than 1,500 talents spent,<sup>51</sup> not to mention human sacrifice and the low political prestige of Athens, especially after Philip consolidated his position in Central Greece. Athens was already ripe for negotiating a peace treaty, which would have actually recognized Philip's military and diplomatic superiority. In order to be more certain of the implementation of his strategic intentions and in order to undermine the confidence of the Athenians, the Macedonian king sent his loyal strategos Antipater to Thrace in the autumn of 347 BC. The situation was favourable for such a campaign, because Amadokos<sup>52</sup> died in 351 or 350 BC, and his successor Teres II tended to have a pro-Macedonian orientation. This was apparently due to pressing circumstances,<sup>53</sup> and Teres II could not

48 G. Cawkwell, *Philip and Athens*, in: *Philip of Macedon*, Athens, 1980, 104.

49 Diod. 16, 53, 6-9 (Vogel); Demosthen. 9, 56-58; 19, 265; P. Carlier, *Op. cit.*, 130-131

50 Г. И. Казаров, *Op. cit.*, 141

51 Aeschin. 2, 70, 72 (Martin-Bude).

52 A. Hock, *Das Odrysenreich ...*, 110; Ю. Тодоров, *Op. cit.* 35

53 A. Fol, *Тракия и Балканите...*, 182.

have been an ally of Kersebleptes, as some researchers claim without supporting their hypothesis with any evidence.<sup>54</sup> That ruler seemed to have had a considerable economic and probably military potential as well, because he minted bronze coins that were typologically connected with the coinage of his father Amadokos (according to numismatists - Amatokos II). On the obverse of these coins there is the traditional double axe with the ruler's name, and on the reverse - a vine with five grapes in a square frame. The coins of Teres II were minted in Maroneia between 351/350 and 347 BC.<sup>55</sup> According to the observations of numismatists, Abdera and Maroneia practically stopped minting coins after Antipater's campaign, which destabilized the minting output of Teres II as well.<sup>56</sup> The almost reliable connection between the names of the magistrates from Maroneia and the bronze coinage of the father of Amadokos (Amatokos II) and the son Teres II has also been reflected.<sup>57</sup> On the other hand, Topalov does not rule out the possibility that the coins of Amadokos (Amatokos II) and Teres II also featured the names of the Thracian magistrates who were in the immediate environment of the rulers. It is quite a different matter to what extent it can be claimed with certainty that the coins of Teres II were minted in the 356-341 BC period.<sup>58</sup> Future research and especially the publications of the coin hoards from museums and private collections will confirm or reject the assumption that the coins of Amadokos (Amatokos II) and Teres II were made in local Thracian mints in the interior of Thrace,<sup>59</sup> under the control if not by the rulers themselves, at least by people close to them from the aristocratic elite. It seems that Teres II sought political recognition or support from a Getic dynast as well, which is evident from a phiale found in the village of Branichevo near Shoumen, on which an inscription reads: "Teres, son of Amatokos."<sup>60</sup>

Antipater's campaign in Thrace in the autumn of 347 BC was aimed not only at preparing more serious Macedonian operations to the

54 Хр. Данов, *Към външната политика...*, 49.

55 Й. Юруков, *Op. cit.*, 67-68.

56 J.F.M. May, *The coinage of Abdera (540-345 BC)*. London, 1966, 268.

57 E. Schoenert-Geiss, *Maroneia und die Thraker. Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Polis und Hinterland* - In EIRENE, XXII, 1985, 40-45.

58 Ст. Топалов, *Op. cit.*, 68.

59 *Ibidem*, 58-59, 62-65.

60 G. Mihailov, *The Inscriptions*. in: *The Rogozen Treasure* Sofia, 1989, 48. И. Маразов, *Царят и изкуството в древна Тракия, Видимият мит*. София. 1992. 147-150.

east against the Odrysian state, as well as exercising pressure upon some of the hesitant members of the Council of the 500 in Athens. In this way, an opportunity was given to the supporters of Philocrates to insist on the concluding of a peace treaty, which was later named after its most ardent supporter.<sup>61</sup>

Antipater's expedition in Thrace started and ended successfully. Teres II became a Macedonian protege either voluntarily or by necessity, and that was the price he paid for remaining on the throne. If one is to believe the evidence in Aeschines and a stratagem of Polyaeus, the Macedonian strategos succeeded in conquering Abdera and controlling Maroneia, where a small garrison was also left.<sup>62</sup> With these important strategic positions, Philip II benevolently agreed to accept the Athenian delegation which included Philocrates, Aeschines and Demosthenes in Pella in March 346 BC.<sup>63</sup> The Macedonian was not prepared for concessions concerning Thrace, all the more that Antipater had already laid his hands on Apris (Apros), present-day Kestrice, and Drys opposite Samothrace, west of the mouth of the river Hebros (pres. Maritsa) near Ainos.<sup>64</sup> These real threats against the Odrysian kingdom logically resulted in closer contacts between Kersebleptes and Athens which sent the *strategos* Chares. He stationed small Athenian garrisons in Serreion and Doriskos near the mouth of the Hebros river, as well as in Ganos, Serreion Terchos, Hieron Oros, Ergiske and the still unlocalized Myrtenon.<sup>65</sup> The operations of Chares were a logical consequence of the preliminary agreements reached between the Athenian delegation in Pella and Philip, according to which each of the sides preserved its possessions.<sup>66</sup> In this way Philip imposed his will from the position of strength, because in practice that meant recognition for his conquests in the Chalkidike and the Aegean coastal region of Thrace. The disputes over the clauses of the future treaty continued in March-April 346 BC in Athens, including on whether to include in

61 G. L. Gawkwell, *The Peace of Philocrates again*. - *Classical Quarterly*, 28, 1978, 93-104.

62 Aeschin. 2, 70-74; Polyaeus, *Strateg.* 4, 2, 22 (Wolfflin-Melber); Мл. Тотев, *Притоси...*, 208; E. Badian, *Op. cit.*, 66.

63 P. Carlier, *Op. cit.*, 150-152.

64 Theopomp. Fr. 160 = Steph. Byz. 107, 5; Theopomp. Fr. 161; A. Фол, *Проучвания...*, IV, 22-23, 34.

65 Demosth. De Chers., 8, 64 (Croiset); Philip III 15, Philip. IV, 8, 65; De corona, 27; Aeschin. 3, 82 (Martin-Budé); Badian, *Op. cit.*, 65.

66 P. Cloché, *Un fondateur d'empire. Philippe II, roi de Macedoine (383/2-336/5)*; Saint-Etienne, 1955, 147-151.

the list of allies the inhabitants of Phokis, of the Thessalian city of Chalos and Kersebleptes who had a friendship but no official alliance (*symmachia*) with Athens and its allies. The Odrysian king was represented by Kritoboulos from Lampsakos, who was authorized to utter the respective oath, but that oath was not pronounced, due to the protest of Philip's envoys and to the fact that he was accepted in principle by Demosthenes.<sup>67</sup> Philip benefited from the understanding that for him the treaty entered into force not when the Athenian *ekklesia* approved it in mid-April 346 BC, but after he took the oath in Pella and headed for Thrace. In late March and early April the Macedonian troops entered the small towns of the Aegeis, crossed the Hebros river and hastily pushed back the Athenian garrisons. Philip entered Doriskos, Ergiske, Serreion, Serraion Teichos and reached Ganos. While the draft treaty, later known after the name of Philokrates, was being approved in Athens, the Macedonians laid hands on the Hieron Oros. The Athenian strategos could do nothing but register only the catastrophic situation, mainly for Athens, because Kersebleptes indeed lost a part of his kingdom and admitted his defeat (on 21 April 346 BC), but the agreement reached between Kardia and Philip had even more negative consequences for his fellow-citizens, because in reality they lost their economic and political positions in the Thracian Chersonesos.<sup>68</sup> While the Athenian delegation was waiting in Pella, Philip completed his operations in Thrace, having attained his most important strategic objectives. Along most general lines, these consisted in eliminating the possibility of a new rapprochement between Kersebleptes and Athens, more extensive Macedonian control in the Propontis and Chersonesos, and - of course - restricted potential of the Odrysian royal court.

There is an opinion in modern literature on the "vassal dependence" of Kersebleptes, who was left to reign, but paid a tribute to Philip and supplied troops to him, if the need arose. The only true and reliable claim of the ones cited earlier was that Philip received considerable revenues from the newly-conquered cities and regions along the Thracian coast, which is evident from the speech of Demosthenes *On the Crown*, delivered in 330 BC.<sup>69</sup>

67 Ю. Тодоров, *Op. cit.* 54; P. Carlier, *Op. cit.*, 155.

68 Aeschin 2, 90, 92; P. Cloche, *Op. cit.*, 152; G. Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon*, London-Boston, 1978, 92-98.

69 Demosth., 18, 27 (Croiset); Ю. Тодоров, *Op. cit.*, 55; C. Carliner, *Op. cit.*, 247-256.

Indeed, according to the provisions of the Peace of Philokrates treaty, endorsed in 346 BC, Philip consolidated substantially his political positions in Hellas, forced Kersebleptes to adopt a defensive attitude and even to pay a tribute,<sup>70</sup> but that retreat of the Odrysae was imposed on them, without affecting or weakening their nucleus along the Hebros and Tonzos rivers. Events in the next several years were to confirm clearly that Kersebleptes still had a considerable military and political potential. Incidentally, this has also been recognized indirectly by those scholars who placed the Odrysian king in "vassal relations" with respect to Philip, with the specific provision that this was temporary. But this leads to the perfectly logical question: if there had been such a dependence at all, then why did Strabo place Kersebleptes in the list of the most famous Odrysian kings next to the names of Kotys, Seuthes, Amadokos and Berisades?<sup>71</sup>

There is no doubt that the Odrysian ruler had a certain time while Philip was consolidating his positions in Epirus and Thessaly in 344 BC. According to some researchers, the Macedonian ruler also conducted a punitive operation against the Illyrians, and more specifically against the ruler of the Ardiaioi, Pleurathos, along the Dalmatian coast near Skodra (Skutari) as early as in 354 BC, i.e. after conducting the Pythian Games in Delphi in the autumn of the previous year.<sup>72</sup> While this assumption still remains in the realm of hypotheses, due to the unreliability of the data, it was much more probable that Philip tried to secure his northern border during the archontic year of 344/343 BC, because according to his chronographic source, Diodorus reports<sup>73</sup> - albeit briefly - about considerable military activities in Illyria, where several fortified settlements were destroyed and a large booty was acquired. There is confirmation of this information in the Prologue to Book 8 of Pompeius Trogus, where it is mentioned that Philip defeated the Illyrian king. Papazoglu associates this march with a badly damaged inscription from Oleveni, south of Bitolja (Heracleia Lynkestis), where there are two references to the name of king Philip, who defeated the Dardanioi during the sixteen years of his rule.<sup>74</sup> Incidentally,

70 M. Errington, *Op. cit.*, 55-56.

71 Strabo 7, fr. 48; A. Фол. *Тракия и Балканите...*, 184.

72 J. M. Dell, *Philip and Macedonia's northern neighbours*, in *Philip of Macedon*, Athens 1980, 95.

73 Diod. 16, 69, 7 (Welles); Pomp. Trog. Prol. 8 (Ruehl); N. G. L. Hanmond, *Illyrians and North-West Greeks c. 360-323 B.C.* CA N VI2, 1991, 439.

74 F. Papazoglu, *Inscription hellénistique de Lyncestide*, *Zava Antika*, XX, Skopje, 1970, 99-113.



Iustinus mentions very briefly that Philip defeated the Dardanioi and his other neighbours. These data and the Oleveni inscription have made it possible for Hatzopoulos to assume that the beginning of the reign of Philip II can be dated to the archontic year 360/359 BC.<sup>75</sup> During the next archontic year - 343/342 BC - Philip II succeeded in de-throning Arybbas and in gaining total control over Epirus.<sup>76</sup>

In the period after the summer of 346 BC, Kersebleptes apparently succeeded in mobilizing the forces of the Odrysae and gradually but surely he undertook some military and political moves in order to restore his earlier position. According to the chronographic source of Diodorus on the archontic year 343/342 BC, the king of the Thracians Kersebleptes not only devastated the territories, but gradually conquered the Hellenistic cities<sup>77</sup> that were Philip's allies. A little earlier or around the same time, the successor of Amadokos, Teres II, joined forces with Kersebleptes. Höck launched the hypothesis about this internal Odrysian alliance, and it is considered to be sufficiently reliable and convincing in modern literature.<sup>78</sup> To these successes it is also possible to add the efforts of the Athenians to resist the Macedonians in the Propontis and Chersonesos during the years after the Peace of Philokrates. *Klerouchoi* led by the *strategos* Diopetthes were sent to the peninsula, and Demosthenes mentions a successful envoy mission of his "to the Thracian kings", i.e. Kersebleptes and Teres II.<sup>79</sup> Philip's reaction was natural, because it was necessary to seek a sufficiently efficient resistance to that solid anti-Macedonian campaign.

The Macedonian has lasting positions in Ionia, and Arrian mentions that there was a statue of Philip II in Ephesus, more specifically in the temple of Artemis.<sup>80</sup> On the other hand, Artaxerxes III Ochus used about 10,000 mercenaries from Thebes, Argos and Ionia to crush the rebellions in Phoenicia in 345 BC and to restore the Achaemenid

75 Iust. 8, 6, 3; M. B. Hatzopoulos, *The Oleveni inscription and the dates of Philip II's reign*, in: *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage*. Washington, 1982, 21-42.

76 J. R. Ellis, *Macedonian hegemony created*. -in: CAH VI2, Cambridge, 1994, 7

77 Diod. 16, 71, 1.

78 A. Höck, *Op. cit.*, 114; Chr. Danov, *Die Thraker auf dem Ostbalkan von der hellenistischen Zeit bis zur Gründung Konstantinopels* in: ANRN VII 1979, 34.

79 Demosth., *De Chers.*, 1-2; Plutipp. 3, 15; 18, 244; F. R. Wüst, *Philipp I von Makedonien und Griechenland in den Jahren von 346-338 v. Chr.* München, 1938 114-117; P. Carlier, *Op. cit.*, 195.

80 Arr. *Anab.* 1, 17, 11 (Roos). S. Homblower, *Persian political history the involvement with the Greeks, 400-336 BC* in: CAH VI2, 1994, 95.

rule in Egypt in 343 BC.<sup>81</sup> In 343 BC, Philip II and the Persian king Artaxerxes III concluded a treaty for friendship and an alliance that was mutually profitable and it naturally represented a severe diplomatic and political blow for Kersebleptes who often received support from the independent Ionian cities.<sup>82</sup> In that way the fronts became clearly outlined and the conflict was inevitable. It remained the sides to get ready for the decisive military confrontation.

Kersebleptes apparently methodically strengthened the territories controlled by him, centered around the lands between the Hebros and Tonzos rivers, from where he gradually exercised pressure or conquered the cities in the Thracian Chersonesos and the Hellespontos in the spring of 342 BC. This forced Philip II to undertake his campaign into Thrace with a well equipped army at the end of May or in the beginning of June, without even suspecting that he was to spend most of the next three years in endless struggles against the Thracian rulers and dynasts. In the beginning of the campaign the army reached the mouth of the Hebros river and used the city of Kardia as a strategic base. It seems that precisely at that time Philip II attracted the talented youth Eumenes to serve him.<sup>83</sup> Eumenes had a brilliant career with Philip and with his son Alexander the Great. Soon Ainos was conquered as well, from where the Macedonians penetrated along the lower course of the Hebros river to the interior of the Odrysian kingdom. In spite of their certain superiority in terms of armament and discipline, the Macedonians were forced to wage many heavy battles. It is difficult to accept the theory that the strategic aim was the practical implementation of the idea about a "Macedonian province" from the Pontos and Istrus of the type of the Persian satrapies.<sup>84</sup> The Odrysae accepted the tactic of the sudden attacks or the siege, thus counteracting the advantages of the Macedonian weapons and military skills. The Thracians also resorted to deceptive manoeuvres and even succeeded in forcing Philip to withdraw from positions he had already conquered.<sup>85</sup>

81 N.G.L. Hammond, *A History of Greece* ..., 561.

82 Arr. *Anab.* 2, 14, 2; A. B. Bosworth, *A historical commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander* Oxford, 1980, 229-230; S. Ruzicka, *A note of Philip's Persian war*, *American Journal of Ancient History*, 1985, No 10, 84-95.

83 Plut. *Eum.* 1 (Ziegler), *Nepos Eum.* 1 (Nipperdev).

84 H. Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte* Von den Anfängen bis in die Römische Kaiserzeit, München, 1969, 3.

85 Polyæn. *Strat.* 4, 2, 4; 4, 2, 13 (Wölfllin-Melber); Г. И. Кауаров, *Op. cit.*, 212-213.

It seems that Philip was surprised by the efficient tactics of the Odrysae, because illness also compelled him to spend the winter of 342/341 BC in Thrace. In the beginning of his speech *On Deeds* in the Chersonesos, delivered in the late spring of 341 BC, Demosthenes mentions specifically that Philip had spent more than eleven months in Thrace. He suffered greatly and was exposed to great dangers in order to conquer Droggilon, Kabyle and Masteira.<sup>86</sup> There is no doubt that in the spring of 341 BC the Macedonian ruler brought new troops from Thessaly and Macedonia, because he realized very well that he had to lay hands on the nucleus of the Odrysian state, which was concentrated then along the middle and lower courses of the Tonzos and Hebros rivers. Diodorus specifically notes that the Macedonians had to wage many battles in order to win and to impose a tax (tithe) on the Thracians. Events should be dated to the summer of 341 BC, and according to Cohen,<sup>87</sup> they demonstrated the great difficulties which Philip had to cope with in a vast and well defended land as Thrace.

Apparently that was the time of the so-called Philip's colonization in Thrace, which included Philippopolis, Kabyle, the city of Poneropolis, mentioned by Theopompos, which is identified with one of the two cities - Droggilon and Masteira<sup>88</sup> - but this is no evidence of a stable Macedonian military and administrative power between the Haemus, the Aegean and the Propontis, as some scholars assume.<sup>89</sup>

In the summer or autumn of 341 BC, Philip succeeded in conquering some of the fortified residences of Kersebleptes, e.g. Ergiske along the Ergene river, a left tributary to the Hebros river, localized in the southern slopes of the Strandja mountain.<sup>90</sup> It seems that Kersebleptes and Teres were then forced to declare their capitulation, but that hardly meant that the Odrysian kingdom became a component of the Macedonian monarchy, as is suggested by Y. Todorov.<sup>91</sup>

The conquered territories, according to the sources of Athenaeus, were distributed among the aristocrats close to Philip's retinue.<sup>92</sup>

86 Demosth., *De Chers.*, 2, 35-37, 44-45; P. Carlier, *Op. cit.*, 194-195.

87 Diod. 16, 71, 2; G. Glotz, R. Cohen, *Histoire grecque*. III. La Grèce au IV<sup>e</sup> siècle. Paris, 1936, 326.

88 Theopomp. Fr. 110; N.G.L. Hammond, *Op. cit.*, 562.

89 Ch. Pelekidis, *Die Griechen in Thrakien*, in: *Thrakien. Generalsekretariat der Region Ostmakedonien - Thrakien*, Athens 1994, 110-111.

90 Demosth. 18, 27, Aeschin. 3, 82; A. Фол, *Опит за локализация на селищата от Розовенските надписи*, *Археология* 28, 1987, № 3, 2.

91 Ю. Тодоров, *Op. cit.* 56.

92 Athen. 6, 261a (Kabel); M. Errington, *Op. cit.*, 56.

which is indirect evidence that the "pitiful dens" in Thrace, mentioned by Demosthenes, among which there was Droggilon, Kabyle and Masteira, were far from the truth. It is sufficient to mention only Kabyle, where archaeological research is in an advanced stage and the published results are impressive.<sup>93</sup> The city, similar to Sauthaba - the residence of Kotys and Kersebleptes, between Ainos and Kardina - bore the name of Sabazios and its translation-designation is interpreted as the "sacred oak forest of Sabazios."<sup>94</sup>

Obviously Philip did not feel very secure in the Odrysian territories controlled by him, because he left his garrisons in the conquered or newly-established settlements. In July 340 BC he besieged Perinthos, in the autumn - Byzantion as well, which continued until the spring of the next year 339 BC, without being crowned with success. The "controlled" Odrysian lands in the interior also rebelled. According to a stratagem preserved in Frontinus, during the siege of Byzantion Philip wrote to his *strategos* Antipater that the Macedonian garrisons in Thrace were isolated because of rebellion. It was necessary to abandon the siege of the inaccessible city, in order to offer assistance to the Macedonians who were in a difficult position. If the cited evidence describes a military ploy devised by Philip in order to deceive the Athenians and to free his blocked fleet in the Straits, two fragments from Book 47 of Theopompos fully confirm it. In fact, Philip was forced not so much to use this ploy, but rather to respond to the complicated situation in Thrace. It seems that the Thracians - Tetrachorites - rebelled towards the end of 340 BC or in the early spring of 339 BC, and Philip had to offer help to his *stratego*i Antipater and Parmenion. The texts of Theopompos have apparently left a lasting impression in the written tradition, because Polyaeus describes a ploy used by Antipater in his war against the Tetrachorites, referred to in a fragment by Strabo as Bessi Tetrachorites or Tetrakomoi.<sup>95</sup> The name of the settlement Aggissos or Agesos, inhabited by the Tetrachorites, is clearly legible in the fragments by Theopompos. In the specialized literature there are arguments in support of the theory that the "quadripartite" Thrace was

93 В. Велков, *Кабиле. Топография*, исследования, извори Т. I, София 1982, 7-16

94 А. Фол, *Тракийският Дионис*, Книга втора, Сабазий, София 1994, 66, 221-222. А. Фол, *Тракийската култура, казано и премъгачано*, София 1995, 69.

95 Front. Strat. 1, 4, 13 (Gundermann); Theopomp. Fr. 217, 218; Polyae. Strat. 4, 4, 1; Strabo. Fr. 58A, M. Errington, *Op. cit.*, 59.

named by the Macedonians in this way probably on the analogy with Thessaly with which there existed obvious ethnic and cultural contacts.<sup>96</sup> Recently Boshnakov expressed the assumption that the Tetrachorites may have been the rebellious Thracians from the newly-conquered territories, including those from the regions of Philippopolis, Kabyle, Droggilon and Mastetra.<sup>97</sup> Perhaps an echo of these events, dated to 340/339 BC, was the reference to the chorion Kabyle in a fragment from Book 47 by Theopompos,<sup>98</sup> whose source was not Demosthenes, but evidence from the headquarters of the Macedonian army. The available data allow me to support the assumption about the quadripartite division of the lands of Southeastern Thrace, i.e. the Odrysian tribal territories, and not those of the Bessi in the region of the Rhodope Mountains, which incidentally has not been accepted in the specialized literature either.<sup>99</sup> The analysis of the described events from the summer of 341 BC until the spring of 339 BC confirms the view that Philip failed to satisfy his aspirations for a stable military and administrative control in Southeastern Thrace.<sup>100</sup>

РАТОВИ ОДРИСКОГ ЦАРСТВА  
СА ФИЛИПОМ II (352-339 пре Христа)  
Резиме

Уз посредништво Харидема, у пролеће или лето 352. године пре Христа, одриски владар Керсеблепт склапа савез са Атином да би осигурао залеђе у Пропонтиди и Тракијском Херсонесу. Изгледа да је тај цар једини могао да се супротстави већ моћном Филипу II. Македонац је реаговао тако што је успео да своју контролу земље Берисадових наследника и његових синова – Кетрипора и Монунија, 352. године пре Христа. Непосредно после тога Филип II је искористио конфликт између "Цара

96 А. Фол, *Тракийският Дионис*, Книга втора, Сабазий, Софија 1994, 66, 221-222; А. Фол, *Тракийската култура, казано и премълчано*, Софија 1995, 69

97 К. Boshnakov, *Die Thraker "Tetrachoritai"*, - *Talanta*, 22-23, 1990-1991, 7-13

98 Theopomp. Fr. 220; А. Фол, *Проучвания* ..., IV, Y 25, 25.

99 Z. H. Archibald, *Op. cit.*, 469; М. Тачева, *За бесите и техните племенни територии*, Минал 1995, No 1, 9-15

100 К. Йорданов, *Гетите, трибалите, Атеј и Филип II*, Известия на ХИМ X, 1994, 20.

дела Тракије" Керсеблепта и другог одриског владара, Амадока, тако што је подржао овог другог који је принудно постао његов савезник. Против Керсеблепта су се изјаснили и градови који су имали територијалне спорове са царем, Бизангион и Перинт. Са свих страна притиснут, Керсеблепт је био принуђен да уступи територије, оспораване од стране његових непријатеља и да закључи мир тако што је у Пелу, 351. год. пре Христа, послао као таоца једног од своја четири сипа.

Филип II 348/347. год. успоставља контролу над градовима на Халкидику и Егеиди после чега је свог верног стратега Антипатра, заједно са јаким одредом, послао у Тракију.

Македонски савезник принудно је поново постао Амадоков син, Терес II и то је био нов удар на антимакедонску коалицију оличену у Керсеблепту и Атини.

У априлу 346. године пре Христа македонска армија продрла је у Тракију, прешла Хеброс, завладала градовима по имену Дориск, Ергиске, Серајон, Тејхос и на крају заузела једну од Керсеблептових престоница – Хиероп Орос. На тај начин значајно је проширена македонска контрола над Егидом, Пропонтидом и Тракијским Херсонесом, а Одриско царство је било врло ослабљено.

Атина и Керсеблепт су 343/342. год. кренули у контраофанзиву против земаља **и савезника македонског цара** што је довело до склапања уговора о пријатељству и савезу између Филипа II и Ахеменијског владара, Артаксеркса III Охоса. У таквој ситуацији рат је постао неизбежан. У лето 342. године пре Христа Филип II је предузео велики поход на Тракију, али је наишао на одлично организовану одбрану Одриза. Тек у пролеће 341. године македонски гарнизони су били постављени у Дронилону, Кабилеу и Мастејри. Међутим, постигнуту успешност нису сигуран доказ о постојању стабилне македонске војне административне власти у земљама између Хемуса, Егеиде и Пропонтиде око и након 341. године пре Христа, како сматрају неки научници. Одриско царство, макар и у сужењим границама постојало је и даље не само у време владавине (при крају владавине) Филипа II већ и у време његовог наследника Александра и тракијског днадоха, Лизимаха.

*Са Бугарског превела: Бојана Лазин*

