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S. PILIPOVIĆ, A Travelling Speculator • V. PETROVIĆ & V. FILIPOVIĆ, The Bronze Signum from Timacum Maius and its Cultic Attribution • I. JORDOVIĆ, Kingdom versus Empire in Xenophon's Cyropaedia V. NEDELJKOVIĆ, Justinian's πάτριος φωνή • J. KALIĆ, Grand Župan Uroš II of Rascia • N. PORČIĆ, Information on Travel of Nemanjić Embassies • M. NIKOLIĆ, The Greatest Misfortune in the Oikoumene • SRDJAN RUDIĆ, The Ideology of the Illyrian Armorial • I. B. BOROZAN, The National-Dynastic Monument in the Kingdom of Serbia • A. NIKOLIĆ, Similarities and Differences in Imperial Administration • D. DIORDIEVIĆ, The 1905 Parliamentary Crisis in Serbia • Z. BAJIN, Miroslav Spalajković, the Serbian Minister in Russia in the July Crisis of 1914 • V. G. PAVLOVIĆ, Le traité de Trianon, l'acte constitutif de l'État yougoslave? • A. LOUPAS, From Paris to Lausanne: Aspects of Greek-Yugoslav Relations • D. BAKIĆ, Nikola Pašić and the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes • L. MONZALI, A Difficult and Silent Return: Italian Exiles from Dalmatia 🛹

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The origin of the Institute goes back to the Institut des Études balkaniques founded in Belgrade in 1934 as the only of the kind in the Balkans. The initiative came from King Alexander I Karadjordjević, while the Institute's scholarly profile was created by Ratko Parežanin and Svetozar Spanaćević. The Institute published *Revue internationale des Études balkaniques,* which assembled most prominent European experts on the Balkans in various disciplines. Its work was banned by the Nazi occupation authorities in 1941.

The Institute was not re-established until 1969, under its present-day name and under the auspices of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. It assembled a team of scholars to cover the Balkans from prehistory to the modern age and in a range of different fields of study, such as archaeology, ethnography, anthropology, history, culture, art, literature, law. This multidisciplinary approach remains its long-term orientation.

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Sanja Pilipović^{*}

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A Travelling Speculator (CIL III 1650) A Glimpse of the Everyday Life of the Principales through the Window of Roman Funerary Art

- Abstract: The focus of the paper is on the travel scene depicted on the funerary stele of *L. Blassius Nigellio* (*CIL* III 1650), a *speculator* of *legio* VII Claudia, from Viminacium. Seeking to gain a more comprehensive understanding of this scene from the everyday professional life of a Roman *speculator*, it draws attention to an iconographic pattern shared by a group of monuments of Roman *principales* (*speculatores, frumentarii, beneficiarii consularis*) among which the scene from Viminacium holds a very important place. It also takes a look at the origin and social status of the Upper Moesian *speculator* who could afford such a costly tombstone.
- Keywords: stele, *speculator*, iconography, carriage (*rheda*), *beneficiarius* spear (*Benefiziarier*-*lanze*), Viminacium

T he marble funerary stele of L. Blassius Nigellio (175 \times 132 \times 30 cm) from the Collection of Roman Stone Monuments of the National Museum, Belgrade, was discovered at Kostolac in 1850. Only its upper part has survived (fig. 1 and 1a). The pediment is carved with the head of Medusa and there is a winged genius on each of its slopes. The central panel depicts a travel scene, and the frieze below it, a hunting scene. The inscription has been published in the third volume of Corpus Inscriptionum latinarum under number 1650 (CIL III 1650; ILS 2378; IMS II 106; ILJug. I 14; cf. AE AE 2011, 1106).¹ It is a simple funerary inscription: the DM formula is followed by the name of the deceased -L. Blassius Nigellio, his occupation – speculator of the 7th Claudian legion, and his age at death - thirty-five. The stele has been dated to the third century. Its relief decoration has been attracting scholarly attention ever since its discovery in the mid-nineteenth century (Kanitz 1868: 680; Kalinka & Swoboda 1890: 30; Vulić 1909: Beibl. 165). Rostovtzeff returned to it several times (1911: 107; 1911a: 267ff; 1926: 366), interpreting the central relief as a cursus publicus scene: the speculator travelling as a courier with his servant who holds a beneficiarius spear (Benefiziarierlanze). Alföldi (1959: 1, no. 11) saw the purpose of the journey differently. He believed it to have been to pressurise the local population

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¹ D(is) M(anibus) | L(ucius) Blassius Nigellio | specul(ator) leg(ionis) VII Cl(audiae) vixit | ann(is) XXXV | [-----?

into selling supplies for the army, and emphasised that the beneficiarius spear held by the servant was a symbol of sovereign imperial power. Subsequently the monument received attention in studies devoted to other issues, such as Mrav's exceptional study on the tombstones with depictions of carriages and insignia of the beneficiarii (2011: 35). The iconography has been dealt with in Popović's (2015: 131–143) important study devoted to this monument and a monument of a frumentarius from Sirmium. The hunting scene below the central panel and the question of assigning the stele to the group of steles with complex relief decoration from Viminacium was the subject of an extensive study (Pilipović 2008: 339; 2011: cat. no. 3). Even though the scene of the travelling speculator has been studied and explained, it seems pertinent to revisit it in order to point to the existence of an iconographic pattern shared by a group of tombstones of principales, and to its place in that group. It also seems pertinent to try to reconstruct the purpose of the depicted journey, and the origin and social status of the Upper Moesian speculator who could afford such a costly tombstone.

The *speculator* L. Blassius Nigellio belonged to a special service of the Roman army which was similar to the modern-day gendarmerie or the customs or intelligence service. *Speculatores*, ten in every legion, were officers attached to the staff (*officium*) of provincial governors.² They performed policing and messenger duties, carried out capital punishment, acted as court officers.³ As officials carrying out the orders of the provincial governor, they had a broader scope of powers.⁴ Like all *principales*, the *speculatores* were better paid than common soldiers and *immunes*, probably twice as much.⁵

The central relief panel depicts the scene from the *speculator*'s everyday life, that is to say his duty journey in an open four-wheeled carriage (*rheda*). The carriage is driven by a coachman in a hooded travelling cloak (*paenula*) with a whip in hand. Behind the driver is the central figure of the scene, the *specula*-

² This military title is first mentioned as early as Caesar's times: Caes., *Gal.* II, 11; V, 49. *Speculatores* were subordinated to provincial governors as *officiales*, cf. Domaszewski 1967: 32, 63; Strassi 2008: 93 (with the earlier literature).

³ On *speculatores* as high-ranking officials attached to the *officium* of provincial governors as couriers between the provinces and Rome (Livy 31, 24. 4; Tac., *Hist.* II, 73) see Demicheli 2013: 115; Strassi 2008: 93, n. 49. The scouts reconnoitring enemy territory were called *speculatores legionis*, while Roman-occupied territory was scouted by mounted *exploratores*, cf. Strassi 2008: 93; Demicheli 2013: 115.

⁴ On *speculatores* as executors of court decisions (Seneca, *Ben.* 3, 25; I, 18.4) see Austin & Rankov 1995: 54–60, 150; Rankov 1999: 18, 26–27; Demicheli 2013: 115; Strassi 2008: 93.

⁵ Principales fared better than common soldiers financially because they received pay and a half (*sesquiplicarii*) or double pay (*duplicarii*). *Tesserarii* were *sesquiplicarii*, while *aquiliferi*, *optiones* and all military staff officers of the provincial governors, and senior officers (*cornicularii*, *beneficiarii* consularis, frumentarii, speculatores, stratores consularis) were on double pay, cf. Breeze 1971: 134; Ferjančić 2010: 135.

tor, who is holding a scroll (*rotulus*) in one hand. Suspended from the top of the scroll is a string with a seal attached to its other end (Popović 2015: 135).⁶ The *speculator* is clad in trousers and a hooded jacket. Seated behind him and facing rearwards is the smallest figure, his servant, in plain clothes, with his master's *beneficairius* lance in hand (Rostovtzeff 1911: 114; Alföldi 1959: 1, no. 11; Rankov 1986: 43; Mrav 2011: 35; Popović 2015: 135).⁷

The scene is suggestive of the *speculator*'s occupation and its most characteristic feature: mobility. The *speculatores*' frequent travels required the use of the easiest and fastest means of transport, and the use of this type of carriage enabled them to take bulkier luggage and at least one driver and one servant with them (Mrav 2011: 37–38). This type of vehicle usually came in one model, as a simple platform with no seats. Some were used for transporting barrels or some other load strapped to the vehicle. Others carried people, a driver and one or two passengers seated on cushions, boxes or seats (Crouwel 2010: 268–269). From the Augustan age, the *speculator*, in his capacity as courier, military intelligence officer or postman, a member of the *cursus publicus*, did not travel only on horseback but also by carriage. According to the sources, he could travel a distance of fifty miles a day and, in case of urgency, as much as four times that distance (200 miles).⁸

Unlike most other known scenes in Roman funerary art showing three persons travelling in an open carriage, the relief from Viminacium depicts the servant with a *beneficiarius* spear in hand.⁹ In funerary context this type of spear does not stand for a weapon but functions as a symbol of the person's membership of the provincial governor's staff, *officium consularis*, and an emblem of Roman power and sovereignty (Rostovtzeff 1911: 114; Alföldi 1959: 11–12; Clauss 1973: 79–83; Rankov 1986: 43; Rankov 1990: 181; Rankov 1999: 31; Mrav 2011: 35ff; Popović 2015: 136). This *signum* (fig. 2) occurs on tombstones and votive monuments of three categories of Roman officials, *speculatores, beneficiarii* and *frumentarii* (Rankov 1990: 181–182). It also occurs as an actual object, a miniature votive spear, laid in their graves. It occurs in travel scenes, as on the relief from Viminacium, in a variety of other scenes, where it defines their character more closely, and as an independent symbol on tombstones and votive

⁶ The artefact is interpreted by some authors as a *rotulus* (Mirković 1986: 128, no. 106) and some believe it to resemble a whip (Rostovtzeff 1911: 110; Mrav 2011: 35).

⁷ It has also been interpreted as a staff (Mirković 1986: 128, n. 106) and as a torch (Milovanović 2013: 178, n. 8).

⁸ The *rheda*, a robust four-wheeled wagon, was one of the most widely used vehicles. It could carry several passengers and their luggage, and therefore was frequently hired by entire families embarking on a long-distance trip. The lighter *cisium* or the *essedum* driven by a coachman were used for shorter and faster trips, cf. Brizzi 1983: 33.

⁹On the *beneficiarius* spear see Alföldi 1959.

monuments. The surviving depictions show various types of the *beneficiarius* spear (Alföldi 1959: 25–27; Clauss 1973: 79–83; Kovács 2003: 261–289; Mrav 2011: 35ff). The one on the Viminacium relief has been classified as the "heart-shaped" type (Alföldi 1959: 11–12, Pl. 10/1–2; Popović 2015: 136).

The Viminacium relief of the travelling *speculator* finds its most significant analogies in a group of monuments that also depict a travel scene.

One of them is a tombstone from *Tomis* in Dacia, which bears a Greek inscription (*AE* 1960, 348). It is the stele of *Vibius Severus* (Oúείβιος Σευήρο) who served in the Pontic legion as *speculator* ($\sigma\pi$ εκουλάτωρ ποντικός). What survives of the relief is its lower part (fig. 3) which depicts a horse-drawn four-wheeled carriage,¹⁰ but we cannot know if it carried any passengers and, if it did, how they were depicted. The monument has been dated to the end of the second or first half of the third century.

Another is the tombstone of the *frumentarius Salvus* (CIL III 3241) from Sirmium in Lower Pannonia (fig. 4 and 4a) (Kenner 1865: 129; CIL III 3241+1040; Schober 1923: no. 280, fig. 147; Noll 1962: 95, 122, no. 409; Mirković 1971: 70–71, no. 34, Pl. VI/1; Dautova-Ruševljan 1983: 13, no. 5, Pl. 3/2; Visy 1997: 55, no. 69; Popović 2015: 131–143). The scene carved in the pediment is virtually identical to the Viminacium one: a carriage drawn by two horses carries three people – the driver, the *frumentarius* and his rearward-facing servant who holds a *beneficiarius* lance (Mrav 2011: 35, no. 2; Popović 2015: 138). The stele has been dated to the second century.

A third monument comes from Vaison in the faraway province of Gaul (fig. 5), but its inscription, which could have provided some information about the deceased, is missing (Espérandieu 1907: no. 293; Rostovtzeff 1911: 272; Gabelmann 1983: 147, 149, fig. 2; Junkelmann 1990: 71, fig. 69; Mrav 2011: 37, no. 4). The scene resembles the one from Viminacium: three people, of whom the rearward-facing one holds a *beneficiarius* spear, are travelling in an open carriage drawn by two horses. The carriage is of a more luxurious type, it has sides decorated in relief, and the central figure is seated on a bench with a back.

A fourth relief that is of relevance to our subject, discovered in Strasbourg, is somewhat different. From its partially preserved inscription (*CIL* XIII 11630) we know that it was set up to a military who had served in imperial administration (fig. 6).¹¹ The difference is in that it shows only one figure in an

¹⁰ IScM II 327: Οὐειβίφ Σευήρφ | σπεκλατόρι πον|τικῷ ἐτῶν κς΄ | οἱ ἀδελφοὶ Ἀλέξαν/ δρος καί Ἱπαρχος | μνήμης χάριν; Conrad 2004: no. 167; Cupcea 2009: 267; Covacef 2011: 204 no. 94; Mrav 2011: 36, no. 3.

¹¹ Since the inscription survives only partially, the name of the legionary remains unknown, but it clearly states that he died at the age of forty after sixteen years in military service, and that the monument was erected by his heirs, cf. Domaszewski 1906: 4, no. 5; Espérandieu & Lantier 1918: no. 5499.

open carriage drawn by two mules. The figure clad in a tunic holds a sword in the right hand an object resembling a whip. The object in the form of a rod terminating in a pinecone-like finial which is observable between the two mules cannot be identified with certainty; it is either a part of the carriage itself or some sort of a symbol. The stele has been dated to the end of the first century.

Travel scenes were a quite common motif in Roman funerary art, especially in the provinces of Pannonia (Sági 1945: 232–351; Visy 1997) and Gaul,¹² but those whose nature is comparable to that of the group encompassing the abovementioned reliefs from Viminacium, Tomis, Sirmium and Vaison are rare. A monument from Langres in Gaul (fig. 7) (Letronne 1854: 181–182; Vulić 1909: 112; Espérandieu & Lantier 1911: no. 3245) and a group of monuments from Lower Pannonia¹³ also depict a scene with three figures (the driver, the passenger and the rearward-facing person) travelling in a rheda. This suggests the existence of an iconographic model for the travel scene on gravestones. The meaning of the travel scene on our group of monuments is indicated either by the beneficiarius spear in the servant's hand (Viminacium, Sirmium, Vaison, Tomis?) or by the very inscription which confirms that the person depicted is a speculator (the stele from Tomis and the simplified scene from Strasbourg) or a frumentarius (the stele from Sirmium). This lends the travel scene a more concrete meaning of an episode from the everyday life of the deceased who belonged to the ranks of *principales*. As far as may be deduced from these examples, the practice of illustrating the life of these military officials with a scene from their professional service was pursued by different stonecutting workshops from the mid-second to the early third century, while the oldest and simplest known depiction of a speculator travelling by himself occurs as early as the end of the first century.

There are in funerary art other scenes whose nature is more closely defined by the motif of *beneficiarius* lance. One of two persons sitting at the table and counting coins on the relief on the altar of a *beneficiarius* from Osterburken (CBFIR 146 = AE 1985, 688) holds a *beneficiarius* lance (fig. 8 and 8a) (Kovachev 2005: 956). It is this iconographic detail that helps us understand the scene: *beneficiarii* performing their duty as tax collectors. Included in this group of monuments may also be two sarcophagi from Brigetio (RIU 2, 506; 529), where the *beneficiarius* lances are held probably by the servants of the deceased, one of whom was an *immunis caeriarensis legionis* (fig. 9), and the other, a centurion (fig. 10) (Pochmarski 2001: 207, nos. 19; 20; Kovachev 2005: 956). A

¹² For a comprehensive overview of the monuments from Gaul see the multi-volume series *Recueil général des bas-reliefs de la Gaule romaine;* Reddé 1978: 44–46.

¹³ These are only fragments of tombstones, but the depicted scenes can be identified: a carriage drawn by two horses carries three persons, the driver, the main passenger and the one facing rearwards, cf. Visy 1997: nos. 29, 34, 40, 42, 52–54.

speculator holding a *beneficiarius* lance himself is depicted on a gravestone from Rome (*AE* 1931, 91) discovered on an unknown site (Crimi 2012: fig. 1).

Examples of the beneficiarius lance shown as an independent motif on gravestones and votive monuments of the principales are numerous. A beneficiarius lance is depicted on three gravestones from Salona, Dalmatia (figs. 11 and 12) – CIL III 9401 (Abramić 1922: 59; Pl. 1/4); AE 1914, 75 = AE 2006, 1009 (Abramić 1922: 57–58, Pl. 1/1 and 2; Ivčević 2006: 142–143, 150, no. 2; fig. 2); AE 1945, 88 = ILJug 2086 (Abramić 1922: 59; Pl. 1/3). On one of these are also depicted a shield, a book and what probably is a writing set. A beneficiarius spear occurs on several monuments of *beneficiarii consularis*: two from Salona in Dalmatia – CIL III 6376 (8656) (Abramić 1922: 61–62; fig. 5); CIL III 12895 (Abramić 1922: 63; T. 2/7); one from Lugdunum in Gaul Lugdunesis - CIL XIII 1909; and a group of monuments from Germania – CIL XIII 6557; 6628; 7400 = ILS 4192a; 7731; 11777; as well as on the monument of a frumentarius from Noricum – CIL III 5579; and on a monument from Aquincum (fig. 13) (Nagy 2007: 83-84, no. 85; Mrav 2011: fig. 21). It also occurs on votive altars dedicated to the supreme deity, Jupiter Optimus Maximus. A beneficiarius lance is depicted on the side of the altar dedicated by a speculator from Carnuntum in Upper Pannonia, while the roof of the altar dedicated by a beneficiarius consularius from Sirmium to Jupiter and the Genius loci is topped with a small symbol, the tip of a *beneficiarius* spear -AE 1994, 1418 (Mirković 1994: no. 19).

An important question for understanding the travelling *speculator* scene from Viminacium is the purpose of the speculator's journey. Some have suggested that he may have travelled as an imperial courier using the imperial postal system, the cursus publicus (Mrav 2011: 37–38 supplies a bibliography of authors who share this interpretation; Sillières 2014: 135). However, Alföldi (1959: 1, no. 11) believed, and with good reason, that the purpose of the journey had been to pressurise the local population into selling supplies for the army. His view has been accepted by Popović (2015) who, based on the speculator's posture and the equipment of his attendant, suggests that it could not have been a routine reconnaissance trip, but rather a special assignment in connection with the maintenance of the army, i.e. either the requisitioning of food and other supplies or the enforcing of the payment of the taxes intended for the same purpose; the speculator is travelling in his capacity as messenger of the provincial governor, and therefore has with him the scroll with the governor's order to that effect. This interpretation seems to find corroboration in Mrav's exceptional study (2011: 21-61). Examining the emblems of the *beneficiarius* discovered in the tombs with carriages in north-eastern Pannonia, Mrav addresses the question of ownership of those carriages and suggests that they probably were private property of the well-to-do *principales* buried in those tombs. They were status symbols of the principales and differed from the carriages of common civilians by being decorated with emblems of the benficiarius. The fact that carriages were

buried with the deceased seems to suggest that they were not owned by the state (ibid. 50-51). Given that the Viminacium relief does not seem to depict a *cursus publicus* scene, Mrav is probably right in assuming that the *speculator* travelled in his own rather than in an imperial carriage.

The surviving inscription does not tell us much about the origin of Lucius Blassius Nigellio. The name Blassius is believed to be Illyrian but it has been attested in inscriptions from Italy as well. The cognomen Nigellio, even though frequent in the Roman Balkan provinces, is perhaps the most frequent in Celtic lands, but it also occurs in Numidia and there is one attested example in Dalmatia (Mirković 1986: 128, no. 106; Popović 2015: 131). What seems to be beyond any doubt, however, is that the speculator belonged to the stratum of very well-off citizens of Upper Moesia. This is suggested by the quality of his marble tombstone, one of the most luxurious ever discovered in the province. These luxurious monuments were usually set up by members of the military nomenclature, veterans, signifiers, or members of the local senates, decuriones, one of whom was the abovementioned veteran and another, an augur.¹⁴ These all are marble monuments decorated in relief with mythological representations and a frieze showing a hunting scene under the influence of Noricum and Pannonia (Pilipović 2008: 337-352; and 2011: 593-612). The frumentarius from Sirmium was not only well-off; he came from an educated milieu, as evidenced by the epitaph inspired by Virgil's verses (Popović 2015: 139). Regrettably, the inscription on the Viminacium monument does not reveal who erected it, the speculator's family members, his fellow legionaries or a freedman. The only known piece of information is that he was a speculator legionis VII Claudiae, the unit stationed at Viminacium, the place of his service and burial.

The post of a *speculator*, as that of a *frumentarius*, required high mobility¹⁵ and they never stayed long in one place, which may explain why a wife and children seldom figure in their epitaphs (Cosme & Faure 2004: 350–351). Their funeral was usually taken care of by their heirs, their freedmen or, especially, their colleagues who had frequently served with them in the same legion.¹⁶ On the other

¹⁴ Most of the gravestones constituting this group of monuments come from Viminacium (*IMS* II, 73, 77, 92, 119), cf. Pilipović 2011: cat. 6, while one stele comes from Mt Kosmaj (*IMS* I, 120), cf. Pilipović 2008: 337–349, and 2011: 593–612; Popović 2015: 133.

¹⁵ One of the main duties common to the *frumentarii* and the *speculatores* was the conveyance of messages between Rome and the provinces, which required much travelling; cf. Rankov 1990: 180–182; Matijević 2014: 71.

¹⁶ In his study on the stele from Salona (*CIL* 3, 2063 (8581) erected to the *frumentarius T. Varronis Maro* of *legio III Cyrenaica* by his former slave Firmin, Matijević (2014: 68) points to the significance of the servants depicted on the reliefs from Viminacium and Sirmium exactly because they hold their master's *beneficiarius* spear, a badge of his service in the *officium consularis*. The *frumentarius* was buried on a granted site (*locus concessus*) on the cemetery at Salona, which suggests that he did not own a burial place and possibly was a stranger in the town.

hand, the *frumentrius* from Sirmium is known to have been buried by his father, which may suggest that the place of his service was also his birthplace. The base camp of his legion (*legionis II Adiutricis*) was at Aquincum (Popović 2015: 140).

Lucius Blassius Nigellio was not the only well-to-do *speculator* from Upper Moesia. A few military officials from the ranks of *principales* who were affluent enough to afford to erect not just one, but two votive monuments have also been attested. Apparently, one of them was Valerian, *speculator* of *legio* IV *Flavia*, who spent some time at the customs post or the station of *beneficiarii* at Ulpiana. He dedicated an *ara*, which has been dated to AD 226, to Jupiter, the gods and goddesses and the Genius of the station (*CIL* III, 8137). It seems that one more dedication from Ulpiana was made by the same *speculator* (*ILJug* 1419).¹⁷

In sum, the stele of L. Blassius Nigellio shows a rare and quite important scene from the everyday professional life of a *speculator* in Roman funerary art. The speculator, travelling in a carriage, possibly his own, apparently was on a military-related assignment the purpose of which was either to requisition supplies for the army or to exact the payment of the taxes intended for its upkeep. The travel scene in which the speculator's servant holds a beneficiarius spear or the beneficiarius spear depicted as an independent symbol occur on a group of monuments of the principales (speculatores, benficiarii consularis, frumentarii) among which the monument from Viminacium is undoubtedly one of the most important. The speculator from Viminacium must have been quite well-off if he could afford a prestigious marble gravestone, such as only wealthy members of Upper Moesian local senates could afford. The topic revisited here is obviously a quite complex one and this paper should be seen as just an attempt at understanding it more comprehensively. Further archaeological investigations will hopefully bring new discoveries that will deepen our understanding of not only the tombstones but also of the life of the principales.

> UDC 904(497.11):726.825(37 Viminacium) 736.2:73.041.7 316.343/.344(37)

Abbreviations

AE	Τ'Λ	4	1. :
AE	ĽAnnée	epigrap	nıque

CIL Corpus inscriptionum latinarum

CBFIR Corpus der griechischen und lateinischen Beneficiarier-Inschriften des Römischen Reiches

¹⁷ Both dedications were made by a *speculator*, and in both cases the 4th Flavian legion has the honorary epithet *Severiana Alexandriana*. This has led Ferjančić (2010: 135–136) to assume, with good reason, that both were made by the same affluent *speculator* even though the dedicant's name has not survived in one case.

ILJug	Inscriptiones Latinae quae in Jugoslavia inter annos MCMXL et MCMLX repertae et editae sunt
ILS	Inscriptiones latinae selectae
IMS	Inscriptions de la Mésie Supérieure
IScM	Inscriptiones Scythiae Minoris Graecae et Latinae
RIU	Die römischen Inschriften Ungarns

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Fig. 1 Tombstone of the speculator L. Blassius Nigellio from Viminacium, IMS II, 106 (National Museum, Belgrade)

Fig. 1a Detail of fig. 1






Fig. 3 Tombstone of the *speculator Vibius Severus* from Tomis, *AE* 1960, 348 (Mrav 2011: fig. 14)

Fig. 2 Different types of the *hasta* as a symbol of power (Alföldi 1959: Pl. 10)





Fig. 4a Detail of fig. 4

Fig. 4 Tombstone of the *frumentarius Salvius* from Sirmium, CIL III 3241+1040 (Popović 2015: fig. 2)

Fig. 5 Tombstone from Vaison (Mrav 2011: fig. 15)





Fig. 6 Tombstone from Strasbourg, *CIL* XIII 11630 (F. Grieshaber, Epigraphic Database Hielderberg)



Fig. 7 Tombstone from Langres (Letronne 1854)




Fig 8 Votive monument of a beneficiarius consularis from Osterburken, AE 1985, 688 (DerHexer, Wikimedia Commons, CC-by-sa 4.0)







Fig. 9 Detail of the sarcophagus of the *immunis caeriarensis legionis P. Aelius Mercator* from Brigetio, RIU 2, 506 (Pochmarski 2001: fig. 5)



Fig. 10 Tombstone of the speculator L. Titio L., AE 1931, 91 (Crimi 2012: fig. 1)



L. Valerius Augustalis from Salona, AE 1945, 88 (Abramić 1922: Pl. 1/3)

PUNCTURE PUN

Fig. 12 Tombstone of a *speculator* from Salona, CIL III, 9401 (Abramić 1922: Pl. 1/4)

Fig. 13 Tombstone from Aquincum (Mrav 2011: fig. 21)

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The Bronze Signum from Timacum Maius and its Cultic Attribution

Abstract: The bronze *signum* discussed in this paper was discovered by archaeological excavation on the site of *Timacum Maius* in 2010. Found in the area of a luxurious Romanperiod building, the artefact shows a tapering body with a central conical socket similar to a spearhead socket. It is one of the twenty-three known *signa* of the so-called classical-type. Most of them were found in the context of the cult of Jupiter Dolichenus, and we also presume the cultic purpose of the bronze *signum* from Timacum Maius. A similar find comes from Jupiter Dolichenus' shrine in Egeta on the Danube limes with an inscription that connects it directly with the Dolichenian cult, and with the First Cohort of Cretans (*Cohors I Cretum*), the unit which had previously been stationed at Timacus Maius. The *signum* from Timacum Maius is most likely also connected with the cult of Jupiter Dolichenus and chronologically belongs to a period which is much earlier than the Severan age.

Keywords: Timacum Maius, signum, bronze, Roman period, Jupiter Dolichenus, cohors I Cretum

R oman *signa*, or standards, usually were military emblems consisting of a flag, metal medallions, discs, figural representations and the like attached to a wooden or metal pole. Their primary purpose in the army was practical, for rallying, directing and controlling the soldiers of a unit. Apart from military *signa*, there were also *signa* intended for cultic purposes. They could be figural or non-figural, and some of them served as holders of sheet-metal votive plaques depicting a deity.

The bronze *signum* discussed in this paper was discovered during the archaeological excavation on the site of *Timacum Maius* in the village of Niševac near Svrljig, eastern Serbia, in 2010.¹ Apart from being included in the catalogue appended to the book *La région de Svrljig en Serbie orientale: préhistoire, antiquité*

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¹ Systematic archaeological excavations organised jointly by the Institute for Balkan Studies SASA and the Svrljig Centre for Tourism, Culture and Sport have been carried out since 2008.


et moyen âge (Petrović, Filipović & Milivojević 2012: 171, no. 12), the *signum* has not been studied in more detail. The site in question, situated twenty-five kilometres northeast of Niš, was a station on the Roman itinerary road *Lissus*–*Naissus–Ratiaria*, which was the shortest route between the Adriatic coast and the Danube (Petrović, Filipović & Luka 2014: 97–142).

The signum was discovered in the area of the luxurious building with a hypocaust and *tubuli*, whose two surviving rooms were explored during the 2010 and 2011 campaigns (Petrović, Filipović & Milivojević 2012: 101ff). Based on the finds of coins of Trajan and Antoninus Pius, the building, which was likely in use until the mid-fourth century, has been roughly dated to the first half of the second century (Petrović, Filipović & Milivojević 2012: 105). However, it may well be of an even earlier date because the discovered coins cannot be taken as the completely reliable terminus post quem for its construction. Namely, not far from this building are the remains of a bathhouse (thermae) which shows a similar building method and technology, and in the construction of which the First Cohort of Cretans (cohors I Cretum) has been ascertained to have taken part. This unit of the Roman army was transferred to the province of Upper Moesia between AD 78 and 80. It was stationed at Timacum Maius and Naissus until it was deployed to fight in Trajan's Second Dacian War, as evidenced by the inscription of a veteran of this cohort settled in Naissus, Tiberius Claudius Valerius (Petrović & Filipović 2015: 35–38). After the war, the cohort was transferred back to Upper Moesia, and in the second and third centuries was stationed in *Egeta* (modern Brza Palanka) on the Danube (AE 1966, 336 = AE 1968, 453).

As already mentioned, the bronze *signum* was discovered in 2010 adjacent to the outer face of the eastern wall of the building with *tubuli*, in a layer of earth containing a large amount of ash and soot (fig. 1). The *signum* had also been exposed to fire, and one of its two finials was missing. The chipped-off piece was discovered at a distance of seven meters, in the room with the hypocaust, i.e. inside the building (fig. 2). This small fragment had not been exposed to fire and, as it turned out during the conservation and restoration of the artefact, it fitted perfectly in place.²

The shape of the artefact is reminiscent of a quiver with its tapering body and a central conical socket similar to a spearhead socket. The circular opening for the pole at its lower end has a ring-like rim (figs 3 and 4). In its upper part is a hole for fixing the inserted wooden pole. The upper third of the body is flattened and at its top is a groove with a surviving rivet. The lower part reveals a casting flaw, a small crevice that was subsequently repaired. Symmetrically welded to the body are two thick S-shaped metal straps, and there are two crosspieces set

² Conservation was carried out by Saša Živić of the National Museum, Belgrade, who supplied us with information about the state of preservation of the artefact and the effect of the fire on it.



Map of Upper Moesia with the sites mentioned in the text

obliquely between their upper ends and the body. Atop the end of each strap is a grooved triangular finial which functioned as a votive plaque holder. All the three grooves are aligned and have preserved rivets. If we disregard the crosspieces and triangular finials, the impression made by the shape is that of stylised snakes; even more so as the view of the *signum* from above shows that the ends of the straps terminate triangularly, much like the heads of venomous snakes. The total width of the artefact is 22.3 cm, the height of the body is 10.9 cm and its diameter at the lower, reinforced end is 3.4 cm.

The *signum* may be said to be a quite rare find. There is only one other known *signum* of the "classical" type discovered in Serbia (from Egeta on the Danube), while the total number of such finds from Europe and the Near East is twenty-two. Most of these finds, it is true, have a single horizontal crosspiece with a groove into which votive plaques were fitted, and the crosspiece is unfail-


ingly supported by two thick straps which are attached to the conical body and also recall stylised snakes. This "classical" type of the *signum* may be divided into two subtypes: with and without the horizontal crosspiece (fig. 5/IIa and fig. 5/ IIb, respectively).

It should be noted that there were also figural *signa*, which seem to have been predominantly used for cultic or votive purposes just like the classical type, but one of the straps is shaped in the form of a dog chasing a hare, while the shape of the other varies and shows a snake, a rosette or a deity. The figural *signa* should undoubtedly be classified as a separate type, but those discovered so far are too few to allow any further classification. To this type (fig. 5/I), in addition to two finds from Serbia – from Belgrade (Jovanović 2007: 32, fig. 4.1; Krunić 1997: 78, no. 82) and Niš (*Naisus-Sirmijum* 1983: fig. 33, no. 33) – belong the *signa* from the environs of Trier (Menzel 1966: 87, cat. no 212, Pls. 64 and 65) and Bonn, Germany (Menzel 1986: 87, no. 210, Pl. 100), and from Merida, Spain (Menzel 1986: 88), and they all have been dated to the third century.

As noted earlier, with the find from Timacum Maius, now there are twenty-three known classical-type signa. The most common are those with the horizontal crosspiece, and even though the crosspiece varies in length - it can be of the same length as the votive plaque or twice as short – all essentially belong to the same variety. The known *signa* of this type were discovered in the Roman provinces of Syria: sites of Tel Dülük 1 and Tel Dülük 2 (Gudea 2004: 218, fig. 2/1, 2); Moesia Superior: sites of Semsen (Gudea 2004: 218, fig. 2/4) and Egeta (Pop-Lazić 1977: 42); Dacia Malvensis: Răcari (Gudea 2004: 218, fig. 2/6); Dacia Porolissensis: Turda (Gudea 2004: 218, fig. 2/7); Pannonia Inferior: Kömlőd 1 and Kömlőd 2 (Gudea 2004: 218, figs. 2/9, 10), Brigetio (Merlat 1951: 93, figs. 17, 18) and Adony, 3 pieces (Banki 1977: 13–14, figs. 1–3); Noricum: Traismauer, 3 pieces (Gudea 2004: 218, fig. 2/21–23), Mauer an der Url, 3 pieces (Hörig & Schwertheim 1987: nos. 294, 295); Germania Superior: Hedderheim, 2 pieces (Gudea 2004: 218, fig. 2/29, 30) and Zugmantel (Merlat 1951: 331, fig. 66); and Britania: Oxford area (Gudea 2004: 218, fig. 2/32). The horizontal crosspiece of some signa is supported by the braces whose shape recalls stylised snakes.

On the other hand, the only example of the type without the horizontal crosspiece and thus corresponding to our find is the *signum* from Zugmantel, which was recovered from a shrine of Jupiter Dolichenus. Its body terminates in the shape of the bull's head, while the straps clearly show snake heads covered in scales. The bull is the main animal associated with the cult of Jupiter Dolichenus, while the snake also occurs on a bronze plaque from Moesia Inferior (Najdenova 1993). Most *signa* were discovered in the context of the cult of Jupiter Dolichenus, i.e. in shrines dedicated to him (*dolichenea*).

By way of an introduction to the line of argument in support of the presumed cultic purpose of the bronze *signum* from Timacum Maius, which is the central proposition of this paper, it is pertinent to note an important element



of the furnishings of the archaeologically explored *dolicheneum* in Egeta on the Danube limes (Vučković-Todorović 1965: 173–182). Namely, the material recovered from Jupiter Dolichenus' shrine includes a signum that bears a punctured inscription: Aurelius Gaius cen(turio) I Cretum v(otum) s(olvit) l(ibens) m(erito) (AE 1981, 737). That the First Cohort of Cretans was immediately connected with the cult of Jupiter Dolichenus and his shrine in Egeta is evidenced by another dedication to him by this army unit (AE 1966, 336 = AE 1968, 453) which was also discovered in the shrine in Egeta. What draws attention apart from the

Fig. 1 Bronze signum in situ

ing with *tubuli* with find-spots of the signum and its fragment




Fig. 3 Signum from Timacum Maius (drawing by Saša Živanović)

fact that both Egeta and Timacum Maius yielded a rare find of the same type, a signum, is that the inscription from Egeta mentions the First Cohort of Cretans, the unit which had been stationed in Timacus Maius. More importantly, both the signum and the cohort are connected with the cult of Jupiter Dolichenus. Even though the cohort came to be stationed in Egeta quite some time after it had been first deployed to Upper Moesia and stationed in Timacum Maius and Naissus, and under different circumstances, the possibility should not be ruled out that the signum from Timacum Maius may have been linked to the cult of the Syrian deity. The more intensive expansion of the cult of Jupiter Dolichenus into the province of Upper Moesia has been frequently linked to the Severan dynasty, which is to say to the late second and early third century (Vučković-Todorović 1965: 178; Zotović 1966: 49; Zotović 1967: 67). It is known, for example, that the First Syrian Cohort of Thracians (cohors I Thracum Syriaca) was garrisoned in the Roman military camp at *Timacum Minus*, present-day Ravna³ in the Timok river valley, the first station after Timacum Maius on the Roman road towards the Danube and Ratiaria, before the Dacian Wars. From an inscription discovered in Timacum Minus (IMS III/2, 23) we learn not only of the tribune Vecilius Modestus under whose command the First Syrian Cohort of Thracians was transferred there from Syria but also about the soldiers and veterans who, on completion of their term of service, settled in the environs of the castrum at Timacum Minus.⁴ Some of them might have been worshippers of the Dolichenian cult.

³ Timacum Minus yielded a statuette of Jupiter Dolichenus on a bull, with no inscription, cf. Vulić 1941–48: 92 and 201.

⁴ For information about the Roman fortification at Timacum Minus and the units it was garrisoned with see *IMS* III/2; Petrović & Jovanović 1997: 18.




Fig. 4 Signum from Timacum Maius




Fig. 5 Proposed typology of figural and non-figural signa

This assumption may find corroboration in the discoveries made during the interwar excavations of Timacum Minus by Nikola Vulić which included a group of high quality statuettes of white marble (Vulić 1941–48: 91–94, nos. 196–205; Jovanović 2007: 183–186). It may not be far-fetched to assume that this group of objects found in one place once adorned a *dolicheneum* (Petrović 2015). The assumption is based on their iconography but cannot as yet be supported by epigraphic evidence.

In conclusion, let us connect a few dots. The *terminus post quem* for the spread of the Dolichenian cult in Upper Moesia is difficult to establish with precision. There must have been ethnic intermingling and migration even before the Severan age and, consequently, there must have been newcomers from the East both among the soldiers and in other social groups such as traders,

craftsmen, miners, freedmen and slaves. *Signa* were often linked with the cult of Jupiter Dolichenus, as shown by, among other things, the find from Egeta with the inscription of the First Cohort of Cretans. This unit is known to have been stationed at Timacum Maius shortly before the Dacian Wars, almost at the same time when the First Syrian Cohort of Thracians was stationed in nearby Timacum Minus, where there most likely was a shrine of the Syrian deity.

If all these data are taken into account, the possibility should not be ruled out that the *signum* from Timacum Maius was also connected with the cult of Jupiter Dolichenus, which may give grounds to reconsider the usual dating of the spread of the cult in Upper Moesia to the Severan age. We believe that the spread of the cult had begun much earlier, perhaps as early as the late first century, which is suggested by archaeological evidence though as yet uncorroborated by epigraphic evidence. On the other hand, the bronze *signum* from Timacum Maius, as well as the building in which it was discovered, may be chronologically linked to the presence there of the First Cohort of Cretans in the last decades of the first century.

> UDC 904(497.11):739.5(37 Timacum Maius) 73.045 Jupiter Dolichenus

Abbreviations

AE – Année épigraphique, Paris. IMS – Inscriptions de la Mésie Supérieure, Belgrade.

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Kingdom versus Empire in Xenophon's Cyropaedia

Abstract: This paper examines the role of the distinction between the Persian kingdom and the Persian empire drawn in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* with the view to showing that Cyrus's government of his empire does not lend itself to a darker reading, but rather that his style of rule is based on an aristocratic-meritocratic view of the world.

Keywords: Xenophon, kingdom, empire, Cyropaedia

T o view complex events through the prism of binary polarisation is dear to the Greek mentality.¹ Xenophon is no exception, as seen in his contrasting the good and the bad in the context of *philia* and his support for the principle that justice is to help friends and harm enemies.² This does not mean that Xenophon habitually perceives complex occurrences and processes through mutually opposed and exclusive factors. His efforts to overcome the *public/private* dichotomy and his rejection of the *vita activa/vita contemplativa* antithesis testify to the contrary. However, presenting certain issues in the form of binary polarisation helps to simplify and explain them.

The *Cyropaedia* is an historical novel, not a faithful account of historical events.³ It is not surprising therefore that Xenophon departs to an extent from what actually took place. In making a distinction between the Persian kingdom and the Persian empire, however, his departure from the factual situation is such

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¹See P. Vidal-Naquet, The Black Hunter: Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 10–11; P. Cartledge, Ancient Greek Political Thought in Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009), 4–5; cf. also H.-J. Gehrke, "Die klassische Polisgesellschaft in der Perspektive griechischer Philosophen", Saeculum 36 (1985), 146–147; Ch. Mann, "Politische Gleichheit und gesellschaftliche Stratifikation. Die athenische Demokratie aus der Perspektive der Systemtheorie", Historische Zeitschrift 286 (2008), 9–11.

² The good – the bad (Xen. Cyr. 2.2.22–7; Mem. 2.6.14–27); cf. I. Jordović, "Ksenofont o Erosu i filiji", Istraživanja 25 (2014), 9–23; justice is to help friends and harm enemies (Xen. Cyr. 1.4.15, 25; 1.6.11, 28–34; 4.5.20, 27–28; 4.6.1–10; 5.1.28; 5.4.32–36; 5.5.13–14; 8.7.6–7, 28; Mem. 2.1.19, 28; 2.2.2; 2.3.14; 2.6.35; 4.2.15–16; 4.5.10; Symp. 4.3; Anab. 1.36; Hier. 2.2).

³ Cic. QFr. 1.1.23; see D. L. Gera, Xenophon's Cyropaedia. Style, Genre, and Literary Technique (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 1–13, esp. 2–3, 6; Chr. Mueller-Goldingen, Untersuchungen zu Xenophons Kyrupädie, (Stuttgart/Leipzig: De Gruyter, 1995), XIV, 2.

that it will strike every reader.⁴ Since this deviation cannot be explained by reference to historical facts or any literary tradition, it must have been conscious and deliberate. This has led some scholars to conclude that Xenophon is indirectly criticizing his hero, and imperious behaviour.⁵

What strikes the reader is that Xenophon's depiction of the Persian kingdom bears little or no resemblance to historical Persia.⁶ The Persian king is not shown as a typical autocrat, although in reality he was. The extent of the departure from historical reality becomes even greater if we remember that the Greeks perceived him as the prototype of a tyrant.⁷ Xenophon uses various ways to show us that he does not see the Persian king as a tyrant. To begin with, he seeks to show that the king does not rule all by himself: there are also the laws, officials and the council of elders. The laws, the purpose of which is the common good (koinon agathon), prevent people from living as they choose. They not only regulate the raising of children and the grooming of youths, but also very clearly order public life. This is reflected in the existence of the so-called free square (eleuthera agora) with its court and public buildings, but without traders or a market. The laws also assign a part of the free square to each of the four age groups (boys, youths, mature men, elders).8 Since the aim of the laws is the common good, family background is not a criterion for the right to a public office.9 Moreover, the Persian king's officials are not reduced to mere executors of his will, as indicated by the stress placed on their submission to the laws and the common good. They are the ones who, in the schools of justice, teach righteousness to the children.¹⁰ Young men who have passed through the school – mature men too - are at the officials' bidding, so that these may make use of them for the

⁴ See C. Nadon, *Xenophon's Prince: Republic and Empire in the* Cyropaedia (Los Angeles/ London: University of California Press, 2001), 32 n. 18, 121.

⁵ Cf. Gera, Cyropaedia, 285–299; D. Johnson, "Persians as Centaurs in Xenophon's Cyropaedia", TAPhA 135 (2005), 177–207, esp. 179–181, 203–205.

⁶ The discrepancy is such that the term Persian republic for the Persian kingdom has become quite widespread in the modern scholarly literature; see Chr. Nadon, "From Republic to Empire: Political Revolution and the Common Good in Xenophon's Education of Cyrus", *The American Political Science Review* 90 (1996), 364; Nadon, *Xenophon's Prince*, 30–1; P. J. Rasmussen, *Excellence Unleashed: Machiavelli's Critique of Xenophon and the Moral Foundation of Politics* (Lanham/Boulder/Plymouth: Lexington Books), 3–13; P. Carlier, "The Idea of Imperial Monarchy in Xenophon's Cyropaedia", in *Xenophon*, ed. V. J. Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 333, 339.

⁷ See Mueller-Goldingen, *Kyrupädie*, 95; C. Dewald, "Form and Content: The Question of Tyranny in Herodotus". In *Popular Tyranny*. Sovereignty and Its Discontents in Ancient Greece, ed. K. A. Morgan (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 33–35, 47–49.

⁸Xen. Cyr. 1.2.2–4.

⁹Xen. Cyr. 1.2.15.

¹⁰ Xen. Cyr. 1.2.6–7.

common good.¹¹ Twelve officers at the head of each of the four age groups see to it that all Persians conscientiously fulfil their duties so that they might become the best possible citizens.¹² And finally, the Persian officials are not chosen by the king, but by the elders – citizens of over fifty years of age who have graduated from the schools of justice, served the state for ten years as youths and further twenty-five years as mature men.¹³

Xenophon seeks to show that the Persian king is not a tyrant also by saying virtually nothing about his powers, which is unusual for a work in the mirror-of-princes genre. It is true that Xenophon generally pays little attention to the nature of the Persian constitution, but even so, he is disproportionately terse about the king's powers. He is content to say that the king regularly takes young men hunting, since that is the best preparation for war. The fact that he feels the need to underline that the king is the *hegemon* in hunting and in war may be interpreted as an indication that the authority of the Persian kings is limited in other situations.¹⁴ As may be seen from Aristotle, the Greeks cited the Spartan kings, and not eastern autocrats, as an historical example of a thus limited kingly power.¹⁵

A third way in which the *Cyropaedia* seeks to show that the Persian king should not be perceived as the prototype of an eastern despot is by comparing him with the Median king. On the one hand, both Cyrus and Cambyses see the role of the king as that of a shepherd and a father who bears the common good in mind and ensures willing obedience and reverence on the part of his subjects by the adept use of reciprocity.¹⁶ The Median king, on the other hand, is shown as the opposite of that ideal. Xenophon's intention to contrast these two models of exercising royal authority is clear from his portrayal of the Median king Astyages, who is shown in a much more favourable light than his father Cyaxares.¹⁷ When Cyrus first meets his grandfather, Xenophon points out that the king wears makeup on his eyes and face, and contrasts the lavish Median dress with the modest garb favoured by the Persians.¹⁸ Shortly afterwards, in the course of

¹⁶ Xen. Cyr. 1.1.2–3; 1.6.8, 24–25; 3.1.28; 8.1.1–2, 15; 8.2.9, 13–14; 8.8.1.

¹⁷ See H. Breitenbach, "Xenophon von Athen". *RE* 9.A.2 (1967), 1709–1710; B. Due, *The Cyropaedia. Xenophon's Aims and Methods* (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1989), 55–62; B. Zimmermann, "Roman und Enkomion – Xenophons 'Erziehung des Kyros," *WJA* (1989), 101; Gera, *Cyropaedia*, 75–76, 103, 155–159; Mueller-Goldingen, *Kyrupädie*, 182–186, 202–203.

¹⁸ Xen. Cyr. 1.3.2; see also 1.5.1; 1.6.8; 2.4.1, 5–6; 4.5.54; cf. Gera, Cyropaedia, 155.

¹¹ Xen. Cyr. 1.2.9, 12–13.

¹² Xen. Cyr. 1.2.5–14, esp. 4, 15.

¹³ Xen. Cyr. 1.2.9, 13–14; 8.5.22.

¹⁴ Xen. Cyr. 1.2.10.

¹⁵ Arist. Pol. 1285a3–30; Carlier, Cyropaedia, 339.

a meal, Cyrus deplores the overly abundant and varied food of the Medes. As the conversation develops, he also condemns the Median attitude towards wine. While Astyages allows himself to be overcome by drink, which leads to his subjects and he forgetting that he is their ruler, the Persian king Cambyses always knows when to stop.¹⁹ The role of the Median king as a contrasting example is vividly expressed in an observation by the Persian queen Mandane. The fact that she is also Astyages's daughter lends additional weight to her words.²⁰ Having spent some time with her young son at her father's court, Mandane decides to return to Persia. Cyrus, however, asks his mother to let him stay longer in Media. He assures her that he has learnt enough about justice in the school of justice, and that if he still has something to learn, his grandfather can teach him. Mandane replies that justice is not understood in the same way in Media and in Persia. The king of the Medes is a despot (despotes) with unlimited power, infamous for his conviction that he should have more than others. The Persian king does what is ordered by the state and accepts what is decreed, since his guiding principle is not his own will, but the law; this is so because the Persians consider equality as justice:

άλλ' οὐ ταὐτά, ἔφη, ὦ παῖ, παρὰ τῷ πάππῳ καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις δίκαια ὁμολογεῖται. οὖτος μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν Μήδοις πάντων ἑαυτὸν δεσπότην πεποίηκεν, ἐν Πέρσαις δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν δίκαιον νομίζεται. καὶ ὁ σὸς πρῶτος πατὴρ τὰ τεταγμένα μὲν ποιεῖ τῇ πόλει, τὰ τεταγμένα δὲ λαμβάνει, μέτρον δὲ αὐτῷ οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀλλ' ὁ νόμος ἐστίν. ὅπως οὖν μὴ ἀπολῇ μαστιγούμενος, ἐπειδὰν οἴκοι ἦς, ἂν παρὰ τούτου μαθὼν ἥκῃς ἀντὶ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τὸ τυραννικόν, ἐν ῷ ἐστι τὸ πλέον οἴεσθαι χρῆναι πάντων ἔχειν. ἀλλ' ὅ γε σὸς πατήρ, εἶπεν ὁ Κῦρος, δεινότερός ἐστιν, ὦ μῆτερ, διδάσκειν μεῖον ἢ πλέον ἔχειν: ἢ οὐχ ὁρῷς, ἔφη, ὅτι καὶ Μήδους ἅπαντας δεδίδαχεν αύτοῦ μεῖον ἔχειν; ὥστε θάρρει, ὡς ὅ γε σὸς πατὴρ οὕτ' ἄλλον οὐδένα οὕτ' ἐμὲ πλεονεκτεῖν μαθόντα ἀποπέμψει.

"Yes, my son," said she; "but at your grandfather's court they do not recognize the same principles of justice as they do in Persia. For he has made himself master of everything in Media, but in Persia equality of rights is considered justice. And your father is the first one to do what is ordered by the State and to accept what is decreed, and his standard is not his will but the law. Mind, therefore, that you be not flogged within an inch of your life, when you come home, if you return with a knowledge acquired from your grandfather here of the principles not of kingship but of tyranny, one principle of which is that it is right for one to have more than all.""But your father, at least," said Cyrus, "is more shrewd at teaching people to have less than to have more, mother. Why, do you not see," he went on, "that he has taught all the Medes to have less than himself? So never

¹⁹ Xen. Cyr. 1.3.4–5, 10–11; Mueller-Goldingen, Kyrupädie, 91–92.

²⁰ Cf. Due, Cyropaedia, 55–62; Gera, Cyropaedia, 76–77, 103; Mueller-Goldingen, Kyrupädie, 12, 95.

fear that your father, at any rate, will turn either me or anybody else out trained under him to have too much." $^{\rm 21}$

Mandane describes Astyages as the Greeks traditionally imagined a true tyrant - a self-centred and self-willed strongman who always wants to have more and puts himself above the law.²² In contrast, Cambyses can hardly be said to be a king, at least not according to Mandane who describes him as a leader of the people (prostates tou demou). In the traditional classification of good constitutions, kingship is a form of government in which the monarch rules with an eye to the common advantage (koinon sympheron), in accordance with the will of its citizens and the laws.²³ Mandane's Persian king, however, goes one decisive step further. Not only is his will in accordance with the law and the will of the citizens but it is the polis that determines (tetagmena) what he should do and what he should have. As for Cambyses, we may more readily say that he is, like Thucydides' Pericles, the first citizen (protos aner) of the polis rather than a monarch.²⁴ The decision to enter war, and for Cyrus to lead the Persian forces, is not made by Cambyses, but rather by the Persian state (to Person koinon) and the so-called elders.²⁵ The democratic inspiration of Xenophon's image of the Persian ruler is also indicated by the equation of justice with equality, a notion usually ascribed to democracy.²⁶

As another indicator of this influence we may take Mandane's words that Cyrus may lose his life if he acts tyrannically upon returning home. The cult of the tyrant slayers (*tyrannoktonoi*) Harmodius and Aristogeiton was an important part of the civic identity of Athens, and the murder of tyrants was considered a patriotic act.²⁷ Accusing political opponents of tyrannical ambitions was fairly common in Athens. On the one hand, the example of Pericles shows that

²⁵ Xen. Cyr. 1.5.4–6; see also 1.4.25; 4.5.16–17.

²¹ Xen. Cyr. 1.3.18 (transl. E. C. Marchant).

²² See Mueller-Goldingen, Kyrupädie, 95–96.

²³ Hdt. 1.97.2–3; 3.80.2–5, 82; Xen. *Mem.* 4.6.12; Arist. *Pol.* 1279a26–1279b10, see also 1285a16–29.

²⁴ Thuc. 2.65.9; see also Xen. Cyr. 1.4.25; 1.5.7; 8.7.10.

²⁶ Thuc. 2.37.1; 6.35.8; Pl. Grg. 508a; Resp. 558c, 561e; Isoc. or. 7.60–1; Arist. Pol. 1280a9–11;
1310a30; 1317b3; see F. D. Harvey, "Two Kinds of Equality", C&M 26 (1965), 101–146, esp. 101, 104, 107, 110–120; E. Schütrumpf, "Aristoteles: Politik I–II, Übersetzt und erläutert von E. Schütrumpf". In Aristoteles Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, Bd. IX, Teil II, ed. H. Flashar (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1991), 478.

²⁷ Hdt. 5.55; 6.109, 123; Ar. Lys. 631–634; Thuc. 1.20; 6.53.3–59.1, 60.1; Arist. Ath. Pol. 18.2–6; see J. Ober, "Tyrant Killing as Therapeutic Stasis: A Political Debate in Images and Texts", in *Popular Tyranny. Sovereignty and Its Discontents in Ancient Greece*, ed. K. A. Morgan (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 216–226.

such defamations did not necessarily entail dire consequences for one's political career.²⁸ On the other hand, Alcibiades' downfall shows the degree to which the behaviour that was construed as tyrannical could mean falling into disfavour with the demos.²⁹ Demophantes' decree of 410 BC shows that tyranny was perceived as the main threat to the democratic order, while in fact the real danger was coming from the oligarchs.³⁰

Xenophon also underlines the differences between the Persian and the Median model of leadership by comparing Cyrus and Cyaxares. Cyrus is reasonable, self-controlled and courageous, cleverly applies the rules of reciprocity and is prepared to endure hardship and difficulty. As opposed to this, Cyaxares exemplifies a ruler who is interested more in the benefits brought by power than in governing. He is a weak, egotistical man who is not in control of himself and has an insufficient grasp of some of the basic principles of leadership.³¹

From what has been said so far, it follows that Xenophon's Persian king bears more similarity to the Spartan kings and Athenian politicians than to a monarch in the traditional sense. This should not be surprising given that the purpose of the *Cyropaedia* was to instruct the Greeks, in fact the higher classes, in the principles of good leadership. The question that arises, however, is how to explain some of Cyrus's methods which are difficult to reconcile not only with the ideals of the Greek polis but also with the image of the Persian king painted above. The methods in question are those that Cyrus resorted to after the conquest of Babylon.

On becoming master of Asia, the first measure introduced by Cyrus in order to rule in the manner he deemed befitting the Great King, or emperor, was to make himself inaccessible. His intention was to appear only on rare and formal occasions but he wanted to achieve that without giving rise to envy and with the consent of his friends.³² So, instead of openly declaring his intention, he resorted to craftiness and began granting an audience to anyone who requested it. As the word spread, people began to line up to see him. Cyrus was therefore able to make time for his friends only in the evening. When parting from them, he would invite them to come again the next day. However, on the following day even more people requested to be received. Thus, Cyrus called a meeting of his friends and commanders, where he complained of the lack of time, of his friends being able to benefit little from him, and he from them. He therefore suggested

²⁸ See I. Jordović, Anfänge der Jüngeren Tyrannis. Vorläufer und erste Repräsentanten von Gewaltherrschaft im späten 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr. (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2005), 135–139.

²⁹ Ibid. *Tyrannis*, 140–171.

³⁰ Andoc. or. 1.96–8; cf. Ober, "Tyrant Killing", 222–224; Jordović, Tyrannis, 181–182.

³¹ Xen. Cyr. 4.1.13–21; 4.5.8–12, 18–21, 27–34, 37–54; 5.1.19–26; 5.5.5–44.

³² Xen. Cyr. 7.5.37.

that they should receive the supplicants instead of him.³³ His proposal was accepted to everybody's satisfaction, as confirmed by Artabazus' and Chrysantas' speeches which followed Cyrus's.³⁴

This trickery recalls the cunning to which Deioces resorted in order to become king of the Medes.³⁵ The story of the establishment of a monarchy in Media is one of the most detailed descriptions of the emergence of this particular system of government in Herodotus. This account is distinguished by abstractness, rationality and absence of both divine and novelistic elements.³⁶ The importance of this logos may be seen in the fact that the pater historiae uses it to begin his narration about Cyrus the Great.³⁷ Herodotus characterises Deioces as a wise man (aner sophos) who, from the outset, secretly yearned for absolute power (erastheis tirannidos). Since at that time lawlessness reigned in Media, Deioces strove to increase his reputation among his compatriots by exhibiting his love of justice. Serving as a judge in his birthplace, he became famous throughout Media on account of his just decisions. More and more Medes began pleading their cases before him, until all of Media relied on him alone for administering justice. Deioces then publicly announced his wish to retire from office because it had made him neglect his personal affairs. His announcement stirred up a debate among the Medes, and it was in that atmosphere that the friends of Deioces suggested that he should be made king, arguing that it would put an end to the state of lawlessness in Media. Their suggestion was widely approved by the Medes, and Deioces was elected king.³⁸

There is no doubt that there are differences between these two narratives. But Cyrus and Deioces are similar in one respect – they both make a manipulative use of their concern for the wellbeing of ordinary people by deliberately encouraging an ever larger number of people to petition them for help, and then

³⁸Hdt.1.96–98.2.

³³ Xen. Cyr. 7.5.37–47.

³⁴ Xen. Cyr. 7.5.48–56.

³⁵ Hdt. 1.95.2–101; see also J. G. Gammie, "Herodotus on Kings and Tyrants: Objective Historiography or Conventional Portraiture?", *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 45 (1986), 178; Gera, Cyropaedia, 287–288.

³⁶ Cf. K. H. Waters, Herodotus the Historian. His Problems, Methods and Originality (London/Sydney: Routledge 1985), 131; U. Walter, "'Da sah er das Volk ganz in seiner Hand' – Deiokes und die Entstehung monarchischer Herrschaft im Geschichtswerk Herodots", in Deiokes, König der Meder. Eine Herodot-Episode in ihren Kontexten, eds. M. Meier et al. (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 2004), 78–79; P. Barceló, Basileia, Monarchia, Tyrannis. Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung und Beurteilung von Alleinherrschaft im vorhellenistischen Griechenland (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 1993), 167.

³⁷ Hdt. 1.95–96.2; see P. Georges, Barbarian Asia and the Greek Experience. From the Archaic Period to the Age of Xenophon (Baltimore/London: The John Hopkins University Press 1994), 176.

declaring that they are overwhelmed as a ruse to establish autocratic rule or to organise it the way they want. And they both have the support of their friends in that.

The influence of Herodotus' story about Deioces becomes even more obvious when we consider the measures the Mede took to fortify his power. Three measures may be taken as commonly practised by autocrats: the construction of a palace, the institution of a personal guard force and the creation of a network of spies.³⁹ All three were also taken by Cyrus.⁴⁰ Two more taken by Deioces were not so common: one was that no one should come into the presence of the king, but everything should be done by means of messengers; the other was that it should be a disgrace for anyone to laugh or to spit in the king's presence. The idea was to prevent the friends who had grown up with him and were also of noble birth from becoming envious or rebellious, and to lead them to believe that Deioces was different.⁴¹ As already stated, Cyrus's first measure betrays a similar way of thinking. Herodotus' influence can also be seen in Cyrus's decision to introduce Median dress and make-up at court, together with his ban on spitting, nose-blowing or turning around to look at anything in public, all motivated by the desire to bewitch (*katagoēteuein*) his subjects.⁴²

Besides similarities with Deioces, there are other circumstances which indicate that Cyrus followed the Median model of rule. The decision to make Median pomp mandatory at his court is perhaps the most obvious but certainly not the only one. Just before he began to set up his system of power, Cyrus ordered the Persians and his allies to assume the attitude of masters (*despotai*) towards the Babylonians.⁴³ Recognition that he is to rule over the largest of all famous cites, and that that city is as hostile to him as any city can be to a man, underpins his need for bodyguards and ten thousand spearmen.⁴⁴ The attitude of a victor resurfaces in Cyrus' announcement to his friends and allies that even though the conqueror is entitled, by a law established for all time among all men, to take it all, they should nevertheless refrain from taking everything away from the vanquished population.⁴⁵

- ⁴⁴ Xen. Cyr. 7.5.58–70, esp. 58.
- ⁴⁵ Xen. Cyr. 7.5.73.

³⁹Hdt. 1.98.2–6, 100.2.

⁴⁰ Palace: Xen. Cyr. 7.5.56–57; body guard: Xen. Cyr. 7.5.58–70; spies: Xen. Cyr. 8.2.10–12; 8.6.16.

⁴¹ Hdt. 1.99–100.1; see V. Azoulay, "Xenophon and the Barbarian World", in *Xenophon and his World. Papers from a conference held in Liverpool in July 1999,* ed. C. Tuplin (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 2004), 151–153.

⁴² Xen. Cyr. 8.1.40–42; see also 8.3.1; cf. Mueller-Goldingen, *Kyrupädie*, 90; Azoulay, "Xenophon", 147–148, 150.

⁴³ Xen. Cyr. 7.5.36.

This attitude may explain why Xenophon directly links his hero to the Median model of rule, on which he passes negative judgment in the preceding parts of the Cyropaedia. In describing how Cyrus structures his imperial authority, Xenophon tells us that the conquest of Babylon led to an important change in Cyrus's style of leadership.⁴⁶ Explaining why it would be desirable for his friends to take on the receiving of petitioners, Cyrus makes a clear distinction between the time when he was a military commander and the moment when he became the Great King.⁴⁷ However, the essential difference is not in that he has become a ruler, since he was predestined for the position by birth,⁴⁸ but in that he has become the ruler of an empire. This is confirmed by Cyrus himself when he exhorts his friends and allies to continue nurturing virtue, since it is a great feat to win an empire (archē) but it is an even greater one to keep it.⁴⁹ Another point in favour of this is that Xenophon, at the beginning of the Cyropaedia, suggests that his hero differs from other kings not because he has inherited power or won it, but rather because he has subjugated numerous foreign peoples, i.e. created an empire.⁵⁰

That Cyrus's becoming ruler of an empire is a key to resolving apparent contradictions is also reflected in his differentiation between two categories of subjects.⁵¹ It is strongly present in his speech following the establishment of his bodyguard force and ten thousand spearmen. Aware that these forces are insufficient to maintain the empire (*archē*), Cyrus turns to those with whose support he achieved military successes and rose to power, and these are the Persian *homotimoi*, the commanders and all those with whom he shared both hardship and success.⁵² In his speech, he urges his friends and allies to continue to cultivate their virtue (*aretē*) and abilities. This is necessary because rulers must be better than their subjects, and the conditions for that are temperance (*sōphrosynē*), self-mastery (*enkrateia*) and diligence (*epimeleia*).⁵³ Laws of warfare entitle the victorious side, Cyrus's friends and allies, to the spoils of war, but they nonethe-

⁴⁶ See Gera, *Cyropaedia*, 184, 286; Azoulay, "Xenophon", 147.

⁴⁷ Xen. Cyr. 7.5.45–47; see Mueller-Goldingen, Kyrupädie, 217.

⁴⁸ Xen. Cyr. 7.2.24; 8.5.26.

⁴⁹ Xen. Cyr. 7.5.76, see also 7.5.70; 8.1.8, 45; 8.6.17; cf. Mueller-Goldingen, *Kyrupädie*, 219–220.

⁵⁰ Xen. Cyr. 1.1.4–5; see Mueller-Goldingen, Kyrupädie, 59.

⁵¹See also Azoulay, "Xenophon", 160; H. Lu, *Xenophon's Theory of Moral Education* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015), 133.

⁵² Xen. Cyr. 7.5.70–71. This was why Cyrus did not appoint satraps to govern some regions that had joined his campaign against Babylon (Xen. Cyr. 8.6.7).

⁵³ Xen. Cyr. 7.5.70, 74–76, 78, 80–81, 83, 84–85 cf. Mem. 2.1.1–7; Isoc. or. 2.9–16, 21, 27, 36–37; 3.14–15, 38–39, 43–44, 48–52. Epimeleia is an important concept to Xenophon, by which he understands the conscientious fulfilment of one's duty and the execution of the as-

less should show love of their fellow humans (*philanthropia*) and refrain from taking everything from the conquered.⁵⁴ Cyrus thus shows that he expects them to behave as he himself does. He therefore intends for them the same position in his empire that the *homotimoi* enjoyed in Old Persia – that of a ruling elite. Cyrus obviously has no intention of essentially changing his behaviour towards them. This is seen in the fact that he avoids simply ordering them to cultivate virtue, but rather strives in his speech to convince them that it is the best thing for them.⁵⁵ Referring to these friends and allies of Cyrus, Xenophon uses the word "associates" (*koinōnes*), and not "peers", i.e. men of equal honour (*homotimoi*). This means that they represent the elite of the newly-formed Persian empire, not of the Persian kingdom, and that their relative ranking depends on their loyalty to the Great King.⁵⁶

The position intended for the vanquished population is the same as that enjoyed by the subjects of eastern despots - they are free but politically disempowered. Theirs is to tend to the land and pay tribute,⁵⁷ as evidenced by the fact that they and their property belong to the victors, and that Cyrus twice likens them to slaves (douloi).58 The comparison with slaves should not, however, be taken to imply the deprivation of all rights, as is shown by the account of Cyrus's actions when he first conquered a territory and its population in the fourth book of the Cyropaedia. Cyrus announces to the prisoners that they have saved their lives by submitting. They will continue to live in the same houses and cultivate the same land, but will not have to wage war. If someone does them harm, Cyrus will defend them, and in return they must surrender their arms. All this shows that the subjugated population is only deprived of their rights in political terms, even though Cyrus also uses the term *doulos* for them.⁵⁹ The fact that the terms archē and douleia are used in reference to Cyrus's rule is also significant since they constitute an important conceptual pair, or dichotomy, in Athenian democratic ideology.60

⁵⁵ Xen. Cyr. 7.5.71, 85; see also 8.6.4–5; cf. Mueller-Goldingen, Kyrupädie, 218.

⁵⁶ Xen. Cyr. 8.1.16, 25, 36, 40; see Azouley, "Xenophon", 159–160; Johnson, "Centaurs", 188.

⁵⁷ Xen. Cyr. 7.5.78–79.

⁵⁸ Xen. Cyr. 7.5.72–73, 78–79, 83–84.

signed task; see K. Meyer, *Xenophons "Oikonomikos"*. Übersetzung und Kommentar (Marburg: P. Kaesberger Westerburg, 1975), 104–106.

⁵⁴ Xen. Cyr. 7.5.72–73.

⁵⁹ Xen. *Cyr.* 4.4.8–12. A terminology of servitude is applicable to the subjugated population because Cyrus remarks that those who show goodwill by their actions or by supplying useful information will be treated as benefactors (*euergetes*) and friends (*philos*), and not as slaves (*doulos*).

⁶⁰ See K. Raaflaub, *The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 128–141; U. Kästner, "Bezeichnungen für Sklaven", in *Soziale Typen*-

After Cyrus, it is Chrysantas' turn to speak and he essentially gives the same counsel as his ruler. It is apparent that he does not consider Cyrus a despot; otherwise he would not say of him that he is a good ruler because he is seeing to it in a fatherly way that they lead a happy life.⁶¹ Chrysantas' speech focuses on the importance of obedience in achieving and maintaining success. This is substantiated by a reference to the importance of obedience to the military leader and its significance for the success of the Persians and their allies in war.⁶² The Persian nobleman points out that a major change has occurred. Many of those present have never commanded anyone but only carried out orders, while from now on every one of them, depending on his duties, will have a certain number of men under his command. Therefore, just as they expect their subordinates to carry out their orders, they too must obey their superiors. According to Chrysantas, however, those present must be distinguished from slaves: while the latter serve their masters against their will, those who claim to be free (*eleutheroi*) do so because they hold it to be of the utmost importance.⁶³

Since Chrysantas' words met with general approval, it was decided that the nobles (entimoi) should be always in attendance at court. Military commanders, satraps, superintendents etc. were appointed from their ranks.⁶⁴ Cyrus centralised his government administration on the model of the army.⁶⁵ Having ensured leisure (schole) for his friends and associates, he believed that those of them who even then failed to spend time at court were intemperate (akrateia), unrighteous (adikia) and negligent (ameleia).66 Cyrus used diverse means to force such individuals to make their appearance at court. He would order one of his closest friends to seize some of their estates and when they came to court seeking justice, Cyrus deliberately delayed judgement in order to accustom them to pay their court, but without subjecting them to penalties. A second measure was to give the regular attendees the easiest and most lucrative assignments and nothing to the truants. From those who remained impervious, he confiscated all possessions and gave them to those who responded immediately when summoned. These measures cannot be identified with tyrannical arbitrariness, since they correspond to the logic of reciprocity, as Xenophon himself points out

- ⁶⁵ Xen. Cyr. 8.1.14–15.
- ⁶⁶ Xen. Cyr. 8.1.16.

begriffe im alten Griechenland und ihr Fortleben in den Sprachen der Welt, vol. 3: Untersuchungen ausgewählter altgriechischer sozialer Typenbegriffe, ed. E. Ch. Welskopf (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1981), 297.

⁶¹ See Mueller-Goldingen, Kyrupädie, 223.

⁶² Xen. Cyr. 8.1.1–3.

⁶³ Xen. Cyr. 8.1.4–5.

⁶⁴ Xen. Cyr. 8.1.6–12.

when he says that in this way Cyrus replaced a useless friend with a useful one.⁶⁷ Notwithstanding his demand for total obedience, Cyrus's attitude towards his friends and associates was not tyrannical.⁶⁸ Xenophon points this out when he describes Cyrus's endeavour to be a model of virtue to his courtiers, his piety, how he made it plain how important he held it to be not to wrong any of his friends or allies, his effort to inspire in all respect for others, to be a model of temperance (*sophrosyne*) even though he more than anyone was able to indulge himself to excess (hybrizein), how he trained himself and others in self-mastery (enkrateia) and to endure toil (ponos). Furthermore, Cyrus differentiates between considerateness (aidos) and temperance (sophrosyne). A considerate person avoids behaving disgracefully in public, but a temperate person also avoids that which is shameful even if it goes unseen.⁶⁹ Finally, one more indication that Cyrus's rule was devoid of tyrannical features is that he instructed the satraps to emulate his style of rule. Here he says that his instructions (such as temperance, endurance, skill in the martial arts, and attendance at court) are not intended for slaves, and that he himself will strive to act in the way he has recommended to them.⁷⁰ All this shows that Cyrus and his associates (koinones), notwithstanding their embracing of the Median ceremonial, remained true to the Persian ideal of firmness and restraint.71

According to Xenophon, Cyrus believed that the greatest danger did not come from the vanquished population but from individuals he deemed powerful. They were well armed, well organised, had military units at their disposal and came into contact not only with Cyrus's bodyguards but also with him, and some even imagined that they were competent to rule. And yet, he neither disarmed them nor openly showed his distrust. Had he done the former, he would have done an injustice which might lead to the break-up of his *archē*; had he done the latter he believed it might lead to (a civil) war. Therefore Cyrus, now as Great King, decides instead to forestall danger by enticing the powerful into becoming greater friends to him than they are amongst themselves.⁷² Xenophon then cites examples of Cyrus's kindness, philanthropy and deft use of reciprocity.⁷³

While seeking not to weaken his associates (*koinones*) even at the cost of risking his own authority, Cyrus opted for an entirely different approach to

⁶⁷ Xen. Cyr. 8.1.17–20, 29.

⁶⁸ An argument in favour of this claim is that Cyrus heeded his father's suggestion that the best obedience is voluntary obedience (Xen. Cyr. 1.6.20–4; 2.4.10).

⁶⁹ Xen. Cyr. 8.1.21–37; cf. Mueller-Goldingen, Kyrupädie, 227–228.

⁷⁰ Xen. Cyr. 8.6.10–14; see also Isoc. or. 2.31.

⁷¹ See Azoulay, "Xenophon", 163–169.

⁷² Xen. Cyr. 8.1.45–48.

⁷³ Xen. Cyr. 8.2.1–28; 8.4.1–26.

the subjugated population. Instilling fear into them was obviously one.⁷⁴ Furthermore, not only did he not encourage those he intended should serve (*douleuein*) to practise virtue and skills, he did not permit them to practise any of the exercises of freemen (*eleutheroi ponoi*) or to possess weapons. Yet, he took care that they should not suffer any deprivation in food or drink on account of their service to the freemen in order to forestall their discontent and lead them to endure the fate of slaves (*andrapoda*) unquestioningly. Thus ensuring that the subjugated population remained weak and disorganised, Cyrus took care that it should not become a source of danger for his rule.⁷⁵

From the speeches of Cyrus and Chrysantas as presented in Xenophon and from his depiction of the measures taken by Cyrus, it may be deduced that there were two kinds of subjects. One comprises Cyrus's friends and associates, who constitute the elite of the empire. They are subordinated but they also exercise authority; they are free, have leisure, pursue their virtues and military skills.⁷⁶ The Persian model of exercising authority applies to them. To the other kind belong the rest of the population, personally free but politically deprived. They have no leisure and do not practise virtue or skills. For these subjects, the terminology of servitude is used, although obviously they are not personally unfree. To them, the Median model of exercising authority applies. The question arises as to why Xenophon makes this distinction. It is hardly likely that he wished to synchronise the account of the Persian empire with historical reality; in the Cyropaedia, he does not hesitate to depart from it whenever it suits him. More importantly, the distinction does not match historical reality in any way. However, it is probable that Xenophon's motive for first emphasising the difference between the Persian and the Median model was to be able to demonstrate that his hero applies both to his empire.

It may be pertinent to note here that Xenophon's introduction of two models of leadership (Persian and Median) matches Isocrates' differentiation between two categories of citizens in his *To Nicocles*.⁷⁷ A comparison with some of Aristotle's political categories may be useful for better understanding the motive for introducing two models of authority or two kinds of subjects in the account of Cyrus's empire.⁷⁸ The *Politics* distinguishes between the virtue of a

⁷⁴ Xen. Cyr. 1.1.5.

⁷⁵ Xen. Cyr. 8.1.43–5; cf. 7.5.78–9; 8.6.13. The term *doulos* can denote slavery but it can also signify political submission or the subjugation of a land, see Kästner, "Bezeichnungen für Sklaven", 297. The term *andrapodon* could denote both a slave and a prisoner of war, and was used as a synonym for *doulos*, see ibid. 290, 313–314.

⁷⁶ Isoc. or. 3.62.

⁷⁷ Isoc. or. 2.16; cf. 3.14–15; see also Xen. Mem. 2.1.1–7.

⁷⁸ This comparison is not meant to suggest any kind of equivalence between Xenophon's and Aristotle's political views.

good man (*aretē andros agathou*) and the virtue of a good citizen (*aretē politou spoudaiou*). While the virtue of the good citizen is geared towards the constitution of which he is a member, the good man possesses virtue which is not relative to any particular constitution.⁷⁹ Given Xenophon's idealisation of his hero and the fact that the main aim of the *Cyropaedia* is to present the principle of good leadership regardless of the form of constitution, Cyrus may be said to possess the virtue of Aristotle's good man.⁸⁰ In the *Politics*, a distinction is also made between despotic and political exercise of authority.⁸¹ Despotic authority (*despotikē archē*) is rule over slaves for the benefit of the master in order to acquire the necessities of life, so the ruler knows how to govern, but not how to perform these (slave's) tasks. Aristotle, it is true, believes that this kind of authority is characteristic of the *oikos*, but at the same time admits that in reality it is also a political system.⁸²

Political authority (*politikē archē*) is rule over people who are equal and free by virtue of birth. It is learned by first being ruled (*archesthai*), and then ruling (*archein*). To illustrate his point, Aristotle offers the example of military leadership – the military leader first serves as a soldier, taxiarch and lochage, and only then takes command. A similar reflection arises in Chrysantas when he tells how Cyrus's associates once only were given orders whereas now they will exercise authority; since they are free, they should voluntarily give their obedience to those whom it is their duty to obey.⁸³ Aristotle believes that the good citizen should have the ability both to be ruled and to rule, and holds this to be a

⁷⁹ Arist. Pol. 1276b29–35.

⁸⁰ Cf. Arist. Pol. 1277a14–23.

⁸¹ Arist. Pol. 1277a33–b16; see K. Raaflaub, "Zum Freiheitsbegriff der Griechen. Materialien und Untersuchungen zur Bedeutungsentwicklung von *eleutheros/eleutheria* in der archaischen und klassischen Zeit", in Soziale Typenbegriffe im alten Griechenland und ihr Fortleben in den Sprachen der Welt, vol. 4: Untersuchungen ausgewählter altgriechischer sozialer Typenbegriffe und ihr Fortleben in Antike und Mittelalter, ed. E. Ch. Welskopf (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1981), 308–309; Schütrumpf, Politik I–II, 428–429; A. Winterling, "Aristoteles' Theorie der politischen Gesellschaft". In Philosophie und Lebenswelt in der Antike, ed. K. Piepenbrink (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003), 70, 79.

⁸² Aristot. Pol. 1255b16, 1259a37, 1277a33-35, 1278b30-36; 1279a17-21, 1279b4-10, 1324a35-38, 1325a28-30, 1333a3-6, 1333b27-29; see E. Schütrumpf, "Politik. Buch I: Über die Hausverwaltung und die Herrschaft des Herrn über Sklaven, Übersetzt und erläutert von E. Schütrumpf", in Aristoteles Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, vol. IX/I, ed. H. Flashar (Darmstadt: Akademie Verlag, 1991), 126-128, 256-257; Schütrumpf, Politik I-II, 435, 441, 455, 457-458; F. Ricken, "Platon: Politikos, Übersetzung und Kommentar von F. Ricken", in Platon Werke, vol. II.4, eds. E. Heitsch and C. W. Müller (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 252-253.

⁸³ Arist. Pol. 1277b7–13; Xen. Cyr. 8.1.2–5.

virtue. This is basically what Cyrus expects from his satraps when he tells them that they should model their authority on his example. Cyrus himself had first learnt to submit himself, as shown by his schooling at the school of justice, his sojourn at Astyages's court and his discussion with Cambyses. Only after that was he appointed military commander.⁸⁴

Aristotle further says that the best-ordered state will not make citizens out of artisans and day-labourers. Should it happen nonetheless, they will not have the virtue of truly free (good) citizens since they do not have the leisure required for exercising public offices (archai). This reflection, too, finds an analogy in the account of the "imperial" koinones. They have the leisure to exercise authority, they practise virtue, practise any of the exercises of freemen (eleutheroi ponoi), and Xenophon calls them the eleutheroi.⁸⁵ Cyrus's koinones, therefore, essentially correspond to the good citizens in the Politics, from which it follows that Xenophon's Persian model of exercising authority corresponds to Aristotle's politike arche. This eliminates vagueness and inconsistency, since it shows that Xenophon pursues the aristocratic-oligarchic concept of the truly free citizen, as represented from the late fifth century onward by many authors who certainly were not advocates of rule by the demos.⁸⁶ Accordingly, freedom is equated with the right to rule, but this right is not enjoyed by all free individuals within the community, only by those who are not pressed by the necessity to work for their living, or those who have the necessary schole time to cultivate virtue and participate in political life. As against the truly free citizens are those who do not share in political life (artisans, day-labourers, metics, women, children and slaves). Although some of these groups (e.g. artisans and day-labourers) also have citizen status, they are still held to be incomplete citizens (politai ateleis).⁸⁷

Yet another similarity with the *Politics* points to Xenophon's espousal of the aristocratic-oligarchic idea of the *truly free citizen*. Having presented the reasons why artisans cannot be considered citizens in the fullest sense, Aristotle cites examples of when and where they were or were not. As one instance of their deprivation of political rights he cites Thebes, where a law decreed that public

⁸⁴ Arist. Pol. 1277b11–16; Cyrus: Xen. Cyr. 1.3.1, 16–18, 1.4.13; 1.5.1; 1.6.3, 6, 8, 12–16, 21–23, 27–37; satraps: Xen. Cyr. 8.6.10–14.

⁸⁵ Arist. Pol. 1277b33–1278a39; Xen. Cyr. 8.1.13–14, 16, 43–44, 8.6.13–14; see Raaflaub, "Zum Freiheitsbegriff", 309, Schütrumpf, Politik I–II, 435.

⁸⁶ See Raaflaub, *Discovery*, 243–247; S. Johnstone, "Virtuous Toil, Vicious Work: Xenophon on Aristocratic Style". In *Xenophon*, ed. V. J. Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), 155.

⁸⁷ Arist. Pol. 1277b33–1278a6–13; 1337b5–14; see Raaflaub, "Zum Freiheitsbegriff", 301– 313, esp. 307–308; D. Rössler, "Handwerker", in Soziale Typenbegriffe im alten Griechenland und ihr Fortleben in den Sprachen der Welt, vol. 3: Untersuchungen ausgewählter altgriechischer sozialer Typenbegriffe, ed. E. Ch. Welskopf (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1981), 229–230.

office could only be taken by persons who had kept out of the trade at the agora (apeschēmenon tēs agoras) for ten years.88 A similar rule is also mentioned by Xenophon in his Oeconomicus. Interestingly, immediately after that he cites the Persian emperor and Cyrus the Younger as examples of engagement in honourable occupations - art of war and husbandry. It is clear from this that being engaged in agriculture does not imply personally tilling the land, but rather seeing to it that others work in the correct manner.⁸⁹ Furthermore, in the Symposium the illiberal arts (banausikai technai) constitute the exact opposite of the kalokagathia ideal.⁹⁰ Of all the similarities, however, the most striking is that, in the Cyropaedia, the Persian model of exercising authority is directly related to this kind of ban. In his brief description of the Persian system, Xenophon points out that the Persians have a so-called free square (eleuthera agora), supposed to prevent citizens from even thinking of committing wicked or disgraceful acts, and so the tradesmen and their goods have been removed from it. The square houses the royal palace and government buildings, and serves as a gathering point for those undergoing the Persian educational system or who are already in public service, i.e. fully-fledged citizens.⁹¹ All this shows that Xenophon embraced the concept of the *truly free citizen*. The concept originated in critical response to the democratic ideology of freedom, but still does not make Xenophon an adamant oligarch, which may be seen from two observations made by Aristotle. One is that of all types of democracy, the participation of artisans (banausoi) in government appears only in democracy's ultimate form; the other is that *banausoi* may be citizens in an oligarchy too.⁹² Xenophon says that all the Persians may send their children to the schools of justice, but only those do send them who are in a position to support their families without working.93 Xenophon, therefore, does not cite low origin or mental and physical inferiority as reasons for the non-participation of Persian commoners in government. Moreover, his Cyrus points out that the Persian commoners lag behind the peers neither in body nor in spirit, except that they have to work for their livelihood.⁹⁴ Finally, there is the

⁸⁸ Arist. Pol. 1278a25–26; see W. L. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle, With an Introduction, Two Prefatory Essays and Notes Critical and Explanatory,* vol. III: Books III, IV, and V (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), 178; Schütrumpf, *Politik* I–II, 441.

⁸⁹ Xen. Oec. 4.2–25; 6.5, 9, esp. 4.2–4; 6.9; see also Lac. 7.1–2; cf. Meyer, Oikonomikos, 111– 112; Rössler, "Handwerker", 241–242; L. Kronenberg, Allegories of Farming from Greece and Rome. Philosophical Satire in Xenophon, Varro and Virgil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 42–44; Johnstone, "Virtuous Toil", 155, 159–166, esp. 159–160.

⁹⁰ Xen. Symp. 3.4; cf. Rössler, "Handwerker", 242.

⁹¹ Xen. Cyr. 1.2.3–4, 15.

⁹² Arist. Pol. 1277b1-3, 1278a21-25.

⁹³ Xen. Cyr. 1.2.15.

⁹⁴ Xen. Cyr. 2.1.15–19, esp. 15; cf. Nadon, "Education", 364–365.

example of Pheraulus, a Persian commoner whom Cyrus considers one of his most capable and trusted friends.⁹⁵ This goes to show that Xenophon linked the concept of the *truly free citizen* to meritocracy. The binding nature of this principle for the *koinōnes* is manifest in Cyrus's belief that no one is worthy of ruling who is not better than his subjects, and in the fact that Cyrus himself always rewarded those who distinguished themselves, and expected his satraps to surround themselves with able individuals and to reward ability and good service.⁹⁶

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⁹⁵ Xen. Cyr. 2.3.7–16; 8.3.2; 8.3.5–8; 8.3.28–32; 8.3.35–50.

⁹⁶ Xen. Cyr. 8.1.12, 37, 39, 8.6.11–12; see also 2.1.22–24; 7.5.35; 7.5.78–81; 7.5.83–85; 8.2.26–28.

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Justinian's πάτριος φωνή**

- **Abstract:** In the Justinianic Novellae, repeated occurrences of the phrase $\pi \dot{\alpha} \tau \rho \omega \gamma \dot{\eta}$, meaning the Latin language, are generally believed to be indicative of Justinian's favourable stance towards Latin culture, Roman tradition, and his own roots. Per se, the importance and dignity of Latin needed no advocacy in the actual environment of the sixth-century Constantinople: not only was the idiom in wide official use, but a fair share of literary production was in Latin, and proficiency in that language was normal with the many admirers and connoisseurs of Roman antiquities. The usual understanding is that by calling Latin the "father tongue" Justinian never emphasized the contingent fact of its being his own first language, but rather referred to Latin as the primary language of the Roman people and the traditional vehicle of high administration throughout the Empire. In the present paper the use of πάτριος φωνή (or π. γλῶττα) is examined in the wider context of earlier, contemporary and later Greek sources, in which it normally means the native language of a foreign individual or ethnicity as opposed to the Greek of the author and his readers; the instances involve a large number of foreign languages, including contemporary spoken idioms as well as traditional languages of different communities. However, the question whether $\pi \dot{\alpha} \tau \rho_{100} \sigma_{100} \phi_{100} \phi_{100}$ ever became a context-free denotation of Latin viewed as the traditional language, by all appearances, is to be answered to the negative. On the other hand, the phrase $\pi \dot{\alpha} \tau \rho_{100} \phi_{100} \phi_{100} \phi_{100}$ of the assumes the specific task of 'flagging' instances of code-switching in Greek texts, and it is this special purpose that it seems to fulfill more than once in the Novellae as well.
- Keywords: Late Greek, Late Latin, bilingualism, flagged code-switching, language policies in the Late Roman Empire, Justinian's reconquista

I t is an established fact that Justinian's command of the Greek language was less than perfect; Procopius went as far as to speak of the man's "barbaric language, appearance and mentality".¹ As a sort of counterbalance to this famously disparaging remark, modern scholars have often stated, with especial emphasis, that Justinian called Latin his mother tongue² and took pride in his latinoph-

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¹ Hist. Arc. 14.2 τήν τε γλῶτταν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐβαρβάριζεν.

² E.g. Rochette 1997a, 142: "[II] appell[ai]t le latin πάτριος φωνή, sa langue maternelle".

ony.³ This statement has primarily concerned the Justinianic Novellae, which have been viewed by some as a showcase of the Emperor's own mind frame and personality.⁴ It has also been maintained that Justinian saw the official use of Greek and/or Latin as a matter of political and strategic importance.⁵ Beyond questions of language, Justinian has been credited with a pronounced leaning towards Latinity in terms of culture;⁶ and, in terms of political tradition and state policies, the Novellae are there to show him working proudly for the greater glory of the Roman name.⁷ In the ironical view of a modern historian, while Justinian "certainly wanted to present himself in the traditional mould of the Roman emperors", he was "far from alone as a Byzantine emperor in appealing to Roman tradition" and was careful to only do it "when it suited him."⁸ Indeed, Justinian's Romanity and Latinity has even been dismissed as meaningless affectation: "Although Justinian had nothing to do with any Roman ancestry, he flattered himself with calling Latin 'the language of our fathers."⁹

To say that Justinian, or any other man in sixth-century Byzantium, was no Roman of old stock but pictured himself as one, certainly sounds anachronistic. Justinian came from what the sources, using names of geographic or political entities with various degrees of precision, call Thrace or Illyricum or Dardania. The land had been under Roman rule for many centuries and lay deep enough within the Latin-speaking area of the Balkans.¹⁰ It had seen trouble and turmoil, but still was not lost to invaders. Its archaeological record from Late Antiquity

³ E.g. Rochette 1997b, 414: "l'empereur-législateur ... emplo[yait] la formule [πάτριος φωνή] avec fierté".

⁴ E.g. Jones 1988, 155–6: "Dans les Novelles … Justinien s'exprime à la première personne. Il explique, philosophe et se prononce; il motive ou affirme, et tranche; en d'autres termes, il se dévoile."

⁵ Rochette 1997b, 415: "[P]artisan d'un Empire latin, sa langue maternelle, Justinien est conscient du danger que comporte le déplacement de la capitale vers l'Est, qui pourrait entraîner l'utilisation générale du grec dans l'administration."

⁶Jones 1988, 153: "Justinien était né en Illyrie orientale, dans une partie de l'Empire … profondément latinisée, et il ne cachait nullement le culte qu'il vouait à la culture latine."

⁷ Cf. esp. Nov. 24.1 ήμεῖς ... τὴν παλαιότητα πάλιν μετὰ μείζονος ἄνθους εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν ἐπαναγαγόντες καὶ τὸ Ῥωμαίων σεμνύναντες ὄνομα / nos antiquitatem rursus cum majori flore ad rem publicam reducentes et Romanorum nobilitantes nomen, and ibid. paulo infra [oi] ἔμπροσθεν ... κατὰ μικρὸν τὸ Ῥωμαίων ηὕξησαν ὄνομα καὶ τοσοῦτον πεποιἡκασιν ὅσον οὐδεμιặ παντελὼς ἑτέρҳ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν δἑδωκεν ὁ Θεός / prior[es] ... paulatim Romanorum auxerunt nomen et tantum egerunt quantum nulli penitus alteri aliarum rerum publicarum contulit Deus.

⁸Cameron 2009, 32.

⁹Tzamalikos 2012, 239 n. 115.

¹⁰ See e.g. Andreose & Renzi 2013, 286.

is important in size and quality; the epigraphy is meagre but Latin all right.¹¹ However, it seems useful to note that we have no actual proof or record that Justinian ever received, at home or elsewhere, any substantial education in Latin. If so, his Latinity must have been essentially of an oral kind, unimbued with erudition even if supported by basic literacy. Given the sociolinguistic realities of the sixth century, this would mean that Justinian's native Latin was of a very different flavour from the prestigious language the use of which he may have been striving to promote.

If the Emperor himself could not be counted among the litterati homines, many around him could: "writing in Latin was clearly appreciated in the East",¹² and the dignity of Latin culture was not an idea that needed inculcation. Besides a number of Latin manuscripts that were produced in sixth-century Constantinople, "implying a clientèle able to appreciate them",¹³ more than a few new books were written. Marcellinus Comes, born in Illyricum in the last decades of the fifth century, wrote his Latin chronicle in Constantinople under Justin I and Justinian; the well-known poet and grammarian Priscian of Caesarea, and his pupil Eutyches, who produced an Ars de verbo, were also there; Cassiodorus wrote the Expositio Psalmorum while in Constantinople in the 540s; Jordanes, too, "has now been placed in a firm mid-sixth century context in Constantinople".¹⁴ There were other Latin writers as well, and there was a changing but ever present group of native Latin speakers: these became numerous after a wave of persons of senatorial rank left Italy for Constantinople during the Gothic War. Papal legates were a continuous presence (Gregory being a famous case in point), while Pope Vigilius and other westerners were summoned to the capital city by Justinian in the years before and during the Fifth Ecumenical Council. Non-native connoisseurs of Latin in sixth-century Constantinople include Paul the Silentiary, Peter the Patrician, the anonymous author of the treatise on political knowledge,¹⁵ and, still as a matter of course, a number of imperial officials. A place of honour is probably due to John the Lydian, the champion of the Roman tradition amidst the intellectuals of Justinian's Constantinople: his conservative and protective attitude towards all things Latin has perhaps best seen as analogous to the way Libanius of Antioch had felt about Hellenism two centuries before.¹⁶

¹¹ For an overview of the finds at Justiniana Prima (Caričin Grad) and in the surrounding area, see Milinković 2015, 190–248.

¹² Cameron 2009, 27.

¹³ Ibid. 24.

¹⁴ Ibid. 26.

¹⁵ Περὶ πολιτικῆς ἐπιστήμης, ed. Mazzucchi 1982.

¹⁶ Cf. Dagron 1969, 45: "[I]ls luttent, pour les mêmes raisons de tradition et de respect de la culture, l'un contre les progrès du latin, l'autre contre la généralisation du grec." — Lydus himself relates another interesting little fact: a conoscente of Latin, Phocas, the praetorian prefect

But the main use of Latin was, of course, the one in affairs of state. Rome's gradual shift towards the East, which began with Diocletian, pushed the Greek-speaking half of the Empire into producing large numbers of men capable of pursuing administrative careers. As a consequence, the fourth century saw an unprecedented rise of Latin schooling in the East.¹⁷ It was only in the fifth century that the imperial administration entered a process of linguistic hellenization.¹⁸ Under Theodosius II, Cyrus of Panopolis was famously able to sustain the urban prefecture and the *praefectura praetorio Orientis* under his own condition of doing it all in Greek and none in Latin,¹⁹ although, to be sure, Cyrus was still liable to official communication in Latin just like any addressee of imperial constitutions or rescripts, as most of Theodosius II's legislation was in Latin, not Greek.

Justinian in his early years issued most of his constitutions in Latin but some in Greek, with no clear pattern emerging as far as the choice between the two languages is concerned; in doing so he kept in line with earlier practice.²⁰ In the Novellae, however, it appears that the choice between Latin and Greek complies to a steady logic: the Novellae that were directed to the central administration of the Empire located in Constantinople, to the Latin-speaking provinces of the northern and central Balkans, to the reconquered territories in the West, or to church dignitaries in those areas, were promulgated in Latin, while those that

of 432, pays a learned refugee from Africa for language tutoring, as he finds that the Africans speak better Latin than the Italians (*Mag.* 3.73 ήξίου περινοῆσαί τινα πρòς διδασκαλίαν αὐτῷ τῆς Ἰταλίδος φωνῆς, Λίβυν ἐπιζητῶν· αὐτὸν γὰρ ἔφασκεν ἐγνωκέναι στωμυλωτέρως παρὰ τοὺς Ἰταλοὺς διαλέγεσθαι). John then proceeds to praise the generosity of the great gentleman who needed no Latin teacher at all but merely found a way to help a man in need without embarrassing him (cf. also Maas 1992, 69). Still, in view of Phocas' knowledgeable stance on contemporary Italian and African Latin, it is not improbable that he genuinely wished to treat himself to Latin conversation with a highly competent native speaker.

¹⁷Cf. Dagron 1969, 38–40: "l'Empire, en devenant oriental, commence par se latiniser davantage ; ... Dioclétien semble le premier à avoir réduit les privilèges de la langue grecque ... Cette tendance devient avec Constantin une politique ... : ... l'Orient sera romain, le latin seule langue officielle. Les successeurs de Constantin suivent la voie ... Cette situation provoque une crise profonde dans l'enseignement au milieu du IVe siècle, lorsque l'Orient a de plus en plus besoin de former des fonctionnaires ... A l'avocat-rhéteur, formé à la mode hellénique pour une société de type « poliade » et provincial, on voit se substituer l'avocat-juriste, formé au droit et au latin dans les écoles de Rome ou de Beyrouth et bientôt de Constantinople". — See also Rochette 2008, esp. his Section 2, "Les hellénophones et le latin".

¹⁸ Vassilikopoulou 1993, 105–106; Adamik 2003, 231. Cf. Dagron 1969, 37: "En 450, le latin a cessé d'être une langue d'usage normal dans l'entourage de l'empereur à Constantinople."

¹⁹To the belated horror of John the Lydian, cf. *Mag.* 2.12: "that's when this office was deprived of the tongue of the Romans and the luck of the Romans, too".

²⁰ Cf. Adamik 2003, 232: in the decades before Justinian roughly one of every five constitutions was issued in Greek not Latin.

went to the Senate and People of Constantinople, the provinces of the southern Balkans and the East, or church dignitaries in those areas, including Constantinople, were promulgated in Greek.²¹ This change of practice in the domain of legal writing may have left the prestige of Latin untouched in the domain of scholarly production and antiquarian learning,²² but it still amounted, at least statistically, to a massive switch from Latin to Greek during the 530s. However, Justinian seems deliberately to have reverted to what had been common practice in the administration of the Early Empire: use Latin in the West and Greek in the East. Meanwhile in the Eastern Empire the people had used mostly Greek and the imperial administration mostly Latin; now with Justinian's reconquista Latin saw much of its territorial and populational base reunited to the Empire, which once again became truly bilingual. The highest authority gave importance and prominence to this fact, deeming it appropriate to communicate with the officials everywhere in their own language, Latin or Greek, secundum locorum qualitatem,²³ and, in spite of the "wider public acceptance" of Greek, in certain cases "the master version" of an imperial constitution was to be considered the one in Latin, "given the composite structure of the Commonwealth".²⁴

²¹ Adamik 2003, 236–237; for earlier attempts at clarifying the language choice in the Novellae see Steinwenter 1936, 1166, and Zilliacus 1935, 73. — The Latin constitutions of Justinian are Nov. 9, 11, 23, 33–37, 62, 65, 75=104, as well as Cod. Just. 1.1.8.7–24 and Nov. App. II 1–3.

²² Dagron 1969, 42: "La véritable hellénisation de l'Empire oriental n'élimine pas le latin, elle le récupère. Le latin perd son privilège de langue d'État, mais dans le même temps il acquiert le privilège de langue de culture." Cf. also Clackson 2015, 70: "In … societies with stable bilingualism there is often an association of different languages with different areas of use … [T] hese are different *domains* of each language."

²³ Nov. 17.epist. ideo librum mandatorum composuimus ... per utramque linguam ... ut detur administratoribus nostris secundum locorum qualitatem in quibus Romana vel Graeca lingua frequentatur scire eorum sanctionem. — In church affairs, too, the acts of the Fifth Ecumenical Council (553) were translated from Greek into Latin soon after the event; previously, a Latin translation of documents from Chalcedon (451) in view of the discussion of the Three Chapters controversy was available at the Council itself (Cameron 2009, 27).

²⁴ Nov. 66.1.2 (about a previous constitution directed to Africa) γενομένων ήμῖν ἰσοτύπων διατάξεων ... τῆς μὲν τῷ Ἐλλήνων φωνῷ γεγραμμένης διὰ τὸ τῷ πλήθει κατάλληλον, τῆς δὲ τῷ Ῥωμαίων, ἥπερ ἐστὶ καὶ κυριωτάτῃ, διὰ τὸ τῷς πολιτείας σχῆμα / factis a nobis uniformibus constitutionibus ... alia quidem Graecorum lingua conscripta propter multitudinis frequentiam, alia vero Latina, quae etiam firmissima propter reipublicae figuram est; cf. the translation from the Greek by Kroll: "cum duo exempla constitutionum ... a nobis facta sint, alterum Graecorum lingua conscriptum propter idoneas multitudini rationes, alterum Romanorum, quod quidem vel maximi momenti est, propter rei publicae formam."

* * *

Here we will take a look at several places in the Justinianic Novellae where the phrase $\dot{\eta} \pi \dot{\alpha} \tau \rho \iota o \varsigma \phi \omega v \dot{\eta}$ is used to refer to the Latin language. However, before turning to the Novellae themselves, we shall examine a wider sample of passages from Greek authors who used the same or similar phrases in what will soon appear to be a variety of contexts.

Any Greek dictionary tells us that $\pi \dot{\alpha} \tau \rho \iota \varsigma$ means "paternal" not only in the sense of "belonging to one's father" but also in the sense of "derived from one's fathers, ancestral, hereditary". When it comes to things usually handed down from father to son, calling a thing paternal may practically equal calling it one's own. Human language is a case in point: generational inheritance being the natural way for people to acquire their first language, a reference to a person's "paternal tongue" can rarely mean anything else but their own native speech. Greek authors normally use expressions like $\pi \dot{\alpha} \tau \rho \iota \varsigma \phi \omega \nu \dot{\eta}$ to describe a person or persons using their native tongue, whichever it may be.²⁵ In the many contexts that involve Romans, it is Latin;²⁶ among Jews in Palestine or elsewhere, it is Aramaic;²⁷ in other situations it may be Syriac, Celtic, Gothic, Persian,²⁸ or any

²⁵ E.g. Eusebius Demonstr. 3.7.15 (about multilingualism in the early Church) κεκήρυκτο γοῦν τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἐν βραχεῖ χρόνῷ ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ οἰκουμένῃ εἰς μαρτύριον τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, καὶ βάρβαροι καί Ἐλληνες τὰς περὶ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ γραφὰς πατρίοις χαρακτῆρσιν καὶ πατρίῷ φωνῇ μετελάμβανον, "Hellenes as well as barbarians partook in writing about Jesus, each using their own language and script".

²⁶ E.g. Memnon frg. 59.3 τοιαῦτα τοῦ Θρασυμήδους ... διεληλυθότος ... ἀντιπαρελθών ὁ Κόττας βραχέα τῆ πατρίφ διελέχθη γλώττῃ, εἶτα ἐκαθέσθη, "Cotta [cos. 74 BC] gave a short speech in his own language";—Athenaeus 6.78 (Democritus of Nicomedia talks about Sulla) ἐμφανίζουσι δ΄ αὐτοῦ τὸ περὶ ταῦτα ἰλαρὸν aἰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γραφεῖσαι σατυρικαὶ κωμφδίαι τῆ πατρίφ φωνῆ, "wrote satyric comedies [i.e. Atellan farces] in his language";—6.105 ὡς Κόττας ίστορεῖ ... ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς Ῥωμαίων πολιτείας συγγράμματι ὃ τῆ πατρίφ ἡμῶν γέγραπται φωνῆ "written in our national language [i.e. Latin] by [Aurunculeius] Cotta", says the host of Athenaeus' banquet, Livius Larensis;—Julian Galil. 194b τῆς Σιβύλλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οι δὴ γεγόνασι «κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον» κατὰ τὴν πάτριον φωνὴν χρησμολόγοι "who at that time uttered oracles in the vernacular", i.e. in Latin.

²⁷ E.g. Josephus B. J. 5.361 Τίτος ... τὸν Ἰώσηπον καθίει τῆ πατρίφ γλώσση διαλέγεσθαι, τάχ' ἂν ἐνδοῦναι πρὸς ὁμόφυλον δοκῶν αὐτούς, "sent Josephus to talk to them in their own tongue";—Eusebius H. E. 3.38.2 (about a supposed Aramaic original of the Epistle to the Hebrews) Ἐβραίοις ... διὰ τῆς πατρίου γλώττης ἐγγράφως ὡμιληκότος τοῦ Παύλου, οι μὲν τὸν ... Λουκῶν οι δὲ τὸν Κλήμεντα ... ἑρμηνεῦσαι λέγουσι τὴν γραφήν.

²⁸ Lucian Alexander 51 άλλὰ καὶ βαρβάροις πολλάκις ἔχρησεν, εἴ τις τῇ πατρίψ ἔροιτο φωνῇ, Συριστὶ ἢ Κελτιστί, ῥαδίως ἐξευρίσκων τινὰς ἐπιδημοῦντας ὁμοεθνεῖς τοῖς δεδωκόσιν, "if anybody asked a question in his own language, Syriac or Celtic";—Procopius De bellis 6.1.16 σιωπὴν μὲν ὁ Ῥωμαῖος εἶχεν, ἄτερος δὲ τῇ πατρίψ γλώσσῃ ... ἔφασκεν κτλ., "said in his native tongue," i.e. in Gothic;—Theophylactus Simocatta Hist. 5.1.13 τῇ πατρίψ φωνῇ

other idiom; in later Byzantine authors, πάτριος φωνή sometimes refers to early varieties of modern European languages.²⁹

In this connexion the question of traditional (learned, literary etc.) vs contemporary (everyday, vulgar etc.) language arises in a number of instances. Within Greek itself, ή πάτριος φωνή sometimes points to Attic Greek as opposed to other (typically less prestigious) forms of the same language. In the heyday of the Second Sophistic, Phrynichus the Atticist blamed one of the classics, Menander, for disfiguring his $\pi \dot{\alpha} \tau \rho \iota o \varsigma \phi \omega v \dot{\eta}$ by "sweeping together a litter of [bad] words";³⁰ in Proclus, Plato is praised for using "his mother tongue", i.e. an expression that was distinctly Attic, to pay honour to the Goddess;³¹ and Photius explained that what was perceived as Xenophon's occasional errors against pure Attic, "his mother tongue", was due to his prolonged dwelling among non-Athenians.³² In other occurrences, though, $\pi \dot{\alpha} \tau \rho_{100} \phi_{100} \psi_{100} \psi_{100}$ denotes a non-standard variety, as when Aelius Aristides opposes the $\pi \dot{\alpha} \tau \rho \iota o \iota \phi \omega \nu \alpha \dot{\iota}$, the vernaculars, which are unacceptable even among locals "whenever anyone's around", to the language he is using ("this idiom"), which is Atticizing literary Greek, "the very definition of a cultured man";³³ or when Michael Psellus disparages "a selfstyled intellectual" by saying that "even now his language is a $\gamma\lambda\omega\sigma\sigma\alpha$ πάτριος καὶ στενή, a meagre vernacular, as he still doesn't seem to have learnt Greek".³⁴

In the context of Jewish affairs, the question of Aramaic vs Hebrew as the $\pi \dot{\alpha} \tau \rho_i o \zeta \phi_i \phi_i$ is often present, and the answer is not always clear. In the ac-

τοὺς περιφρουροῦντας φενακισάμενος, "cheating the guards by speaking their language", i.e. Persian.

²⁹ Michael Attaliates Hist. p171 Bekker τοῦ Κρισπίνου ... τοῖς Φράγγοις τῷ πατρίφ διαλεχθέντος φωνῷ, "in their language", i.e. French;—PsCodinus De officiis p219 Verpeaux ἕπειτα ἔρχονται καὶ πολυχρονίζουσι καὶ οἱ Βάραγγοι, κατὰ τὴν πάτριον καὶ οὖτοι γλῶσσαν αὐτῶν, ἤγουν ἐγκλινιστί, "the Varangians, too, in their mother tongue, which is English" (see Rhoby 2013).

³⁰ Eclogae 402 (prompted by Menander's use of the noun κατωφαγᾶς) πόθεν, Μένανδρε, συσσύρας τὸν τοσοῦτον τῶν ὀνομάτων συρφετὸν αἰσχύνεις τὴν πάτριον φωνήν;

³¹ In Platonis Timaeum 1.98 Diehl εἰκότως οὖν αὐτὴν [Athena] ὁ Πλάτων ... ἀρχηγὸν τῶν ἐν γῃ κλήρων τούτων προσείρηκε, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τῆς πατρίου φωνῆς τιμῶν τὴν θεόν· Ἀρχηγέτιν γὰρ οἱ Ἀττικοὶ τὴν Πολιοῦχον ἀνόμαζον.

³² Bibliotheca 279 (p533b Bekker) εἰ δὲ καὶ Ξενοφῶν εἴρηκε «τοὺς νομεῖς», οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν ἀνὴρ ἐν στρατείαις σχολάζων καὶ ξένων συνουσίαις εἴ τινα παρακόπτει τῆς πατρίου φωνῆς· διὸ νομοθέτην αὐτὸν οὐκ ἄν τις ἀττικισμοῦ παραλάβοι.

³³ Panathenaicus 1p181 Dindorf Έλληνες ... τὰς μὲν πατρίους φωνὰς ἐκλελοίπασι καὶ καταισχυνθεῖεν ἂν καὶ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς διαλεχθῆναι τὰ ἀρχαῖα παρόντων μαρτύρων· πάντες δὲ ἐπὶ τήνδε ἐληλύθασιν ὥσπερ ὅρον τινὰ παιδείας νομίζοντες.

³⁴ Poem 67 (πρός μοναχόν τινα γράψαντα πρός αὐτὸν μεθ' ὑπερηφανίας καὶ δοκοῦντα εἶναί τινα τῶν σοφῶν), 285–287 ἔτι ... γλῶσσαν πάτριον καὶ στενὴν κεκτημένος ... καὶ μὴ μαθών, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀκμὴν τὰ τῆς Ἐλλάδος.

count of the seven brothers' martyrdom in the Second Book of the Maccabees,³⁵ one of the martyrs is asked whether he will eat pork, ὁ δὲ ἀποκριθεὶς τῇ πατρίῳ φωνη προσείπεν Ούχί (7.8); as each of them is being tortured to death, their mother encourages them to endure: ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν παρεκάλει τῆ πατρίω $\varphi\omega\nu\eta$ (21). The king does not understand her speech but can guess well enough what is going on (24). Later he orders the woman to talk to her youngest son, still alive, and bring him to his senses; προσκύψασα δὲ αὐτῶ χλευάσασα τὸν ώμον τύραννον ούτως ἔφησεν τῃ πατρίῳ φωνῃ (27): in spite of the king she tells her son to suffer without yielding. Throughout this scene what is repeatedly meant by ή πάτριος φωνή is surely Aramaic as against Greek, the latter standing at the opposite pole of the bilingual situation described, besides being the narrator's own language. Two later occurrences of π . φ . in 2*Macc*, however, involve no opposition to Greek, but describe Judas Maccabeus "chanting the battle cry and hymns in the ancestral tongue" (12.37) and his victorious men "blessing the sovereign Master in the ancestral tongue" (15.29): in both cases Hebrew, not Aramaic, is probably meant.³⁶ A further curiosity is found in Josephus' account of the siege of Jerusalem. Whenever the Jewish watchmen detect a Roman artillery engine fired, they shout out a warning "in their tongue": Ό υίος ἔρχεται, "Here comes the son!" One naturally surmises this was Aramaic, but it is only with Hebrew that the situation makes sense: punningly, the watchmen shouted ha-bben "the son" instead of ha-eben "the stone".37

The case of the Romans and their own πάτριος φωνή may seem more straightforward, as in most instances Latin with no further implications or complications is meant: e.g. Dionysius Halicarnassensis *Ant. Rom.* 6.90.1 βωμόν κατεσκεύασαν ... ὃν ἐπὶ τοῦ κατασχόντος αὐτοὺς τότε δείματος ἀνόμασαν, ὡς ἡ πάτριος αὐτῶν σημαίνει γλῶσσα, Διὸς Δειματίου, "as their language puts it" about a dedication to Juppiter Territor;³⁸ Julian *Or.* 2.78a (in honour of Constantius) εἴ τις ... τὸ βασιλέως ἀναγνοὺς ξύγγραμμα ... ἀπαιτοίη οὐ τὰ νοήματα μόνον, ὅσαις δὲ ἀρεταῖς ἐκεῖνα κοσμεῖται κατὰ τὴν πάτριον φωνὴν ξυγκείμενα, "all the beauty of his original Latin" as opposed to any possible translation; Joannes Lydus *Mag.* 2.3 ὥστε τοὺς Ῥωμαίους εἰπεῖν ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῇ πατρίῳ φωνῃ· *utinam nec natus nec mortuus fuisset*, about Augustus; Theophylactus Simocatta *Hist.* 6.7.9 καὶ γοῦν ὁ στρατηγὸς τῇ πατρίῳ φωνῃ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τῶνδε τῶν

 $^{^{35}}$ For a dozen useful references to the use of $\pi \acute{\alpha}\tau\rho io \varsigma~\phi wv \acute{\eta}$ in and around the Bible, see Renan 1863, 32 n. 2.

³⁶ Cf. BJér ad 2*Macc* 12.37.

³⁷ Bellum Judaicum 5.272 σκοποὶ ... αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν πύργων καθεζόμενοι προεμήνυον ὁπότε σχασθείη τὸ ὄργανον καὶ ἡ πέτρα φέροιτο, τῇ πατρίῳ γλώσσῃ βοῶντες Ὁ υἰὸς ἔρχεται. Cf. Thackeray (Loeb) ad loc.

³⁸ Cf. ILS 3028.

λόγων ἀπήρξατο, about Priscus' addressing his troops during the 593 campaign in the Balkans.

The conservative nature of the Romans' own standard language is sometimes reflected in Greek sources, e.g. in Flavius Arrianus, *Tactica* 33.1 (concerning riding courts and equestrian practice in Rome) ὅτι οὐδὲ αὐτοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τὰ πολλὰ τῆς πατρίου φωνῆς ἔχεται ἀλλὰ ἔστιν ἃ τῆς Ἰβήρων ἢ Κελτῶν, "much of the terminology used by the Romans themselves comes not from their own language but from Iberian or Celtic", i.e. constitutes a technical jargon outside "normal" Latin; or in Zosimus, 5.29.9, where the senator Lampadius, in opposition to Stilicho's policy of dealing with the barbarian threat by exchanging gold for peace in 408, echoes Cicero in the Roman Senate: τῆ πατρίω φωνῆ τοῦτο ὑποφθεγξάμενος· *non est ista pax sed pactio servitutis* [cf. Cic. *Phil.* 12.14], ὃ δηλοῖ δουλείαν μᾶλλον ἤπερ εἰρήνην εἶναι τὸ πραττόμενον.

But Late Latin was a complex diasystem of often diverging "lects", and it may be little wonder that in the early seventh century Theophylactus Simocatta saw the "paternal tongue of the Romans" in somewhat strange colours. In *Hist*. 6.9.15, as he described drunken soldiers disregarding their sentry duty, he wrote tỹç διαφρουρᾶς κατημέλησαν, ἢν σκούλκαν σύνηθες τῇ πατρίῳ φωνῇ Ῥωμαίοις ἀποκαλεῖν: here a modern translation (Whitby & Whitby 1986) says "in their ancestral tongue", but the expression itself was hardly ancestral, as *sculca* belonged to the jargon of the Late Roman army;³⁹ another similar case is found at 3.4.4 τὰ σημεῖα ... ἂ τῇ πατρίῳ φωνῇ βάνδα Ῥωμαῖοι κατονομάζουσιν, with the occurrence of the Late Latin *bandum* "flag". Probably still within sermo castrensis, at 7.14.8 ἐντεῦθεν οἱ βάρβαροι τὰ ἐχυρώματα τῶν διαβάσεων περικάθηνταικλεισούρας τῇ πατρίῳ Ῥωμαῖοι φωνῇ ἀποκαλεῖν ταῦτα εἰώθασιν⁴⁰ the π. φ. of the Romans is specifically credited with κλεισούρα "defile", a Latin vulgarism which had a prominent future in several languages of the Balkans.

Outside military jargon, Theophylactus labelled expressions in contemporary Latin with another notable term, ἐπιχώριος. At 2.11.4 Κομεντίολος ... ἐπὶ τοὺς στενωποὺς τοῦ Αἴμου στρατοπεδεύεται ... Σαβουλέντε δὲ Κανάλιον ὁ τόπος ἀνόμασται ἐπιχωρίῳ προσηγορίᾳ τινί, the "local" toponym he mentions is obviously in Latin as it was spoken in the sixth-century Balkans. The meaning "local" for ἐπιχώριος is less obvious in the well-known passage 2.15.6–10,⁴¹

³⁹ For sculca and its derivates see Dennis & Gamillscheg 1981, 546–547. — A much earlier occurrence of πάτριος φωνή meaning "jargon" may be found in Lucian, Alexander 6 περιήεσαν γοητεύοντες ... καὶ τοὺς παχεῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων – οὕτως γὰρ αὐτοὶ τῇ πατρίφ τῶν μάγων φωνῇ τοὺς πολλοὺς ὀνομάζουσιν – ἀποκείροντες: A. M. Harmon (Loeb) translates: "in the traditional patter of magicians".

⁴⁰ Cf. a later dependency in Souda, kappa 1761 (Κλεισοῦραι:) οὕτω καλοῦνται τὰ ὀχυρώματα τῶν διαβάσεων τῆ πατρίω τῶν Ῥωμαίων φωνῆ.

⁴¹ For a discussion see Coseriu 1983.

where the Roman army during the 593 campaign against the Avars keeps marching after dark somewhere on the southern slopes of the Haemus Mons, when suddenly ἕν τι τῶν ὑποζυγίων τὸν ἐπικείμενον παραπέρριψε φόρτον· συνέτυχε δὲ τὸν κεκτημένον εἰς τὸ πρόσω βαδίζειν· οἱ δὲ παρεπόμενοι καὶ ὑρῶντες τὸ νωτοφόρον ζῶον τὰ ἐπικείμενά πως αὐτῷ ἐπισυρόμενον ἀκοσμότερον εἰς τοὐπίσω τραπέσθαι τὸν δεσπότην ἐκέλευον τό ... ζῶον ἐπανορθοῦσθαι τοῦ πλημμελήματος. τοῦτό τοι τῆς ἀταξίας γέγονεν αἴτιον καὶ τὴν εἰς τοὐπίσω παλίρροιαν αὐτοματίζεται· παρηχεῖται γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡ φωνή, καὶ παράσημον ἦν τὸ λεγόμενον καὶ φυγὴν ἐδόκει δηλοῦν, ὡς οἶα τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιφανέντων άθρόον αὐτοῖς καὶ παρακλεψάντων τὴν δόκησιν. μεγίστου δὲ συμπεσόντος τῷ στρατεύματι θρύλου, θροῦς παρ' αὐτῶν πολὺς ἐπανίσταται, παλιννοστεῖν τε έβόα πᾶς γεγωνώς διαπρύσιον ἐπιχωρίω τε γλώττῃ εἰς τοὐπίσω τραπέσθαι ἄλλος ἄλλφ προσέταττεν «τόρνα, τόρνα» μετὰ μεγίστου ταράχου φθεγγόμενοι, οία νυκτομαχίας τινός ένδημούσης άδοκήτως αὐτοῖς. The incident happened between Roman soldiers on expedition, of whom there is little reason to think as "locals" speaking the dialect of the region; the word they used, tornare "turn back", would later become pan-Romance; it appears that by ἐπιχώριος γλῶττα Theophylactus meant the "usual, customary" rather than "indigenous, local" Latin,⁴² and that is clearly what Theophanes the Confessor assumed as he wrote his own account of the event.43

Here we are back to the "paternal tongue of the Romans" with one final remark about Theophylactus. At *Hist.* 5.6.7 Mebodes the Persian "orders the Romans to give the battle cry and talk in their language", προστάξας τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τῆ πατρίψ φωνῆ ἀλαλάζειν τε καὶ διαλέγεσθαι. The battle cry itself may have been in Latin, but otherwise for Mebodes the language of the Romans was clearly Greek: cf. 5.6.11–7.1 ὁ δὲ Μεβόδης ἐς Ἀντιόχειαν τὴν Περσῶν πτυκτίον ἐξέπεμπε γραμμάτων Ῥωμαϊκῶν· ἡ δὲ δέλτος εἶχεν ἐπὶ λέξεως τάδεκαλὸν γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς συνθήκης τῶν ῥημάτων τὴν ἕκθεσιν, ὡς ἔχει φύσεως, προενέγκασθαι· Ῥωμαῖοι πιστοὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τῷ κυρίῳ ἡμῶν τοῖς τὴν Ἀντιόχειαν τῆς Περσίδος χαίρειν κτλ., "Mebodes sent a message to Persian Antioch written in Roman script", and Theophylactus deems important to cite the exact wording, which is Greek.

⁴² Cf. also 2.4.1 Βιτάλιος ὁ ταξίαρχος ... τήν ... Περσικὴν ἀποσκευὴν ἐχειρώσατο, ῆν σύνηθες Ῥωμαίοις τῆ ἐπιχωρίφ φωνῆ τοῦλδον ἀποκαλεῖν. Τοῦλδος (or -ov) "baggage train" is a well-known Late Greek military term (note that the whole Book 5 of Maurice's Strategicon is "On the τοῦλδος") maybe coming from a Vulgar Latin *toltum, from tollere (see Gyftopoulou 2013, 84), and ἐπιχώριος is there to announce a "substandard" or "jargonesque" term.

⁴³ p258 de Boor ένὸς ... ζώου τὸν φόρτον διαστρέψαντος, ἕτερος τὸν δεσπότην τοῦ ζώου προσφωνεῖ τὸν φόρτον ἀνορθῶσαι τῆ πατρῷą φωνῆ· «τόρνα, τόρνα, φράτερ», καὶ ὁ μὲν κύριος τῆς ἡμιόνου τὴν φωνὴν οὐκ ἠσθάνετο, οἱ δὲ λαοὶ ἀκούσαντες καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἐπιστῆναι αὐτοῖς ὑπονοήσαντες εἰς φυγὴν ἐτράπησαν, «τόρνα, τόρνα» μεγίσταις φωναῖς ἀνακράζοντες.

The passages we have seen so far seem to offer enough proof that the phrase $\dot{\eta} \pi \dot{\alpha} \tau \rho \iota \circ \varsigma \phi \omega v \dot{\eta}$ per se implies no "traditional" quality other than the natural transmission of language through human generations.⁴⁴ Meaning a person's or group's "own" tongue, it usually stands in contrast to another idiom that is manifestly or underlyingly present in the situation – including the one of the writer and his readers. In Greek sources certain foreign cultures are spoken of more frequently and more extensively than others; such is the case of the Jews and the Romans, and that is the single reason why the designation of "the native tongue" applies to Hebrew or Aramaic or Latin more often than to other languages.

Some of our citations also display what appears to be an idiomatic feature: the use of the phrase $\dot{\eta} \pi$. φ . as an adverbial of manner, in the dative, to announce that exotic language material will be or is being adduced in the original.⁴⁵ A couple of even clearer examples follow. Here is how Dionysius of Halicarnassus introduces a Latin term at *Ant. Rom.* 9.10.2: τούτους Ῥωμαῖοι τοὺς ἡγεμόνας τῷ πατρίῳ γλώττῃ πριμοπίλους καλοῦσιν, "these are originally called *primipiloi* by the Romans". As he relates about a barbarian king, Athenaeus (249a–b) says: ἑξακοσίους ἔχειν λογάδας περὶ αὐτόν, οῦς καλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ Γαλατῶν τῷ πατρίῳ γλώττῃ σιλοδούρους, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἑλληνιστὶ εὐχωλιμαῖοι, "they are originally called *silodouroi* by the Gauls, for which the Greek would be, etc.":⁴⁶ here both τῷ πατρίῳ γλώττῃ and ἑλληνιστί, for all the idiomaticity, look pleonastic.⁴⁷ The twin champions of original citation in Greek literature

⁴⁴ Incidentally, this also seems true about the corresponding Latin phrase sermo patrius, which can designate either the everyday or the traditional variety of a language: cf. Tac. Ann. 4.45 (in Spain a native kills the Roman praetor and is caught after a pursuit) repertus cum tormentis edere conscios adigeretur, voce magna sermone patrio frustra se interrogari clamitavit ... nullam vim tantam doloris fore ut veritatem eliceret, against 2.60 (Germanicus travelling on the Nile and visiting Thebes) manebant structis molibus litterae Aegyptiae priorem opulentiam complexae, jussusque e senioribus sacerdotum patrium sermonem interpretari referebat eqs. (for Egyptian cf. Porph. Abst. 4.9 (= Euseb. Praep. ev. 3.4.9), where a hymn singer standing at the door of the temple of Serapis uses traditional idiom for ritual purposes: ὑπηνίκα ἑστὼς ἐπὶ τοῦ οὐδοῦ τῇ πατρίῳ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων φωνῇ ἐγείρει τὸν θεόν).

⁴⁵ Cf. Rochette 1997a, 341 n42: "L'expression [se] rencontre ... très souvent chez les auteurs grecs de la basse époque pour indiquer qu'il s'agit d'une phrase prononcée en latin ($\tau \tilde{\eta} \pi \alpha \tau \rho i \phi \phi \omega \eta$)" – with no reference to any particular text or passage.

⁴⁶ This is about Adiatuanus, king of the Sotiates, having 600 guards known as the *soldurii*, cf. Caes. *Gal.* 3.20–22, and the language in question is either Celtic or Aquitanian.

⁴⁷ On the other hand, note that the meaning of "original" (as opposed to transposition of any kind) is not confined to this particular use of the phrase: cf. the passage from Julian's *Or.* 2 cited above, and also Eusebius, *Onomast.* p2 Klostermann, τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς θείας φερομένων γραφῆς πατρίψ γλώττη πόλεων καὶ κωμῶν τὰς σημασίας ... ἐκθέμενος, "I shall set forth the signification of the names of towns and villages as they originally appear in the Sacred Scriptures".

may well be Philo Judaeus with his Hebrew and John the Lydian with his Latin, and both are keen on marking their citations by means of the π.-φ.-adverbial: e.g. Philo Spec. leg. 2.145 ἑορτὴ τετάρτη, τὰ διαβατήρια, ἢν Ἐβραῖοι Πάσχα πατρίφ γλώττῃ καλοῦσιν, "what the Hebrews originally call the Pasch"; Congr. erud. gr. 177 τις τῶν φοιτητῶν Μωυσέως, ὄνομα Εἰρηνικός, ὃς πατρίφ γλώττῃ Σαλομὼν καλεῖται, "The Peaceful One, or Salomon in the original"; De vita Mosis 2.97 πτηνῶν δυοῖν, ἂ πατρίφ μὲν γλώττῃ προσαγορεύεται Χερουβίμ, ὡς δ' ἂν Ἐλληνες εἴποιεν, ἐπίγνωσις καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ πολλή, "originally called Cherubim, for which the Greek would be, etc."; Jo. Lyd. Mag. 1.50 (about the vigiles urbani) βοῶντες τῇ πατρίφ Ῥωμαίων φωνῇ «omnes collegiati concurrite», οἶον εἰπεῖν «πάντες ἑταῖροι συνδράμετε»; Mens. 4.158 (about a customary greeting given and received by the Romans on winter solstice) ἐπευφήμουν ἀλλήλους τῇ πατρίφ φωνῇ λέγοντες «βίβες ἄννους», οἶον «ζῆθι εἰς χρόνους»; 4.118 (about how Julian met his fate in battle) εἶς ... τῶν ... Σαρακηνῶν ἐκ τῆς ἀλουργίδος βασιλέα ὑπολαβὼν ἀνέκραγε πατρίως «μαλχάν», οἰονεὶ «βασιλεύς» (not Latin!).

All these instances of citation fall into the category of code-switching, and the adverbial expressions τῆ πατρίω γλώττῃ, τῆ πατρίω φωνῆ, πατρίως, all serve the special purpose of cautioning the reader: they are flags that set apart exotic matter from the text that flows in its own language; as such, they are verbal equivalents of what may otherwise be achieved through intonation (in speech) or typography (in writing).⁴⁸ The Greek authors recur to flagged code-switching especially often for the sake of etymology. Here, again, the examples involve a number of different languages and strange associations; for Latin, let us restrict ourselves to a single but colourful passage where Dionysius explains the name of Italy, Ant. Rom. 1.35.2 Ἑλλάνικος δὲ ὁ Λέσβιός φησιν Ήρακλέα τὰς Γηρυόνου βοῦς ἀπελαύνοντα εἰς Ἄργος, ἐπειδή τις αὐτῷ δάμαλις άποσκιρτήσας τῆς ἀγέλης ἐν Ἰταλία ἐόντι ἤδη φεύγων διῆρε τὴν ἀκτὴν καὶ τὸν μεταξύ διανηξάμενος πόρον τῆς θαλάττης εἰς Σικελίαν ἀφίκετο, ἐρόμενον ἀεὶ τοὺς ἐπιχωρίους καθ' οὓς ἑκάστοτε γίνοιτο διώκων τὸν δάμαλιν, εἴ πή τις αὐτὸν έωρακώς είη, τῶν τῆδε ἀνθρώπων Ἑλλάδος μὲν γλώττης ὀλίγα συνιέντων, τῆ δὲ πατρίφ φωνῆ κατὰ τὰς μηνύσεις τοῦ ζώου καλούντων τὸν δάμαλιν ούίτουλον, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν λέγεται, ἐπὶ τοῦ ζώου τὴν χώραν ὀνομάσαι πᾶσαν ὄσην ὁ δάμαλις διῆλθεν Οὐιτουλίαν.49

⁴⁸ See Adams 2003, 297–416 on code-switching in classical texts; flagging, 318–319.

⁴⁹ Examples of other languages involved in flagged code-switching for the sake of etymology: — Hebrew: Origenes, Sel. in Num. PG12.576 μãν ἀνομάσθη ἀπὸ τοῦ τοὺς Ἐβραίους πρώτους θέαμα ξένον ὁρῶντας εἰπεῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῆ πατρίψ γλώσση "Mãv", τουτέστι "Τί τοῦτο;" — Thracian: Greg. Nys., Or. fun. in Flacillam imp. 9p480 Spira ὡ χωρίον ... τῆ σκοτομήνῃ ἐπώνυμον – ἀκούω γὰρ κατὰ τὴν πάτριον αὐτῶν γλῶσσαν Σκοτούμην τὸν τόπον ἐπονομάζεσθαι – ἐκεῖ ἐσκοτίσθῃ ὁ λύχνος, ἐκεῖ κατεσβέσθῃ τὸ φέγγος, ἐκεῖ αἱ ἀκτῖνες τῶν ἀρετῶν ἠμαυρώθησαν. — Aramaic: Sozomenus, H. E. 7.29.2 ὁ Μιχαίου τάφος ... ὃ «μνῆμα πιστὸν» ἀγνοοῦντες ὅ τι λέγουσιν οἱ ἐπιχώριοι ἐκάλουν, Νεφσαμεεμανᾶ τῆ πατρίψ φωνῆ

Strangely perhaps, the authors use the very same adverbial phrase to clarify they will not be citing the original. In certain cases it looks as if the original citation would indeed have been of little interest or even impracticable. For instance, in the scene where Priscus addresses his troops $\tau \tilde{\eta} \pi \alpha \tau \rho i \omega \phi \omega v \tilde{\eta}$ (Hist. 6.7.9) Theophilactus goes on to cite the speech and of course does so in Greek, not Latin. Occasionally the π . φ . adverbial even feels redundant, as when Josephus describes a customary procedure in the Roman army, B. J. 3.92 ο ... κῆρυξ δεξιὸς τῷ πολεμάρχῳ παραστάς, εἰ πρὸς πόλεμόν εἰσιν ἕτοιμοι, τῇ πατρίω γλώσση τρìς ἀναπυνθάνεται, and we see no reason for his insisting on the idiom of the reported utterance: obviously, Romans would use their own language among themselves.⁵⁰ In other cases, though, the modern reader would certainly rather have the original than the excuse for its absence: e.g. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4.39.5 about the name of Vicus sceleratus in Rome: οὗτος ὁ στενωπὸς ... ἐξ ἐκείνου τοῦ δεινοῦ καὶ μυσαροῦ πάθους ἀσεβὴς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων κατὰ τὴν πάτριον γλῶτταν καλεῖται, "the Romans call it Impious Street in their language"; or Jos. B. J. 5.438 about Melchizedek: Χαναναίων δυνάστης ὁ τῇ πατρίω γλώσση κληθεις βασιλεύς δίκαιος "a ruler called, in the native tongue, Righteous King". In these passages the reluctance to cite even proper names in the original may look absurd to us, but in view of their public, which was predominantly and proudly monoglot, the Greek authors were just careful to describe alloglossic situations without actually creating any.

* * *

To turn to the Justinianic Novellae, the most obvious passages of interest are those in which $\dot{\eta} \pi \dot{\alpha} \tau \rho_{IOC} \phi \omega \nu \dot{\eta}$ refers to Latin in relation to Greek. The locus princeps is the following:

όνομάζοντες. — Phoenician: Steph. Byz. Ethnica p255 Meineke (= Claudius Iolaus frg. 2 Müller) μετὰ Καισάρειαν Δῶρα κεῖται βραχεῖα πολίχνη, Φοινίκων αὐτὴν οἰκούντων, οῦ διὰ τὸ ὑπόπετρον τῶν τε αἰγιαλῶν καὶ τὸ πορφύρας γόνιμον συνελθόντες καλιὰς αὐτοῖς ὠκοδομήσαντο καὶ ... τεμνόμενοι τὰς πέτρας διὰ τῶν ἐξαιρουμένων λίθων τὰ τείχη κατεβάλοντο καὶ τὴν εὕορμον χηλὴν ... ἔθεντο, ἐπώνυμον αὐτὴν τῷ πατρίῳ γλώσσῃ Δώρ καλοῦντες.

⁵⁰ The Spanish episode in Tacitus (above, n. 44) looks of a similar kind – despite the drama it brings to the scene, *sermone patrio* has no bearing on the situation described. *Contra* Clackson 2015, 74: "This may be a symbolic use of language, but it may also reveal the reversion to the first language under extreme stress." But there is no reason to think that throughout his capture and ordeal the murderer spoke a word in any other than his native tongue."

Nov. 7.1 οὐ τῆ πατρίφ φωνῆ τὸν νόμον συνεγράψαμεν ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ δὴ τῆ κοινῆ τε καὶ ἐλλάδι, ὥστε ἅπασιν αὐτὸν εἶναι γνώριμον διὰ τὸ πρόχειρον τῆς ἑρμηνείας non paterna voce legem conscripsimus sed hac communi et Graeca, ut omnibus sit nota propter facilem interpretationem

"for this law to be easily understood and thus universally known, we did not write it in the paternal tongue, but in this one, the Greek and common language"⁵¹

Here the traditional and official quality of Latin is opposed to the practicality of Greek. Unquestionably, what $\dot{\eta} \pi \dot{\alpha} \tau \rho_{100} \zeta \phi_{000} \psi_{100} \dot{\eta}$ conveys at this place is what we have seen documented in other sources, too: the view of Latin as "the language of our origins" despite the vicissitudes of the Empire's political and social history. But had the phrase itself, after much repeated use, finally come to *mean* Latin? Another passage from the Novellae will tell:

Νον. 146.1 θεσπίζομεν ... ἄδειαν είναι τοῖς βουλομένοις Ἐβραίοις κατὰ τὰς συναγωγὰς τὰς αὐτῶν, καθ' ὅν Ἐβραῖοι ὅλως τόπον εἰσί, διὰ τῆς ἐλληνίδος φωνῆς τὰς ἱερὰς βίβλους ἀναγινώσκειν τοῖς συνιοῦσιν, ἢ καὶ τῆς πατρίου τυχὸν (τῆς ἰταλικῆς ταύτης φαμὲν) ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπλῶς, τοῖς τόποις συμμεταβαλλομένης τῆς γλώττης καὶ τῆς δι' αὐτῆς ἀναγνώσεως

"the Jews in their synagogues, wherever they are, shall be free to gather at will and read the Holy Scriptures in Greek or, if need be, in the paternal tongue (by which we mean the language of Italy) or indeed in other tongues, as different places will suggest using, and reading in, different languages" sancimus licentiam esse volentibus Hebraeis et synagogas suas, in quem Hebraei omnino locum sunt, per Graecam vocem sacros libros legere convenientibus et patria forte lingua (hac dicimus) et aliis simpliciter, locis translatis lingua et per ipsius lectionis⁵²

Approving the use of languages other than Hebrew in synagogues, this text speaks of Greek, Latin, or any other language in local use. H $\pi \dot{\alpha} \tau \rho_{100} \phi_{000} \psi_{100}$ is there to refer to Latin the usual way, but in this particular context it comes awkwardly, as it may be taken quite naturally to mean "the paternal tongue" of

⁵¹ This and the subsequent ad hoc translations from the *Novellae* are mine.

⁵² By the end of this passage the word-for-word Latin translation becomes nonsensical; cf. n. 55 below.

the Jews. Whence the parenthesis: "by which we mean the language of Italy";⁵³ this reassures the reader that despite the factual complexity of the situation described, $\dot{\eta} \pi$. φ . should be taken in its usual meaning. What it proves to us, however, is that $\dot{\eta} \pi$. φ . cannot *denote* Latin; it is only by implication that the usual meaning comes about, when it does come about; the phrase by itself is incapable of clearly referring to Latin if the context implies otherwise.

In other instances the contrast between Greek and Latin follows a somewhat different line:

Nov. 13.1 τῆ μὲν ἡμετέρα φωνῆ praetores plebis προσαγορευέσθωσαν, τῆ δὲ ἐλλάδι ταύτῃ καὶ κοινῃ πραίτωρες δήμων nostra quidem voce praetores plebis appellentur, graeca vero ista et communi lingua praetores populorum

"let them be called the *praetores plebis* in our tongue, and the *community pretors* in this tongue, the Greek lingua franca"

Here as elsewhere we hear about "the Hellenic and common language" – its being a lingua franca definitely gives Greek the status of a universal possession. As against this, Latin is now styled "our own tongue": while Greek belongs to the world, Latin belongs to "us". But who is *we*? Did Justinian by "*our* language" mean particularly his own? Despite the evasiveness of the first person plural in a formal register, we cannot rule out this possibility, especially in view of another passage from the same constitution:

Nov. 13. pr ή μέν ... πάτριος ήμῶν φωνὴ praefectos vigilum αὐτοὺς ἐκάλεσε, τῆ τῶν ἀγρυπνούντων καὶ οὐδὲν ἀνεύρητον καταλιμπανόντων ἀνθρώπων ἀρχῆ τούτους ἐπιστήσασα, ἡ δέ γε Ἑλλήνων φωνὴ οὐκ ἴσμεν ὅθεν ἐπάρχους αὐτοὺς ἐκάλεσε τῶν νυκτῶν patriae .. nostrae vox praefectos vigilum eos appellavit a vigilantibus et nihil imperscrutandum derelinquentibus hominibus, cingulis hos praeponens, vox enim Graecorum nescimus unde praefectos eos appellavit noctium

"our own paternal tongue calls them the *praefecti vigilum* ... whilst in Greek, for whatever reason, they are called the night commanders"

In Athenaeus⁵⁴ we saw Latin being called ἡ πάτριος ἡμῶν φωνή by a noble Roman speaking Greek, and it seems that we have a close parallel here. To

⁵³ Or, in the Latin version, "the language of this text".

⁵⁴ See n. 26 above.

judge by the words *patriae nostrae vox*, the Latin translator⁵⁵ here read $\pi \alpha \tau \rho i \delta \sigma \varsigma$, not $\pi \dot{\alpha} \tau \rho i \sigma \varsigma$; in either case, it is the subsequent possessive that makes the phrase remarkable, giving it the look of a personal statement.

But besides looking personal it also looks incidental to the point of being unexpected. This is believably due the fact that we are meeting a whipped-up version of $\dot{\eta} \pi$. ϕ . at a place where we should expect the phrase in its usual form to perform a function we have seen performed often enough – flag the use of technical terms, as it does elsewhere in the Novellae, too:

Nov. 140.pr (about consensual divorce of marriage) ὥστε καὶ νόμους κεῖσθαι πολλοὺς τοῦτο λέγοντάς τε καὶ διορίζοντας καὶ bona gratia τὴν οὕτω προϊοῦσαν λύσιν τῶν γάμων τῇ πατρίῳ καλοῦντας φωνῇ ut et plurimae tunc leges exstarent hoc dicentes et »bona gratia« sic procedentem solutionem nuptiarum patria vocitantes voce

"and there are many laws saying and sanctioning this and calling this type of divorce *bona gratia* in the paternal tongue"

Varieties of the same technical function include introducing a style of office, in

Nov. 30.5 (a province reorganized) καλείσθω τε ό ταύτης ήγούμενος τῆ πατρίφ φωνῆ proconsul Justinianus Cappadociae voceturque hujus rector patria voce »proconsul Justinianus Cappadociae«

"let its administrator be called *proconsul* N. Cappadociae in the paternal tongue"

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⁵⁵ Kroll thought poorly of this particular Latin translation ("Nov. XIII … Latine legitur … interpretis novicii inscitia multifariam deformata", Kroll *ad loc.*), and the gibberish in the middle of this sentence proves him right. Cf. Kroll's own correct translation: "patria nostra lingua praefectos vigilum eos vocabat, quippe quos hominum qui vigilias agunt nec quicquam inexploratum relinquunt regimini praeficeret, Graecorum vero lingua nescimus unde praefectos noctium eos vocavit."

and announcing a citation, in

Νον. 22.2 ὁ παλαιότατος ... τῶν νόμων ... κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν καὶ πάτριον γλῶτταν οὑτωσί που λέγων antiquissima .. lex .. secundum antiquam et patriam linguam ita dicens

"the most ancient of the laws says, in the old and paternal tongue" [there follows a Latin citation from the Twelve Tables Law]

The etymologic motive, as seen in examples from other sources, is apparent in the Novellae as well:

Nov. 15.pr τῆ πατρίφ φωνῆ «δεφένσωρας»⁵⁶ αὐτοὺς καλοῦμεν, ὅπως ἀν ἀπαλλάξαιεν κακῶν τοὺς ἀδικουμένους paterna voce defensores eos vocamus, quatenus eripiant malis injustitiam patientes

"in the paternal tongue we call them the defensores, as they are supposed to remove any evil from those who have been wronged"

In the following passage, a Latin conceptualization, virtue = manhood, is mentioned as a sort of general relevancy even though deemed inapplicable to the particular case:

Nov. 69.pr οὐδὲ ἀνδρείαν τὴν μὴ μετὰ δικαιοσύνης ἐπαινέσομεν, καίτοιγε ἡ πάτριος φωνὴ τὴν ἐν ὅπλοις ἰσχὺν ἀρετὴν ὀνομάζει μόνην nec fortitudinem quae non est cum justitia laudabimus, cum scilicet patria lingua fortitudinem in armis virtutem appellet solum

"we shall not praise bravery without justice, although nothing but valour in arms is called virtue in the paternal tongue"

Remarkably, each of these passages could, in a freer translation, do very well without the "paternal tongue" at all. By putting it thus: "using the original term", "his style of office shall be", "in the archaic wording of the original", "they are officially called", "in traditional terms", one would perhaps better reproduce the strategy of the Greek, which deftly implies Latin every time without ever mentioning it directly.

To sum up. Did Justinian explicitly call Latin his own first language in the Novellae? In *Nov.* 13 he did – twice, or so it seems; but to do so he used more than just $\dot{\eta} \pi \dot{\alpha} \tau \rho_{10} \sigma_{10} \phi_{10} \phi_{10} \phi_{10}$, the phrase other sources prove could indeed mean

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⁵⁶ Sic, vs δηφ- in other sources.

one's mother tongue. What is beyond doubt is that by $\dot{\eta} \pi \dot{\alpha} \tau \rho_i o \zeta \phi \omega v \dot{\eta}$ Justinian meant the traditional language of the Roman people and state,⁵⁷ which is all the more obvious as the "paternal" prestige of Latin was remembered even after the language was forgotten.⁵⁸ (The concept is interesting from another angle, too, because it seems to anticipate the Western view of Latin as the Vatersprache, the traditional "father tongue" of high culture and public action, as opposed to any vernacular;⁵⁹ a big difference, however, is that for Justinian and his contemporaries Latin did not occupy the position of the "high" language in a diglossic community.) Another obvious aspect of Latin as the $\pi \dot{\alpha} \tau \rho_{100} \phi_{100} \phi_{100} \phi_{100}$ was its official status: this had never been questioned, but still underwent important modification under Justinian as his administration was adapting to the complexities of the Empire restored. Anyways, official is the translation one would tend to use for $\dot{\eta} \pi \dot{\alpha} \tau \rho_{100} \phi_{000} \psi_{000} \dot{\eta}$ at more than one place in the Novellae. But besides or before anything that pertains to ideology, the phrase had got one long-established and highly technical use: to flag code-switching, i.e. announce terms from and citations in a foreign language. In translation we may speak of the original or whatever else we fancy in that way; meanwhile we can be certain that the Greek expression speaks as much as a simple pair of quotation marks.

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⁵⁹ See e.g. Ziolkowski 1997, 299–301 (»Die Soziolinguistik des Mittellateins«).

⁵⁷ Cf. Rochette 1997a, 142 n352: "[I]l faut traduire πάτριος φωνή par « langue historique de l'Empire »."

⁵⁸ E.g. Const. Porph. *Them*. As.-Eur. prol.1 oi ἀπ' ἐκείνου κρατήσαντες [the emperors who came after Heraclius] ... εἰς μικρά τινα μέρη κατέτεμον τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχὴν ... μάλιστα ἑλληνίζοντες καὶ τὴν πάτριον καὶ Ῥωμαϊκὴν γλῶτταν ἀποβαλόντες, "rejecting what was their own language and one of Rome". — Coming from an earlier world, Themistius, Φιλάδελφοι ἢ περὶ φιλανθρωπίας p71 Harduin, provides a fascinating contrast: οὐδέποτε ... ἀναγκαίαν εἰναὶ μοι τὴν διάλεκτον τὴν κρατοῦσαν ὑπολαβών, ἀλλ' ἰκανὸν ἀεὶ νομίσας τὴν πάτριον καὶ Ἐλληνικὴν ἀποχρώντως μεταχειρίζεσθαι, where "the ruling language" is Latin, while Greek, the "adequate mastery" of which Themistius deems "sufficient in any situation", is called "our own and Hellenic", i.e. the language that came down to the actual generation through both natural transmission and cultural tradition. On the other hand, Vassilikopoulou 1993, 104, doesn't seem to be right in thinking that Themistius regarded "the ruling language" with contempt.

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Grand Župan Uroš II of Rascia

Abstract: Historical data on the person and policies of the "veliki [grand] župan" Uroš II - archžupan in Byzantine sources, magnus comes in Latin texts - can be found in twelfthcentury Serbian, Greek, Hungarian, German and Russian sources. The paper is divided into three sections dealing specifically with Uroš II's family relations (ancestors and descendants); chronological issues of his reign in Serbia; and his domestic and foreign policies. Uroš II's father, the Serbian župan Uroš I, had three sons and a daughter: Uroš II, Desa, Beloš and Helen (Jelena). Uroš II succeeded his father as the ruler of Serbia. Helen married king Béla II of Hungary (1131-41) and became a very influential figure at the Hungarian court. Their brother Beloš, who was known in Hungary as ban Béla and subsequently held the office of the palatine of Hungary, considerably contributed to the firming up of Serbian-Hungarian political ties. Based on a detailed analysis of the surviving sources, the author suggests the conclusion that Uroš II was a true predecessor of Stefan Nemanja in all his policies. He was a vassal of the Byzantine emperor but he allied with Hungary in the aspiration to achieve independence. At the time of Uroš II and his successors the region of Rascia (Raška, Rassa), known for the city of Ras (modern Novi Pazar) and the Bishopric of Raška with the bishop's seat at the church of Sts Peter and Paul, was the core of the Serbian state.

Keywords: archžupan/magnus comes, Serbia, Rascia, city of Ras (Novi Pazar), Uroš II, Byzantium, Hungary

R ascia (Raška) underwent major changes in the twelfth century.¹ The road travelled from a small vassal polity of Byzantium to the state of Stefan Nemanja was a long one. It is still inadequately known. This becomes particularly clear with regard to Rascia's internal development. Historians have had much trouble clarifying it primarily because of the nature of the surviving sources which seldom contain information about areas such as the economy, administration or way of life of the Balkan peoples. These areas tended to become a focus of interest in contemporary writings only when they came to upset the established system of relations in a given region. That is exactly how the twelfth-century *župans* of Rascia entered history. Of all of them, the remarkable figure of Stefan Nemanja has always attracted the greatest attention. His reign and especially his achievements overshadowed everything that had gone before. The unprec-

¹ The name "Raška" (Rascia) for the core area of the medieval Serbian state became established in the twelfth century. It is much older, though, and associated with the history of the city of Ras (modern Novi Pazar) and the Bishopric of Raška, cf. J. Kalić, "Naziv 'Raška' u starijoj srpskoj istoriji (IX–XII vek)", *Zbornik Filozofskog fakulteta* XIV-1 (1979), 79–91. The title of the ruler of Serbia before she was constituted as a kingdom in 1217 was "veliki [grand] župan", referred to as "archžupan" in Byzantine sources and as "magnus comes" in Latin texts.

edented extent of the Serbian realm centred on Rascia was such a compelling proof of the magnitude of Nemanja's achievement that both Serbian and foreign scholars mostly focused on him. Foreign historians were usually led to Rascia via the work of the Byzantine writers John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates. They sought to unravel at least the basic issues of twelfth-century Serbian history, and in doing so rightly insisted on Serbian-Byzantine relations. But they tended to lose their way in the really convoluted tangle of family and political relations of the *župan*s of Rascia.² Serbian historiography, on the other hand, was preoccupied with the personage of Stefan Nemanja and, in search for data that could shed light on his activity, either completely ignored his predecessors or tended to link them to him by making all sorts of constructions. This was particularly obvious in the attempts to identify Nemanja's father. Struggling to solve the mystery, historians tended to link to Uroš I, Uroš II and Desa pieces of information that in fact have nothing to do with them.³ In this way a grave injustice was done to those who had paved the way for Nemanja.

This paper is devoted to the grand *župan* Uroš II of Rascia in an effort to provide answers to a few basic questions concerning Uroš II himself, the times in which he reigned and the policies he pursued.

Family background

Župan Uroš I of Rascia had three sons and a daughter. One son's name was Desa, according to the *Letopis popa Dukljanina* (Chronicle of a priest of Dioclea).⁴ In

² K. I. A. Grot, *Iz istorii Ugrii i slavianstva v XII veke* (1141–1173) (Warsaw 1889); E. Golubinskii, *Kratkii ocherk istorii pravoslavnyh tserkvei* (Moscow 1871); A. Huber, *Geschichte Österreichs*, vol. I (Gotha 1885); V. N. Zlatarski, *Istoriia na bŭlgarskata drzhava* II (Sofia 1934).

³ I. Ruvarac, "Prilošci k poznavanju izvora srpske istorije", *Godišnjica N. Čupića* 14 (1984); Lj. Kovačević, "Nekolika pitanja o Stefanu Nemanji", *Glas SKA* 58 (1900), 1–106; D. Anastasijević, *Otac Nemanjin* (Belgrade 1914); St. Novaković, "Zemljište radnje Nemanjine", *Godišnjica N. Čupića* 1 (1877), 163–244; St. Stanojević, "O Nemanjinom ocu", *Starinar V* (1928–30), 3–6; V. Ćorović, "Pitanje o hronologiji u delima sv. Save", *Godišnjica N. Čupića* 49 (1940), 1–69; *Letopis popa Dukljanina*, ed. F. Šišić (Belgrade – Zagreb 1928); R. Novaković, "Kad se rodio i kad je počeo da vlada Stevan Nemanja", *Istoriski glasnik* 3–4 (1958), 165–192; M. Dinić, "Srpske zemlje u ranofeudalno doba (do XII veka)", in *Istorija naroda Jugoslavije* I (Belgrade 1953), 249–250; K. Jireček, *Istorija Srba* I (Belgrade 1952), 141ff.

⁴ Letopis popa Dukljanina, ed. F. Šišić, 375; cf. N. Radojčić, "Društveno i državno uredjenje kod Srba u ranom srednjem veku", *Glasnik Skopskog naučnog društva* XV (1935), 15; in reconstructing the relations of kinship by birth and marriage in the family of the *župans* of Rascia we depend on various sources. In addition to the abovementioned *Letopis*, they include the Byzantine writers Kinnamos and Choniates, Otto of Freising and the *Vienna Illuminated Chronicle*. The sources originated in different environments and vary in trustworthiness. Some of the writers were contemporaries of or chronologically close to the events they wrote about (Otto of Freising, Kinnamos, Choniates), but some accounts are of a later date and

his account of the events in Serbia in the mid-twelfth century, Kinnamos claims that Uroš (II) and Desa were brothers.⁵ Information about yet another family member survives in Hungarian sources: Helena, daughter of Uroš I and sister of Uroš II and Desa. Namely, towards the end of his life king Stephen II of Hungary decided to marry his heir, Bela the Blind, son of Almos, to the daughter of the Serbian grand *župan* Uroš (I). Thus Uroš's daughter became a Hungarian queen, wife of Bela II (1131–1141).⁶ Since a child was born out of this union, Géza, future king Géza II (1141–1162), and since it is reliably known that Stephen II lived to see his birth, the date of the marriage of Helena and Bela can be established quite accurately. Stephen II died on 1 March 1131 and, therefore, the marriage is assumed to have taken place in 1129 or in 1130 at the latest. So it was then that close family ties were established between the *župan* of Rascia and the Hungarian royal house. This fact explains some important subsequent events.

Besides Uroš (II), Desa and Helena, Uroš I had a third son, Beloš. Beloš was a very interesting figure and left a deep imprint in Hungary where he lived most of his life. He enjoyed the reputation of an accomplished warrior. According to complex evidence from several sources, in the war between the minor king Géza II's forces and the Austro-German invading armies in 1146, the decisive role was played by the king's uncle, the *ban* Beloš.⁷ The invaders were defeated and Beloš became quite influential at the Hungarian court. He took part in the upbringing and education of king Géza II.⁸ Sources usually refer to him as "ban".⁹

⁸Cinn. 104.

⁹ He figures in Hungarian charters from 1142 onward, and with the title of *dux* or *ban*: G. Fejér, *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae ecclesiasticus ac civilis*, vol. II (Buda 1829), 88; the charter

therefore rely on earlier writings (*Vienna Illuminated Chronicle*). For the *Letopis* cf. the view of S. Mijušković, transl. and ed., *Ljetopis popa Dukljanina* (Titograd 1967), 7–120.

⁵ Ioannis Cinnami Epitome rerum ab Ioanne et Alexio Comnenis gestarum, ed. A. Meineke (Bonn 1836), 113.

⁶Chronicon pictum Vindobonense, ed. I. Szentpétery, Scriptores rerum Hungaricum I (Budapest 1937), 443: "Statimque misit [sc. king] nuncios in Servian et filiam Uroš comitis magni in legitimam uxorem Bele traduxerunt." Queen Helena convenes an assembly at Arad (ibid. 444). There is an ample scholarly literature on the Vienna Illuminated Chronicle, to mention but: H. Marczali, Ungarns Geschichtsquellen im Zeitalter der Arpaden (Berlin 1882), 68–83; S. Domanovszky, preface to Scriptores rerum Hungaricum I, ed. Szentpétery (Budapest 1937); C. A. Macartney, The Medieval Hungarian Historians (Cambridge University Press, 1953), 133–142; T. Kardos, preface to the edition of this Chronicle Die ungarische Bilderchronik (Budapest 1961), 5–30; and more recently, e.g.: G. Kristó, "Anjou-kori krónikáin", Századok 3–4 (1967), 457–508.

⁷ Otto Frisingensis, Gesta Friderici imperatoris, MGH SS XX, 369–370, including a fine description of Beloš and his abilities; Chronicon, ed. Szentpétery, 456: "avunculus domini regis Bele ban nominatus"; Lavrent'evskaia letopis', vol. I of Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei (PSRL I) (Leningrad 1928), under the year 1144 mentions the Hungarians and the "ban, the king's uncle".

From 1145 he served as palatine of Hungary.¹⁰ In the Hungarian-Byzantine war of 1151 he fought against the Byzantine emperor Manuel's army which invaded Syrmia. The *ban* Beloš launched a counteroffensive towards Braničevo and drove the Byzantines out of Hungary.¹¹ He disappears from the sources towards the end of Géza II's reign. This inspired the assumption that he had fallen from his charge's grace and was removed from his high offices. Some historians believed him to have been the grand *župan* of Rascia mentioned as the ruler holding the Serbian throne in the 1160s.¹² It is a fact that the *ban* Beloš supported Géza's brothers, Stephen in particular, in the struggle for power.¹³ The struggle reached its peak after Géza II's death in 1162, and the circumstances for Beloš to support Stephen's pretensions became even more favourable. Stephen ascended to the Hungarian throne in 1163, backed more by Byzantine money and arms than by

of 1142 is also included in I. Kukuljević-Sakcinski, *Codex diplomaticus regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae et Slavoniae,* vol. II (Zagreb 1876), 30, but under the year 1141. Probably based on that, V. Klaić, "Hrvatski bani za Arpadovića", *Vjestnik kr. hrvatsko-slavonsko-dalmatinskog Zemaljskog arkiva* 1 (1899), 129, believed that the *dux* Beloš was mentioned in the sources for the first time in 1141. I. Kukuljević-Sakcinski, "Prvovjenčani vladaoci Bugara, Hrvata i Srba", *Rad JAZU* 59 (1881), 116, argued that Beloš occurred in a charter of 1137. This view was adopted by Kovačević, "Nekolika pitanja", and rectified by Šišić, *Letopis*, 99, n. 78. Cf. also M. Gyóni, *A magyar nyelv görög feljegyzéses szórványemlékei* (Budapest 1943), 29–30.

¹⁰ The year 1145 – "Belus Palatinus Comes": Fejér, *Codex diplomaticus* II, 124; 1146 – "Belus Comes Palatinus et Banus": G. Wenzel, *Codex diplomaticus Arpadianus continuatus*, vol. I (Pest 1860), 57; 1148 – Fejér, *Codex diplomaticus* II, 129; 1150 – again as "Beluš Banus": Wenzel, *Codex diplomaticus* I, 60. Under the same year, the Russian *Ipati'vskaia letopis'* (PSRL II) (St. Petersburg 1908), 407–408, brings the information that the daughter of the Hungarian *ban* is to be married to Prince Vladimir, brother of Izaislav Mstislavich. Cf. V. G. Vasil'evskii, "Soiuz dvukh imperii", *Trudy V. G. Vasil'evskago* IV (Leningrad 1930), 104. The year 1152 is also mentioned: Wenzel, *Codex diplomaticus* I, 60; T. Smičiklas, *Codex diplomaticus regni Croatiae*, *Dalmatiae et Slavoniae*, vol. II (Zagreb 1904), 67.

¹¹ Cinn. 117. Beloš continues to be mentioned in Hungarian sources until 1158: Wenzel, *Codex diplomaticus* I, 62; Fejér, *Codex diplomaticus* II, 140–143, 144, 146, 148. This brief list of references to Beloš does not take into account many testimonies to his activity. Cf. B. Homan, *Geschichte des ungarischen Mittelalters*, vol. I (Berlin 1940), 384–385; J. Radonić, "Srbija i Ugarska u srednjem veku", in *Vojvodina* I (Novi Sad 1939), 130–131.

¹² It has long been observed that the name of the *ban* Beloš does not occur in the Hungarian sources between 1158 and 1163. This has been the reason for some to assume that sometime "around 1158" he went to Serbia where the emperor Manuel appointed him as grand *župan*: Grot, *Iz istorii Ugrii*, 230–234; F. Chalandon, *Les Comnène* II (Paris 1912), 391–392; Klaić, "Hrvatski bani", 135–137; Šišić, *Letopis*, 96–98, believed he had been the grand *župan* of Rascia in 1161–1162. Cf. n. 49 below.

¹³ Rahewin, Gesta Friderici, MGH SS XX, 423–424. Cf. J. v. Pauler, "Wie und wann kam Bosnien an Ungarn", Wissenschaftliche Mitteilungen aus Bosnien und Herzegowina II (1894), 161; Jireček, Istorija I, 145; B. Nedeljković, "Postojbina prvog bosanskog bana Boriča", Istoriski časopis IX–X (1959), 55–56.

supporters in the country. In a charter issued in Esztergom, Beloš figures among his closest associates.¹⁴ Beloš died before 1198.¹⁵ In his lifetime he had a Benedictine monastery built on his estate in Syrmia, in the present-day village of Banoštor, Serbia. Evidence of this lavishly endowed monastery and its founder survives in the name of this settlement that has grown in the vicinity.¹⁶

Uroš II ruled Rascia at exactly the same time when Beloš was at the helm of Hungarian politics. Even though Beloš's policy of supporting the Serbian anti-Byzantine agenda was neither new in Hungary nor was it his invention, it was expanded and set on a firmer basis in his time. Serbian-Hungarian cooperation was at work during the wars against Byzantium in 1149–50.

When did Uroš II become the grand župan of Rascia?

The Serbian-Byzantine wars waged in the mid-twelfth century are known well enough. Their course is outlined by the data provided by Kinnamos and Choniates, and their nature identified by modern scholarship.¹⁷ We shall, therefore, only dwell on the data that are helpful in clarifying the question posed above.

Emperor Manuel I Komnenos undertook two successive campaigns against Rascia. The first was launched in response to the news of an anti-Byzantine alliance of the Alemanni, Serbs and Hungarians.¹⁸ Namely, the Serbs joined

¹⁴ In this document king Stephen IV confirms the *ban* Beloš's ruling that the forest of Dubrava is in the ownership of the Bishopric of Zagreb. Among the king's witnesses, Borič, the *ban* of Bosnia, figures immediately after Beloš and before the other *župans*. The charter is published by Smičiklas, *Codex diplomaticus* II, 303, but the line where the *ban* Borič is mentioned is left out. Cf. Fejér, *Codex diplomaticus* II, 166.

¹⁵ He is referred to as "deceased" in a letter of the pope Innocent III to the bishop of Kalocsa. Cf. Smičiklas, *Codex diplomaticus* II, 303.

¹⁶ In his abovementioned letter Innocent III says: "in proprio fundo suo, qui appellatur Keu, monasterium in protomartiris Stephani honorem construxit..." It may not be irrelevant that in 1164 the emperor Manuel, while on his Hungarian campaign, made a stop in Syrmia in a place called Petrik ($\chi \tilde{\omega} \rho ov \Pi \epsilon \tau \rho i \kappa ov$) which seems to have been the Hungarian *Keu* or *Ku* that occurs in the sources. Hungarian *kö* means "stone", which is equivalent to Greek " $\pi \epsilon \tau \rho a$ ". That the later settlement of Banoštor should be brought into connection with Beloš's estate Keu seems to be suggested by a later document of 1309 which mentions "Civitas de Ku que alio modo Monasterium Bani nominatur": *Monumenta Vaticana*, ser. I, vol. II (Budapest 1885), 322. Cf. D. Csánki, *Magyarország történelmi földrajza a Hunyadiak korában*, vol. II (Budapest 1894), 234.

¹⁷ Vasil'evskii, "Soiuz dvukh imperii", 94; Jireček, *Istorija* I, 142; Dinić, "Srpske zemlje", 249– 250; J. Kalić, "Srpski veliki župani u borbi s Vizantijom", in *Istorija srpskog naroda*, vol. I, ed. S. Ćirković (Belgrade 1981), 197–211; F. Makk, *The Arpáds and the Comneni* (Budapest 1989), 42–62.

¹⁸ Cinn. 101–102.

a broad anti-Byzantine coalition formed by the South-Italian Normans, Hungary and a powerful German duke of the house of Welf. Somewhat later, the idea of a war against the emperor Manuel attracted the French king, Louis VII, and Hungarian-Byzantine clashes were also sparked in the fiercely rivalling Rus' principalities. Opposed to the thus allied forces was the firm German-Byzantine alliance concluded during the stay of Conrad III Hohenstaufen in Constantinople at the time of the Second Crusade. Most of the battles between these hostile blocs were fought between the Normans and Byzantium over the Ionian Islands, between the Welf and Hohenstaufen families, and between the Serbs and Byzantines in Rascia.¹⁹ In 1149 Manuel ravaged Ras and captured Nikava and Galič, and then returned to Constantinople only to resume his campaign the following year, and on a much larger scale.²⁰

Neither Kinnamos nor Choniates mention the *župan* of Rascia who rebelled against Byzantium in 1149 by name. Kinnamos does not name him even in his extensive account of the emperor's campaign of 1150.²¹ Yet, after the account of the Serbian defeat at the Battle of the river Tara in the late autumn of 1150, he adds that "a long while later" the Serbs deposed Uroš without the emperor's knowledge and handed power over to his brother Desa. But they were fearful of the emperor's anger and so they brought the dispute before Manuel to arbitrate. Manuel restored Uroš (II) to power.²² It has been rightly inferred from this passage that Manuel backed Uroš in this internal conflict given that he, apparently after the Battle of the Tara in 1150, had accepted him as the ruler of Rascia and his vassal.

Thus, it may be indirectly inferred from Kinnamos that Uroš II was the grand *župan* of Rascia in 1150. That this was so becomes clear from Choniates' account of the same events. It explicitly names Manuel's adversary in Serbia in 1150: Uroš, the ruler of the Serbs.²³ And that is not all. This important passage in Choniates contains yet another piece of information. The emperor learned,

¹⁹ H. v. Kap-Herr, *Die abendländische Politik Kaiser Manuels* (Strasbourg 1881), 31–37; P. Lamma, *Comneni e Stauffer*, vol. I (Rome 1955), 85–115; J. Kalić, "Evropa i Srbi u XII veku", *Glas SANU* 384 (1998), 95–106.

²⁰ Cinn. 102–103; Nicetae Choniatae Historia, ed. I. Bekker (Bonn 1835), 119–120.

²¹ Cinn. 103–113.

²² Cinn. 113.9–16.

²³ Chon. 121.18–19. It is curious that this piece of information has largely gone unnoticed even though attention to it was drawn quite early on by Ruvarac, "Prilošci", 214–215. Uroš's name occurs only in the Greek text. The translator into Latin left the name out. It should be noted that Uroš's name occurs in both manuscripts of Choniates' text used for the Bonn edition. Manuscript B says: τὸν ῥῆγα σερβίας τὸν οὕρεσην: Chon. 121; Th. Skutariotes, Σύνοψις χρονική, in K. N. Sathas, ed., Μεσαιωνική Βιβλιοθήκη, vol. VII (Venice and Paris 1894), 238.3–4, says: τὸν Σερβίας ἄρχοντα Οὕρεσιν.

Choniates says, that the ruler of the Serbs misconducted himself and *acted even worse than before*,²⁴ which is obviously an allusion to the previous year, 1149, because it was the only year prior to 1150 in which the Serbs rebelled against Manuel.

It follows from Choniates, then, that Uroš II was the Serbian ruler in 1149, that he rebelled against Byzantine rule then, and that he continued his rebellion in 1150 "worse than before". This disproves all assumptions, so current in the earlier literature, concerning Vakhin, the Serbian *župan*.²⁵

This conclusion is confirmed, in their own way, by Byzantine twelfthcentury rhetoricians. Their writings do not contain any precise chronological information; such information simply emerges from their content. The poet Theodore Prodromos, for example, glorifying the emperor's deeds, describes Manuel's campaign against the Serbs. In his words, Serbs dispersed before the advancing imperial army and their ruler, Uroš, did not appear before the emperor but withdrew to a remote part of his land.²⁶ This apparently refers to the emperor's campaign of 1149. The same event seems to be referred to in an oration of Michael of Thessalonike, also known as Michael (the) Rhetor, which mentions, in the florid rhetorical manner, ties between Serbs and Hungarians. The emperor, Michael says, attacked the heart of the Serbian land, which he calls "the land of the Slavs", and routed the adversary.²⁷

Apart from these more or less known data about Uroš II, Kinnamos' text contains other details about the situation in Rascia. They reveal some facts about Uroš II himself: in the passage describing the Serbian defeat at the Battle of the Tara in 1150. The envoys of the Serbian grand *župan* were the first to appear before the emperor, and then came the *župan*. On that occasion the terms of their relationship were settled. Uroš II paid homage to the emperor and promised to provide military assistance in two cases. Namely, he agreed to

²⁴ Chon. 121.18–19: βασιλεύς δὲ αὐτὸς αὖθις μαθών κακουργεῖν τὸν Σερβίας δυναστεύοντα οὕρεσι καὶ χείρονα δρᾶν τῶν προτέρων...

²⁵ On Vakhin, see a more detailed analysis of the sources and literature by J. Kalić in *Vizantijski izvori za istoriju naroda Jugoslavije* IV (Belgrade 1971).

²⁶ Theodorus Prodromus in *Recueil des historiens des croisades, Hist. grecs,* vol. II, ed. E. Miller (Paris 1881), 761–763. The poem says that Manuel moved against the Serbs after his victory in Corfu, i.e. in 1149.

²⁷ W. Regel, *Fontes rerum byzantinarum*, vol. I (St. Petersburg 1892), Speech no. X, pp. 174– 175. The speech seems to have been composed in 1150 because the rhetorician, describing the emperor's campaign against the Serbs which may be identified as the 1149 campaign based on its content, says in one place (174.15): τί μὴ λέγω τὰ πἑιρουσι. Cf. K. Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur* (Munich 1897), 473; G. Moravcsik, *A magyar történet bizánci forrásai* (Budapest 1934), 206; Jireček, *Istorija* I, 142; only R. Browning, "The patriarchal school at Constantinople in the twelfth century" (II), *Byzantion* 33 (1963), 12, dates the speech to 1155 without offering any supporting argument.

send two thousand men in the event of a war in the west, and "when a war is waged in Asia, whereto he usually sends three hundred, he will send another two hundred" men.²⁸

It follows clearly from this text that Uroš had provided three hundred men for the Byzantine emperor's Asian campaigns prior to 1150, and at least once (τὸ πρότερον εἰώθει). The question is: when did the emperor Manuel wage a war in the east before 1150? because it apparently was then that Uroš sent his soldiers. If we go back in time, it is known that in 1146 Manuel launched a large-scale expedition against the sultan Masud of Iconium.²⁹ The emperor had mustered a large army which headed towards the heart of the enemy's land. Regrettably, Kinnamos and Choniates say nothing about how and from which regions the army was mustered; consequently, there is no mention of Serbs as participants in the expedition either. However, since it is known that Manuel waged no war in the east between 1146 and 1150, it appears unquestionable that the Serbian military assistance to the emperor mentioned by Kinnamos should be dated to 1146. Manuel suspended his expedition against the sultan upon learning about preparations being made in the west for another large-scale crusade, which meant a new threat from that direction.³⁰ Whether Uroš had sent a contingent to Manuel prior to 1146 and, if so, for which war, cannot be inferred from these sources.

What follows as a necessary conclusion is that: in 1146, Uroš already was the grand $\check{z}upan$ of Rascia, he already was a vassal of Manuel I Komnenos and he was honouring his duties as a vassal to the emperor. It is very likely that he had been in power even before 1146. Whether he had ruled Rascia before 1143, the year Manuel ascended to the Byzantine throne, or whether this change on the throne had an effect on his position remains an open question. Be that as it may, he was the grand $\check{z}upan$ of Rascia from 1146 on.³¹

²⁸ Cinn. 113.306: κἄν μέν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐσπέραν στρατεύοιε, σὺν δισχιλίοις ἕπεσθαι ὡμολόγει, πολεμοῦσί γε μὴν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀσίας πρὸς οἶς τὸ πρότερον εἰώθει τριακοσίοις καὶ διακοσίους ἣδη προσεπιπέμπειν. It is Uroš who pledges to send the promised military assistance to Manuel; ergo, not some other *župan* of Rascia.

²⁹ Cinn. 46ff; Chon. 71–72.

³⁰ B. Kugler, *Studien zur Geschichte des zweiten Kreuzzuges* (Stuttgart 1866), 114; Chalandon, *Les Comnène* II, 247–257.

³¹ Anastasijević, *Otac Nemanjin*, 23, believed that Uroš II had not become the grand *župan* of Rascia until "about 15 or 16 years" after 1129–1130. In support of his claim he pointed to the information that in the war between Géza II and the Germans in Hungary about 1146, in addition to the *ban* Beloš, a certain "*comes* Uroš" had also excelled (*Chronicon* I, 457). Anastasijević assumed that this Uroš might have been Uroš II who had been in, or sent aid to, Hungary at the time. Although interesting, this assumption can hardly be accepted. Firstly, there are several persons by the name Uroš in the same source (*Chronicon* I, 430; 437f). Secondly, this was the year when the grand *župan* of Rascia sent a contingent for Manuel's

Historians still cannot say with certainty whether the grand *župan* Uroš II of Rascia was related to Stefan Nemanja.³² What is certain, however, is that all views based on the assumption that either Uroš II or Desa was Nemanja's father should be discarded. Based on that assumption, data and events that are completely unrelated to Uroš II have been related to him nonetheless.³³ When the available data are properly delineated from one another, what remains as a reliable basis for further research are the following facts: Uroš II was the grand *župan* of Rascia in 1146, he held the position in 1149 and 1150 as well, and it was him who led the well-known rebellion against Byzantium in those years.

Until when did Uroš II rule Rascia?

The end of Uroš II's reign is still quite obscure. There is no explicit information in the sources, and the answer cannot be given unless two other questions are answered first. First, when did the conflict between Uroš and his brother Desa take place? And, second, are Uroš II and Primislav one and the same person?

According to Kinnamos, a long time intervened between the Battle of the Tara and the moment the Serbs deposed Uroš and handed power over to his brother Desa without the emperor's knowledge. However, Kinnamos claims, fearful of Manuel's anger, they appeared before the emperor with Uroš and Desa and stated that they would recognise the authority of the one the emperor should choose. Manuel chose Uroš again.³⁴

This obviously was a struggle for power in Rascia, outlined briefly and in the writer's typical disguised manner. Even though many details of these events can be surmised rather than proved, the central issue to be clarified is the issue of their chronology. When was Uroš II ousted? Two other contemporary writers

campaign in the east. It does not seem very likely that Uroš II would have left the country, even for a short while, in order to appear on a distant Hungarian battlefield in person.

³² Novaković, "Kad se rodio i kad je počeo da vlada Stevan Nemanja", 184, assumed that a relative of Nemanja's, close or distant, had ruled Rascia between 1142 and 1144.

³³ Anastasijević, *Otac Nemanjin*, 24, believed that Nemanja's father, be it Desa or Uroš II, had been exiled from Rascia in 1131 and that he then went to Zeta, where his son Nemanja was born around 1132. While Anastasijević hesitated between Desa and Uroš II as Nemanja's father, Šišić, ed., *Letopis*, 96–98, opted for Uroš II. Relying on the data about Uroš in Stefan the First Crowned's account of "great mayhem" in Rascia and the banishment of Nemanja's father, Šišić concluded that Uroš II had ruled in 1131–32 and again in 1133–61. He reiterated this view in his *Poviest Hrvata za kraljeva iz doma Arpadovića* 1102–1301 (Zagreb 1944), 60–61, but now stretched Uroš II's reign to 1166 without offering any argument to support it. On the subject of Nemanja's ancestors see S. Ćirković, "Preci Nemanjini i njihova postojbina", in *Stefan Nemanja – Sveti Simeon Mirotočivi, istorija i predanje*, ed. J. Kalić (Belgrade 2000), 21–29.

³⁴Cinn. 113.

speak about it: the rhetorician Michael of Thessalonike and the poet Theodor Prodromos. The former requires particular attention.

Michael of Thessalonike wrote four orations between 1149 and 1156. He dedicated them to Manuel Komnenos, using all his skills and eloquence to depict his military successes against the enemies of the empire as flamboyantly as possible. In one of the speeches, he mentions the conflict between two Serbian župans, whom he calls satraps.³⁵ There the Serbs are called Dacians, the Dacian people, and the Hungarians, Gepids. The Dacian people, long subjected to the emperor, the rhetorician says, sided with the Gepidic ruler, i.e. the Hungarians, ousted the satrap (župan) appointed by the emperor and acclaimed the one appointed by the Gepids.³⁶ Manuel decided to restore the overthrown one to power and moved against the Serbs. As he adjudicated in favour of the previous satrap, the Serbs calmed down, gave hostages and "fought in alliance", i.e. they committed themselves to providing military assistance to Byzantium.³⁷

This account essentially matches the one by Kinnamos. Even though Michael of Thessalonike names neither the overthrown *župan* nor the one who aspired to take his place, it does not seem difficult to grasp who is who, because he claims that the Serbs deposed the ruler appointed by Manuel, which tallies with Kinnamos' account of Uroš II. The usurper in this case must have been Desa, only that Michael also states that he enjoyed Hungarian support.

In order to be able to use these data, we need to establish when the speech was written and to which events it referred.

In one place in this oration Michael of Thessalonike says that four years have elapsed since the emperor brought thousands of prisoners from Hungary, since the Byzantine army ransacked Hungary, which he calls Pannonia, leaving it empty and desolate.³⁸ During the wars against Hungary, which is the period when the rhetorician composed his speeches, the emperor Manuel captured a large number of prisoners *only once*, and, according to Kinnamos' and Choniates' matching accounts, in 1151.³⁹ If we add four years to this year which brought

³⁵ Speech no. X in Regel, Fontes rerum byzantinarum I, 152–165.

³⁶ The Dacian people [Serbs] ... σατράπην μέν, ὃν αὐτὸς ἐγκαταστηάμενος εἶχες, ἐζ ἑαυτοῦ ἐποίησατο, τὸν δ'ἐκ τοῦ Γήπαιδος δεδομένον τούτω ἠσπάσατο (ibid. 163.25–27).

³⁷ Ibid. 163–164.

³⁸ Michael of Thessalonike to the emperor: Ἐμνησικάκει μὲν σοι ὁ Γήπαις λείας ἐκείνης, ἀφ' ἦς ἐρήμη καὶ κένανδρος ἡ Παννονία γέγονε μονονού, καὶ δηλοῦσιν αἱ μυριάδες τῶν αἰχμαλώτων οὓς ὁ στρεπτὸς περιηχένισε αίδηρος, τὸν ἀπ'ἐκείνου γοῦν χρόνον καὶ ἐς τέταρτον ἔτος ὅλον, τοῦτον εἰς συσκευὴν ὡς ἀμυνούμενος ἀπηνάλωσε (ibid. 158.1–5).

³⁹ Manuel's first clash with the Hungarians in Rascia took place in 1150, but on that occasion only an auxiliary unit from Hungary led by Vakhin took part in the battles (Cinn. 107–112; Chon. 121–122). Hence, there could not have been a large number of prisoners, let alone thousands. In 1151 Manuel raided into Hungary, leaving a trail of plunder and destruction in

Manuel big successes and a rich booty, we obtain the year 1155 as the date of the described strife in Rascia.⁴⁰

Having described the conflict in Rascia and the emperor's intervention there, Michael of Thessalonike mentions the conclusion of a Hungarian-Byzantine peace. Some historians contended that the oration should be dated to 1156 and not to 1155.⁴¹ But the writer's own biography appears to provide evidence to the contrary. Namely, at the council held in Constantinople on 26 January 1156, the patriarch of Antioch, Soterichos Pantevgenos, was condemned for his teachings along with his followers. Michael of Thessalonike was one of them and he was removed from his position.⁴² Considering that the council was held in early 1156, his oration obviously could not have been composed then and certainly

⁴¹ Moravcsik, A magyar történet bizánci forrásai, 206; I. Rácz, Bizánci költemények Mánuel császár magyar hadjáratairól (Budapest 1941), 11.

his wake. Kinnamos and Choniates both claim that he captured a large number of prisoners and that the returning Byzantine army took them with it (Cinn. 113–118; Chon. 122–123). In 1152 Manuel reappeared on the Danube, but there was no fighting (Cinn. 119–120). The following year, 1153, saw no war on the Hungarian-Byzantine border either (Cinn. 121; Chon. 132). Clashes in Danube areas took place in 1154, but this time Byzantium was on the defensive: it defended Braničevo and Belgrade (Cinn. 130–133; Chon. 133–134). There could not have been many Hungarian captives. On the contrary, the Byzantines suffered an overwhelming defeat and heavy losses at Belgrade. Finally, in 1155 Manuel's army was on the Danube again, but on this occasion a Hungarian-Byzantine peace treaty was concluded without battle (Cinn. 133–134).

⁴⁰ The oration was dated in this way even by Regel, *Fontes* I, xix, but he created confusion by mentioning prisoners from Serbia although there were none then. The same dating can be found in Krumbacher, *Geschichte*, 473; and in Anastasijević, *Otac Nemanjin*, 24, n. I, though with no supporting argument. Browning, "The patriarchal school", 12, thinks of 1153 as the date of the oration, but does not offer arguments to support his view. It should be noted that there is another oration of Michael of Thessalonike (no. VIII in Regel, *Fontes* I, pp. 131–152) that may be related to 1153 because therein the author mentions ten years of Manuel's reign. It is impossible that both orations (nos. VIII and IX in Regel, *Fontes* I) date from 1153 because the analysis of their content shows two different situations in Serbia. In Oration VIII there is no mention of any conflict between the *župans* of Rascia or their supporters.

⁴² Cinn. 176; Chon. 275–276; cf. Chalandon, Les Comnène II, 640–641; Lamma, Comneni e Stauffer I, 255–256; R. Browning, "A new source on Byzantine-Hungarian relations in the twelfth century", Balkan Studies 2 (1961), 182–183; P. Wirth, "Michael von Thessalonike", Byzantinische Zeitschrift 55.2 (1962), 267. Michael of Thessalonike was archbishop until 1156. It is known that he was replaced by Basil of Ochrid in 1156; cf. V. G. Vasil'evskii, in his critical review in Vizantiiskii vremennik VI (1899), 529, of K. Krumbacher, "Michael Glykas", Sitzungsberichte d. phil.-philos. und hist. Klasse der K. b. Akademie der Wissenschaften III (1894), 410.

could not have glorified the emperor's successes achieved later that year. Therefore, the events the rhetorician speaks about can only be dated to the year 1155.43

Another contemporary, the poet Theodore Prodromos, offers a somewhat different picture of the situation in Rascia. According to him, Desa was an unlawful ruler of the Serbs (Dalmatae) who, upon the news of Manuel approaching, went out to meet the emperor and pledged submission to him, though not quite of his own volition. He appeared before the emperor together with his rival, whom the poet does not name. In this version too, the emperor acts as an arbiter and settles the situation in Serbia by restoring to power the one "who fell from power". The text mentions the *župans* who had abandoned allegiance to the arch*župan*. The emperor forced them to submit to his authority.⁴⁴

Prodromos offers some new information but there is also many a vague place. His style being entirely subjugated to the desire to evoke imperial superiority as vividly as possible, he resorts to excessive contrasts. This goes especially for his portrayal of Manuel's opponents. Upon hearing that the great autocrat is approaching, they as a rule are overwhelmed with fear, prostrate before him and plead for mercy, which is what the *župan* of Rascia, Desa, does too. Some conclusions can be drawn nonetheless. Firstly, the struggle for power in Rascia must have begun at the time of the Hungarian-Byzantine war because Prodromos describes the emperor's doings in Rascia, and then proceeds to depict how Manuel moved his army towards the Danube, against the Hungarians, on which

⁴³ Since in this oration Michael mentions the conclusion of the Hungarian-Byzantine peace, the years prior to 1153 should also be ruled out because it is known from Kinnamos and Choniates that hostilities lasted until 1155. The question is why Moravcsik, A magyar történet bizánci forrásai, 206, and Rácz, Bizánci költemények, 11, date this oration to 1156. Moravcsik – Byzánc és a magyarság (Budapest 1953), 80, and "Hungary and Byzantium", in The Cambridge Medieval History IV (Cambridge 1966), 581-582 - was of the opinion that the Hungarian-Byzantine war had ended with a peace treaty in 1156 and not in 1155. Since Michael of Thessalonike mentions the conclusion of this treaty in his speech, however, the speech needs to be dated accordingly. On the reasons why some historians date the end of the war to 1156 see J. Kalić-Mijušković, Beograd u srednjem veku (Belgrade 1967), 353, n. 82. It appears, however, that Michael of Thessalonike himself provides data that contradict Moravcsik's dating. Namely, if our interpretation of his speech is correct, i.e. if four years elapsed from 1151 when Manuel had returned with a large number of prisoners from Hungary, then the conclusion of the peace treaty has to be dated to 1155. And that is not all. We have already noted that Michael of Thessalonike was removed from office in 1156, which means that he could not have composed a praise of Manuel's successes in 1156. Consequently, the successes he describes can only be dated to the previous year, 1155.

⁴⁴ Prodromos' poem is published in *Recueil des historiens des croisades*, *Hist. grecs* II, 748–752, but the version is incomplete. The missing passages are precisely those that concern the situation in Serbia. Jireček, *Istorija* I, 144, used this incomplete version and therefore, as he himself noted, he was unaware of some parts of Prodromos' text. The complete version of the poem is included in Rácz, *Bizánci költemények*, with the part on the Serbs on pp. 29–35.

occasion he concluded peace with the Hungarian king.⁴⁵ In this, Prodromos' sequence of events tallies with that of Michael of Thessalonike. Secondly, Desa was one of the participants in the struggle for power in Rascia. According to Prodromos, the emperor backed the overthrown ruler. Desa came before the emperor together with the other pretender to the throne. Thirdly, besides the two feuding *župans*, Prodromos mentions other *župans* who abandoned allegiance to their ruler and whom the emperor forced to submit to him. If Prodromos' poetic and exaggeration-laden narrative is to be trusted, the situation in Rascia was tumultuous, ridden with internal strife.

Those are the available sources of information about the internal strife that was shaking Rascia in the mid-twelfth century. Although they do not tally on the sequence of events and although they include texts by two Byzantine rhetoricians composed in a deliberately bookish and vague style, it seems that an important chronological datum may be gleaned from them nonetheless. The conflict in Rascia took place at the time of the Hungarian-Byzantine war, and shortly before the conclusion of peace, which is to say in 1155. Choniates makes no mention of these events.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Prodromos, Poem 2, in Rácz, *Bizánci költemények*, 35, v. 357ff.

⁴⁶ In his account of the Hungarian-Byzantine war of 1150–51, Choniates mentions the Serbs only one more time after his description of the Serbian defeat on the river Tara. He says that the emperor declared war on the Hungarians again and that he arrived in Serdica, where his army had been gathered. Envoys of the Hungarian king also arrived there with an offer of peace. After the negotiations that ensued, the emperor gave up his Hungarian campaign and moved against the "satrap of the Serbs". Instilling the latter with fear along the way, he persuaded him into recognising only him (the emperor) and into revoking the agreement with the Hungarians. Having achieved all that, the emperor disbanded the troops and withdrew (Chon. 132).

In view of the course of Choniates' narrative, this episode in Serbian-Byzantine relations may be dated to between 1151 – since Choniates previously describes the emperor's successes against the Hungarians in 1151 (Chon. 122–123) – and November 1153, when Manuel was in the Bitola area (Chon. 133); in 1153, on 22 November, Manuel wrote to the bishop Wibaldus "a Castro Pelagoniae": cf. Ph. Jaffé, *Bibliotheca rerum germanicarum*, vol. I (Berlin 1864), 561. The year 1152 as the year of Manuel's campaign should be ruled out based on comparative analysis of Kinnamos' and Choniates' texts. Namely, writing about the events of 1152, Kinnamos says that the emperor *arrived* to the Danube and was about to engage the Hungarians in battle, but peace was concluded soon afterwards (Cinn. 119–120). Choniates is explicit that the emperor only went as far as Serdica and then turned the army against the Serbs without going to the Danube (Chon. 132). Choniates' account, therefore, does not tally with Kinnamos' account of the events of 1152, but it does tally with his account of the events of 1153. Namely, describing the year 1153 Kinnamos says that the emperor set out towards the Ister to engage the Hungarians, but does not say whether he reached the river or not (Cinn. 121).

As it appears from all this, Manuel's operation against the *župan* of Rascia mentioned in Choniates (Chon. 132) should be dated to 1153, as proposed early on by Vasil'evskii, "Soiuz

Uroš II does not figure in the sources after 1155. All trace of him ends there. In the 1160s there occur references to Primislav as the grand *župan* of Rascia. The only who knows of him is Kinnamos. In the Serbian annals and genealogies, which are of a much later date, the name Prvoslav occurs, but that was Nemanja's brother.⁴⁷

According to Kinnamos, Primislav ruled Serbia until 1162. Namely, that year Manuel set off for Serbia in order to "straighten out" the situation there, i.e. to install a loyal vassal in power.⁴⁸ "As I have already related," Kinnamos says, the

What has to be clarified at this point is whether Choniates' account of the events of 1153 can be taken as corresponding to Kinnamos' account of the strife in Rascia, the conflict between Desa and Uroš (Cinn. 113), as believed by Vasil'evskii, "Soiuz dvukh imperii", 66–67, and Kovačević, "Nekolika pitanja", 65–66. They based their view on the fact that after the Battle of the Tara until the end of the Hungarian-Byzantine war in 1155, Choniates mentions the Serbs only once, and in this particular section (Chon. 132). They were led to such a conclusion by the desire to find in Choniates the information that would match Kinnamos, to confirm it. In this particular case, such a desire faces great difficulties because the two texts considerably differ in content. Firstly, Kinnamos (Cinn. 113) says that the Serbs deposed Uroš and handed power to Desa. Fearful of the emperor's discontent, they appeared before him and Manuel adjudicated in Uroš's favour and restored him to power. Choniates (Chon. 132) claims that the emperor set out against the satrap of the Serbs (he speaks of only one satrap, not two, or of any dispute between *župans*), made him revoke his alliance with the Hungarians and recognise him as his sole overlord. Who was the "satrap" that Manuel set out against in 1153? If it was Uroš II, then there was no dispute with Desa. Moreover, it would mean that Uroš II was in alliance with the Hungarians at the time, whereas the oration of Michael of Thessalonike suggests that it was Uroš II who enjoyed Hungarian support in his dispute with Desa (Regel, Fontes I, 163–164). If, on the other hand, we assume that in 1153 Manuel set out against Desa, who had replaced Uroš, such an assumption cannot be made to agree with Choniates' claim that Manuel forced this one and only satrap to revoke his alliance with the Hungarians and recognise him (the emperor) as his sole overlord, which would mean that it was under those terms that he remained in power, which then again contradicts Kinnamos' claim that Manuel gave support and power to Uroš in the dispute between Uroš and Desa (Cinn. 113). Secondly, Kinnamos claims that the ruler of Rascia was overthrown without the emperor's assent and π othoïç ΰστερον the Battle of the Tara in 1550 (Cinn. 113), which agrees much better with the year 1155 than 1153. It seems from all the above that Choniates' account of the events of 1153 and Manuel's intervention against the župan of Rascia (Chon. 132) should not be taken as corresponding to Kinnamos' account of the internal dissension in Rascia (Cinn. 113).

⁴⁷ Lj. Stojanović, *Stari srpski rodoslovi i letopisi* (Belgrade 1927), 14–17, 181, 186, 191, 193, 197, 202, 279. It has been widely accepted that Primislav and Prvoslav are one and the same person. It should be borne in mind that Kinnamos (Cinn. 235) mentions yet another Primislav, but that one was a Russian prince.

⁴⁸ The chronology of Manuel's arrival in Philippopolis follows from the course of Kinnamos' narrative. He first says (Cinn. 203) that after the death of the Hungarian king Géza II, his

dvukh imperii", 66 (although later, on p. 78, he says it was 1152), and Chalandon, *Les Comnène* II, 408, with no explanation.

then-incumbent ruler Primislav "rebelled and acted wilfully" even before.⁴⁹ On those earlier occasions, the emperor had not removed him from power, but now, in 1163, he did, and he replaced him with his brother Beluš. The latter ruled for a short time and then withdrew to Hungary, where he died quite a while afterwards.⁵⁰

It has long been observed that Kinnamos, speaking of Primislav, adds the phrase "as I have already related". But nowhere before the section of the text

⁵⁰ Cinn. 204. The question to be posed here is whether this Beluš, Primislav's brother, is the same person as the Hungarian ban Beloš who occurs in Hungarian and other sources in 1142-58 and 1163 (cf. n. 8-11 above). As we have already seen, the course of Kinnamos' narrative allows the events in the section where Primislav and Beluš are mentioned to be dated to 1162. According to Kinnamos, it was in that year that Manuel removed Primislav from power and replaced him with Beluš (Cinn. 204). Therefore, only in that year, and not before, could Beluš be the grand *župan* of Rascia. The fact that the Hungarian sources make no mention of the ban Beloš, under the assumption that Beloš and Primislav are one and the same person, is irrelevant to the question as to who was in power in Rascia prior to 1162. The view should be discarded, then, that the *ban* Beloš withdrew to Serbia in 1158 or in any other year prior to 1162 and, if Kinnamos is to be believed, took power there. Yet another reason seems to go against identifying the ban Beloš as Beluš, the grand župan of Rascia. Considering that the alliance between Serbs and Hungarians was seen in Constantinople as dangerous and hostile, it is only natural to ask whether the emperor Manuel would have entrusted rule in Rascia to a man who had been his open enemy in Hungary in 1151 (Cinn. 117), who had many connections and substantial estates in Hungary. In connection with the emperor's expedition against the Serbs, twelfth-century sources mention several times their ties with the Hungarians as something the emperor sought to put an end to. There is no doubt that further enquiries into the personage of the ban Beloš in Hungary are needed in order to unravel this question with more certainty. Yet, it seems little likely that Manuel would have entrusted rule over the Serbs to a man who embodied the Hungarian-Serbian ties even if he could have been in disgrace with the Hungarian court at the time. Such a conclusion would hardly be changed by the fact that the *ban* Beloš supported Géza II's brothers at the expense of Géza's son in the struggle for power which raged in Hungary and in which Manuel interfered by supporting the very same pretenders. Arguing against identifying the ban Beloš as Beluš, Primislav and Desa's brother, were Vasil'evskii, "Soiuz dvukh imperii", 94; Kovačević, "Nekolika pitanja", 70; Dinić, "Srpske zemlje", 250. The fact may not be irrelevant that Kinnamos refers to the ban Beloš as Βέλοσις (Cinn. 104, 117) and to Primislav's brother as Βελούσης (Cinn. 204).

brother Ladislaus (II) had already seized power from Géza's son Stephen (III), and we know that this took place in the summer of 1162: Homan, *Geschichte I, 393–394*; Šišić, *Poviest Hrvata*.

⁴⁹ The emperor set off for Philippopolis τὰ πρὸς τῆ Σερβικῆ καταστησόμενος πράγματα. Ὁ γὰρ τοι Πριμίσθλαβος, ὀς τῆς χώρας τότε ἦρχε, καὶ ἄλλοτε μήν ὤοπερ μοι δεδιήγηται πρότερον, ἀποστασίαν ὠδίνησε καὶ ἀὐτονόμω ἐχρῆτο τῆ γνώμη (Cinn. 204.1–4). Many scholars believed that the name of this *župan* of Rascia was Prvoslav (Jireček, *Istorija* I, 144, n. 122; Ruvarac, "Prilošci", 215; Ćorović, "Pitanje o hronologiji", 47–48). It should be noted that in the earliest surviving copy of Kinnamos' manuscript (Vat. gr. 163, fol. 254^r) clearly stands Πριμίσθλαβος.

that describes the events of 1162 does Kinnamos speak of Primislav; he only speaks of Uroš (II) and Desa. Since it is known that Uroš made attempts to emancipate himself from imperial control, many historians were led to conclude that Primislav and Uroš II are one and the same person.⁵¹ There still are no new data that could help resolve this old problem. Kinnamos' text is enigmatic, vague. And yet, it seems that his passing reference to his own non-existent previous account does not allow a conclusion as bold as the one proposing that he used two different names to refer to one person. Even a critical edition of Kinnamos' work would hardly make it any more plausible.⁵²

Consequently, the question posed above – until when did Uroš II rule? – can presently be answered only incompletely. He was the grand *župan* of Rascia in 1155 and certainly for some time after that. It is not known when and under what circumstances he left the position of power. The change of ruler took place between 1155 and 1162. It is a fact that in 1160 the emperor Manuel expected the *župan* of Rascia to provide military assistance for his upcoming campaign in the east.⁵³ This fact implies that there was no conflict between the emperor and the grand *župan* at that moment. Whether this *župan* was Uroš II or a successor of his still remains a matter of conjecture.

The politics of Uroš II

We have before us some ten years of Uroš's reign (1146–1156). Apart from a short break when he was ousted by Desa, he managed to remain in power in the face of very turbulent times and the volatile situation in the country. It is a long enough period to permit some conclusions about his politics and, possibly, his goals.

⁵¹ Vasil'evskii, "Soiuz dvukh imperii", 94–95; Kovačević, "Nekolika pitanja", 69–70; Anastasijević, Otac Nemanjin, 11–12; V. Klaić, Povjest Hrvata od najstarijih vremena do svršetka XIX. stoljeća, vol. 1 (Zagreb 1899), 161. Ćorović, "Pitanje o hronologiji", 47–48, aware of the impossibility of Kinnamos' claim (Cinn. 204.2–3), suggests that it does not refer to Primislav, whom he calls Prvoslav, but to the situation in Serbia that Kinnamos mentions in the previous sentence. Although quite interesting, his interpretation is grammatically untenable. Those are clearly two separate sentences. What remains a possibility, of course, is that Kinnamos' text should not be understood literally. In his analysis, C. Neumann, *Geschichtsquellen im zwölften Jahrhundert* (Leipzig 1880), 80, finds that there are many lacunae in Kinnamos' text, such as the one concerning Primislav, which he ascribes to the copyist who left out or shortened some passages.

⁵² Against identifying Prvoslav (Primislav) as Uroš II were also Ruvarac, "Prilošci", 215; Jireček, *Istorija* I, 144; Ćorović, "Nekolika pitanja", 48–49; Dinić, "Srpske zemlje", 250.

⁵³ Cinn. 199.

Uroš II fought for the independence of Rascia. In this policy, he, as well as Desa, was Nemanja's true predecessor.⁵⁴ In 1146 he already was a vassal to the emperor Manuel. Perhaps he had come to power with the emperor's support. This is suggested by the claim of Michael of Thessalonike that the emperor decided in 1155 to restore to the throne of Rascia the *župan* whom he had installed and the Serbs deposed.⁵⁵ Uroš fulfilled his vassal duties and supplied the emperor with auxiliary troops when required.⁵⁶

A few years later he joined an anti-Byzantine coalition, which, as far as is known, was his first attempt to achieve independence for Rascia. As long as the emperor was firmly in power, Choniates claims, the Serbs seemed to be wellintentioned and sweet-tongued, while harbouring quite the opposite feelings.⁵⁷ At the earliest opportunity, however, and it was the year 1149, when the Norman-Byzantine war was in full swing, they took to arms against Byzantium. The Serbs attacked "neighbouring lands" which were under Byzantine rule.⁵⁸ They fought fiercely but were defeated the same year, the heart of their land was ravaged and Ras itself destroyed. The emperor's triumph was not complete though. The conflict was resumed next year, and on an even larger scale. Uroš II secured Hungarian military assistance. It is obvious, even though it is not explicitly mentioned anywhere, that his strong family ties with the Hungarian ruling house and common interests were strongly conducive to their military cooperation.

In the dramatic confrontation of 1150, which ended in the barely accessible and by then already snow-covered areas around the river Tara, the Byzantine army confirmed its superiority.⁵⁹ The Serbs were overpowered again and Uroš II was forced to negotiate. His vassal duties were reconfirmed and enlarged. He had to agree to increase the number of soldiers (from 300 to 500) he would place at the emperor's disposal in case of a war in the east, while the figure for a war in the west remained unchanged (2,000). It appears that Uroš also gave hostages and "accepted twice as large a burden of submission as before", as Michael of Thessalonike recorded gloatingly.⁶⁰

⁵⁴ That Desa had been Nemanja's political forerunner was established by Jireček, Istorija I, 144.

⁵⁵ See n. 35 above.

⁵⁶Cinn. 113.

⁵⁷ Chon. 119.11–14.

 $^{5^8}$ Chon. 119. There Choniates (Chon. 119.23–24) says that the *župan* of Rascia, when he realised that he could not resist the Byzantine army, ἀφίσταται μὲν τῶν πεδινῶ.

⁵⁹ Cinn. 103–113; Chon. 121–123. Cf. the accurate description of the events in Jireček, *Istorija* I, 142–143.

⁶⁰ Cinn. 113; Regel, *Fontes* I, 143. The submission of the Serbs (Dalmatae) is also mentioned in the work of an anonymous twelfth-century poet preserved in a Venetian manuscript of the thirteenth century: S. Lampros, "O Μαρκιανὸνος κῶδιζ 524", *Neos Hellenomnemon* 8 (1911), 148–150.

The *župan* of Rascia did not stay still for long. An opportunity to resume his rebellion arose in 1153. Namely, a new Hungarian-Byzantine conflict was on the horizon. In order to prevent the enemy's incursion from the north, Manuel took his army along the usual route towards the Danube, but Hungarian envoys met him halfway in Sofia, where peace was soon arranged. Manuel then redirected his army against the Serbian *župan*. The emperor was particularly displeased with his arrangements with the Hungarians. As it seems, however, the two sides did not engage in any battle. Faced with the immediate threat of military intervention, Uroš pledged submission to Manuel, recognised his overlordship and promised to "break the agreement" with the Hungarians).⁶¹ One more attempt to achieve Rascia's independence failed.

This was not the only trouble the emperor Manuel faced in the Balkans the same year, 1153. He had appointed his cousin Andronikos Komnenos as governor of an important province bordering Hungary. It encompassed present-day Braničevo, according to Kinnamos, Niš, and, according to Choniates, Belgrade as well.⁶² Those were three most important Byzantine fortresses that defended the Morava river valley, affording obstacles to the enemy's advance from the north. Andronikos seized the unexpected opportunity. He promptly entered into negotiations with the Hungarian king, seeking assistance against the emperor. He offered king Géza II the province he administered in the event of the favourable outcome of the planned action. He also despatched envoys to the German king, Frederick I Barbarossa. He pursued his design in secrecy. None of the sources says that Andronikos sought assistance from the Serbs or negotiated with them about anything. However, in view of Andronikos' activity in the neighbourhood of Rascia and the fact that he sought assistance from the Hungarian royal court which maintained close contacts with Uroš II (it was the time when the power of the ban Beloš in Hungary was at its peak), it is quite unlikely that his plans would have remained unknown to the župan of Rascia. And that is not all. By undermining the emperor Manuel's reputation, he no doubt facilitated the ambitions of other enemies of the empire. Even though there is no documentary evidence of any link between Andronikos' activity and Uroš's policy, it seems very likely that Uroš played it to his advantage.

Little is known about the situation in Rascia. Contemporary writers were not interested. Only Theodor Prodromos mentions feuding *župans* in Serbia who do not obey the grand *župan*.⁶³ There was feuding within the family of Uroš II himself. Details of his conflict with his brother Desa are not known; only its outcome was recorded: Uroš II was ousted by his brother Desa, i.e. by his

⁶¹ Chon. 132. The same in Th. Skutariotes, Σύνοψις χρονική, 242.

⁶² Cinn. 124; Chon. 133.

⁶³ Rácz, Bizánci költemények 32–33, verses 301–356.

brother's supporters, and apparently with Hungarian backing.⁶⁴ Since the rebels, according to Kinnamos, feared the emperor's anger, it is obvious that *at that time* Uroš II enjoyed Manuel's support.

Yet, despite the information that Desa's struggle for power was supported by Hungary, it would be erroneous to describe him as a Hungarian man and Uroš II as a Byzantine protégé. Both Uroš and Desa were both at one time or another in their lives. Manuel took Uroš to task over his allying with the Hungarians more than once (1150; 1153), but he accepted him as his vassal (1146; 1153; 1155). The next *župan* of Rascia, Desa, pursued the same policy in the 1160s: he was brought to power by Manuel but before long the emperor accused him of colluding with the Hungarians and had him imprisoned.⁶⁵

In brief, in their struggle for independence, the *župan*s of Rascia (Uroš II, and then Desa) were well aware of the existing circumstances and based their decisions on them, acting against Byzantium whenever possible, because it was Byzantium, not yet Hungary, that stifled their autonomous rule. Stefan Nemanja pursued the same policy as they had, only that he managed to achieve its goal. However, the circumstances in which Uroš had rebelled against Byzantium were very different from those in Nemanja's time; they had been much less favourable. Byzantium under the Komnenoi, from the end of the eleventh century until 1180, was on the rise. It had full control over the situation in the Balkan Peninsula. In the reign of Manuel Komnenos it largely dictated Hungarian politics too. Under such circumstances, Rascia was unable to achieve independence. It was not until Byzantium's abrupt decline after 1180 that it became a viable prospect. Nemanja seized the opportunity. It is only that the road travelled to it can be seen more clearly now. On that road, Uroš II had made his full contribution.

UDC 94(497.11:439)"11" 929.731 Uroš II

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 [&]quot;The patriarchal school at Constantinople in the twelfth century" (II). Byzantion 33 (1963), 11-40.

⁶⁴ Regel, Fontes I, 163–164; Cinn. 113.

⁶⁵ Cinn. 204; 212–214.

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Information on Travel of Nemanjić Embassies: Content and Context

- Abstract: The paper offers an overview of available information on travel of medieval Serbian embassies in the Nemanjić dynasty period. This content is contextualized into the wider picture of regional embassy travel, presented by the far better documented embassies of Dubrovnik, Venice and the Byzantine Empire. The information is sorted by the key determining factors of an embassy's journey – diplomatic and auxiliary personnel, representational accessories such as gifts and adornments, transport over land and sea, sustenance, lodging, expenses and obstacles presented by nature and men.
- Keywords: Serbia, Middle Ages, Nemanjić dynasty, embassy, envoy, travel, Dubrovnik, Byzantium, Venice

D uring the Middle Ages, before the widespread introduction of permanent embassies, practically every diplomatic mission involved travel. Because of their official nature and political importance, these journeys were often noted in contemporary records and narratives. As a result, they rank among the best documented examples of medieval travel available to modern researchers. In South-eastern Europe, one readily thinks of the wealth of information on this subject provided by the administrative archives of Venice and Dubrovnik or by Byzantine historical narratives, some of which constitute first-hand accounts.^I Unfortunately, medieval Serbia does not fit into this pattern. Because of the typological structure and modest overall quantity of the surviving domestic sources, information on the travel of Serbian embassies is both scarce and

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¹Historiographic results made possible by this wealth of information include J. Tadić, Promet putnika u starom Dubrovniku (Dubrovnik 1939); L. Bréhier, Le monde byzantin: Les institutions de l'empire byzantin (Paris 1949), 281–333; D. Queller, Early Venetian Legislation on Ambassadors (Geneva 1966); D. M. Nicol, Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations (Cambridge 1988); Viaggiare nel medioevo, ed. S. Gensini (Pisa 2000), esp. F. Senatore, "I diplomatici e gli ambasciatori", 267–298; E. Malamut, "Sur la route de Théodore Métochite en Serbie en 1299", Actes des Congrès de la Société des historiens médiévistes de l'enseignement supérieur public (Aubazine 1996), 165–175; Voyages et voyageurs à Byzance et en Occident du VI^e au XI^e siècle, eds. A. Dierkens and J-M. Sansterre (Geneva 2000); Travel in the Byzantine world, ed. R. Macrides (Aldershot 2002), esp. K. Belke, "Roads and travel in Macedonia and Thrace in the middle and late Byzantine Period", 73–90; Les relations diplomatiques au Moyen Âge. Formes et enjeux (Paris 2010), esp. N. Fejić, "Les relations diplomatiques au miroir des sources normative: le cas de Dubrovnik (1272–1500)", 99–110.

widely dispersed, demanding extensive research with little prospect of achieving anything more than a fragmentary picture. It is therefore hardly surprising that this information has never been systematically collected or reviewed.² Yet, there may be two ways to provide such an attempt with the necessary degree of coherence to make it worthwhile. Firstly, the information collected can be placed in the comparative context of better documented regional diplomatic practices. Secondly, attention can be focused on one clearly defined segment of the Serbian Middle Ages that can provide a solid backdrop. The best choice in that respect is obviously the two-century period from the late twelfth to the second half of the fourteenth century, during which Serbia was a unified, internationally significant state under the rule of the Nemanjić dynasty.

Available sources contain information on at least some hundred and forty Nemanjić embassies. Their destinations cover a wide area that encompasses Serbia's immediate neighbours, includes Venice and other Italian centres involved in Balkan affairs, and occasionally reaches France, Germany, the Black Sea steppes, Asia Minor and the Levant. However, with any once existing Nemanjić administrative records now completely lost and domestic historical narratives limited to hagiographic accounts of the lives of rulers and leading churchmen, much of this information comes from foreign sources, which are primarily concerned with Nemanjić embassies as negotiators and not as travellers. Also, some embassies cannot be said to have really travelled, as they were dispatched in situations when Nemanjić rulers and their foreign counterparts were already close to each other, usually in the course of preparations for a summit meeting or a military confrontation.³ Thus, the number of recorded embassies that actually offer information on travel is much smaller than the total, with additional variations concerning specific travel-related issues.

The range of issues related to medieval embassy travel is fundamentally determined by two factors – the general conditions, such as available routes and means of transport, and the specific nature of the embassy as a diplomatic mission. Theoretically, the only person who was absolutely necessary for an embassy to fulfil its purpose, and the only one who had to make the trip, was the ambassador or envoy himself. Yet, since the envoy was a representative of the

² For a recent general overview of travel in medieval Serbia see N. Porčić, "Putovanje – život u pokretu", in *Privatni život u srpskim zemljama srednjega veka*, eds. S. Marjanović-Dušanić and D. Popović (Belgrade 2004), 183–217.

³ Examples include embassies sent by king Stefan Dečanski to the Bulgarian emperor on the eve of the Battle of Velbužd (*Životi kraljeva i arhiepiskopa srpskih, napisao arhiepiskop Danilo i drugi*, ed. Dj. Daničić (Zagreb 1866), 182) and to the young king Dušan during their standoff at the Bojana River (ibid. 209), as well as embassies sent by Dušan prior to his meetings with the Byzantine emperors Andronicus III and John VI near Thessaloniki in 1334 and 1350 respectively (*Ioannis Cantacuzeni eximperatoris historiarum libri IV*, ed. L. Schopeni, vol. I (Bonnae 1828), 457; vol. III (Bonnae 1832), 137).

authority that sent him, entrusted with speaking and acting in its name, he was by definition a person of importance. As such, he was normally supplied with various accessories intended to produce a representative effect and a number of auxiliary personnel dedicated to various duties. Furthermore, an embassy could, and very often did, include more than one envoy, resulting in additional accessories and more personnel. Also, the ensemble that was thus created had to be provided with the means of sustenance and transport appropriate for the route, the choice of the latter being limited to riding and pack animals, litters, wagons and vessels. Finally, the journey could encounter various natural or man-made obstacles, many of which were capable of preventing the embassy from fulfilling its mission.

Within the available body of information about Nemanjić embassies, the most frequently encountered of these aspects is the number of envoys. That, of course, is a natural consequence of the central role played by the envoy – indeed, many times the term "envoy" serves as a substitute for "embassy". Taken at face value, this information leads to the conclusion that the number of envoys in Nemanjić embassies was almost always one or two; the only embassies known to have included more are a three-envoy mission sent to the Pope in 1354, and a six-member delegation from the Nemanjić town of Cattaro (Kotor) directed by king Stefan Dragutin to collect a royal family deposit from nearby Dubrovnik in 1281.⁴ However, since the sources that transmit this information are not official Nemanjić appointments or records, but descriptions of the embassies' activities, mostly from the recipient's point of view, the numbers given by them can seldom be accepted as definite. For example, when these sources mention just one envoy, there is often a good chance that they are referring only to the most prominent member of a multiple-envoy embassy, whose colleagues remain out of sight thus, on 4 June 1281, records of the Angevin kingdom in Southern Italy mention one Serbian envoy, a comes Georgius, but the very next day they speak of "envoys".⁵ Also, a large portion of the recorded cases simply use the numerically

⁴ Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia II, ed. A. Theiner (Romae 1860), no. 16; Kancelariski i notariski spisi 1278–1301, ed. G. Čremošnik (Belgrade 1932), no. 94.

⁵ V. Makušev, "Ital'janskie arhivy i hranjaŝiesja v nih materialy dlja slavjanskoj istorii II. Neapol i Palermo", Zapiski Imperatorskoj akademii nauk 19 (1871), Priloženie 3, 31; F. Rački, "Rukopisi tičući se južno-slovinske povjesti u arkivih srednje i dolnje Italije", Rad JAZU 18 (1872), 218–219 (because of errors and inconsistencies in existing editions, Angevin records will be quoted from both Makušev and Rački). In another instance, Venetian authorities note that a Serbian embassy from February 1346 was delivered by "an envoy" (*Listine o odnošajih izmedju južnoga slavenstva i Mletačke Republike* II, ed. S. Ljubić (Zagreb 1870), no. 527), but when passing through Dubrovnik a few weeks earlier, this same embassy had "envoys" (Monumenta ragusina. Libri reformationum I (Zagrabiae 1879), 221).

unspecific plural form "envoys",⁶ usually with no way of telling how many individuals are meant by that. In fact, sometimes it is clear that there must have been more than two: as the Byzantine courtier and author Theodore Metochites was leaving Constantinople at the head of an embassy to Serbia in 1299, he was given a send-off by "Serbian envoys who were *all* gathered" at one of the city gates.⁷ Therefore, the only correct conclusion regarding the number of envoys in Nemanjić embassies would be that it usually was not limited to just one and could reach three or more, just like many foreign embassies that appeared before Nemanjić rulers.⁸

Far less information is available on the representational accessories with which these Nemanjić envoys were supplied. When Vukan, the eldest son of the dynasty's founder Stefan Nemanja, expresses his desire to send an embassy to the Pope "with great magnificence", we can only suppose that he had in mind both major types of representative items – gifts for the recipient and accessories intended to enhance the appearance of the embassy itself. For specific gifts, we have an impressive list of items presented by a Serbian envoy to the Mamluk sultan of Egypt in 1344 – five hawks, five falcons, four silver cups and a richly decorated sword⁹ – but other than that, there are apparently only the mentions of a precious censer for the Pope and "plenty of gold" for the Bulgarian court in hagiographic narratives about Nemanja's youngest son and Serbia's first archbishop, Saint Sava.¹⁰ For representative appearance of the embassy itself, the most relevant illustration available is the description of a diplomatically significant visit made by king Stefan Uroš II Milutin's consort, queen Simonis, to the court of his brother Dragutin – after Milutin provided "all that was necessary" for her retinue, they "inspired wonder in all who saw them", travelling along with "royal garment and girdles of gold, pearls and precious stones, royal purple and scarlet, like so many flowers in the field".11

Nevertheless, direct information on representational accessories is supplemented by some testimonies of a more general nature. In fact, a passage men-

⁶ An incomplete list of examples just from Venetian records: *Listine* I, no. 254; II, 142, 185, 247, 591; III, 112, 202, 257.

⁷ L. Mavromatis, Fondation de l'empire serbe: le kralj Milutin (Thessaloniki 1978), 90.

⁸ For some three- and four-envoy Dubrovnik embassies to Serbia see *Monumenta ragusina* I, 79–80; II, 293, 365; V, 145, 234–235, 284, 314, 325.

⁹ A. Uzelac, "Srbija i mamelučki Egipat tokom XIII i XIV veka", Beogradski istorijski glasnik 4 (2013), 31.

¹⁰ Život svetoga Simeuna i svetoga Save, napisao Domentijan (abbr. Domentijan), ed. Dj. Daničić (Belgrade 1865), 245–246; Život Svetoga Save, napisao Domentijan (abbr. Teodosije, who is the actual author), ed. Dj. Daničić (Belgrade 1860), 306.

¹¹ Životi kraljeva, 96.

tioning gifts borne by the embassies of king Dragutin¹² and multiple notes about Saint Sava casually transporting "all his necessities" through the various stages of his "diplomatic pilgrimages" to the Levant, ¹³ give off an air of routine about these matters that could make them unattractive to the dominant types of sources at our disposal. One possible archival glimpse of this routine is provided by a Dubrovnik record from February 1280 about two Serbian envoys who bought a fur coat, silk and other textiles to the amount of 100 *hyperpyra* – the purpose of this purchase is not stated but it is very likely that they were procuring representational accessories for their mission.¹⁴ Thus, although far inferior in quantity and detail to, for example, records about Dubrovnik embassies,¹⁵ available sources are sufficient to confirm that representational accessories were in fact a common ingredient of an outgoing Nemanjić embassy's travel package.

It is important to note, however, that items of this sort could also be attached to embassies on their way home. Representation usually worked reciprocally and Serbian diplomatic travellers frequently received gifts from their hosts both for the Nemanjić rulers and for themselves. These gifts, which are specified on several occasions and contain such items as war horses, military equipment, clothes, textiles and money.¹⁶ could obviously become a determining factor of the embassy's return trip. Also, some embassies were actually tasked with acquiring certain items for their principals. Several embassies to Venice bought and exported home significant quantities of military equipment,¹⁷ while at least two embassies to the Italian Angevins took back home a shipment of wheat.¹⁸ Yet, perhaps the most interesting and most challenging in terms of logistics were

¹⁴ Kancelariski i notariski spisi, no. 16.

¹⁸ Makušev, 31−32 ≈ Rački, 219, 221.

¹² Ibid. 39–40.

¹³ Domentijan, 277, 312, 329; Teodosije, 132, 171, 186, 199. Although Sava's travels to the Levant were not diplomatic missions in the strict sense, their strong political connotations and outward similarities to embassies qualify them as highly relevant comparative material. However, it should be noted that the authors, especially Teodosije, tend to supplement facts with their general knowledge and ideas, cf. S. Ćirković, "Problemi biografije Svetoga Save", in *Sava Nemanjić – Sveti Sava. Istorija i predanje*, ed. V. Djurić (Belgrade 1979, 11–12.

¹⁵ For types and value of gifts presented by Dubrovnik embassies to the Nemanjić court see *Monumenta ragusina* I, 79–80, 111; II, 293, 360; V, 22, 37, 234–235, 298. Examples of Dubrovnik embassies "dressing up" for occasions like royal weddings or coronations: ibid. I, 226; V, 343–344.

¹⁶ Životi kraljeva, 44; Teodosije, 159; Monumenta ragusina II, 298; III, 197, 212; Uzelac, "Srbija i Mamelučki Egipat", 25. On the special gifts presented to Sava by the Egyptian sultan see A. Z. Savić, "Darovi sa Nila: novi pogled na susret Svetog Save sa egipatskim sultanom", Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju 90 (2014), 7–35.

¹⁷ Listine I, no. 254, 566; II, 8, 185, 196, 247, 489, 713; III, 202. See also R. Ćuk, Srbija i Venecija u 13. i 14. veku (Belgrade 1986), 129–130.

sixty-seven bales of cloth, thirty-six silver girdles, thirty-three silver cups and two hundred decorative ribbons, all exported from Venice by an embassy returning in June 1332 and probably intended for use at Dušan's wedding.¹⁹

Embassies that usually included multiple envoys and valuable accessories obviously could not function without auxiliary personnel. With the right type of sources, this component of embassy travel can be described with great precision. Preserved internal administrative records of Dubrovnik in the first half of the fourteenth century reveal a practice of attaching four to six "servants" per envoy for embassies travelling overland and about three per envoy for those travelling by sea, with possible additions of a common accountant, cook, priest, interpreter and scribe (notary), bringing the usual total to somewhere between ten and twenty persons.²⁰"Insider" embassy narratives of Byzantine authors also occasionally reveal exact numbers – Nicephorus Gregoras, who participated in an embassy to Serbia in 1327, suggests a figure of seventy members, including some who knew the local language.²¹ Yet, even with a marked deficiency in both of these source types, it is possible to find evidence that sheds some light on this aspect of Nemanjić embassies as well.

Nemanjić embassy auxiliary personnel are generally mentioned on several occasions both in foreign administrative records and in domestic narrative sources.²² Furthermore, Angevin records contain two examples that provide exact numbers – a Serbian embassy from 1274 consisting of one named envoy and "eighteen persons returning with him",²³ and another from 1281 comprising an unspecified number of "envoys" with twenty-nine or thirty persons, including, however, the retinue of Maria de Chau, sister of the Serbian queen mother Helen, who was travelling with the diplomats.²⁴ In addition, information suggestive of the size of some other seaborne embassies is offered by the type of vessel they used for transport – one-envoy embassies dispatched to Croatia in 1304 and 1332 were expected to fit on a simple boat (*barcha*),²⁵ but Serbian "envoys" going to Venice in January and June 1346, as well as the two-envoy embassy to the same destination in late March 1332, used a galley.²⁶ The examples do not offer

¹⁹ Listine I, no. 556. The shipment also included military equipment worth 900 hyperpyra.

²⁰ Monumenta ragusina I, 111, 226; II, 216, 293; V, 236, 270–271, 294–295, 325, 343–344, 360–361.

²¹ Correspondance de Nicéphore Grégoras, ed. R. Guilland (Paris 1927), 35, 39.

²² Domentijan 218; Teodosije, 127, 159, 166; Makušev, 33 ≈ Rački, 224; Monumenta ragusina

I, 145, II, 365; Listine III, no. 439.

²³ Makušev, 30 ≈ Rački, 217.

²⁴ Ibid. 31 ≈ 218–219. A joint travel party consisting of an Angevin, Bulgarian and Serbian embassy in 1273 numbered sixty persons (ibid. 28 ≈ 217).

²⁵ Monumenta ragusina V, 74, 345.

²⁶ Monumenta ragusina I, 221, 233; V, 344–345.

enough details to enable solid conclusions – for instance, using a galley in 1332 might have had more to do with the extensive shopping list for Dušan's wedding than with the size of the embassy – but they can be taken as an indication that the complement of auxiliary personnel in Nemanjić embassies was comparable to the range defined by Dubrovnik missions, with a potential to reach the numbers recorded by Gregoras if such a need arose.

An attempt can also be made to identify certain specialties among the auxiliaries. The "servant" supposedly sent by Saint Sava to fetch ice during the archbishop's diplomatic mission to the king of Hungary is a literary representation of lowest-ranking embassy personnel,²⁷ but between him and the envoy there may have been other ranks and duties. This hierarchy is suggested when Dragutin rewards the Hilandar monks belonging to the embassy sent by his brother Milutin "with precious gifts, each according to his title".28 It is visible again in a description of Sava's second journey to the East, for which he "chose some of his noblemen".²⁹ They were clearly not there to fetch ice – in keeping with the traditional role of the nobility perhaps their duty was to provide security. "Abracito (sic), the king's priest", who served on the embassy to Venice that arranged the marriage of Dragutin's son in 1293, wrote the Serbian version of the marriage contract, indicating that he was in fact the embassy's scribe.³⁰ The note about the arrival of the Serbian envoy before the Mamluk sultan's palace in company with a musician playing his instrument adds another, rather curious potential specialty.³¹

An interesting example of auxiliary personnel may also be hidden in Metochites' work. On its journey to Serbia in the late winter of 1299, the Byzantine embassy led by Metochites was accompanied by a member of the Serbian embassy currently staying at the imperial court. This unnamed individual whose attitudes and actions provoke several memorable episodes, providing a sort of comic relief to the narrative of a difficult journey,³² has been duly noted by historians, who consider him to have been an envoy or ambassador.³³ Indeed, he is

²⁷ Domentijan, 249. A certain Bardus, "servant" to one of the envoys sent to Dubrovnik in October 1321, was evidently also a member of this category, cf. "Spomenici srpski", ed. K. Jireček, *Spomenik Srpske kraljevske akademije* 11 (1892), no. 6.

²⁸ Životi kraljeva, 44. The "titles" mentioned may well refer to positions in the monastic hierarchy of Hilandar, but it is natural to assume that this hierarchy also determined the role and importance of individual members within the embassy.

²⁹ Ibid. 250.

³⁰ F. Nardi, Tre documenti della famiglia Morosini (Padua 1840), 15–16.

³¹ Uzelac, "Srbija i Mamelučki Egipat", 31.

³² Mavromatis, Fondation de l'empire serbe, 90–96, 101–102.

³³ Malamut, "Sur la route", 167; K. Belke, *Roads and travel*, 83; R. Radić, "Theodore Metochites on one Serbian and one Bulgarian envoy", *Polyhronia: sbornik v čest na prof. Ivan Božilov*, ed. I. Iliev (Sofia 2002), 236.

accompanied by three Serbian servants and boasts of having travelled among the Hungarians, Bulgarians, Tatars and others.³⁴ Yet, he displays a haughty, tactless, thoroughly undiplomatic character prone to violence, as well as lack of knowledge about diplomatic customs. Metochites himself does not call him an envoy, describing him, in fact, as "not one of their top people".³⁵ At the end of the journey, as the embassy approaches Serbia, he goes ahead of the main party to notify king Milutin of Metochites' arrival. When all this is considered, it seems more probable that he was indeed not an envoy but a senior member of the auxiliary personnel, managing the common servants or performing some more specific tasks for this obviously quite large embassy. In that sense, his apparently routine communication with the king and his claims of earlier missions may indicate that he was a permanent member of the royal household who had become specialized for such a role.³⁶

Although many medieval travellers made their way around on foot, a combination of practical needs and the desire to maintain a dignified appearance required that embassies use some means of transport. For overland journeys, Nemanjić embassies are exclusively recorded to have used riding and pack horses. One cannot rule out occasional use of other animals, as well as wagons,³⁷ but there can be little doubt that horses were predominant, in view of the natural conditions and infrastructure of the region.³⁸ Comparative information suggests that the ratio of horses to men was often about one to one – Gregoras says of the embassy in which he participated: "The number of horses and us was two

³⁴ These claims find support in known diplomatic contacts – see comments by Ivan Djurić accompanying the Serbian translation of Metochites' work in *Vizantijski izvori za istoriju naroda Jugoslavije* VI, ed. F. Barišić and B. Ferjančić (Belgrade 1986), 92, notes 27 and 28.

³⁵ Mavromatis, Fondation de l'empire serbe, 90.

³⁶ This role seems comparable to that of knights encountered in retinues of contemporary European envoys – see, e.g., G. P. Cuttino, *English Diplomatic Administration 1259–1339* (Oxford University Press, 1940), 88–89, 125 – and reflected by two Frenchmen notable enough to be mentioned by name in the retinue of the envoys sent to Serbia by Charles of Valois in 1308 (A. Ubičini, "Ugovor o savezu i prijateljstvu medju Karlom od Valoa i poslanicima srpskog kralja Uroša", *Glasnik Srpskog učenog društva 27* (1870), 328.

³⁷ In addition to donkeys, mules, and oxen (*Leksikon srpskog srednjeg veka*, eds. S. Ćirković and R. Mihaljčić (Belgrade 1999), 710–714 (M. Blagojević), with reference to earlier works), a more exotic, yet realistic, possibility were camels, recorded in the possession of king Milutin (*Životi kraljeva*, 137; see also A. Uzelac, "Kamile u srpskim srednjovekovnim zemljama", *Initial. A Review of Medieval Studies* 3 (2015), 23–34). A rare mention of wagons in Balkan embassy travels of this period occurs in Metochites (Mavromatis, *Fondation de l'empire serbe*, 93).

³⁸ On horses in medieval Serbia see *Leksikon,* 314–315 (R. Mihaljčić), with reference to earlier works; see also E. Kurtović, *Konj u srednjovjekovnoj Bosni* (Sarajevo 2014).

times seven tens."³⁹ This does not mean that every embassy member travelled on horseback – among Dubrovnik embassies, only those whose tasks required speed and mobility were fully mounted, while most used about one-third of their horses as pack animals attended by auxiliary personnel on foot.⁴⁰ In fact, available information about the number of horses in Nemanjić embassies, which again comes exclusively from Angevin records, contains much lower ratios – the

eighteen-person embassy of 1274 had five horses, and a two-envoy embassy with unspecified auxiliary personnel from 1302 had only three.⁴¹ Larger numbers might have been involved in an 1273 embassy, which combined on its journey with an Angevin and Bulgarian embassy for a total of sixty horses, as well as in the embassy of 1281, which counted thirty persons and twenty-five horses, but some, if not the majority, belonged to the retinue of Maria de Chau.⁴²

Other information on horses used in Serbian embassies is of a more general and indirect nature. On his travels through the Nicaean and Bulgarian empires, Saint Sava is said to have been provided with horses by their rulers, while Dragutin presented Milutin's envoy Danilo, *hegoumenos* of the monastery of Hilandar and subsequent archbishop and dynastic historian, with "his own fine horses to take him back to the place of his abode".⁴³ Documentary evidence confirms that embassies could be supplied with horses by their hosts,⁴⁴ but they also needed to have some to begin their journey from Serbia. A Byzantine embassy to the Nemanjić court around 1270 noted that Serbian horses were inferior to their own,⁴⁵ and an early fourteenth-century Western account states that they are for the most part "small like pack horses (*roncini*), but sturdy and good runners".⁴⁶ Nevertheless, Serbian narrative sources often speak of horses as a

³⁹ Correspondance, 35. Some numbers involved in Dubrovnik embassies: *Monumenta ragusina* I, 111; V, 333–334, 343–344.

 $^{^{\}scriptscriptstyle 40}$ See n. 39 above, as well as Monumenta ragusina I, 226, and V, 360–361.

⁴¹ Makušev, 30, 33 ≈ Rački, 217, 224.

⁴² Ibid. 28, 31 ≈ 217, 218–219. Maria's retinue on a separate trip in 1280 included twenty horses (ibid. 31 ≈ 218).

⁴³ Domentijan, 276, 329; Teodosije, 171, 199; Životi kraljeva, 45.

⁴⁴ One form of assistance that was supposed to be given to embassies from Balkan countries expected to arrive in the Angevin kingdom in 1271 was to provide them with horses – Makušev, 29 ≈ Rački, 217.

⁴⁵ Georges Pachymérès: Relations historiques II, ed. A. Failler (Paris 1984), 457.

⁴⁶ Anonymi descriptio Europae orientalis, eds. T. Živković, V. Petrović and A. Uzelac, trans. D. Kunčer (Belgrade 2013), 123. The difference is reflected by the horses of the 1274 embassy to Angevin Italy, three of which are described as *roncini*, and two as war horses. The latter might have actually been a present for the Serbian ruler.

prized possession of the Nemanjić rulers.⁴⁷ It seems natural to suppose that the animals with which embassies set off on their journey came from these royal herds, although it is also possible that, while still on Serbian soil, envoys as royal representatives made use of the obligations of *ponos* and *povoz*, requiring local population to provide transport for the ruler as he passed along.⁴⁸

Available source material on the travels of Nemanjić embassies also contains some information on the means of maritime transport. One aspect of this information concerns the types of vessels and can be indicative of the size of a given embassy. But sources are rarely specific in this respect - in addition to the already mentioned extremes, "boats" and "galleys",⁴⁹ we find only a "small communal vessel" used to transport an embassy to Angevin Italy in 1323,50 and a katrga used by Saint Sava when returning from his first Levantine expedition.⁵¹ More details are provided about the ways in which embassies acquired these means of transportation. Essentially there were three possibilities - own vessels, vessels provided by the host or hired vessels. Throughout its existence, Nemanjić Serbia was a maritime country, encompassing important seafaring communities in the southern part of the eastern Adriatic coast. However, there seems to be no mention of the use of own vessels to transport Nemanjić royal embassies. On the contrary, descriptions of Saint Sava's maritime voyages explicitly mention "paying the fare", sailing with a crew of "men of other nations", and being provided with a vessel by a host ruler - Sava's katrga was furnished by the Nicaean emperor.⁵² One could perhaps argue that these voyages took place far from Nemanjić shores, but even when he set out across the Adriatic from the Nemanjić maritime town of Budva, Sava apparently did not use a local vessel, but probably a

⁴⁷ *Domentijan*, 83, 92; *Teodosije*, 105, 209; *Životi kraljeva*, 130, 137. Similarly, the precise information on the number of horses in embassies to Angevin Italy results from the efforts of local rulers to prevent unauthorized export of a valuable asset. In fact, harbourmasters were sometimes required to personally oversee the embarkation – Makušev, 40.

⁴⁸ Leksikon, 533, 552 (M. Šuica).

⁴⁹ See n. 25 and 26 above.

⁵⁰ Monumenta ragusina I, 81–82.

⁵¹ *Teodosije*, 171–172. The term was obviously loaned from contemporary Byzantine naval terminology, in which it denoted a warship of the galley type – J. H. Pryor and E. M. Jeffreys, *The Age of the* Dromon. *The Byzantine Navy ca* 500–1204 (Brill Academic Publishers, 2006), 418–421.

⁵² Domentijan, 277, 299, 326–327; Teodosije, 171–172, 181–183, 195–196. Return trips on vessels provided by the host find documentary confirmation in Angevin mentions of the Nemanjić embassies of 1274 and 1279 (Makušev, $30-31 \approx \text{Rački}$, 217, 218). However, in 1302 (ibid. $33 \approx 224$), the Angevin ruler only instructed his port authorities to "allow" the Serbian envoys to board a ship.

almost non-existent, but the fact that the Serbian embassy that was about to set sail for Venice from Dubrovnik in April 1332 consisted of two envoys from the main Nemanjić port of Kotor lends additional credence to the suggestion that Dubrovnik was the main point of departure for Nemanjić embassies travelling overseas.⁵⁵

At least two good reasons can be found for this practice. Since Dubrovnik was part of the Venetian maritime empire, transport on its ships must have been considered safer.⁵⁶ Nemanjić awareness of this aspect is attested by king Dušan's request to the Venetian authorities in 1340 that Serbian noblemen, whom he was preparing to send to the Holy Land with rich votive gifts, travel in a convoy of Venetian galleys.⁵⁷ The other reason was most probably the availability of a convenient way to cover expenses. Nemanjić rulers enjoyed various revenues from Dubrovnik, including an annual tribute of 2000 *hyperpyra* payable on the feast day of Saint Demetrius.⁵⁸ This enabled them to purchase goods and services in the city on credit, by simply deducting the sum from the next annual tribute. The purchase made by two Nemanjić envoys in 1280 was settled in this manner, but there is also direct testimony to its use for hiring vessels – in April 1304, the envoy Matthew procured the boat for his trip to Skradin by presenting to the Dubrovnik authorities a letter from king Milutin with instructions to charge the envoy's expenses to the Serbian ruler's account.⁵⁹

⁵³ Sava is said to have "stayed there a few days, until his ship came" – Životi kraljeva, 251. For a discussion of Sava's maritime route to the Holy Land on his earlier journey, see M. Marković, Prvo putovanje Svetog Save u Palestinu i njegov značaj za srpsku srednjovekovnu umetnost (Belgrade 2009), 20–28.

⁵⁴ In addition to the five examples referenced in notes 25 and 26, known departures from Dubrovnik include the 1323 embassy to Angevin Italy (the "small communal vessel" belonged, in fact, to the commune of Dubrovnik), a 1319 joint Serbian and Dubrovnik embassy to Croatia (*Monumenta ragusina* V, 145), and probably a 1336 mission tasked with importing military equipment and war horses from Venice (ibid. II, 365).

⁵⁵ On this embassy see Ćuk, *Srbija i Venecija*, 51. Another example of an envoy from Nemanjić maritime regions sailing from Dubrovnik is provided by the 1323 embassy to Angevin Italy. However, this was a two-envoy embassy whose other member was a Dubrovnik nobleman.

⁵⁶ The galley provided to the 1332 embassy to Venice was actually a "vessel of the commune of Venice, which is here in Dubrovnik".

⁵⁷ *Listine* II, no. 144.

⁵⁸ On this tribute see M. Dinić, "Dubrovački tributi. Mogoriš, Svetodmitarski i Konavoski dohodak, Provižun braće Vlatkovića", *Glas Srpske kraljevske akademije* 168 (1932), 224–239.

⁵⁹ Monumenta ragusina V, 74.

In addition to hiring the boat, Matthew apparently used Milutin's letters to cover other expenses.⁶⁰ Although the purpose of these expenses is not stated, it is highly probable that at least some of them concerned the everyday needs of the travellers and their animals, such as food, drink and fodder. One way to address this need was to carry provisions from home - the baggage of Metochites included "foods and drinks", and a Dubrovnik mission to Bosnia mentions bringing along "victuals".⁶¹ However, logistical issues seriously limited the effectiveness of such a solution. Therefore, Venetian and Dubrovnik embassies were regularly granted an allowance in money for these purposes, which Venetians sometimes called "expenses of the mouth".⁶² In Byzantine practice, the allowance could also take the form of precious goods.⁶³ Accounts of Saint Sava's departures from Serbia seem to imply all of these arrangements, when relating how the rulers supplied him with gold, silver and "other necessities".⁶⁴ Awareness of the expenses involved in stately embassy-like travel is also demonstrated by Maria de Chau, who is seen making efforts to collect funds prior to her departure for Angevin Italy in 1281.65 Yet, leaving aside Sava's travels and the episode with the fish that miraculously leapt on board his ship to feed the saint and his companions,⁶⁶ the only explicit testimony to a Nemanjić embassy looking after needs of this sort concerns a Serbian envoy from October 1343, who wished to bring to Dubrovnik "several of his own kegs full of wine, for the use of him and his retinue".⁶⁷

Fortunately for medieval embassy members, reliance on one's own provisions and funds was not the only way to get food and drink. In keeping with the notion that authority should be expressed through generosity,⁶⁸ the power hold-

⁶⁰ In April, when boat hire is mentioned, "all expenses that occurred" totalled twenty *hyperpyra*. Three months later, Matthew is again recorded as using Milutin's letter to obtain another ten *hyperpyra* (ibid. 77). The Dubrovnik archives keeps an original letter of Milutin's authorizing Matthew to withdraw ten *hyperpyra* (*Zbornik srednjovekovnih ćiriličkih povelja i pisama Srbije, Bosne i Dubrovnika* I, ed. V. Mošin, S. Ćirković and D. Sindik (Belgrade 2011), no. 102). The sum is written in the same hand as the rest of the letter, suggesting that the expenses were "preauthorized".

⁶¹ Mavromatis, Fondation de l'empire serbe, 99; Monumenta ragusina V, 333–334.

⁶² Monumenta ragusina I, 111, 226; V, 181, 236, 270–271, 294–295, 343–344, 354, 360–361; Listine II, no. 288; III, no. 182. Based on Dubrovnik records, it is even possible to calculate a ratio of roughly one *hyperpyron* daily per four to six embassy members.

⁶³ L. Bréhier, Institutions, 307.

⁶⁴Domentijan, 262; Teodosije, 116–117, 166, 181; Životi kraljeva, 250–251.

⁶⁵ Kancelariski i notariski spisi, no. 64, 68.

⁶⁶ Domentijan, 327; Teodosije, 196.

⁶⁷ Monumenta ragusina I, 145.

⁶⁸ On royal generosity, or largitas, see G. Althoff, Family, Friends and Followers. Political Bonds in Early Medieval Europe, trans. C. Carroll (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 106–107.

ers of the time devoted special attention to providing for the sustenance of their diplomatic visitors. An early fourteenth century source states that the king of Hungary spends "everything that he has" on his magnates and envoys, while the Byzantine emperor is so open-handed in cash and kind that envoys try to extend their stay at his court "so that they can become rich".⁶⁹ Communal governments such as Venice and Dubrovnik also honoured their diplomatic visitors in this manner, even if the expenses were not always viewed favourably by the ruling oligarchies.⁷⁰ Finally, in Serbia itself, the *Law Code* of emperor Dušan expressly extended the long-standing obligation of *obrok*, which required every village to provide the passing ruler, his retainers and officials with free meals, to inbound and outbound foreign envoys.⁷¹

Information on Nemanjić embassies indicates that they benefitted significantly from these opportunities. While in Serbia, they could use both the *obrok* and a similar obligation concerning fodder (*pozob*).⁷² The treats they received abroad are recorded on numerous occasions. These again include the travels of Saint Sava – Nicaean, Epirote, Bulgarian, and even Muslim rulers are said to have supplied him with "gold" and/or "necessities", the latter sometimes being additionally described as coming from their own households.⁷³ But there is no small amount of evidence related to regular embassies. Serbian and other Balkan envoys whose arrival was expected in Angevin Italy in 1271 were to be given not only horses but also money for travel expenses,⁷⁴ while returning embassies in 1279 and 1281 received an eight-day supply of fodder "and other necessities" for their sea crossing.⁷⁵ In Dubrovnik, several records note grants of money or "comestibles" of a certain value – usually two *hyperpyra* per day with a maximum of ten *hyperpyra* – to Serbian envoys,⁷⁶ and in 1323 the city council voted

⁶⁹ Anonymi descriptio, 113, 141.

⁷⁰ Queller, Early Venetian Legislation, 54.

⁷¹ Dušanov zakonik, ed. Dj. Bubalo (Belgrade 2010), 101 (Article 133).

⁷² On these obligations see *Leksikon*, 458, 535, both entries by M. Blagojević, with reference to earlier works, and esp. his "Obrok i priselica", *Istorijski časopis* 18 (1971), 166–188. The obligation to provide the emperor's envoys with three meals is expressly mentioned in Article 1 of the Statute of Budva – *Statuta et leges civitatis Buduae, civitatis Scardonae, et civitatis et insulae Lesinae*, ed. S. Ljubić (Zagreb 1882), 3, and service to envoys in general is encountered in Nemanjić charters – e.g. *Zbornik srednjovekovnih ćiriličkih povelja i pisama*, no. 92, l. 33a, 255–258; no. 98, l. 26.

⁷³ Domentijan, 277, 280, 312, 329; Teodosije, 132, 171,191–192, 199–200.

⁷⁴ Makušev, 29 ≈ Rački, 217. An allowance was also granted to Bulgarian envoys arriving in 1281 (ibid. 28–29 ≈ 219).

⁷⁵ Ibid. $30-31 \approx 218-219$.

⁷⁶ *Monumenta ragusina* I, 66; II, 365; V, 126, 278, 299. The comestibles provided by Dubrovnik authorities on such occasions included bread, meat (especially lamb), cheese, and wine (ibid. I, 280, 285).

overwhelmingly to cover the expenses for the first twenty days of the embassy sent to negotiate a marriage alliance between Serbia and the Italian Angevins.⁷⁷ Venetians also liberally covered the expenses of Nemanjić envoys whose tasks were of special importance to them.⁷⁸ Finally, Metochites reassures his Serbian companion that his needs during the journey through Byzantine territory shall be satisfied through "imperial kindness and generosity" expressed in the form of daily allowances.⁷⁹

The combination of distances involved and modes of travel available, coupled with the duration of embassy business itself, meant that envoys and their retinues also regularly needed lodgings to rest and sleep in. These could again be self-provided by using tents - Saint Sava is said to have stayed in one during his mission to the Bulgarian regional lord Strez.⁸⁰ Lodging of this sort, however, raised various concerns – both Metochites and Gregoras felt uneasy at the prospect of spending the night in the open.⁸¹ It is, therefore, no surprise to find Dušan's Law Code prescribing that travellers caught by nightfall on the road must be accepted for overnight stay at the nearest village.⁸² This was probably an expansion or reiteration of earlier obligations towards important travellers and, although there is no direct evidence, Nemanjić embassies must have relied on them while on Serbian soil.⁸³ Evidence concerning Nemanjić embassy lodging abroad is also very limited. Most of it deals with Saint Sava's travels to Hungary, Nicaea, Bulgaria, and Muslim courts.⁸⁴ Apart from that, there is only Metochites, who leads his Serbian companion through the Byzantine system of lodging along the route and also mentions that Serbian envoys in Constantinople had "usual" residences.⁸⁵ It was indeed customary for the host to assign appropriate lodgings to visiting envoys,⁸⁶ but Metochites' words allow for the possibility that Serbian embassies made use of various establishments created or supported

⁷⁷ Ibid. I, 81–82; see also n. 55 above.

⁷⁸ Listine II, no. 591; III, no. 439. Grants of such larger sums are sometimes difficult to distinguish from outright bribery, exemplified in Dubrovnik negotiations with Serbian envoys in 1362 – Monumenta ragusina III, 197, 212.

⁷⁹ Mavromatis, Fondation de l'empire serbe, 91.

⁸⁰ Teodosije, 111.

⁸¹ Mavromatis, Fondation de l'empire serbe, 102; Correspondance, 35–39.

⁸² Dušanov zakonik, 109 (Article 159).

⁸³See n. 71 and 72 above.

⁸⁴ These include unspecified "lodgings" in Hungary, "a quiet place to stay" in Nicaea, "a home to lodge in" in Babylon, accommodation with the local Christian metropolitan in Cairo, and the emperor's own warm palaces in Bulgaria – *Domentijan*, 250, 277, 312, 329; *Teodosije*, 154, 190, 191, 198.

⁸⁵ Mavromatis, Fondation de l'empire serbe, 90.

⁸⁶ In Venice, innkeepers were required to have rooms ready for the accommodation of foreign envoys – Queller, *Early Venetian Legislation*, 56.

by the Nemanjićs in foreign lands. The travels of Saint Sava again offer specific examples, as he regularly took up residence in monasteries to which he and his kin had made rich endowments – in Constantinople this was the Evergetis, in Thessaloniki the Filokalou, and in Jerusalem the monastery of Saint John the Divine.⁸⁷ Thus, when sources tell us that king Milutin built "palaces" and "royal residences" in Constantinople and Thessaloniki,⁸⁸ and that Kotor noblemen with close ties to the Nemanjić court had houses in Dubrovnik,⁸⁹ the possibility that these were used for the lodging of embassies, much like the Dubrovnik tribute was used for financing them, does not seem too remote.⁹⁰

Even if transport, sustenance and lodging issues were successfully sorted out, there were still other, less foreseeable factors that could complicate or even prematurely terminate an embassy's journey. Some of these were natural – the biographies of Saint Sava offer some descriptions of stormy maritime voyages and general allusions to the treachery of the sea,⁹¹ while Metochites details the difficulties of a journey in severe winter.⁹² In fact, both sides in the 1299 negotiations used the weather as a convincing excuse for delays,⁹³ and one of Sava's reasons for demanding an autocephalous Serbian archbishopric was avoiding the "long and troublesome journey" at each subsequent succession.⁹⁴ However, although these hardships could result in accidents and disease, apart from Sava's own illness and death on the return trip from the Levant and the severe cold caught by Metochites' Serbian companion who insisted on braving the winter winds without headgear, there is no other direct information about these factors interfering with the travels of Nemanjić diplomats.⁹⁵ Moreover, Milutin's envoys

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⁸⁷ Domentijan, 179, 227; Teodosije, 52, 77, 135, 186, 198. On Sava's endowments to these and other monastic institutions see M. Živojinović, "Ktitorska delatnost Svetoga Save", in Sava Nemanjić – Sveti Sava. Istorija i predanje, ed. V. Djurić (Belgrade 1979), 15–25.

⁸⁸ Životi kraljeva, 134. See also M. Živojinović, "Bolnica kralja Milutina u Carigradu", Zbornik radova Vizantološkog instituta 16 (1975), 105–115.

⁸⁹ E.g., the Thoma family – M. Malović-Djukić, "Kotorski vlastelin Toma Pavla Toma", *Istorijski časopis* 48 (2001) 69).

⁹⁰ However, the proposition that Serbian envoys mentioned by Metochites might have been based in one of these establishments (*Vizantijski izvori* VI, 83, n. 9) is unlikely, because it is hardly imaginable that Milutin would have started his projects in Byzantine cities before the 1299 peace treaty between Serbia and the Empire (Živojinović, "Bolnica", 108).

⁹¹ Domentijan, 277, 299, 300; Teodosije, 183. The sea is called the "briny grave".

⁹² Mavromatis, Fondation de l'empire serbe, 92–94.

⁹³ Ibid. 98, 109, 115.

⁹⁴Domentijan, 220; Teodosije, 130.

⁹⁵ Letters by Dušan and one of his nobles from 1352 mention a trusted servant who had fallen ill and probably died on a trip to Venice, but there is no indication that he belonged to an embassy – *Spomenici* srpski II, ed. M. Pucić (Belgrade 1862), no. 25.

who concluded the treaty with Charles of Valois at the abbey of Lys near Paris on 27 March 1308, as well as his envoy who "very quickly" made two successive journeys to Constantinople for secret negotiations with the internal opposition to emperor Andronikos II in 1320/21, made their journeys in wintertime.⁹⁶

Much more traces are found of various man-made difficulties. There is no evidence of these being caused by the host - medieval diplomacy embraced the ancient concept of inviolability of the envoy as an essential precondition for negotiations,⁹⁷ and the known Nemanjić embassies seem to have been treated appropriately.98 Nevertheless, problems could arise from lack of information. Even in Serbia itself, envoys could get in trouble for requesting the usual dues when a given community had been exempted from them - Milutin's charter for the monastery of Saint George near Skoplje not only releases the monastic estate from providing food and lodging for envoys, but even threatens offenders with an elaborate curse and a beating while being thrown out.99 Two cases of such misunderstandings are recorded abroad – the wish of the Serbian envoy from 1343 to bring his wine to Dubrovnik went against city regulations, but was nevertheless granted, while vigorous insistence of Metochites' Serbian companion to receive from the Byzantine population the type of service accorded to embassies in Serbia led to a brawl with the locals that was stopped by Metochites' intervention before serious injuries occurred.100

The fact that both of these situations were promptly resolved by the host emphasizes the key importance of establishing direct contact. This could be achieved by sending prior notification of the embassy's arrival or by simply travelling together with the host's own envoys returning from the Nemanjić court, who then communicated the news to their principals. The host usually responded by providing escorts, as well as guarantees of safe conduct. Reflections of all these procedures, which are amply attested in comparative sources, can also be

⁹⁶ Ubičini, "Ugovor o savezu" 324; *Cantacuzenus* I, 35–37 (see also *Vizantijski izvori* VI, 307–309).

⁹⁷ On this concept in medieval times see L. Frey and M. Frey, *The History of Diplomatic Immunity* (Ohio State University Press, 1999), 75–118.

⁹⁸ Still, Saint Sava is described as doubting his safety when he set out for the Hungarian court (*Teodosije*, 153), and there must have been a real sense of danger in Milutin's embassy to the Tatar khan Nogai which found him on his way to attack Serbia with a large army – Životi kraljeva, 120–121. For some comparative regional examples of mistreatment of envoys by the host see R. Radić, *Strah u poznoj Vizantiji* I (Belgrade 2000), 236–243.

⁹⁹ Zbornik srednjovekovnih ćiriličkih povelja pisama I, no. 92, lines 255–258. Since it is difficult to imagine such treatment of foreign envoys, this must have applied primarily to the Nemanjić's own embassies.

¹⁰⁰ Mavromatis, *Fondation de l'empire serbe*, 91–92. Perhaps it was this kind of attitude on the part of embassy members that provoked the sharp tone in the charter for the monastery of Saint George.

ing prior notifications and receiving escorts and, on one occasion, letters of safe conduct.¹⁰¹ Actually, his mission to Hungary is a textbook example – he arrives in company with returning Hungarian envoys, who notify their king that the Serbian archbishop is coming with them, and on his departure he is given an escort of Hungarian nobles to the Serbian border.¹⁰² Metochites also mentions a Serbian envoy travelling with a returning Byzantine messenger,¹⁰³ while his own Serbian companion reflects the case when part of a Nemanjić embassy returns home together with the envoys dispatched by the other side. Documentary sources are not that explicit. There are no preserved safe conducts for Nemanjić envoys and when the coastal authorities of Angevin Italy were ordered to provide the embassies expected to arrive from Serbia and other Balkan lands with safe conduct to the king's presence, it is not clear whether that means letters, escorts or both.¹⁰⁴ However, this and at least three Dubrovnik examples indicate the use of prior notification,¹⁰⁵ while joint travel is mentioned or suggested on several occasions, albeit usually with homeward-bound Nemanjić embassies accompanying foreign envoys.¹⁰⁶

In addition to guaranteeing safety and ensuring that, as Metochites put it, "we are not denied what is due to us, as sometimes occurs", ¹⁰⁷ joint travel and early contacts with hosts also assisted embassies in finding the way to their destination. This could prove to be quite a problem given the medieval phenomenon of itinerant rulers. There are several examples of incoming embassies making efforts to locate Nemanjić rulers, most strikingly a Dubrovnik embassy from August 1345 which expected to meet king Dušan in Prizren, but found him several weeks later in Serres.¹⁰⁸ However, other than the fact that some of Saint

¹⁰¹ Domentijan, 66, 99–100, 310–312, 329; Teodosije, 139, 174 (safe conduct), 188, 190–192, 199.

¹⁰² Teodosije, 153, 159.

¹⁰³ Mavromatis, Fondation de l'empire serbe, 100.

¹⁰⁴ Makušev, 29 ≈ Rački, 217. A safe conduct for a 1361 mission to Dubrovnik and Croatia is also mentioned (Monumenta ragusina III, 102).

¹⁰⁵ Monumenta ragusina II, 215; III, 196; V, 299.

¹⁰⁶ Makušev, 28, 30–31, ≈ Rački, 217. Listine III, no. 439; Monumenta ragusina II, 365; Ubičini, "Ugovor o savezu" 310, 328.

¹⁰⁷ Mavromatis, Fondation de l'empire serbe, 90.

¹⁰⁸ Monumenta ragusina I, 184; N. Porčić, "Povelja kralja Stefana Dušana Dubrovčanima o carini sluge Dabiživa", Stari srpski arhiv 5 (2006), 86–87. For other examples from Dubrovnik see Monumenta ragusina I, 79, 105, 110; II, 365; V, 314. Metochites also made enquiries about Milutin's movements (Mavromatis, Fondation de l'empire serbe, 101), and a Venetian envoy from November 1346 reported that he "found" Dušan "several days inland" in Byzantine territory (*Listine* II, no. 657)

Sava's escorts in the Levant obviously also acted as travel guides,¹⁰⁹ there are no testimonies about Nemanjić envoys having problems with finding their way or taking measures not to get lost.¹¹⁰

As much as close cooperation with the hosts was helpful, there were still factors outside their control that could threaten the success of an embassy's journey. A major one was thieves, brigands and pirates. Theft and brigandage were a problem in Serbia itself, where legislation attempted to counter them by enforcing common responsibility on the locals and instituting a system of armed escorts working in relays.¹¹¹ Gregoras, on the other hand, tells us that some Byzantine areas he passed through on his way to Serbia had been practically depopulated by brigand activity.¹¹² Yet, although we have recorded instances of foreign embassies targeted by brigands in Serbia - most notably the theft of "excellent" horses from the Byzantine embassy of about 1270, when brigands also attacked the chief Nemanjić negotiator¹¹³ – there seem to be no such cases involving Nemanjić embassies. Saint Sava is said to have miraculously avoided Adriatic pirates waiting to ambush him, while later on the fear of his companions that they will be murdered and robbed by the foreign crew transporting them proved unfounded.¹¹⁴ The closest comparable incident involves a party of Serbian travellers on the way from Milutin's court to Hilandar at the time when Catalan mercenaries ravaged the area. This party, which successfully posed as an "embassy heading for Constantine's holy city", managed to defeat an attack led by a local "potentate" with brigand-like intentions, proving that an embassy-sized company had some capability of defending itself.¹¹⁵

Nemanjić embassies are more explicitly linked to another security challenge – interference of third political powers. In 1199, Nemanja's son Vukan was hesitant to send his "magnificent" embassy to the Pope, "having heard that

¹¹² Correspondance, 35.

¹⁰⁹ See n. 101 above.

¹¹⁰ However, Bulgarian envoys to Angevin Italy in 1281 were given "a horseman" to take them to the royal court "because they do not know the roads" – Makušev, 29.

¹¹¹ Dušanov zakonik, 100, 108–109 (Articles 125, 155–157, 160). The mainstay of these measures was apparently the *priselica*, which demanded compensation from the local community for damage incurred by travellers in their area (*Leksikon*, 586 (M. Blagojević), with reference to earlier works). In fact, the abovementioned obligation to provide shelter to travellers after nightfall (n. 82) was essentially an extension of this principle, as it required incompliant landowners to compensate any resulting loss.

¹¹³ *Pachymeres* II, 457. A Dubrovnik embassy from 1318 also suffered a stolen horse and, quite curiously, a burned document belonging to one of the envoys (*Monumenta ragusina* V, 114–115, 118).

¹¹⁴ Domentijan, 299–300, 326–327; Teodosije, 181–182, 195–196.

¹¹⁵ Životi kraljeva, 345–346.

the land [Italy] is in turmoil",¹¹⁶ but there are also two examples of actual interference with apparent political background. The first used nonviolent means – when a Serbian envoy requested a boat to take him to Zadar in April 1332, the authorities of Dubrovnik turned him down.¹¹⁷ Although there are no details, the fact that the galley given to Serbian envoys bound for Venice just ten days before was provided only under the express condition that they not stop anywhere along the way to negotiate with somebody else, seems to indicate that Dubrovnik and its Venetian masters were actually sabotaging a Serbian diplomatic contact that was not to their liking. Far more sinister are the events recounted by Gregoras, concerning Nemanjić envoys to the Ottoman leader Orhan around 1351 – on their return trip together with a Ottoman embassy to the Serbian court, they were ambushed near Rodosto by an ally of the Byzantine emperor who had an interest in preventing these contacts. As a result, some of the envoys were murdered, others captured, and the rich gifts they carried were looted.¹¹⁸

Nevertheless, such setbacks seem to have been very rare and it may be concluded that, regardless of their diplomatic achievements, Nemanjić embassies were successful travellers - the vast majority of them managed to arrive at their destination and then to make it home safely. Many of these journeys and their protagonists have left no trace in the sources available today and are thus consigned to the role of historical stowaways in the story of Nemanjić diplomatic travel. Yet, the information that has been preserved can be put to good use. Since it hardly ever offers more than a handful of glimpses at any of the aspects of embassy travel over a period of almost two centuries, there is obviously no potential for diachronic analysis. But if this fragmentary content is placed into the context of much richer comparative information it becomes possible to attain something of a comprehensive, albeit static, picture. That picture is sufficiently clear to show that the experience of Nemanjić embassy travel essentially conforms to comparative models. In fact, it offers some interesting contributions to the general model, such as the use of Dubrovnik tributes as an expedient source of on-the-road funding, the tendency for satisfying the needs of travellers in kind, as opposed to the more money-oriented solutions of others, as well as a range of interesting individual cases. In that sense, it presents itself as a research field worthy of attention, where a comparative approach can yield valuable results furthering our knowledge of diplomacy, travel and state administration in medieval Serbia and its regional contemporaries.

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¹¹⁶ Register Papst Innozenz, no. 167 (176).

¹¹⁷ Monumenta ragusina V, 345.

¹¹⁸ Gregoras III, 100.

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The Greatest Misfortune in the Oikoumene Byzantine Historiography on the Fall of Constantinople in 1453^{**}

- Abstract: The focus of the paper is on the manner in which the so-called *Four Historians* of the Fall of the Byzantine Empire to the Ottoman Turks Doukas, Laonikos Chalkokondyles, George Sphrantzes and Kritoboulos of Imbros – describe the 1453 conquest of Constantinople, revealing at the same time their different political views both on this event and on the historical reality before and after it.
- Keywords: Doukas, Laonikos Chalkokondyles, George Sphrantzes, Kritoboulos of Imbros, political attitude, Constantinople

T he fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453 was an event which more than any other left a deep imprint not only in the collective memory of the Greeks but also on the other nations that considered themselves as spiritual children of the Byzantine Empire. Western European states, on the other hand, soon pragmatically accepted the change of master in the city on the Bosporus and did not mourn the lost Queen of Cities as the Greeks have ever since.

What this experience meant to the Byzantines is a question which involves uncertainties over the terms they used to express their identity, and their meaning – Hellene ("Έλλην), Roman (Ῥωμαίος), race (ράτσα, φυλή), genus (γένος), nation (ἕθνος), fatherland (πατρίς). As pointed out by S. Vryonis, the usage of these terms varied not only from writer to writer but also in the work of a single writer.¹

The main Greek historical sources for the events are the works of the so-called "historians of the fall" of the Byzantine Empire to the Ottomans – Doukas, Laonikos Chalkokondyles, George Sphrantzes and Kritoboulos of Imbros. Although they wrote after 1453, both as contemporaries and as witnesses, it is their cultural and political background as well as the context of their work

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¹ S. Vryonis, "Byzantine Cultural Self-Consciousness in the Fifteenth Century", in *The Twilight of Byzantium: Aspects of Cultural and Religious History in the Later Byzantine Empire*, eds. D. Mouriki & S. Ćurčić (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1991), 5–14.

taken as a whole – narratives of the decline of the Byzantine Empire and the rise of the Ottoman one - that link them closely to the historical phenomenon today known as Byzantium. Their narratives, on the other hand, offer very different interpretations of these events, as may best be seen from their accounts of the fall of Constantinople which, in their eyes, was a turning point in world history.

Laonikos Chalkokondyles' *Demonstrations of Histories* written in Constantinople around 1464-68 cover the longest period (1298-1463). The work appears to have been addressed to the local Greek population and, in a broader sense, to Western European intellectuals.²

Doukas' narrative, which survives without a title and in only one manuscript, covers a shorter period (1341-1462). It apparently was addressed to the Byzantine nobles who supported the church union, and to the Hellenized circles of the Western archons who ruled some parts of Byzantium, such as Gattilusio of Lesbos in whose service Doukas had been since 1421.³

George Sphrantzes, a dignitary, diplomat and close associate and friend of the last three Palaiologan emperors, wrote a chronicle known as *Chronicon Minus* which relates the events from 1413 to 1477. As an Orthodox Roman and bitter opponent of the Ottoman Turks, he shared both the political views and the fate of the Byzantine archons who fled to the West after the Ottoman conquest of the Morea in 1460. His work is believed to have been addressed to them.⁴

Finally, Kritoboulos of Imbros, a Byzantine intellectual who was a member of the learned circle of Gennadios Scholarios, wrote a programmatic history recounting the events that took place between 1451 and 1467. Although it is commonly held that Kritoboulos, who dedicated this work to Mehmed II the Conqueror, wrote it as a laudatory tribute to the sultan's person and deeds, he in fact is quite critical of his hero and the Ottoman Turks in general, as evidenced mostly by his description of the conquest of Constantinople.

And it was Kritoboulos who wrote the most detailed account of the events prior, during and after the fall of Constantinople. Although dedicated to Mehmed Fatih, whom he regarded as the Byzantine emperors' legitimate suc-

² H. Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner*, vol. I (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1978), 485-490; D. R. Reinsch, "Η θεώρηση της πολιτικής και πολιτιστικής φυσιογνωμίας των Ελλήνων στους ιστορικούς της Άλωσης", *Études balkaniques* 6 (*Cahiers Pierre Belon*) (1999), 80; A. Kaldellis, "The Date of Laonikos Chalkokondyles' Histories", *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 52 (2012), 119, 133–134; *Laonikos Chalkokondyles, The Histories*, trans. A. Kaldellis, Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library 33–34 (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2014), vol. 1, x-xi.

³ Hunger, Literatur, 490–494; Reinsch, "Θεώρηση", 82, 84.

⁴ Hunger, *Literatur*, 494-499; *Giorgio Sfranze*, *Cronaca*, ed. R. Maisano, Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae 29 (Rome: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1990), 69*; Reinsch, "Θεώρηση", 84-86.

cessor, his work, as noted by D. R. Reinsch, was addressed to the Greeks of Constantinople.⁵ Yet, it was written in order to become part of the Greek historical canon. In the dedicatory letter at the beginning of his history, Kritoboulos states that not only is there no history in Greek of the sultan whose deeds, no inferior to those of Alexander, should be passed on to future generations for eternal glory, but that those who will live after Kritoboulos should not be deprived of such a narrative and its lessons (τοιαύτης ἀμοιρήσαντες ἱστορίας τε καὶ μαθήσεως). Although, the historian continues, many competent Arabs or Persians could perform the task better, as they are familiar with the sultan's deeds, having witnessed them unlike him, their effort would be of little consequence unless written in Greek, the language respected far and wide. For once philhellenes translate his history into their own languages the deeds of the sultan will become known not only to the Greeks but also to western nations as far as the British Isles, and even beyond.⁶ The sultan's deeds described in Greek were intended to become part of Greek tradition and history, part of Greek identity. Kritoboulos' work was, therefore, written explicitly for future generations. The historian observes that it is in the nature of human memory to belittle ancient deeds because they become less and less believable as times goes by, while those more recent are easy to embrace simply because they are closer, be they worthy of admiration or not.⁷ For future generations to admire something from the past and learn from it, the Greeks should present the sultan's feats to them.

Kritoboulos begins by asking future generations for forgiveness because, unlike many others, he does not merely lament over the misfortune but also exposes the weaknesses of his own people. Yet, he essentially does not criticize his compatriots and minimizes their responsibility. For if, he says, there were individuals who, although in charge, did not use their power as they should have, it was not the fault of the people (oùk ἐστι τοῦτο τοῦ γένους ἀμάρτημα), but their own.⁸ On the other hand, the example of Loukas Notaras is quite indicative. It is well known that Notaras, "one of the most capable and the most illustrious in knowledge, wealth, virtue and political power",⁹ was not only willing but actively sought to come to terms with the Ottoman Turks in order to keep his power, influence and wealth.¹⁰ The sultan even thought of appointing Notaras as com-

⁵ Reinsch, "Θεώρηση", 81; cf. Hunger, Literatur, 500-501.

⁶ Critobuli Imbriotae Historiae, ed. D. R. Reinsch, Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae 22 (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1983), 4-5.

⁷ Ibid. 12.

⁸ Ibid. 13–15.

⁹ Ibid. 82.

¹⁰ E. Zachariadou, "Τά λόγια και ο θάνατος του Λούκα Νοταρά", in *Ροδώνια, Τιμή στον Μ. Ι. Mavoύσακα*, I (Rethymno 1994), 135–146; D. R. Reinsch, "Lieber den Turban als was? Bemerkungen zum Dictum Lukas Notaras", in ΦΙΛΕΛΛΗΝ, Studies in Honour of Robert Brown-

mander of the city and charging him with the task of repopulating it. But when some people led the sultan into believing that Notaras would plot against him, he was struck by the arrows of envy, and he and his sons met an unjust death. The megas doux died bravely.¹¹ In other words, Notaras' death was not a consequence of his own political choice.

Kritoboulos' history, then, is essentially about the *translatio imperii*, but it had two aims – to instruct the Greeks first and then, once translated into other languages by philhellene scholars, the rest of the *oikoumene*. His work reveals the political views which he shared with those of like mind and which he hoped would be accepted by their compatriots as well. That political stance implied cooperation with the new masters and the acceptance of the new circumstances.

Kritoboulos' endeavour to praise the person and deeds of Mehmed the Conqueror put aside, his account of the siege of Constantinople is a very sharp criticism of his hero and the Turks in general. Two contrasting statements in Mehmed's speech to his soldiers seem to suggest what Kritoboulos believed Constantinople represented for the Ottomans and what the city meant to the Byzantines. Namely, the sultan's statement that the mighty Ottomans are defied by a city which now is nothing more than farmland, worthless houses and empty walls, most of them in ruins, seems to suggest what Constantinople represented for the Turks.¹² For Kritoboulos, on the other hand, Constantinople was something else. He shows it through Mehmed's enticement to his soldiers to battle, promising them that all manner of treasures awaits them there, in the imperial palaces, in the houses of the powerful, even in the homes of common people, but particularly in the churches. Moreover, they will find many noblemen ($\tau \tilde{\omega} v$ $\varepsilon \tilde{v} \gamma \varepsilon \gamma o v \delta \tau \omega v$), some of whom they will sell, and some of whom they will keep as slaves. They will also find beautiful women, whom they can make their wives, their servants or they can sell them, as well as young noble boys. They will delight in the beauty of public buildings, houses and gardens. The sultan will give them a large and populous city, the capital of the ancient Romans – which has attained the peak of its good fortune and glory, and has truly been the head of the whole oikoumene – for loot and plunder.¹³

Kritoboulos openly criticizes the wanton violence of the janissaries and other Ottoman soldiers upon their entry into the city. His emotional description of the abuse of women, old men, and children, and of thousands of other horrible acts (älla μυρία εἰργασμένους δεινά)¹⁴ certainly does not fit with what is

- ¹² Critobulos, 29.
- ¹³ Ibid. 60–61.
- 14 Ibid. 71–72.

ing, ed. C. Constantinides et al. (Venice: Istituto Ellenico di Studi Bizantini e Postbizantini, 1996), 377-389.

¹¹ Critobulos, 83–85.

widely accepted to have been the purpose of his history – to glorify Mehmed the Conqueror. Kritoboulos wonders if there is a way at all to describe the desecration and burning down of churches ($\tau \omega \nu i \epsilon \rho \omega \nu$), the opening of tombs and the throwing of the remains of the dead into the streets. Many books, sacred as well as profane, were burnt or destroyed in some other way or sold for nothing. The city was so ravaged that it was hard to believe that there had ever been houses with furniture.¹⁵ In other words, the description of the devastation Constantinople underwent is a portrayal of barbarism and savageness. When the sultan entered the city and looked about to see its size and position – to which Kritoboulos adds its magnificence, the beauty of its people, the gracefulness, opulence and splendour of its churches and public buildings and the houses of the powerful ($\tau \omega \nu \dot{\epsilon} \nu \delta \nu \nu \dot{\alpha} \mu \epsilon$) – and saw all the devastation wrought to it, he could not suppress tears at the realisation what a city he had given over to plunder and destruction.

At the beginning of his work, Kritoboulos says that the destruction of the Romans, the oldest and largest state, was the most significant of all events and not a simple change of affairs (μ εγίστη δη πάντων γέγονεν αὕτη καὶ μ εταβολη πραγμάτων οὐ τῶν τυχόντων).¹⁶ The fall of Constantinople was a tragedy (πάθος) the like of which had never before befallen any of the greatest cities be it in terms of their size or of the bitterness and harshness of destruction.¹⁷ Not even Troy, Babylon or Carthage, Rome, Jerusalem or even Constantinople itself when captured by the Latins, had suffered that much at the hands of their conquerors, for they had not been ravaged as heavily and their inhabitants had not suffered as Constantinople has now. For Kritoboulos, Constantinople was splendid, glorious and rich, the example of every good, the centre of knowledge, wisdom, culture and virtue, of all the best in one place, the New Jerusalem, the fatherland. This time, however, it was deprived of everything: wealth, glory, order, splendour, honour, the brilliance of its population, valour, education, wisdom, religious order, dominion. And just as the city had once thrived in prosperity and good fortune, so now it was brought down into the abyss of misfortune and misery. The city which once had ruled over many nations now became the object of shameful slavery.¹⁸

Similarly to some short anonymous chronicles,¹⁹ Kritoboulos stresses the parallelism between the names of the first and the last emperor and their mothers, giving a sort of a periodization of Byzantine history. The first was Constan-

¹⁵ Ibid. 72–73, 74, 75.

¹⁶ Ibid. 12.

¹⁷ Ibid. 76.

¹⁸ Ibid. 78-79.

¹⁹ *Die byzantinischen Kleinchroniken*, vol. I, ed. P. Schreiner, Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae 12 (Vienna: Verlad der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1975), 370.

tine, the fortunate emperor (εὐτυχής), son of Helen, who gave prosperity to the city, and the last was Constantine, the unfortunate emperor (δυστυχοῦς), son of Helen, in whose reign the city was reduced to the worst slavery and misery. He was the paragon of virtue, a new Pericles, but he was unfortunate throughout his life and especially at its end.²⁰ In the end, the fall of the city was God's will.²¹

The Greeks should, therefore, remember the suffering which the city had gone through. If Kritoboulos' history was meant to be read by the sultan, it is no wonder that it did not have a bright future at his court. For it contained serious criticisms, at least as far as the description of the fall is concerned, and the sultan expectedly did not like it. At the end of the dedicatory letter Kritoboulos says that, if his words seem far too inadequate to describe the sultan's deeds and so fail to match up to their greatness, which must be the case, then the book should be condemned as useless, while he himself, reverencing him from afar in silent awe, will leave the recording of history to others who are much more competent in such matters.²² This was exactly the fate both of the writer and, until the nineteenth century, of his work.

Laonikos Chalkokondyles wrote a shorter account of the fall of Constantinople. His data matches that of Kritoboulos and Doukas. For him, the fall of Constantinople generally meant enslavement. The words of Ismail, son of the ruler of Sinope, who at the moment the city wall was broken through called on the Byzantines to send an envoy to the sultan in order to obtain good peace terms, seem to reveal the author's own views - the city would otherwise be seized by force, women and children enslaved, and the Byzantines themselves annihilated.²³ Moreover, for him, the city was the empire itself, as suggested by the words of Mehmed II demanding that the janissaries help him win an empire (ἐμοὶ εὐκλεῆ ἀνελόμενοι συγκατεργάζεσθε τὴν βασιλείαν ἐμοὶ).²⁴ Chalkokondyles sees the attacking Turks as barbarians, as does the Emperor of the Hellenes, who died bravely.²⁵ Chalkokondyles, same as Doukas, mentions the prophecy that the conquerors will break into the city, but only as far as the place called Forum Tauros (ἄχρι τοῦ Ταύρου χώρου), and then the defenders will drive them away. In his description of the barbarity of Ottoman soldiers Chalkokondyles is, however, more restrained. He speaks of scores of people seeking shelter in the

²⁵ Ibid. 159.

²⁰ Critobulos, 80–81.

²¹ Ibid. 80.

²² Ibid. 9.

²³ Laonici Chalcocondylae Historiarum Demonstrationes, vol. II, ed. E. Darkó (Budapest: sumptibus Academiae litterarum hungaricae, 1922), 156.

²⁴ Chalc. II, 157.

city's largest church, Hagia Sophia,²⁶ and he says that many were killed inside the church. Others, wandering the streets in confusion, were soon captured or slain. On the other hand, many, such as Theophilos Palaiologos and Palaiologos Metochites, fought bravely for the fatherland ($\pi p \delta \tau \eta \varsigma \pi \alpha \tau p (\delta o \varsigma)$, hopeful of being able to prevent their wives and children from being forced into slavery (eig av $\delta p \alpha \pi o \delta (\sigma \mu \delta v)$.²⁷

The barbarity of the Turks is shown by other pieces of information as well – the janissaries grabbed so much loot that they did not know what to do with it, and it even happened that, unaware of the actual value of the jewellery, they exchanged gold for bronze.²⁸

Chalkokondyles concludes the story of the fall with the observation that it certainly was the most grievous catastrophe known to history ($\dot{\eta}$ ξυμφορὰ αὕτη μεγίστη τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην γενομένων ὑπερβαλέσθαι τῷ πάθει) and that the complete destruction of the Hellenes is comparable to the fall of Troy. The Romans (τοὺς Ῥωμαίους),²⁹ he continues, believe that this disaster befell the Hellenes (τοῖς Ἔλλησι) as a vengeance for the sack of Troy long ago.³⁰ Both writers, Kritoboulos and Chalkokondyles, are believed to have belonged to the same intellectual circle, the one gathered around Gennadios Scholarios. Both of them saw the fall of Constantinople as revenge for the fall of Troy.³¹

There are views that the interpretation of the fall of Constantinople as vengeance for the sack of Troy had originated among the humanists in the West. Such an interpretation of the fall of Constantinople, which even implied that it had been justified, became so popular that, as some believe, Chalkokondyles accepted it, since he probably completed his work while in Italy, where he had contacts with humanistic circles.³²

Laonikos Chalkokondyles, viewed by some as the originator of $\tau \eta \varsigma$ $\mu \epsilon \gamma \dot{\alpha} \lambda \eta \varsigma$ iδέας,³³ and by others as the only historian of the fall demonstrably influenced by the Renaissance,³⁴ is a writer whose historical work continues to intrigue scholars. It has recently been argued that he was the Herodotus of the

²⁶ Ibid. 161.

²⁷ Ibid. 161–162.

²⁸ Ibid. 162.

²⁹ Here Chalkokondyles (*Histories*, xviii) has the Latins in mind.

³⁰ Chalc., 166–167.

³¹ Reinsch, "Θεώρηση", 81.

³² M. Philippides & W. K. Hanak, *The Siege and the Fall of Constantinople in 1453: Historiography, Topography, and Military Studies* (Farnham; Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 201–202.

³³ Chalc. II, I, 2; Hunger, Literatur, 489.

³⁴ J. Harris, "Laonikos Chalkokondyles and the Rise of the Ottoman Turks", *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 27 (2003), 153–170.

fifteenth century and that his work should be seen as post-Byzantine rather than proto-humanistic.³⁵ While H. Hunger regarded him as religiously indifferent,³⁶ D. R. Reinsch correctly insists that he not only was interested in religious matters but also, unlike his teacher Plethon, a Christian.³⁷ He was not, though, a solitary humanist who wrote his work in Athens, Italy or Crete. He wrote it, as others believe, in Constantinople,³⁸ addressing it to the local Greeks and, more widely, the intellectuals who knew Greek and who met with his work around 1500.³⁹ It seems, however, that there are elements in his narrative, most notably his use of names and toponyms, which suggest that he intended it for a broader audience. He does not, for instance, use the name Golden Horn, but refers to the place simply as the harbour. Or, why would he feel the need to explain what Hagia Sophia was, the most famous church in the world even after Constantinople was captured by the Turks who even today use that name? His use of ancient toponyms may be indicative not only of his classical education and preferences but also of his wish to make his work accessible to his potential audience, the audience of Western Europe or, at least, to a world beyond Constantinople.

Doukas, unlike the previous two writers, makes his political position, which is basically pro-unionist and anti-Turkish, perfectly clear. His narrative of the fall is, like that of Kritoboulos, detailed, dramatically told, and offers a glimpse of the everyday life of the Constantinopolitans prior to the conquest. But Doukas provides some information which Kritoboulos does not. He tells us about a Byzantine embassy sent to Mehmed while he was in Asia Minor dealing with the situation in Karaman. The embassy was received by Halil Pasha who heard their complaint that they had not yet received the money for Orhan promised by the sultan upon his accession to the throne. The pasha then gave the famous speech which appears to reflect the attitude of the writer himself – You stupid and unreasonable Greeks, you must change your ways (Åqete, å κατέχετε).⁴⁰ This was the reason for Mehmed to suspend his campaign in Karaman and return to Europe to begin preparations for the assault on Constantinople. That was, according to Doukas, a poor decision taken by a foolish assem-

³⁵ Chalkokondyles, Histories, x-xi. See also A. Kaldellis, A New Herodotos: Laonikos Chalkokondyles on the Ottoman Empire, the Fall of Byzantium, and the Emergence of the West. Supplements to the Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library (Washington D.C: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2015).

³⁶ Hunger, Literatur, 489.

³⁷ Chalc. I, 133; II, 223; Reinsch, "Θεώρηση", 78.

³⁸Kaldellis, "Date", 119, 133–134.

³⁹ Reinsch, "Θεώρηση", 80.

⁴⁰ *Ducas, Historia Turco-Byzantina (1341–1462),* ed. V. Grecu (Bucharest: București Ed. Acad. Repubicae Popularis Romanicae, 1958), 293.

bly of Romans which had conceived a futile plan (ή μωρὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων συναγωγὴ ἐσκέψατό τινα ματαίαν βουλήν).⁴¹

A motif threaded throughout Doukas' narrative is that of a treacherous and duplicitous sultan.⁴² Yet, in parallel with his criticism of the deceitful sultan – a wolf by nature disguised in a lambskin, an Antichrist before Antichrist, the destroyer of Christ the Shepherd, the enemy of the Cross and a true apprentice of Satan, Nebuchadnezzar who arrived before the gates of Jerusalem – Doukas levels severe criticism at his compatriots.

His sharpest criticism, of course, is made about the rejection of the decree of church union of 1439. The emperor, according to Doukas, only pretended to support it, as did all members of the clergy and the senate who attended the ceremony of its reaffirmation in Hagia Sophia in December 1452.43 He designates the anti-unionists as schismatics (τὸ σχισματικὸν μέρος).⁴⁴ Ironically distorting their piety, Doukas says that the unruly mob and common people (χυδαῖος οὖν καὶ ἀγοραῖος λαὸς) that left the enclosure of the Pantokrator monastery went to taverns where they cursed the unionists and raised toasts to the Mother of God, invoking her help.⁴⁵ He calls the Constantinopolitans an uncouth mob opposed to everything of a better sort, rooted in arrogance, with branches of vain opinion, flowers of haughty pride, the dregs of the Hellenes, quick to despise the rest of mankind although so despicable themselves. Since the Byzantines broke so many oaths they had taken in the name of the Holy Trinity, in Lyon, in Florence, even in Hagia Sophia, nothing less could be expected than that all memory of them and their city will be wiped off the face of the earth.⁴⁶ Doukas finds Cardinal Isidore to be a wise man, educated in the true dogmas (πεπαιδευμένον έν δόγμασιν ὀρθοῖς), a Roman by birth who proved himself to be an honourable father at the Council of Florence.⁴⁷ Very indicative in this sense is Doukas' claim that Gennadios Scholarios continued to attack St. Thomas Aquinas and Demetrios Kydones as heretics, in which he had great support from Loukas Notaras, megas doux, who preferred the Turkish turban to the Latin $\kappa \alpha \lambda \dot{\nu} \pi \tau \rho a$.⁴⁸

⁴¹ Ducas, 293.

⁴² Ibid. 289, 293, 303.

⁴³ Ibid. 315.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid. 317.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 319.

⁴⁷ Ibid. 315.

⁴⁸ Ibid. 329. Reinsch, "Lieber den Turban", 377-389, suggests that the term "καλύπτρα λατινική" does not refer to the papal mitre or tiara, but rather to the Latin imperial crown. See also N. Necipoğlu, *Byzantium between the Ottomans and the Latins. Politics and Society in the Later Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 214-218.

So, if we bear in mind that the "mob" Doukas describes was in fact the majority of Constantinopolitans, and that he thought that even those who accepted the union only pretended to do so, it follows that Constantinople, as a symbol of everything that had fallen with it, was treacherous and politically immature. The impression is that Doukas distances himself from Constantinople. It is obvious that he was a supporter of the union, but his zeal for it suggests that he might even have converted to Catholicism, as, after all, did many intellectuals and archons of his time. One should not forget that he had spent years in the service of the Genoese.

Doukas directly addresses the people who took shelter in Hagia Sophia after the Ottomans entered the city: "You miserable Romans ($\mathcal{P}\omega\mu\alpha ioi$), you wretches, who even yesterday and the day before called this church a cavern of the infidel, an altar of the heathen! Not a single one of you would enter it then due to its defilement because the services were celebrated by those who had embraced the union. But now that wrath looms over you, you have fled into it as if it were your only hope and salvation. And yet, even though just anger has come upon you, your hearts are not inclined towards peace."⁴⁹

Doukas' account tallies with that of Kritoboulos in the gist and sequence of the main events during the siege of Constantinople. Both report on the emperor's embassy to the sultan prompted by the beginning of the construction of the fort of Rumeli Hisar, on the arrival of Urban, on a large cannon being transported from Edirne, the conquest of Byzantine territories along the Sea of Marmara and the siege of Selymbria, the naval battle won by the Byzantines, on Giustiniani, on the transport of Turkish ships into the Golden Horn. Doukas even uses the same parallel as Kritoboulos, liking this undertaking to that of Xerxes. The only difference being that Kritoboulos mentions the canal which Xerxes cut through the Athos peninsula, whereas Doukas states that Xerxes crossed the Hellespont, but was defeated by the Athenians and retreated. This new Macedonian, however, crossed the land as though it had been a sea, destroyed the Hellenes and golden Athenians, the jewel of the world, and took the Queen of Cities.⁵⁰ In other words, this Athens, i.e. Constantinople, was conquered by a new Alexander who surpassed even Xerxes himself. Thus, this Conqueror is at once a new Alexander, by what he achieved, and better than him, by the skill with which he achieved it. The likening to Alexander the Great, by the way, was not an invention of the Byzantine historians; that was how the sultan perceived himself.51

⁴⁹ Ducas, 365.

⁵⁰ Ibid. 339.

⁵¹ D. R. Reinsch, "Kritobulos of Imbros – learned historian, Ottoman raya and Byzantine patriot", *Zbornik radova Vizantološkog instituta* 40 (2003), 305–306.

Doukas describes how John Hunyadi sent an envoy to the sultan with helpful instructions how to destroy the city walls. Giving an utterly down-toearth explanation of why a Christian would have done such a thing, Doukas refers to one of the prophecies in which his story of the fall abounds - Hunyadi was told by a prophet that fortune would not smile on the Christians until Constantinople was destroyed by the Turks.⁵² Treacherous Constantinopolitans, Christians, should, therefore, pay for their oath-breaking, so that fortune might return to righteous Christians. Doukas is, therefore, a Christian first and then a Hellene, but he does not identify himself with the Constantinopolitans. Consequently, Hunyadi's act was not only explicable but justified as well.

Whereas, for Kritoboulos, the people ($\gamma \epsilon \nu o \varsigma$) were by no means responsible for the misfortune which had befallen the Romans, Doukas takes a diametrically opposite view. In his poignant description of men and women, monks and nuns weeping bitterly, pounding their chests in despair and begging to be admitted to the ships that were leaving the city, Doukas argues that it was not possible because it had already been decided that they should drink from the cup filled with God's wrath.⁵³

Doukas, of course, does not fail to describe the plundering of the city, especially of its monasteries and churches, Hagia Sophia in particular, and of the houses of distinguished noblemen, but his description of the barbarities is not nearly comparable in manner and extensiveness to the one of Kritoboulos.⁵⁴

In his lamentation for Constantinople, with which his narrative of the fall ends, Doukas calls it the head of all cities, the centre of the four quarters of the world, the Glory of the Christian Faith and the destruction of the barbarians, a second Paradise planted in the West, the daughter of Zion. He grieves over the holy relics of saints, the churches, the bodies of the emperors, the books. Jeremiah, who mourned over Jerusalem, mourns over Constantinople as well, and to him, Doukas believes, God has revealed the truth about the New Jerusalem. The captivity which befell Constantinopolitans is not of the Babylonian kind; they are scattered all over the world.⁵⁵

Finally, George Sphrantzes had no particular audience in mind when writing the notes that would serve as the basis of his Memoirs. This work was most likely addressed to the few Byzantine officials who, like Sphrantzes himself, were on their way to Western Europe.⁵⁶ Although he does not say so explicitly, he identifies himself with the Orthodox Romans who acknowledge the

⁵² Ducas, 343.

⁵³ Ibid. 371, 373.

⁵⁴ Ibid. 363, 365, 367, 371, 375, 391, 393.

⁵⁵ Ibid. 385–391, 393.

⁵⁶ Sfranze, Cronaca, 69*.

Palaiologoi as their leaders, as opposed to the impious ($\dot{\alpha}\sigma\epsilon\beta\epsilon\tilde{i}\varsigma$) and the Christians of the West ($\tau\eta\varsigma \Delta\dot{\omega}\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma X\rho_i\sigma\tau_i\alpha\nu_0i$).⁵⁷

His report on the siege and fall of the city is written succinctly in the manner of a chronicle. Recent research suggests that he may have recorded a special diary of the fall of the Byzantine capital.⁵⁸ Apart from a short note that the sultan took the city in the early morning of 29 May 1453, that Emperor Constantine was killed then, that he himself was in another part of the city at the time and was captured, Sphrantzes says nothing else about the event itself.⁵⁹ His criticism is aimed at the Christians of other countries who did little to help Constantinople. The first on his list is the Despot of Serbia, Djuradj Branković, who did not refuse to act as an intermediary in the peace agreement between the Hungarians and the Turks, although that would have at least delayed the attack on the city. The miserable despot did not realize that once the head is removed, the limbs perish too.⁶⁰ Not even the Venetians helped, particularly due to Francesco Foscari, who had personal motives. Namely, at the time when Constantine Dragases was Despot of the Peloponnesus, negotiations were conducted about his marriage with Foscari's daughter. There was a considerable dowry involved, as well as the possibility of uniting his dominion with the territories of the Venetians. But after Constantine's accession to the imperial throne, this union became unfeasible, since not a single archon or archontissa of Constantinople would have accepted as their mistress and empress the daughter of a Venetian, not even the daughter of the doge himself.⁶¹ There was no help from the Church of Rome or the Sultan of Cairo either.⁶² Not a penny arrived from Serbia, although both men and money could have been sent secretly. They had been sent to the sultan instead, and now the Turks shouted from beneath the city walls: "Even the Serbs are with us!"⁶³ Nor did other Christians come to the aid of the city – those from Trebizond, Wallachia and Georgia.⁶⁴ The Hungarians waited to see how things would develop. Moreover, Hunyadi demanded territories in return, and Sphrantzes claims that he himself wrote a chrysobull granting him

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Reinsch, "Θεώρηση", 85, 86.

⁵⁸ Philippides & Hanak, Siege and Fall, 49, 144.

⁵⁹ Sfranze, Cronaca, 134.

⁶⁰ Ibid. 136. On the attitude of the historians of the Fall towards Serbia see M. Nikolić, "The Byzantine Historiography on the State of Serbian Despots", *Zbornik radova Vizantološkog instituta* 45 (2008), 279–288.

⁶¹ Sfranze, Cronaca, 136-138.

⁶² Ibid. 138.

⁶³ Ibid. 140.

Mesembria when the siege was laid.⁶⁵ Who knew, Sphrantzes asks, that Lemnos was ceded to the Catalan king or how much money was sent to Chios in order to secure some help? The emperor did even more in order to save his house, the Christians and his own life.⁶⁶ He fasted, he prayed, both on his own and through priests whom he gave money to do so, he looked after the poor, he took many pledges, all in the hope of preventing the Christians from being enslaved by the Turks. All this was despised by God, for what sins, Sphrantzes does not know. On the other hand, nothing of the emperor's efforts was known to people and so everyone talked of him as they pleased.⁶⁷ In the 1590s, Western Europe would encounter Sphrantzes' work through the version written by Makarios Melissenos.⁶⁸

The fate of the city was inseparable from the fate of its last emperor. It is the personage of Constantine Dragases that is the focus of the accounts of the fall in Byzantine short chronicles. There, Constantinople is the Empress of Cities, Jerusalem destroyed by Nebuchadnezzar, the fatherland of all, the New Rome, the megalopolis. It was ruled by Constantine born in the purple who, defending it, found his death and his equal-to-the-apostles' wreath of martyrdom, unwilling to surrender his palace to the lawless. Although he could have avoided the threat, he rather chose to fight, and was slain and perished together with his fatherland.⁶⁹

It has recently been suggested that Doukas, Kritoboulos, and Chalkokondyles as the youngest of them, were historians who at the same time, independently of one another, responded to the same events and set out to commit them to writing. A new dating of Chalkokondyles' *Histories* has been proposed as well – the period between 1464 and 1468. This chronology would allow for the possibility that it was not just that Chalkokondyles used the work of Kritoboulos,⁷⁰ but that it may have also been the other way around. Indicative in this connection, is that Kritoboulos, at the beginning of his work, says that he will not write about Sultan Mehmed's predecessors since many have already done that.⁷¹ Traditionally the fourth historian of the fall, George Sphrantzes, is no longer assigned to this group, since his work is not, strictly speaking, a his-

⁷⁰ Critobulos, 84*-85*.

71 Ibid. 13.

⁶⁵ Ibid. 140-142.

⁶⁶ Ibid. 140.

⁶⁷ Ibid. 142.

⁶⁸ On the relationship between Sphrantzes' Memoirs, i.e. *Chronicon Minus*, and the *Chronicon Maius*, i.e. its version reworked by Macarios Melissenos, with relevant bibliography and the analysis of parts of interdependent sources, see Philippides & Hanak, *Siege and Fall*, 146–187.

⁶⁹ Kleinchroniken, I, 271–272, 369, 370, 419, 436, 529, 632, 640, 656, 684.

tory. In any case, there is no evidence to suggest that he was aware of or used any of these historians in his writing.⁷²

For all the difference in their attitudes, to these writers Constantinople was the centre of the world, the beginning and the end of history, its very heart, their fatherland, the New Jerusalem. Their main motive for writing their works was to pass on the memory of the greatest misfortune in the *oikoumene* to future generations of Greeks to perpetuate it and to learn from it. *If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning.*⁷³

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⁷² Kaldellis, "Date", 133–134.

⁷³ Psalm 137, 5 (KJV).

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The Ideology of the Illyrian Armorial

- Abstract: The appearance of the Illyrian Armorial in the late sixteenth century has been linked to Petar Iveljin (son of Ivelja) Ohmućević-Grgurić, a native of Dubrovnik (Ragusa) in the service of the Spanish king. The main purpose of the Armorial was to demonstrate his noble descent. It was therefore designed in such a way as to make it clear to everyone who should see it that the Ohumućević-Grgurićs were an old and reputable noble family. In order for the Armorial to achieve the intended purpose efficiently, some ideas and beliefs were slipped in which were current in the milieu in which it was created. The Illyrian Armorial cannot therefore be properly understood without taking into account the time and setting of its creation as it reflects various political, cultural and religious influences of its time.
- Keywords: Illyrian Armorial, Illyrian heraldry, Petar Ohmućević, Ohmućević-Grgurić, Slavism, Illyrism

The creation of Illyrian heraldry and the Illyrian Armorial has been linked to the activity of Petar Iveljin (son of Ivelja) Ohmućević-Grgurić from Slano near Dubrovnik (Ragusa).¹ The effort Petar Ohmućević and his family put into self-promotion and self-exaltation, including claiming to be related to the Komnenoi, purported descendants of the Byzantine and Trebizond emperors, led to the creation of a number of historical, genealogical and heraldic works. Most of them were highly uncritical and largely based on invented family traditions and genealogies, and forged documents.² Illyrian heraldry cannot, however, be

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¹ On Illyrian heraldry and the Ohmućević-Grgurić family see A. Solovjev, "Postanak ilirske heraldike i porodica Ohmućević", *Glasnik Skopskog naučnog društva* 12 (1932), 79–125; A. Solovjev, "Prinosi za bosansku i ilirsku heraldiku i 'Rodoslovlje bosanskih i srpskih kraljeva", *Glasnik Zemaljskog muzeja u Sarajevu* NS (A) 9 (1954), 87–133; S. Rudić, *Vlastela Ilirskog grbovnika* (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 2006); A. Palavestra, "Ilirski grbovnici i ilirska heraldika", *Ilirski grbovnici i drugi heraldički radovi* (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike; Dosije studio, 2010), 53–110. I was unable to consult S. *Ćosić, Ideologija rodoslovlja. Korjenić-Neorićev grbovnik iz* 1595 (Zagreb: Nacionalna i sveučilišna knjižnica; Dubrovnik: HAZU, Zavod za povijesne znanosti, 2015).

² For an incomplete list of printed works and manuscripts about the Ohmućević-Grgurić family see V. Foretić, "Udio naših ljudi u stranim mornaricama i općim pomorskim zbivanjima kroz stoljeća", in *Pomorski zbornik povodom 20-godišnjice dana mornarice i pomorstva Ju-goslavije 1942–1962*, vol. I, eds. Grga Novak and Vjekoslav Maštrović (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti; Zadar: Institut za historijske i ekonomske nauke, 1962), 296–299, n. 43.

associated only with Petar Ohmućević and his personal ambitions. It was also a product of its times. The 1590s were marked by the activity of the Roman Curia, the Spanish court in Naples, and Austria, which sought to stir up an uprising of the Balkan Christians against the Ottomans. It was also a time when a Slavic, i.e. Illyrian spiritual and political movement began to take shape, primarily in Dalmatia. The idea of Slavic unity championed by this movement arose under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church and encouraged the appearance of historical constructions whose purpose was to prove an identity between Slavs and ancient Illyrians, the Slavic origin of illustrious figures of the past and the grandeur of a former Slavic state. The awareness of the Slavic community as a new political factor came as a result of dissent within the Roman Catholic Church, the plans of Pope Clement VIII to launch a crusade against the Ottomans, and the shared interest of the Christians to have Muslims driven out of Europe. Dubrovnik held an important place in the political and cultural developments of the period. While recognising the Sultan's authority, it remained linked with the Christian lands. Many Ragusans took part in wars the Christian countries, notably Spain, waged against the Ottomans. Many of them climbed high on the ladder and held prominent posts at the Spanish court.³

Petar Ohmućević-Grgurić was one of the best known Ragusans in Spanish service. He took part in a number of Spanish naval campaigns, which earned him the rank of admiral. He came to the fore particularly during the conquest of Portugal in 1580 and in the Azores in 1582, and also played an active role in the war between England and Spain which was fought not only in Europe but also in the newly-discovered lands, "the Indies" as America was dubbed, which is why he was titled as Capitán generale per l'Indie. From 1581, he sailed on the St Jerome, a ship he built and armed at his own expense. In 1590 he and his nephew Stefan Dolisti-Tasovčić entered a contract to serve the Spanish king with twelve ships of Ragusan ship-owners built in Spain - those were merchant vessels adapted for war. In 1592 and 1594 Petar Ohmućević figured prominently in the accusations the English made, in Constantinople, against Dubrovnik of its ships having been integrated into the Spanish fleet which was preparing to attack England. Apart from war campaigns, his ships were used for the transport of grains. In 1594, three of his ships carrying grains from Barletta to Naples were captured by the Ottomans. In their defence before the Sublime Porte the Ragusans stated that Petar Ohmućević, disappointed at his allegedly old nobility not having been recognised, had left Dubrovnik territory with his relatives, settled in Spain and entered into Spanish service. Petar Ohmućević died in Lisbon in 1599.4

³Rudić, Vlastela Ilirskog grbovnika, 25–26.

⁴ Solovjev, "Postanak", 82–94; Rudić, *Vlastela Ilirskog grbovnika*, 25–37. Petar Ohmućević had four brothers and two sisters. Three brothers lost their lives as sea captains in Spanish service. One sister was married to Nikola Dolisti-Tasovčić, and the other, Jelena, is known to have

The life story of Petar Ohmućević-Grgurić reveals a remarkably capable and ambitious man. He was intent on becoming a member of a Spanish chivalric order, but to become one he had to meet several strict conditions – he had to be a nobleman, moreover to have eight degrees of nobility, to come from a purely Roman Catholic background, and to prove that there had been no Jews, heretics and Muslims in his family. He first tried to have his nobility confirmed in his native Dubrovnik in 1584.⁵ When this failed, he resorted to the only means left in the absence of genuine evidence – he began to construct genealogical and heraldic fictions and to forge documents. As early as 6 May 1584 he received confirmation of his noble descent from the Bosnian bishop seated at Požega, Antonius Mattheus, to whom he had submitted a few forged charters, his family tree and a table with eight degrees of his Roman Catholic and noble descent and eight coloured coats of arms of his ancestors.⁶ In Aleksandar Solovjev's view, this may be taken to be the beginning of Illyrian heraldry.⁷

Having failed to have his nobility recognised in Dubrovnik, Petar Ohmućević filed a request with the Viceroy of Naples supported with false documents and genealogies. On 17 May 1594, the Royal Council in Naples issued him the letters patent of nobility and the confirmation of the false charters. Two years later, Petar Ohmućević became a knight of the Order of St James of Galicia, and later on was awarded the rank of Commander of the Order with an annual income of 3,000 scudi.⁸ The Illyrian Armorial, being designed to support Petar's claims, must have been created at that time, and certainly before the grant of nobility, i.e. around 1590.⁹

The original of the Illyrian Armorial is lost. Its appearance and content are known only from the surviving copies. We refer primarily to the oldest ones – Korenić-Neorić (1595), London (1590s), Altan's (1614), Belgrade II (*ca* 1615) – which are believed, with reason, to be very similar or even identical to the lost protograph. Whoever the originators of numerous copies may have been, their objective was largely the same – to rise to nobility, to strengthen social prestige and, hopefully, to come into possession of estates in the Balkans should it hap-

married, sometime between 1585 and 1590, Pietro Comneno, a purported descendant of the Byzantine and Trebizond emperors.

⁵Solovjev, "Postanak", 83.

⁶ Francesco de Petris, "Breve discorso genealogico della antichissima, e nobilissima famiglia Ohmvchievich Gargvrich", 11–14, in Lorenzo Miniati, *Le glorie cadute dell'antichissima, ed augustissima famiglia Comnena* (Venice: Francesco Valuasense, 1663); Solovjev, "Postanak", 83–85. Solovjev noted the possibility that the letter of the Bosnian bishop could be a forgery made in Naples before 1594.

⁷ Solovjev, "Postanak", 85.

⁸ Francesco de Petris, "Breve discorso", 23; Solovjev, "Postanak", 87.

⁹Solovjev, "Prinosi", 131.

pen that the Turks were driven out of the region.¹⁰ Those who made the copies were not always true to the model being copied, and the most frequent modifications concern the number and sequence of noble insignia.¹¹ It has been assumed that the protograph contained 141 family coats of arms, the same as a few of the oldest preserved copies, unlike, for instance, only 127 in the Fojnica Armorial or as many as 164 in Vukoslavić's Armorial.¹²

The oldest surviving copy of the Illyrian Armorial is the Korenić-Neorić Armorial of 1595, and it may be assumed that it was copied from the protograph.¹³ It contains six non-paginated and 157 paginated leaves. The front page is followed by four pages of the table of contents both in Serbian Slavonic language and Cyrillic script and in Latin language, while the sixth and last nonpaginated leaf contains a vignette with a Christogram, and the Armorial's title and year of creation. There follow the leaves paginated with Roman numerals.

¹¹ See Solovjev, "Prinosi", 103–131; J. A. Goodall, "An Illyrian armorial in the Society's collection", *The Antiquaries Journal* 75 (1995), 255–310; A. Palavestra, *Beogradski grbovnik II i ilirska heraldika* (Belgrade: Muzej primenjene umetnosti 2006), 10–15, 35–67; Rudić, Vlastela Ilirskog grbovnika, 59–91; Palavestra, "Ilirski grbovnici", 65–101. Three of these armorials have been published as facsimile editions: Korenić-Neorić: I. Banac, *Grbovi – biljezi identiteta* (Zagreb: Grafički zavod Hrvatske, 1991), 131–316; Fojnica: *Fojnički grbovnik* (Sarajevo: Oslobodjenje, 1972); *Fojnički grbovnik* (Sarajevo: Rabic, 2005); *Fojnički grbovnik* (Sarajevo: Rabic, 2009); *Fojnički grbovnik* (Fojnica: Franjevački samostan Fojnica, 2012); and Belgrade II: Beogradski grbovnik II: fototipsko izdanje (Belgrade: Muzej primenjene umetnosti, 2006).

¹² About thirty copies of the Illyrian Armorial are known to have been made, but some of these are known only from written references, cf. Rudić, *Vlastela Ilirskog grbovnika*, 59–91.

¹³ A. Palavestra, "Komentari", in A. Solovjev, *Istorija srpskog grba i drugi heraldički radovi* (Belgrade: Pravni fakultet; Dosije; BMG, 2000), 180.

¹⁰ In the seventeenth century many families that had fled before the Ottomans began to appropriate coats of arms from the Armorial, claiming descent from the former Bosnian nobility. It is known that the seventeenth-century Habsburgs, by confirming nobility to families that had fled Ottoman-held Bosnia, sought to strengthen their loyalty with the view to achieving their goal of conquering Bosnia. In the eighteenth century nobility began to be granted to some Dalmatian families. The bestowal of nobility based on the Armorial went on until as late as the mid-1910s. See F. Heyer von Rosenfeld, Der Adel des Königreich Dalmatien (Nuremberg: Bauer und Raspe (Emil Küster), 1873); I. Bojničić, Der Adel von Kroatien und Slavonien (Nuremberg: Bauer und Raspe (Emil Küster), 1899); V. Duišin, "Srpske plemićke porodice u Vojvodini od 1690 do 1790 godine", Glasnik Istoriskog društva u Novom Sadu 13 (1940), 89–123; B. Zmajić, "Legalizacija grbova nekih naših obitelji na temelju Ohmućevićevog Grbovnika", Glasnik arhiva i Društva arhivskih radnika Bosne i Hercegovine 7 (1967), 41–53; S. Traljić, "Palinićev bosanski zbornik", Zbornik Historijskog instituta Jugoslavenske akademije 1 (1954), 184–185; M. Atlagić, Grbovi plemstva u Slavoniji i Vojvodini u novom veku s posebnim osvrtom na grbove srpskog plemstva (Priština: Pergament, 1997). In the second half of the seventeenth century the archbishop of Sofia Stefan Knežević used the Knežević family's coat of arms from the Illyrian Armorial, cf. I. D. Spisarevska, Chiprovskoto vüstanie i evropeĭskiiat sviat (Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1988), ill. 38.

Leaf I shows St Jerome, leaf II King Stefan kneeling before St Stephen, leaf III the Mother of God, leaf IV St Gregory. Leaf V contains the coat of arms of Emperor Stefan (Dušan), and leaves VI–XV feature the coats of arms of Macedonia, Illyria, Bosnia, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Rascia and Primorje (maritime land), respectively. Leaf XVI shows the arms of Emperor Uroš, and leaves XVII–CLVII contain the arms of 141 noble families.¹⁴

The Ohmućević-Grgurić family holds a prominent place in the Armorial because it obviously had to be clear to all that they were one of the most reputable noble families of the Illyrian Empire, a fictitious realm ruled by the Nemanjić dynasty. The family arms occurs on sheet XXXI of the Korenić-Neorić Armorial as fifteenth among the family arms and immediately after those of the ruling family and the most distinguished noble families, those whom the Ohmućević-Grgurićs either allegedly served or whose members figure in the forged charters.¹⁵ According to S. Ćirković, the presence of the ruling and magnate families conferred prestige and authority on those who commissioned the Armorial or their more recent ancestors.¹⁶ The Ohmućević-Grgurić coat of arms is followed by those of noble families which were either related to them or mentioned in the false charters. From leaf XLVII there begin to appear many unknown families, but among them too there are relatives of the Ohmućević-Grgurićs. Aleksandar Solovjev ascertained that the Armorial contains all known sixteenth-century relatives of this family, but pointed out that we know of only half of them because the genealogical tables contain the surnames of only those girls who married into this family, the only exception being two sisters of Petar Ohmućević who are known to have married into the Tasovčić and Komnen (Comneno) families, respectively. Solovjev therefore assumed that the Armorial may well contain the coats of arms of some other female-line relatives of the family.¹⁷ The Armorial also features the arms of the families occurring in the genealogical table that Petar Ohmućević had submitted to the Bosnian bishop Antonius Mattheus to prove his descent back for eight generations of purely Roman Catholic nobility.¹⁸

All of the first four depictions in the Armorial may be linked with the Ohmućević-Grgurić family. The first picture shows St Jerome, who was particularly venerated in their midst. The oldest family tomb (1472) is in the church

¹⁴ Aleksandar Palavestera proposed an ideal reconstruction of the Illyrian Armorial, i.e. the Armorial of Don Pedro Ohmućević Grgurić, see Palavestra, *Beogradski grbovnik II*, 22–28, and "Ilirski grbovnici", 58–64.

¹⁵ Solovjev, "Postanak", 99.

¹⁶ S. Ćirković, "Dopune i objašnjenja", in S. Novaković, *Istorija i tradicija*, ed. S. Ćirković (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1982), 478.

¹⁷ Solovjev, "Postanak", 99.

¹⁸ The arms of these families are shown on leaves XXXIV (Kostanjić); XL (Bogašinović); XLIII (Tasovčić); XLV (Čihorić); L (Bosnić); LX (Dražojević); and LXX (Ljubibratić).

of St Jerome in Slano, and Ivelja's sons had a sumptuous altar set up in it in 1580. Don Pedro's admiral ship was named St Jerome. The second picture shows King Stefan kneeling before St Stephen - which is similar in iconography to the painting from the Franciscan monastery of Sutjeska to the back of which the "Genealogy of the Serbian and Bosnian Kings" was glued. The third picture depicts the Mother of God with a part of Bosnia's coat of arms - a similar picture can also be found above the Ohmućević-Grgurić family tree in Miniati's collection. The fourth picture shows St Gregory, whom the Ohmućević-Grgurićs considered their special patron. The composite imperial insignia on leaves V and XVI present the Nemanjićs as the rulers of Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Dalmatia and Primorje (Littoral) – the lands mentioned in the false charters.¹⁹ Ivo Banac believes that the depictions on the first sixteen leaves of the Armorial reveal a link between the one-time glory of the South Slavs and private objectives of the Ohmućević-Grgurić family. According to him, the family's priorities are readable from the arrangement of the insignia in the composite coat of arms of Emperor Dušan – precedence is given to Macedonia, the land where the family allegedly enjoyed the greatest power, followed by Bosnia, the land they originally came from, and then - in the proper diplomatic order - Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia, and then Bulgaria, Serbia, Rascia and, finally, Primorje, their current homeland.20

The Armorial's title page, written both in Serbian Slavonic language and Cyrillic script and in Latin, was intended to inform the readers from the very start of the alleged time and place of its creation, and thus to attest to its antiquity and authenticity. Petar Ohmućević's most renowned ancestor, according to family tradition, was the "imperial grand *vojvoda*" Hrelja who had owed his power, as had his alleged descendants, to Emperor Stefan Dušan, the ruler of the fanciful Illyrian Empire. This was why the date of the Armorial was placed in the reign of Stefan Dušan (1331-1355) and, in some copies, explicitly in the year 1340. Its antiquity would automatically imply the antiquity of the nobility of the Ohmućević-Grgurić family, in whose honour and glory it had been composed. The authority and authenticity of the Armorial were to be further corroborated by the mention of its author, Stanislav Rubčić, holder of the invented title of

¹⁹ Solovjev, "Postanak", 96, 99. The "Genealogy of the Serbian and Bosnian Kings" is Petar Ohmućević-Grgurić's first heraldic undertaking, dated by A. Solovjev to 1584/5. See O. Pucić, "Zur südslavischen Heraldik I", *Archiv für Slavische Philologie* 4 (1880), 339–342; S. Novaković, "Heraldički običaji u Srba u primeni i književnosti", *Istorija i tradicija*, 384–387; Solovjev, "Postanak", 111 (drawing of the "Genealogy"); Solovjev, "Prinosi", 87–103, 132–133; Rudić, *Vlastela Ilirskog grbovnika*, 43–46.

²⁰ Banac, Grbovi – biljezi identiteta, 13–14.

Emperor Dušan's *ban cimerja* (*rex insigniarum*).²¹ According to the title page, the Armorial was translated from an old book kept in a Basilian monastery on Mount Athos. The mention of Mount Athos in a manuscript that was intended to confirm its user's adherence to the Roman Catholic Church may be explained by the reputation that Mount Athos enjoyed in the circles in which the Armorial was created, and by relations that the rulers of the Illyrian Empire and Don Pedro's great "ancestor", Hrelja, maintained with it. The Basilian monastery was not a random choice either: namely, not much before the creation of the Illyrian Armorial, Pope Gregory XIII (1572–1585) united the Italian Basilian monks into one congregation. Nor should we lose sight of attempts at church union made at the time, so the reference to Mount Athos may perhaps be seen as a propaganda move in that direction.

The author of the Illyrian Armorial would not have been able to achieve his primary objective – to exalt the Ohmućević-Grgurić family – had he limited himself to this family only. Had he done that, his work would certainly not have produced the desired effect. He therefore slipped in some ideas and beliefs that were current in the environment in which he lived and worked, thereby making his work acceptable in content and appearance to those that it was intended for. It is therefore impossible to understand the Illyrian Armorial outside the context of the time and setting of its creation because it reflected various contemporary political, cultural and religious influences.

As already mentioned, during the sixteenth century the Roman Curia, the Spanish court in Naples and Austria worked actively on fomenting an uprising of the Balkan Christians against the Ottomans. It was also a time when the memory was revived of ancient empires, of the glory of former Slavic states, of old and once famous families whose real and alleged descendants now sought to profit from the troubled times. The Illyrian Armorial was created in such an atmosphere: the Balkan Christians now could show foreigners, most notably the Spaniards and Italians, that they too had once had a large and glorious empire, and that their representatives were not simple peasants and commoners but descendants of the once illustrious "Illyrian" nobility.²²

In Aleksandar Solovjev's view, the "Illyrian" idea runs steadily throughout the activity of the Ohmućević-Grgurić family.²³ In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Renaissance and Renaissance humanism in the literature, art and culture of Dubrovnik and the Dalmatian coast were in full swing, awakening interest in classical antiquity, classical sciences and values. A revived interest in history and in the study of the distribution and origin of peoples would over

²¹ Jakov Lukarević refers to Stanislav Rubčić as the writer of a life of Emperor Dušan: J. Luccari, *Copioso ristretto de gli anali di Ravsa* (Venice: Ad istantia di Antonio Lenardi, 1605), 58.

²² Solovjev, "Postanak", 106.

²³ Ibid.

time give rise to many a fantastic theory. Unlike the Italians, who naturally glorified ancient Rome, and the Germans, who based their pride in their ancestors on Tacitus' Germania, there emerged in Slavic environments theories about Illyria and the Slavs as a once glorious people who had inhabited vast territories.²⁴ Long-forgotten Greek and Roman geographic and ethnographic names came into use again. A considerable role in spreading these ideas was played by Ptolemy's atlas, for a long time the only geographic manual. Peoples living in territories of long-vanished peoples now came to be called by their names. The Frankish state was dubbed Gaul, the Hungarians came to be called Pannonians and the Italians, Ausones. By the same token, the Slav-inhabited areas of the Balkan Peninsula were dubbed Illyria and Macedonia.²⁵ As early as the mid-fifteenth century, Enea Silvio Piccolomini, future Pope Pius II, believed that Illyricae gentes lived to the west and north of the Albanians.²⁶ Piccolomini's work influenced a number of later writers, including Sabellicus (Marcus Antonius Coccius) for whom Bosnians were Illyrians, Bulgarians, Triballi, and Serbs, Moesi.²⁷ The belief that Illyria and Bosnia are synonymous can be found in Giovanni Musachi as well.²⁸ Many learned men of the time called the Balkan Slavs Illyrians, to mention but a Tuscan, Francesco Serdonati, for whom King Zvonimir, Sandalj Hranić and Stefan Kosača were, among others, principi degli Illiri oggi Schiavoni.²⁹ Mavro Orbin claimed that the tomb of Ban Stefan's sister Danica in Rome bore the inscription: HIC IACET DIANA ILLIRICA.³⁰

It should be noted that Byzantine writers throughout the Empire's existence had used ethnographic and geographic names and concepts which the humanists "discovered" and introduced in Roman Catholic Europe. Medieval

²⁴ M. Kombol, Povijest hrvatske književnosti do narodnog preporoda (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 1961), 79.

²⁵ A. Matkovski, Grbovite na Makedonija (Kumanovo: Misla, 1990), 54–56.

²⁶"Post Albaniam Illyricae sequuntur gentes, ad occidentem septentrionemq; versae. hoc genus hominum nostra aetas Schlavos appelat, & alij Bosnenses, alij Dalmatae, alij Croacij, Istri, Carniq; non cupantur", quoted after J. Matasović, "Tri humanista o patarenima", *Godišnjak Filozofskog fakulteta u Skoplju* 1 (1930), 245.

²⁷ "Enimuero Delmatici nomini quidam, qui Sclaui sunt hodie, Illyrij qui Bosinenses, sed de Bosina alia est opinio, quae suo postea locomemorabitur. Triballi qui Bulgari, Misij qui Servij", quoted after Matasović, "Tri humanista", 238.

²⁸ G. Musachi, "Breve memoria de li discendenti de nostra casa Musachi", in *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes*, ed. Charles Hopf (Berlin: Weidmann, 1873), 312, 314 : "...tutti li Rè d'Illyria, ch' oggi dicono la Bosna, le gente de quel paese chimiano il loro Rè Stefano [...] Regno de Bosna alias Illiria."

²⁹ M. Deanović, "Talijanski pisci o Hrvatima do kraja 17. vijeka", *Anali Historijskog instituta JAZU u Dubrovniku 8–9 (1960–1961), 135.*

³⁰ M. Orbini, Il Regni de gli Slavi (Pesaro: Apresso Girolamo Concordia, 1601), 351.

Serbian writers, such as Teodosije and Grigorije Camblak, had used them under Byzantine influence.³¹

The Roman Curia began as early as the fifteenth century to make use of the Illyrian idea as a tool in its missionary work in the Balkans. As a result, the Slavic name was gradually replaced by the Illyrian name, as shown by the case of the hospitium of St Jerome in Rome founded by Pope Nicholas V in 1453. It was established for "Dalmatians and Slavs" (*Dalmatiae et Sclavoniae nationes*), and its brotherhood was originally styled *societas hominum Sclavorum, societas Sclauorum Urbis Sancti Jeronimi de regione Campi Martis.*³² The hospitium was referred to as Slavic in documents until 1485, when it was named Illyrian for the first time. The following year Pope Innocent VIII also referred to it as Illyrian;³³ then it was called either Slavic or Illyrian until 1655, from when on only the Illyrian name was used.³⁴

The Illyrian idea, which was widespread among learned people at the time, was quite frequently intertwined with or identical to the Slavic idea. From the fifteenth century, the interest of Slavic humanists in the past and in the current situation of their peoples became part of their concerns with the origin, unity and greatness of the Slavs, whereby they competed against the pan-Romanism

³⁴Črnčić, "Imena Slovjenin i Ilir", 70.

^{31"}Сь сынь бѣ жоупана великааго Неманк владыкы србскааго, иже самодрьжавно владычьствовавшоу вьсеми срьбьскыми землами, еже глаголют се Дїоклитїа Далматїа Травоунїа, кь вьстокоу очби Илиріи приближаюшть се, кь западоу же рымьсцти ибласти прилежешти" [The latter was son of the Serbian ruler grand župan Nemanja, who ruled as autokrator over all Serbian lands that are called: Dioclitia, Dalmatia, Travunia, nearing Illyria in the east, and abutting the Roman province in the west]: Teodosije [misattributed to Domentijan by the editor], Život Svetoga Save, ed. Djuro Daničić (Belgrade: Društvo srbske slovesnosti, 1860), 3; "царствоуюшти бо Константиновь градь тогда фроугимь прѣемшимь и дрьжештимь, царство грьчьско на двое разстие се, по высем бо Теталии и Илирии вь Солочит царствочюшточ Оеодороч" [For then Constantine's imperial city was seized and held by the Francs, and the Greek empire was cut in half because all of Thessaly and Illyria was ruled by emperor Theodore in Thessalonike]: ibid. 170; "въньць царствїа роукама възьмь архїерен чьстноую тиго главоу вънчавааше, съврьшенна показавь илирїчьскымь выстамь езькимь цара" [Taking the imperial crown in his hands, the archbishop crowned his honourable head and presented him as the perfect emperor to all IIlyrian peoples]: J. Šafarik, "Стефана ОУроша -г- зыписано Григорикмь мнихомь", Glasnik Društva srbske slovesnosti 11 (1859), 65.

³² L. Jelić, "Hrvatski zavod u Rimu", Vjestnik Kr. Hrv.-Slav.-Dalm. Zemaljskog arkiva IV (1902), 6–8; see F. S. I. [fra Steffano Ivančić?], La questione di S. Girolamo dei Schiavoni in Roma in faccia alla storia e al diritto ed il breve di S.S. Leone XIII "Slavorum gentem" (Rome: Tip. Capitolina, D. Battarelli, 1901).

³³ I. Črnčić, "Prilozi k raspravi: Imena Slovjenin i Ilir u našem gostinjcu u Rimu poslije 1453 godine", *Starine JAZU* 18 (1886), 36, 38. The papal letters from 1181 until the time of this document of Innocent VIII make no mention of either Illyria or Illyrians. I. Črnčić, "Imena Slovjenin i Ilir u našem gostinjcu u Rimu poslije 1453 godine", *Rad JAZU* 13 (1886), 3.

of Italian and the pan-Germanism of German humanists. It was their belief, which was particularly pronounced in Mavro Orbin, that language in a land always remains the same, with minor changes, and they therefore declared as Slavs not only the Illyrians and many other peoples but also the Roman emperors born on their side of the Adriatic.³⁵ These ideas about Slavic unity "undoubtedly were a reflection of a gradual rise of the Slavic world in the sixteenth century".³⁶

Quite naturally, humanism in the Balkans thrived best in coastal towns. Juraj Šižgorić (Georgius Sisgoreus) of Šibenik, one of the most important Dalmatian humanists, thought of the area inhabited by the South Slavs as constituting one cultural and geographic whole. According to him, it was due to the malice of heavens, human negligence, civil wars and envy, that the Illyrians achieved little worthy of mention and gave few illustrious persons, such as the Dalmatian Gaius, who became pope and gave name to the dalmatic, or Diocletian and Jerome. For Šižgorić, his Dalmatia was the noblest province of Illyria.³⁷

The pan-Slavic idea was first articulated in 1525 by Vinko Pribojević, a native of the island of Hvar, who attributed to the Slavs a far more glorious past than they actually had and included among the Slavs many more peoples than actually belonged to them. He thought of himself as being a Dalmatian, an Illyrian and a Slav. Pribojević also believed that many great men of a distant past had been Slavs – Philip and Alexander of Macedon, Aristotle, twenty-one Roman emperors and nine popes. He claimed that the Slavs descended from the forefather of the Thracians, Tiras, son of Japheth, son of Noah. According to his theory, Tiras' descendants used to have twelve names, and are now called by a single name, "Slavs", which derives from the Slavic word "slava" (glory).³⁸

The Illyrian name was occasionally also used in the official documents of the Republic of Ragusa. Perhaps its commerce in the Mediterranean and the Balkans led them to conclude that their city linguistically belonged to the Slavic world in its immediate and more distant hinterland and perhaps, as a result, the humanistic movement in the Republic introduced itself, in the cultural and political sense, with the idea of the unity of that world using the Illyrian name.³⁹

³⁵ R. Samardžić, "Kraljevstvo Slovena u razvitku srpske istoriografije", in M. Orbin, *Kraljevstvo Slovena* (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1968), CXVII–CXVIII. M. Orbini, *Il regno de gli Slavi*, 173, believed that the language spoken in Illyricum, although somewhat changed since the arrival of Goths and Slavs, had been the same as that spoken in his times. ³⁶ Samardžić, "Kraljevstvo Slovena", CXIX–CXX.

³⁷ J. Šižgorić, "De situ Illyriae et civitate Sibenici a. 1487", Gradja za povjest kniževnosti Hrvatske 2 (1899), 1–12.

³⁸ V. Pribojević, O podrijetlu i zgodama Slavena (Zagreb: JAZU, 1951), 56–61, 69–71, 74–76.

³⁹ B. Hrabak, "Tradicija o srednjevekovnoj Bosni u Dubrovniku XV i XVI veka", in *Radovi sa simpozijuma Srednjovjekovna Bosna i evropska kultura,* ed. Fikret Ibrahimpašić (Zenica: Muzej grada Zenice, 1973), 342.

Dissent within the Roman Catholic Church also played an important role in the development of the Illyrian idea. In 1561, in Urach near Tubingen, Germany, a group of Protestant refugees set up a printing press and began printing books in Glagolitic, Latin and Cyrillic scripts.⁴⁰ Their aim was to lay the foundations of an "Illyrian" language that would be understandable in all South-Slav lands. It may be said that the idea of South-Slavic cultural and political unity had never before been expressed so clearly.⁴¹ The most important representative of Protestantism in the South-Slavic area was Matija Vlačić Ilirik (1520–1575), who thought of himself as being an Illyrian and a Slav, and emphasised Illyrism which, for him, was synonymous with Slavism. According to Vlačić, the "Illyrian language" was one of the four main world languages along with Greek, Latin and German, and Illyrian and Slavic churches were one and the same.⁴²

The Reformation soon prompted the reaction of the Roman Curia. At the Council of Trent (1545–1563), the Roman Catholic Church adopted several decisions which had an impact on the areas inhabited by the South Slavs as well. The Council defined as one of its objectives not only defence against Protestantism but also the renewal and propagation of Roman Catholicism.⁴³ Pope Gregory XIII sought, in the spirit of the Council, to bolster Roman Catholicism in southern Dalmatia, particularly in Dubrovnik and Kotor (Cattaro), so that the strengthened Roman Catholic Church in Dalmatia would be able not only to prevent any further spread of Protestantism but also to spread itself towards the east through the Serbian Patriarchate of Peć that was supposed to be brought into church union with Rome.⁴⁴ In 1580 Gregory XIII established at the pilgrimage church of Sancta Casa in Loreto, south of Ancona, the Jesuit *Collegium Illyricum* for South Slavs who were to be prepared to fight Islam, Protestantism and schism.⁴⁵

The Illyrian idea was at its peak in the late sixteenth century and it was transparently expressed in the Armorial. Unlike the "Genealogy of the Serbian and Bosnian Kings" which embodies the Illyrian-Bosnian idea evoking the faded

⁴⁰ F. Bučar, *Povijest hrvatske protestanske književnosti za reformacije* (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 1910), 73.

⁴¹Z. Črnja, Kulturna historija Hrvatske: ideje, ličnosti, djela (Zagreb: Epoha, 1964), 297.

⁴² M. Mirković, *Matija Vlačić* (Belgrade: Nolit, 1957), 22. Matija Grbić was entered on the Tübingen University roll of students in 1537 with the qualifier "Illyricus" added to his name, and by 1559, four other students were entered on the roll with this same addition to their names, cf. Dj. Köbler, "Humanist Matija Grbić", *Rad JAZU* 145 (1901), 45, 100.

⁴³ J. Radonić, Štamparije i škole Rimske kurije u Italiji i južnoslovenskim zemljama u XVII veku (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka, 1949), 5.

⁴⁴ J. Radonić, *Rimska kurija i južnoslovenske zemlje XVI–XIX veka* (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka, 1950), 4.

⁴⁵ Radonić, Štamparije i škole Rimske kurije, 92.

grandeur of the Bosnian kingdom, successor of the Nemanjić state, the Armorial highlighted the new Illyrian-Serbian idea. It is Emperor Stefan (Dušan), rather than weak Bosnian kings, who figures there as the powerful ruler of the vanished Illyrian Empire uniting nine South-Slavic kingdoms under his sway.⁴⁶ Saint Jerome (Patronus atque lux totius Illyriae), who was considered to be a Slav and the creator of Glagolitic script and Illyrian literature, is shown as the patron of this invented Empire.⁴⁷ Saint Stephen is depicted as *Patronus atque dux Illyriae*, and the Mother of God as Patrona ac Mater pyssima totius Illiriae. The coat of arms of Illyria is shown as one of the individual arms of the South-Slavic kingdoms, but is not included into the composite arms of the Illyrian rulers. The composite coat of arms contains only the arms of those lands that were inhabited by Slavs - even though several of the noble families were of non-Slavic origin or resided outside of the territories covered by the depicted territorial coats of arms. This once again goes in favour of the already proposed view about the Slavic idea having been synonymous with the Illyrian idea. It is also observable that all surnames in the Armorial are Slavicised, i.e. they all end in $-i\dot{c}$. This was done even there where the family was quite clearly Slavic, which once again speaks of the author's intention to show that the territories encompassed by the former Illyrian Empire were inhabited by one people – Illyrian, i.e. Slavic.⁴⁸

According to the Armorial, the Illyrian kingdoms, i.e. parts of the Illyrian Empire, were Macedonia, Bosnia, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, Bulgaria, Rascia, Serbia and Primorje – which is to say all South-Slavic areas of the Balkans (except those of present-day Slovenia). It may be interesting to compare this concept of the Illyrian Empire with contemporary geographic maps and written sources. Ancient Greek historians used the name Illyria for the area inhabited by Illyrian tribes, i.e. the one extending east of the Adriatic Sea between Liburnia in the north and Epirus in the south. For the Romans, Illyria was a territorial unit whose boundaries were subject to frequent change and which therefore often occupied a much larger area than the one habitually called Illyria. The reforms of

⁴⁶ Solovjev, "Prinosi", 102–103.

⁴⁷ "Hieronymum ex oppido Stridonis [...] non Italum, sed Slauum extitisse" (Pribojević, *O podrijetlu i zgodama Slavena*, 66); "Is enim, ut patrium idoma (Sabellico teste) illustratet, nova literarum elementa commentus est, quibus in sacris et prophanis rebus regionis accole nostra tempestate utuntur" (ibid. 86); "S. Girolamo fú Slavo" (Orbini, *Il Regno de gli Slavi*, 176); "La natione Slaua ha due forti de Caratteri, quel che non hano nè Greci, nè Latini; vna fu ritrovata da Cirillo, & la chiamano Chiuriliza: dell'altra fù inventore San Girolamo, chiamata Buchuiza; & è fatta nel seguende modo" (ibid. 46).

⁴⁸ Dukadjini – Dukadjinović, Kastrioti – Kastriotić, Orsini – Ursinić, Piccolomini – Pikjelomenović, Frankopan – Frankopanović. The compiler did the same with the Kosača family name as he recast it into Kosačić. The Slavicised surnames Pikjelomenović and Ursinić were pointed to early on by G. Gelcich, *I conti di Tuhelj: contributo alla storia della Marina Dalmata ne' suoi rapporti colla Spagna* (Ragusa: I. R. Scuola Nautica, 1889), 157.

Emperors Diocletian and Constantine created the prefecture of Illyricum which encompassed Noricum, Pannonia, Valeria, Savia, and almost the entire Balkans – Dalmatia, Moesia Prima, Dacia, Praevalitana, Dardania, Epirus, Macedonia, Thessaly, Achaea and Crete. As we can see, the prefecture of Illyricum did not include the areas of present-day Thrace and Bulgaria (except for its eastern part with Serdica), which belonged to the prefecture of the East.⁴⁹ According to Šižgorić, in the north of Illyria was Hungary, Friulia was in the west, the Black Sea in the east, and Macedonia in the south.⁵⁰ According to Ludovik Crijević Tuberon, Illyrian peoples inhabited the area between the Dalmatian coast and the river Drava, and the Hungarians called them Croats, Slavs and Rascians.⁵¹ The perception of Illyria in this territorial extent was maintained even much later. According to an anonymous manuscript from 1790, Illyricum spread from Istria to Epirus, and was inhabited by Slavic peoples: Croats, Dalmatians, Bosnians, Serbs, Bulgarians.⁵² Of course, not everyone shared this perception. Sebastian Münster, in his Cosmographia (1544), included Carantania, Croatia and Sclavonia into Illyricum, but did not know whether Bosnia also belonged there. According to him, Dalmatia was a special case and did not belong to Illyricum.⁵³

Bosnia holds a central place in the Armorial, although it was, on the one hand, dwarfed by Illyria, and, on the other, lost among several lands which had

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⁴⁹ Procopius of Caesarea, *De belo Gothico*, ed. Guilielmi Dindorfil (Bonn: Weber, 1833), 449, refers to Sardica as a city in Illyricum.

⁵⁰ Šižgorić, *De situ Illyriae et civitate Sibenici a. 1487, 3*: "Illyria a septentrionali plaga habet hungariam: ab occasu foroiulium: ab orty littus Euxinum, a meridie Macedoniam."

⁵¹ Lvdovici Tvberonis Dalmatae abbatis Commentarii de temporibvs svis (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2001), 10: "A litore Dalmatico, quod mari Adriatico abluitur, ad Drauum amnem gentes Illyricae sunt, quas Hungari partim Choruatos, partim Slauenos, ac Rhaxianos dicunt", and, according to him, a large part of Illyricum is called Rascia: "Magna enim Illyrici pars nunc quoque Raxia appellatur" (ibid. 11).

⁵² Dissertatio Brevis ac Sincera Hungari Auctoris de Gente Serbica perperam Rasciana dicta ejusque Meritis ac fatis in Hungaria cum Appendice Privilegiorum eidem Genti elargitorum, 1790, 17: "Regnum enim Illyricum, quod ab Istria usque ad Epyrum, nunc Albaniam dictam, per Oram maris Adriatici se protendebat, diversae Slavonicae Nationes sibi succedentes, Croatae, Dalmatae, Bosnenses, Serbii, Bulgari, funditus everterunt, ita, ut ne nomen quidem Illyrici manserit, imo nec amplius constet, qualinam gens olim Illyra lingua usa fuerit."

⁵³ S. Münster, Cosmographia. Beschreibung aller Lender durch Sebastianum Münsterum: in welcher begriffen aller Voelker, Herrschaften, Stetten, und namhafftiger Flecken, herkommen: Sitten, Gebreüch, Ordnung, Glauben, Secten und Hantierung durch die gantze Welt und fürnemlich Teütscher Nation (Basel: durch Henrichum Petri, 1544), DXLVIII: "Es seind vor zeiten zwischen dem Venediger möre und Ungerland zwo namhafftiger prouintzen oder landschafften gelegen, die man Illyricum unnd Dalmaciam hat geheissen. Aber zü unsern zeiten ist Illyria in vill landschafften zertheilt worden, nemlich in Carinthiam, das ist in Kernten, und in Coruatiam, Croatiam, zü teütsch Crain und Crabaten, item in Sclauoniam, das ist die Windisch marck. Etlich wöllen auch das Bosna oder Bossen darzü hab gehört."

purportedly formed part of the Illyrian Empire.⁵⁴ Its position is reflected particularly well in the design of the coat of arms of the Bosnian kingdom. For the sake of reminder, the "Genealogy of the Serbian and Bosnian Kings" shows the coat of arms of Illyria with the inscription: "[tit ilira stariéh bo{gnana" [the shield of the Illyrians, ancient Bosnians]. Bosnia's coat of arms in the "Genealogy" consists of two crossed bands with negro heads surmounted by a smaller shield with a crown. Its coat of arms in the Armorial also displays two crossed bands, but there is at their crossing a small shield bearing the Illyrian coat of arms, while the shield with a crown was left out. The distinctive link between Bosnia and Illyria may also be seen in the coat of arms of the ruler of the Illyrian Empire Emperor Stefan (Dušan), which shows a female figure holding a banner with the arms of Illyria in one hand, and a shield with Bosnia's insignia in the other. According to Stojan Novaković, the reason why Bosnia's coat of arms contains the Illyrian arms "may be that its people was accorded the position of particular priority among those considered, under their modern-day ethnic names, to be descendants of the Illyrians".55 At the time of the Armorial's creation, it was widely believed that the Bosnians descended from the Thracian people of Bessi. According to Ludovik Crijević Tuberon, Bosnians were descendants of the Thracian Bessi who, having been expelled by the Bulgarians, settled in Illyricum between the Sava, Una and Drina rivers and the Adriatic Sea.⁵⁶ Sebastian Münster shared this view, believing that the name Bessi had changed as the letter "e" had been replaced with an "o", and so "Bessi" became "Bosi".⁵⁷ Mavro Orbin concurred with Crijević and Münster.58

It may be interesting to note that the arm with a sword and the crescent moon with a star above as an integral part of the Bosnian arms appeared together for the first time on the tombstone of Queen Catherine of Bosnia who died in 1478 and was buried in the church of Santa Maria in Ara Coeli in Rome. However, the insignia from this tombstone is known only from drawings whose accuracy can be reasonably doubted.⁵⁹ Namely, around 1590, during repair works

⁵⁴ Ćirković, "Dopune i objašnjenja", 475.

⁵⁵ Novaković, "Heraldički običaji u Srba u primeni i književnosti", 403.

⁵⁶ *Lvdovici Tvberonis,* 89: "Porro Bossinates, Thracum Bossorum soboles, olim Thracia a Bulgaris pulsi eas regiones Illyrici insederunt, quae Sauo, Valdano, Drino amnibus et mari Adriatico, qua Dalmatiae pretenditur, continentur."

⁵⁷ Münster, Cosmografia, DXLIX.

⁵⁸ Orbini, Il Regno de gli Slavi, 345.

⁵⁹ Andrija Kačić-Miošić, *Razgovor ugodni naroda naroda slovinskoga* (Dubrovnik: Nakladom knjižarnice D. Pretnera, 1886), 247, believed that the crescent moon and a star was the arms of Bosnia: "Bosanska arma jest jedan štit i na njemu pô misica i jedna zvizda. U Primorju na mnogim starim grobnicam nahodi se rečena arma: sva je prilika, da su takve grobnice učinjene od bosanskih uskoka, za jednu uspomenu od svoga dočašća i gospodstva" [The Bos-

on the church, the grave slab was pulled out of the floor and built into one of the columns. On that occasion, the plaque with a Cyrillic, Serbo Slavonic inscription vanished and was replaced with one bearing a Latin inscription. When Franjo Rački visited the church in the late nineteenth century, the coat of arms on the slab was very worn-out and he was unable to discern in its centre the shield with the arm with a sabre and the crescent and a star. He therefore posed the question as to where the drawings of the intact arms had come from.⁶⁰ Aleksandar Palavestra, when he visited the church a century later, was also able to see only the outlines of the arms, the figure of the queen and the Latin inscription. What he has found indicative is the year the grave slab was moved to another place, which was the time of the flourishing of Illyrian heraldry. He therefore has not ruled out the possibility that the crescent with a star and the arm with a sword was a subsequent, late sixteenth-century interpretation by a person from the circle in which the Slavic movement and Illyrian heraldry were being created under the auspices of the Roman Curia.⁶¹

The distinctive place accorded to Bosnia is also reflected in the depiction of its patron, St Gregory (Pope St Gregory is depicted also above the border surrounding the "Genealogy of the Serbian and Bosnian Kings"),⁶² and in the presence of some elements of Bosnia's arms in the depiction of the Mother of God. Based on a part of the text of the "Genealogy", Vladimir Mažuranić believed that the Mother of God, venerated in Hungary as *patrona Hungariae*, was the new

nian arms is a shield and on it a half moon and a star. In the coastal lands this arms occurs on many old gravestones: in all probability, such gravestones were made by Bosnian rebels in memory of their arrival and nobility]. According to A. Solovjev, "Simbolika srednjovekovnih spomenika u Bosni i Hercegovini", *Godišnjak Društva istoričara Bosne i Hercegovine* 8 (1956), 35, the crescent moon and a star were probably introduced under the influence of Bosnian tombstones on which they occurred so frequently that emigrants from Bosnia might well have understood it as some sort of a national symbol. See also P. Andjelić, "Neka pitanja bosanske heraldike", *Glasnik Zemaljskog muzeja u Sarajevu* NS (A) 19 (1964), 168.

⁶⁰ F. Rački, "Stari grb bosanski", *Rad JAZU* 101 (1890), 155–157. A transcription of the original Cyrillic inscription is preserved in the work of the Italian calligrapher Giovanni Battista Palatino published in Rome in 1547.

⁶¹ Palavestra, "Komentari", 266; A. Palavestra, "O nadgrobnoj ploči kraljice Katarine", *Ilirski grbovnici*, 48–49.

⁶² In 1461, Pope Pius II confirmed St Gregory as the patron saint of Bosnia, cf. P. F. Nedić, *Monumenta privilegiorum, concessionum, gratiarum et favorum provinciae Bosnae Argentinae* (Vukovar: Typographia Ernesti Jančik, 1886), 111. See also A. Soloviev, "Saint Grégoire, patron de Bosna", *Byzantion* 19 (1949), 263–279. Solovjev, "Postanak", 96, suggested that the depiction of St Gregory in the Armorial might be understood as an allusion to Pope Gregory XIII who had reformed the calendar, and restored the Illyrian College of St Jerome in Rome and the monastic order of St Basil.

patroness of Bosnia.⁶³ Having been made king of Bosnia by the Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus in 1471, Nicholas of Ilok (Nikola Iločki) began to strike the coins with the image of the Mother of God and the inscription *Patrona Regni*.⁶⁴

Bosnia's central place in the Armorial is also reflected in the fact that most of the historically attested families came originally from it. Particularly prominent is the ruling Kotromanić dynasty whose coat of arms comes first among the family arms. What adds to the impression of the importance attached to this family is the fact that it is immediately followed by the Nemanjićs – the ruling dynasty of the Illyrian Empire, as well as the fact that the arms of both families contain the same symbol, a lion. The role of the Bosnian royal family is also visible in the composite arms of the Illyrian rulers where only the coats of arms of the Nemanjićs and the Kotromanićs are shown. The importance of the Kotromanićs is further stressed by the fact that the coats of arms of their family branches, the Tvrtkovićs and the Hristićs, hold the fourth and the seventh place respectively among the family arms.

The Nemanjićs – Emperors Stefan (Dušan) and Uroš, the rulers of the Illyrian Empire, were also given a special place in the Armorial.⁶⁵ It was not by accident that the author chose members of this Serbian family as rulers of the invented Empire. As we have seen, Hrelja, the purported ancestor of Petar Ohmućević, was in the service of Emperor Dušan who, according to a forged charter of 1349, granted him several towns. The imperial title of the last two rulers of the Nemanjić dynasty must have inspired admiration and respect even at the time of the Armorial's creation. The fact should not be overlooked either that Emperor Dušan maintained friendly relations with Dubrovnik, Petar Ohmućević's place of origin, and that during his reign Serbian-Ragusan cooperation was a major factor of Dubrovnik's prosperity.

Ragusan sources quite frequently link the Nemanjićs with Bosnia and refer to them as its rulers. This is also observable in the "Genealogy of the Serbian

⁶³ V. Mažuranić, Dodatci uz Prinose za Hrvatski pravno-povjestni rječnik (Zagreb: JAZU, 1923), 27–28.

⁶⁴I. Rengjeo, "Novci bosanskih banova i kraljeva", Glasnik Hrvatskog državnog muzeja u Sarajevu 55 (1943), 289–291.

⁶⁵ A reworked version of Dušan's Law Code done in the late seventeenth century or the first quarter of the eighteenth says: "Благочьстываго и христолюбиваго, маћедонискаго цара Стефана сръбъскаго, блъгар'скаго, оугар'скаго, дальмат'скаго, арбанаскаго, оугровлахїнскаго, и инимь многимь прћаделомь и земламь самодрьжца" [The pious and Christ-loving Macedonian emperor Stefan, autokrator of Serbian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Dalmatian, Albanian, Hungaro-Wallachian and many other provinces and lands] (*Zakonik cara Stefana Dušana,* vol. III: *Baranjski, Prizrenski, Šišatovački, Rakovački, Ravanički i Sofijski rukopis*), eds. Mitar Pešikan, Irena Grickat-Radulović and Miodrag Jovičić (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1997), 359–360, 406). Solovjev, "Postanak", 106, linked this version to the Illyrian and Slavic movement and saw in the title of Emperor Dušan "a symbol of the desired unity of all Balkan Christians".

and Bosnian Kings", which is considered to have been one of the main sources for the Armorial and which makes mention of "all the Nemanjić kings of Bosnia".66 What must have also led to such interpretations was a very blurry understanding of the past, which is obvious in Ragusan historiography. Among other things, it is reflected in "Bosnianness", i.e. a tradition about the medieval Bosnian state which considerably contradicts historical fact.⁶⁷ For an anonymous writer, Emperor Dušan was the king of Bosnia, Nikola Altomanović was a Bosnian magnate, and the 1389 Battle of Kosovo was fought between the Bosnians and the Turks.⁶⁸ Ludovik Crijević Tuberon wrote that Stefan Nemanjić (Dušan) had commanded Bosnians in Illyricum.⁶⁹ For Nikola Ranjina too, the Nemanjićs were the rulers of Bosnia, and Vojislav Vojinović and Nikola Altomanović were Bosnians.⁷⁰ The Nemanjićs were considered the rulers of Bosnia by Serafino Razzi too.71 For Jakov Lukarević, Desa – whom he considered an ancestor of the Nemanjićs, was "pro nepote di Stefano Prete della Chiesa di Tuchegl Città di Bosna".⁷² In the early eighteenth century, Junije Rastić wrote that members of Nemanja's house had ruled over all of Illyricum.⁷³

Undoubtedly one of the most interesting ideas put forth by the Armorial is the placing of a distinctly Christian Orthodox family at the head of an imaginary Catholic empire. There is in the entire activity relating to Illyrian heraldry a visible intention to present the Nemanjićs as Roman Catholic. The same may be said of the "Genealogy of the Serbian and Bosnian Kings", where the images of the first archbishop of the autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church, St Sava, emphasised by a white mitre lit with rays of light, and of Archbishop Sava

⁶⁶ Pucić, "Zur südslavischen Heraldik I", 341; Novaković, "Heraldički običaji u Srba", 386.

⁶⁷ Hrabak, Tradicija o srednjevekovnoj Bosni, 339–354.

⁶⁸ Annales Ragusini Anonymi item Nicolai de Ragnina, ed. S. Nodilo (Zagreb: JAZU, 1883), 40, 41, 48: "Fu morto Re Stiepan de Bosna adi 18 decembre in suo paese di Bosna" [...] "Nicola Zupan, signoretto de Bosna" [...] "Adi 15 giugnio, in giorno di S.to Vido, et fo martedi, fu battaglia tra Bosnesi et Gran Turco, li quali Bosnesi furono Despot Lazar Re de Bosna."

⁶⁹ *Lvdovici Tvberonis,* 95: "Stephanus Nemagna, Bossinatibus in Illyrico ad temporis imperans."

⁷⁰ Annales Ragusini Anonymi, 218, 223, 225, 233f: "Nemagna re di Rascia, o vero di Bosna" [...] "Urosio re di Rascia e di Bosna" [...] "Imperator Stefano di Bosna" [...] "la guera fra li Ragusei et Bosnesi, delli quali era el guida Voisav Voinovich" [...] "Et etiam loro morseno per mano di Nicolò, zupan Bosnese."

 ⁷¹ S. Razzi, La storia di Ragusa scritta nuovamente in tre libri (Ragusa: Editria Tipografia Serbo-Ragusea, A. Pasarić, 1903), 29, 67–68: "Stefano Nemagna, Principe de Bossinati" [...]
 "Stefano Rè di Bossina."

⁷² J. Luccari, Copioso ristretto de gli anali di Ravsa, 20.

⁷³ Chronica Ragusina Junii Restii (ab origine urbis usque ad annum 1451) item Joannis Gundulae (1451/1484), ed. S. Nodilo (Zagreb: JAZU, 1893), 51: "Casa di Nemagna, che signoreggiò tutto l'Illirico."

II, shown in a red cardinal cap, reveal the intention to present the Nemanjić archbishops, and through them the entire dynasty, as good Roman Catholics.⁷⁴ The Roman Catholic orthodoxy of the Armorial, and thus of the rulers of the Illyrian Empire, was ensured by the four opening pictures. The same motive was behind the inclusion in the Armorial of the coat of arms of the Pikjelominovićs (leaf CXXXI), in fact the Italian Piccolomini family.⁷⁵ The author did that in order to be able to fit the Nemanjićs into a picture which had to be acceptable both to the user of the Armorial and to the Spanish court in Naples in the service of which he was. In this, he might have relied on some details from the history of this dynasty which suggested their "positive" attitude towards Roman Catholicism.

An important element for understanding the ideology of the Armorial is also the depiction of the unnamed ruler kneeling before St Stephen and receiving with his both hands the cross with a banner showing the Crucifixion. Aleksandar Solovjev was content to note, without further elaboration, that it is King Stefan kneeling before St Stephen, and pointed to the similarity of the depiction to the abovementioned painting from the monastery of Sutjeska⁷⁶ which shows King Stefan Tomaš kneeling before Christ – tradition has it that it shows his conversion from Bogomilsm to Roman Catholicism.⁷⁷ Ivo Banac identified the ruler as Stefan Nemanjić but misidentified the saint as St Demetrius.⁷⁸ There is no doubt that the depicted ruler is Emperor Stefan Nemanjić (Dušan), whose coat of arms is placed at the beginning of the Armorial. St Stephen was the patron saint of the Nemanjić dynasty and his cult played an important role in medieval Serbia.⁷⁹ The Bosnian kings based their claim to the crown on their kinship ties with the Nemanjićs and, in emulation of them, assumed the royal

⁷⁴ Solovjev, "Prinosi", 102.

⁷⁵ The Piccolomini family is included in the Illyrian Armorial because of the role that Enea Silvio Piccolomini, Pope Pius II, played during the last few years of the existence of the medieval Bosnian state, his effort to organise a crusade against the Turks, his reputation in the Roman Catholic Church, and the circumstances of the Armorial's creation; cf. S. Rudić, "Porodica Pikjelomenović i Ilirski grbovnik", *Istorijski časopis* 47 (2000), 77–87.

⁷⁶ Solovjev, "Postanak", 96.

⁷⁷ The painting from the monastery of Sutjeska dates from the mid-fifteenth century. The identity of the depicted ruler was a matter of some controversy. The view that it is Stefan Tomaš was held by Martin Nedić, according to R. Drljić, *Prvi ilir Bosne fra Martin Nedić*. 1810–1895 (Sarajevo: Trgovačka štampa, 1940), 111, fn. 22; F. Rački, "Stari grb bosanski", 136, and V. Mažuranić, *Dodatci uz prinose*, 21. Stojan Novaković, "Heraldički običaji u Srba", 384, believed the ruler to be King Tvrtko, while Vjekoslav Klaić, *Povijest Hrvata*, II-3 (Zagreb: Kugli, 1904, 37), identified him as King Stefan Tomašević.

⁷⁸ Banac, Grbovi – biljezi identiteta, 150.

⁷⁹ S. Marjanović-Dušanić, *Vladarska ideologija Nemanjića* (Belgrade: SKZ; Sveti arhijerejski sinod SPC; Clio, 1997), 42–59.

name of Stefan.⁸⁰ It is quite clear therefore that St Stephen figures in the Armorial as the patron saint of not only the Nemanjićs but also of the rulers of Bosnia. This becomes obvious also from the inscription in the "Genealogy of the Serbian and Bosnian Kings" which says that all the crowned Nemanjić kings of Bosnia assumed the name Stefan (Stipan) like the Ptolemies of Egypt had used to.⁸¹

What emerges from all this is a quite interesting picture - once heretical Bosnia serving as a link connecting Stefan Dušan's "schismatic" empire with the Roman Catholic world of the compiler and users of the Armorial.⁸² Yet, the concept of a thus conceived Roman Catholic empire was not contradicted only by the fact that its core was made up of Orthodox rulers and magnates but also by the inclusion of adherents of the "Bosnian Church", and especially of Muslim families, some of which either ranked high in the hierarchy of the sixteenth-century Ottoman state or were important on the local, Bosnian, level. In that way the author of the Armorial highlighted the unity of the Illyrian people which he put above religious affiliations. In glorifying this people, he consciously stepped out of his imaginary Roman Catholic circle and embraced the Illyrians (Slavs) of the other two faiths, and even placed an Christian Orthodox dynasty at the head of the imaginary Illyrian Empire. Given the circumstances of the Armorial's creation, the question may be posed as to whether it was simply the product of a humanistically educated author who consciously chose to disregard the religious dimension, or it should perhaps be looked at in the context of the then current plans for a church union and a crusade.

The idea of Roman Catholicism threaded through the Armorial was its author's key idea. He was not motivated only by his own religious beliefs but also by the awareness that the Armorial would not otherwise be able to achieve the purpose for which it was made in the first place. The other two great ideas, Illyrism and Slavism, had to be subjugated to it, which, after all, should not have been difficult because the Roman Curia had already been exploiting them in its activity.

⁸² Ćirković, "Dopune i objašnjenja", 475–476.

UDC 929.642 Ohmućević-Grgurić 929.7.034(497 Dubrovnik)"15"

⁸⁰ S. M. Ćirković, "The Double Wreath: A Contribution to the History of Kingship in Bosnia", Balcanica XLV (2014), 122–123; R. Mihaljčić, "Odjek titularnog imena Nemanjića", Vladarske titule oblasnih gospodara, vol. VI of Sabrana dela (Belgrade: Srpska školska knjiga; Knowledge, 2001), 205–239.

⁸¹ Pucić, "Zur südslavischen Heraldik I", 341; Novaković, "Heraldički običaji u Srba", 386. Pius II commented: "Sicut Romani quondam suos principes, vel Caesares, ves Augustos vocauere, Aegyptij, vel Pharaones, vel Ptolemaeos: ita & Bosnenses suos reges apellauerunt Stephanos", quoted after Matasović, "Tri humanista", 246. This interpretation was also adopted by Orbini, *Il regno de gli Slavi*, 369: "Percioche, si come peril passato il Romani chiamavano i loro Principi Cesari, o vero Augusti, e gli Egitij Faraoni, ò Tolomei; cosìli Bosnesi (dice Gioanni Gabellino ne' Commentarij di Pio 2. al 3. lib) chiamavano i loro Rè Stefani."

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The National-Dynastic Monument in the Kingdom of Serbia The Monument to Prince Miloš Obrenović in Požarevac as a Case Study

- **Abstract:** The monument to Prince Miloš Obrenović unveiled in 1898 embodied the concept of national-dynastic monument in the Kingdom of Serbia at the end of the nine-teenth century. The statue in the manner of academic art by Djordje Jovanović, a prominent Serbian sculptor, may be seen as a creative transfer of European practices in designing majestic monuments to rulers. Set up in downtown Požarevac, the monument to Prince Miloš was intended to act as a place of collective remembrance and a means of legitimation of King Alexander Obrenović. Forming part of the process of constructing the cult of Prince Miloš, the monument may be seen as a visual testimony to the attempt of the shaken dynastic regime to define its own ideological model by using the image of its charismatic founder. The unveiling ceremony, pervaded with a military spirit, confirmed the place of the Požarevac visual *topos* on the map of patriotic geography, pointing to the power of the visual work in the system of the representative culture of the state and the nation in the late nineteenth century.
- Keywords: Požarevac, Prince Miloš Obrenović, Djordje Jovanović, visual culture, nationaldynastic monuments

Monument: between politics and art

The study of the monument to Prince Miloš Obrenović in Požarevac requires a brief typological overview of national-dynastic monuments in a broader, European context.¹ The term "monument" is used here in the narrow sense of a work of art in the form of a human figure that supports the memory of notable events and persons of a community.² The central role of the monument is to signpost the binding values of a given society and thus to verify the timeless sustainability of the message it is meant to convey. The monument is supposed to respond to the requirement of permanence which is to be confirmed by the

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¹ R. Koshar, From Monuments to Traces. Artefacts of German Memory 1870–1990 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 15–79; W. Telesko, Das 19. Jahrhunderts. Eine epoche und ihre Medien (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2010), 137–156.

² H. E. Mittig, "Denkmal", in Werner Busch & Peter Schmook, eds., *Kunst. Die Geschichte ihrer Funktionen* (Berlin: Quadriga/Beltz, 1987), 457.

unchallenged acceptance of the historical rationale behind its creation.³ Therefore, all elements of the monument – embodied in clothing, ornament or the inscription on its pedestal – are shaped with the idea of affirming the binding power of the visual work, and of its moral and didactic function.

Even though we tend to perceive nineteenth-century monuments as little short of sacred objects, and even though their creators tended to present them as unquestionable objects enveloped in an aura of sacredness, they were also construed as secular artefacts and as such frequently aroused controversy and harsh criticism from contemporaries.⁴ Finally, the value of public monuments was defined by their political potential, which led to the downplaying of artistic errors and formal inadequacies.⁵ Anatomical inaccuracies and stylistic incongruities in such monuments were downplayed in favour of their universally accepted patriotic content, which protected less satisfactory works from potentially devastating effects of aesthetic criticism.⁶ The presence of a monument in the mass media (newspapers, books, magazines) testified to its propaganda purpose and to its place in the nation's public opinion. A generator of modern societies, public opinion⁷ created a climate that enabled an ideological and ethical framework for the emergence of a public monument. The main social structures (the church, the military and civil elites) determined the form and content of a monument, as well as its place in the community's public memory. The vitality and historical sustainability of the monument depended on contents of current relevance being perpetually read into it. Thus, it was through the agency of the public that some monuments became symbols of collective memory and markers of national identity.⁸ They gained political verification at the moment of ceremonial inauguration, becoming artefacts appealing to patriotic upbringing and national consciousness.

Monuments can frequently contribute to the understanding of an epoch and its political-historical patterns better than documentary sources.⁹ The question of the artistic quality and aesthetic value of a monument was brushed aside at the moment of unveiling, when the sculpted work assumed the significance of

⁹ Allings, Monument und Nation, 596.

³ Ibid. 460–461.

⁴ R. Allings, Monument und Nation: das Bild vom Nationalstaat im Medium Denkmal - zum Verhältnis von Nation und Staat im deutschen Kaiserreich 1871–1918 (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1996), 598–599.

⁵ Mittig, "Denkmal", 464–465.

⁶ Ibid. 465.

⁷ J. Habermas, O javnom mnjenju. Istraživanje u oblasti jedne kategorije gradjanskog društva (Novi Sad: Mediteran Publishing, 2012).

⁸ N. Makuljević, Umetnost i nacionalna ideja u XIX veku. Sistem evropske i srpske vizuelne kulture u službi nacije (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2006).

a first-rate political object (source). Monuments were given their final purpose and required political significance by laudatory patriotic speeches and politically engaged texts.¹⁰ As a consequence, they eventually became engaged media expressions in the service of the dominant ideological currents.

The political communication of monuments in public space involves the conversion of a historical content into form which derives its rhetorical power and influence from the clarity and readability of its message.¹¹ It is important to emphasize the contribution of the method of political iconography to the interpretation of the monument as an active political performer in political space.¹² Political iconography seeks to situate the performance of a monument between the intentions of its creators and the expectations of the public and thus to convert its aesthetic effect to a charismatic effect.¹³ The method corresponds with various disciplines such as cultural history, the history of ideas and social history, endeavouring to explore the effects of political staging in the field of visual culture. It is not focused exclusively on high art; it also explores other phenomena (media) such as urban planning, print media and ephemeral spectacles,¹⁴ studying the modes of creating, appropriating and protecting the political significance, intentions, influences and functioning of visual strategies.¹⁵

The ruling structures of society in most European countries of the late nineteenth century rested on national, military and monarchical elites whose relationships defined the basic social norms. Army and monarchy, as pillars of the national state, defined the framework of modern states. They were perceived as permanent structures of society, protectors of peace and welfare and guarantors of the survival of the state and national unity. Their supporter and generator was the conservative-national section of the urban elites which, in line with market mechanisms and the overall militarization of society, sought to convince the nation of the immutability of the existing state of affairs. At the end of the nineteenth century, nations began to disregard state borders and to campaign for tribal (ethnic) unity. The process of national mobilization would find expression in the culture of monuments and its need to accommodate the aspirations to join various ethnic groups into a unified body.

15 Ibid. 102.

¹⁰ Ibid. 598.

¹¹ Mittig, "Denkmal", 460–461.

¹² Martin Warnke, Politischen Ikonographie. Bildindex zur Politischen Ikonographie (Hamburg 2001).

¹³ Ibid. 2–3.

¹⁴T. Haunfels, Visualisierung von Herrschaftsanspruch. Die Habsburger und Habsburg-Lothringer in Bildern (Vienna: Praesens Verlag, 2005), 101.

The basis of national-dynastic monuments

National monuments are an expression of the endeavour to shape national identity with the use of the visual language. Thomas Nipperdey, in his seminal article, points out that the intention of nineteenth-century national monuments was to promote the concept of the nation (national idea) by means of lasting symbols and thereby to set an example for future generations.¹⁶

A strict typology of national monuments is difficult to develop, but a few types may be distinguished nonetheless. One of the basic types is the nationaldynastic monument.¹⁷ This type of monument was inaugurated throughout late nineteenth-century Europe amidst the tension between the pursuit of absolute monarchical power, constitutional limits to it and class turbulences. These monuments were statements of the current course of society, which depended on where the preponderance of power lay, and they sought to materialize the ruler's immortal image into the ideal of the seamless unity of nation and monarchy.

The end of the eighteenth century saw the birth of the cult of genius. The right of hereditary succession, as a precondition for glorifying the ruler, is on retreat before the concept of personal merit. Now the ruler has to earn respect and honours and to prove his worth by personal example and virtue. The moralizing tone of a monument is substantiated by the character of the depicted ruler. The apotheosis of the great individual and his untainted character is meant to serve the common good, which leads to the design of dynastic-national monuments being imbued with a stronger patriotic charge. The depicted ruler not only represents the monarchy but also co-acts with the dominant national idea.¹⁸ The monument encapsulates all ideals of the nation, and thus explicitly defines the desires of the community. The hero (monarch) in monumental form becomes an extraordinary individual and the leader of the community¹⁹ which ritually gathers and self-defines in front of his stone statue.

In line with the basic principles of the culture of monuments, the topic of national-dynastic monuments in Serbia was placed on the agenda in the mid-nineteenth century (1857) with the proposal to set up a monument to Karadjordje in Belgrade.²⁰ The first monumental national-dynastic monument in the Kingdom of Serbia was erected in honour of Prince Michael Obrenović in downtown Belgrade in 1882, as a visual statement of the link between the dy-

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¹⁶ T. Nipperdey, "Nationalidee und Nationaldenkmal in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert", *Historische Zeitschrift* 3 (1968), 532.

¹⁷ Ibid. 534–535.

¹⁸ Ibid. 537.

¹⁹ A. D. Smith, *Chosen Peoples* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

²⁰ Makuljević, Umetnost i nacionalna ideja u XIX veku, 293.

nastic history of the Obrenovićs and the national idea.²¹ Despite its distinctly dynastic vocabulary, the monument to Prince Michael was the product of a compromise between the supporters of constitutional monarchy and the promoters of the ideal of dynastic patriotism. Conforming to the prescribed guidelines, the monument was comprehensively imbued with the Serbian national idea, which was made manifest in accompanying emblems (e.g. the figure of a *gusle* player as an epitome of Serbian ethnic identity).

The end of the nineteenth century saw a strong reassertion of the absolutist concept of power entertained by the last Obrenović rulers. The struggle with the parliamentary opposition led to the frequent change of government. In October 1897 King Alexander Obrenović dismissed the Radical government and installed a neutral cabinet of Progressives and Liberals led by Vladan Djordjević.²² Even though the new government's legitimacy was soon confirmed by the Liberals' convincing victory at the election of 4 June 1898,²³ its neutrality sanctioned the political dominance of the crown over both the parliament and the government. The Djordjević cabinet remained in office until 1900. In a bid to consolidate his shaky position, the ruler resorted to yet another political move. The construction of the cult of Prince Miloš Obrenović was supposed to reaffirm the dynasty and renew its vitality.²⁴ The glorification of the founder of the dynasty involved adding the epithet "the Great" to Prince Miloš's name in 1896, one of the propaganda devices used to shape the dynastic mythology of the Obrenovićs.²⁵ The establishment of the Order of Miloš the Great in 1898 was also in the service of countless ephemeral spectacles in honour of the founder of the dynasty. The historical image²⁶ of the mythologized ruler was accommodated to current ideological contents and thus the young King Alexander acquired the right to a political life of his own through the old monarch. Prince Miloš was also used as a suitable image to evoke a golden age.²⁷ The founder of state and dynasty, the mythical father of the nation, became an instrument of

²¹ M. Timotijević, "Mit o nacionalnom heroju spasitelju i podizanje spomenika Mihailu M. Obrenoviću III", *Nasledje* III (2002), 45–78.

²² S. Rajić, Aleksandar Obrenović: Vladar na prelazu vekova, sukobljeni svetovi (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 2011), 229.

²³ Ibid. 223.

²⁴ I. Borozan, Reprezentativna kultura i politička propaganda. Spomenik knezu Milošu u Negotinu (Belgrade: Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu, 2006), 145–148.

²⁵ Ibid. 146–148.

²⁶ K. Mitrović, "Dvor kneza Miloša Obrenovića", in *Privatni život kod Srba u devetnaestom veku*, eds. A. Stolić & N. Makuljević (Belgrade: Clio, 2006), 261–301.

²⁷ M. Timotijević, Takovski ustanak – srpske Cveti. O javnom zajedničkom sećanju i zaboravljanju u simboličnoj politici zvanične reprezentativne kulture (Belgrade: Istorijski muzej Srbije & Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu, 2012), 321.

legitimation of the last Obrenović king. An imaginary past became a guarantee for the present and for the survival of the last Obrenović.

The implied unity of the national idea and monarchy embodied in the figure of Miloš Obrenović was bolstered by the action of visual-verbal culture. The purpose of countless panegyrics in the print media was to help construct the hagiography of the mythical ruler. Intended in substantiation of the chosenness of the father of the nation were also numerous sculptures, painted portraits, photographs, picture postcards and other media of mass communication. Eventually, Prince Miloš was moved out of historical time²⁸ into a timeless, mythical space attuned to the current strategies of political elites.

Požarevac as an ideological topos and the shaping of the Monument to Prince Miloš Obrenović

As part of the unprecedented elevation of the cult of Prince Miloš, a monument to the charismatic Obrenović ruler was unveiled in the centre of Požarevac in 1898. The monument was intended as a reminder of the glorious liberation of the town in 1815 by the Serbian insurgent army led by Prince Miloš himself.

After liberation, the town of Požarevac began to develop at a fast pace.²⁹ It was given its urban reference points by the Prince himself who had a church built in 1819 and his residence a few years later, in 1825. By building the church and the residence Prince Miloš clearly staked his claim to the town, making its symbolic urban pattern dependent on the ideological basis of the Obrenović dynasty and its founder.³⁰ During the nineteenth century the town remained a stronghold of the dynasty and a place of the collective memory of its liberator. As part of constructing Požarevac as a powerful state and national *topos*, several military institutions were set up there, notably the Military Academy (1837), which established the town's military spirit.³¹ Požarevac was assigned an important military role which was built throughout the century in parallel with the modernization of the army and the state. The town was also the seat of the county military command garrisoned with two regiments: the 8th and the 9th (named Prince Nikola I), which is a clear indicator of the strengthening of the military structure in the town in the course of the nineteenth century.

²⁸ R. Ljušić, *Kneževina Srbija 1830–1838* (Belgrade: Zavoza za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 2004).

²⁹ M. Manojlović. *Požarevac od turske kasabe do srpske varoši 1804–1858* (Požarevac: Narodni muzej Požarevac, 2005).

³⁰ M. Lazić, "Crkva i dvor u Požarevcu kao ideološki centri vladarske reprezentacije kneza Miloša", *Viminacium* 16 (2011), 135–168.

³¹ M. Manojlović, *Požarevac, okružna varoš 1858–1918* (Požarevac: Istorijski arhiv Požarevca, 2011), 86–95.

In the course of the nineteenth century Požarevac became a symbol of modernization and emancipation of the Serbian state, and an urban *topos* of great importance.³² The importance attached to it was formalized in 1839 when it became the seat of the eponymous county with the status of a county town. Between 1878, when the territorially enlarged Principality of Serbia achieved independence, and the First World War, Požarevac was one of the five largest towns in Serbia. In line with the general political course of the country, local elections in Požarevac held on 23 May 1898 were marked by a remarkable success of the Progressives and the Liberals.³³

In 1897, in accordance with the character of the town and the legitimation of King Alexander, the project of setting up a monument to Prince Miloš in downtown Požarevac was initiated by Mihailo Kovačević, Požarevac County governor.³⁴ The usual public competition was bypassed and the design of the monument was entrusted to the sculptor Djordje Jovanović.³⁵ On behalf of the Committee on the Erection of the Monument, Kovačević asked the sculptor to prepare a drawing of the future monument. Kovačević, being a prominent supporter of the dynasty, also initiated the erection of a monument to Prince Miloš Obrenović in Negotin (1901) during his subsequent service in that part of Serbia.³⁶ Djordje Jovanović,³⁷ a leading Serbian sculptor trained at art schools and academies in Vienna, Munich and Paris, was a natural choice as author of the monument in his hometown.³⁸ His artistic reputation based on the authorship of the monuments to Hajduk Veljko in Negotin (1892)³⁹ and to Josif Pančić in Belgrade (1891)⁴⁰ must have been seen as a good enough recommendation for this commission.

³² Manojlović, Požarevac, okružna varoš, 272–366.

³³ M. Manojlović, "Političke stranke i izborne borbe u Požarevcu u drugoj polovini XIX i početkom XX veka", *Viminacium* 16 (2011), 306.

³⁴ V. Tomić, "Požarevljani u spomen knezu Milošu Obrenoviću", *Viminacium* 16 (2011), 211–219.

³⁵ "Autobiografija Djordja Jovanovića", in M. Jovanović, *Djoka Jovanović* 1861–1953 (Novi Sad: Galerija Matice srpske, 2005), 111.

³⁶Borozan, Reprezentativna kultura i politička propaganda, 165–177.

³⁷ M. Jovanović, *Djoka Jovanović* 1861–1953 (Novi Sad: Galerija Matice srpske, 2005); M. Jovanović, *Vajar Djoka Jovanović* (1861–1953) (Belgrade: SANU, 2008).

³⁸ Borozan, Reprezentativna kultura i politička propaganda, 85–236.

³⁹ Ibid. 156–157. Veljko Petrović, popularly known as Hajduk Veljko, was a commander of insurgent forces in the First Serbian Uprising (1804–1813) against Ottoman rule.

⁴⁰ M.Timotijević, "Naučnik kao nacionalni heroj i podizanje spomenika Josifu Pančiću", Godišnjak grada Beograda XLIX-I (2002–2003), 211–243. Josif Pančić (1814–1888) was a physician, but most famously a botanist, discoverer of the species *Picea omorika (Pančić) Purk*. He was the first president of the Royal Serbian Academy.

Jovanović took on the obligation to complete the statue by St John the Baptist's feast day 1898 for a fee of 12,000 francs. The unveiling of the monument was planned for the day the town had been liberated from the Ottomans. The sculptor completed the statue at his Paris studio. Given the size of the square in Požarevac where the monument was to be erected, Jovanović increased the originally planned height of the statue of 2.5 meters by half a metre. A plaster cast of it exhibited at the Paris Salon in 1898 was quite a success.⁴¹ It won the praises of French art critics. Worthy of particular mention is the text of Armand Silvestre in the exhibition catalogue which included a photograph of the statue of Prince Miloš and described it as one of the most successful of the exhibited works.⁴² Besides art critics, the monument also won appreciation from the French military. Officers of the Paris Military School expressed the wish to have a collotype print of the statue. As a result of the effort to overcome the trauma caused to the nation by the defeat in the war with Germany in 1871, France was strewn with monuments glorifying the spirit of the French soldier and national identity.43 That was the kind of the spirit that the French army officers recognized in the statue of Prince Miloš and his commanding posture. We can learn from their request for the collotype of the statue that there was an original photograph taken for reproduction purposes in the mass media.⁴⁴ This image was supposed to adorn the walls of government institutions, army barracks, schools and private spaces like some sort of a modern patriotic icon and, functioning as a visual booster, to raise the spirits and morally uplift the whole nation. The photograph of the statue of Prince Miloš Obrenović by the French photographer Michel Berthaud and its transposition to the medium of the collotype print eventually gained a canonical status (fig. 1). The image was included in the memorial album published in honour of the election of Djordje Jovanović as member of the Royal Serbian Academy.

As far as the visual record of the monument at the time it was displayed at the Paris Salon is concerned, a photograph showing the sculptor and his artwork should be mentioned (fig. 2). The image of Djordje Jovanović standing proudly in front of the statue of the Serbian ruler clearly reveals the artist's selfassured identity and social status. The author and his work legitimize one other, creating a representative visual image which indirectly confirms the identity of a Serbian sculptor in the French capital at the end of nineteenth century.

⁴¹ Jovanović, Djoka Jovanović, 38.

⁴² A. Silvestre, La sculpture au Salon (1898) (Paris 1898).

⁴³ J. Hagrove, "Qui vive! France! War Monuments from the Defense to the Revanche", in *Nationalism and French Visual Culture*, 1870–1914, eds. J. Hagrove & N. McWilliam (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005), 55–82.

⁴⁴ Jovanović, Djoka Jovanović, 38.



Fig. 1 Djordje Jovanović, Monument to Prince Miloš Obrenović, 1898, collotype print (Historical Museum of Serbia)

Fig. 2 Djordje Jovanović in Paris with the statue of Prince Miloš Obrenović, 1898, photograph (private collection)

The formal analysis of the monument clearly leads towards reading the figure of Prince Miloš within the narrative of the Knight of Takovo. The sabre in his left hand and the energetic gesture of his outstretched right arm are associated with the militant pathos of the first Obrenović. The rhetoric of visual language was placed in the service of raising the historical Prince Miloš to the level of an abstract idea. In the context of the glorification of the Second Serbian Uprising, which had started at Takovo in 1815, and of the constitution of the Takovo myth,⁴⁵ the famous ruler was depicted as a valiant defender of the homeland and a fighter for national justice⁴⁶ in line with the Obrenović dynasty's concept of "folkness". In the spirit of the militarization of the state and the nation the Prince's figure reflected the current ideological and ethical framework of society. Prince Miloš was not depicted fighting in the Battle of Požarevac, which would have confirmed the trustworthiness of historical narrative, but as an encapsulation of the idea of the power of the dynasty and the nation. The ruler was a visual symbol of the unity of state and nation, a proof of the rising power

⁴⁵ Timotijević, Takovski ustanak – srpske Cveti, 320–330.

⁴⁶ Borozan, Reprezentativna kultura i politička propaganda, 344–345.

of military structures in the society of the late nineteenth century.⁴⁷ The mythical dimension overshadowed historical authenticity, and the Prince's image was typologically equated with iconic images. Even though the Prince's image was based on his authentic portraits, it was transformed into a timeless and suprapersonal mask of authority and institutional state power.

Despite the prominent timeless dimension of the monument, Jovanović built the image of Prince Miloš on hard historical facts in keeping with the tenets of academic art. The Prince's attila and helmet with plume are exact replicas of the elements of his historical attire that Jovanović borrowed from the National Museum for this particular occasion.⁴⁸ The consecrated jacket that visually evokes the dignity and historicity of the Prince's image confirms the respect for the rules of decorum characteristic of idealistic realism. At the core of the concept of idealistic realism is the idealized and selective representation of nature aimed at making corrections and embellishments to the observable world.⁴⁹

The unveiling ceremony of the Monument to Prince Miloš Obrenović in Požarevac on 24 June 1898

The project of erecting the Požarevac monument had media coverage from day one. The *Večernje Novosti* reported that the proposal of the county governor Mihailo Kovačević met with an affirmative response in the District of Ram. The citizens of Ram proved their loyalty to the dynasty by donating 1,000 dinars for the future monument to Prince Miloš in April 1897.⁵⁰ The same month, as we can read in the *Večernje Novosti*, the citizens of Požarevac donated 15,000 dinars.⁵¹ Periodical reports on the donations made were part of the standard process of national mobilization and patriotic homogenization aimed at keeping the local population on the ball since only the residents of the Požarevac County were allowed to donate money.⁵² Thus, in spite of a broader significance of the whole project, it was regional identity that defined the question of local heritage and of the place of the county residents in the system of dynastic patriotism.

⁴⁷ M. Milićević, Reforma vojske 1897–1900 (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 2002).

⁴⁸ Jovanović, Djoka Jovanović, 40.

⁴⁹ Borozan, Reprezentativna kultura i politička propaganda, 258–271.

⁵⁰"Patriotski odziv", Večernje novosti no. 114, 26 May 1897.

⁵¹ "Spomenik knezu Milošu", Večernje novosti no. 115, 27 May 1897.

⁵² The minimum donation was set at five dinars. People were encouraged to donate by the announcement that their names would be included in a commemorative book which was to be released on the unveiling day, cf. "Domaće vesti", *Male novine* no. 89, 30 March 1898.

In May 1898, the foundation stone of the monument was consecrated and the project entered its final phase of realization.⁵³ The public was informed of the planned festivities by the media, including a detailed programme of the unveiling ceremony. The purpose of such invitingly offered information was to achieve the highest possible attendance at the big event.

Djordje Jovanović sent the bronze statue from Paris by the arranged date. In his recollections of the whole affair, the sculptor says indignantly that he was not paid the entire agreed fee, and that the local authorities even failed to inform him of the monument's safe arrival in Požarevac.⁵⁴ It was not until his intervention that the Committee on the Erection of the Monument found it fit to pay what was due to him but not even then all of it. The Committee justified its failure



Fig. 3 Unveiling of the Monument to Prince Miloš Obrenović, 1898, picture postcard (Historical Museum of Serbia)

to fulfil contractual obligations by the large costs of preparations for the upcoming celebration, which clearly indicates the precedence of the grand unveiling ceremony over the work of art.⁵⁵ Through their rhetoric and their propaganda character, the celebrations surrounding the unveiling of the monument, as parareligious moments in the life of the nation, became a value in themselves, dwarfing the aesthetic value of the work of art.

The monument to Prince Miloš was set up in the centre of Town Park (fig. 3).⁵⁶ Its setting up on the most prominent urban location indicates a political reading of public space (square).⁵⁷ The monument defined the town's symbolic topography and asserted ideological ties between Požarevac and the Obrenović

⁵³ "Osvećenje temelja", Male novine no. 126, 20 May 1898.

⁵⁴ "Autobiografija Djordja Jovanovića", 112.

⁵⁵ Jovanović was belatedly informed that he was awarded the Order of St. Sava 4th Class by Prime Minister Vladan Djordjević for his work of art. Jovanović did not attend the unveiling ceremony in Požarevac.

⁵⁶ Manojlović, Požarevac, okružna varoš, 176–177.

⁵⁷ Makuljević, Umetnost i nacionalna ideja u XIX veku, 255–259.

dynasty. Moreover, it was placed in front of a monumental public building,⁵⁸ the County Hall,⁵⁹ forming with it a whole in townscape and ideological terms.⁶⁰ In the vault of its ceremonial hall is a medallion painted with a representation of the Takovo Uprising (fig. 4).⁶¹ This work of an unknown painter of the late nineteenth century followed the standard iconographic pattern to give a visual form to the gathering at which the decision was taken to raise the Second Serbian Uprising. Thus, the painted medallion with the status of a patriotic iconic image⁶² and the monument to Prince Miloš complemented one another, creating a conceptual and symbolic framework for the glorification of the nation's statehood and the vitality of the reigning dynasty. King Square (*Kraljev trg*) was defined as the stage for a display of power and a visualization of the state and the ruling dynasty in conformity with the required national policy but also with the local memory of Prince Miloš.

Upon its arrival in Serbia, the statue of Prince Miloš was raised on an already prepared pedestal. The real and symbolic base of every public monument, the pedestal helped verbalize the figural representation, and in that way round out the emblematic nature of the visual representation. As a symbolic signifier of the sculpted image, the pedestal bears several inscriptions. Its left-hand side is inscribed with the date of the liberation of the town, 24 June 1815, and the date of the unveiling of the monument, 24 June 1898. The right-hand side is carved with two key dates in the life of Prince Miloš: his birth, 7 March 1780, and death, 14 September 1860. The most important inscription is placed on the front of the pedestal – the words that, according to Vuk St. Karadžić, Prince Miloš said during the Battle of Požarevac: *Delibasha, Sultan's soldier, You have other options and ways to follow, And I have no other way but this, So, may it be life or death.*⁶³

On 24 June 1898 Požarevac became the main symbolic *topos* on the patriotic geography map and the focal point of national self-understanding.⁶⁴ That was the intended spirit of the great celebration occasioned by the unveiling of

⁵⁸ The County Hall was the largest public building in Serbia at the time of its completion in late 1889. It was designed in the style of academism by Friedrich Gizel.

⁵⁹ A. Kadijević, "Arhitektura i urbanizam u Srbiji od 1854. do 1904. godine", in *Nauka i tehnika u Srbiji druge polovine XIX veka 1854–1904*, ed. T. I. Podgorac (Kragujevac: University of Kragujevac), 276.

⁶⁰ Makuljević, Umetnost i nacionalna ideja u XIX veku, 261.

⁶¹ Timotijević, Takovski ustanak – srpske Cveti, 355.

⁶² Ibid. 400–406.

⁶³ V. Stefanović Karadžić, Prvi i drugi srpski ustanak (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1947), 366.

⁶⁴ V. Djordjević, *Kraj jedne dinastije. Prilozi za istoriju Srbije od 11. oktobra 1897. do 8. jula 1900,* vol. 1 (Belgrade: Štamparija D. Dimitrijevića, 1905).



Fig. 4 *Takovo Uprising* by an anonymous painter, County Hall, Požarevac, late 19th century (photo by the author)



Fig. 5 Unveiling of the Monument to Prince Miloš Obrenović in Požarevac, 1898, photograph (Historical Museum of Serbia)

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the monument (fig. 5).⁶⁵ On the day of the anniversary of the liberation of the town, in the presence of eight thousand people, a complex national spectacle was performed at the centre of which was the monumental image of the founder of the Obrenović dynasty. The town was crowded with people from all of Serbia and all of *Serbdom* who had come, as national pilgrims, to visit the new destination in the visual system of patriotic tourism. Representatives of patriotic cultural associations, such as the Choral Society "Dušan the Mighty" and the Belgrade Singing Society, greatly added to the festal tone of the spectacle. As far as the military spirit of the celebration is concerned, what is observable is an active role played by the representatives of the local garrison and the presence of an equestrian association, the Circle of Riders "Prince Michael". The arrival of King Alexander and the ex-King Milan in Požarevac was described by reporters as a manifestation of strength and fighting spirit.⁶⁶ The two rulers riding on horseback, saluted by a salvo of artillery and rifle fire and escorted by the National Guard, set a tone of masculinity for the entire celebration.

The ceremony, disturbed by spells of heavy rain, reached its culmination when the reigning monarch Alexander Obrenović pulled the white cloth from the monument. Announcing this ceremonial act, Prime Minister Vladan Djordjević addressed the assembled people: The son of the first Serbian king after Kosovo. The son of the descendant of Miloš who staked the victorious flag atop the walls of the ancient and proud city of Niš and shouted to the Serbian nation: the Serbian flag is flying in the middle of Niš but our forlorn Kosovo hasn't been avenged yet. People pray and wish for this image to be presented to them by the worthy descendant and successor of Miloš, the one who made the memorable words known to all: Nothing is more important to me than Serbia.⁶⁷ The speech was supposed to evoke the notion of the Prince's spirit being incarnated in the figure of the reigning monarch or, in other words, the sanctified ancestor was invoked to sustain the legitimacy of his weak descendant. The speech of the newly-appointed county governor, Kosta Jezdić, struck a similar chord: This Great Serb, this greatest son of his people and his times, Miloš the vojvoda of Rudnik, the knight of Takovo [...] this hero giant who like Theseus flew down into the abyss and crushed the darkness and brought thence the imprisoned Serbs into the light of day.⁶⁸ It is evident that

⁶⁵ The complex celebration surrounding the unveiling of the monument has already been an object of scholarly analysis, and our attention will therefore be focused primarily on the monument in the light of the narrative of the Takovo knight: Tomić, "Požarevljani u spomen knezu Milošu Obrenoviću", 215–219.

⁶⁶"Narodna slava", Male novine no. 172, 26 June 1898.

⁶⁷ Djordjević, Kraj jedne dinastije, 532.

⁶⁸"Govor predsednika Odbora za podizanje spomenika Knjazu Milošu, okružnog načelnika K. Jezdića, prilikom svečanog otkrivanja spomenika Velikome Milošu na dan 24. juna 1898. u Požarevcu", *Male novine* no. 180, 4 June 1898.

Jezdić's intention was to emphasize the knightly spirit of the first Obrenović and, thus, the masculinity and strength of contemporary Serbian society and its crown. His classically composed speech situates the Prince's figure in the field of the mythical struggle between good and evil in a bid to transfer history to the level of cosmology. Later in his speech, the county governor likened the Prince to Napoleon and Hannibal, pointing to his soldierly character and statesmanlike wisdom. The ancient concept of the hero as the community's moral role model was placed in the context of a political reading of the history of the Serbian people, and so Prince Miloš became an embodiment of national patriotism and a paragon of national endeavour. In this speech the ruler was also defined by the region of his birth: The lush and magical Šumadija gave birth to Serbian Miloš, she was his mother. Serbian genius was his father.⁶⁹ Nineteenth-century national ideals involved the notion of the unity of soil and people, which meant that the first Obrenović was *necessarily* predetermined to be born exactly there where he was born, on Šumadija's soil. Geographic determinants in the life of a nation implied that its identity depended on the characteristics of local soil and climate, from which Prince Miloš also sprang.

The celebration was supposed to include a theatrical performance, "Dušan the Mighty", but it was cancelled due to rain. The purpose of the evocation of the most famous medieval Serbian ruler was to revive the age perceived as the optimum historical age of the Serbian people in an attempt to revive its past glory in the present historical moment. The unification of the dispersed Serbian people and the aspiration for the liberation of the *enslaved brothers* were the driving force behind this kind of popular celebrations aimed at mobilizing the national spirit. During the celebration in Požarevac, the Belgrade Choral Society performed the song composed to the poem of Dragomir Brzak,"In front of the Monument to Prince Miloš". Its patriotic verses were undoubtedly a testimony to glorifying the Serbian arms and warrior character embodied in the figure of Prince Miloš: Here come I. Here comes war. Those were your words that rumbled like thunder across all of Serbia. And the guns roared, And the yataghans swished, After a dark, terrible night, Bright days dawned.⁷⁰ The pathos marking the event reflected the current political situation in Serbia. The pursuit of national homogenization, the integrative idea of the Kosovo legacy and the revival of the Takovo myth, all of it was in the service of the preservation of the dynasty and its place in the European-wide process of militarization. In the context of the masculine pathos of the celebration in Požarevac, veterans of the War of Independence were awarded the Takovo Cross. Prince Miloš's insurgents Sima Mišić from Aleksandrovac and Dimitrije Jovanović, a rebel army drummer, were deco-

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ D. Brzak, "Pred spomenikom kneza Miloša", *Vitez* no. 9–10, 24 June 1898, p. 2.

rated in token of remembrance of the "Serbian Palm Sunday"⁷¹ and the glorious rebellion against the Ottomans.⁷²

The unity of the people and the Prince's image and their integration into a single national body was vividly evoked by the ceremony in Požarevac. The issue of the magazine *Vitez* (Knight) devoted to the Požarevac monument highlighted the dynastic-national character of this work of art.⁷³ The author of the text called the Prince a new Achilles in front of whom the people should be united under the lucky star of the native Obrenović dynasty, thus offering their sacrifice on the altar of the nation and the throne. The editorial board, in accordance with their understanding of the nationalization of the monument, placed the canonical photograph of the model of the statue on the front page and, to highlight the national idea, framed it with the Serbian tricolour (fig. 6).⁷⁴

The monument began its life in the collective memory of the nation at the moment of its unveiling. The idea was that patriotic pilgrims would visit the Prince's cult image every year on Liberation Day, offering flowers and wreaths to the liberator of the town.⁷⁵ The regular annual commemorations would keep up dynastic patriotism, raising patriotic consciousness of the population. This practice continued until the overthrow of the Obrenović dynasty in a coup in 1903. With the ascension of a king of another dynasty, Peter I Karadjordjević after 1903, the practice of paying homage to the former dynasty was abandoned. However, the performative power of the Požarevac monument in public space before the coup should not be taken for granted. Namely, in 1900 the daily *Večernje Novosti* reported on the local community's neglect of the monument to its liberator since inscription letters had fallen off the pedestal.⁷⁶ The actual power of the dynastic-national monument lay in the space between high ideals and daily practice.

In 1900, shortly after the campaign for erecting the monument in Požarevac was brought to a successful end, Simeon Roksandić completed a monument to the founder of the Obrenović dynasty for the hall of the Kragujevac *Gymnasium*,⁷⁷ and in 1901 Djordje Jovanović created another monument to Prince Miloš, in Negotin.⁷⁸ This monumental triad suggests the sustainability

⁷¹ Decision on starting the Second Serbian Uprising was reached on Palm Sunday 1815 at Takovo.

⁷² Tomić, "Požarevljani u spomen knezu Milošu Obrenoviću", 216.

⁷³ Brzak, "Pred spomenikom kneza Miloša", 2.

⁷⁴ Vitez, no. 9–10, 24 June 1898.

⁷⁵ Tomić, "Požarevljani u spomen knezu Milošu Obrenoviću", 218–219.

⁷⁶"Fotografija iz Požarevca", Večernje novosti no. 37, 6 January 1900.

⁷⁷"Otkriće spomenika kneza Miloša Velikog u Kragujevcu", *Nova iskra* 1 (1901), 26–27.

⁷⁸ Borozan, Reprezentativna kultura i politička propaganda, 237–288.



Fig. 6 Djordje Jovanović, Monument to Prince Miloš Obrenović, Vitez, illustrated magazine, 1898 (National Library of Serbia)

of national-dynastic monuments before the demise of the Obrenović dynasty. Erected as part of the process of the nationalization of society, supported by civil and military structures, these monuments heralded a continuity of the process of the failed militarization of society under King Peter.⁷⁹ The military elite whose power became obvious at the time of the fall of the Obrenović dynasty would prove to be a basic social structure. The conceptual and formal similarity of the abovementioned monuments and their rhetorical power obviously had a limited significance. The 1903 coup and the assassination of King Alexander

⁷⁹ D. T. Bataković, "Storm over Serbia: Rivalry between Civilian and Military Authorities (1911–1914)", *Balcanica* XLIV (2013), 319–330.

Obrenović⁸⁰ laid bare the discrepancy between representative culture and the pulse of the times. At the turn of the century, the use of imposing propagandistic memorials as a means to save the regime of the last Obrenović monarch proved to be unsustainable and the monument in Požarevac sank into collective oblivion.

> UDC 73.041.2:929.731 Miloš Obrenović 94(497.11):316.658.2"18"

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⁸⁰ Rajić, Aleksandar Obrenović, 512–528.

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Similarities and Differences in Imperial Administration Great Britain in Egypt and Austria-Hungary in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1878–1903

- Abstract: This article discusses the similarities and differences of the position of Great Britain in Egypt and Austria-Hungary in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the age of New Imperialism. Comparative approach will allow us to put both situations in their historical context. Austria-Hungary's absorption of Bosnia-Herzegovina was part of colonial involvement throughout the world. Egypt and Bosnia-Herzegovina were formally parts of the Ottoman Empire, although occupied and administrated by European Powers. Two administrators, Evelyn Baring as consul-general in Egypt and Benjamin von Kállay as civil administrator of Bosnia-Herzegovina, believed that it was their duty to bring "civilization", prosperity and western culture to these lands - a classic argumentation found in the New Imperialism discourse. One of the most important tasks for both administrators was fighting the national movements, which led to the suppression of political freedoms and the introduction of a large administrative apparatus to govern the newly-occupied lands. Complete control over political life and the educational system was also one of the major features of both administrations. Both Great Britain in Egypt and Austria-Hungary in Bosnia-Herzegovina never tackled the agrarian question for their own political reasons. British rule in Egypt and Austro-Hungarian in Bosnia-Herzegovina bore striking resemblances.
- Keywords: colonialism, New Imperialism, civilizing mission, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Egypt, bureaucracy, administration, Benjamin von Kállay, Evelyn Baring

The aim of this work is to highlight similarities and differences between the "veiled protectorate" of Great Britain in Egypt and Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While British rule in Egypt is invariably described in historiography as colonial, that of Austria-Hungary in Bosnia-Herzegovina is still seen, at least by some western scholars, as a special case, something between colonialism and modernization. A comparison of administration in the two occupied territories will provide a clearer picture of the Dual Monarchy's rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Comparative approach allows us to place the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in its historical context. The occupation of this land has often been studied in historiography as an isolated event without correlation with other events. A comparative method enables us to see the parallels in the events leading to the occupation of both Egypt and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the territories held by the Ottoman Empire, and notable similarities in the nature of the regimes in the occupied territories. The Dual Monarchy's involvement in Bosnia-

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Herzegovina was not an exception, but rather a part of much larger colonial involvement of great powers throughout the world.

When Cecil Rhodes declared that "expansion is everything" he defined the moving principle of a new era known as "New Imperialism". While prior to "New Imperialism" territorial and economic control had been an exclusive concern, the aim in the new period was also to impose a "higher" culture on a local one which was unable to resist the imposition. Many believed that the duty of Europeans was to bring "civilization" to distant lands and, with it, peace, prosperity and western culture. To rule the minds of the subjected people was as important as territorial and economic rule over their land.¹

Two new techniques for ruling over people were introduced in this period. As Hannah Arendt put it, "one was race as a principle of the body politic and the other bureaucracy as a principle of foreign domination."² Race was part of contemporary explanatory discourse used to justify imperialism, while bureaucracy was used as an agency for spreading ideas associated with foreign rule. Bureaucracy was crucial to organizing expansion in both territorial and cultural sense, and was of utmost importance for further involvement and conquest.³ These ideas soon met with reality in two Ottoman provinces – Egypt and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Prelude to occupation

Egypt was formally part of the Ottoman Empire until 1914. Nominally an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire from 1882 to the First World War, it was *de facto* a British protectorate. The British occupation had no legal basis and it appears to have been provisional in character.

Since 1805 Egypt was ruled by a local dynasty and had an almost independent status in the Ottoman Empire. Measures taken by Muhammad 'Ali changed Egypt's position within the Ottoman Empire. 'Ali managed to organize local administration, create a naval force and an army, and restore finances.⁴ Conflicts with the Ottoman Empire were costly for Egypt. European powers took an interest in these conflicts and the position of Egypt started to change. For Britain, it was unacceptable to have the Red Sea reduced to an Egyptian lake. The

¹ M. Ković, "Civilizatorska' misija Austorugarske na Balkanu – pogled iz Beograda", *Istraživanja* 22 (2011), 365–367.

² H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1973), 185.

³ Ibid. 186.

⁴ K. Fahmy, "The Era of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha, 1805–1848", in *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, vol. 2: *Modern Egypt From 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century*, ed. M. W. Daly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 139–140.

Red Sea was its vital route to India and it was necessary to keep local authorities in Egypt in check. The Balta Liman Treaty (1838) between the Sublime Porte and Britain brought an end to monopolies throughout the Ottoman Empire. Thus Egypt's economic independence, based on monopolies, suffered a serious setback.⁵ In a struggle with the Ottoman and British empires, Muhammad 'Ali was forced to renounce his country's economic independence but he obtained the sultan's *firman* granting his male descendants hereditary rights. Along with the establishing of schools, local administration and military forces, these rights proved to be of great importance once the British entered Egypt.

After Muhammad 'Ali's death, his successors began to pursue a different policy. While Muhammad'Ali had insisted on cultural links with the Ottomans regardless of his independence, his successors cut their ties with the formal suzerain. Between 1848 and 1879 European powers took control of the country. The vast majority of Egyptian foreign trade was directed to Britain and France in the second place.⁶ Egypt's geographical location was an important factor in British involvement. Egyptian rulers needed European support to maintain order. Aware of the dangers of European involvement, they sought to exploit the differences between France and Britain. None of their plans proved successful, however, and European bankers and traders played a crucial role in establishing foreign rule. From 1854 onwards European banks were established in Egypt and foreigners were employed by the Egyptian government, particularly in the railway department. British and French control was cemented through friendship between Said, the son of Muhammad'Ali, and the French consul Ferdinand de Lesseps. Lesseps convinced Said that the construction of a canal at Suez connecting the Mediterranean and the Red Sea would improve Egypt's position and make Said himself an important figure.⁷ Large-scale construction works led to extensive borrowing from European banks and European control grew stronger. The initial agreement between Lesseps and Said meant that Egypt not only agreed to abandon the land along the canal and provide workforce but also renounced all income derived from transit.

Said's death changed nothing. Ismail, Said's successor, had no control over the country's economy. In 1863, he faced Napoleon III's arbitration regarding the dispute between the Egyptian government and the Suez Canal Company over the rising debt. After the American Civil War (1861–1865), which enabled Egypt's short-lived economic growth due to the increased export of cotton, foreign bankers forced the Egyptians to spend their accumulated funds on large-

⁵ Ibid. 174.

⁶ F. R. Hunter, "Egypt under successors of Muhammad 'Ali", in *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, vol. 2, 181.

⁷ A. Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, A History of Egypt. From the Arab Conquest to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 79.

scale public works and Egypt was soon left with no money to defray its rising debt. In 1875, Egypt sold its shares in the Suez Canal Company to Britain and was forced to ask for financial support from European states. European powers were now in a position to interfere in Egypt's internal affairs. By 1878 France and Britain took over the ministry of finance. British representative Evelyn Baring would soon become the *de facto* ruler of Egypt.

Relations between Egypt and Britain soon mirrored those between Ismail and Baring. The latter insisted that Ismail spend all European money to bribe Ottoman officials to allow Egypt's declaration of independence. Ismail was recognized as khedive by the Ottomans, but Egypt had little benefit from it. Foreigners filled in all important positions in the local administration and, in addition, the khedive's power was undermined by local elites. Owing to its influence on the local administration, Britain was able to maintain its position without resorting to military force. Egyptian key officials cooperated with Britain – Nubar Pasha became the president of the council of ministers.⁸ His European-controlled government was unpopular. Claiming to act in response to the discontent of the Egyptian people, Ismail proclaimed the formation of a truly Egyptian cabinet.⁹

Ismail's feeling of triumph was short-lived. France and Britain colluded with the Sublime Porte to end the reign of khedive Ismail. In June 1879, the Ottoman sultan ordered Ismail to leave Egypt at once, and Ismail's son Tawfiq was made the new khedive of Egypt. Baring was satisfied because, in his eyes, Ismail was the greatest obstacle to reforms in Egypt,¹⁰ but he was also aware of difficulties in relations between locals and foreigners. He preferred Britain's exercise of informal rule which would not lead to open confrontation between locals and Europeans.

Baring's suspicions were justified. The growing number of Europeans in Egypt and their increasing role in the local administration and government provided further reason for tensions.¹¹ Tawfiq started his reign with the idea of adopting a constitution in cooperation with the younger generation of intellectuals. The idea appealed to local elites, who believed in the imminence of change, especially with Jamal al-Afghani preaching pan-Islamic ideas. With his newspa-

⁸ Hunter, "Egypt under successors of Muhammad'Ali", 196.

⁹ Ibid. 197.

¹⁰ R. Owen, Lord Cromer: Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian Proconsul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 114–117.

¹¹ According to the 1882 census, Egypt had a population of 6,806,381; there were 90,886 foreigners, of whom 6,118 were British. It is believed that the native population was larger by at least 100,000 persons, since Egyptians were fearful about conscription, cf. L. Mak, *The British in Egypt: Community, Crime and Crisis 1822–1922* (London; New York: I. B. Tauris, 2012), 15–17.

per articles, he was an early promoter of nationalism in Egypt.¹² However, the khedive changed his mind under the influence of the British consul. He abandoned his reformist position, banished al-Afghani as well as liberal journalists from Egypt,¹³ and appointed Riaz Pasha as prime minister.¹⁴ Newspapers were banned, the rest of journalists were deported. This did not help the regime. The opposition called for the necessity of a constitution, but Riaz Pasha and the khedive ignored such requests. The opposition consisted of young intellectuals, liberal pashas and army officers. One of the colonels, Ahmad Urabi, was the leader of the opposition movement which was growing stronger under the popular "Egypt for Egyptians" slogan, and culminated in the rebellion of 1879–1882. This was a matter of concern for British and French politicians and, in January 1881, they insisted that the khedive was the only guarantee of peace and prosperity in Egypt.¹⁵ The British consul in Egypt reported that rebellions were a serious threat. France and Britain soon sent their joint fleet. That did not defuse the situation; on the contrary, it further weakened the khedive's position. Riots in Alexandria showed the extent of the rebellion and the British bombarded the city in July 1882. Troops were soon deployed and local elites that hoped to neutralize the involvement of European powers faced the prospect of Britain's establishing a "veiled protectorate" over Egypt.

In another frontier province of the Ottoman Empire, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the situation was as complex as that in Egypt. In April 1878, Gyula Andrassy's memorandum explaining the reasons for the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina arrived in London. Andrassy insisted that the crises that had escalated in Bosnia-Herzegovina were a danger to Europe, and that the province would cause even more problems if granted autonomy. He gave a depiction of the internal situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and concluded that the occupation of the province would improve the stability of the Ottoman Empire and the whole region. He pointed out that, for Austria-Hungary, the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be a defensive move against the danger of a possible conflagration arising from the Eastern Crisis (1875-1878).¹⁶ Political motives are not difficult to find in this memorandum – preventing the creation

¹² A. Goldschmidt, "al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din", in *Historical Dictionary of Egypt*, ed. A. Goldschmidt, Jr. (London: Boulder, 2000), 32.

¹³ Editors of the newspaper Young Egypt were among the deported, cf. D. M. Reid, "The Urabi Revolution and the British Conquest 1879–1882", in *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, vol. 2, 222–223.

¹⁴ Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, A History of Egypt, 85.

¹⁵ Ibid. 87.

¹⁶ Memorandum austrougarske vlade britanskoj vladi (21 April/3 May) 1878, published in *Balkanski ugovorni odnosi (1876–1996)*, vol. I: 1*876–1918*, ed. M. Stojković (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1998), 92–99.

of a large South-Slavic state was of utmost importance. Cultural and civilizing mission was crucial to achieving such a goal. "Altruistic" note in this memorandum was used to disguise an Austro-Hungarian proposal for carrying out a colonial exploitation in the province.¹⁷ The Congress of Berlin allowed Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina for a period of thirty years. The Dual Monarchy spared no effort to present the act of occupation in a positive light. It sought to show that the Balkan peoples were incapable of organizing political life on their own and could not be counted among modern civilized societies.¹⁸ The discourse used to justify the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was characteristic of the age of New Imperialism. European superiority was obvious when European powers were compared to the Ottoman Empire. The latter was seriously in decline, which affirmed the image of Europe as a beacon of modernity and civilization. Bosnia-Herzegovina fitted perfectly well into that narrative.¹⁹

Both Egypt and Bosnia-Herzegovina remained formally part of the Ottoman Empire, although they were occupied and administrated by European powers – Britain and Austria-Hungary. The Dual Monarchy was given a mandate to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina by other European powers and its rule had a legal basis. British occupation of Egypt, on the other hand, had no legal grounds.

Defining positions

Egypt and Bosnia-Herzegovina were occupied at almost exactly the same time in 1878. The French and British taking over of the Egyptian ministry of finance did away with any semblance of Egyptian independence. Cooperation with the Sublime Port to install a new khedive proved that Egypt was in transition from being an "almost independent" country to being under "veiled protectorate". The Urabi revolt brought hope but it was crushed by the British force of arms. Once the British had set foot in Egypt, it was obvious that they had no intention to leave, especially because Egypt's undefined legal status allowed for greater freedom in dealing with it. Britain had no timeframe for leaving the Ottoman territory, apart from a "promise" to the khedive that the troops would leave as soon as peace, prosperity and order had been secured.

The status of Bosnia-Herzegovina was more clearly defined since the occupation was sanctioned by Article 25 of the Berlin Treaty. However, that did not matter much for the local population – the goal of Austria-Hungary was to establish a stable regime which would lead to annexation, which was seen as the

¹⁷ R. Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism. The Habsburg "Civilizing Mission" in Bosnia 1878– 1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1.

¹⁸ T. Kraljačić, *Kalajev režim u Bosni i Hercegovini (1882–1903)* (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1987), 22.

¹⁹Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 2.

only solution given the declining power of the Ottoman Empire and the growing Serbian national movement. Just as the British had to suppress a rebellion in Egypt, the Dual Monarchy met with resistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The resistance largely came from its Muslim Slav population; Christian Orthodox Serbs were militarily exhausted after four years of relentless fighting against the Ottomans to forge a union with Serbia and Montenegro.²⁰ Both Muslim Slavs and Christian Orthodox Serbs were strongly opposed to the rule of the Dual Monarchy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Roman Catholic Croats favoured it.²¹

Austro-Hungarian troops entered Bosnia-Herzegovina on 29 July 1878.²² They faced a much stronger resistance than expected²³ but, considering Austro-Hungary's mandate to occupy the province, the rebellion was doomed to failure. The issues of agrarian reform, high taxation and corruption were not, however, addressed by the time Austro-Hungarian rule ended in 1918.

British rule in Egypt was not strictly defined, as the legal position of Egypt was not clear. Bosnia-Herzegovina was under the joint rule of Austria and Hungary, and it was placed under the jurisdiction of the joint Ministry of Finance. The 1878 Treaty of Berlin did not specify the type of administration to be introduced in the occupied Ottoman province. Andrassy insisted that these lands be placed under civil control as soon as possible. The organization of a provincial government was informed by the Imperial Resolution of September 1882.²⁴ Evelyn Baring – later known as Lord Cromer – in Egypt and Benjamin von Kállay in Bosnia-Herzegovina became the *de facto* rulers of the occupied territories. Both men assumed office in 1882. Baring served as British consulgeneral in Egypt and Kállay was appointed as civil administrator (i.e. governor) of the Condominium of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Finance. Both of them introduced an imperial bureaucracy in the occupied lands.

For Baring, Egypt was just a means to achieve British geopolitical objectives, a step in the process of expansion that would secure India. That determined his attitude towards the local population. He displayed an utter lack of interest

²⁰ D. T. Bataković, "Prelude to Sarajevo: the Serbian question in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1878–1914", *Balcanica* XXVII (1996), 119.

²¹ R. Jeremić, "Oružani otpor protiv Austro-Ugarske", in *Napor Bosne i Hercegovine za oslobodjenjem i ujedinjenjem*, ed. P. Slijepčević (Sarajevo: Štamparija Prosveta 1929), 67.

²² Croatian general Josip Filipović was in command of the occupation army. He insisted on the formation of a local police force that would include local population loyal to the Dual Monarchy, mostly Roman Catholics, cf. V. Skarić, O. Nuri-Hadžić and N. Stojanović, *Bosna i Hercegovina pod Austro-Ugarskom upravom* (Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1938), 12.

²³ Jeremić, "Oružani otpor", 69.

²⁴ S. Szabó, "Bosnia-Herzegovina's Administration under Habsburg Rule, 1878–1918", *The South Slav Journal* 31/ 1-2 (2012), 55–57.

in the people under his administration because, to him, Egypt was a mere, if important, theatre in which the "expansion is everything" doctrine was applied.²⁵ Lord Cromer was an embodiment of the transformation of temporary colonial services into permanent ones. His first reaction upon arriving in Egypt was ambiguous due to the hybrid form of government he found there. A few years later this unprecedented form of government became characteristic of most imperial administrations.²⁶ Cromer grew accustomed to it and soon began to point out the advantages of such methods of ruling over foreign lands. Informal influence was preferable to a strictly defined policy since it left room for flexibility and only required an "experienced minority", as he dubbed bureaucracy, to rule over an "inexperienced majority".²⁷ He expounded his complete "bureaucratic philosophy" in the essay "The Government of Subject Races".²⁸

Benjamin von Kállay presented his ideas regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina in the lecture "Hungary's place between East and West" delivered at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1883, laying the theoretical foundation of his mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to a representative of the Dual Monarchy, the cultural mission would be over once "backward" lands had been assimilated in the multi-ethnic empire.²⁹

Imperial bureaucrats

Fully aware of the importance of experienced bureaucrats, both Britain and Austria-Hungary sent their skilled administrators to Egypt and Bosnia-Herzegovina respectively. Cromer's and Kállay's careers had been quite similar before they were appointed to govern the occupied provinces. They introduced an extensive administrative apparatus in the provinces under their respective administrations. The Dual Monarchy increased local administration from a total of 120 Ottoman officials in 1878 to more than 9,000 Austro-Hungarian officials in 1908.³⁰

Baring at first pursued a military career, his first post being in Corfu in 1858. In 1872 he left the army and went to India, which marked the beginning of

²⁵ Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 210–212.

²⁶ Ibid. 213.

²⁷ Ibid. 214.

 ²⁸ Earl of Cromer, "The Government of Subject Races", Political and Literary Essays 1908–1913 (London: Macmillan & Co., 1913), 3–53.

²⁹ Okey, *Taming Balkan Nationalism,* 57. For more on Kállay's ideas see B. Kállay, *Ugarska na granici istoka i zapada* (Sarajevo: Zemaljska štamparija, 1905).

³⁰ A. Sked, The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire 1815–1918 (London: Longman, 1999), 245.

his career as a colonial administrator.³¹ There he was in charge of administration and finance. He stayed in India until 1876 and his contribution to administration and especially his financial reforms launched his career. Not long after he returned from India he was dispatched to Egypt to oversee finances. He spent four years in Egypt before returning to India for a brief stay. Between 1882 and 1907 his name was a synonym for British rule in Egypt in the form of a veiled protectorate. Experienced in financial matters, he was sent to Egypt to carry out needed reform; but it did not take him long to realize that financial matters could be managed by one of his many assistants and he switched his focus to something more important – fighting the national movement.

Kállay's career was quite similar. He too was an experienced diplomat before arriving in Bosnia-Herzegovina to rule over the occupied territory. The oft-mentioned fact that his mother was of Serbian origin had no influence whatsoever on his views,³² but he spoke Serbian as well as English, Greek, Russian and Turkish language. He was greatly influenced by the revolutionary events of 1848, and believed that the importance of the Serbian question was obvious. He deemed it crucial for the Dual Monarchy to replace Russian influence in the Balkans with its own. So he seemed perfect for the role – he spoke the language, was respected among Serbs and undoubtedly was loyal to Hungarian interests in the Dual Monarchy.³³ In 1868, Kállay was appointed consul-general in Belgrade. While pondering how to minimize Russian influence in Belgrade, Kállay realized that the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina was crucial to the accomplishment of the Serbian national programme. There is a note in his diary that a dispute between Serbs and Croats regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina would be very beneficial to the Dual Monarchy.³⁴

The unification of Germany had a tremendous impact on the policy towards Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Kállay left Belgrade in 1875 convinced that any concessions to or compromise with Serbia were impossible. The Eastern Crisis (1875–1878) would once again turn his attention to the Balkans. He soon became the finance minister of the Dual Monarchy – which meant that he was also the *de facto* ruler of Bosnia-Herzegovina.³⁵

In brief, the careers of the two administrators were clearly similar in more than one respect. Both were experienced and highly skilled professionals, both

³¹Owen, Lord Cromer, 56.

³² R. Okey, "A Trio of Hungarian Balkanists: Béni Kállay, István Burián and Lajos Thallóczy in the Age of High Nationalism", *The Slavonic and East European Review* 80/2 (April 2002), 235.

³³ Kraljačić, Kalajev režim, 48–49.

³⁴ Dnevnik Benjamina Kalaja 1868–1875, ed. A. Radenić (Belgrade; Novi Sad: Istorijski institut, 1976), 116.

³⁵ Kraljačić, Kalajev režim, 55.

were appointed as high officials of the finance ministry and both were familiar with the local population. Their missions also had the same objective – fighting against the national movements and securing complete control over political life in the occupied provinces, Egypt and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Facing the national movements

Once British soldiers set foot on Egyptian soil it became clear who the real master was even though Egypt remained formally under control of the Ottoman sultan. This created a legal conundrum that helped Britain to establish a "veiled protectorate", a synonym for British rule until 1914. Indeed, constant improvisations and hybrid forms of rule were the hallmarks of foreign rule until the outbreak of the Great War.³⁶

Britain claimed that its army would leave Egypt as soon as the financial situation had been settled and the authority of the khedive restored. This proved to be impossible. In 1883, Britain allowed the formation of a quasi-parliamentary institution as a sort of compromise, since the khedive, as has been seen, gave up the intention to introduce a proper constitution. The Egyptian parliament was a mere advisory body to the khedive without any real political power. On his arrival from India, Baring became aware of the complexity of the political situation. The khedive was discredited due to his overt collaboration with the European ambassadors during the Urabi revolt. Baring spent his first years as consul-general racing against the clock to stave off bankruptcy.³⁷ More important than keeping Egyptian finances afloat was a change in Baring's attitude: in 1888, he insisted that British rule was necessary. He embarked on numerous reforms, which were necessary in his opinion. One reform led to another and it did not take long before this process began to serve as an excuse for the British to abandon every thought of withdrawing from Egypt. The appointment of Herbert Kitchener as chief inspector of the Egyptian police was a turning point for Baring.³⁸ He appointed Fahmy Pasha as prime minister and started employing the British to serve in the Egyptian administration on an even larger scale than before.³⁹ The number of British people in Egypt was on the rise, as Cromer insisted on settling Europeans. In 1897, there were 19,563 Britons in Egypt, a sharp rise in comparison with 6,118 in 1882.⁴⁰

³⁶ M. W. Daley, "The British occupation 1882–1922", in *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, vol. 2, 240.

³⁷ A. Milner, England in Egypt (London: E. Arnold, 1902), 172.

³⁸ Daley, "The British Occupation 1882–1922", 241.

³⁹ Owen, Lord Cromer, 241.

⁴⁰ Mak, British in Egypt, 19.

From 1891 onwards Baring was focused on fighting against the national movement. He was in complete control of Egypt's administration and his "veiled protectorate" started to look more like a "veiled colony". The rise of the new khedive, Abbas II, proved to be a great challenge for him. Baring - raised to peerage as Lord Cromer in 1892 – sensed trouble almost immediately. The young khedive was educated in Europe, but Cromer described him as a true Egyptian in terms of his outlook.⁴¹ While the late khedive had owed his life to the British, the young Khedive owed them nothing, which drastically changed the relations between the formal ruler and the de facto ruler. Abbas II surrounded himself with young Egyptians educated in Europe just like him, and started to question Cromer's decisions. Egyptian students, who obtained their higher education in Europe and returned home, challenged the attitude of local population that cooperated with the British. Abbas II was one of the most important figures in the rise of Egyptian nationalism, but its true prophet was Mustafa Kamil. He stood up against the education policy pursued in Egypt that made schooling a privilege of the rich elite. Moreover, the language of instruction was English and education was, according to Kamil, designed to stifle a sense of patriotism among younger generations. He insisted that Egypt was a civilized country perfectly capable of governing itself.⁴² Cromer's last years in Egypt were marked by constant struggle with the national movement that opposed British rule. He endeavoured to limit political freedoms and became weary of quasi-parliamentary institutions even though they had almost no influence on political life in Egypt. His career in Egypt ended in 1907 when a conflict between the British and the locals led to the death of a British solider and life imprisonment for four Egyptians. The incident caused protests that worried London. Baring was soon recalled and he left Egypt for good.

In another part of the Ottoman Empire, occupied by Austro-Hungarian troops, the situation was somewhat similar. Kállay's main objectives were to undermine Russian influence and to put an end to the idea of a large Slavic state on the southern border of the Dual Monarchy. There was no doubt that the occupation was a prelude to annexation, and Kállay openly stated so himself in a text he wrote prior to assuming office in Sarajevo.⁴³ On arrival he faced two problems: the national movements and the loyalty of local population. The memories of the 1878 Serbo-Muslim rebellion were fresh and Kállay was determined to prevent any future uprising. He insisted on a strong Austro-Hungarian military presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina to prevent any interference from Serbia and

⁴¹ Earl of Cromer, Abbas II (London: Macmillan, 1915), 4.

⁴² R. L. Tignor, *Egypt – A Short History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 236–237.

⁴³ Kraljačić, Kalajev režim, 89.

Montenegro, and a strictly centralist government.⁴⁴ After the rebellion Kállay feared potential cooperation between Orthodox Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina and he brought in large military and police forces and colonized loyal population from other parts of Austria-Hungary.⁴⁵

Although official Belgrade kept its distance from the national movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina in compliance with the 1881 Secret Convention with Vienna, Kállay saw Serbia as the greatest threat to the Dual Monarchy. The Serbian and Montenegrin borders were under strict control, and there was, for example, a ban on the books and newspapers coming from Serbia.⁴⁶ Kállay was intent on shaping Bosnia-Herzegovina without allowing any influence from across the border. The isolation of the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina from their co-nationals in Serbia and Montenegro was central to the Austro-Hungarian policy of absorbing Bosnia into the Dual Monarchy.

To ensure Bosnia-Herzegovina's separation from Serbia and Montenegro, Kállay resorted to constructing a unified "Bosnian nation". By imposing the concept of an alleged "Bosnian nation" through a series of administrative measures Kállay strove to suppress the existing and well-developed modern national identities, Serbian in the first place. Not surprisingly, Orthodox Serbs, who made up nearly a half of Bosnia's population, deeply resented such denationalizing measures.

	Muslim		Christian Orthodox		Roman Catholic		Jewish	Other	Total
1879	448,613	38.73%	496,485		209,391	18.08%	3,426	249	1,158.164
1885	492,710	36.88%	571,250	42.76%	265,788	19.89%	5,805	538	1,336.091
1895	548,632	34.99%	673,246	42.94%	334,142	21.31%	8,213	3,859	1,568.092

Table 1 Population of Bosnia-Herzegovina⁴⁷

However, these attempts eventually failed. In 1896, representatives of the Christian Orthodox Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina sent a memorandum with their grievances to the Emperor Franz Joseph I. They complained about the violation of their "ecclesiastical and national" autonomy: non-Serb government agents attended their meetings, interfered in their decisions, removed all religious and historical symbols of the Serbs, and often replaced arbitrarily Serb priests and other legitimate religious representatives in contravention of the Serbs' ecclesiastical and national autonomy. The use of Cyrillic alphabet, an

⁴⁴ Jeremić, "Oružani otpor", 77.

⁴⁵ Ibid. 78.

⁴⁶Kraljačić, Kalajev režim, 115–116.

⁴⁷ Dj. Pejanović, *Stanovništvo, školstvo i pismenost u krajevima bivše Bosne i Hercegovine* (Sarajevo: Prosveta, 1939), 3.

important symbol of Serbian identity, was being suppressed and Latin alphabet imposed instead – this was part of the construction of a Bosnian nation.⁴⁸

The Dual Monarchy dealt harshly with the leaders of the Serb national movement. The most common oppressive measure used against prominent Serbs was imprisonment. It was meant as a warning: they were usually released from prison after a short period of time. Another tactics was to tarnish the reputation of the imprisoned by spreading rumours of their collaboration with the occupation authorities among the Serbian population.⁴⁹ All signatories of the memorandum to Franz Joseph I were subjected to various forms of harassment and tacit discrimination.

While clamping down on the Serb national movement, Kállay also sought to separate Muslim Slavs, who largely had no national identity, from Christian Orthodox Serbs and Roman Catholic Croats. The Muslims were supposed to counterbalance the growing "Serbian nationalism", while the preservation of their privileged feudal status over Christian Serb serfs served to keep the two communities divided. Kállay never forgot the Serbo-Muslim rebellions against Austro-Hungarian rule (1878 and 1882) and he was intent on preventing cooperation between Christian Orthodox Serbs and Muslim Slavs of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In his pivotal study *The History of the Serbian people* written during his days as consul-general in Belgrade Kállay stated that a large number of Muslim bey families were of Serbian origin and that they had converted to Islam in order to preserve their status and property.⁵⁰ He apparently was weary of the connections between the Muslim Slav and Serb population arising from their common origin.

The Muslim Slavs seemed perfect for Kállay's nation-construction project. Most of the local feudal elite came from the ranks of local Muslim Slavs, whereas Serbs worked their land as dependent peasants. Kállay never initiated the much-needed agrarian reform because he wanted to protect the interests of Muslim landowners. A quarter of Muslim Slavs lived in urban environments and constituted the core of the artisanal class. Therefore, Muslim Slavs were the socially dominant community and seemed best suited to support the idea of a Bosnian nation as opposed to Serb and Croat nationalisms.⁵¹ At the culturalideological level, Kállay wanted to forge a new identity for Bosnian Muslims by trying to create a link between pre-Ottoman traditions of the medieval Bosnian state, particularly those associated with the extinct Bogumil church, and the

⁴⁸ D. T. Bataković, *The Serbs of Bosnia & Herzegovina. History and Politics* (Paris: Dialogue, 1996), 66.

⁴⁹ Maksimović, "Crkvene borbe i pokreti", 83.

⁵⁰ V. Kalaj, Istorija srpskog naroda (Belgrade: Petar Ćurčić, 1882), 148.

⁵¹Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 92–93.

present-day bey class, cutting out entirely Islamic tradition.⁵² Yet, many Muslims left Bosnia-Herzegovina to settle in the Ottoman-held lands of Turkey-in-Europe. Between 1878 and 1883, some 8,000 Muslims left Bosnia.⁵³ Furthermore, Austria-Hungary colonized *Habsburgtreu* population – Germans, Czechs, Croats, Poles – in their place.⁵⁴

	1879–1885	1885–1895		
Muslim	9.83 %	22.30 %		
Christian Orthodox	15.06 %	35.60 %		
Roman Catholic	26.93 %	59.58 %		
Jewish	69.46 %	139.73 %		
Other	116.09 %	1,449.80 %		

Table 2 Population increase in percentage⁵⁵

The Roman Catholic population was better treated than the Christian Orthodox Serbs and Muslim Slavs, which created antagonisms that served well the purposes of the Dual Monarchy's "divide and rule" policy. The Roman Catholics grew in number during Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1878, there were 209,391 Roman Catholics and their number reached 334,142 in 1895; in Sarajevo, the rise was striking: from 800 to 11,000 Roman Catholics.⁵⁶ Local Catholic priests, particularly Franciscan, were replaced with those loyal to the Dual Monarchy, mostly Jesuit. The latter were one of the important factors in the Germanization of Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁵⁷ The Jesuits' propaganda activity was not focused on the Roman Catholics alone.⁵⁸ The Bishop of Sarajevo, Josif Štadler, came into conflict with the Franciscans because, he claimed, they showed signs of religious tolerance and were inactive in terms of propaganda.⁵⁹

Kállay spared no effort to impose the concept of the Bosnian nation but to no avail. The creation of a Bosnian flag and coat of arms, the publishing of newspapers and language reforms did not have the desired effect. In the late nineteenth century, genuine national movements were on the rise and precluded

⁵² Ibid. 60.

⁵³ Maksimović, "Crkvene borbe i pokreti", 93; *Izveštaj o upravi Bosne i Hercegovine 1906,* Zagreb 1906, 9.

⁵⁴ Maksimović, "Crkvene borbe i pokreti", 91.

⁵⁵ J. Cvijić, *Aneksija Bosne i Hercegovine i srpski problem* (Belgrade: Državna štamparija Kraljevine Srbije, 1908), 30.

⁵⁶ Maksimović, "Crkvene borbe i pokreti", 97.

⁵⁷ Ibid. 99–100.

⁵⁸ Skarić, Nuri-Hadžić, Stojanović, Bosna i Hercegovina pod Austro-ugarskom upravom, 35.

⁵⁹ V. Ćorović, Odnosi izmedju Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u XX veku (Belgrade: Državna štamparija Kraljevine Jugoslavije, 1936), 163.

the success of his "Bosnian nation" project. Kállay had to accept that his plan bore no fruit. Shortly before his death, he stated that religious affiliation equalled national identity, thus effectively dropping the concept of the Bosnian nation.

Austria-Hungary's "civilizing mission" required a large administration to accomplish its goals. No more than a quarter of civil sevants were born in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶⁰ Foreigners, mostly Germans, Poles, Hungarians, Czechs and Slovaks filled the most important administrative positions. In 1904, 34.5% of civil servants came from Austria, 38.29% from Hungary and 26.48% were the natives of Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶¹ It was nearly impossible for the natives to reach higher echelons of administration. Demands for liberalization of the administration were, however, left unanswered. Kállay desired an apolitical population under the firm control of the bureaucracy.⁶² As one of the foremost British historians noted, "one can point out that taxes increased fivefold under Austria's administration and that the bureaucracy which had comprised only 120 men under the Turks rose to 9,533 in 1908. [...] administration played off Croats against Serbs and encouraged Croats and Mohammedans to cooperate. If all this did not represent imperialism, it is difficult to know what it did represent."⁶³

The number of schools was in steady decline. According to the 1906 report on Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were 352 schools in 1904/5, of which 239 public schools, 103 confessional schools and 10 private schools. On average there was one public school for every 4,455 inhabitants. This compares poorly with the average of one public school for 2,264 inhabitants in Serbia at the time.⁶⁴ The situation in secondary education was similar, but the Dual Monarchy maintained that there were more than enough schools.⁶⁵ There were three gymnasiums in all of Bosnia-Herzegovina – in Sarajevo, Mostar and Tuzla – with a total of 1,024 students.⁶⁶ Between 1887 and 1918, 723 students graduated from the Sarajevo gymnasium. Out of this number, 102 were Muslim Slavs (14%), 220 were Orthodox Serbs (30%) and 310 were Roman Catholics (40%).⁶⁷ It should be noted that whereas the University of Cairo was founded in 1908, i.e. while Egypt was still under the "veiled protectorate" of Great Britain, Austria-Hunga-

⁶⁰ Kraljačić, Kalajev režim, 439.

⁶¹ Ćorović, Odnosi izmedju Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u XX veku, 162.

⁶² R. J. Donia, Islam under the Double Eagle: The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1878– 1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 14.

⁶³ A. Sked, The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 245.

⁶⁴ Izveštaj o upravi Bosne i Hercegovine 1906, 137.

⁶⁵ Ibid. 138.

⁶⁶ Ibid. 180.

⁶⁷ S. M. Džaja, Bosna i Hercegovina u austrougarskom razdoblju (1878–1918) (Mostar-Zagreb: Ziral, 2002), 141–142.

ry never opened a university in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This no doubt had to do with the constant fear of liberal and progressive ideas that could be spread from universities.

In public schools, students learned only from the textbooks approved and published by the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while private and confessional schools used books of their own choice. Serbian schools, understandably, used textbooks from Serbia or local books that were not consistent with Austria-Hungary's official policy. The Dual Monarchy reserved the right to ban certain Serbian books if the authorities found them inappropriate for Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶⁸ Interestingly, even the content of Kállay's own *History of the Serbian people* was deemed problematic and the book was banned informally. Kállay asked Lajos Thallóczy, a Hungarian historian, to write a history of Bosnia and school textbooks which would lend scholarly support to the construct of the "Bosnian nation" which had allegedly existed since the middle ages.⁶⁹ The foreigners settled in Bosnia-Herzegovina sent their children to private schools which catered to their requirements.

The most pressing problem was the need to carry out the agrarian reform, but that was not to happen. There was no serious attempt to emancipate the dependent peasantry (*kmets*), mostly Christian Orthodox Serbs. In the economic sphere, Bosnia-Herzegovina's incorporation into the customs system of the Dual Monarchy meant that Vienna dominated the market and completely suppressed goods from other markets and the products of local artisans, ruining the local economy.⁷⁰

Conclusion

The colonial nature of the British regime in Egypt is unquestionable in historiography. On the other hand, for all its distinctly colonial features, the rule of Austria-Hungary in Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite being colonial, is often perceived as a period of modernization. However, the two cases are strikingly similar: the two occupations coincide in time, the "administrators" had similar careers before arriving in Egypt and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, most importantly, the arguments given to explain and justify both occupations were typical of the age of "New Imperialism".

⁶⁸ Izveštaj o upravi Bosne i Hercegovine 1906, 140.

⁶⁹ I. Ress, "Lajos Thallóczys Begegnungen mit der Geschichte von Bosnien-Herzegowina", in *Lajos Thallóczy, der Historiker und Politiker,* eds. Dž. Juzbašić and I. Ress (Sarajevo: Akademie der Wissenschaften und Künste von Bosnien-Herzegowina; Budapest: Ungarische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2010), 61.

⁷⁰ Dž. Juzbašić, Politika i privreda u Bosni i Hercegovini pod austrougraskom upravom (Sarajevo: Akademija nauka i umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, 2002), 142.

Both occupation regimes were provisional in character. There was no timeframe for the British to withdraw from Egypt. With the false promise of leaving Egypt once order had been restored and with no legal limits to its "rule", Britain established a "veiled protectorate". On the other hand, Austria-Hungary was given a mandate by European powers to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina with the mission to "bring order" within thirty years.

Both Baring and Kállay directed the work of a large administrative apparatus and had to deal with national movements – that was their greatest challenge. Political freedoms in the occupied territories were almost non-existent and neither occupation regime tackled the agrarian question. Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina was consistent with the desire of the Habsburg politicians to conquer foreign lands with their civilization and economy. Contemporaries saw similarities between the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that of Cyprus and Tunisia.⁷¹

As for differences, Egypt had its local dynasty and the khedive became the focal point of the national movement. Unlike Egypt and Britain, Bosnia-Herzegovina shared a common border with the Dual Monarchy before the occupation, but it was also conterminous with Serbia and Montenegro, which were central to the national liberation movement of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The most important features of the British regime in Egypt and the Austro-Hungarian regime in Bosnia-Herzegovina were the suppression of national movements, and complete control of political life and education. The Dual Monarchy sought primarily to suppress the Serb national movement by imposing the construct of a "Bosnian nation." Even when the experiment with the "Bosnian nation" failed and true national movements grew in strength, the Dual Monarchy continued to control and limit access to education in Bosnia-Herzegovina. All hope that the oppressive foreign rule would be relaxed after Kállay's death in 1903 soon died out and the Dual Monarchy continued to treat the occupied province in a manner typical of the age of "New Imperialism".

> UDC 327.2(410:620)"1878/1903" 327.2(436:497.15)"1878/1903"

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⁷¹ M. Ković, "Nacionalizam", in *Srbi 1903–1914: Istorija ideja*, ed. M. Ković (Belgrade: Clio, 2015), 213–214.

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The 1905 Parliamentary Crisis in Serbia

Abstract: This paper examines the 1905 May crisis in Serbia that emerged from the conflict between the parliament and Cabinet. It places this particular crisis in the context of development of parliamentarianism in Serbia in the period from the 1903 coup to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. This process reflected the application of parliamentary system of government, as it was replicated from the British and French examples, to the circumstances prevailing in Serbia during the challenging period of building a democratic government after the autocracy under the Obrenović dynasty. The case of the May 1905 crisis demonstrated that parliamentary democracy in Serbia was making progress despite the legacy of the "old regime" and the lack of tradition to build on. Hence the crisis remained strictly within parliamentary bounds.

Keywords: Serbia, parliamentary democracy, Old Radicals, Independent Radicals, Nikola Pašić, King Peter I Karadjordjević, cabinet crisis 1905

Re-established in the Kingdom of Serbia after the coup of 29 May 1903, when King Alexander Obrenović was assassinated and King Peter I Karadjordjević was elected as Serbia's new ruler, parliamentarianism survived several disruptions and crises in the following three years.¹ During this time, the question of Serbia's foreign policy orientation in relation to the two blocs of European powers, the Entente and the Triple Alliance, was being decided. Both sides of political life in Serbia, internal affairs and foreign policy, came to be interlocked, affecting one another. Parliamentary life underwent three successive crises. The first emerged from the conflict concerning purchase of artillery in January 1905; the second followed from the dispute about floatation of a foreign loan in May 1905; the third concerned resumption of diplomatic relations with Great Britain in late 1905 and early 1906. At the heart of all these crises was a dispute about the principles and functioning of parliamentary democracy. The first crisis, in January 1905, reflected the relationship between constitutional factors: parliament and King; the second crisis, in May 1905, emerged from disturbed relations between the parliament and Cabinet; the third crisis, in the winter of 1905/6, which involved the so-called "conspirators' question" affected a development of relations between the civilian and military authorities.² All these

¹ Alex N. Dragnich, "King Peter I. Culmination of Serbia's Struggle for Parliamentary Government", *East European Quarterly* 4: 2 (1970). For more detail see Dragoljub R. Živojinović, *Kralj Petar I Karadjordjević. U otadžbini*, vol. II (Belgrade: Beogradski izdavački grafićki zavod, 1990).

² Cf. more in Dimitrije Djordjević, "The Role of the Military in the Balkans in the Nineteenth Century", in R. Melville and H-J. Schroeder, eds., *Der Berliner Kongress von 1878* (Wies-

crises unravelled under the influence of internal forces that had risen from the 1903 coup and external factors shaped by the Great Powers rivalry in the Balkan theatre in the early twentieth century. This study aims to outline the course of one of these parliamentary crisis caused by the clash between the parliament and Cabinet in May 1905 and the effect it had on a development of parliamentary democracy in Serbia before the First World War.³

Ι

The first election in Serbia following 29 May 1903 showed further development of political polarization within the Serbian political classes. It brought about further estrangement between the People's Radical Party of Nikola Pašić (Narodna radikalna stranka), the representatives of the older generations, i.e. Old Radicals, and Independent Radicals (Samostalna radikalna stranka), led by the younger, mostly French-oriented intellectuals. Emerging from the general election with practically equal strength,⁴ the relations between Old Radicals and Independent Radicals marked the entire development of parliamentary democracy in Serbia: homogeneous Cabinets were difficult to form and thus coalition Cabinets became a necessity. The Pašić Old Radicals offered Sava Grujić, who had replaced Jovan Avakumović's "revolutionary" 1903 Cabinet, to form a new government either with them or with Independent Radicals.⁵ Looking for as wide a support as possible in the National Assembly, Grujić decided to form a coalition Cabinet embracing both wings of Radical Party - the MPs of both factions still had a common caucus. The reconstruction of the Grujić Cabinet in January 1904 signalled that the coalition was entering a crisis. Growing differences regarding certain political issues and struggle for the appointment of their own supporters in the ranks of officialdom was increasingly dividing Radicals and In-

baden: Steiner, 1982), 317–347.

³ External effects of these crises, especially in the light of Austro-Serbian relations, have been covered in the early chapters of Dimitrije Djordjević, *Carinski rat Austro-Ugarske i Srbije* 1906–1911 (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1962); see also Ljiljana Aleksić, "Rad srpske vlade na zajmu 1904–1906. godine", *Istorija XX veka* IX (1962), 141–249; D. Djordjević, "Srbija i Balkan na početku XX veka (1903–1906)", in *Jugoslovenski narodi pred Prvi svetski rat*, Posebna izdanja SANU, CDXVI, Odeljenje društvenih nauka. vol. 61 (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1967), 210–212.

⁴ In 1903, Old Radicals had 75 and Independent Radicals 65 out of 160 MPs. The other political parties, Liberals and Progressives in particular were rather marginalized. For example, Prime Minister, Liberal Avakumović, was elected in one constituency alone out of three in which he ran for election. See the Archives of Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade (hereafter ASANU), no. 9287, "Memoirs of Jovan Avakumović" (in manuscript), part V.

⁵ Alex N. Dragnich, *The Development of Parliamentary Government in Serbia* (Boulder & New York: East European Monographs, Columbia University Press 1978), 95–97.

dependent Radicals.⁶ In the negotiations for a new Cabinet, in November 1904, both groups concluded that their coalition could not continue, given their differences in the major issues such as floating a loan, purchase of guns and railway construction. The Radicals seized on the reluctance on the part of Independent Radicals to form their own Cabinet under Nikola Pašić. This led to the definitive rift between the two factions and the secession of Independent Radicals into separate caucus.⁷ This event was of paramount importance for the political and parliamentary history of Serbia in 1903–1914. Homogenous Cabinets could not be formed because of the lack of an absolute majority in the parliament. Coalition Cabinets reflected mutual relations between the two parties.⁸ From 29 May 1903 to 17/30 April 1906 (according to Julian/Gregorian calendar – the former was in official use in Serbia until 1919), there were six Cabinets in Serbia with an average duration of 162 days: that of the "revolutionary government" lasted for 114 days, the first Grujić coalition Cabinet 126 days, the second coalition Cabinet 296 days, the homogenous Pašić Cabinet 176 days, that of Independent Radicals 213 days, and the second Grujić Cabinet 48 days. On the other hand, the weakness of successive Cabinets in the parliament allowed political activity of the "irresponsible factors" outside the parliament, gathered around the Court. "Behind Cabinets that sought how to survive in the parliament irresponsible persons were lurking", Kosta Stojanović wrote.9 In the conditions of parliamentary balance of power, the military and civilian camarilla around King Peter I

⁶ The 1903 May coup brought about a change of personnel in the administrative apparatus. For example, four generals, twelve colonels and four lieutenant-colonels were retired from the army (*Stenografske beleške Narodne skupštine* II, Belgrade 1909, 928). In a grab for service in the government, Radicals obtained senior and Independent Radicals junior positions. In October 1903, eight Old Radicals were appointed judges in the Court of Cassation out of fifteen, and not a single Independent Radical; out of ten judges of the Court of Appeal, there were five Old Radicals and one Independent Radical. Out of 24 presidents of the Court of First Instance, there were eight Old Radicals and eight Independent Radicals; the latter outnumbered Radicals only among judges, where the ratio was 27:24 in their favour (*Stenografske beleške Narodne skupštine, vanredni saziv* 1906, 186; *Srpske novine* (Belgrade), nos. 242, 247, 23 and 29 October respectively). The younger Independent Radicals, in particular, were vehement in their demand to "cleanse" the administrative apparatus from the people of the old regime. See ASANU, no. 12532/1, Ljubomir Stojanović Papers, Sima Katić to Lj. Stojanović, private, 26 June 1903.

 ⁷ Odjek nos. 107 and 109, Belgrade, 10 and 12 May 1905 respectively; Vladimir Todorović, "Pisma o zajmu", Odjek no. 81, 6 April 1905; Stenografske beleške I, 1906, 277, Lj. Stojanović u Skupštini 22 October 1905; Stenografske beleške II, 1906, 1156.

⁸ "In Serbia, wills, wits and opinions are so divided that you cannot find a strong majority anywhere and for any purpose", Jovan Žujović wrote to Ljubomir Stojanović on 17 August 1905, ASANU, no. 12398/5.

⁹"Slom i vaskrs Srbije", unpublished memoirs of Kosta Stojanović, ASANU, no. 10133, folio 138.

had an opportunity to tip the balance in relations between political parties. This factor's interference in political life in Serbia endangered the functioning of the political system as a whole, contrary to constitutional principles established after the fall of the last Obrenović in 1903.

Π

As soon as it was formed, in early December 1904, the homogenous Old Radical Cabinet found itself in crisis. A paper-thin parliamentary majority made it difficult for the Pašić Cabinet to resolve the major question of procuring a loan for purchasing guns and constructing railway.¹⁰ The negotiations about the loan caused conflicts both inside and outside Serbia. Foreign capital and large European factories interested in orders from Serbia went a long way to secure the orders for themselves. This brought about the involvement of diplomacy and, in particular, the worsening of Austro-Serbian relations. On the other hand, the Old Radicals came into a sharp conflict with opposition in the parliament and the Court in their struggle for a loan and guns. The King's civilian and military advisers among whom were some of the officers who had participated in the 29 May conspiracy openly clashed with the government, drawing King Peter I Karadjordjević in political strife and shifting the ground of political conflicts outside the parliament.¹¹

Cabinet crises stemmed from these aggravating relations, which generated a constitutional crisis in Serbia given the forms of conflict and its participants. All three Cabinet crises, in January, February and April 1905, were not opened in the National Assembly, but rather followed from a clash between the Cabinet and the Court.¹² They were overcome within constitutional bounds, because political parties defended the prerogatives of parliament in relation to the King, thus defending their own interests.¹³ Emerging victorious from the January crisis, the Cabinet was forced to capitulate before King Peter I in early February, only to restore the balance of power in April when it suppressed the resistance on the part of the Court in the matter of purchase of guns. It was then that

¹⁰ The Old Radicals barely acquired majority in the parliament winning over to their side six Independent Radical MPs. Pašić was supported by 81 out of 160 MPs. See Jaša Prodanović, "Radikalna vlada", *Republika* no. 23, Belgrade, 9 April 1946. Independent Radicals attempted to dissuade General Radomir Putnik from supporting Old Radicals but without success.

¹¹ See more in Wayne S. Vucinich, *Serbia between East and West 1903–1908* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1954).

¹² The crisis of the Cabinet formed by Independent Radicals in December 1905 had the same cause. It was a conflict with the Court that brought down the Ljubomir Stojanović Cabinet as well as those of Sava Grujić in April and June 1906. See *Stenografske beleške* II, 1905, 1030.

¹³ The Independent Radicals supported Pašić's Cabinet in its confrontation with the Court in the January 1905 crisis. See *Odjek* no. 16, 20 January 1905.

the influence of the "civilian conspirators" was removed from policy-making.¹⁴ In the new circumstances brought about by the strengthened strict parliamentary system of government after 1903, there was no going back to "personal regimes" from the past that had relied on the army and administrative apparatus.

III

Overcoming dangers that lurked his Cabinet in a clash with the Court, Pašić believed that he had defeated the King's opposition.¹⁵ Calculating that Independent Radicals were not yet prepared to take office and having won over their leader Ljubomir Živković in the matter of loan,¹⁶ Nikola Pašić decided in early May to proceed with the planned procurements and ordered his Finance Minister Lazar Paču to sign a loan protocol with French banks on 6 May in Paris.¹⁷ Even the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade, an opponent of Radicals, did not consider the demission of the Radical Cabinet possible.¹⁸ Realising that the loan affair would meet with a strong opposition in the parliament, the Interior Minister Stojan M. Protić started to prepare the ground for a new election as early as April by filling the administrative apparatus with Radicals.

The conclusion of the loan agreement in Paris caused a stir of protest in Serbia, which threatened to undermine the position of the Cabinet. The attacks of Independent Radicals on Protić in mid-February reflected the increasing intolerance between the two wings of the formerly united Radical Party. At the same time, the Cabinet was taken by surprise by the attacks on the Minister of Construction Petar Velimirović.¹⁹ On that occasion, it barely scraped through the vote of confidence with the majority of eight votes. Debates in the parliament proved that the Cabinet found it difficult to rein in their own MPs. The press went on about how a good deal of Radicals was against the new loan.²⁰ The Austro-Hungarian Minister was informed that the King had dismissed Jaša

¹⁴ Živojin Balugdžić fled to Zemun after the trial; Nenadović was also ousted from the Palace. See Dimitrije Djordjević, *Carinski rat Austro-Ugarske i Srbije*, 73–79.

¹⁵ When Petar Mišić, one of the leaders of the 1903 conspirators, supported Radicals, it led to a split among the latter. The Cabinet also tried to disperse a group of officers-conspirators in early April by transferring them from Belgrade to the interior of the country. See St. A. Wien, Polit. Archiv XIX, Serbien, Bericht № 47 A-B Str. vert. Hoyos to Goluchowski, Belgrade, 13 May 1905.

¹⁶ASANU, no. 7940/30/1905, [A copy of] Dumba to Goluchowski, Belgrade, 3 June 1905.

¹⁷ Archives of Serbia, Belgrade, Političko odeljenje, conf. no. 767, 25 April 1905, Paču's telegram from Paris, 23 April 1905.

¹⁸ St. A. Wien, Pol. Archiv XIX, Serbien, Bericht № 42, Hoyos to Goluchowski, Belgrade, 28 April 1905.

¹⁹ Stenografske beleške II, 1904, 1303–1311.

²⁰"Fuzionaši protiv zajma", *Politika* no. 472, Belgrade, 6 May 1905.

Nenadović in late April because he did not want to provide Cabinet with an opportunity to open a crisis based on its relations with the Court, anticipating that it would fall on account of the loan.²¹

For all these reasons, an extraordinary session of the parliament scheduled for 8/21 May 1905 was eagerly expected,²² for it had to decide on the loan and on a trade agreement concluded with Germany. It was clear even before that session that it would be a stormy one: when Old Radicals proposed to Independent Radicals to prepare a list of parliamentary officials, as customary, the latter declined, stating that they had not been consulted prior to submitting the loan for ratification.²³ Such a refusal was tantamount to a declaration of war.

An even greater danger for the Cabinet lay in the ranks of its own parliamentary majority. When deliberations in the parliament started on 8/21 May, the benches of Old Radical MPs were often not taken as opposed to those occupied by the opposition MPs. A number of prominent Radicals did not turn up in the parliament at all.²⁴ It was clear that the Cabinet would fall even before the parliament was convened. In order to prevent a Cabinet crisis on a procedural basis and intent on bringing it down on account of the loan, Independent Radicals left the parliament session so that it had to be adjourned due to lack of quorum.²⁵

Faced with obvious languor and indiscipline of its majority, the Cabinet came to the conclusion that it could not rely on its own MPs, that the opposition was prepared for a decisive struggle and that a vote to approve the loan would be impossible in such circumstances. Therefore, Pašić decided to fall on the grounds of a failure to have the Speaker of the parliament elected, which would provide him with a reason to request the dissolution of the parliament. This would allow him to postpone the decision on the loan and to close the ranks of his own party. When the parliament reconvened on 9/22 May, Pašić's supporters were instructed to vote for an Independent Radical candidate to become a Speaker. Seeing through his game and trying to impose a discussion on the loan on the Cabinet, Independent Radicals backed the candidacy of a Radical to cut the ground below the Cabinet's feet and remove the rationale for resignation. After three agonizing votes, Aca Stanojević, an Old Radical, was elected Speaker of the parliament, with the relative majority of 66 out of 138

²¹ St. A. Wien, Polit. Archiv XIX, Serbien, Hoyos to Goluchowski, 28 April 1905.

²²"A session of the National Assembly of Serbia has never been expected with such curiosity, as is the case now", read *Politika* no. 472, 6 May 1905.

²³"Izbor predsedništva Narodne skupštine", Odjek no. 108, 11 May 1906.

²⁴ For example, M. Milovanović, J. Jeličić, P. Savić, S. Kokić, M. Radojković and others. See *Politika* no. 475, 9 May 1905.

²⁵ Stenografske beleške VII, 1906, 4445; Politika no. 475, 9 May 1905.

present MPs.²⁶ Stanojević, however, refused to accept the position of Speaker in the existing conditions and Pašić had his opportunity to demand the dissolution

IV

of parliament, threatening with his own resignation. The crisis was thus opened.

Events in the Assembly snapped Radical MPs out of their lethargy. Gathered in full force in their caucus, they approved the stance of the Cabinet, taking a resolute attitude: the National Assembly was to be dissolved immediately and a new election held under the current Cabinet. An attempt of Sava Grujić to seek an agreement with Independent Radicals was unanimously rejected.²⁷ On the other hand, Independent Radicals decided at the same time not to make any agreement with Old Radicals and to accept a mandate for the formation of a new Cabinet under which an election would be held, if offered one.²⁸ It was then that crisis emerged among Independent Radicals because Ljubomir Živković resigned as president of the Main Committee, since he disagreed with the decision of his party to form a Cabinet, if opportunity presented itself.²⁹

Both sides, Old Radicals and Independent Radicals, agreed on the following: National Assembly should be dissolved and new elections held – in anticipation of potential gains. All fourteen political and party leaders convened at the Court on 11/24 May for consultation were in favour of dissolving the parliament.³⁰ Political public in Belgrade and the country in general, fed up with Cabinet crises, also demanded new election in the hope that one or the other party would finally prevail and ensure a stable government.³¹ However, the King opposed dissolution, partly because he doubted that the new election would result in a strong parliamentary majority, partly because he feared that dissolution would bring about unpleasant comparisons with the practice of

²⁶ An Independent Radical N. Nikolić received 53 votes, Lj. Živković and A. Marković one vote each, while 17 ballot lists (Liberals) were empty. For this election see St. A. Wien, Polit. Archiv XIX, Serbien, Bericht № 49 Vert., K. Dumba to A. Goluchowski, Belgrade, 22 May 1905; K. Dumba, *Dreibund und Ententepolitik in der Alten und Neuen Welt* (Zurich 1931), 228; *Odjek* no. 106, 9 May 1905.

²⁷ Politika no. 476, 10 May 1905.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ The Main Committee was reconstituted on 11/24 May. Ljubomir Stojanović became its president, while Ljubomir Davidović and Milutin Stanojević were elected vice presidents. See *Odjek* nos. 108 and 110, 11 and 13 May 1905 respectively.

³⁰ These were Independent Radicals Lj. Živković, N. Nikolić, Lj. Stojanović, Lj. Davidović and J. Prodanović; Radicals N. Pašić, A. Stanojević, A. Nikolić, St. Protić, priest M. Djurić and Sv. Simić; Liberals Avakumović, Veljković and Ribarac. See *Odjek* no. 108, 11 May 1905; *Politika* no. 477, 11 May 1905.

³¹ Politika no. 476, 10 May 1905.

previous regimes.³² Finally, having been pressured by all political factors he had consulted, the King gave in but hesitated for four days before making his final decision. It was not until 12/25 May that Peter I signed the decree to dissolve the parliament.³³

The decision to hold elections raised two questions that further aggravated the crisis: the resignation of the old Cabinet and the mandate to form a new one.

While the resignation of the Cabinet was being announced in the parliament on 10/23 May, Pašić told the King that he requested dissolution of the National Assembly, "placing at his [King's] disposal all portfolios in case this proposal was not accepted". In fact, there were two resignations: one, unconditional, before the parliament, and the other, conditional, before the King.³⁴ According to the latter, dissolution of the parliament would exclude resignation and the Cabinet would carry out general elections, although it was in minority after the vote of 10/23 May. Central to this political game was Pašić's tactics to outmanoeuvre his opponents: he resigned in order to rope the King into dissolving the parliament and, at the same time, tried to keep the mandate for himself. Old Radicals were particularly confused by Independent Radicals' decision of 9/22 May to form the Cabinet should King Peter I offer it to them. Thus, when the King finally accepted the dissolution of parliament, Radicals claimed that their resignation was not valid any more, all the more so because the King was still hesitant to accept it. This hesitation was brought to an end when Independent Radicals stated to the King on 12/25 May that they "could not offer him any advice until after he accepts the Cabinet's resignation".³⁵ The King then, six days into the crisis, on 13/26 May, informed Pašić that the resignation of his Cabinet had been accepted.

The stepping down of Pašić's Cabinet posed a problem of forming a new government that would carry out fresh parliamentary elections. Negotiations that followed were conducted with four possible alternatives in view: a coalition Cabinet consisting of Old Radicals and Independent Radicals; a "neutral" Cabinet for the sole purpose of holding elections; a Cabinet backed by the existing

³² King also resisted the proposals for dissolution of parliament in the crisis of January 1905. See ASANU, no. 7940/17/1905, Dumba to Goluchowski, 21 March 1905.

³³ Politika no. 478, 12 May 1905.

³⁴ In its first copies of 9/22 May, the *Samouprava*, an organ of the Old Radical Party, brought news about "Cabinet's resignation". However, later copies of the same issue dropped out the news about resignation and published only Pašić's statement to the King. See "Dve Samouprave", *Politika* no. 476, 10 May 1905; *Samouprava* no. 107, 10 May 1905; "Povodom krize", *Odjek* no. 109, 12 May 1905.

³⁵ Politika no. 478, 12 May 1905.

parliamentary majority; a Cabinet emerging from parliamentary minority under the assumption that the impending elections would result in its victory.

V

King Peter I insisted on a coalition between Old Radicals and Independent Radicals. This would no doubt be the most durable parliamentary solution, as it would command the vast majority in the National Assembly. This combination was, however, not possible due to the dispute of the two sides over the concluded loan: one insisting on accepting it, the other on rejecting it. Initially, both parties declined the possibility of a coalition. Radicals replied to the King that he had a choice to make – either resignation or dissolution of parliament, believing that it was only natural for their Cabinet to hold the elections.³⁶ Independent Radicals Ljubomir Stojanović, Ljubomir Živković, Ljubomir Davidović and Jaša Prodanović professed that they were bringing down the Cabinet not because they wanted to take office, but rather to obstruct the loan arranged by Old Radicals.³⁷ At the meeting of the leaders of two parties at the Court on 10/23 May, Pašić and Stojanović decided to try to find a basis for an agreement. The negotiations that took place next day, however, bore no fruit. Talks between Nikola Pašić and Ljubomir Živković who, after his resignation, was not authorized to speak on behalf of his party, were not less fruitless.³⁸

Despite their initial opposition, Independent Radicals agreed to coalition with Radicals on condition that the latter cancelled the loan, that a new loan was arranged solely for the purpose of armament and that Pašić was excluded from a new Cabinet. On the sixth day of the crisis, negotiations took place between the two caucuses on this basis.³⁹ But Old Radicals remained adamant. The *Samouprava*, their official organ, wrote that "there is no compromise" as "there can only be a complete abandonment of its own [Independent Radicals'] standpoint".⁴⁰ Insulted by such insistence, Independent Radicals reproached Old Radicals that they used to change their leaders at a decree from the Court, and now they refused a coalition with their former comrades.⁴¹ However, being members of a young and inexperienced party, Independent Radicals were weary of assum-

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., no. 477, 11 May 1905.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Old Radicals were represented by Sava Grujić, A. Stanojević, Milan Mostić and Jakov Čorbić; the delegation of Independent Radicals consisted of Ljubomir Stojanović, Ljubomir Davidović, Nikola Nikolić and M. Stanojević. See *Politika* no. 480, 14 May 1905.

⁴⁰ Samouprava no. 109, 12 May 1905.

⁴¹"Koaliciona vlada", Odjek no. 114, 18 May 1905.

ing power with something of an academic and purist reluctance.⁴² Old Radicals sensed this and played on that card. Pašić stalled the crisis, trying to wear down his opponents. He waited for a moment of attrition and apathy to impose himself again.

The King also worked for the formation of a coalition Cabinet under Mihailo Vujić, Milovan Dj. Milovanović or Sava Grujić.⁴³ Vujić was the Serbian Minister in Vienna, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade learned that the Court, through a confidential person, had sounded out Vujić's interest in forming a Cabinet in early April.⁴⁴ The Serbian Minister in Rome Milovan Dj. Milovanović recorded at this time his bitterness against Old Radicals and Pašić, whom he accused of ruling with the assistance of dispositional expenses. Milovanović equally resented Independent Radicals and labelled them "political dilettantes".⁴⁵ In late December 1904, when the "guns question" reached its acute phase, it was expected in Belgrade that a moderate Old Radical Cabinet under Sava Grujić would be formed, with the support of Independent Radicals.⁴⁶ The Court reverted to this combination during the crisis of January 1905.47 Following the failed meeting between Old Radical and Independent Radical delegates in the parliament on 14/27 May, the King summoned Sava Grujić, in agreement with Ljubomir Stojanović, Stojan Ribarac, Vojislav Veljković and Ljubomir Davidović, to form either a coalition or a homogenous Radical Cabinet.⁴⁸ Sava Grujić informed the Old Radicals' caucus of the mandate he had been given, but he was cold-shouldered. Radicals were of the opinion – with only one vote against this decision – that Grujić should not accept it. The caucus even de-

⁴² Jovan Žujović constantly longed for his geology department and he implored his party colleagues to relieve him of ministerial and political duties. (See ASANU, no. 13209, Žujović to Lj. Stojanović, 25 August/7 September 1905; also Žujović's personal archive, note of 10 November 1905). Prodanović exhorted him to attend the meetings in Independent Radicals' caucus rather than going to the meetings of the Geological Society. N. Nikolić relinquished his membership in the abovementioned caucus. See ASANU, no. 12709/1–3. Lj. Stojanović was tired of being Minister in 1909 and looked for a suitable excuse to resign. See Žujović's personal archive, note of 11 August 1909. Prodanović also threatened to resign as Minister of Economy unless he was relieved of his duties. See ASANU, no. 12783, Prodanović to Lj. Stojanović, 2 June 1910.

⁴³ St. A. Wien, Polit. Archiv XIX, Serbien 51, Bericht № 49 Vert. Dumba to Goluchowski, Belgrade, 22 May 1905.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 94–97 Serbien Anleihe, 3. 102, Dumba to Goluchowski, Belgrade, 3 April 1905.

⁴⁵ Archives of Serbia, M. Dj. Milovanović Papers, envelop XXX/176, note from March 1905; also his notes from August 1904.

⁴⁶ St. A. Wien, 94–97 Serbien Anleihe, Dumba to Goluchowski, 9 December 1904.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 94–97 Serbien Anleihe, 3. 73, telegram from Dumba to Goluchowski, № 5, 25 January 1905.

⁴⁸ *Politika* no. 481, 15 May 1905.

cided to expel from the party any individual who would accept a portfolio in the new Cabinet. Grujić was forced to return the mandate to the King, and he resigned from the presidency and even membership of the Main Committee of the Old Radical Party.⁴⁹ Radicals defended their stance by claiming that forming a coalition Cabinet for the purpose of holding elections was a sheer nonsense: how could anyone form a coalition between the opposition that brought down the government and the Cabinet that was brought down by it?⁵⁰ An attempt to establish cooperation between Old Radicals and Independent Radicals thus failed.⁵¹

VI

Since inter-parties conflicts made it impossible to form a coalition Cabinet, the press advanced suggestions for the formation of a "neutral", business-like Cabinet for the sole purpose of carrying out general elections.⁵² After some initial hesitation, Independent Radicals accepted the possibility of a business-like Cabinet, convinced that they only needed to secure non-interference on the part of the government to achieve an electoral victory. King Peter I thought of a "neu-

⁴⁹ Odjek no. 112, 16 May 1905; Politika no. 484, 18 May 1905.

⁵⁰ Stojan Protić, *Odlomci iz ustavne borbe u Srbiji*, I (Belgrade: Štamparija Dositiej Obradović, 1911), 53–54 (reprint from *Samouprava*, 2–8 April 1908).

⁵¹ All attempts to restore unity in the Radical Party made from 1903 onwards failed. In 1904, a club of Belgrade Radicals was formed for the purpose of smoothing away the existing differences. Cf. K. Stojanović, Govori i rasprave političko-ekonomske, I (Belgrade 1910), 103. At the insistence of a large number of members of both Radical factions, Stanko Petrović, an MP, undertook an action for reconciliation and unity in August 1904 (ASANU, no. 12823, Stanko Petrović to Ljubomir Stanojević, 26 July 1904). The MPs from the Belgrade County supported by their electorate tried to do the same (ASANU, no. 12749, Rad. S. Paunović to Blagoje Živanović, president of Kumodraž municipality, 29 November 1904). Radicals from the town of Užice tried to work together with Independent Radicals in March 1905 (ASANU, no. 12456, Mih. Jovičić to Lj. Stojanović, 28 April 1905). Ljuba Živković broke away from Independent Radicals in May 1906 because of his failed efforts to bring together the two parties during the negotiations to form a coalition Cabinet (*Odjek* no. 53, 1 March 1906; no. 100, 28 April 1906). In the summer of 1906, conversations were underway with the view to uniting again in a single party. Radicals demanded a simple merger, but Independent Radicals refused (Jovan Žujović's note, 4 December 1906). The Novi Sad-based newspaper Zastava also argued for a concord between the two Radical wings. In October 1906, highranking Old Radical politician Jovan Djaja preached reconciliation between two radical factions in the pages of Narod. Milovan Dj. Milovanović, Mihailo Vujić and Sava Grujić spared no effort to that end (ASANU, no. 7940/45/1905, Czikan to Goluchowski, Belgrade, 5 October 1905). All these attempts and others that followed failed dismally.

⁵² Politika no. 479, 13 May 1905; no. 477, 11 May 1905, "Ko bi vršio nove izbore".

tral" Cabinet as early as January 1905 and he spoke to the Austro-Hungarian Minister in that sense.⁵³

Business-like Cabinets were extremely unpopular in Serbia, reminiscent of the abrogation of the Constitution under the previous regimes. Politicians who found themselves pushed into the background after the 1903 change of regime bided their time to re-enter the political arena at the moment when confrontation between Radicals and Independent Radicals reached a deadlock. Jovan Avakumović also cautiously advised the King to have a business-like Cabinet, recalling the practice of Liberal Regents and reminding the King that he was a guardian of the Constitution even against a Cabinet.⁵⁴ The former Finance Minister Vukašin Petrović rejoiced in Vienna upon hearing the news that a mandate to form a Cabinet would be offered to Djordje Pavlović, a Progressive and minister under Milan and Alexander Obrenović.⁵⁵

Radicals were adamant in their opposition to the formation of a "neutral" Cabinet both in principle and for practical reasons. A Cabinet must follow from parliamentary majority, *Samouprava* wrote, any other solution would not be a parliamentary one. The questionable "neutral" nature of any Cabinet put aside, such construction was but an augury of a reactionary and personal regime. This was a dangerous game in which business-like Cabinets were intended to sanction reactionary government and turn it gradually into a permanent system. Such governments had no support in the country and no authority abroad.⁵⁶ In Old Radicals' view, even Cabinets formed for the sole purpose of holding elections were a negation of parliamentarianism: a Cabinet is to be formed on the basis of a programme and elections serve only to pass judgment on that programme. Therefore, a Cabinet could not exist solely for the purpose of holding elections, since it surpassed in itself the purpose and aim of elections.⁵⁷

Radicals also opposed the possibility of a business-like Cabinet on political grounds. It posed a serious danger for their retaining a mandate, since Old Radicals were convinced that Independent Radicals would decline to come into office at the last moment.

⁵³ ASANU, no. 7940/7/1905, Dumba to Goluchowski, Belgrade, 29 January 1905.

⁵⁴ ASANU, no. 9287/V, "Memoirs of Jovan Avakumović", sheet 53.

⁵⁵ ASANU, no. 10139/6, Andra Djordjević Papers, a letter from Vukašin Petrović, Vienna, 13 May 1905. In March 1905, Petrović tried from Vienna to revive the activities of the old Progressives (Vladan and Andra Djordjević and others) by establishing the Main Committee of a peasant party, a faction of Kurtović's Peasant Concord. See no. 10139/4, V. Petrović to A. Djordjević, Vienna, 14 March 1905. The activities of this group came to the fore a year later, in the crises in early 1906. See ASANU, no. 7940/37/1906, Lowenthal to Merey, 11 August 1906.

⁵⁶"Neutralni kabineti", *Samouprava* no. 108, 11 May 1905; also, no. 109, 12 May 1905.

⁵⁷ Stojan Protić, Odlomci iz ustavne borbe u Srbiji, I, 53–54.

VII

The standpoint of Old Radicals' caucus during the May crisis of 1905 was that a new Cabinet could only emerge from the existing parliamentary majority. In other words, they requested a mandate to form another homogenous Radical Cabinet, insisting that it was the only truly parliamentary solution. Independent Radicals were not against a new Radical Cabinet in principle, but they demanded that it drop the loan.⁵⁸ They also demanded that both Nikola Pašić and Stojan M. Protić be excluded from such a Cabinet.⁵⁹ Old Radicals refused such and similar conditions out of hand as not being parliamentary, unwilling to consider any infringement on their mandate. Independent Radicals then made a concession, accepting Pašić but not Protić, whom they accused of preparing the ground for new elections with inappropriate methods even before the crisis.⁶⁰ The opposition press clamped down on Protić in particular, accusing him of abusing power. Pašić was, however, inflexible and he did not sacrifice Protić. Nikola Pašić left the King with a choice: either all Old Radicals relinquish office or they all remain.

The intransigent attitude of Old Radicals with regard to the composition of a new Cabinet and the dogged opposition of Independent Radicals to the loan prolonged the crisis and created a rather uncertain situation.⁶¹ King Peter I found himself in a deadlock, having exhausted the possibilities of a coalition Cabinet and parliamentary majority Cabinet. Pašić's weight was coming to the fore. After having outflanked the Court in the crises of January and April, he was now defeating Independent Radicals. If successful, he was going to become the master of Serbia's political life. Such prospects turned the conspirators against him and they threw all their influence with the King onto the scales on the side of Independent Radicals.⁶² Their attitude finally swayed the King to offer the mandate to form a Cabinet to Independent Radicals, who constituted parliamentary minority.⁶³ This decision surprised everyone. Old Radicals, in particular, were disappointed and bitter. The Main Committee of Independent Radicals undertook to form a Cabinet with the limited mandate to hold general elections.

⁵⁸ Lj. Stojanović's statement in the caucus of Independent Radicals, 11 May 1905, *Politika* no. 478, 12 May 1905.

⁵⁹ Politika nos. 480 and 481, 13 and 14 May 1905 respectively.

⁶⁰ "Minula kriza", *Odjek* no. 113, 17 May 1905. According to Independent Radicals, Protić, in his capacity as Interior Minister, used an official cipher to request from county officials to name those Old Radicals who might be suitable candidates for MPs. See *Odjek* no. 118, 23 May 1905.

⁶¹ "No one knows how this crisis will end, neither the King nor MPs nor their caucuses", *Politika* no. 479 wrote on 13/26 May 1905.

⁶² ASANU, no. 7940/31/1905, Dumba to Goluchowski, Belgrade, 13 June 1905.

⁶³"Nov obrt", Politika no. 481, 15 May 1905.

A list of the first Cabinet composed of Independent Radicals prepared at dawn on 15/28 May was thus incomplete.⁶⁴ The new Cabinet formed on the seventh day of the crisis immediately convened the National Assembly to read out the King's decree on dissolution. The new elections were scheduled for 10/23 July; the convocation of the newly-elected National Assembly was scheduled for 25 July/7 August 1905.⁶⁵ With this, the Cabinet crisis was resolved.

VIII

Infuriated for having been driven out of office, Radicals breathed fire on the new Cabinet, threatening that they would resign collectively from the civil service and leave Independent Radicals to make do.⁶⁶

Starting the election campaign, Old Radicals accused Independent Radicals of being pro-Austrian on account of their opposition to the loan and of coming into office through non-parliamentary means, as a parliamentary minority.⁶⁷ Both accusations were designed to discredit the new Cabinet's foreign and domestic policy. Both parties embarked on a fierce press campaign that would, to a large extent, mark Serbia's political life until the First World War.

Old Radicals explained the formation of the first Independent Radical Cabinet in May 1905 by fatal influence of the past. "Le mort saisit de vif", Sto-

⁶⁴ Independent Radicals had a number of capable politicians in 1905. Ljuba Stojanović and Jovan Žujović dealt with foreign policy; education was the domain of Ljuba Davidović and Jaša Prodanović; M. Drašković, Dr. M. Marković and David Simić specialised in economy; Nik. Nikolić, Drag. Pećić, Iv. Pavićević, K. Timotijević, Dj. Nestorović and Drag. Joksimović examined legal matters; Savčić and Vulović dealt with construction. Despite numerous ministerial candidates in the party, Independent Radical Cabinet was rather rump: Prime Minister and Interior Minister Ljubomir Stojanović, Education Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs Jovan Żujović, Army Minister Colonel Vasa Antonić, Construction Minister Vladimir Todorović, Finance Minister Dr. Milan Marković, Minister of Justice Nikola Nikolić, Minister of Economy Ivan Pavićević. See R. M., Kraljevske vlade od 1903–1935 (Belgrade: Štamparija Drag. Popovića, 1935). General Živković declined the portfolio of Army Minister and, because of that, V. Antonić, commander of 16th Regiment in Niš, was urgently summoned to Belgrade (Odjek no. 113, 17 May 1905; Politika no. 482, 16 May 1905). Nikola Nikolić resigned as soon as 23 May/5 June because he had physically assaulted Pašić for being insulted in the pages of Samouprava ("Nemio dogadjaj", Odjek no. 120, 22 May 1905; Samouprava nos. 114 and 120, 18 and 25 May 1905 respectively).

⁶⁵ Odjek no. 113, 17 May 1905.

⁶⁶ Personal Papers, Jovan Žujović's note, no date.

⁶⁷ "Značaj promene", *Samouprava* no. 114, 18 May 1905; "Zar baš tako vajna braćo?", *Odjek* no. 115, 19 May 1905; *Stenografske beleške* II (1905), 1053, Stojan Protić u Skupštini, 12 December 1905.

jan Protić wrote.⁶⁸ According to Old Radicals, the crisis was resolved contrary to parliamentary principles. Pašić's Cabinet formed by parliamentary majority realised that it had no sufficient strength to solve major issues that were on the agenda and requested the dissolution of parliament and general elections in order for the people to be consulted. In keeping with parliamentary practice, there were two alternatives in such a case: the current Cabinet could hold the elections, or a new minority Cabinet, if the King came into conflict with the majority and acted on the presumption that the minority would win the elections. The latter solution was, however, dangerous for a monarch in case of an unfavourable election result and could thus be resorted to only in extreme cases. It was out of question if there was no conflict between the King and the parliamentary majority. Such a conflict could have resulted from the dissolution of parliament demanded by the Cabinet. However, the King had accepted the proposal of the Cabinet. Therefore, Peter I accepted the will of the majority and then offered a mandate to the minority. For that reason, the formation of an Independent Radical Cabinet was not parliamentary.⁶⁹ To prove their point, Old Radicals advocated the principle of solidary accountability of Cabinet and parliament, invoking British parliamentary practice. "Either we stick to parliamentarianism or we do not", Protić wrote, "if we do, we must work as other parliamentary states."70

Independent Radicals defended the formation of their Cabinet, denying that Radicals had the majority. A parliamentary vote on 9/22 May showed that Pašić's Cabinet was in the minority. This was a clear sign that the parliament would not work with it. From the moment it lost the majority, Pašić's Cabinet became non-parliamentary.⁷¹ The King was faced with a choice: "larger" or "smaller" minority. He opted for the latter, believing it would provide a greater guarantee for free elections. However, although he was defeated in the Assembly, Pašić did not surrender and demanded dissolution. Forcing the King to consent to it, he made him an accomplice in the Cabinet's actions. The Cabinet is, in fact, just a committee of parliamentary majority that mediates between the parliament and the King, the latter two being unaccountable factors. The National Assembly is senior to the Cabinet, because the latter emerges from the former,

⁶⁸ St. Protić, Odlomci iz ustavne borbe u Srbiji I, Pritisak prošlosti (reprint from Samouprava, 14 May 1906).

⁶⁹ St. Protić, Odlomci I, Borba protiv većine (reprint from Samouprava, 2–8 April 1908) and Pritisak prošlosti (reprint from Samouprava, 14 May 1905).

⁷⁰ Ibid., Pritisak prošlosti.

⁷¹ Radicals denied this, describing a vote of 9/22 May as "parliamentary coincidence", and not acknowledging they had lost the majority. The Cabinet was in the minority, but there was no majority on the side of opposition. See "Izbori časništva Narodne Skupštine", *Samouprava* no. 110, 13 May 1905.

and not the other way around. Radicals wanted, however, to impose a Cabinet on the Assembly, requesting dissolution of the National Assembly as soon as it opposed their Cabinet. Had Old Radicals accepted the terms of Independent Radicals, the Assembly could have continued its work with a new Cabinet, just as the French parliament had voted Combes out of office and then supported Rouvier's Cabinet.

Although they opposed the dissolution of parliament in principle, Independent Radicals justified their acceptance of general elections by a change of public mood. To prove their point, they adduced a number of examples from French, English and Italian parliamentary practice when a minority was given the mandate to carry out elections.⁷² Therefore, Independent Radicals were adamant that the formation of the Cabinet was strictly parliamentary: if the rule was to give the parliamentary majority a mandate to form a new Cabinet, then the constitutional mechanism could be disturbed in case the King gave a mandate to the minority. Such disturbance occurred when the Radical Cabinet lost its majority. The victory of Independent Radicals in the parliamentary elections in July 1905 – narrow as it was⁷³ – served as confirmation of their thesis.

Political opinion in Serbia was divided in the aftermath of the crisis. The conspirators' daily *Mali Žurnal*, Independent Radical *Dnevni list*, pro-Austrian *Štampa* and independent *Politika* took a favourable view of the new Cabinet and approved the manner in which the crisis was brought to an end. On the contrary, Progressive *Pravda* condemned the outcome of the crisis as not being parliamentary. Novi Sad-based *Zastava* was in favour of reconciliation between the two Radical wings and wrote to that effect. Legal theoreticians such as Slobodan Jovanović expounded the opinion that King Peter I was within his rights to dissolve a parliament that he found was no longer representative of popular opinion. Thus the emphasis was not on the crisis itself, but rather on its consequences, because the King was obliged to accept the result of an election, regardless of its outcome, since doubts regarding popular opinion had been dispersed.⁷⁴

⁷² Independent Radicals reminded of the following examples: Pitts' Cabinet in 1783, Peel's Cabinet in 1834, Derby's Cabinet in 1858/1859, and Campbell-Bannerman's Cabinet in 1905 in Britain; d'Azeglio's Cabinet in 1895 in Italy etc. All these were Cabinets entrusted with carrying out elections that emerged from parliamentary minority. See "Promena vlade", *Odjek* no. 112, 16 May 1905; "Stara pesma", no. 136, 14 June 1905; "Samoupravine zablude", no. 145, 25 July 1905; "U velikoj nevolji", no. 153, 2 August 1905; "Je li parlamentarno?", *Politika* nos. 531–534, 6–9 July 1905.

⁷³ In July 1905, Independent Radicals had 81 out of 160 MPs.

⁷⁴ Slobodan Jovanović, *Ustavno pravo Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca* (Belgrade: Službeni list, 1995), 139.

Contrary to the two large political parties, the tiny Serbian Social Democratic Party played no role in the crisis. "So far the workers party has been prosecuted by Fusionists and from now on this would be done by Independent Radicals", the *Radničke novine* wrote. However, indifferent to a change of Cabinet, the Social Democratic Party was not indifferent to the hints that the old regime might be restored. Therefore, the Social Democrats condemned interference of the "Court camarilla" in politics and attacked Independent Radicals, who professed to be democrats, for taking office from its hands. In the view of Social Democrats, the new Cabinet's coming to power was not parliamentary.⁷⁵

IX

The crisis in May 1905 can be assessed from a general, societal and practical political point of view. The crisis served the purpose of clarifying general notions of parliamentarianism that had been making headway in Serbia after the 1903 coup. Debate in the press and public concerned the questions of constitutional prerogatives of the King, the system of government by parliamentary majority and its relationship with parliamentary minority. Central to this crisis was the question whether the fall of a Cabinet brought in its tail dissolution of parliament. Essentially, it was a problem of relations between Cabinet and parliament, their trial of strength. Parliamentarism in Serbia without sufficient democratic traditions was torn between two systems adopted in Western Europe: the British and the French. According to the former, the parliament shares the fate of the Cabinet; according to the latter, the existing parliament elects a new Cabinet. The former system was viable in Britain due to the two-party composition of its parliament; by contrast, the multitude of parties in France informed the formation of coalition governments emerging from parliamentary majority. With her own structure of political parties, Serbia was somewhere between British and French parliamentary practice: in 1905, she had five political parties, but two of them stood out as the largest. However, the balance of strength between Radicals and Independent Radicals made the formation of a homogenous Cabinet difficult. For that reason, although parliamentarianism in Serbia came close to British parliamentary practice, the need for coalition-making facilitated the application of the French system.

Conflict regarding relations between executive power and parliament reflected different viewpoints and interests. Relying on the numerous and strong administrative apparatus, the Cabinet tended to impose itself on the parliament. Arguing for supremacy of Cabinet over parliament, Old Radicals represented the interests of traditional entrepreneurial groups in Serbia that called for a

⁷⁵"Tiranija tevabije", *Radničke novine* no. 49, 4 June 1905; "Posle smene", no. 45, 21 May 1905; "Situacija", no. 43, 14 May 1905.

"strong" Cabinet. On the other side, arguing for predominance of the National Assembly, Independent Radicals expressed the views of the growing number of younger democratic groups within Serbian society that wanted to ensure a democratic system through the strict application of parliamentary democracy.

Conflict concerning these questions was amplified because Serbian society and its political classes were in the permanent process of stratification, with modern business-oriented elite taking shape since the late nineteenth century in step with Serbia's economic development.⁷⁶ Therefore, parliamentary democracy was in many ways still very fragile. That crisis was not as pronounced at this time as it had been in the last decades of the nineteenth century, for democracy had scored victory in 1903 over the Court and the autocratic, "personal regimes" of the last Obrenović kings that had relied on the Army and bureaucracy. For that reason, the 1905 May crisis remained within boundaries of parliamentary democracy.

The struggle for a mandate to form Cabinet that would carry out general elections showed how important it was in Serbia to acquire control over the election process, despite all the constitutional and legal provisions established after the 1903 coup, which guaranteed free elections for the National Assembly. This stemmed from the role that the administrative apparatus played in Serbia's political life. The formation of an Independent Radical Cabinet in 1905 signalled the beginning of a fierce and relentless struggle between the two Radical groups, since Independent Radicals demonstrated to their opponents through their acceptance to form their own Cabinet that they were not just capable of being opposition, but were also able to take office. Therefrom their mutual rivalries further increased and coloured political life in the Kingdom of Serbia, exerting a considerable influence on the development of parliamentary democracy until the outbreak of the First World War in July 1914.

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⁷⁶ Dimitrije Djordjević, "Serbian Society 1903–1914", in Dimitrije Djordjevic & Bela A. Kiraly, eds., *East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars* (Boulder & New York: Columbia University Press 1987), 227–239.

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Miroslav Spalajković, the Serbian Minister in Russia in the July Crisis of 1914

- Abstract: One of those who played a supporting role in the prologue of the great European tragedy of 1914 was Miroslav Spalajković, the Serbian Minister in St Petersburg. Known as a sworn enemy of Austria-Hungary, he was a close associate of the Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić. The latter was aware of Spalajković's weaknesses but trusted him nevertheless. Although Spalajković had spent a brief period of time in St Petersburg prior to the July Crisis and could not have exerted considerable influence on the Russian ruling circles, he spared no effort to secure support for Serbia in the face of Vienna's sabre-rattling. In fact, the Russians did not need a Serbian diplomat to point out what was obvious: that they could not allow the destruction of an independent and pro-Russian Serbia on the southern border of Austria-Hungary. Having sensed the political mood in St Petersburg, he enthusiastically reported to his government that Serbia would not be left in the lurch. His dispatches boosted self-confidence in Serbia and made its leaders firmer in their resistance to Austria-Hungary's demands.
- Keywords: Serbia, Miroslav Spalajković, July Crisis 1914, Russia, Austria-Hungary, First World War

A lthough a century later almost all principal facts regarding the July Crisis of 1914 have been long established, there is still ample scope not only for new interpretations, but also for the elucidation of certain details which are important for understanding the outbreak of war. Activities of certain secondary participants in the July Crisis no doubt merit an in-depth study of their impact on the course of events. In history, just like in theatre, supporting roles in great tragedies are more captivating than leading roles in ephemeral plays. Miroslav Spalajković, the Serbian Minister in Imperial Russia, found himself in such a role in the build-up to the First World War.

In his doctoral thesis, awarded in Paris in 1897, Spalajković intended to prove that the sovereignty over Bosnia-Herzegovina belonged to the Ottoman Empire and not to Austria-Hungary that had occupied the province since 1878. Two years later, he tried to influence French public opinion with an expanded edition of his thesis, in which he pointed out the similarity between the Treaty of Berlin and the Treaty of Frankfurt, arguing that both treaties contained "a permanent cause of war" in future.¹ The young Serb obviously placed his hopes

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¹ M[iroslav]-J. Spalaïkovitch, *La Bosnie et l'Herzégovine: étude d'histoire diplomatique et de droit international* (Paris 1899), XXXIII: "Universal suffrage and the principle of nationalities

in the alliance between France and Russia, two of the Great Powers which were, he wrote, most interested in the destiny of the Serbian nation.² He also asserted that Russia had "no personal interest in the Balkans [...] apart from defending Orthodox religion and the rights of the oppressed people", as opposed to Austria-Hungary which rightfully considered Russia's attitude "as the greatest obstacle to its conquering ambitions".³ Furthermore, he wrote that the national interest compelled Russia to prevent *Drang nach Osten*, in which Austria-Hungary was but Germany's tool.⁴ According to Spalajković, Vienna hesitated to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina due to its fear of internal crisis,⁵ while for Serbia and Montenegro the unification with those regions was their "true and unique raison d'être"; and the clash of interests over the province was essentially "the eternal antagonism between the two ideas, that of Greater Serbia and that of Austria as a Balkan power".⁶ Because of that he warned that "the Serbian question" would be "a source of troubles and dangers for Europe, until it has been solved in a just manner".⁷

Spalajković soon entered Serbian diplomacy and for a long time he wrote nothing but reports. It took him eleven years to publish his second book – in fact, a booklet about Camillo Cavour. He wrote about Piedmont but he had Serbia on his mind, following his homeland's diplomatic defeat in the Annexation

² Ibid. XXVIII.

³ Ibid. XII.

⁴ Ibid. XXVIII–XXX.

⁶ Ibid. XXVI; cf. Miroslav Spalajković, "Političke istine", Srpska riječ, 23 February 1921, 1.

⁷ Spalaïkovitch, *La Bosnie et l'Herzégovine*, XXV. In a memorandum, written with the view to persuading the British not to extradite him to the Yugoslav communist authorities in December 1945, Spalajković wrote that this thesis embodied his entire political activity: "union of all Serbs and resistance to Pan-Germanism in all its forms" (Spalajković family papers. "Mémorandum relatif au Dr Miroslav J. Spalaïkovitch, ancien ministre plénipotentiaire de Yougoslavie", 1).

stem from the same social principle, the one of democracy based on the will of the people to freely determine their destiny in foreign as well as internal affairs", Spalajković cleverly made use of both democracy and revanchism in the culminating year of the Dreyfus affair. "Republican France would commit a fatal mistake if it renounced to invoke, in its foreign policy, the principle of nationalities, today when, in the name of that principle, it has to claim two brutally torn provinces [Alsace and Lorraine], and when so many Slavic nationalities in the East (in Austria and Turkey), devoted to France and inspired by the same democratic spirit, aspire to constitute themselves in autonomous political units." (ibid., XXX)

⁵ That crisis, Spalajković foresaw, would lead to the formation of a "new political entity that would comprise, apart from Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, Slavonia, Srem and Hungarian Banat (former Serbian Vojvodina), Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina": "Who knows whether the Habsburg Monarchy would, by annexing another million and a half Slavs, prepare its own ruination!" (ibid. XXII–XXIII).

Crisis: "Bright future was waiting for that small state and its House of Savoy. Piedmont changed its policy, as befitting the weak; [...] it gained as much in victories as in defeats."⁸ The ambitious and rising Secretary-General of the Serbian Foreign Ministry also wrote that Cavour's role had been "very uncomfortable": "Italy's feelings pushed him into action; however, the moment for action had not yet come. He had to encourage and promise but not fulfil; he had to keep a train full of steam without commanding 'ahead."⁹

One of the consequences of the Annexation Crisis was the Friedjung trial in Vienna (December 1909). Spalajković appeared as a witness in that cause célèbre and proved that the document which had been used by the Ballhausplatz to show that he had participated in financing the Croat-Serb Coalition in Croatia was a poor forgery. He later helped the Czech opposition leader Tomáš Masaryk to make use of the Friedjung affair against the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Aehrental, which led to his conflict with the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade, Count János Forgách. This conflict was so fierce that Forgách wrote to Aehrental that Spalajković was a "half-mad deadly enemy" of the Habsburg Monarchy and, moreover, a "Russian spy". The Serbian Foreign Minister Milovan Dj. Milovanović barely succeeded in preventong his assistant from challenging the haughty Forgách to a duel. The incident ended with Forgách being transferred to Dresden and Spalajković to Sofia. Forgách labelled Spalajković a Russian spy mainly because of the latter's close relations with Nicholas Hartwig, the Russian Minister in Belgrade. In addition, Spalajković was also one of the closest collaborators of the Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić.¹⁰

In June 1912, shortly before the First Balkan War, Spalajković told the British chargé d'affaires in Sofia Colville Barclay that Russia, after having helped the formation of the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance "as a barrier to Austrian advance", should impress on Great Britain and France "the desirability of driving the Turks out of Europe". When Barclay remarked that he "failed to grasp what advantages Russia and especially England and France would reap from such a policy, which would probably cause a European war", Spalajković replied that "a European war was not a necessity". In Spalajković's view, Russia believed that Germany's support to Austria-Hungary would not be unlimited and wanted to localise a future war. Nevertheless, he observed that a victory in a European war (he obviously meant a short one) "would mean the crushing of Germany, the recovery of Alsace Loraine to France, the saving of millions a-year in ship-

⁸ Miroslav Spalajković, Kavur: patriot i diplomat (Belgrade 1910), 5–6.

⁹ Ibid. 28.

¹⁰ For a biased account see Friedrich Würthle, *Die Spur führt nach Belgrad: die Hintergründe des Dramas von Sarajevo* (Vienna 1975), 147–168, 185–189; a different view is given in Zoran Bajin, "Miroslav Spalajković na Fridjungovom procesu", *Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju* 85 (2012), 89–112.

building to Great Britain, in fact, the beginning of an era of peace in Europe".¹¹ After the outbreak of the First Balkan War, Spalajković adopted a conciliatory attitude towards Austria-Hungary. In November, in an interview for the *Neue Freie Presse*, he praised Vienna's passive attitude, and even tried to convince his Austro-Hungarian colleague in Sofia that relations between the Dual Monarchy and Serbia had reached a turning point; the two countries could establish a joint protectorate over Albania.¹² In June 1913, Spalajković was said to be a candidate for the post of Foreign Minister, which prompted the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade Stephan Ugron to ask for instructions from the Ballhausplatz. Count Berchtold responded that, in view of Spalajković's recent moderation, his "unpalatable candidacy" should not be thwarted; however, if Ugron were directly asked for his opinion, he was instructed to state that Spalajković's record was not conducive to improving relations between Belgrade and Vienna.¹³

When a crisis emerged in September over delimitation of the border between Serbia and Albania, Spalajković was the Foreign Minister *ad interim* (Pašić was in Paris), and he took a hostile attitude towards Austria-Hungary.¹⁴ The Russian chargé d'affaires Basil Strandmann recalled that Spalajković had reproached him because of the policy pursued by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov. Spalajković considered Russian policy "weak and unworthy of a great state" and claimed that "it would be sufficient for Russia to 'bang its fist on the

¹¹ British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914 [hereafter: BD], vol. IX/1 (London 1933), 573; Alfred Rappaport von Arbengau, "Spalajković", Berliner Monatshefte 7 (1935), 563–564. On the eve of the war, Spalajković informed Pašić how the Russian Minister urged him to facilitate the sending of Serbian reinforcement to the Bulgarian army: "I told Mr. Nekliudov that Serbia knows well what she is doing and that she had agreed to send part of her army to Bulgaria not only for military reasons, but also for political ones, so that, in the future, when we and Russia, in particular, need it, we could demand from Bulgarians, with good reason, to send their army to Serbia to fight against another enemy who is much more dangerous and stronger than Turkey." (Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–1914 [hereafter: DSP], vol. V/2 (Belgrade 1985), 802)

¹² "Die Wünsche Serbiens: Gespräch mit Dr. Spalaikovic", Neue Freie Presse, 16 November 1912, 2; Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914: diplomatische Aktenstücke des Österreichisch-Ungarischen Ministeriums des Äussern [hereafter: ÖUA], vol. IV (Vienna; Leipzig 1930), 912–913, 920–923, 969.

¹³ Ibid. VI, 723, 745–746.

¹⁴ Spalajković told the irritable chargé d'affaires von Storck that Austria-Hungary, with millions of Serbs *within its borders*, was acting as the protector of the Albanians "against the brothers of this highly-cultured nation", while its agents stirred up Albanian brigands' attacks against Serbia; Storck retorted accusing Serbia of injustice against the Albanians. Shortly before Pašić's return to Belgrade, Spalajković's statements became moderate, but Storck still advised the Ballhausplatz to be extremely cautious with the Serbs, especially with Pašić who, he claimed, lied less than Spalajković only because he talked less. (ibid. VII, 295–296, 373, 376–377, 387–388)

table' so as to make whole Europe submit to her will".¹⁵ Because of Spalajković's stance, St. Petersburg impatiently awaited for Pašić's return to Serbia.¹⁶ None-theless, the Prime Minister's presence in Belgrade did not prevent the culmination of the crisis following Vienna's ultimatum on 17 October; but the Serbian government gave in and eliminated the possibility of a war.¹⁷ "There was no doubt that Spalajković would have reacted to the Austrian ultimatum in a completely different way, which could have led to major complications", Strandmann wrote in his memoirs. "Pašić's complaisance caused Spalajković's discontent, so he openly talked about his disagreement everywhere, claiming that Austria-Hungary could not have done anything if the ultimatum had been rejected."¹⁸

At the beginning of 1914, Spalajković took up his new post in the St Petersburg Legation. Having received his letter of credence, Sazonov insisted that the Serbo-Bulgarian rapprochement was necessary: Serbia could not allow difficulties in the East to prevent her from pursuing an active policy towards Austria-Hungary.¹⁹ During the audience with the Emperor, Spalajković followed Pašić's instructions and talked about Serbia's need to undertake security measures on the Albanian border. Not concealing his satisfaction with deterioration of the situation in Albania, the Tsar assured Spalajković that Rus-

¹⁵ Vasilij N. Štrandman, *Balkanske uspomene* (Belgrade: Žagor, 2009), 225.

¹⁶ Alluding to Spalajković's designation as a new Serbian Minister in St Petersburg, Sazonov's Assistant Anatoly Neratov told the Austro-Hungarian chargé d'affaires that further pressure on Belgrade was not advisable: "Mr. Pašić is absent, and Mr. Spalajković, who is a hothead and whom I prefer to see here than in Belgrade, would only be made obstinate by a 'demonstration." (ÖUA, VII, 386; Friedrich Stieve, ed., *Der diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis* 1911–1914: *aus den Geheimakten der russischen Schriftwechsel Staatsarchive*, vol. III (Berlin 1926), 295; Vladimir Ćorović, *Odnosi između Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u XX veku* (Belgrade 1936), 499)

¹⁷ Ernst Christian Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars* 1912–1913 (London 1938), 422–429; Samuel R. Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the origins of the First World War* (New York 1991), 151–153; F[rancis] R[oy] Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo: the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary*, 1866–1914 (London 1972), 359–360; Ćorović, Odnosi između Srbije *i Austro-Ugarske*, 500–509.

¹⁸ Strandman, *Balkanske uspomene*, 230. At the end of October, Sazonov warned the Serbian Minister Dimitrije Popović that some of Spalajković's statements about Serbia's longrange plans regarding Albania had leaked to Vienna. Moreover, he confided in the British chargé d'affaires that "Serbia had been more to blame than was generally supposed" because Spalajković "had held the most imprudent language with regard to Serbia's coming to an understanding with Essad Pasha" to crush the Albanian government and settle the question of Serbia's access to the Adriatic Sea. (DSP, VI/3, 457; BD, X/1, 49; Helmreich, *The diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*, 421)

¹⁹DSP, VII/1, 128–130.

sia would try to secure Serbia "from that side".²⁰ Pašić soon had an important discussion with Nicholas II when he visited St. Petersburg together with the Crown Prince Aleksandar. He said that Serbia required peace in order to recover and arm herself, and asked for rifles, ammunition and artillery. The Russian Emperor promised aid. Pašić stated that the Yugoslavs in Austria-Hungary understood that their salvation could come only from Russia or Serbia. If one of the Tsar's daughters became the Queen of Serbia, he went on, "she would gain affection of all the Serbs and perhaps later be crowned as "the Empress of the Serbo-Croatian, Yugoslav nation".²¹ Spalajković informed Belgrade that the reception given to the Crown Prince and Pašić exceeded all expectations and augured sympathies and support from Russia, which had grown indifferent to Bulgaria.²²

The visit was successful indeed, but the armaments promised by the Emperor did not arrive in Serbia quickly. The decision in this matter lay with the Ministry of War where, regardless of the support Spalajković received from V. A. Artamonov, the Russian military attaché in Belgrade on leave, opinion prevailed that the armament of Russian army had priority over any shipment abroad.²³ Spalajković and Artamonov suggested to Pašić and Hartwig that, al-though the people in St Petersburg were "completely certain that Serbia would mobilise in the case of a European war and spring into action," it would be wise to reinforce that belief with the Serbian offer to conclude a military convention

²⁰ Ibid. 136; Arhiv Srbije [Archives of Serbia], Belgrade [hereafter: AS], Ministarstvo inostranih dela – Političko odeljenje [hereafter: MID-PO], 1914, box IV, file VI, M. Spalajković to N. Pašić, 21 January/8 January (Old Style), 1914; *Dnevniki imperatora Nikolaia II* (Moscow 1991), 442.

²¹ M[ilosh] Boghitschewitsch, ed., *Die auswärtige Politik Serbiens* 1903–1914, vol. I (Berlin 1928), 414–421; Nikola Popović, *Odnosi Srbije i Rusije u Prvom svetskom ratu* (Belgrade 1977), 31–33; Djordje Stanković, *Nikola Pašić i jugoslovensko pitanje*, vol. I (Belgrade 1985), 138–139. Spalajković told the French chargé d'affaires, who had heard that the Serbian Prime Minister talked of possible conflicts with Bulgaria, Turkey and Austria-Hungary in order to receive Russian aid, that Pašić had wanted "to talk about all eventualities". (*Documents diplomatiques français* (1871–1914) [hereafter: DDF], 3^e Série (1911–1914), vol. IX (Paris 1936), 310)

²² AS, MID-PO, 1914, b. V, f. V, M. Spalajković to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29/16 January, 1914; 30/7 January 1914; 2 February /20 January1914. At the same time, Spalajković allegedly complained to "some Russian gentlemen" of the lack of understanding for Serbian interests in St. Petersburg. Since the German Ambassador shared this information with his Austro-Hungarian colleague, the latter misled Vienna with his conclusion that the Serbian Minister was not satisfied with the results of Pašić's visit. (ÖUA, VII, 817)

²³DSP, VII/1, 381–382, 446.

with Russia.²⁴ Spalajković told Sazonov that Serbia would certainly actively support Russia in every eventuality: "Serbia, however, will not do anything against Russia's will and together with Russia it will patiently wait for the day of scoresettling, especially because she needs to recover [from the war against Turkey] and because Russia is getting stronger in time and Austria more shaky. Yet, if an unexpected turn of events leads to a general war, only armed Serbia will be able to respond to call. The Russian General Headquarters should consider our front against Austria an extension of the Russian front." Having praised Pašić's "patience and prudent policy", Sazonov replied that he did not believe there was "such force that could prevent the Serbian people from attacking Austria" in case of war, but that they should wait "for certain little papers to disappear and the

the Serbian army was still unsolved in early summer.²⁶ In February, Spalajković informed Pašić about the rumours of Sazonov's imminent replacement and the possibility of Hartwig's taking his place. Spalajković emphasised that the change in the Foreign Ministry would be certain if someone more energetic took Berchtold's place, because Russia would then need "a more decisive and determined minister".²⁷ However, in late March he wired that Sazonov's position did not seem shaken any longer and that "greater experience and greater determination" could be observed in his work.²⁸ This did not prevent him from stressing "Hartwig's immense diplomatic and statesmanlike abilities and the correctness of his views and conduct during the Balkan crisis" to the recently appointed Prime Minister Ivan Goremykin. The latter was in agreement,²⁹ but the appointment of a foreign minister in Russia did not depend much on a prime minister, especially on an old bureaucrat such as

persons who signed them to die".25 Nevertheless, the question of armaments for

²⁴ Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia], Belgrade [hereafter: AJ], Zbirka Jovan M. Jovanović Pižon [hereafter: JJP], box 2, M. Spalajković to N. Pašić, 19/6 March 1914; Milorad Ekmečić, *Ratni ciljevi Srbije 1914* (Belgrade 1973), 66.

²⁵ DSP, VII/1, 546–547; Würthle, Die Spur führt nach Belgrad, 56.

²⁶ Popović, Odnosi Srbije i Rusije, 33–34.

²⁷ DSP, VII/1, 281, 327–328; AS, MID-PO, 1914, b. IV, f. VI, M. Spalajković to N. Pašić, 16/3 February 1914. Hartwig's role was also noted in Russian nationalist circles, which wanted him to replace Sazonov whom they considered too cautious. Cf. Anatolii Venediktovich Ignat'ev, *Vneshniaia politika Rossii 1907–1914: tendentsii, liudi, sobytiia* (Moscow 2000), 43; Sean McMeekin, *July 1914: countdown to war* (New York 2013), 52; DDF, 3, IX, 381.

²⁸ DSP, VII/1, 559.

²⁹ Ibid. 699.

Goremykin.³⁰ Therefore, Spalajković's efforts to lobby for Hartwig, which he did not keep secret of,³¹ resulted only in Sazonov's increasing distrust in both men.

Of course, the mere fact that he was Hartwig's protégé, which played a part in his appointment to St. Petersburg,³² made Spalajković's personal relations with Sazonov more difficult. Hartwig had no qualms about disparaging the head of Russian diplomacy: he proclaimed that Sazonov, whose sole important diplomatic position had been at the Holy See, was capable of "nothing more than reading papal encyclicals".³³ Not surprisingly, Sazonov did not hold his slanderer in high esteem either. "Sazonov did not like Hartwig and Hartwig knew it", Spalajković succinctly recorded many years later. "There were differences both in their mentalities and abilities. They were both filled with Slavic feelings. They were both sincere Russian patriots. Sazonov knew Western Europe well, while Hartwig knew Eastern Europe, Austria and the Balkans in particular, which was especially important for Russian interests. Because of his education and his conceptions, Sazonov was closer to the mindset of Russian intellectuals, while Hartwig, entirely imbued with traditional-historic feeling about Russian and Slavic mission, was closer to the soul of Russian people."34 And although he had more sympathies for Hartwig, Spalajković admitted that Sazonov had been "an honest statesman, perfectly loyal, driven by a sincere and enlightened sympathy for Slavic nations, especially Serbia".35

³⁰ Vladimir Nikolaevich Kokovtsov, *Iz moego proshlogo: vospominaniia* 1903–1919 gg., vol. II (Moscow 1992), 267. Spalajković and Goremykin had a mutual acquaintance, journalist Yevgeny Shelking – the former proposed to his government to decorate him. Cf. AS, MID-PO, 1914, b. VI, f. VIII, M. Spalajković to N. Pašić, 13 May/30 April 1914; Eugene de Schelking, *Recollections of a Russian diplomat: the suicide of monarchies (William II and Nicholas II)* (New York 1918), 214–216. Shelking had been a diplomat, but his career had been destroyed by his passion for gambling. Although an intrigant and alleged police informer, he was intelligent and he had protectors among reactionary ministers. Cf. Anatoly Nekludoff, *Diplomatic reminiscences before and during the World War*, 1911–1917 (London 1920), 88–89.

³¹ AJ, JJP, b. 35, M. Dimitrijević to J. Jovanović, 19/6 May 1916; b. 36, R. Jovanović to J. M. Jovanović, undated (1916); b. 38, M. Nenadić to J. Jovanović, 18/5 May 1916.

³² Štrandman, *Balkanske uspomene*, 229. "Before my departure for Russia at the end of 1913, Hartwig told me that he considered my new duty to be an inseparable part of his mission in the Balkans, and he did not conceal his satisfaction with Pašić sending me to St. Petersburg", Spalajković remembered. "Our viewpoints entirely coincided in all matters without exception." ("Nikola Hartvig: iz uspomena Dr. M. Spalajkovića", *Pravda*, 23 July 1939, 10)

³³ Andreĭ Toshev, Balkanskite voĭni, vol. I (Sofia 1929), 367–368; DDF, 3, X, 734.

³⁴"Nikola Hartvig: iz uspomena Dr. M. Spalajkovića", 10.

³⁵ M[iroslav] Spalaïkovitch, *Une journée du Ministre de Serbie à Pétrograd: le 24 juillet 1914* (Paris 1934), 9. (The text of the speech titled "Les journées d'inquiétude vécue à Pétrograd" in AS, Lični fond Miroslava Spalajkovića, 83.)

In March, Spalajković extensively reported to Belgrade on fierce polemic between the Russian and German press,³⁶ the origin of which he found in the German fear of Russia's intention to "conduct an active Balkan policy, i.e. to impose, even with force of arms, its Balkan programme on Austria and Germany". That fear, he claimed, was fuelled on account of the knowledge of "colossal proportions" of Russian military preparations: "Once you have added that Goremykin, who is not considered a friend in Germany, arrived to power, along with a possibility that energetic and decisive Hartwig takes Sazonov's place [...] then the storm raised by German and Austrian semi-official press becomes completely understandable from a psychological point of view." According to Spalajković, an article on Russia's readiness for war inspired by the Minister of War Sukhomlinov caused "general approval and joy" and, "after ten years of silence", restored faith in the strength of the Russian army.³⁷ He also drew attention to the rumours regarding a possible alliance between Russia, France, Germany and Great Britain and the partition of the Dual Monarchy based on the alleged conversations between Wilhelm II and Sukhomlinov.³⁸

Though he attentively followed European politics, Spalajković was primarily interested in the Balkan affairs. He lobbied Russian journalists to take a favourable view of Serbia and he soon boasted to Pašić that Bulgarian influence on the press was suppressed.³⁹ The Bulgarian Minister, General Radko Dimitriev, tried to convince him of the necessity for Serbo-Bulgarian reconciliation with the Russian mediation. Having underestimated his immense Russophilia, Spalajković did not believe *Napoleoncheto* (Little Napoleon) because he thought the Bulgarian was just aiming to separate Serbia from Greece and Romania.⁴⁰ Moreover, their discussion carried on through the Russian press and turned into a fierce polemics.⁴¹ Pašić found the whole affair unpleasant, so he reproached his

⁴⁰ DSP, VII/1, 545–546.

³⁶ Valentin Alexeevich Emets et al., eds., *Istoriia vneshnej politiki Rossii: konets XIX – nachalo XX veka* (Moscow 1999), 418–425; Sergei Sergeevich Ol'denburg, *Tsarstvovanie imperatora Nikolaia II*, vol. II (Munich 1949), 134–135; Oleg Rudol'fovich Airapetov, *Uchastie Rossiiskoi imperii v Pervoi mirovoi voine* (1914–1917), vol. I (Moscow 2014), 16–17, 20.

³⁷ DSP, VII/1, 448–451, 485–487.

³⁸ Spalajković and the French chargé d'affaires were told at the Novoe Vremya office that this information came directly from Sukhomlinov, but it was most probably the result of the former Prime Minister Witte's intrigues. Cf. ibid. 559–561; DDF, 3, X, 20–21, 33–34; George Buchanan, My mission to Russia and other diplomatic memories, vol. I (London 1923), 182–183; Ekmečić, Ratni ciljevi Srbije, 75–76; Würthle, Die Spur führt nach Belgrad, 236–237.
³⁹DSP, VII/1, 294; AS, MID-PO, 1914, b. IV, f. VI, M. Spalajković to N. Pašić, 27/14 March 1914.

⁴¹ "Razgovor sa g. Spalajkovićem. G. D-r Spalajković o zauzeću Jedrena i o srpsko-bugarskim odnosima", *Samouprava*, 24 March/6 April 1914, 1–2; "Srbija i Bugarska. Razgovor sa g.

minister. Spalajković responded with a personal letter in which he promised to cease polemics, claiming that Sazonov did not blame him for the unfortunate affair.⁴² In fact, the polemics between the two Ministers continued in disguise. Spalajković found out that an unnamed Bulgarian statesman whose interview was published in May, in which he denounced the alleged forced recruitment and executions in Macedonia, was Radko Dimitriev himself. The Serbian Minister responded in kind in the pages of *Novoe Vremya* – in the form of an interview with a certain statesman in Belgrade.⁴³

In the spring of 1914, Spalajković was preoccupied with several questions of major importance for Serbia, apart from the relations with Bulgaria. He discussed the possibility of unification between Serbia and Montenegro, the rectification of the Serbian-Albanian border and the Oriental railways with Sazonov and the Assistant Minister Neratov. The two men received his arguments with sympathy. Nevertheless, Spalajković warned Belgrade that the news about interference of the Serbian army with politics left an extremely negative impression in St. Petersburg and had to be refuted so as not to hinder the solution of "the question of Albania" in Serbia's favour. He also talked about the Oriental railways with the Italian Ambassador, Marquis Carlotti, who told him that

⁴³ Ibid. M. Spalajković to N. Pašić, 23/10 April 1914.

Spalajkovićem", Samouprava, 27 March/9 April 1914, 1–2; "Miroslav i Ratko", Štampa, 3 /16 April 1914, 1; "Diplomatski predstavnici i štampa", Samouprava, 3/18 April 1914, 1.

⁴² In that letter, Spalajković also wrote about an interesting conversation he had had with the journalist Vsevolod Svatkovsky as well as the news he had received from his friend in Sofia, the British Minister Bax-Ironside: "Svatkovsky, whom you know well too, stopped by yesterday. He had returned from Vienna the other day. He had also visited Sazonov and told him [...] [that in] Austria conciliatory policy towards national minorities was being pursued. [...] Austria does not do it because she truly wants to alter her domestic political system, but because it needs to complete its military programme without major internal friction, and then she would revert to her old system. Svatkovsky says that Russia should do the same, especially regarding the Poles. It is not enough to make military preparations, but one's domestic policy should also [...] be shaped so as to ensure success in case of war. And once Russia has defeated Austria, she can return to her russification system in Poland. Sazonov shares this viewpoint completely. But unfortunately, Svatkovsky says, there are other ministers who oversimplify the matter. [...] Sazonov told Svatkovsky that, at the moment, no efforts are spared to close ranks between the Powers of Triple Entente, and, for that reason, negotiations between Russia, France and England were underway. If possible, a formal alliance will be made. The English Minister writes to me from Sofia that [...] King Ferdinand's position has become increasingly difficult [...] The English Minister does not believe that a European war will break out in the next two years. Much will depend, he says, on how long the Austrian Emperor will survive." (AS, MID-PO, 1914, b. VII, f. VI, M. Spalajković to N. Pašić, 15/2 April 1914)

"Russia is becoming so powerful that the whole world bows to her and everyone endeavours to gain her friendship".⁴⁴

Spalajković wanted to spend the beginning of the summer resting in his dacha in Finland.⁴⁵ His plan was, however, spoiled because of the strained relations between Greece and Turkey,⁴⁶ and then the news reached him about the Sarajevo assassination of 28 June. The death of Archduke Franz Ferdinand was followed by the mob attacks on the Sarajevo Serbs and their property and the news of the alleged arrest of his father-in-law Gligorije Jeftanović, one of the political leaders of Bosnian Serbs.⁴⁷ That is why he asked Sazonov, who tried to calm him down, to enquire into the fate of Jeftanović and Milan Srškić (Jeftanović's other son-in-law) via the Russian Consulate in Sarajevo. However, when the information to the effect that neither of them had been arrested

⁴⁷ Andrej Mitrović, Serbia's Great War 1914–1918 (West Lafayette 2007), 18–19; MO, 3, IV, 64-65; "Un soulèvement aurait été préparé en Bosnie-Herzégovine", Le Matin, 30 June 1914, 3. Rumours spreading across Sarajevo that Spalajković and Prince Djordje Karadjordjević were behind the assassination were simply absurd. As for Jeftanović, the assassins were hostile to him and the older generation of the Bosnian Serb politicians. Princip stated during the trial that it was not true that he knew "Jeftanović or Spalajković," and Čabrinović even said during the investigation that the Young Bosnian group in Belgrade had discussed eliminating Jeftanović, whom they considered to be a political turncoat. (Vladimir Dedijer, Sarajevo 1914 (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1978), vol. I, 29, 264–265, 429–430; vol. II, 256; Vojislav Bogićević, ed., Sarajevski atentat: izvorne stenografske bilješke sa glavne rasprave protiv Gavrila Principa i drugova, održane u Sarajevu 1914 g. (Sarajevo 1954), 275). Friedrich Würthle, Die Spur führt nach Belgrad, 114–116, tried to obfuscate the matter with his tendentious interpretation of a story told by Gligorije's son Dušan Jeftanović, whose unreliability is further amplified by the fact that it was published eleven years after his murder in 1941. (Vojislav Bogićević, "Posle boja kopljem u trnje!..' Prilog istoriji sarajevskog atentata", NIN, 20 July, 1952, 10; Nikola Dj. Trišić, Sarajevski atentat u svjetlu bibliografskih podataka (Sarajevo 1964), 402–403)

⁴⁴ DSP, VII/1, 620, 649, 666–667, 703, 772, 794–795; VII/2, 130–131, 260, 297; AS, MID-PO, 1914, b. VII, f. X, M. Spalajković to N. Pašić, 13 May/30 April 1914; b. X, f. III, M. Spalajković to N. Pašić, 18/5 June 1914.

⁴⁵ Narodna biblioteka Srbije – Posebni fondovi [National Library of Serbia – Special Fonds] [hereafter: NBS-PF], Arhiva Grgura Jakšića, R 558/IX/637, M. Spalajković to G. Jakšić, 17/4 April 1914.

⁴⁶ Spalajković informed Neratov on 16 June that Pašić, who was worried because of a possibility of war between Greece and Turkey, thought that the Great Powers should intervene in Athens and Constantinople in order to preserve peace in Europe at all costs. Having received a reply that all necessary steps had been taken, he informed Pašić that the Russian government was content with the advice he had given to Greeks and pleased that he remained in power, which was a guarantee of Serbia's "wise conduct" in the future. (*Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v epohu imperializma: dokumenty iz arkhivov tsarskogo i vremennogo pravitel'stv 1878–* 1917 gg. [hereafter: MO], Ser. 3: 1914–1917 gg., vol. III (Moscow 1933), 315; AS, MID-PO, 1914, b. VIII, f. III, M. Spalajković to N. Pašić, 18/5 June 1914)

reached him on 5 July, the Serbian diplomat had already voiced his resentment in Russian newspapers.⁴⁸

On 29 June, the Vechernee Vremia published a statement from "Serbian diplomatic circles" that the entire Russian press attributed to Spalajković. According to that statement, the Sarajevo assassination had nothing to do with Serbia because there were no revolutionary organisations in that country; also, there was no Black Hand, which was a fabrication of the Viennese diplomatic circles.⁴⁹ It was the irritation of the persecuted Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in particular, the rumours of Franz Ferdinand's personal responsibility for the oppression that were the true reasons for the assassination. An anonymous Serbian diplomat also reminded of the fiasco of the previous high-treason trials in Austria-Hungary and stressed that, despite all endeavours to prove that there had been a conspiracy plotted in Belgrade, he was convinced that the investigation would show that Serbia had no connection with "that disgraceful thing". Two days later, the Novoe Vremia published another statement from "the Serbian diplomatic circles" claiming that the Austro-Hungarian authorities suspected and targeted all Serbs and that the Jesuits stirred up conflicts between the Catholic and Orthodox Christian Serbs. Furthermore, there was a veiled threat that Jeftanović's arrest, a provocation to the entire population of Bosnia, could cause major complications.⁵⁰

The news about the statements attributed to Spalajković promptly reached the Vienna press. Budapest's *Pester Lloyd* fiercely denounced him because, as a

⁴⁸ MO, 3, IV, 110, 132. Sazonov told Spalajković that he did not consider the Austrian accusations important and that Europe's sympathies towards Serbia would only increase after the violence perpetrated against the Bosnian Serbs. Simultaneously, he wanted him to urge Pašić to restrain from any overhasty step and to calm passions in Serbia and Bosnia at all costs (DSP, VII/2, 469, 476; Mark Cornwall, "Serbia", in *Decisions for war 1914*, ed. *Keith Wilson* (London 2006), 60–61).

⁴⁹ In July 1917, after the execution of the Black Hand's leader Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis, Spalajković told the Foreign Minister in the Russian Provisional Government Tereshchenko "about that group of officers, about their sectarian solidarity, their terrorizing the dynasty, the Government, the population, their fatal influence on our [Serbian] internal and foreign affairs, our relations with Bulgaria and Austria in 1913 and 1914, about the character and the intentions of Colonel Dimitrijević, who wanted to play a part of Enver Pasha in Serbia and establish military oligarchy." (AS, MID – Strogo poverljiva arhiva, 1917, 323, M. Spalajković to N. Pašić, 10 July/27 June 1917); cf. Hans Uebersberger, Österreich zwischen Russland und Serbien: zur Südslawishen Frage und der Entstehung des Ersten Weltkrieges (Cologne; Graz 1958), 305–314.

⁵⁰ ÖUA, VIII, 281–284; Trišić, Sarajevski atentat u svjetlu bibliografskih podataka, 18, 23–24; Cornwall, "Serbia", 66, 89; Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (New York 2013), 388–389. It should be noted that Spalajković soon suggested to Belgrade to decorate Manuilov, an editor in the *Novoe Vremia*. (AS, MID-PO, 1914, b. VI, f. VIII, M. Spalajković to N. Pašić, 13 July/30 June 1914)

"lawyer of the Sarajevo murderers", he had pleaded for mitigating circumstances and it demanded from the Serbian Government to call him to account.⁵¹ The Ballhausplatz asked for a translation of the Serbian Minister's "untrue as well as improper" statements from the chargé d'affaires in St. Petersburg.⁵² Having sent it, Czernin claimed that the purpose of Spalajković's statements was to further poison Russian public opinion against Austria-Hungary and he observed that it was high time to stop his "mendacious talkativeness".⁵³ On 6 July, Czernin expressed his anger with the "tactless interviews" full of untruths before Sazonov, who tried to explain Spalajković's irritation away by reminding of the attacks on his family in Sarajevo. "The conversation, that was at times rather stormy, ended quite friendly since Mr. Sazonov, after all, admitted the Serbian Minister's lack of tact and proper upbringing", Czernin informed Vienna.⁵⁴

In the meantime, Spalajković professed to the Russian press that the accusation that "the criminals" had operated under command from Belgrade was groundless and that Serbia, which sincerely expressed her condolences to the Habsburg Monarchy, would continue to do everything in her power to maintain good neighbourly relations.⁵⁵ The Russian newspapers also published that Spalajković had explained to Sazonov, who had fully agreed, the Serbian attitude and pointed out the impossibility of having Austro-Hungarian officials conduct an investigation in Belgrade.⁵⁶ Spalajković wired Pašić that the Russian press, after some initial confusion, was not misled by Vienna and condemned the "savage attacks on the innocent Serbs in Bosnia". He found it inconvenient to write about the impression that the death of Archduke made in St. Petersburg: "The feeling of satisfaction is general."⁵⁷

Spalajković was struck by Hartwig's sudden death in the Austro-Hungarian Legation on 10 July, which was a severe blow since both he and Serbia lost their principal friend and supporter. Sazonov took Hartwig's death "quite indifferently", but he thanked the Serbian minister for a magnificent funeral in

⁵¹ "Aeußerungen des serbischen Gesandten in Petersburg Spalajkovic", *Neue Freie Presse* (Abendblatt), 2 July 1914, 2; *Pester Lloyd*, 3 July 1914, 1–2; "La campagne serbophobe", *Le Figaro*, 4 July 1914, 2.

⁵² ÖUA, VIII, 264.

⁵³ Ibid. 285; Würthle, Die Spur führt nach Belgrad, 112.

⁵⁴ ÖUA, VIII, 337–338. Czernin complained of Spalajković to the Italian Ambassador as well, cf. *I documenti diplomatici italiani* [hereafter: DDI], Quarta serie: 1908–1914, vol. XII (Rome 1964), 136.

⁵⁵"Izjava g. Spalajkovića", Samouprava, 24 June/7 July 1914, 2.

⁵⁶DDI, 4, XII, 103–104.

⁵⁷ DSP, VII/2, 504, 514; Cornwall, "Serbia", 61; Popović, Odnosi Srbije i Rusije, 46; Würthle, Die Spur führt nach Belgrad, 102–103.

Belgrade.⁵⁸ Soon the rumours about Hartwig's poisoning reached St. Petersburg. Although Spalajković was not so naive to believe in them, a quarter-century later he developed a fantastic theory that the Ballhausplatz, and especially Forgách, aware of Hartwig's heart condition, had instigated the Minister in Belgrade Giesl to inflict "as much nervous agitation as possible" on the Russian so as to remove, in this brutal way, the greatest obstacle to the plan to localise the Austro-Serbian conflict.⁵⁹

Although the Ballhausplatz did not use such methods, an insidious blow in the form of the ultimatum to Serbia was being prepared there.⁶⁰ Neratov told Spalajković that Sazonov, who was briefly absent from St. Petersburg, believed that Austria-Hungary would not dare to undertake any measures.⁶¹ On his return, however, Sazonov became very anxious because of the alarming news he received; he blamed, apparently under Spalajković's influence, Forgách (then the Second Section Chief at the Ballhausplatz) and the Hungarian Prime Minister

⁵⁸ Strandman, *Balkanske uspomene*, 274–279; MO, 3, IV, 263–267; DSP, VII/2, 547; "Nikola Hartvig: iz uspomena Dr. M. Spalajkovića", 10; Airapetov, *Uchastie Rossijskoj imperii v Pervoj mirovoj voine*, I, 25. Two weeks later, acting on instructions from Belgrade, Spalajković suggested Sazonov to send a new minister to Serbia immediately. On his own initiative, he proposed the *Counsellor of the Embassy* in Vienna Prince Kudashev, because he was "most convenient due to the close distance [between Vienna and Belgrade]" and because some friends recommended him as "an entirely loyal and honest man, who is the only one capable of replacing Hartwig to some extent." (AS, MID-PO, 1914, b. II, f. VIII. M. Spalajković to N. Pašić, 24/11 July 1914)

⁵⁹ "Nikola Hartvig: iz uspomena Dr. M. Spalajkovića", 10.

⁶⁰ Imanuel Geiss, ed., July 1914, the outbreak of the First World War: selected documents (New York 1974), 89–101; Annika Mombauer, ed., The Origins of the First World War: diplomatic and military documents (Manchester 2013), 238–239; Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the origins of the First World War, 197–203; Manfried Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburgermonarchie 1914–1918 (Vienna 2013), 102–115. During the initial discussions in Vienna about the content of the ultimatum, it was suggested that the Serbian government's apology for Spalajković's statements be demanded. Yet, in article 9 of the final version, no names were mentioned in connection with the requested explanation of anti-Austrian statements made by Serbian officials from 28 June onwards (Luigi Albertini, The origins of the war of 1914, vol. II (Oxford 1953), 171, 288). Count Forgách further revised the ultimatum and he had a major role in the drafting of article 9, as well as the key article 6 (ibid. 255–256; Würthle, Die Spur führt nach Belgrad, 210). Afterwards, Spalajković attributed to his personal enemy an even greater share of blame, claiming that Forgách had borne in mind their conflict and the fact that he had left Belgrade compromised while drafting the text of the ultimatum ("G. dr. M. Spalajković nam govori o Forgaču, Fridjungovom procesu i ulozi 'Politike'', Politika, 28 February 1929, 2).

⁶¹ DSP, VII/2, 589–590.

Tisza for being the main supporters of war.⁶² Pašić was also anxious and, on 18 July, he sent a circular note to all legations except that in Vienna, in which he emphasised a peaceful stance of the Serbian government and pleaded for the help of the Great Powers.⁶³ Having partially altered and strengthened it, Spalajković rewrote Pašić's note into a memorandum in French, which claimed that the press campaign against Serbia excited the public opinion in Austria-Hungary in order to prepare "desirable conditions for the blow premeditated in certain government circles in Vienna and Budapest". It also stressed that Serbia wanted peace and good neighbourly relations with the Dual Monarchy and, for that reason, she was willing to agree to judicial process in Serbian tribunals "against the possible accomplices in the crime of Sarajevo"; but Serbia "could not, in any case, accept a possible demarche of a kind that any state, which wanted to preserve its independence and dignity, would refuse". When this memorandum was sent to Sazonov, he was already preoccupied with the visit of the French President Raymond Poincaré.⁶⁴

On 21 July, Poincaré talked to the diplomatic corps in the Winter Palace. While waiting to greet the President, Spalajković told the British Ambassador "with considerable emotion" that he regarded the present crisis "as the most dangerous one through which Serbia had passed during the last two years" and emphasised that the Serbian government was willing to meet any legitimate demand on the part of the Dual Monarchy. However, Tisza and Forgách were inflaming the "public opinion so as to force the aged Emperor's hand". To Buchanan's remark that "if Serbia adhered to her present correct attitude it would be impossible for Austria to find a pretext for attacking her", Spalajković replied that Austria-Hungary would fabricate some incident for that purpose. Buchanan

⁶² Sazonov told the German Ambassador that the actual chiefs of the bellicose faction were Count Forgách, "an intriguer of the worst kind," and Count Tisza, "a fool". A few days later, he repeated the same to the British Ambassador, adding that he feared that Forgách's influence at the Ballhausplatz was all-powerful (*Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch 1914*. Herausgegeben im Auftrage des Auswärtigen Amtes (Berlin 1921), 139; BD, XI, 118). In fact, Forgách was not the main supporter of war, Tisza even less so; but the former substantially influenced the latter to stop opposing the idea of settling scores with Serbia for good, cf. Rauchensteiner, *Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburgermonarchie*, 104; Graydon A. Tunstall, Jr., "Austria-Hungary," in *The Origins of World War I*, eds. Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig (Cambridge 2003), 118; Fritz Fellner, "Austria-Hungary", in *Decisions* for war 1914, 11–12.

⁶³DSP, VII/2, 595–598; Mombauer, The Origins of the First World War, 283–285.

⁶⁴DSP, VII/2, 611–614; MO, 3, IV, 374–377; Thomas G. Otte, *July Crisis: the world's descent into war, summer 1914* (Cambridge 2014), 209–210. At the same time, Spalajković asked Russian and French journalists to start "an energetic campaign against Austria-Hungary's hostile stance and intentions towards Serbia" (DSP, VII/2, 615).

repeated to Poincaré what Spalajković had told him.⁶⁵ And the French President resolutely stated to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador (who avoided to specify what was demanded from Serbia and falsely claimed that the matter was still under consideration) that he hoped the Habsburg Empire would not descend on a small country which had friends. Count Szápáry wired the Ballhausplatz that he suspected the Serbian Minister, whom Sazonov had recently characterized as "unbalanced", of having a hand in Poincaré's "tactless" and "sounding like a threat" utterance.⁶⁶ After his conversation with the ambassadors, the French president just shook hands with the disappointed ministers. He only stopped before Spalajković and asked him for news from Serbia. After receiving a reply to the effect that the situation was rather grave, he said: "We will help you to improve it."⁶⁷

Spalajković's words were soon going to prove accurate despite Szápáry's attempt to convince him that the responsible people in Vienna were not agitated with regard to Austro-Serbian relations.⁶⁸ A true state of affairs became clear to Spalajković when he received on 24 July a dispatch from Belgrade that informed him of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia.⁶⁹ He immediately phoned to arrange a meeting with Sazonov, who had a busy day ahead of him. Sazonov's first reaction to the news was ominous: "It's a European war!"⁷⁰ When Szápáry read him the ultimatum with commentaries, Sazonov countered that it was all "Count Forgách's doing" and that Austria-Hungary wanted to go to war with

⁶⁵ BD, XI, 61–62; Buchanan, My mission to Russia, I, 188.

⁶⁶ ÖUA, VIII, 337–338; Sindey Bradshaw Fay, *The origins of the World War*, vol. II (New York 1929), 281–282.

⁶⁷ Maurice Paléologue, *La Russie des tsars pendant la Grande Guerre*, vol. I (Paris 1921), 8–11; Spalaïkovitch, *Une journée du Ministre de Serbie à Pétrograd*, 9–10; Raymond Poincaré, *Les origines de la guerre* (Paris 1921), 206–209; Raymond Poincaré, *Au service de la France*, vol. IV (Paris 1927), 251–256; Raymond Poincaré, *Comment fut déclaré la guerre de 1914* (Paris 1939), 34–35; John F. V. Keiger, *France and the origins of the First World War* (London 1983), 151; John F. V. Keiger, *Raymond Poincaré* (Cambridge 1997), 167; Otte, *July Crisis*, 197–198; Stefan Schmidt, *Frankreichs Außenpolitik in der Julikrise* 1914: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des *Ausbruchs des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Munich 2009), 79–80; DSP, VII/2, 622–623. After the departure of the French delegation, Spalajković cabled Belgrade that the Tsar and the President had talked about Serbia (ibid. 645).

⁶⁸ DSP, VII/2, 632; Ćorović, Odnosi između Srbije i Austro-Ugarske, 673.

⁶⁹ In that ciphered dispatch sent via Vienna, a Serbian translation of the ultimatum was delivered to Spalajković. The content of the dispatch was difficult to decode, but its meaning was grasped nevertheless. Just before noon, a non-ciphered dispatch with the original French text of the ultimatum arrived via Bucharest, cf. Spalaïkovitch, *Une journée du Ministre de Serbie à Pétrograd*, 10.

⁷⁰ MO, 3, V, 45; Mombauer, The Origins of the First World War, 321.

Serbia and was setting fire to Europe.⁷¹ After a lunch with the French and British ambassadors and the Romanian Minister, Sazonov attended the meeting of his Cabinet, which decided to demand from Vienna, together with other Great Powers, a prolongation of the deadline given to Serbia for a reply, to advise Belgrade not to engage in hostilities and entrust the Great Powers to find a solution, and to ask for Tsar's approval for mobilising four military districts and the fleet "should the subsequent course of events so require".⁷² Following this meeting, he received the Serbian Minister in his office.

"The day was beautiful, one of those summer days that give St Petersburg the air of festivity", Spalajković recalled twenty years later how he had brought the text of the ultimatum to the Choristers' Bridge. "A warm and sunny day, where everything breathed the joy of living, while the paper that I nervously clutched in my hand promised to introduce shortly the reign of death."73 The spasm of anxiousness was soon eased as Sazonov condemned the ultimatum "with disgust" and professed that it contained demands "that no state could accept without committing suicide". Sazonov also said that Serbia could "undoubtedly" count on Russia's help, but he did not specify if military assistance was included. After all, these matters were "for the Tsar to decide and consult with France". He mentioned that he had wired Strandmann with his instructions,74 and advised Serbia to withdraw her troops into the interior, if unable to defend herself, and appeal to the Great Powers. Spalajković replied that this advice would be practical only if Austria-Hungary were to invade only the border area, but devastation of the entire country could not be allowed; the war could be avoided, he was certain, only if Russia impressed on Austria-Hungary and Germany her resolve to carry out general mobilisation should the conflict not be discussed by the Great Powers.⁷⁵ After leaving Sazonov's office, the Serbian

⁷¹ ÖUA, VIII, 645–648; Geiss, July 1914, 174–178; Würthle, Die Spur führt nach Belgrad, 212–213.

⁷²MO, 3, V, 45–46; Geiss, July 1914, 186–187; Mombauer, The Origins of the First World War, 322–326, 331–332; Dominic C. B. Lieven, Russia and the origins of the First World War (New York 1983), 141–144; Albertini, The origins of the war, II, 297; Ignat'ev, Vneshniaia politika Rossii, 213–214; Airapetov, Uchastie Rossiiskoi imperii v Pervoi mirovoi voine, I, 36–37.

⁷³ Spalaïkovitch, *Une journée du Ministre de Serbie à Pétrograd,* 10–11. Spalajković's memories of July 1914 are generally rather impressionistic.

⁷⁴ MO, 3, V, 41–42; Geiss, *July 1914, 187–188*; Mombauer, *The Origins of the First World War, 321*. Nevertheless, Strandmann decided not to communicate this advice to the Serbian government since the matter was left to his discretion (Štrandman, *Balkanske uspomene, 308–309*).

⁷⁵ DSP, VII/2, 648–649; BD, XI, 93; Spalaïkovitch, Une journée du Ministre de Serbie à Pétrograd, 11–16; Sergey Sazonov, Les années fatales (Paris 1927), 189; Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 462; Cornwall, "Serbia", 79–80; Otte, July Crisis, 238; Ekmečić, Ratni ciljevi Srbije, 69–70; Würthle, Die Spur führt nach Belgrad, 212. Sean McMeekin's account of the conversation

Minister met the good-humoured German Ambassador and asked him how to find the way out of the crisis. Count Pourtalès did not want to be drawn into discussion and simply retorted that everything depended on Belgrade alone, since the matter was one between it and Vienna. Not pleased with such disingenuousness, Spalajković brusquely responded that he was wrong and that he would realise not before long that it was not "a matter between Serbia and Austria, but a European one".⁷⁶ He then wired Pašić what Sazonov had advised him. Although the official journal of the Russian Foreign Ministry stressed that the advice was that of "extreme moderation",77 it was still based on the premise that Serbia should not accept all points of the ultimatum.⁷⁸ Spalajković, of course, did not dare to draw explicit conclusions, but he underscored the great bitterness and general opinion in St. Petersburg that Serbia could not submit to the Austro-Hungarian demands: "The Ministerial Council decided to take energetic measures, even mobilisation. The Tsar's sanction is being awaited. An official communiqué in which Russia takes Serbia under her protection is going to be published."79

Indeed, on 25 July, the *Pravitel'stvennyj vestnik* and other newspapers published the government's statement that it "vigilantly monitors the development of the Serbo-Austrian conflict to which Russia cannot remain indifferent."⁸⁰ In the afternoon, Spalajković cabled that the Russian government was holding a session in the Emperor's presence, that all preparations for mobilisation had been ordered and that it would be declared "right away, if the Austro-Hungarian Minister left Belgrade"; after the session he wired that "decisions favourable for Serbia" had been made and that the army exhibited "utmost bellicosity".⁸¹ In the

⁷⁷ MO, 3, V, 46; Geiss, July 1914, 190; Mombauer, The Origins of the First World War, 322.

⁷⁸ Albertini, The origins of the war, II, 354–355.

between Sazonov and Spalajković is largely inaccurate or even fictional. Although he refers to Luigi Albertini's classical book, his account entirely lacks Albertini's impartiality and scrupulosity regarding the use of all available documents, see McMeekin, *July 1914*, 185–186.

⁷⁶ DSP, VII/2, 636; Spalaïkovitch, *Une journée du Ministre de Serbie à Pétrograd*, 16. Just a few minutes later, Pourtalès realised that this was not only Spalajković's personal opinion when he heard Sazonov energetically opposing the notion of a *local conflict and stating that the question was a European one*. Cf. F[riedrich] Pourtalès, *Mes dernières negociations à Saint-Pétersbourg en juillet 1914* (Paris 1929), 21–22, 88–90, 96–98; MO, 3, V, 46–47; Geiss, *July 1914*, 190–191; Mombauer, *The Origins of the First World War*, 322.

⁷⁹ DSP, VII/2, 636; AJ, JJP, b. 11, M. Spalajković to M. Bošković, 25/12 July 1914; Cornwall, "Serbia", 80; Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 462; Otte, July Crisis, 238–239; Ćorović, Odnosi između Srbije i Austro-Ugarske, 711; Würthle, Die Spur führt nach Belgrad, 222–223.

⁸⁰ Emets et al., Istoriia vneshnej politiki Rossii, 434; Ol'denburg", Tsarstvovanie imperatora Nikolaia II, II, 146; Albertini, The origins of the war, II, 358–359.

⁸¹ DSP, VII/2, 669–670, 681; Ekmečić, *Ratni ciljevi Srbije,* 70; cf. Leonard Turner, "The Russian mobilisation in 1914", *Journal of Contemporary History* 3/1 (1968), 75–76.

evening, he had further information that, after the Tsar's surprising show of determination, it had been decided to "go to any length in protecting Serbia", as well as to mobilise the Kiev military district and take preparatory measures in others. Spalajković also reported that all final-year cadets had been promoted to an officer rank "in a demonstrative manner": "In all circles without exception, the greatest resolve and jubilation reigns on account of the Tsar and the government's stance."⁸² After midnight he wired that the Russian public opinion was appalled at the false information that the ultimatum had been entirely accepted. But the real answer,⁸³ which accepted only that part of the ultimatum concerning "culprits" brought about "general jubilation and praise to the Serbian government": "Tonight Russian students and civil servants have exhibited their sympathies in front of our Legation. [...] All military measures have been taken. An indescribable enthusiasm for the Emperor and the government to enter the war has been aroused within all classes of the Russian nation. No other event has ever been more popular."⁸⁴

On 26 July, Spalajković's optimism peaked since he felt that a moment for action à la Cavour was fast-approaching: "I officially inform you that the Russian army will cross the frontier the moment Austria-Hungary attacks Serbia, and therefore it is crucial that you inform me immediately about that. It is also of paramount importance to keep the spirit of the Serbian army and people high in the beginning. All the troops should be withdrawn from the Bulgarian frontier since we are guaranteed complete safety from that side. The outbreak of war is

⁸² DSP, VII/2, 674–675; Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 463; Ekmečić, *Ratni ciljevi Srbije*, 70. The following day, the Minister in Paris Vesnić wired that France would stay with her ally Russia, whose government had taken "an energetic attitude" and would not allow the destruction of Serbia (DSP, VII/2, 672).

⁸³ The Serbian Prime Minister sent the text of the reply to the ultimatum to his Minister in the Russian capital via an unenciphered dispatch; yet, it arrived after some delay, as most dispatches between Belgrade and St Petersburg did in those days. Nevertheless, Sazonov must have been pleased when Spalajković handed it to him, because problems with receiving and decoding Strandmann's dispatches were even more serious. "He finds your response to be a piece of great political wisdom", Spalajković cabled Pašić. "It will serve him as a powerful tool against Austria-Hungary, which must be condemned because it rejected it." (DSP, VII/2, 719; MO, 3, V, 85; Popović, *Odnosi Srbije i Rusije*, 57)

⁸⁴ DSP, VII/2, 668; Würthle, *Die Spur führt nach Belgrad*, 234–235. The former chargé d'affaires in Berlin Miloš Bogićević, who became a tool of the German propaganda after the war, wrote that as early as 23 July Spalajković had informed "by circular message" all Serbian legations "that the Russian Government had ordered the mobilisation of two million men" and that the enthusiasm for war had been tremendous. Given the absurdity of sending such confidential information by circular dispatch, this statement was not a case of faulty memory, but rather constituted an intentional falsification of documents from the captured Serbian archives, cf. Milosh Bogitshevich, *Causes of the war: an examination into the causes of the European War, with special reference to Russia and Serbia* (London 1920), 66–67.

impatiently being awaited here. The present moment is unique because Russia is determined to go to the very end and perform a historic act. In my opinion, we are facing a splendid opportunity to use this event wisely and achieve the full unification of the Serbs. It is desirable, therefore, that Austria-Hungary should attack us. In that case, ahead in the name of God!" Informing Pašić about the General Headquarters' approval of the immediate shipment of arms to Serbia and the Tsar's belief that the Serbs would "fight like lions", Spalajković claimed that 1,700,000 men would be mobilised to launch a "most energetic offensive" as soon as Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia. Moreover, he pointed out that Germany's stance was still not clear and that it could use the opportunity to share in the partition of Austria-Hungary: "Otherwise, the French military plan will be executed so that a victory against Germany is also certain."85 Yet, Spalajković was more reserved in public than in his dispatches. When a large crowd of people made its way to the Serbian Legation, he appeared at the window and, having received an ovation, made a speech, "expressing the filial sympathy of his country for Russia"; but he closed the window when the cry of "down with Austria" was raised.86

Spalajković's optimistic dispatches from St. Petersburg boosted self-confidence in Serbia. Pašić regularly informed the Cabinet about their content.⁸⁷ He also let Spalajković know that the spirit of the people was elevated after they heard that Russia would not leave them in the lurch.⁸⁸ On 27 July, in the wake of Pašić's oblique refusal of British mediation, Strandmann gained the impression that Serbian ministers were afraid of appearing willing to yield further, after making the utmost concessions in response to the ultimatum. He also believed that "under the influence of Spalajković's dispatches which described the enthusiasm spreading across Russia, they do not think it advantageous for Serbia to shift the focus of the question from St. Petersburg onto some other European

⁸⁵ DSP, VII/2, 680–681, 688; Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 468; Würthle, *Die Spur führt nach Belgrad*, 235–236; Ekmečić, *Ratni ciljevi Srbije*, 70–71. During the New-Year reception in 1915, Nicholas II praised the Serbian victories. Spalajković responded that the Serbian army, which was "Russia's left wing", owed much to the Tsar, "who watches over Serbia and who always said that the Serbs would fight like lions." The Emperor smiled at the Serbian Minister's witticism to the effect that a special celebration of the centenary of the Congress of Vienna should be prepared for Austria-Hungary (AS, MID-PO, 1915, b. XII, f. VII, M. Spalajković to N. Pašić, 15/2 January 1915).

⁸⁶ BD, XI, 184.

⁸⁷ Ekmečić, *Ratni ciljevi Srbije*, 72. Apparently under the influence of Spalajković's reports, Pašić wired the chargé d'affaires in Berlin that Russia's stance was excellent (DSP, VII/2, 683).

⁸⁸ Ibid. 682.

capital".⁸⁹ And Spalajković's optimistic dispatches continued.⁹⁰ Having forgotten the similar scenes he had seen two years earlier in Sofia, when the short-lived solidarity of the two Slavic nations had ended in fiasco, he wrote about "constant grandiose demonstrations" in the streets and in front of the Serbian Legation: "Unanimity of the people and the army. Enthusiasm and belligerence have reached their peak."⁹¹

On 28 July, Spalajković reported to Pašić that Sazonov believed that "certain detente" was taking place, and he hoped that, with the help of London's mediation, the dangerous situation could be defused, including the threat of a localised war that Berlin desired. Spalajković also reported how Sazonov had praised Pašić for complying with Vienna's demands "to the utmost extent"; Sazonov thought that a conflict should be evaded so as to allow Serbia to "gain time and the possibility to grow stronger and wait for a favourable moment".92 Just as he relayed Sazonov's optimistic views to Niš, where the Serbian government had moved in the anticipation of an attack from the north, Spalajković received Pašić's dispatch with the news of Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Serbia. He immediately informed Sazonov about this "deplorable act" on the part of a Great Power against "a small Slavic country that had just emerged from a long series of heroic and exhausting struggles" and conveyed the hope of "the entire Serbian nation" that "the civilized world" would reprove such an act, and that Russia, as "Serbia's protector", would severely punish it.93 Spalajković soon apprised Pašić of "tremendous enthusiasm" in the Russian capital, which was no exaggeration, because the news of the declaration of war on Serbia caused mass demonstrations. Thousands of people, cheering Serbia and France, gathered in front of the Serbian Legation, where the Minister showed himself at the balcony and, having been greeted with acclamation, rendered a short speech.94

⁸⁹ MO, 3, V, 165–166; Štrandman, *Balkanske uspomene*, 324; Cornwall, "Serbia", 83. That same day, responding to a dispatch sent after the ultimatum had been delivered, Nicholas II wrote to Regent Alexander that Russia would by no means leave Serbia alone (MO, 3, V, 145; DSP, VII/2, 691–692). According to Minister of Economy Velizar Janković's memories, Pašić did not conceal his excitement when he informed the members of Cabinet about this dispatch (AS, Varia, 1104, V. Janković, *Ultimatum Austro-Ugarske Srbiji 1914 godine*, 12; Djordje Stanković, *Nikola Pašić*, *saveznici i stvaranje Jugoslavije* (Belgrade 1984), 44.

⁹⁰ DSP, VII/2, 679, 687.

⁹¹ Ibid. 682; Popović, Odnosi Srbije i Rusije, 58.

⁹² DSP, VII/2, 719–720. Although he was temporarily optimistic, Sazonov did not exclude the possibility of war and, claiming that Romania and Greece had agreed to stop Bulgaria's intervention, suggested to the Serbs not to disperse their troops (ibid. 709).

⁹³ MO, 3, V, 177–178; DSP, VII/2, 711; Otte, July Crisis, 358.

⁹⁴ DSP, VII/2, 717; "La déclaration de guerre provoque de l'enthousiasme à Saint-Pétersbourg", *Le Matin*, 29 July 1914, 3; "L'impression à Saint-Pétersbourg", *La Croix*, 30 July 1914, 2; "L'opinion russe", *L'Ouest-Éclair*, 30 July 1914, 2; Milenko Vukićević, "Petrograd u početku

On 29 July, Spalajković wired Pašić that, if Austria-Hungary embarked on military action against Serbia, Russia would immediately declare not only mobilisation but also war: "In fact, Russian mobilisation has already been completed. The Russian government does not waver. The odds are increasing that the situation will improve after the statements and assurances given by Germany here."95 In the evening, however, a peaceful solution seemed much less likely. Spalajković informed the Choristers' Bridge about the bombardment of Belgrade and wired Niš that the Tsarist government, having concluded that compromise was now impossible, opted for "war, which will be announced as soon as mobilisation and concentration of the entire army had been completed, and, in the meantime, it would continue the talks with Germany only to conceal its intentions and buy some time": "That plan will be carried out with greater prospect for success, if Austria-Hungary is content with the occupation of Belgrade and some border areas. So, the die is cast. Please, stay strong and do not lose heart."96 The die was indeed cast the following day and Spalajković informed Niš about the Tsar's Ukase regarding partial mobilisation, which was a ruse, he stated, for general, "but secret" mobilisation, "so that Germany would not attack Russia too soon".97 In his next dispatch, Spalajković repeated that the Russian government was "determined to go to war, be it localised or not, and there is no going back". He considered the localisation of the war between Russia and Serbia against Austria-Hungary possible, since an official from the Choristers' Bridge had confidentially told him that Germany was in "a desperate situation" because it did not want war. The Serbian Minister was further encouraged by

Velikoga rata 1914. godine", in *Krv Slovenstva: spomenica desetogodišnjice Svetskog rata*, ed. Aleksije Ksjunjin (Belgrade 1924), 102. The atmosphere in the streets of St. Petersburg definitely made an impression on Spalajković, but it could be assumed that the optimistic tone of his dispatches was designed to prevent despondency in Serbia. Szápáry's information, if it was true, suggested that the Serbian Minister had placed his hopes in the British mediation, and, consequently, had become very depressed after receiving the news about the declaration of war (ÖUA, VIII, 897).

⁹⁵ DSP, VII/2, 726. That same day, Spalajković transmitted the Serbian government's plea for a loan in the amount of twenty million francs – it was immediately approved (MO, 3, V, 211; DSP, VII/2, 754).

⁹⁶ DSP, VII/2, 730; Ekmečić, *Ratni ciljevi Srbije*, 74; cf. Turner, "The Russian mobilisation in 1914", 87.

⁹⁷ DSP, VII/2, 735. Spalajković was no doubt pleased when he read a dispatch from the Serbian Minister in London Mateja Bošković claiming that "England has given assurance to France that it would help it in the case of German attack", although the latter in fact wired him because he was concerned about Russia's attitude: "Let me know, for God's sake, what's going on with Russia. It is pestered from all sides to restrain from military action in our favour. Would it leave us alone in this unequal fight?" (AJ, JJP, b. 11, M. Bošković to M. Spalajković, 29/16 July 1914).

the President of the Duma Rodzianko, who told him that the enthusiasm of the Russian nation was even greater than that in 1876 and that war was inevitable.⁹⁸

On 1 August, Rodzianko visited Spalajković leading the Duma delegation and stated, with his thunderous voice, that Russia would accept peace "only after defeating the Germans".99 The Russian General Staff informed the military attaché Branislav Lontkijević that general mobilisation had been declared and that Serbia should draw in as many enemy troops as possible.¹⁰⁰ Spalajković sent Pašić this encouraging news: "No matter how diplomatic action develops, Russia is categorically determined to solve the entire Slavic question this time. The situation is as follows: everyone here feels and considers the Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia to be an attack on Russia, and the bombardment of Belgrade to be a bombardment of St. Petersburg. Germany's absurd efforts to localise the war between Serbia and Austria-Hungary have long failed; the success of the English programme to localise the war between Serbia, Austria and Russia becomes more and more likely [...]. The highest representatives of the Russian army ask you to hold out heroically and to get over the destruction of Belgrade which will be compensated to us hundredfold."101 But Spalajković's hopes that London could restrain Berlin were groundless and, in the evening of that fateful day, the Choristers' Bridge informed him that Germany had declared war on Russia. "Here reigns complete calmness and self-confidence", he wired Pašić. 102

¹⁰¹ Ibid. 772. On 31 July, Spalajković sent two memoranda to Sazonov informing him on the systematic bombardment of Belgrade, the Serbian mobilisation and concentration of troops, the enthusiasm among the people for defending their country and the disturbing stance of Bulgaria (MO, 3, V, 287–288). The following day, he boasted to Pašić that his dispatch about the bombardment of Belgrade made the "utmost impression" on the Russian government and public opinion, but he complained that the Press Bureau "mentions only a few details which suggests that the damage is insignificant", and because of that "it weakens the impression and impedes the plan for further actions." For that reason, he asked for and later received another dispatch in which the continuation of bombardment was presented more dramatically (AS, MID-PO, 1914, b. II, f. VII, M. Spalajković to N. Pašić, I August/19 July 1914).

¹⁰² DSP, VII/2, 777. In his "belletristic memoires", the Soviet author Mikhail Zenkevich ironically evoked the atmosphere of the Palace Square at the outbreak of war: "The chiming is so deafeningly joyous, gun salvos so loudly-solemn, the crowd so enthusiastically charged and white phantoms far away over there, at the palace windows, are bowing so kindly. – Spalajković, Spalajković is coming! ... And the crowd rushed and pushed me to the wall. Out of the car that is slowly making its way and excitedly humming, the gold-embroidered plume tricorn and the Serbian Minister's smiling face with a crooked nose are flashing. 'Long live!' – resounds along the square." (Mikhail Aleksandrovich Zenkevich, *Muzhickii sfinks* (Moscow 1994), 15). The unanimity reigned in the centre of the city, while on 1 August around 27,000 workers staged a demonstration against the war in the Vyborg District. A small group of

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⁹⁸DSP, VII/2, 742-743.

⁹⁹ Ibid. 771.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. 756.

Two days later, he reported that Serbia's attitude left "the most favourable impression on the Russian government and the public opinion" and that "mass demonstrations" had taken place in front of the Legation, during which Rodzianko had rendered a speech.¹⁰³ On 4 August, Spalajković wired that the Russian mobilisation was "brilliant and beyond any expectation": "The Russian government receives very good news from all sides." This included the German declaration of war on France, the alleged possibility of an agreement between Greece and Turkey and the British declaration of war on Germany. As a result, the Serbian Minister was pleased to observe the "indescribable jubilation" in St. Petersburg.¹⁰⁴ Patriotic feelings were also vented at the solemn session of Duma on 8 August, on which occasion the greeting dispatches from the Serbian and Montenegrin parliaments were read aloud and Spalajković himself was given a standing ovation.¹⁰⁵

The carnage of war followed shortly. "In the Carpathians, Russian and Austrian regiments already grappled with each other; two ancient and powerful empires were struggling desperately," Spalajković wrote many years later. "The death spread its inexorable power all around … Poor people! Who thought of them, of the wails of their families, of the cries of their souls in those harsh days!"¹⁰⁶ But at the time he was primarily interested in achieving a victory. In late August, Spalajković informed Pašić that the Russian army was advancing on all fronts and that panic seized Vienna and Berlin; after the Serbian victory on the Cer mountain and the Russian capture of Lemberg, he claimed that the final success was "already halfway guaranteed".¹⁰⁷ Evidently, Spalajković believed, like so many others, in the illusion of a short-war, but the march of events disillusioned

anti-war demonstrators even marched on the Nevsky Prospect, but it was quickly dispersed by enraged patriotic crowds, cf. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *The February Revolution: Petrograd*, 1917 (Seattle 1981), 90.

¹⁰³ DSP, VII/2, 786. Since Rodzianko lived near the Serbian Legation, the demonstrators asked to see him one evening after another. The President of the Duma would appear on the balcony, and that time he went out in the street and rendered a speech from the top of a car (Mikhail Vladimirovich Rodzianko, "Krushenie Imperii", *Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii* XVII, ed. Iosif Vladimirovich Gessen (Berlin 1926) 79).

¹⁰⁴ AS, MID-PO, 1914, b. II, f. VII, M. Spalajković to N. Pašić, 4 August/ 22 July 1914; 5 August/ 23 July 1914; b. XV, f. V, M. Spalajković to N. Pašić, 4 August/22 July 1914; b. IV, f. IV, M. Spalajković to N. Pašić, 5 August/23 July 1914.

¹⁰⁵ Popović, Odnosi Srbije i Rusije, 58; Dittmar Dahlmann, "Parliaments", in *The Cambridge History of the First World War*, ed. Jay Winter, vol. II (Cambridge 2014), 34–36; Paléologue, *La Russie des tsars*, I, 63–65; Rodzianko, "Krushenie Imperii", 81–82.

¹⁰⁶ Miroslav Spalajković, "Stradanja", in *Milan Srškić (1880–1937)* (Sarajevo 1938), 61.

¹⁰⁷ AS, MID-PO, 1914, b. XV, f. V, M. Spalajković to N. Pašić, 26/13 August 1914; 28/15 August 1914; 3 September/21 August 1914; 5 September/23 August 1914.

him soon. Russia initially had a military superiority over Austria-Hungary,¹⁰⁸ but the German offensive in the spring and summer of 1915 placed her in a difficult position.¹⁰⁹ Consequently, Russia offered, together with Great Britain and France, the territories that Serbia aspired to on the basis of her Yugoslav programme and even Macedonia that constituted a part of pre-1914 Serbia to neutral states as a price for their entrance into the war.¹¹⁰ Although Spalajković had full understanding for Russian troubles, the question of borders led to his outbursts in Sazonov's office.¹¹¹ In July 1915, he wired Pašić: "It is clear to me that we are only making their pain worse with our pleas because of their inability to give us everything we want. The circumstances are stronger than Russia which was not prepared enough to complete her Slavic mission alone. It is neither our nor her fault that the war started prematurely, but now it is not the time for complaints but for realistic policy to achieve such success as the present grave situation would allow with as little sacrifices as possible."¹¹² By the end of 1918,

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¹⁰⁸ Norman Stone, The Eastern Front 1914–1917 (London 1985), 70–91, 113–128; Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburgermonarchie, 248–256, 306–318; Geoffrey Wawro, A mad catastrophe: the outbreak of World War I and the collapse of the Habsburg Empire (New York 2014), 169–252; Airapetov, Uchastie Rossiiskoi imperii v Pervoi mirovoi voine, I, 132–135; II, 45–52.

¹⁰⁹ Stone, The Eastern Front, 128–191; W[illiam] Bruce Lincoln, Passage through Armageddon: the Russians in war and revolution 1914–1918 (New York 1986), 117–163; Airapetov, Uchastie Rossiiskoi imperii v Pervoi mirovoi voine, II, 65–79, 129–172, 213–221; A[natoliy] I[vanovich] Utkin, Pervaia mirovaia voina (Moscow 2001), 188–198, 206–209.

¹¹⁰ Z[byněk] A. B. Zeman, A diplomatic history of the First World War (London 1971), 11–20, 40–45, 73–77; Robert H. Johnston, Tradition versus revolution: Russia and the Balkans in 1917 (Boulder 1977), 46–47, 59–60.

¹¹¹ Spalajković's outbursts induced Sazonov to think about suggesting Pašić to replace him, cf. Štrandman, *Balkanske uspomene*, 396–397. In addition, Spalajković was in personal conflict with his two secretaries in the Legation, who tried to blacken him as much as possible. "Mr. Spalajković talks everywhere about his bad relations with Mr. Sazonov, sometimes he threatens him, and usually accuses and judges him", one of them wrote to the Assistant Foreign Minister Jovan Jovanović in Niš. "He says that discussions like this take place between him and Mr. Sazonov. Mr. Sazonov to him: Vous êtes fatal pour votre pays. Vous êtes fou [You are fatal for your country. You are mad] etc. Mr. Spalajković to him: Vous êtes ignorant. Vous ne savez rien du tout des affaires des Balkans [You are ignorant. You don't know anything at all about the Balkan affairs] etc." (AJ, JJP, b. 35, M. Dimitrijević to J. Jovanović, 19/6 May 1916)

edonia to Bulgaria in order to induce Sofia to join the Entente Powers, he asked his diplomats for their opinion. The majority was against this proposal, but not Spalajković. "In such a fateful moment for Russia no Serb who has ears and heart can waver", he wired to Niš, "because without Russia we would have been neither born nor ever become what we are today, and it must not be forgotten that Russia has always been our only protector in this world; therefore, when Serbia makes sacrifices for Russia, it endures them also for herself and

the situation considerably changed and allowed Serbia to achieve almost all of her war aims, but with immense casualties and without Russia's participation, which had been unthinkable four years earlier.

Based on his reconstruction of events, Luigi Albertini concluded that, "if assurances of full support had not come from St. Petersburg" (which, he explained, "does not mean that Russia should have tolerated the humiliation and violation of Serbia which might have had incalculable repercussions in the Balkans"), the Serbian government would have replied to the ultimatum with full formal acceptance and a small reservation "so skilfully worded as to make it very difficult for Austria to construe it into a rejection".¹¹³ Mark Cornwall, who used the published Serbian diplomatic documents that had been mostly unknown in Albertini's time, accurately observed that there is no evidence that Belgrade "was ready to accept all Austria's terms and was only stiffened to offer resistance after receiving a clear message of Russian support on the 25th". However, his contentions that "the exact opposite seems to be the truth" and that "Pašić was probably disappointed at the degree of Russian support" are rather questionable.¹¹⁴ It seems that Albertini was closer to the mark when he claimed that the Serbian reply had become firmer after "full support" had been given from St. Petersburg. The fact that Regent Alexander wired Nicholas II on 24 July expressing Serbia's willingness to accept those Austro-Hungarian demands that the Emperor might suggest seems to confirm such view.¹¹⁵ Besides, the similar cases of the Annexation Crisis in 1909 and the Albanian crisis in the autumn of 1913 suggest that without Russian support the Serbian statesmen would probably have yielded in the last moment, hoping to evade later the execution of their pledges. That must have been especially true for the prudent Russophile Pašić, who was notoriously cautious."In politics, especially foreign affairs, he trod carefully, as when one walks on a rotten plank", his pupil Spalajković remembered.¹¹⁶ Due to his temper, Spalajković never learned to walk on a rotten plank during his diplo-

for her future." (Popović, Odnosi Srbije i Rusije, 164–167; Stanković, Nikola Pašić, saveznici i stvaranje Jugoslavije, 153–155; AS, MID-PO, 1915, b. XIII, f. IV, M. Spalajković to N. Pašić, 8 August/26 July 1915)

¹¹³ Albertini, The origins of the war, II, 360–361.

¹¹⁴ Cornwall, "Serbia", 73, 77. Cornwall was not quite fair to Albertini when he wrote that, in that particular instance, the latter had been "relying primarily on hearsay evidence" collected by Luciano Magrini. Albertini used almost all known documentary sources and it was only because of their scarcity that he relied to a greater degree on not highly reliable sources such as Magrini's interviews. On the other hand, the memoirs of the "maverick" Prince Djordje which Cornwall used could hardly be regarded as a highly reliable source.

¹¹⁵ DSP, VII/2, 637; Richard C. Hall, "Serbia", in *The Origins of World War I*, 109; Cornwall, "Serbia", 75–76; Albertini, *The origins of the war*, II, 352.

¹¹⁶ Miroslav Spalajković, "Gospodin Pašić: državnik – diplomat – filosof", in *Spomenica* Nikole P. Pašića 1845–1925 (Belgrade 1926), 33.

matic career. However, in 1941, when Yugoslavia found herself alone in the face of Hitler's ultimatum-like demand to join the Axis, he publicly opted for signing the pact with Germany,¹¹⁷ despite his prior Germanophobic attitude and his dim view of Czechoslovakia's attitude in the crisis of 1938.¹¹⁸

Such contradictions invite further research into Spalajković's personality, and in particular the reliability of his reports from St. Petersburg. The Serbian historian Ekmečić has written that, in July 1914, Spalajković was intermittently "carried away by his enthusiasm outside the boundaries of reality".¹¹⁹ The Soviet historian Pisarev has even claimed that Pašić did not trust Spalajković, who misinformed him about Russia's stance wiring his fantasies and falsities.¹²⁰ The former Serbian Minister in Vienna, Jovan M. Jovanović, wrote in his notes after the Great War that Spalajković was "fanciful, sometimes an optimist, sometimes a dark pessimist" and that Pašić had been aware of his tendency to "exaggerate" and even report "an invented thing".¹²¹ Pašić knew Spalajković's faults, but he doubtlessly trusted him, since he always appointed Spalajković to the most significant Legations and stood by him in spite of all objections. His telegrams exuded an exaggerated optimism and relayed very subjective estimates; such reporting in part reflected the atmosphere of patriotic demonstrations in the streets of St. Petersburg that no doubt strongly affected the Serbian Minister. Eager to reinforce the resistance of the Serbian government in the face of Austria-Hungary's pressure, he delighted in sending news from Russia, which

¹¹⁹ Ekmečić, Ratni ciljevi Srbije, 71.

¹²¹ AJ, JJP, b. 44, J. M. Jovanović's notes, undated.

¹¹⁷ M[iroslav] Spalajković, "Rat i Jugoslavija", Politika, 25 March 1941, 1.

¹¹⁸ "A nation that does not defend itself cannot expect anyone to help it," Spalajković wrote in an unpublished article. "This is the first and foremost political truth which was confirmed by the last bitter experience of the Czechoslovakian nation. [...] Czechoslovakia had a positive alliance treaty with the strongest military power in Europe – France; Serbia had not had a single ally and could have counted with certainty only on the moral protection of Russia. Czechoslovakia collapsed because she did not want to defend herself; faced with the ultimatum from Berlin, she submitted without resistance. However, in 1914, after the ultimatum from Vienna, Serbia had responded with guns to the declaration of war." (NBS-PF, Arhiva Živka Milićevića, R 725/II/45, M[iroslav] Spalajković, "Odlučnost Srbije 1914 godine")

¹²⁰ According to Pisarev, Spalajković was "suggesting to the Serbian government the idea of Russia's readiness for an immediate entry into war against Austria-Hungary, whereas the Tsarist government warned Belgrade about the danger of a military confrontation, which was advantageous to the German bloc." (Iurii Alekseevich Pisarev, *Tajny Pervoi mirovoi voiny*: *Rossiia i Serbiia v 1914–1915 gg.* (Moscow 1990), 9, 92) *In the twilight of the Soviet Union*, Pisarev wrote both as a patriotic apologist and a representative of Marxist-Leninist historiography, whose animosity Spalajković earned because of his *thirty years* of personal *war against communism, which started in January 1918 when he shouted at Lenin that he spit in his face* (Joseph Noulens, *Mon ambassade en Russie soviétique 1917–1919*, vol. I (Paris 1933), 188–189; George F. Kennan, *Russia leaves the war* (Princeton 1956), 336).

were magnified, with uncorroborated details and personal opinions of his interlocutors from semi-official circles, but not substantially inaccurate. Spalajković's personal enmity towards Austria-Hungary and Count Forgách certainly contributed to such behaviour.

On the other hand, the Austrian historian Friedrich Würthle has written that Spalajković could take credit for convincing the Russians of the need for their intervention and that 24 and 25 July were the "pinnacle of his St. Petersburg mission". Arbitrarily interpreting Spalajković's memoirs, Würthle has claimed that on 24 July "Sazonov at first advised that the ultimatum be entirely accepted, but Spalajković made it clear to him that that was absolutely out of the question". Moreover, Würthle has overemphasised Spalajković's influence on Sazonov and Nicholas II. In his view, Spalajković, an advocate of Greater Serbia, spared no effort to facilitate the outbreak of war and thus, usurping a role that he was not supposed to play, he contributed to the aggravation of crisis.¹²² Sazonov and other Russians did not need Spalajković to convince them of what was obvious: that they could not allow the destruction of an independent and pro-Russian Serbia whose army would be a serious threat to the southern borders of Austria-Hungary in case of a European war. But the Russians did not find it opportune to tell that explicitly to the Serbian Minister. Spalajković sensed the political mood in St. Petersburg and he reported to his government, with exaggerated enthusiasm but quite accurately, that Serbia would not be left in the lurch.

> UDC 94(497.11):327[°]1914[°] 929 Miroslav Spalajković

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¹²² Würthle, Die Spur führt nach Belgrad, 213–215, 221, 243.

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Le traité de Trianon, l'acte constitutif de l'État yougoslave ?

Abstract : La guerre victorieuse de la Serbie et la dissolution de l'Autriche-Hongrie avaient permis l'union du Royaume du Pierre I avec les provinces orientales de la partie hongroise de l'Empire des Habsbourg. Or, avant que leur union fut acceptée par les Alliés, selon les termes de l'armistice à Villa Giusti, une administration temporaire est mise en place dans les régions du Banat, Bačka et Baranja, celles avec une population hongroise conséquente. Traité du Trianon entérine en juin 1920 l'intégration de la Croatie, de la Slavonie, de la Bosnie et Herzégovine, et de la Vojvodina au Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes. La minorité hongroise dans l'État yougoslave connut une évolution qui assura sa stabilité numérique ainsi que son essor culturel grâce au système d'éducation en langue hongroise de l'école primaire jusqu'à l'université.

Mots clés : Traite de Trianon, armistice, Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, Hongrie

L État yougoslave, naît le 1 décembre 1918 comme le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, tandis que son territoire est délimité par les traités de paix signés après la Grande guerre. Parmi ceux derniers le Traité de Trianon entérine en juin 1920 l'intégration de la Croatie, de la Slavonie, de la Bosnie et Herzégovine, et de la Vojvodina à l'État yougoslave. En conséquence, plus de la moitié du son territoire lui fut accordé aux dépens de la partie hongroise de la défunte Monarchie de Habsbourg. De ce fait le traité sanctionnant la démise de la Hongrie historique peut véritablement être considéré comme un acte constitutif de l'État commun des nations yougoslaves. Or, une telle lecture de l'issue de la Grande guerre dans l'espace yougoslave, fondée que sur le critère territorial, est fort réductrice. La recomposition territoriale et la naissance de nouveaux États sont la conséquence de l'application du droit des nationalités à disposer d'euxmêmes. Ce fut le critère qui, après la disparition de Habsbourg, de Hohenzollern, et de Romanov, a été jugée par les Alliées le plus appropriée pour réorganiser l'espace allant de la frontière russe jusqu'à l'Adriatique, et dont les conséquences territoriales ont été codifiés par les traités de paix. Certes, son application a été décidée par l'issue de la guerre, néanmoins selon ce critère l'importance du Traité de Trianon pour l'État yougoslave devienne bien moindre. La naissance de l'État yougoslave est la conséquence de la libre volonté des nations qui ont exprimé le souhait d'en faire partie. Les traités codifient les arbitrages alliés des contentieux territoriaux entre les nouveaux États nationaux crées sur les vestiges de la Dou-

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ble Monarchie. Dans cette perspective, le contentieux portant sur l'établissement de la frontière entre la Hongrie et l'État yougoslave ne fut certainement pas le plus grand péril qui guettait ce dernier, après la fin des hostilités.

La difficulté d'arriver à un compromis territorial au sujet de la frontière hongroise, peut-être analysée du côté yougoslave en trois temps : d'abord la période de l'armistice, ensuite les projets et négociations pendant la durée de la Conférence de la paix, et finalement la mise en place des termes du traité de Trianon et leur viabilité à long terme. En ce qui concerne les deux principaux théâtres d'action, c'est-à-dire, Paris et Versailles d'une part et les régions de Banat, Bačka et Baranja¹, de l'autre, il nous est paru utile de se concentrer sur le procès décisionnel au sein des instances yougoslaves dans le premier cas, et sur l'analyse de la situation au sein des différentes communautés nationales dans le deuxième cas. Une comparaison avec les autres conflits frontaliers hypothéquant l'avenir de l'État yougoslave à l'époque, est indispensable pour bien apprécier l'importance respective du contentieux territorial avec l'Hongrie.

L'armistice de Belgrade, la chute de l'Autriche-Hongrie

L'incapacité de la Double Monarchie de se désolidariser de son allié allemand et à donner des preuves de sa capacité de se réformer afin de prendre en compte les intérêts des nationalités qui vivaient dans le cadre de se frontières, incite les Alliés de considérer la possibilité de sa dissolution. Cependant, ce n'étaient que des projets lointains avant que le 15 septembre 1918, l'offensive des armées serbes et françaises obligent l'armée bulgare à la retraite qui se solde par l'armistice bulgare du 29 septembre 1918. La preuve que le front commun des Puissances centrales est définitivement rompu arrive de Vienne lorsque, le 4 octobre, l'empereur Charles envoie au président Wilson, la demande austro-hongroise de paix fondée sur les principes contenus dans sa Déclaration de 14 points. L'Empereur réitère sa volonté de faire respecter les intérêts des nationalités lorsqu'il, le 16 octobre, annonce la réforme fédérale dans la partie autrichienne de l'Empire. En revanche, le cabinet Wekerle en Hongrie s'oppose à toute entorse aux droits historiques hongrois, considérant comme envisageable qu'une autonomie croate dans le cadre de la couronne de Saint Étienne.² L'insuffisance des réformes annoncées, ou seulement envisagés d'une et de l'autre partie de Leitha, est démontré le mieux par le comte Mihály Károlyi qui déclare le 16 Octobre dans le Parlement hongrois que la guerre est perdue.³ Les dires de Károlyi sont confir-

¹Les trois régions avec Syrmie en plus, après la Révolution de 1848, et la création en 1849 du duché de Vojvodina serbe et du Banat de Temesch, sont dans les sources serbes connus sous l'appellation de Vojvodina.

² Ignác Romsics, The Dismantling of Historic Hungary (East European Monographs, 2002), 50.

³ Ervin Panlevi, ed., The History of Hungary (Budapest 1973), 415.

més par le président Wilson, lorsqu'il, le 18 octobre, dans sa réponse à l'initiative austro-hongroise de paix, estime que le choix de leur destin futur appartient désormais aux nationalités eux-mêmes.⁴ Or, les nationalités ne tardent pas de faire savoir leur choix lorsqu'elles, l'une après l'autre, déclarent la sécession de la Monarchie de Habsbourg et la création de leurs propres États nationaux. En Hongrie, la lourde tâche de faire face à la défaite militaire et à la création des nouveaux états nationaux sur les vestiges de la Double Monarchie, incombe au cabinet du comte Mihály Károlyi, la figure de proue de l'opposition à la politique belliciste des gouvernements hongrois pendant la guerre. Nommé par l'empereur le 31 octobre, il reçoit le jour même la déclaration d'indépendance croate qu'il ne peut qu'admettre.⁵

La déclaration croate est en vérité la déclaration du Conseil National des Slovènes, Croates, Serbes et qui proclame, le 31 octobre 1918, la naissance de l'État SHS dans les limites des frontières des provinces yougoslaves de la Double Monarchie et son intention de s'unir avec la Serbie et le Monténégro.⁶ La création d'un État yougoslave est depuis décembre 1914 un des buts de guerre de la Serbie. Dans les milieux intellectuels serbes déjà en novembre 1914 on a des idées claires sur l'étendue de l'État yougoslave qui doit réunir les provinces suivantes : le Banat, la Bačka, le Srem, la Slavonie, la Croatie, la Slovénie, l'Istrie, la Dalmatie, la Bosnie-Herzégovine, le Monténégro et la Serbie.⁷ Pendant les quatre années de la guerre, le cabinet de Nikola Pašić œuvre pour créer les conditions favorables à la naissance de l'État yougoslave soutenus par le Comité yougoslave, une organisation non gouvernementale composé des émigrés politiques des provinces yougoslaves de la Double Monarchie. Seulement après la percée du front de Salonique la relève est assurée par les hommes politiques sur le terrain avec la création le 6 octobre du Conseil National des Slovènes, Croates et Serbes, tandis qu'avant la fin d'octobre toutes les autorités locales dans les provinces yougoslaves reconnaissent formellement le Conseil national comme leur instance supérieure. Sa première décision dans cette capacité est justement la déclaration du 31 octobre l'annonçant la sécession de la Double Monarchie et l'intention de s'unir avec la Serbie dont les unités de l'avant-garde arrivent justement sur les frontières orientales de la désormais défunte Double Monarchie.

Arrivée sur les frontières serbes d'avant guerre, les troupes serbes ne peuvent les dépasser sans l'accord du général Franchet d'Esperey, commandant du

⁴ Woodrow Wilson, Messages, discours, documents diplomatiques relatifs à la guerre mondiale. Traduction conforme aux textes officiels, publiée avec des notes historiques (Paris 1919), 334.

⁵ Romsics, The Dismantling, 53.

⁶ Ferdo Šišić, *Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba*, *Hrvata i Slovenaca 1914–1919* [Les Documents sur la création du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes] (Zagreb 1920), 216–217.

⁷ Boppe à Delcasssé, Nis, le 14 novembre 1914, AMAE, Guerre 1914–1918, Serbie, vol. 370, pp. 19–20.

front d'Orient. Il leur ordonne le 3 novembre, traverser la Drina et le Danube en justifiant sa décision de la façon suivante:

Le mouvement yougoslave paraît prendre une extension considérable. L'armée serbe devra mettre tout en œuvre pour l'organiser et exploiter à notre profit, en vue de l'action commune contre les empires centraux.

Dans ce but une intervention directe est nécessaire. Elle sera d'autant plus aisée que nous n'avons plus à redouter un retour offensif des forces austro-hongroises sur le front nord de la Serbie.

En conséquence, l'armée serbe devra pousser, le plus tôt possible, des éléments dans tous les territoires favorables au mouvement yougo-slave, dans le Banat, en Bosnie-Herzégovine, la Croatie, etc., afin de donner la main aux forces en voie d'organisation.⁸

En ordonnant aux troupes serbes d'avancer sur les territoires de l'ancienne Monarchie des Habsbourg, Franchet d'Esperey démontre qu'il voulait organiser une vaste offensive contre l'Allemagne par la voie orientale passant à travers les provinces yougoslaves. Il en informe son gouvernement, et reçois le 5 novembre l'ordre de Clemenceau de concentrer les troupes françaises et britanniques sous son commandement dans la zone de Salzbourg-Braunau pour une offensive décisive en direction de Munich. En même temps Clemenceau l'informe de la conclusion de l'armistice entre les Alliés et l'Autriche-Hongrie à Villa-Giusti, qui doit servir comme le cadre juridique à l'armée serbe afin qu'elle se déploie dans les provinces limitrophes de l'Autriche-Hongrie pour assurer sa défense et ses intérêts politiques.⁹ L'étendue des territoires jugé indispensables afin d'assurer la sécurité de la Serbie est communiqué d'Esperey par le régent Alexandre le jour même à Niš. L'État-Major serbe avait préparé plusieurs tracées de ligne de démarcation avec la Hongrie, dont la minimale et absolument indispensable allait de Timişoara à Sombor.¹⁰

La nécessité de préciser la ligné de démarcation avec la Hongrie provient du fait que le 3 novembre deux colonels hongrois se présentent aux troupes serbes pour demander qu'un armistice séparé soit signé avec le nouvel État hongrois.¹¹ Pour donner plus de crédibilité à cette demande, le président du Conseil hongrois, le comte Károlyi en personne, demande et obtient d'être reçu le 7 novembre à Belgrade par d'Esperey. Le nouveau gouvernement hongrois

⁸ D'Esperey, Instruction particulières pour armée Henry, armée serbe, Salonique, le 3 novembre, *Les Armées françaises dans la Grande Guerre,* tome VIII, vol. 3, Annexes vol. III, 480 (Paris 1925).

⁹ Bogdan Krizman, « Beogradsko primirje od 13. novembra 1918 » [Ľarmistice de Belgrade du 13 novembre 1918], *Letopis Matice srpske za društvene nauke* 47 (1967), 118.

¹⁰ Ibid. 126.

¹¹ Franchet d'Esperey à Clemenceau, Salonique, le 4 novembre 1918, Série A-Paix, vol. 105, p. 59.

souhait notifier aux Alliés la rupture avec la politique menée par les précédents gouvernements, dont la principale gage était le renommé du Président de Conseil en tant que l'opposant de la première heure à la politique belliciste hongroise. Comte Károlyi précise que son gouvernement ne se sent pas responsable de la politique et des actes de ses prédécesseurs. Il déclare que l'Hongrie se considère désormais comme un État neutre. Au nom de son gouvernement comte Károlyi se déclare prêt d'accorder la reconnaissance à l'État yougoslave si tel devait être la décision de la future Conférences de la paix. En cas d'une occupation alliée comte Károlyi exprime le souhait que les troupes d'occupation ne soient pas composées des unités des pays voisins. Finalement, il exprime le souhait que les Alliés puissent établir des relations diplomatiques avec l'Hongrie.¹² L'exposé de comte Károlyi est un plaidoyer pour la reconnaissance formelle de l'État hongrois, qu'il cherche à présenter comme substantiellement différente de la Hongrie dualiste et donc libérée de la responsabilité de sa conduite pendant la Grande guerre.

Or, d'Esperey se démontre fort peu enclin de faire la distinction entre ce cabinet hongrois et les précédents car il conclut succinctement, de la manière militaire : « dans cette guerre vous étiez de coté des Allemands, donc vous en avez la même responsabilité et vous devez être punis au même titre qu'eux ».¹³ Il évoque aussi la répression des nationalités, yougoslave, roumaine, tchèque et slovaque dans le cadre de la partie hongroise de la Double Monarchie. Bref, il fait comprendre à ces interlocuteurs hongrois qu'il les considère comme délégués d'un adversaire vaincu, et nullement comme ceux d'un pays neutre. Il leur remet la proposition de la convention d'armistice, mais le comte Károlyi refuse de la signer si l'intégrité territoriale de la Hongrie ne soit pas sauvegardée. Dans l'incapacité d'arriver à un accord, les deux parties ajournent les débats, en attente de l'avis des Alliés d'une part et de l'Assemblée hongroise de l'autre. Pour le gouvernement français il ne pouvait y avoir deux armistices, et le général d'Esperey reçut le 9 novembre l'ordre explicite de Clemenceau de conclure avec les Hongrois une simple convention sur l'application de l'armistice de la Villa Giusti pour la partie orientale de la Monarchie.¹⁴ En attente de la réponse hongroise, les unités serbes continuent leur avancée commencé le 6 novembre par la traversé du Danube. Elles se déploient d'abord dans le Banat sur la ligne Bela Crkva-Vršac- Timiçoara, délimitant ainsi la zone convoitée par la Serbie face aux exigences roumaines. En Bačka, les troupes serbes entrent sonellement le 9 novembre à Novi Sad, le 13 novembre dans la ville de Baja et le lendemain à Pécs.

Après que le gouvernement hongrois avait accepté les termes d'armistice, sans que quelconque garantie de son intégrité territoriale eût été donnée, l'armistice est formellement signé le 13 novembre à Belgrade. Le texte de

¹² Krizman, « Beogradsko primirje », 122, 123.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Clemenceau à d'Esperey, Paris, le 6 novembre 1918, Série A-Paix, vol. 105, p. 63.

l'armistice précise la ligne de démarcation avec la Hongrie, laissant sous contrôle alliée les villes de Szeged, Baja et Pécs. Selon les termes de l'armistice les pouvoirs civils hongrois pouvaient rester en place dans la zone sous contrôle alliée. ¹⁵ Dans leur capacité des troupes alliées, les unités serbes se déploient dans la zone délimitée par l'armistice. Elles ne rencontrent aucune résistance car les forces armée hongroises étaient en décomposition. Les Alliés se refusaient de reconnaître le gouvernement du comte Károlyi car ils partageaient l'avis du général d'Esperey et continuaient à considérer le gouvernement hongrois comme un adversaire vaincu et responsable de la conduite de guerre à côté des Allemands.¹⁶ La proclamation de la République démocratique hongroise le 16 novembre n'y change rien dans l'attitude alliée.

Il est intéressant de comparer l'attitude alliée envers la Hongrie et envers les provinces yougoslaves, car dans les deux cas les changements démocratiques n'ont eu aucun effet sur les décisions alliées d'instaurer une zone d'occupation militaire selon les vœux de leur alliées, respectivement italien et serbe. Certes, les prétentions italiennes sur la côte Adriatique ont été codifiées par un traité formel, celui d'avril 1915 signé à Londres, tandis que la Serbie n'avait aucun document pour soutenir ses ambitions territoriales.¹⁷ Néanmoins le principe fut le même, car lorsque les intérêts des alliées étaient en cause ni le Conseil national SHS ni le gouvernement Károlyi, ne pouvaient se prévaloir de leur caractère démocratique afin de se libérer de la responsabilité d'avoir participé dans la guerre du côté des Puissances centrales. Le cas du Conseil national SHS est particulièrement intéressant, car face aux exigences italiennes, les yougoslaves ont été traités comme faisaient partie de la Double Monarchie vaincue. En revanche, face à la Hongrie, grâce à l'alliance, destinée à devenir l'union, avec la Serbie, le Conseil national SHS a été considéré comme l'instance représentative des nationalités yougoslaves opprimées. Ce privilège n'a pas pu être accordé au gouvernement hongrois seulement à cause de la conduite irréprochable de son président. D'ailleurs, la révolution en Hongrie intervient seulement après la fin des hostilités, et les réformes annoncées ont certes le caractère démocratique, mais ne prévoient une réforme constitutionnelle reflétant le caractère multinational de la Hongrie, capable de satisfaire les nationalités dont les revendications ont été considérablement accrues par la naissance de leurs États nationaux respectifs.

¹⁵ Voir la thèse de Paul Gradhvohl, « Genèse et mise en œuvre du contrôle militaire interallié en Hongrie : un exemple de politique militaire française au centre de l'Europe en 1918– 1927 » (Université de Paris I, 1999).

¹⁶ Ignác Romsics, The Dismantling, 60.

¹⁷ Au sujet de contentieux italo-yougoslave dans l'Adriatique pendant et après la Grande guerre voir : Frédéric Le Moal, *La France et l'Italie dans les Balkans 1914–1919* (Paris 2006).

L'arrivée des troupes serbes changea la nature des relations intercommunautaires en zone sous contrôle alliée, c'est-à-dire les provinces de Banat, Bačka i Baranja. Elles sont censées d'abord assurer l'ordre publique, vue l'instabilité inhérente à l'époque suivant la fin des combats. La décomposition de l'administration précédente, la présence des soldats revenants armés du front, ainsi que des déserteurs, de l'armée allemande qui en se retirant se sert de tout ce dont elle trouve sur son chemin, créent une atmosphère d'insécurité ambiante. Les épisodes de pillages, dont les principales victimes étaient les communautés juives, se multipliaient. On note quelques exemples de violences motivées par la volonté de revanche contre les autorités austro-hongroises et leurs représentants. La tâche d'organiser une nouvelle administration locale incombe au gouvernement hongrois, mais l'instabilité voire le revanchisme des populations locales incite les cadres de la vielle administration locale hongroise à se retirer en Hongrie propre. Le cabinet Károlyi cherche à les remplacer par la mise en place, dans l'esprit du temps, des Conseil nationaux dans les principales villes de Vojvodine, dont la composition doit refléter le caractère multiethnique de la ville en question. Les Conseils doivent être soutenus dans l'exercice de leur fonction par une milice locale, elle aussi multiethnique.¹⁸

L'armistice de Belgrade prévoyait la continuité de l'administration locale hongroise dans les territoires sous contrôle allié. Or la réforme de l'administration introduisant les Conseil locales à caractère multinational représente un changement par rapport à la situation existante au moment de l'armistice, d'ailleurs même l'État hongrois change de caractère après la Révolution du 16 novembre. L'organisation de l'administration locale selon les affinités nationales ouvre la brèche qui permet aux populations yougoslaves voire slaves en général, de créer leur propres Conseils nationaux composés majoritairement des Serbes et soutenu par l'armée serbe. L'expression la plus éclatante de cette tendance fut la convocation de la grande Assemblé nationale réunie le 25 novembre 1918 à Novi Sad, composée d'une grande majorité des délégués serbes, mais aussi de leurs collègues croates, slovaques, ruthènes, voire de quelque délégué allemand et tchèque. L'Assemblée proclame la sécession de l'Hongrie et sa volonté de s'unir avec la Serbie.¹⁹ Elle nomme aussi le Grand conseil national, l'instance suprême dont la tâche est d'organiser l'administration locale. L'administration locale ainsi créée, ne fut pas reconnue par les Alliés, mais elle fut néanmoins effective. Le soutien de l'armée serbe, la seule force capable d'imposer l'ordre civil, bien plus que ne l'étaient les milices mises en place par le gouvernement hongrois, lui accordait une crédibilité supplémentaire. Cette administration régionale avec tous

¹⁸ Sur la situation en Vojvodine voir : Zoran Janjetović, *Deca careva, pastorčad kraljeva. Nacionalne manjine u Jugoslaviji* [Les enfants des empereurs, les beaux-fils des rois. Les minorités nationales en Yougoslavie 1918–1941] (Belgrade 2005), 121 et *passim*.

¹⁹ Dušan T. Bataković, Yougoslavie. Nations, religions, idéologies (Lausanne 1994), 138.

les territoires sous son responsabilité, intègre le premier décembre 1918 le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, et en mars 1919 transmet ses prérogatives aux instances centrales à Belgrade.²⁰

La contrôle de l'administration locale par les Yougoslaves et notamment les Serbes dans les trois régions précitées faisait partie du même processus national qui à vu les Slovènes reprendre à leur compte les conseils municipaux à Ptuj et à Maribor, jadis contrôlés par les Allemandes, ou les Croates imposer leur pouvoir dans la région de Medjumurje par l'action militaire du 24 décembre 1918. Certes, les termes d'armistice n'ont pas été respectés, mais il était question d'une révolution nationale qui gérait l'espace qu'elle croyait désormais appartenir à son État national. La main mise yougoslave et serbe sur l'administration locale s'est traduite dans les faits par la dissolution des conseils et milices créés par Budapest. Les cadres serbes occupent les postes de direction, mais ils ne sont pas assez nombreux pour remplacer les fonctionnaires hongrois dans les échelons subalternes de l'administration. Cependant, ceux derniers doivent prêter serment d'allégeance aux nouvelles autorités s'ils veulent garder leurs postes. La langue serbe devient la langue d'administration, et tous les signaux extérieurs de la présence hongroise, drapeaux, tableau, l'armorie, sont remplacées par ceux du Royaume nouvellement crée. En conséquence, l'élite hongroise, les fonctionnaires et les cheminots, choisissent de partir en Hongrie. Néanmoins, cette administration a le caractère intrinsèquement temporaire car la question de la délimitation de la frontières reste ouverte jusqu'à la décision de la Conférence de la paix, dont les travaux commencent en janvier 1919.

Les conceptions yougoslaves de la frontière avec l'Hongrie

Le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, l'intitulé officiel de l'État yougoslave, et son premier gouvernement, celui de Stojan Protić, nomme le 22 décembre la délégation qui doit le représenter au Congrès de la paix. Elle se présente à Paris officiellement en tant que la délégation serbe car le Royaume SHS n'est pas reconnu par les Alliés. Néanmoins, tous les chefs de file des différentes nations yougoslaves en font partie et notamment Nikola Pašić, le chef historique des Radicaux serbes et le président du Conseil de la Serbie pendant la Grande guerre, Ante Trumbić, président du Comité yougoslave, et Josip Smodlaka, l'homme politique croate représentant les intérêts de la Dalmatie.²¹ La délégation yougoslave se réunit courant janvier à Paris afin d'établir la position commune en vue des pourparlers sur la tracée des frontières de l'État commun. En ce qui concerne l'Hongrie le point de vue serbe est exprimé le mieux par le gé-

²⁰ Janjetović, Deca careva pastorčad kraljeva, 125–128.

²¹ Andrej Mitrović, *Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira 1919–1920* [La Yougoslavie à la Conférence de paix, 1919–1920] (Belgrade 1969), 5–10.

néral Petar Pešić, membre de la délégation militaire qui se fait partisan d'une ligne stratégique, assurant la meilleure défense des plaines de Vojvodina. Selon ce projet l'État yougoslave revendique la possession des villes de Szeged, Baja, Pécs, Szigetvár. Ce projet est soutenu par l'argumentation historique des experts serbes tels que les historiens Stanoje Stanović et Jovan Radonić et reçoit le appui inconditionnel de Pašić.²²

Cependant, le projet serbe est fortement contesté dès l'arrivée de Smodlaka à Paris, car il s'oppose à l'utilisation du critère stratégique pour l'établissement de la tracée des frontières de l'État commun. Il explique, le 18 janvier, soutenu par Trumbić, que de cette façon on aurait accrédité les exigences italiennes en Adriatique dont une des justifications principales était le besoin d'une ligne stratégique assurant la défense des intérêts italiens. Les deux hommes politiques originaires de la Dalmatie exigent que la délégation yougoslave base son argumentaire que sur le principe ethnique. Cet argument provoque une vive discussion au sein de la délégation yougoslave. Pašić estime qu'on ne peut pas comparer les exigences yougoslaves envers l'Hongrie, un pays vaincu, avec les prétentions italiennes sur le territoire d'un pays ami et allié. Il n'est pas non plus prêt d'accepter que la ligne voulu par le général Pešić soit exclusivement stratégique, car il la considère comme ethniquement viable aussi.²³

Les différences au sein de la délégation yougoslave révèlent les agendas nationaux différents, ainsi que la complexité de la tâche de la délégation du pays, privé de la reconnaissance internationale et dont presque toutes les frontières étaient l'objet de litige avec les voisins. L'intervention de Smodlaka pose la question de principe de nationalité, celui qui était à l'origine de la création de l'État commun, que Pašić ne pouvait se permettre d'ignorer. Le premier signe d'un changement arrive lorsque Pašić se déclare prêt de renoncer à demander la Baranja, le région se trouvant entre les rivières de Danube et Drava. Une première indication dans ce sens est contenu dans son discours du 23 janvier, lorsqu'il établie comme priorités les régions de Banat et Bačka, ajoutant qu'il faudrait renoncer au Baranja car on ne pouvait pas le demander vu que l'élément slave y est minoritaire. L'imposition du principe ethnique est manifeste lorsque la délégation yougoslave dans la session plénière du 28 janvier décide de renoncer à demander la Baranja, avec les villes de Szigetvár et Pècs, et la Bačka septentrionale avec la vile de Baja.²⁴ Cette solution territoriale fut contenue dans le mémoire officiel yougoslave soumis à la Conférence de paix en deuxième moitié de février. L'argumentation qui l'accompagnait fut basée à la fois sur des critères,

²² Andrej Mitrović, *Razgraničenje Jugoslavije sa Madjarskom i Rumunijom 1919–1920* [La délimitation de la frontière entre la Yougoslavie et respectivement la Hongrie et la Roumanie] (Belgrade 1975), 6–16.

²³ Ibid. 35–37.

²⁴ Ibid. 44.

stratégiques, ethniques, économiques, et démographiques. La revendication sur la Baranja orientale semble d'avoir été fait pour des raisons tactiques, afin qu'en y renonçant en cas de besoin, on pouvait faire preuve de la bonne volonté.

Les flottements au sein de la délégation yougoslave peuvent être expliqués par les agendas différents, mais aussi par le manque des informations crédibles sur la situation réelle sur le terrain. Autant qu'on pouvait faire des projets stratégiques et économiques sur la tracée de la frontières, il était bien plus difficile de connaître les fluctuations ethniques que la région ait connu. On faisait peu confiance aux recensements austro-hongrois car ils se basaient sur la langue d'usage et non sur la langue maternelle. On évoque le cas des fonctionnaires et des colons qui étaient arrivée récemment sans avoir eu du temps pour s'y enraciner, et en conséquence ne devaient pas être pris en compte. Pašić évoque le sort de la population yougoslave conséquente qui serait restée dans l'État hongrois si la ligne proposé soit acceptée, pour justifier l'intégration d'une importante minorité hongroise dans l'État yougoslave. Comparé aux projets du général Pešić, le memorandum yougoslave signifait un important pas en arrière afin de respecter le principe ethnique.

L'issue des délibérations dans la commission territoriale des affaires yougoslaves et roumaines donne raison au projet yougoslave, exception faite de Baranja, qui comme on l'a vue, ne fut pas véritablement considéré comme ethniquement indispensable. Le Président de la commission André Tardieu, informe officieusement Pašić, que la commission a accordé à l'État yougoslave les villes de Kikinda, Sombor et Subotica, ce qui répondait au souhait de la délégation yougoslave. La rédaction définitive du rapport de la commission territoriale, en date du 6 avril 1919 confirma les dires de Tardieu. Cette solution fut approuvée par le Conseil suprême allié en date du 12 mai 1919.²⁵

Lorsque l'issue de la délibération paraissait satisfaire les souhaits de la délégation yougoslave, arrive en provenance du gouvernement de Belgrade la demande qu'on insiste sur le sort de Baranja orientale. Cette exigence est présente comme émanant du terrain, c'est-à-dire comme une demande des populations locales. La nouvelle demande yougoslave est présentée officiellement à la Conférence le 18 mai, et la première réponse officieuse arrive déjà le 26 mai, lorsque Tardieu informe Trumbić que l'État yougoslave aura la partie orientale de Baranja. Le Conseil suprême allié décide le 1 août d'accorder au Royaume SHS la partie sud-est de Baranja, et la tracée définitive de la frontière avec la Hongrie est notifiée le 18 août officiellement à la délégation du Royaume SHS.²⁶ L'état yougoslave en tant que Royaume SHS signé le traité de Versailles en juin 1919, et de ce fait obtient une reconnaissance internationale. Ses frontières sont établies formellement par une série des traités particuliers dont le traité de Trianon, en ce qui concerne l'Hongrie.

²⁵ Ibid. 116.

²⁶ Ibid. 176.

La participation yougoslave dans le processus de négociations qui précède sa signature fut limitée car l'arbitrage territorial reste celui qui a été notifiée à la délégation yougoslave en août 1918. Finalement la frontière se rapproche à la ligne qu'en novembre 1918 l'État-major serbe avait considérée comme indispensable. Malgré l'indiscutable avantage que lui accorde le statut de l'allié de la première heure, la Serbie se montre respectueuse du principe ethnique, car la frontière définitive sanctionne le retrait considérable par rapport à la zone établi par l'armistice ce qui ne fut pas nécessairement la conduite des autres voisins hongrois.

L'issue de la controverse territoriale sur le tracée de la frontière avec l'Hongrie fut en accord avec les souhaits de la délégation yougoslave. Les objectifs territoriaux, notamment en Banat et Bačka, ont été atteints. Finalement, la tâche ne s'est pas avérée trop difficile comme le témoigne l'historien et l'expert auprès la délégation yougoslave, Stanoje Stanojević dans ses souvenirs.

On a eu la Vojvodine assez facilement, sans trop d'efforts et sans grand combat. Les discussions portaient sur l'étendue de certains régions de la Vojvodine, et le combat se concentré sur le Banat orientale, la Bačka du Nord-Est, et la Baranja septentrionale, c'est à dire sur le sort des villes de Timișoara, Baja et Pécs.²⁷

Le traité de Trianon et la position de la minorité hongroise

L'arbitrage territorial codifié par le traité de Trianon reflète certainement l'issue de la Grande guerre, mais aussi la politique hongroise menée depuis l'accord dualiste de 1867. La défaite de la Double Monarchie fut celle de la Hongrie historique. L'adhésion hongroise aux principes ethniques fut tardive est peu convaincante aux yeux des Alliés vu la vigueur et la détermination des troupes hongroises pendant les quatre années des combats. Le revanchisme des nationalités vivant dans la Double Monarchie est manifeste vu leur adhésion aux mouvements nationaux, due en partie aux souvenirs des pratiques de l'administration hongroise. Le caractère peu démocratique du système politique hongrois n'accorda que peu de place aux nationalités, ce qui ne pouvait que se refléter dans leur attitude après la fin des hostilités. Décrédibilisées, mis au pilori, les autorités hongroises ne pouvaient pas s'opposer à la naissance des états nationaux dans leur voisinage tandis que les contentieux territoriaux avec eux se soldent aux dépens des intérêts hongrois. D'ailleurs, la difficulté d'établir les frontières ethniques dans les régions qui n'en connaissant pas depuis des siècles, et dont l'évolution favorisait une intégration à caractère multiculturel est bien réelle, parfois elle fut impossible vu le mélange des populations. La ligne retenue laisse une importante

²⁷ Stanoje Stanojević, « Vojvodina na Konferenciji mira » [La Vojvodine à la Conférence de la paix], *Letopis Matice srpske* 300 (1914–1922), 81–91.

minorité hongroise dans le cadre de Vojvodina, 24 % par rapport à la majorité relative de 42 % des Yougoslaves selon le recensement yougoslave du 1921.²⁸

Les résultats des recensements aussi bien austro-hongrois du 1910 que ceux yougoslaves de 1921 et de 1931 sont discutables, car ils ne connaissent pas la catégorie de la nationalité, mais dans le premier cas de la langue d'usage et dans le deuxième de la langue maternelle. Les recensements ne pouvaient pas, au-delà de leur défauts, décrire la complexité d'une société, certes au prise avec des mouvements nationaux, mais dont la population consistait aussi des groupes dont l'appartenance nationale n'est pas clairement établi tels, les Bunjevci, voire d'une multitude des cas particuliers dont l'appartenance nationale fut décidée par des stratégies personnelles, possibilité d'emploi, voire par l'éducation acquise qui les font faire le choix en désaccord avec leur histoire familiale, etc. Le sort des minorités, juive par exemple, ce groupe qui reflétait le mieux le mélange ethnique et culturel de la Monarchie des Habsbourg, est un cas à part. Néanmoins, même avec les données dont on dispose certaines tendances peuvent être établies. Audelà de l'importance numérique de la minorité hongroise, c'est sa stabilité qui attire l'attention. La fluctuation du nombre des Hongrois en Vojvodine suit une courbe en U, car en 1910, ils sont 450 646, en 1921, 369 859, et en 1931, 399 175, ce qui prouve que l'émigration reste limitée, et que la qualité de leur vie n'est point mis en cause par l'État yougoslave.²⁹ Après donc que les effets de la guerre se sont estompés, c'est-à-dire la mobilité, volontaire ou non de la population d'une ou de l'autre partie de la frontière, le nombre des Hongrois en Vojvodina augmente. La Seconde guerre mondiale, malgré une nouvelle série des conflits locaux dans le cadre d'une guerre à caractère à la fois ethnique et civile, et l'intégration forcée de la région dans la Hongrie doté d'un régime révisionniste et revanchard, n'y change rien dans la tendance générale. La politique nationale de la Yougoslavie communiste, c'est à dire la politique proclamée de la fraternité et unité, assure à la minorité hongroise le cadre juridique et constitutionnel pour le développement culturel et la préservation de son identité nationale. Le nombre d'écoles, lycées, et l'université en langue hongroise, crées dans la seconde moitié du siècle dernier démontre que malgré l'arbitrage territorial, la frontière codifié par le traité de Trianon, n'était pas l'obstacle pour le développement de la minorité hongroise ni pour l'établissement des bonnes relations interethniques, exception faite de la période de la guerre avec ses inhérents conflits et revanchismes de toute sortes. La preuve en est la participation active des partis politiques hongroises dans la vie politique serbe après 1990, lorsqu'ils étaient un soutien ferme d'abord de l'opposition démocratique et ensuite aux gouvernements pro-européens après l'année 2000.

> UDC 94(4:439):341.382["]1920" 94(497.11):341.218(497.1)

²⁸ Svetlana Radovanović, « Demographic Growth and Ethnodemographic Changes in the Republic of Serbia », in *The Serbian Questions in The Balkans* (Belgrade 1995).

²⁹ Janjetović, Deca careva, pastorčad kraljeva, 65–66.

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From Paris to Lausanne: Aspects of Greek-Yugoslav Relations during the First Interwar Years (1919–1923)

- Abstract: This paper looks at the course of Greek-Yugoslav relations from the Paris Peace Conference to the Treaty of Lausanne. Following the end of the First World War Greece and the newly-created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes formed a common front on an anti-Bulgarian basis, putting aside unresolved bilateral issues. Belgrade remained neutral during the Greek-Turkish war despite the return of King Constantine. But after the Greek catastrophe in Asia Minor the relations between Athens and Belgrade were lopsided.
- Keywords: Greek-Serbian/Yugoslav relations, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Greek-Turkish war 1920–1922, Serbian/Yugoslav free zone in Thessaloniki, Eleftherios Venizelos, Nikola Pašić, Macedonian problem, Western Thrace

T he history of Greek-Serbian relations during the Balkan wars and the First World War has largely been already written.¹ By contrast, there are not

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¹ On Greek-Serbian relations during the period of 1912–1918 see Dušan Lukač, ed., Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije (1903–1914), vol. 6–2 (Belgrade: SANU, 1981); Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, "Greek-Serbian relations 1912–1913: Communication Gap or Deliberate Policy", Balkan Studies 45/1 (2004), 23-38; Dušan T. Bataković, "Serbia and Greece in the First World War", Balkan Studies 45/1 (2004), 59-80; Loukianos Hassiotis, Ελληνοσερβικές σχέσεις 1913–1918, συμμαχικές προτεραιότητες και πολιτικές αντιπαλότητες [Greek-Serbian relations 1913–1918. Allied priorities and political rivalries] (Thessaloniki: Vanias, 2004); Ioannis Papadrianos, "Die Beziehungen zwischen Griechenland und Serbien vor dem Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkrieges", in Proceedings of the Fifth Greek-Serbian Symposium: 1) Serbia and Greece during the First World War; 2) The Ideas of the French Revolution, The Enlightenment and the Pre-Romantic Period in the Balkans, 1780-1830, organized by the Institute for Balkan Studies and the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts in Thessaloniki and Volos, 9–12 October 1987 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1991); D. Donta, "Troubled Friendship. Greco-Serbian Relations, 1914–1918", in The Creation of Yugoslavia 1914–1918, ed. D. Djordjević (Santa Barbara: Clio Books with the University of California, 1980), 95–124; Miladin Milošević, Srbija i Grčka 1914–1918. Iz istorije diplomatskih odnosa (Zaječar: Istorijski arhiv, 1997); Spyridon Sfetas, "Aspects of Greek-Serbian Relations in 1914 and the Image of the Serbs in the Greek Press", in Srbi i Prvi svetski rat 1914–1918 (Proceedings of the international conference held 13–15 June 2014), ed. Dragoljub R. Živojinović (Belgrade: SANU, 2015), 365-376.

many studies on Greek-Serbian/Yugoslav relations during the interwar period. This article is based on this author's study² on Greece and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from the Paris Peace Conference in 1919/20 to the denunciation of the Greek-Serbian Treaty of Alliance (1913) in late 1924.

The prevalence of Eleftherios Venizelos in Greek politics after 1917 to the detriment of King Constantine and his supporters, that is to say the pro-German wing of the Greek political scene, was the key factor for a new rapprochement between Athens and Belgrade. Frequent border incidents and complaints of the local population living near the frontier on both sides did not lead to political tensions. Nikola Pašić along with El. Venizelos attached major importance to mutual understanding between the two states. Their main concern was to set up a common diplomatic front against Bulgaria. In October 1918 Venizelos met the Serbian minister in Athens, Živojin Balugdžić, and Nikola Pašić Greek chargé d'affaires in Belgrade, Ioannis Kountouriotis. At both meetings there were assurances that Serbia would support Greek claims to Eastern and Western Thrace³. However, Kountouriotis considered it necessary that Greece should regain Serbian public sympathy. To that end, he did not hesitate to ask Pašić to intervene in the Serbian Press in order for it to adopt a more friendly rhetoric towards Greece.⁴ The same request came from Pašić as regards the Greek Press. It probably was not a coincidence that the Greek newspapers at the end of 1918 and beginning of 1919 featured the tragic losses of the Serbian nation, the devastated Serbian capital, the suffering economy and the need to revive the Balkan coalition.⁵

Members of such a coalition should be considered Greece, Serbia and Romania. The coalition would be formed on an anti-Bulgarian basis. The enlargement of the coalition could be canvassed only after the singing of the Peace Treaty. On 21 November 1918, Greece, Serbia and Romania sent a joint memorandum to the Foreign Office, in which they were notifying their willingness to work together at the upcoming Conference according to the principle of nation-

² Athanasios Loupas, Από τις σχέσεις συμμαχίας στην ψύχρανση: Η Ελλάδα και το Βασίλειο των Σέρβων, Κροατών και Σλοβένων, 1919–1924 [From alliance to cooling: Greece and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes] (Athens: Herodotos, in press).

³ Hassiotis, Ελληνοσερβικές σχέσεις 1913–1918, 231–232.

 ⁴ Υπηρεσία Διπλωματικού και Ιστορικού Αρχείου (Service of Diplomatic and Historical Archives, hereafter SDHA), Αρχείο Κεντρικής Υπηρεσίας (Central Service Archives, CSA) 1919 A-5-V (10) Περί των Βαλκανικών Κρατών – Σερβία [About Balkan States – Serbia], Kountouriotis to Diomidis, 28 December 1918, No. 647.

⁵ Μακεδονία (Makedonia), 31/12/1918; Εμπρός (Embros), 1/1/1919; Ακρόπολις (Akropolis), 4/1/1919.

alities.⁶ So, by the time the Peace Conference began, Athens and Belgrade had laid the foundations of a fruitful cooperation. The Greek kingdom was the only neighbouring country with which the newly-established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (hereafter KSCS) did not have any border disputes.⁷ In his memorandum regarding Greek national claims, dated 30 December 1918 and distributed to the Entente delegations at Paris in January 1919, Venizelos did not mention at all the Greeks in Northern Macedonia, now part of the KSCS, while Yugoslav delegates counted on Greece's support to their national claims. In addition to Bulgarian aspirations in Macedonia and Thrace, Italian claims on the Adriatic (Dalmatia, Istria, Montenegro), Albania and Asia Minor constituted a great threat to both Greek and Yugoslav interests.

From the Peace Conference in Paris to the Greek elections (January 1919 – November 1920)

The recognition of the new kingdom was of great importance to the Yugoslav delegation. Italian aspirations, however, appeared to be a considerable obstacle. The Greek delegation found itself in an awkward position in this matter. According to Venizelos, Greece should come to an understanding with Italy in order to settle their disputes over Northern Epirus and Asia Minor.⁸ On the other hand, however, the Greek Prime Minister was insisting on Greece becoming the first state to officially recognize the KSCS, as a gesture of symbolic significance which would positively impact Serbian public opinion. In his effort to remain neutral in the Italo-Yugoslav antagonism over the Adriatic, Venizelos instructed the Deputy Foreign Minister, Alexadros Diomidis, to handle the matter of recognition in such a manner as not to impair Italian interests.⁹ However, Diomidis failed to do so. Having in mind earlier instructions, according to which Greece was to refrain from any action which might dissatisfy Italy, Diomidis had held off carrying out Venizelos' orders. New and clearer instructions from Paris were

⁶ N. Petsalis-Diomidis, *Greece at the Paris Peace Conference 1919* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1978), 74.

⁷ A. Mitrović, "The 1919–1920 Peace Conference in Paris and the Yugoslav State: An Historical Evaluation", in *Creation of Yugoslavia*, ed. Djordjević, 209; I. Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference. A Study in Frontier-making* (Yale University Press, 1963), 96.

⁸ E. Venizelos, *Ta Kείμενα*, τ. Β' 1915–1920 [The Records, vol. II: 1915–1920] (Athens: Liberals' Club, 1982), 641, 648. See also R. L Woodall, *The Albanian Problem during the Peacemaking* 1919–1920 (Memphis State University, 1978), 104.

⁹ SDHA, Αρχείο Πρεσβείας Παρισίων [Paris Embassy Archives, hereafter PEA] 1920/3.6 Ελληνοσερβικές Σχέσεις [Greek-Serbian Relations], Politis to Diomidis, Paris 19 December 1918/2 January 1919, No. 444

needed in order to overcome Diomidis' reservations. After all, a Greek-Italian understanding seemed out of reach in early 1919. But Greece had already lost precious time. At any rate, what mattered most was that Greece missed the opportunity to be the first country to recognize the KSCS, as Venizelos fervently desired.¹⁰ It is true, though, that it was believed in certain political and military circles in Athens that the new Yugoslav kingdom, due to its military power, might be a potential threat to Greece's national security in the long run.¹¹ On the whole, however, the establishment of the KSCS was cordially welcomed in Greece insofar as it was seen as an implementation of the principle of nationalities. The enlargement of Romania and the creation of the KSCS were viewed by Greek policy-makers as a shift in the balance of power in the Balkans. Thus, the territorial expansion of Greece was more than necessary to maintain the Balkan equilibrium.¹²

Since then, Greek and Yugoslav officials endeavoured to counter the Bulgarian initiatives at the Peace Conference and promote their common interests. Pointing out that Bulgaria's disarmament had been encountering a lot of difficulties the Yugoslav delegation proposed to Entente Headquarters in Constantinople the siege of Strumnitsa by Entente forces, including Greek units. The heads of the Greek and Yugoslav delegations also sent a joint diplomatic note to the French Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau, alerting him to the threat stemming from the activities of Bulgarian komitadjis on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian and Greek-Bulgarian borders. Venizelos also suggested the deployment of Greek, Yugoslav and Romanian troops to the southern Bulgarian border in order to strengthen the meagre Entente forces and his country's negotiating position,¹³ but his suggestion was not adopted. The idea of launching military operations against Bulgaria was entertained once more in August 1919. In reply to Clemenceau's query about the Greek army's readiness, Venizelos stressed that it was capable of dealing with local insurrections in Thrace but that it was not in a position to wage a two-front war against Turkey and Bulgaria. He held, though, that should Sofia resist the implementation of the Peace Treaty, Greece along with the KSCS and Romania would be willing to force Bulgaria into accepting the agreement.¹⁴

¹⁰ Ibid., Venizelos to Diomidis, Paris 2/15 February 1919, No. 1488.

¹¹ SDHA, CSA, 1919 A-5–V (10), op. cit., Kountouriotis to Diomidis, 28 December 1918, No. 647

¹² Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece at the Paris Peace Conference, 67–68, Hassiotis, Εληνοσερβικές σχέσεις 1913–1918, 223; D. Dakin, Η ενοποίηση της Ελλάδας, 1770–1923 [The Unification of Greece], trans. A. Xanthopoulos (Athens: MIET, 2001), 334.

¹³ Desanka Todorović, *Jugoslavija i balkanske države, 1918–1923* (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1979), 36–37.

¹⁴ Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece at the Paris Peace Conference, 267.

The Greek-Serbian cooperation applied also to the field of propaganda during the Peace Conference in Paris. Both sides made several attempts to highlight the dramatic effect that the Bulgarian occupation had on the Greek and Serbian population in Eastern Macedonia and South Serbia respectively, and at the same time sought to promote their own perspectives on demographics in Macedonia and Thrace. The studies *Le Peninsule balkanique* by Jovan Cvijić, Professor at the University of Belgrade, and *Les Bulgares peints par eux-mêmes* by Victor Kühne – the latter also being translated in English at the initiative of the Greek-British Association¹⁵ – were the most typical examples of the abovementioned policy. As products of Greek-Serbian cooperation may also be seen the pamphlets entitled *Les mensonges bulgaires* and *Une reponse à "la vérité sur les accusations contre la Bulgarie*". Those two pamphlets were written in order to confute Bulgarian arguments (*La vérité sur les accusations contre la Bulgarie*) about the Bulgarian occupation in Eastern Macedonia.¹⁶

The Greek-Serbian cooperation produced palpable results on 17 September 1919 when the Paris Conference ordered the Bulgarian troops out of Strumnitsa and Western Thrace. Two days later the terms of the peace treaty were delivered to the Bulgarian delegation. On 27 November 1919 the newlyelected Bulgarian government of Aleksandar Stamboliyski signed the Treaty of Neuilly. The treaty provided for territorial cessions to neighbouring countries: to the KSCS: a) the western provinces of Tsaribrod and Bosilevgrad, which were of particular strategic importance; and b) the city of Strumnitsa; and to Romania: c) Southern Dobruja. At the same time, an inter-allied administration was imposed in Western Thrace, thereby depriving Bulgaria of a territorial outlet to the Aegean Sea. Nonetheless, an economic outlet was ensured to Bulgaria by the signatories (article 48, paragraph 3).

On 25 April 1920 the San Remo Conference transferred the administration of Western Thrace to the Greek authorities, concluding the integration of the territory into the Greek state. This triggered a common and prompt reaction of Turkish nationalists and Bulgarian komitadjis who wished to oust Greek political and military authorities and to declare Thrace autonomous. The leading figure of that short-lived movement was Cafer Tayar, an Ottoman officer of Albanian origin. The Turkish-Bulgarian danger was evident in South Serbia as well. The Serbian Press in Skoplje imputed the rise of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) to the collusion of Bulgarian and Turkish elements and stressed that there were contacts between the Young Turks and the Muslim

¹⁵ Hassiotis, Ελληνοσερβικές σχέσεις 1913–1918, 231; Miranda Paximadopoulou-Stavrinou, Η Δυτική Θράκη στην εξωτερική πολιτική της Βουλγαρίας. Το Ζήτημα της Βουλγαρικής Οικονομικής Διεξόδου στο Αιγαίο (1919–1923) [Western Thrace in the foreign policy of Bulgaria. The question of Bulgaria's economic outlet to the Aegean Sea] (Athens: Gutemberg, 1997), 28, fn. 15.

¹⁶ Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece at the Paris Peace Conference, 86–87.

population living in the southern provinces of the KSCS. At the same time, key figures of the Turkish community in Skoplje were arrested on the accusation of bearing subversive ideas against the Yugoslav state.¹⁷ Various rumours regarding the number of troops that Tayar had at his disposal for the upcoming Turkish-Bulgarian uprising in Thrace in September or the readiness of Albanian irregulars to take up arms against the KSCS¹⁸ proved to be false. Thus, Yugoslav assistance was not necessary in defeating Tayar's movement.¹⁹

In view of the new circumstances, i.e. the territorial enlargement of the two states and the fact that one of them (Kingdom of Serbia) no longer existed as a legal entity, a redefinition of the 1913 Greek-Serbian Treaty of Alliance was needed.²⁰ In the spring of 1920 Balugdžić tabled the issue claiming that "it would be ludicrous if Greece demanded military assistance from the Yugoslav Government for war in Asia Minor, just as it would be ridiculous if Yugoslavia had similar demands for military operations against Hungary or against some other far-flung state"²¹ Greece sought to preserve the alliance in order to secure the status quo as it had been formulated by the treaties of Bucharest (1913) and Neuilly (1919). In other words, to safeguard the Greek-Bulgarian border and to maintain a common front with the KSCS against Bulgaria. In order to prevent misunderstandings such as had arisen in 1915, it was agreed to clarify their mutual obligations. This was to be achieved either by concluding a new treaty or by signing an interpretative protocol. Both sides agreed on the latter solution. However, the negotiations had not been concluded and the issue remained unsettled.22

Despite a convergence of political and strategic views between Athens and Belgrade, Greek-Yugoslav relations did not go without disagreements, the main of which concerned Italy. Being at loggerheads with Rome over Fiume

¹⁷SDHA, CSA 1920/22.1, Ελληνοσερβικές σχέσεις (θέματα πολιτικά, στρατιωτικά, εμπορικά) [Greek-Serbian relations (political, military and commercial affairs)], Picheon to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Skoplje, 15 March 1920, No. 83; 25 February 1920, No. 60; and 10 March 1920, No. 75.

¹⁸ Ibid., Picheon to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Skoplje, 26 August 1920, No. 296; Staff Service to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 24 July 1920, No. 465/ii/2660.

¹⁹ Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države, 85–86.

²⁰ In accordance with article 7 of the treaty Serbia was granted freedom for her transit trade through the port of Thessaloniki. On 10/23 May 1914 a Convention Relative to Transit through Salonica was concluded between the Royal Hellenic Government and the Royal Serbian Government. In accordance with article 1 of the Convention a section of the port was assigned to Serbia for its transit trade. Due to the outbreak of the First World War the Convention was not ratified.

 ²¹ SDHA, CSA 1920/21.3, Φάκελος Σερβίας [Serbia File], Memorandum, 28 May 1920.
 ²² Ibid.

(Rijeka), whose port was of vital importance to the Yugoslav economy, Belgrade perceived the Italian factor as a threat to Yugoslav interests.²³ On the other hand, Venizelos pursued a more conciliatory policy towards Rome which bore fruit on 29 July 1919 when a non-binding agreement with the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tomasso Tittoni, was signed. The agreement provided for an overall settlement of the Greek-Italian disputes: the Dodecanese, with the exception of Rhodes, was to be ceded to Greece and Italy was also to support Greek claims in Northern Epirus. Greece, for her part, pledged to support an Italian mandate for central Albania and to secure a free zone to the port of Smyrna, already under Greek administration. Venizelos had not intended to substitute the Greek-Yugoslav alliance, which was a keystone of his policy, with the agreement of 29 July 1919, but to square things with Rome. Nevertheless, the Venizelos-Tittoni agreement gave rise to considerable discontent in the KSCS. Greek officials made statements in the spirit of appeasement wishing to reassure their Yugoslavs counterparts that the agreement was not a turn against the KSCS, but quite the contrary, the latter would benefit from it since Italy should no longer back up Bulgarian claims.²⁴ In practice, however, the agreement never entered into force and in fact was terminated by Italy in July 1920.25

Venizelos' adherence to the Greek-Yugoslav coalition was also proved on the question of Northern Macedonia. The Greek Prime Minister ruled out all possibility of claiming the territory for Greece as Greek refugees from Monastir (Bitolj), Gevgeli, Strumnitsa and Dojran wanted. Organized in various clubs, unions and associations, North-Macedonian refugees in Thessaloniki soon became a lobby which caused the Greek Government much trouble, giving rise to Yugoslav complaints on various occasions. However, Venizelos restricted himself to promising material assistance to those who should choose to stay in Greece permanently and stressed that he would not take any action to redraw the Greek-Yugoslav border.²⁶

In August 1919 negotiations about the re-establishment of the Serbian Patriarchate and its jurisdiction over South Serbia and Northern Macedonia began between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and a delegation of the KSCS. The main obstacle to the conclusion of the agreement was the issue of the fate of the Greek communities in Northern Macedonia. The Fanar demanded that the text of the agreement make an explicit mention of the cultural freedom of the Greek

²³ In a discussion with the American President, Woodrow Wilson, Pašić drew a parallel between the Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Italian presence in Albania, cf. Todorović, *Jugoslavija i balkanske države*, 54.

²⁴ Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece at the Paris Peace Conference, 256.

²⁵ Konstantinos Svolopoulos, Η ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική 1900–1945, τ. Α΄ [Greek Foreign Policy 1900–1945, vol. I] (Athens: Vivliopolio tis Estias, 2005), 147.

²⁶ Hassiotis, Ελληνοσερβικές σχέσεις 1913–1918, 353.

communities. The Yugoslav delegation replied that the KSCS had no intention to impede Greeks' cultural life but they also stated that they were not authorized by their government to discuss such matters.²⁷ Having received further instructions from Belgrade, the delegation made a counterproposal according to which no special mention to that effect would be made in the text, but instead the Ecumenical Patriarchate would address a letter to the two governments asking them to come to an agreement on the Greek communities. At the same time they asked for Venizelos' intervention.²⁸ In the end, the Fanar, following Venizelos' advice, accepted the Yugoslav terms and issued the Synodal Tome. It was more than evident that the Greek Prime Minister did not have any intention to add such an issue to his agenda. In fact, Venizelos sacrificed the Greeks of Northern Macedonia for the sake of Greek-Yugoslav relations. To the same end, Belgrade raised neither the question of the Serbian free zone in the port of Thessaloniki²⁹ nor that of the Slavic population in Greek Macedonia and also turned down the French proposal for the internationalization of the city.³⁰

After the Treaty of Sevres (10 August 1920) was signed and the longstanding dream of the *Megali Idea* which had dominated Greek politics since Independence seemed to come true, Venizelos called elections. He believed that his achievements in Paris (Treaty of Neuilly and Treaty of Sevres) would bring him a splendid victory. The Serbian Press launched a campaign in favour of Venizelos' Liberal Party. The 10 October 1920 issue of *Politika* is highly indicative: "His victory would mean that the real carrier of a political entente with us is not merely a political figure but a whole nation. We shall be the first to sincerely salute such a victory."³¹ It was obvious, then, that for the KSCS, bilateral relations with Greece depended on the outcome of the elections.

²⁷ SDHA, CSA, 1920/49.2 Εκκλησιαστικά Σερβίας [Serbian ecclesiastical issues], Kanellopoulos to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Constantinople, 26 August 1919, No. 6482.

²⁸ Ibid., Kanellopoulos to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Constantinople, 7 March 1920, No. 1734

²⁹ The impact that the issue of the serbian/yugoslavian zone in the port of Thessaloniki had had on the greek-yugoslav relations during the interwar period is being thoroughly described in the article of Dragan Bakić, "The port of Salonica in Yugoslav Foreign Policy", *Balcanica* XLIII (2012), 191–219.

³⁰ Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia; hereafter: AJ], 336–F-59-XIIG/2, Delegacija Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca na Konferenciji Mira u Parizu, Pašić to Gavrilović, Paris, 17 February 1919, No. 214.

³¹ Politika, 10/10/1920.

From the Greek elections (November 1920) to the end of the Greek-Turkish war (August/September 1922)

Liberals won the majority of votes in the elections, but because of the complicated electoral system the United Opposition won a vast majority of seats in Parliament and formed a new government. One of the first moves of the incoming pro-royalist government was to hold a referendum on the return of King Constantine, hated both by the Entente powers and by the KSCS because of his pro-German attitude during the First World War. On 6 December 1920, in a climate of fanaticism and deep political polarization, the referendum was held despite Liberals' abstention. A few days later King Constantine was reinstated triumphantly. The course of events caused considerable concern in Belgrade. The restoration of the pro-German political elite in Greece also had a psychological effect in the KSCS. Thus, their victory was considered as a setback in Greek-Yugoslav relations.

At the same time, the KSCS was coming to an agreement with Italy over Dalmatia. The Treaty of Rapallo signed on 12 November 1920 provided for the creation of the Free State of Fiume and the cession of Zara (Zadar) to Italy, thereby depriving the KSCS of an outlet to the ports of the Adriatic. So, the dependence of the Yugoslav trade on the port of Thessaloniki became even greater. Moreover, the prospect of Aleksandar Stamboliyski's visit to Belgrade in early 1921 was an additional cause for concern for Athens. Following Constantine's return, France had radically changed its policy towards Greece and supported a Yugoslav-Bulgarian rapprochement.³² The combination of all these factors generated in Athens the fear of a diplomatic isolation at a time when the war in Asia Minor was moving towards a new phase.

Yet, Belgrade had good reasons not to change its policy towards Athens. The Yugoslavs believed that Stamboliyski's party, the Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union (BAPU), maintained contacts with the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), whose demand for an autonomous Macedonia was widening the rift between the two countries. The fact that the local population in Serbian Macedonia voted for the CPY, at IMRO leader's (Todor Aleksandrov) instigation, both in local and in parliamentary elections in 1920 was indicative of Bulgarian influence in the area. Furthermore, the armed action of IMRO in late 1920 and the Protocol of Tirana, i.e. an agreement signed by the Committee of Kosovo and IMRO, led to the closing of the Yugoslav-Bul-

³² Documents on British Foreign Policy, First Series [hereafter DBFP], vol. XII: The Balkan States, January 19 – December 31, 1920 (London: HMSO, 1962), No. 488, Memorandum by Mr. Nicolson on future foreign policy towards King Constantine, London, 20 December 1920.

garian border.³³ Thus, although Constantine had not been officially recognized by the Yugoslav government, relations between Athens and Belgrade remained unharmed and Greece was still considered an ally.³⁴ The Bulgarian danger was still the common denominator of Greek-Yugoslav interests. On 11 April 1921 a joint note by Greece, KSCS and Romania was delivered to Sofia accusing the Bulgarian government of encouraging guerrilla activities and demanding urgent measures for the dissolution of revolutionary committees,³⁵ while at the same time Belgrade's Press made hints that the KSCS was planning to take over the mines in Pernik should Bulgaria keep avoiding implementing the Peace Treaties.³⁶ Additionally, contacts between Kemalists and Bulgarian revolutionary organizations, a visit of BAPU members to Ankara and the Bulgarian government's secret communication with Moscow were some of the proofs that Sofia's intentions were not in compliance with the spirit of the Peace Treaties.

At the insistence of both the French and British ambassadors in Belgrade, however, Pašić consented to receive the Bulgarian Minister of Interior, Aleksandar Dimitrov.³⁷ In view of the forthcoming vote on the new Constitution, Pašić wanted to appease the Croatian Peasant Party of Stijepan Radić and the Alliance of Agrarian Workers of Mihajlo Avramović, both supporters of a rapprochement with the Bulgarian Agrarian government.³⁸ Dimitrov assured Pašić that his government had abandoned its predecessors' policy towards Macedonia, informed him that a sum of 40 million levas had been spent on combating komitadjis, and also suggested that joint action should be taken by the two countries' border authorities. However, Dimitrov was not given a warm reception. Pašić pointed out that the time was not yet ripe for the full normalization of bilateral

³³ Spyridon Sfetas, Makedonien und Interbalkanische Beziehungen 1920–1924 (Munich: Hieronymus, 1992), 66.

³⁴ Živko Avramovski, Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji. Godišnji izveštaj Britanskog poslanstva u Beogradu 1921–1938, vol. I: 1921–1930 (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 1986), 25.

³⁵ Sfetas, Makedonien und Interbalkanische Beziehungen, 69–70.

³⁶ DBFP vol. XXII: Central Europe and the Balkans 1921 (London: HMSO, 1980), No. 128, Young to Curzon, Belgrade, 3 March 1921.

³⁷ At this point it should be noted that a Bulgarian representative, Kosta Todorov, had been appointed in Belgrade in September 1920. Todorov was a close associate of Stamboliyski and a firm advocate of Yugoslav-Bulgarian friendship as well. In his first statements he stressed that: "I have come to Belgrade to restore diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and to pave the way for a new era of friendship between our countries... I must confess that the war against Serbia was not only criminal but a fratricidal one as well. We must not forget that a man is now working in the opposite direction, a man who, when accused and imprisoned in 1914 because of his pro-Serbian sentiments, stated: 'I am neither Bulgarian nor Serb, I am Yugoslav'." *Politika*, 9/9/1920. Todorov was referring to Aleksandar Stamboliyski.

³⁸ Sfetas, Makedonien und Interbalkanische Beziehungen, 72.

relations and, consequently, he turned down Bulgarian proposals.³⁹ What was more important, though, was that before Dimitrov's visit to Belgrade, the Bulgarian Prime Minister had let his Serbian counterpart know, through the Yugoslav representative in Sofia, Milan Rakić, that Bulgaria was ready to undertake, together with the KSCS, military operations against Greece. Not surprisingly, such a proposal was not even taken seriously by Pašić.⁴⁰

Similar suggestions had been also made by the Turkish side. In May 1921 the Kemalists offered an alliance to the KSCS, according to which the two countries should launch a joint attack against Greece. Turkey would regain Asia Minor and the KSCS would finally obtain an outlet in Thessaloniki. In the Turkish view the Great Powers were too engrossed with the German question to intervene, while Russia, as a Slavic country, would not oppose such a settlement.⁴¹ However, Belgrade kindly refused once again.⁴² Apart from geopolitical distortions which the return of the Turkish factor to the Balkans would entail, Pašić was also anxious about the influence that a victorious Kemalist Turkey might have upon the Muslim population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbian Macedonia and Kosovo. The fliers found in Skoplje according to which IMRO and Mustafa Kemal were working together for an autonomous Macedonia showed that Belgrade's fears were justified.⁴³

In June 1921 the KSCS and Romania signed a defensive alliance which was extended by a military convention in January 1922. These agreements were parts of a wider alliance, formed by the KSCS, Romania and Czechoslovakia on the basis of bilateral agreements, which is known as Little Entente (*Petite Entente*). Greek representatives in Belgrade and Bucharest had been kept informed of the negotiations and were also satisfied hearing from Take Ionescu, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the Greek-Serbian Treaty of Alliance and the bilateral agreements between Czechoslovakia, Romania and the KSCS were part of the same set.⁴⁴ In January 1922, General Victoras Dousmanis was sent to Belgrade and Bucharest to sound out the position of the Yugoslav and Romanian governments on the possibility of Greece participating in the Yugoslav-

³⁹ Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države, 112.

⁴⁰ DBFP, vol. XXII: Central Europe and the Balkans 1921, No. 181, Peel to Curzon, Sofia, 16 June 1921.

⁴¹ AJ, 370-1-3, Poslanstvo KJ u Turskoj – Carigrad, Ankara, 1921, Chargé d'Affaires in Constantinople to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 May 1921.

⁴² Ibid., Pašić to Chargé d'Affaires in Constantinople, Belgrade, 14 May 1921, con. No. 468.

⁴³ SDHA, CSA, 1922/12.3 Μακεδονικό Ζήτημα. Θέσεις των Βαλκανικών Χωρών. Τρόπος δράσης Μακεδονικού Κομιτάτου [Macedonian Question. Balkan Countries' Views. Macedonian Committee's mode of action], , Picheon to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Skoplje, 28 October 1921, No. 1133.

⁴⁴ DBFP vol. XXII, No. 209, Grunville to Curzon, Athens, 1 July 1921.

Romanian defensive alliance and the prolongation of the Greek-Serbian Treaty of Alliance.⁴⁵ But sending Dousmanis, an ex-adjutant of King Constantine and ardently pro-German during the First World War, in the mission did not prove to be a wise choice.⁴⁶ However, Dousmanis was given assurances by Pašić that the KSCS would defend the Treaty of Neuilly. As far as the Greek-Turkish conflict was concerned, the Yugoslav government adopted a stance of benevolent neutrality.

In June 1922, on the occasion of the royal wedding between King Alexander Karadjordjević and the Romanian Princess, Maria of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a Greek delegation made up of the Ministers of Foreign and Military Affairs, Georgios Baldatzis and Nikolaos Theotokis, was sent to Belgrade. The two men raised once more the question of Greece's joining the Little Entente.⁴⁷ The uncertainty about the final outcome of the Greek-Turkish war in Asia Minor was causing great anxiety in Athens about the fate of Western Thrace. That is the reason why the Greek government sought for diplomatic support abroad.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Avramovski, Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji, 94.

⁴⁵ Alexis Kyrou, *Οι Βαλκανικοί γείτονές μας* [Our Balkan neighbours] (Athens 1962) 162. According to Yugoslav diplomatic sources the purpose of Dousmanis' visit to Bucharest was to lay the foundations of a Greek-Romanian defensive alliance, something that the Romanians ruled out before the war in Asia Minor was over. AJ, 395-7-28 Poslanstvo KJ u Rumuniji – Bukurešt, Yugoslav Embassy to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bucharest, 25 January 1922, No. 47, and highly confidential, 28 January 1922, No. 50. It should also be noted that the first attempt of joining the Yugoslav-Romanian-Czechoslovak coalition had been made by Venizelos in 1920, just after signing the Treaty of Sevres. Venizelos believed that the safest way to secure his achievements was an alliance concluded by the winners, which would restrain revisionist tendencies. But he encountered firm opposition from Edvard Beneš, who was more inclined towards Bulgarian participation. On the other hand, Take Ionescu, who wanted a wider alliance which would extend from the North Sea to the gulf of Thessaloniki, supported Venizelos. The KSCS held an attitude of ambivalence. Although it did not oppose Venizelos' viewpoints, it wished to disassociate Central Europe's issues from the Balkan ones. SDHA, PEA, 1920/3.6, op. cit., Simopoulos to Politis, Prague, 3 August 1920, No. 298; Mavroudis to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade, 22 July 1920, No. 956, attached to No. 10130 confidential, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Hellenic Embassy in Paris, Athens, 8 August 1920; Politis to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 15/28 August 1920, No. 5658

⁴⁶ C. Iordan, Romănia şi relațiile internaționale din sud estul European: probleme ale păcii, securității şi cooperării (1919–1924) (Bucharest: All Istoric, 1999), 60. According to German sources the distrust towards Dousmanis shown by the Yugoslav side was a serious obstacle to the extension of the Treaty of Alliance which was to expire the following year, cf. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes [hereafter PAAA], Bonn, Akten betreffend politische Beziehungen zwischen, Griechenland und Jugoslawien, R 72 627, B I (5.10.1921 – 27.11.1925), German Embassy to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade, 2 February 1922, No. 126.

⁴⁸ PAAA, R 72 627, B 1, German Embassy to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 8 May 1922, No. 177.

The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the two sides had discussed several matters, such as the status of Western Thrace, the renewal of the Greek-Serbian Treaty of Alliance (1913), the Serbian free zone in the port of Thessa-loniki and coordinated action on behalf of Greece, the KSCS and Romania in order to eliminate the activities of komitadjis within their own countries.⁴⁹ Yet, measures were taken only for the latter. It was evident that the Greek-Yugoslav collaboration was limited to coping with Bulgarian revisionism. There were no doubts, thus, that a closer cooperation between Athens and Belgrade was hampered by the Greek involvement in Asia Minor.

From the Greek debacle in Asia Minor (August/September 1922) to the Treaty of Lausanne (July 1923)

Under the pressure of the military disaster, the chaotic and bloody evacuation of Smyrna and the uprooting of hundreds of thousands Greeks from their ancestral homeland in Asia Minor, King Constantine abdicated, for the second time in five years, and was succeeded by his son George II. A new government under Sotirios Krokidas was formed. Yet, the real power was in the hands of the Revolutionary Committee, composed by pro-Venizelist officers (Colonels Nikolaos Plastiras and Stylianos Gonatas, and Commander Dimitrios Fokas), while the reins of Greek foreign policy were given again to Elefhterios Venizelos provided that Greece should consent to the loss of Eastern Thrace, as France persistently wanted. Apart from rapid political changes in Greece, the rise of Benito Mussolini to power in Italy and the divergent attitudes of the French and the British towards Turkey were making up the political context in which Belgrade and Athens were to adjust their policies.

For the KSCS a Turkish comeback to European soil would only have an adverse effect. The 24 September 1922 issue of *Politika* remarked that "to the Italian-Hungarian-Bulgarian chain a Turkish link must also be added".⁵⁰ Thus, the question of Thrace was of major importance for the Yugoslav officials. Pašić initially opposed the advance of Turkish troops beyond Gallipoli, while Momčilo Ninčić, Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, concurred with the French stance, which supported the restoration of Turkish rule in Eastern Thrace.⁵¹ Apart from that, for the KSCS it was fundamental that a possible amendment to the status quo in Thrace should not be combined with border change in favour of Bulgaria.⁵²

⁴⁹ Politika, 10/6/1922; Καθημερινή [Kathimerini], 2/6/1922.

⁵⁰ Politika, 24/09/1922.

⁵¹ In the end, however, Pašić aligned with his Minister's position.

⁵² Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države, 177–178.

At the same time, Balugdžić in a bid to allay Greek concerns stated that the Yugoslav government would do its utmost to minimize Turkey's territorial gains in Thrace and that the KSCS did not intended to denunciate the Greek-Serbian Treaty of Alliance.⁵³ On the other hand, though, Ninčić finally accepted Stamboliyski's request to visit Belgrade. The rise of fascism in Italy forced Belgrade to reassess its relations with Sofia, given that Rome had been financing guerrilla activities and Bulgarian propaganda in Serbian Macedonia. From the Bulgarian perspective it was believed that after the Greek defeat in Asia Minor the circumstances were favourable for snatching Western Thrace and to that end a rapprochement with the KSCS was indispensable.

That really bothered Greek officials who rushed to arrange a meeting with their Yugoslav counterparts earlier than the Bulgarians. On 5 November 1922 the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nikolaos Politis, visited Belgrade. For Greece it was more necessary than ever before to tighten the relations with its traditional ally. Therefore the purpose of Politis' visit was to secure diplomatic support to the upcoming Conference in Lausanne. Politis was warmly welcomed by Pašić and Ninčić and the talks held in a friendly atmosphere. Several issues, both of economic and political nature, were put on the table. Politis conveyed to Ninčić his government's will to meet its commitments arising from the 1914 Convention on the Serbian transit trade through the port of Thessaloniki and he stressed that a new commercial agreement between the two countries was also needed.⁵⁴ As for political matters, Politis argued that the Greek government had no intentions to expel the Slavophones of Western Macedonia in order to settle Greek refugees from Asia Minor, as the Yugoslav Press had been suggesting.⁵⁵ He also argued that Greece had not so far intervened in favour of the Greek population in Northern Macedonia despite their countless appeals, and that Yugoslav press reports could be considered as interference in the internal affairs of Greece.⁵⁶ Moreover, Politis brought to Ninčić's attention the recent unrest in Nevrokop and suggested joint action with Romania in order to tackle the danger stemming from the Bulgarian komitadjis.⁵⁷ As far as the Bulgarian outlet to the Aegean Sea was concerned, the Greek Minister mentioned that it was his government's intentions to provide further facilitations, regarding the navigation on Evros (Maritsa) river and the railway line Karagatsi-Alexandroupoli (Dedeagach), following the example of the Convention signed for the navigation

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid. 176.

⁵⁴ SDHA, CSA, 1922/17.5 Εξωτερικών και Εσωτερική Πολιτική Σερβίας [Foreign and Domestic Policy of Serbia], Records of the talks between Ninčić, Pašić and Politis, Belgrade, 23 October/5 November 1922.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

on Danube.58 For their part, the Yugoslav officials stressed that the Greek government should not pay attention to various rumours spread by the press and that the minority issues between the two countries should be solved by bilateral agreements and not by the intervention of the League of Nations. For the same reason - that is to say to avoid international mediation - the Yugoslav Minister declined Politis' offer for common action against komitadjis. He noted, though, that due to racial kinship the Yugoslav government was obliged to maintain unrelenting focus on the Slavophones of Western Macedonia.⁵⁹ Regarding the Bulgarian outlet to the Aegean, Ninčić outlined that Belgrade would not give its consent to Bulgarian excessive demands and recommended that no initiative should be taken on this particular issue before the opening of the Conference.⁶⁰ In reply to Politis' query about the attitude of the KSCS in case of a new Greek-Turkish conflict, Ninčić gave assurances that Belgrade would not tolerate a Bulgarian assault on Greece,⁶¹ but evaded pledging direct military support to Greece. Finally, King Alexander pointed out that the reorganization of the Greek Army⁶² and the consolidation of the new regime in Athens was of paramount importance not only for Greece but also for the whole Balkan Peninsula.⁶³

A few days later Stamboliyski was received in Belgrade. It was the first time since the Balkan Wars that a Bulgarian Prime Minister visited Serbian capital. In order to gain Yugoslav government's support on the issue of the Bulgarian outlet to the Aegean, Stamboliyski had waived any territorial claims on Serbian Macedonia, renounced the destabilizing activities of the Bulgarian-Macedonian organizations which were turning against the KSCS and promised to take measures against the komitadjis.⁶⁴ For Bulgaria, an outlet, either as an internationalization of a strip of territory from the Bulgarian border to Alexandroupoli or as a form of autonomy for Western Thrace – which would ultimately lead to the annexation to Bulgaria – was interpreted as a territorial one. However, the Yu-

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² One of the most difficult tasks that the Revolutionary Committee had been charged with was to form a capable fighting force from the remnants of the Army of Asia and restore order and discipline in the army. This mission was carried out successfully by General Theodoros Pangalos. Very soon Greece disposed of an army of more than 100,000 soldiers capable of undertaking a new offensive on Eastern Thrace.

⁶³ Ιστορικό Αρχείο Ελευθερίου Βενιζέλου [Historical Archive of Eleftherios Venizelos (HAVE)], I/42/126, Politis to Venizelos, Belgrade, 5 November 1922, No. 212

⁶⁴ Živko Avramovski, "Makedonsko pitanje u jugoslovensko-bugarskim odnosima od 1918. do 1925. godine", in *Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi u XX veku*, vol. I, ed. Živko Avramovski (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju; Narodna knjiga, 1980), 162.

goslav officials doubted Stamboliyski's competence and decisiveness to impose his will in his own country. Besides that, the possibility of an autonomous Western Thrace entailed a lot of dangers for Serbian Macedonia, since it would infringe on the Treaty of Neuilly. In fact, during the Peace Conference in Lausanne Ninčić stated that "...the word autonomy should not be used in the Balkans."⁶⁵

The Conference in Lausanne opened in late November 1922. The Turkish delegation was highly assertive, raising territorial claims in Karaagach and Didymoteicho and demanding a plebiscite for Western Thrace. Likewise, the Bulgarian delegation put forward autonomy as the solution for Western Thrace, or at least its neutralization under international command, as the most appropriate way to ensure an outlet to the Aegean Sea, rejecting all alternatives presented by Venizelos. More or less the same also went for Turkey. As the Greek-Turkish differences seemed irreconcilable, the resumption of warfare was still a plausible scenario. In this fluctuating and uncertain situation, Venizelos sought to form a common front with the KSCS. In late December he submitted an informal proposal to the Yugoslav ambassador in Paris and member of the Yugoslav delegation in Lausanne, Miroslav Spalajković, according to which Greece was willing to cede the city of Florina with its districts to the KSCS in exchange for military cooperation against Turkey.⁶⁶ In particular, Venizelos' plan provided for a Yugoslav mediation to Paris and London in favour of Greece and for the deployment of two Yugoslav divisions (or one division and heavy artillery) across the Greek-Turkish front and of another two divisions to the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border. In case of success Greece would regain Eastern Thrace up to Çatalca and the Florina district would be granted to the KSCS.⁶⁷ Despite its initial objections due to the cession of Greek territory, the Revolutionary Committee gave its consent to Venizelos' plan.⁶⁸ In late January Lieutenant General Alexandros Mazarakis-Ainian was sent to Belgrade carrying a letter of Venizelos to Pašić with the aforementioned content. But Pašić avoided meeting him. According to Mazarakis, Pašić's reluctance to receive him should be imputed to French intervention.⁶⁹ Reckoning that a new round of the Greek-Turkish war in Eastern Thrace could lead to the Soviet invasion of Romania with the prospect of turn-

⁶⁵ Paximadopoulou-Stavrinou, Η Δυτική Θράκη, 216, fn. 19.

⁶⁶ Υπουργείο των Εξωτερικών, 1919–1940, Ελληνικά Διπλωματικά Έγγραφα, τ. 3 [Ypourgeio ton Eksoterikon, Greek Diplomatic Documents, vol. III] (Athens 1994), Venizelos to Alexandris, Lausanne, 18/31 December 1922, No. 216.

⁶⁷ Ibid., Venizelos to Alexandris, Lausanne, 8/21 January 1923, No. 321, ed. n. 408–409, and Venizelos to Alexandris, Lausanne, 9/22 January 1923, No. 323. See also HAVE, I/43/16α, Venizelos to Alexandris, Lausanne, 19 January 1923, No. 484.

⁶⁸ Ibid., Plastiras, Gonatas, Alexandris to Venizelos, Athens, 19 December 1922/1 January, 1923, No. 221.

⁶⁹ Alexandrou Mazaraki-Ainianos, Απομνημονεύματα [Memoirs] (Athens: Ikaros, 1948), 330.

ing a localized conflict into an international crisis, French policy-makers exercised their influence on the Yugoslav government to dodge military adventures.⁷⁰

Apart from that, the Yugoslavs did not intend to come to any political agreement with Greece unless the issue of the free zone in the port of Thessaloniki was solved.71 It was more than obvious that the circumstances favoured the Yugoslav cause and that it was the most opportune time for the KSCS to obtain tangible concessions. Having consulted with his government in Belgrade, Živojin Balugdžić addressed a memorandum to the Greek Minister of National Finance, Andreas Hadjikyriakos, which set forth the Yugoslav position (the free trade zone should be extended for the needs of bilateral trade with Greece; joint Greek-Yugoslav railway stations should be established in Thessaloniki and Gevgeli; and Yugoslav customs officials should operate in the free zone which should be granted to the KSCS).⁷² A group of Greek experts was charged with the task to assess the Yugoslav memorandum and come up with a plan. The Greek side acquiesced to ceding part of Thessaloniki's port but insisted that the customs, police and judicial authorities remain under Greek jurisdiction in that part as well. In order to maintain its sovereignty the Greek government was also planning, as an alternative, to hand over the management of the free zone to a private Yugoslavian enterprise.⁷³ As expected, Belgrade was not satisfied and, in fact, it did not fail to express its discontent. The statements that Balugdžić gave to the Politika on 11 February 1923 were most characteristic. In reference to the question of the Serbian free zone, the Yugoslav Minister in Athens stressed that: ... it was the fulfilment of an obligation in the framework of the Greek-Serbian Alliance as a condition for the recognition of Greek sovereignty over Thessaloniki... Thessaloniki had been saved in the Second Balkan War by common efforts... Complete freedom for our import and export trade must not be seen as a concession."74 He also believed that Athens had no choice but to relent,75 while both the Greek and Yugoslav Press were stressing that the Yugoslav government would exert much more pressure on Greece on the issue of the Thessaloniki port as long as the route to the Adriatic was cut off by Italy.⁷⁶ At the same time

⁷⁰ AJ, 395-9-96, Ninčić to Yugoslav Embassy in Bucharest, Belgrade, 15 January 1923, No. 339.

⁷¹ DBFP, vol. XXIV: Central Europe and the Balkans 1922–23 (London: HMSO, 1983), Young to Curzon, Belgrade, 4 January 1923, No. 236.

⁷² See also Bakić, "The port of Salonica in Yugoslav Foreign Policy 1919–1941", 198.

⁷³ Ibid., Bentinck to Curzon, Athens, 10 March 1923, No. 294.

⁷⁴ Politika, 23/02/1923.

⁷⁵ AJ, 334-9-29, Ministarstvo inostranih poslova KJ, Balugdžić to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 24 December 1922.

⁷⁶ DBFP, vol. XXIV: Central Europe and the Balkans 1922–23, Young to Curzon, Belgrade, 4 January 1923, No. 238, fn. 1; Ελεύθερο Βήμα [Eleftheron Vima], 21/03/1923.

Yugoslav-Bulgarian negotiations about the question of komitadjis, whose action had become uncontrollable, were launched in Niš. As in the past, the likelihood of a South-Slavic rapprochement between Belgrade and Sofia fuelled anxiety in Athens.

In view of the re-opening of the Conference in Lausanne, the new Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Apostolos Alexandris, visited Belgrade on 14 April 1923 in order to be informed about the negotiations in Niš and also to obtain Yugoslav views on the questions that were to be further discussed in Lausanne. Alexandris was expressly reassured that the talks in Niš were of a technical nature and that no political agreement had been reached between the two sides.⁷⁷ Apart from that, Pašić and Ninčić reiterated that the KSCS should remain neutral in case of a Greek-Turkish war and that it was also willing to make a diplomatic demarche to Sofia so as to ward off an attack in the rear of the Greek army. The Yugoslav officials also stressed to Alexandris that the Yugoslav delegation would stand up for Greece on the question of the war reparations which Ankara persistently demanded and that the KSCS would not tolerate any solution for Western Thrace which would not be acceptable to Athens.⁷⁸ In return, Alexandris demonstrated good will to address Yugoslav demands regarding the free zone in the port of Thessaloniki on condition that Greek sovereignty was preserved. In particular, the Greeks accepted the establishment of Yugoslav custom authorities within the zone, but they insisted that the harbourmaster had police and judicial jurisdiction over the zone. Besides, the Greek side ruled out the possibility of the appointment of a Yugoslav vice-harbourmaster, which, for the Greeks, would indicate a form of a Greek-Yugoslav condominium over the port. The two sides came to terms on 10 May 1923 when the Convention on the Regulation of Transit via Salonica was signed at Belgrade. Unlike the 1914 Convention the new one contained an explicit reference to a "Serbian Free Zone".⁷⁹ The zone was an integral part of Greek territory but labelled as "Serbian" and based on the legislation of the KSCS. The employees were citizens of the KSCS and were appointed by its government.

The agreement had a positive effect on the Greek cause in Lausanne. After the Convention had been signed the Yugoslav delegation sided with Venizelos in rejecting the Turkish demands for war reparations.⁸⁰ However, in mid-May 1923 while the negotiations in Lausanne seemed to have reached an impasse the Yugoslav government refused to make a demarche to Sofia as had been prom-

⁷⁷ Sfetas, Makedonien und Interbalkanische Beziehungen, 163.

⁷⁸ DBFP, vol. XXIV: Central Europe and the Balkans 1922–23, Young to Curzon, Belgrade, 12 April 1923, No. 325.

⁷⁹ Paximadopoulou-Stavrinou, Η Δυτική Θράκη, 242, fn. 106.

⁸⁰ Υπουργείο των Εξωτερικών, 1919–1940, Kaklamanos to Alexandris, Lausanne, 7 May 1923, No. 520.

ised to Alexandris. Ninčić justified his government's decision by stressing that Belgrade did not desire to encourage bellicose tendencies⁸¹ in Greece but, on the contrary, to preserve peace in the area. He reasserted that the KSCS would remain neutral as regards the Greek-Turkish conflict but underlined that similar assurances would not be given either to Turkey or to Bulgaria.⁸² In other words the Yugoslav government intended to create some sort of peer pressure on all concerned and also to highlight that the resumption of warfare was the worstcase scenario. Finally, the Greek-Turkish dispute was settled after a personal agreement between Venizelos and Ismet Inönü, head of the Turkish delegation in Lausanne. Venizelos consented to the cession of Karaagach to Turkey and in return Inönü abandoned all claims to war reparations. In this way Venizelos avoided a war which would probably have had unspeakable repercussions for Greece and at the same time posed a major obstacle to the Bulgarian outlet to the Aegean Sea, since that should now pass through Turkish territory.

Conclusion

For Greece the Treaty of Lausanne (24 June 1923) signified the end of an era. The dream of a *Greece of two continents and five seas* with Constantinople as its capital had faded away once and for all. The entombment of the *Megali Idea* drove Greek foreign policy in completely different directions. Territorial integrity and national security were now the main priorities of the Greek governments which at the same time were facing political instability, economic devastation and social upheaval caused by the influx of more than one million refugees from Asia Minor, Eastern Thrace and the Black Sea. By contrast, the KSCS, despite its domestic problems, had an enhanced role in European and, particularly, Balkan politics. In such circumstances the traditional Greek-Serbian/Yugo-slav friendship was put to the test. In November 1924 Belgrade denounced the Greek-Serbian Treaty of Alliance (1913) on the pretext of the Greek-Bulgarian protocol on minorities signed in September 1924. Given that the Yugoslav of-

⁸¹ It is true that the high-ranking officers of the Revolutionary Committee were urging Venizelos to let them undertake military operations even without Yugoslav assistance. But Venizelos ruled out that possibility claiming that without the approval of the Entente Powers and Bulgarian neutrality every military initiative taken by the Greek Army should be considered as a national suicide. Ibid., Venizelos to Alexandris, Lausanne, 2/15 January 1923, No. 296. See also HAVE, I/43/11, Venizelos to Alexandris (via London), Lausanne, 1/14 January 1923, No. 829.

⁸² Υπουργείο των Εξωτερικών, 1919–1940, Mavroudis to Venizelos, Belgrade, 24 May 1923, No. 578 and 579; AJ 395–9-95, Ninčić to Yugoslav Embassy in Bucharest, Belgrade, 24 May 1923, No. 219.

ficials had been aware of the content of the Greek-Bulgarian negotiations, one may conclude that the real reason for the denunciation was that the KSCS⁸³ wanted to impose its views regarding several bilateral issues upon Greece by negotiating a new alliance treaty with the Greek government from a position of strength. Apparently, Greece's weakness worked in the favour of such a manoeuver. Since then bilateral relations between Athens and Belgrade entered a cold period. It was only after Venizelos' return to power in 1928 and the conclusion of a Greek-Italian Treaty of amity, reconciliation and juridical settlement that the policy-makers in the KSCS started again to look upon their Greek counterparts as equal partners.

> UDC 94(495:497.1) 327(495:497.1)[°]1919/1923[°]

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⁸³ See also Bakić, "The port of Salonica in Yugoslav Foreign Policy 1919–1941", 198–202.

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Nikola Pašić and the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 1919–1926^{**}

- Abstract: This paper looks at Nikola Pašić's views of and contribution to the foreign policy of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS/Yugoslavia after1929) during the latest phase of his political career, a subject that has been neglected by historians. His activities in this field are divided into two periods – during the Paris Peace Conference where he was the head of the SCS Kingdom's delegation and after 1921 when he became Prime Minister, who also served as his own Foreign Minister. During the peace conference, Pašić held strong views on all the major problems that faced his delegation, particularly the troubled delimitation with Italy in the Adriatic. In early 1920, he alone favoured the acceptance of the so-called Lloyd George-Clemenceau ultimatum, believing that the time was working against the SCS Kingdom. The Rapallo Treaty with Italy late that year proved him right. Upon taking the reins of government, Pašić was energetic in opposing the two restoration attempts of Karl Habsburg in Hungary and persistent in trying to obtain northern parts of the still unsettled Albania. In time, his hold on foreign policy was weakening, as King Alexander asserted his influence, especially through the agency of Momčilo Ninčić, Foreign Minister after January 1922. Pašić was tougher that King and Ninčić in the negotiations with Mussolini for the final settlement of the status of the Adriatic town of Fiume and the parallel conclusion of the 27 January 1924 friendship treaty (the Pact of Rome). Since domestic politics absorbed much of his time and energy, the old Prime Minister was later even less visible in foreign policy. He was forced to resign in April 1926 on account of his son's corruption scandal shortly before the final break-down of relations with Italy.
- Keywords: Nikola Pašić, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Yugoslav state, foreign policy, peace conference, Pact of Rome

O n 10 December 2016, it will have been exactly ninety years since Nikola Pašić (1845–1926), one of the most prominent statesmen in modern Serbian history, passed away. His political career spanning over five decades was an integral part of the turbulent past of Serbia in the last twenty years of the nineteenth and the first quarter of the twentieth century. During this time, Pašić became the leader of Radicals, the largest political party in the country, and opposed the absolutist rule of the Obrenović dynasty struggling for parliamentary democracy; he emerged as Prime Minister following the coup d'état in 1903 and presided over what is often referred to as the golden age of Serbia

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^{**} It should be clarified that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS) was the official name of the country until 1929 when it was changed to Yugoslavia. The latter name, as well as the term Yugoslavs (South Slavs) for its inhabitants, was often used even before 1929.

under King Petar I Kardjordjević until the outbreak of war in 1914; he led his country through all the trials and tribulations of the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) and the Great War; and he maintained the key position in political life of the newly-formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS) until his death in advanced age. Consequently, it is difficult to overstate the crucial role that the grand old man of Serbia played in all aspects of her internal and foreign policy, and, given the importance of Serbia in the build-up to and during the First World War, incommensurate with her size and strength, in international history of this troubled period.

Naturally, Pašić has been the subject of much historiographical interest, although his scholarly biography is yet to be written.¹ As a result of the emergence of Yugoslavia on 1 December 1918, Pašić's premiership during the First World War with special reference to the development of the Yugoslav question has received by far the most scholarly attention.² As for studies of Pašić's impact on the newly-formed SCS Kingdom, they are mostly concerned with internal politics, and particularly with the central issue of the tumultuous Serbo-Croat relations.³ In contrast, there is not a single work that focuses on the role of Pašić in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy – as opposed to the general surveys of that policy and a multitude of studies that address specific topics.⁴

¹ Most informative works on different aspects of Pašić's political life are Nikola Pašić: život i delo, Zbornik radova sa naučnog skupa u Srpskoj akademiji nauka i umetnosti (Zaječar: Zadužbina "Nikola Pašić," 1995); Vasa Kazimirović, Nikola Pašić i njegovo doba I-II (Belgrade: Nova Evropa, 1990); Djordje Stanković, Nikola Pašić: prilozi za biografiju (Belgrade: Plato, 2006); a masterly portrait of Pašić's contemporary is provided in Slobodan Jovanović, Moji savremenici: o Nikoli Pašiću i Pismo iz Londona (Belgrade: Beoknjiga, 2014), 9–104.

² Charles Jelavich, "Nikola P. Pašić: Greater Serbia or Jugoslavia?" Journal of Central European Affairs 11 (1951), 133–152; Alex Dragnich, Serbia, Nikola Pašić and Yugoslavia (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1974); Dragoslav Janković, Jugoslovensko pitanje i Krfska deklaracija 1917. godine (Belgrade: Savremena administracija, 1967); Dragoslav Janković, "Veliki' i'mali' ratni program Nikole Pašića (1914–1918)", Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu 2 (1973), 151–167; Djordje Stanković, Nikola Pašić i jugoslovensko pitanje 1-2 (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1985); Djordje Stanković, Srbija i stvaranje Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2009); Djordje Radenković, Pašić i Jugoslavija (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1999); Dragovan Šepić, Italija, saveznici i jugoslovensko pitanje, 1914–1918 (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1970); Vojislav Pavlović, De la Serbie vers la Yougoslavie: la France et la naissance de la Yougoslavie 1878–1918 (Belgrade: Institut des études balcaniques, 2015).

³ Alex Dragnich, *The First Yugoslavia: Search for a Viable Political System* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983); Djordje Stanković, *Nikola Pašić i Hrvati*, 1918–1923 (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1995); Gordana Jović-Krivokapić, "Nikola Pašić 1918–1926: kraj jedne karijere", *Tokovi istorije* 1 (2011), 32–45.

⁴ E.g. see Vuk Vinaver, "O spoljnopolitičkoj orijentaciji Jugoslavije, 1920–1925", Zbornik za društvene nauke 44 (1966), 23–59; Bogdan Krizman, Vanjska politika jugoslavenske države 1918–1941: diplomatsko-historijski pregled (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1975); Bojan Dimitrijević

Partial exception to this omission are the treatments of the proceedings of the SCS delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, of which Pašić was the head.⁵ This apparent lacuna in the existing historiography is more understandable in the light of the fragmentary nature of primary sources – to a large extent, lost during the Second World War – that makes any attempt to determine Pašić's personal influence on foreign policy a difficult venture. Nevertheless, such an attempt is both necessary and possible; that is exactly what this paper proposes to do.

In view of his role during the Great War, Pašić was surprisingly not the first Prime Minister of the SCS Kingdom in the Cabinet formed on 7 December 1918. Although he was unanimously proposed for this position by all Serbian political parties and the representatives of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from the former provinces of the Habsburg Empire, Prince Regent Alexander refused to confirm his premiership, giving a taste of his autocratic ambitions. Stojan Protić, a fellow Radical, formed a coalition Cabinet instead - Pašić was not even its member.⁶ To Pašić's and his supporters' chagrin, Ante Trumbić, the head of the Yugoslav Committee which had represented the Habsburg South Slavs during the war and clashed with Serbia's Prime Minister, was appointed the Foreign Minister. The long-serving Serbian Minister in Paris, Milenko Vesnić, even offered his resignation on account of his dissatisfaction with Trumbić's inimical attitude towards Pašić and the entire Serbian government.⁷ On 22 December 1918, Protic's Cabinet appointed the delegation of the SCS Kingdom for the Peace Conference in Paris with Pašić at its head. Josip Smodlaka, a prominent Croat politician from Dalmatia, has claimed that he insisted on Pašić's appointment, since the latter had not been allowed to be Prime Minister.⁸ Be that as it may, the grand old man of Serbia found himself in Paris in early January.

and Stanislav Sretenović, "Spoljna politika Kraljevine SHS/Jugoslavije 1918–1941", *Istorija* 20. veka 26/2 (2008), 45–83.

⁵ Ivo Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference: a Study in Frontiermaking (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); Andrej Mitrović, Jugoslavija na konferenciji mira 1919–1920 (Belgrade: Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika, 1969); Dejan Djokić, Nikola Pašić and Ante Trumbić: The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (London: Haus Publishing, 2010). Djokić's work is largely based on those of Lederer and Mitrović.

⁶ Branislav Gligorijević, "Kralj Aleksandar Karadjordjević i Nikola Pašić", in *Nikola Pašić: život i delo* (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 1997), 428, has ascribed the Regent's ill will towards Pašić to his bitterness on account of the latter's handling of the Geneva declaration in November 1918 that enunciated the principles on which the Yugoslav state was going to be organised.

⁷ Radoslav Vesnić, Dr Milenko Vesnić: gransenjer srpske diplomatije (Belgrade: Prometej, 2008), 450–451.

⁸ Dragan Stojković, ed., Zapisi Dra Josipa Smodlake (Zemun: Mostart, 2012), 124.


Pašić was the only head of a major delegation, with the exception of Japan, who was not at the same time Prime Minister or President of his country. He led a seven-member strong political delegation located in the Hôtel de Beau-Site on the Rue de Presbourg that was supported by around 100 exceedingly able technical experts and secretaries. The all-important Political Section of the delegation was designed to reflect the composition of the SCS Kingdom founded on the premise that its population constituted a single - though threenamed - Yugoslav nation. It thus consisted of three Serbs, Pašić, Vesnić, and the former Serbian Minister in London Mateja Bošković; two Dalmatian Croats, Trumbić and Smodlaka; and two Slovenes, Ivan Žolger, university professor and formerly a holder of a ministerial post in the Habsburg service, and Otokar Ribarž, a prominent leader from Trieste and the Slovene littoral. Pašić, Trumbić, Žolger and Vesnić were plenipotentiaries who took part in the deliberations of the conference, while the other three men were "governmental delegates" equal with them in decision-making process within the delegation. In his capacity, Pašić had a direct and strictly confidential communication with Prime Minister in Belgrade, which allowed him to relay his personal views on different issues raised in Paris. These views were not necessarily those of the delegation as a whole, of which he made clear, but they were eagerly awaited in Belgrade. Pašić was by no means the only delegate who could contact the government at will: Foreign Minister Trumbić and the Parisian Minister Vesnić had their own channels of communication.9 Despite the fact that he had no ministerial responsibility, the sheer reputation of the 74-year-old Pašić secured a considerable weight for his opinion both within the Yugoslav delegation and before the delegations of other powers.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the composition of Yugoslav delegation - Trumbić alone was a member of Cabinet - dictated that all the major decisions had to be made or approved of in Belgrade. Given the problems involved in the war-ravaged system of communications, this was a handicap for the delegation insofar it lacked authorisation to make decisions at crucial times; on the other hand, this could also provide a convenient excuse for avoiding or postponing difficult decisions.

This analysis will not detail the work of the SCS delegation regarding the delimitation with the neighbouring countries, since that has been done elsewhere.¹¹ It will examine in broad lines the views and contribution of Pašić, and offer an assessment of his activities in Paris. But to scrutinise Pašić's influence

⁹ Mitrović, Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira, 37–38.

¹⁰ Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, 91–93.

¹¹Apart from the cited monographs of Lederer and Mitrović, see also the latter's *Razgraničenje* Jugoslavije sa Mađarskom i Rumunijom 1919–1920: prilog proučavanju jugoslovenske politike na Konferenciji mira u Parizu (Novi Sad: Forum, 1975); Bogdan Krizman, "Pitanje granica Vojvodine na Pariškoj mirovnoj konferenciji 1919. godine", Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene



Nikola Pašić [Politka Online]

and effectiveness, and indeed those of the entire SCS delegation, is to understand that the Yugoslavs laboured under extremely difficult conditions. The fledgling state had territorial claims against six of its seven neighbours, allies and enemies alike - the old Serbian border with Greece was the only one out of dispute. Worst of all, the formally allied Italy proved to be from the outset an incubus of every single Yugoslav aspiration in terms of territorial settlement and political stabilisation. The root of the trouble lay in Italy's designs on the Slovene and Croat-populated provinces of Istria and Dalmatia which had been promised to her under the terms of the secret Treaty of London concluded on 26 April 1915 in exchange for her entry into war on the side of the Entente Powers.¹² The encroachment on Dalmatia and large part of Istria was a blatant abrogation of the nationality principle as there were a few Italians living in these lands. As signatories of the London Treaty, Britain and France were bound to support Italian claims on the Yugoslav territories - in what became known as the Adriatic question - whereas the American President, Woodrow Wilson, the champion of the right to national self-determination, sided with the Yugoslavs.

But Italian enmity did not just stem from conflicting territorial claims; it was grounded in Rome's opposition to the very existence of any large and

nauke 24 (1959), 31–72; Desanka Todorović, "Pitanje jugoslovensko-bugarske granice na Mirovnoj konferenciji u Parizu 1919–1920", *Istorija XX veka: zbornik radova* IX (1968), 63–126.

¹² Milan Marjanović, Londonski ugovor iz godine 1915.: prilog povijesti borbe za Jadran 1914– 1917 (Zagreb: JAZU, 1960); Šepić, Italija, saveznici i jugoslovensko pitanje, 1–75.

independent Yugoslav state. For the Italians, such a state was in itself a hindrance to Italian ambitions in the Danube basin and the Balkans, and posed an even greater obstacle insofar it was viewed as an instrument of French policy for containing Italy.¹³ It was against this background that Italo-Yugoslav relations were developing during the peace conference and afterwards. One of the major difficulties that the Italians created for the SCS Kingdom was that it was not recognised by the Principal Allies and the Yugoslav delegation was officially regarded as that of pre-war Serbia. The international *de facto* recognition would not be granted before the SCS delegates attached their signature to the Versailles Peace Treaty with the defeated Germany.¹⁴ Apart from this, the Italian delegation had decisive advantages over the Yugoslavs in Paris: it was a member of the Allied Supreme Council, along with France, Britain, the USA and Japan, that made all the final decisions; in that capacity, it reserved for the Supreme Council the solution of territorial disputes with the SCS Kingdom - the latter country, of course, had no say in its deliberations; it exerted influence in the territorial committees that decided on border disputes between small powers to the detriment of Yugoslavs. In addition, Italian troops were in occupation of the large slices of Dalmatia and most of Albania which provided another means of putting pressure on the SCS Kingdom.¹⁵ To facilitate its goals, the Italian government sanctioned in December 1918 the execution of the plan drawn up by General Badoglio for the purpose of disrupting the Yugoslav union using all available subversive activities short of war.¹⁶ Constant Yugoslav anxieties in regard to Italian hostility were thus far from being exaggerated.

On the evening of 18 January 1919, immediately after the official opening of the peace conference, an exceptionally important session of the delegation took place for the purpose of presenting a memorandum on Yugoslav territorial demands. Smodlaka argued that the Yugoslavs should absolutely adhere to the nationality principle and restrict their demands to those territories populated by their people. Pašić acknowledged the primacy of nationality principle, but made it clear that Italy's demands at the expense of the SCS Kingdom as an allied country and their own revendications at the expense of the former enemies fell into two distinct categories. Furthermore, he claimed, "it is not possible to draw a political border along ethnographic line, as the nations are mixed, and as much foreign population we take as many of our own people will remain to others." With General Pešić, head of the military mission, and Bošković strongly advo-

¹³ Vojislav Pavlović, "Le conflit franco-italien dans les Balkans 1915–1935. Le rôle de la Yougoslavie", *Balcanica* XXXVI (2005), 163–201.

¹⁴ Bogdan Krizman, "Pitanje međunarodnog priznanja jugoslavenske države", *Istorija XX veka: zbornik radova* III (1962), 345–386.

¹⁵ Mitrović, Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira, 103–108.

¹⁶Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, 71–75.

cating maximalist demands based on strategic needs and for bargaining purposes, and Trumbić and Smodlaka – as well as Ribarž but not his fellow Slovene Žolger – standing for ethnic criterion, the cleavage in the delegation assumed an air of Serbo-Croat conflict of interest. General Pešić had no doubt that this was the case when he recorded, "Clearly, Trumbić and Smodlaka are protecting the Littoral alone [Dalmatia and Istria], and they care little for the rest."¹⁷ In the following days, the dispute continued and it compelled Pašić to make his position clear. Apart from the pressing need to formulate territorial demands of the SCS Kingdom, Pašić was drawn out by Trumbić's tactics. The latter tried to fasten on the nationality principle, invoking Regent Alexander's manifest of 6 January 1919, which had laid stress on the "ethnographic borders of our entire people," and asking for expert advice on the ethnographic area of South Slavs. Pašić especially focused on the territorial settlement with Bulgaria, for which he prepared his own memorandum, and Romania in the Banat region, and brushed away Trumbic's remarks. The Foreign Minister and Smodlaka agreed that certain revendications were needed to secure the Vardar and Timok valley from Bulgarian attacks, but insisted that these be demanded for security reasons and not based on the implausible ethnic claims of their Serbian colleagues. While Trumbić preferred to conceal the true motives of his considerations, Smodlaka was straightforward: he opposed a more extensive annexation of Bulgarian territory because he believed that "the way we treat here Bulgarians, that is how Italy will treat us; with this, we give her cause and justification for her strategic encroachments on our territory."18

A recent analysis has stated that differences between Pašić and Trumbić emerged, at least partly, due to their conflicting ideologies, "the nationality principle vs *Realpolitik*."¹⁹ This appears to be a simplification of what in reality was hardly a clear-cut line of division. Pašić was mainly concerned with territorial acquisitions that would directly benefit pre-war Serbia and secure strategically more viable frontiers regardless of the nationality principle and especially at the expense of a former enemy. In that, he was a true practitioner of *Realpolitik*. Trumbić's sole motivation by Wilsonian-minded principle of self-determination is highly doubtful, however. He did expound the nationality principle, but, in doing so, he was, just like Pašić, animated by more narrow "tribal" interests – delimitation of borders with Italy was an exclusively Croat (and Slovene) affair.

¹⁷ Bogdan Krizman and Bogumil Hrabak, *Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS na Mirovnoj konferenciji u Parizu 1919–1920* (Belgrade: Institut društvenih nauka, 1960), 27.

¹⁸ Ibid. 28–34; Miladin Milošević and Bora Dimitrijević, Nikola Pašić – Predsedniku vlade, strogo poverljivo, lično, Pariz, 1919–1920: Pašićeva pisma sa konferencije mira (Zaječar: Zadužbina "Nikola Pašić," 2005), doc. 4, no. 40, Delegation to Protić, 27 January 1919, and doc. 5, no. 87, Delegation to Protić, 1 February 1919.

¹⁹Djokić, Pašić and Trumbić, 151.

A native of Dalmatia himself, Trumbić feared, along with Smodlaka, that Pašić's strategic requirements concerning the Bulgarian or Hungarian border might undermine Yugoslav superior moral position in the Adriatic and lend justification to excessive Italian claims. After all, it was hardly surprising that the Serb, Croat and Slovene delegates alike were more willing to make concessions when such losses were suffered by a "tribe" other than their own. Nevertheless, it has been rightly asserted that differences between them should not be overstated since "they maintained a remarkable show of unity when communicating with other delegations."²⁰

As for Pašić's general outlook on the conference, he was a careful observer of the workings of Great Powers in Paris despite their secretiveness and he had a great acumen to sense what was going on behind the scenes. In April 1919, Pašić penned an exceptionally perspicacious and prescient summary of his impressions of the peace conference. He observed that the French territorial claims on the Rhineland and the Anglo-French stance on reparations weakened the tenets of peace-making expounded by Wilson; consequently, the President had to confine his more idealistic visions to the creation of the League of Nations designed to guard the peace of the world in future. Pašić was not taken in by the enthusiastic predictions of a new and better world, since he foresaw that the mirage of the League of Nations would not usher in an era of peace and stability. In his view, based on the decades-long experience, the conference in Paris was no different from the 1878 Treaty of Berlin in that the "Great Powers decide international questions according to their own understanding and appreciation." Naturally, Pašić was mostly preoccupied with the issues that troubled the SCS delegation, and particularly the tortuous Adriatic question. By April the Yugoslavs had advanced proposals for President Wilson's arbitration and a plebiscite to be held in the contested zones, only to find both initiatives flatly refused by Italy. Pašić pointed out the hypocrisy with which the Great Powers applied different principles in territorial disputes:

True, everything must be subjected to a principle now: that of nationality where they [Great Powers] find it appropriate to apply that principle, then strategic principle where they find it appropriate to apply that principle, even if strategic principle is used not to protect the weaker nation from the stronger, but to use it against the weaker. To secure the stronger against the weaker, whose parts he ripped off from his entity, by taking other peoples' territory. Then economic, trading principle would be used to give to cities other peoples' lands and other peoples in order to prosper, to provide "hinterland," as Bosnia and Hercegovina was given to Austria-Hungary to secure the life and trade of Dalmatia. ... Italy must be secured against future Yugoslavia which does not have a single war ship, because peace could be disturbed if another neighbouring state has war ships. Peace is secured not only when Italy has war ships, but also when all sea

²⁰ Ibid. 67.

ports are in her hands. For in that case she is a master and any danger of a conflict is excluded. This is how future peace is intended to be ensured. Brute force will reign in the future, just as it reigned before this war.²¹

With this in view, Pašić clearly and succinctly formulated what the newly-minted SCS Kingdom could expect from the conference: "We will get what and as much as they find fit to give us." Nevertheless, he did not despair and was convinced that "our moral strength," demonstrated in the horrors of the Great War, was such that "in future we will reverse and avenge the injustice we suffer now."²² Apparently, Pašić did not succumb to the illusion that the new order that was being created in Paris would be permanent or durable. He thus viewed any proposal or a settlement from the standpoint of a position in which it would place the SCS Kingdom in case of a future conflict. For example, Pašić was dead set against the neutralisation of the Adriatic sea – the renunciation of the right to have a battle fleet – advocated by Trumbić, which he saw as an infringement on the sovereignty and an acceptance of Italy's domination of Belgrade's policy:

Neutrality is perfectly in Italy's interest, and to our detriment only. Italy can agree to it, but she will still have a large fleet at her disposal that she could use where and how she pleases. In case of war with Italy, we will be without a fleet and must place all our hope in the protection of the League of Nations, and it is doubtful that we will have any real assistance from that quarter. With neutralisation, we become a second-rate state. Freedom is defended by blood and arms, not by neutralisation and other ideas. When Europe or the whole world splits into two camps and wages war, then all theories and ideas and the entire international law crumble. What good was neutrality to Belgium in 1914? Do we have any guarantees that Italy will respect the neutrality of the Adriatic in case of war?²³

Based on the experience of peace-making in Paris, Pašić informed his government that the Supreme Council carefully excluded the representatives of minor powers from interfering with its decisions. Those delegates were occasionally invited to express their views on specific matters of immediate interest to their countries, but they were never told the Supreme Council's decisions before these were announced to all, or terms of peace were given to an enemy state. They were, Pašić wrote, "held here for the sake of appearance, so that the world believes that they have some rights in resolving the matters; it is dreary, but that

²¹ Nikola Pašić – Predsedniku vlade, doc. 19, Delegation to Protić, April 1919, personal, str. conf. [7463].

²² Ibid.; see also doc. 21, Delegation to Prime Minister, str. conf. no. 14, 15–17 April 1919.

²³ Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS, 221. Pašić reaffirmed his scepticism with regard to the League of Nations at the meeting of the Radical MPs held on 23 December 1920. Discussing international situation, he said for that organisation that it "does not give substantial guarantees for the future peace. We are all now in that League: both the victors and the defeated". See Djordje Radenković, *Pašić i Jugoslavija* (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1999), 538.

is the true state of things."²⁴ Nevertheless, he was an arch realist and, as such, convinced that the only way for the delegation of a small power to have a measure of success was in close cooperation with Great Powers, former Serbia's allies and the sole arbiters at the conference – with the exception of Italy. Through Vesnić's regular communication with the Quai d'Orsay, Pašić was alert to French point of view and had an opportunity to sound out the Allies.²⁵ He confirmed his cautious attitude towards the Entente Powers on several occasions. When Trumbić wanted to raise officially the question of relations between the SCS Kingdom and Italy, France and Britain insofar these Great Powers were bound by the Treaty of London and still acted as arbiters of the Italo-SCS conflict within the Supreme Council, Pašić opposed his proposal.²⁶ For all its legal logic and fair-mindedness, such protest was outside the realm of political reality. Pašić also made clear his disagreement with the Cabinet's proposal to threaten Yugoslavia's withdrawal from the conference in case the Entente Powers refused to invalidate the Treaty of London or hand the Adriatic question to Wilson for arbitration. In his view, such a break with the Allies would be "fatal" in Yugoslavia's parlous financial and political position.²⁷ In May 1919, Pašić was the only one out of five delegates who voted for the proposition that the entire former Austro-Hungarian territory should pay reparations rather than just new Austria and Hungary.²⁸ This was clearly a heavy burden for his country, but he seems to have accepted it as inevitable in light of the Entente's political will. In this connection, Pašić's handling of the minority clause of the St. Germain Peace Treaty with Austria, designed to protect the rights of minorities in the successor states, was also of interest. He set his face against signing the St. Germain Treaty - together with Bošković and against the opinion of five other delegates - since the application of the minority clause would extend to Macedonia, pre-1914 Serbian territory. This was such an upalatable demand that Ljubomir Davidović's Cabinet resigned in protest. Finally, Pašić changed his mind on 12 November and advised the government to sign the treaty faced with the threat that the signing of a treaty with Bulgaria could come into question and realizing there could be further trouble in financial matters.²⁹

²⁴ Nikola Pašić – Predsedniku vlade, doc. 52, Delegation to Davidović, str. conf. no. 67, 30 August 1919.

²⁵ Zapisi Dra Josipa Smodlake, 161.

²⁶ Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS, 50–52; Bogdan Krizman, "Jadransko pitanje pred našom delegacijom na Pariškoj mirovnoj konferenciji do potpisivanja ugovora s Njemačkom (28. lipnja 1919.)", Jadranski zbornik III (1958), 293–294.

²⁷ Nikola Pašić – Predsedniku vlade, doc. 13, str. conf. no. 1, Delegation to Protić, 13 March 1919.

²⁸ Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS, 126–127.

²⁹ Ibid. 182–183; Bogumil Hrabak, Zapisnici sednica Davidovićeve dve vlade od avgusta 1919. do februara 1920, Arhivski vjesnik XII (1970), 23–24, 55.

With small powers being ignored at the conference, there were only two ways in which the SCS delegation could influence decision-makers, aside from propaganda activities. First, it issued numerous memoranda that expounded its views on particular territorial issues and were submitted formally to the Supreme Council. Pašić took a lead in this respect and himself drafted a number of memoranda regarding all the disputed border areas.³⁰ Second, the delegates endeavoured, as Pašić explained to Belgrade, to "get in touch privately with certain experts in various commissions, who are entrusted with studying and making reports on the questions, which are of interest to us, under the guise of providing new information on the matter they examine or informing ourselves if the questions have been resolved and how etc."³¹ This informal form of lobbying was usually more effective if the delegate managed to establish close relations with

an expert whom he tried to win over for the Yugoslav cause. Pašić was engaged personally in lobbying important individuals, who held positions in the territorial commissions and belonged to the delegations of the Principal Allies. Among others, he had conversations with André Tardieu, chairman of the Commission on Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs; Philip Kerr, Lloyd George's private secretary, President Wilson and Frank Polk, American plenipotentiary delegate.³² In Lederer's estimation, Pašić's interview with Wilson on 17 April 1919 was a success and it influenced the President to Yugoslavs' benefit.³³ On the other hand, his efforts to arrange a meeting with Lloyd George bore no fruit.³⁴

Pašić's attitude towards the particularly grave and long-drawn-out Adriatic controversy requires special attention. His fellow delegate Smodlaka has asserted that Pašić, and Serbs in general, were rather indifferent to the Adriatic question, all the more so if intransigence in this matter militated against their

³⁰ Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts [hereafter ASANU], Nikola Pašić Papers, no. 9874, The Ethnographic Border between the Slovenes and Italians, The Serbo-Croat-German-Hungarian Border, Delimitation with Romania in the Banat, Delimitation with Bulgaria; see also Pašić's handwritten drafts in no. 14528/VIII-11, Serbo-Bulgarian Relations and the Rectification of the Border; no. 14528/VIII-18, Delimitation between the Serbs and Hungarians in Bačka; no. 14528/VIII-23, Notes and statistical data on the Banat and Baranja; no. 14528/VIII-31, Albania.

³¹ Nikola Pašić – Predsedniku vlade, doc. 52, Delegation to Davidović, str. conf. no. 67, 30 August 1919.

³² Nikola Pašić – Predsedniku vlade, doc. 12, Delegation to Protić, no. 510, 8 March 1919; doc. 23, Delegation to Prime Minister, str. conf. no. 17, 18 April 1919; doc. 49, Delegation to Prime Minister, str. conf. no. 64, 14 August 1919.

³³ Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference*, 194. To prepare the ground for Wilson's favourable reception of the Serbian claims against Bulgaria, Pašić had sent him the text of the two secret treaties concluded by Bulgaria with Austria-Hungary and Germany during the war (ASANU, Pašić Papers, no. 14528/II-12, Wilson to Pashitch, 1 April 1919).

³⁴ASANU, Pašić Papers, no. 11571/26, Philip Kerr to Pachitch, 15 September 1919.

desiderata on the Hungarian, Romanian, Bulgarian and Albanian border, where Italians invariably obstructed Serbian interests.³⁵ Such view was no doubt affected by later Serbo-Croat differences, but it was nevertheless accepted in much of the Yugoslav communist historiography.³⁶ However, there is no evidence for such sweeping claims. On the contrary, the record shows that Pašić supported the Croat delegates who insisted in late June 1919 that the minimum territorial programme in the Adriatic be specified beyond which there would be no further concessions to Italy. Besides allowing for "a few islands to come under the League of Nations, with a plebiscite to follow later," Pašić professed that any other concession would "encroach on the vital interests of the state."³⁷ In this respect, Pašić's view was opposite to that of a fellow Serb Bošković, who argued for a speedy agreement with Italy in order to improve Yugoslav prospects for more favourable territorial settlement in the eastern parts of the country.³⁸ The head of the SCS delegation further elaborated his views in a lengthy letter to the government in Belgrade in early January 1920. Besides specifying the maximum concessions that could be given to Rome, in accordance with the opinion of the delegation, he warned that the thrust of Italian policy was to create a situation in which the SCS Kingdom would be placed at its mercy. Through subversion and policy of encirclement with the Yugoslav neighbours, Italy would "surround us with agitations and disturbances, and put pressure on us from all sides to surrender and pursue such policy that would be in her interest."39 Thus Pašić looked at the problem of relations with Italy not as a matter of territorial bargaining that concerned one province of the country more than the other, but rather from the point of view of the Kingdom as a whole with all its geopolitical implications. He doggedly maintained that Italian sovereignty had to be rejected at any point along the coast from Pula southwards, including the islands.⁴⁰ Far from neglecting northern Adriatic, as Smodlaka contended, Pašić and, for that matter, the Belgrade government took care not to sacrifice Croatian interests there. It was no coincidence that Trumbić always set the tone of Yugoslav policy towards Italy.

³⁵ Zapisi Dra Josipa Smodlake, 145–146.

³⁶ E.g. see Julijana Vrčinac, "Spoljna politika Jugoslavije u periodu 1919–1941 godine", in Dragi Milenković, ed., *Iz istorije Jugoslavije 1918–1945* (Belgrade: Nolit, 1958), 304.

³⁷ Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS, 155–156.

³⁸ Mitrović, Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira, 163–167.

³⁹ Jadransko pitanje od Pariza do Rapala: zvanični dokumenti (Belgrade: Državna štamparija Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, 1924), no. 7, Pašić to Davidović, 7 January 1920, Delimitation between the SCS Kingdom and Italy.

⁴⁰ Ibid.; Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS, 231.

An important part of the Adriatic question concerned the status of Albania and, for that reason, Pašić referred to her as "the object of compensation".⁴¹ It could have hardly been otherwise as Italian troops had occupied most of Albania on the basis of an inter-Allied military agreement. The Serbian army was in control of northern region of the country; it had to evacuate the town of Scutari under the duress of Allied pressure.⁴² According to the Treaty of London, Italy was to have the port of Valona and her hinterland and an exclusive influence in the rest of Albania, save the northern parts with the town of Scutari to be divided between Serbia and Montenegro and those in the south which should be attached to Greece. The SCS government firmly believed it was a matter of vital importance not to allow Italy to acquire the full sovereignty over Valona and her environs, and secure a complete control over the rest of Albania under the pretext of a League of Nations mandate. In the mind of the policy-makers in Belgrade, Italian entrenchment in Albania was a repetition of the unfortunate experience with the Austro-Hungarian mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴³ The Italian money, arms and propaganda fostered turmoil deep into the Yugoslav territory, in the provinces of Kosovo, Metohija and Macedonia with considerable Albanian population, as well as in Montenegro among the supporters of the former king, Nikola I Petrović, and furnished ample justification for Belgrade's fears.⁴⁴ From the strategic point of view the Yugoslavs were also frightened of the peril of Italians "joining hands" from Albania with the Bulgarians across the Vardar valley in Serb Macedonia, thus cutting off the vital Belgrade-Salonica railway in the same fashion the Bulgarian army had actually done in 1915.⁴⁵ The stance on the Albanian question was formed accordingly. The SCS delegation in Paris plumped for the independence of Albania in her 1913 frontiers, after the First

⁴¹ Ljubodrag Dimić and Djordje Borozan, eds., *Jugoslovenska država i Albanci*, 2 vols. (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, Arhiv Jugoslavije, Vojno-istorijski institut, 1998), I, no. 968, Pašić to Davidović, 23 December 1919.

⁴² Dimo Vujović, "Oslobodjenje Skadra 1918. godine i stanje na crnogorsko-albanskoj granici", *Istorijski zapisi* 1 (1960), 93–128.

⁴³ *Jugoslovenska država i Albanci* I, no. 852, Pašić to Protić, 18 April 1919; no. 968, Pašić to Davidović, 23 December 1919; no. 972, Memorandum on Albania submitted to Wilson [American President], undated; *Jugoslovenska država i Albanci* II, no. 12, The position of the Yugoslav delegation in relation to the memorandum of 9 December 1919, 8 January 1920.

⁴⁴ Vuk Vinaver, "Italijanska akcija protiv Jugoslavije na albansko-jugoslovenskoj granici 1918– 1920. godine", *Istorijski zapisi*, 3 (1966), 477–515; Dušan T. Bataković, "Srpsko-arbanaški sporovi oko razgraničenja i arbanaška emigracija sa Kosova i Metohije (1918–1920)", in *Kosovo i Metohija u srpsko-arbanaškim odnosima* (Belgrade: Čigoja štampa, 2006), 279–298; Dmitar Tasić, *Rat posle rata: vojska Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca na Kosovu i Metohiji i u Makedoniji 1918–1920*, 2nd ed. (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2012).

⁴⁵ *Jugoslovenska država i Albanci* II, no. 14, Dr Trumbić's expose at the meeting of the allied Prime Ministers on 10 and 12 January 1920.

Balkan War, under the slogan "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples." Only if the stance of Great Powers had rendered that independence impossible to achieve, the delegates should have fallen back on the reserve policy – the absorption of the northern parts as far as the Drin river in order to gain the strategically more viable border.⁴⁶

To be sure, Pašić must have had his eye on the northern part of Albania centred on Scutari. Prior to the Great War, he had sought an outlet to sea for land-locked Serbia over the Albanian soil in the direction of the ports of San Giovanni di Medua and Durres. In fact, Austria-Hungary had promoted the formation of an independent Albania in 1913 to prevent Serbia's access to the Adriatic. Nevertheless, in 1919, Pašić appreciated that obtaining the northern Albania at the price of having Italian troops permanently established in a strategically sensitive position for a new and still fragile state was too high a price to pay. He thus adhered to the official policy of the delegation and the SCS Kingdom, as evidenced by all the documents he produced. But Pašić advocated an active approach to Albanians to win them over to follow Yugoslavia's lead in opposing Italian protectorate for which no effort and expense should be spared. In Paris, he himself worked with Essad-pasha Toptani, who had been the fulcrum of Serbian influence in Albania since before the war and remained so until his murder in June 1920.⁴⁷ Pašić also prompted Protić to revive previous agitation among the Albanian tribesmen in the north with a view to stiffening their resistance to Italian penetration. For that purpose, he recommended a restoration of the "Albanian department" in the Foreign Ministry.⁴⁸ It was, however, Protić's successor Davidović who accepted his suggestion. The special Albanian section of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry (also known as the Fourth section) was formed in August 1919 under direct control of Prime Minister to oversee and coordinate Albanian policy.⁴⁹ Pašić's pursuit of active involvement in Albania was clearly a policy of insurance in case the Italians remained in that

⁴⁶ Dragan Bakić, "The Italo-Yugoslav Conflict over Albania: a View from Belgrade, 1919– 1939", *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 25/4 (2014), 592–594.

⁴⁷ ASANU, Pašić Papers, no. 14528, VIII-32, Pašić to Protić, personal, str. conf., no. 1974, 3 June 1919; for the background see Dušan T. Bataković, "Esad-paša Toptani i Srbija (1912– 1915)", and "Esad-paša Toptani, Srbija i albansko pitanje (1916–1918)", in *Kosovo i Metohija u srpsko-arbanaškim odnosima* (Belgrade: Čigoja štampa, 2006), 201–237 and 257–298 respectively.

⁴⁸ ASANU, Pašić Papers, no. 14528, VIII-32, Pašić to Protić, no. 36, undated but late January 1919; Nikola Pašić – Predsedniku vlade, doc. 16, str. conf. no. 8, 20 March 1919; Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS, 207–209.

⁴⁹ ASANU, Ivan Subotić Papers, 14576-V-4, Albania, The history of our policy in Albania in 1920 based on the Foreign Ministry's Archives, Dossier Ar. 1- The situation in Albania, folio 1; The history of our policy in Albania in 1921, Subotić to Mitrović, 1 September 1933, conf. no. 15656/34, folio 79.

country; his actions bore the mark of his experience of Albanian affairs before and during the war. It is certainly unfounded to claim that "the cynical old man" hoped that Italy would dismiss the notion of the 1913 independent Albania and thus enable the SCS Kingdom to have Scutari.⁵⁰ Such contention assumes that he attached greater importance to obtaining northern Albania than to having the Italians removed from the country and deprived of a base for further inroad in the Balkans - and that is entirely unconvincing. The same author is much closer to the mark when he claims that Pašić came to doubt the likelihood of maintaining Albanian independence, which Wilson's declaration of 23 April seems to have confirmed.⁵¹ Indeed, in September, Pašić penned a draft memorandum for the conference in which he advanced Yugoslav demands after "having been convinced that the Peace Conference does not intend to carry out the 1913 London agreement on Albania and does not intend to request from Italy to abandon Valona and her surroundings."52 In such circumstances, he demanded the border on the Black Drin and Drin rivers, but also requested a plebiscite for the Mirdites and Malissors tribes, situated on the other side of the Drin, with a view to including them in the SCS Kingdom as an autonomous region. Pašić archived this note "until the time has come to submit it to the conf[erence]."

Pašić's views markedly departed from those of other delegates in the aftermath of the Lloyd George-Clemenceau ultimatum of 14 January 1920. The British and French premiers presented a settlement of the Adriatic question on the following terms: the town of Fiume (Rijeka) and Zara (Zadar) to become free states under the guarantee of the League of Nations and the right to choose which country would represent them diplomatically; a corridor along the coast to link Fiume with Italy's territory; the islands of Lošinj, Palagruža and Vis to be ceded to Rome; Italy's sovereignty over Valona and the division of the rest of Albania between the SCS Kingdom and Greece, with the remainder to come under Italian mandate.53 Lloyd George and Clemenceau threatened the Yugoslav delegation with the integral execution of the Treaty of London if Belgrade failed to comply. The ultimatum clearly tried to play on the card of compensating the SCS Kingdom in northern Albania for the concessions in Fiume and thus satisfying both the Italians and Yugoslavs. Krizman's study suggests that Regent Alexander, who was in Paris in early January and saw much of Lloyd George, was responsible for such a move: he made no secret of his opinion that

⁵⁰ Mitrović, Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira, 120, 169.

⁵¹ Andrej Mitrović, "Mirovna delegacija Kraljevine SHS i deklaracija V. Vilsona od 23. aprila 1919", Zbornik Filozofskog fakulteta (Belgrade) X/1 (1968), 488.

⁵² ASANU, Pašić Papers, no. 14528, VIII-34, Concept of a note on Albania, no. 4305, 2 September 1919.

⁵³ Ferdo Šišić, Jadransko pitanje na Konferenciji mira u Parizu: zbirka akata i dokumenata (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 1920), doc. XXVI.

acquiring Scutari and saving the Slovenes from the formation of an *état-tampon* around Fiume was more important than the latter town.⁵⁴ Lacking any clear-cut instructions from the government, the burden of decision-making was placed on the delegates whose opinion was divided.

Trumbić believed that the moment was not decisive. He was against the 14 January proposal and even claimed that he preferred the execution of the Treaty of London as less harmful to the essential interests of the country. He suggested to propose to Belgrade giving an evasive reply to the ultimatum and the other delegates, except Pašić, agreed. The latter was concerned about the consequences of refusing the Entente's proposal and decided to send his personal opinion to the government.⁵⁵ Indeed, in a letter written later that day Pašić argued for the acceptance of the Entente's offer in principle as being less of an evil than the Treaty of London – he still wanted to ask for the border proposed by Wilson in April 1919 and the exclusion of the port of Baroš from the Fiuman state. Characteristically, Pašić looked into the future: he thought that neither solution would resolve the conflict with Italy definitely. He also insisted on the importance of maintaining "not just sympathies, but also support of the Entente in a possible dispute with Italy".56 This was in keeping with Pašić's conviction that any solution to the Adriatic question reached in a bilateral arrangement with Italy would be less favourable to the SCS Kingdom than that in a settlement underwritten by the Allies.⁵⁷ And the Entente Powers were anxious to dispose of the Adriatic question before the fast-approaching end of the conference. On the other hand, Pašić was concerned about the capabilities of his country to withstand the prolonged period of tensions and dangers of a conflict. With this in view, he warned his colleagues in the delegation that it was time to settle the problem; their playing for time raised the question "what would situation be in time, whether [it would be] better or worse."58 It was, however, President Wilson who relieved the Yugoslavs of their dilemma, since he torpedoed Lloyd George's and Clemenceau's initiative.

The Italo-Yugoslav conflict outlived the peace conference. Pašić and Trumbić remained charged with conducting direct negotiations with the Italians as Britain and France dropped their mediating role. Trumbić was proved correct in his contention that the January ultimatum was not a decisive moment. Pašić was, however, right in his estimation that the position of the SCS Kingdom vis-à-vis Italy would grow weaker, if it was left to deal with Rome alone,

⁵⁴ Bogdan Krizman, "Saveznički ultimatum u jadranskom pitanju siječnja 1920. godine", *Jadranski zbornik* 2(1957), 213.

⁵⁵ Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS, 250–251.

⁵⁶ Jadransko pitanje od Pariza do Rapala, no. 33, Pašić to Davidović, 24 January 1920.

⁵⁷ ASANU, Nikola Pašić Papers, no. 11573, Pašić's note, no date.

⁵⁸ Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS, 254–255.

on a strictly bilateral basis. This was apparent in the instructions that Prime Minister Protić sent to Pašić and Trumbić before their meeting with the Italian delegation in Pallanza in May 1920. The two plenipotentiaries were given complete freedom to negotiate and specifically allowed to agree to full Italian sovereignty over Fiume, if they found it absolutely necessary.⁵⁹ But these talks were interrupted due to the resignation of the Francesco Nitti Cabinet in Rome. The last phase of the Adriatic question took place under the premiership of Vesnić, a former delegate in Paris. Pašić appreciated that resistance to Italy was going to collapse and he declined on account of ill-health to participate again in the SCS delegation. The government then appointed Vesnić, Trumbić and Kosta Stojanović, the Minister of Finance, to travel to Santa Margherita and continue the negotiations.⁶⁰ Before the Yugoslavs left for Italy and during their talks with Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister, Britain and France, in particular, made it clear to Belgrade that it was imperative to reach an agreement with Rome and that it could not count on their mediation in case of failure.⁶¹ By this time, Wilson's political position in America had become so precarious that his potential intervention on behalf of the Yugoslavs was out of the question. Diplomatically isolated and with mounting difficulties at home, the SCS delegation faced increased Italian demands and had to yield – the result was the Treaty of Rapallo concluded on 12 November 1920.⁶² Italy was given more territory including the Snežnik plateau in the Dinaric Alps and territorial continuity with Fiume, which would become an independent state; Italian sovereignty was recognised over the islands of Cres, Lušinj, Lastovo, Palagruža and the small town of Zara with its Italian majority in the midst of the Slav population. With the incorporation of Snežnik, Italy was given "around 2,000 square kilometres and around 100,000 inhabitants more than she requested in January this year in Paris, and all the railway from Logatec to Rijeka, which was supposed to remain in our state in its entirety."⁶³ Clearly, the final Adriatic settlement was a dismal failure for the Yugoslavs and it confirmed Pašić's political foresight.

In the wake of the January 1920 ultimatum, Pašić was mainly concerned with Albania. He had reason to believe, based on the experience with the Lloyd George-Clemenceau proposals, that it would be possible to attain his desiderata

⁵⁹ Archives of Serbia [hereafter AS], Varia Collection, V-73, Protić to Pašić and Trumbić, str. conf. no. 204, 7 May 1920.

⁶⁰ AS, Varia Collection, V-65, The Adriatic Question, memorandum by Milan Antić [Councellor at the Foreign Ministry], 25 February 1922, fols. 391–392.

⁶¹ Vojislav Jovanović, *Rapalski ugovor: zbirka dokumenata* (Belgrade: Udruženje novinara Narodne Republike Srbije, 1950), docs. 10–29, 35, 42, 60.

⁶² Ibid. doc. 46; Vesnić, Milenko Vesnić, 540–554.

⁶³ Jadransko pitanje od Pariza do Rapala, no. 112, Vesnić [from Santa Margherita] to [Momčilo] Ninčić [Deputy Foreign Minister in Belgrade], 10 November 1920.

in the north of that country. He urged the Cabinet in Belgrade to realise that Italy would be allowed to set her foot firmly in central Albania and that "we have to demand different and better frontier in the direction of the Albanian territories which would fall under Italian protectorate."⁶⁴ In the first half of 1920, he remained in contact with Tihomir Popović, his close associate in the Foreign Ministry, who kept him informed about the developments in Albania and the actions of Serbian agents in that country. After the assassination of Essadpasha, Pašić suggested an agreement with certain Marturi and other Albanian leaders with a view to expelling Italians and establishing some form of a confederation between the SCS Kingdom and Albania. His ambitious plan also envisaged an absorption of northern Albania as part of an agreement with the Albanians.⁶⁵ During the negotiations with the Italians in London in February 1920, Trumbić suspected Pašić of having his heart set on northern Albania to the exclusion of Fiume and, moreover, of dealing with Lloyd George behind the scenes.⁶⁶ There is, however, no evidence of any underhand deal with the British premier. The situation changed during the summer of 1920 when the rebellious Albanians drove Italian forces out of the country with the exception of the small island of Saseno off Valona. The Serbian army defeated the advancing Albanian forces and moved its positions further beyond the demarcation line held since the war.⁶⁷ Tirana took the initiative before the League to have her independence recognised – Albania was admitted to the Geneva organisation on 20 December 1921 – and consequently obtain the withdrawal of foreign troops from her soil. The League transferred the discussion of frontier problems in Albania to the Conference of Ambassadors, a permanent organisation of the Allied Ambassadors at Paris charged with the execution of the peace treaties.

After year and a half absence during the peace-making, Pašić returned to the SCS Kingdom and, on I January 1921, became Prime Minister – he also served as his own Foreign Minister. With the exception of the short-lived Davidović Cabinet (27 July – 6 November 1924), he would retain premiership until April 1926 and have a role in the conduct of foreign policy. Much of it had to do with the execution of the peace settlement, at least in early years.

⁶⁴ Ivo Andrić, *Diplomatski spisi*, ed. Miladin Milošević (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1992), Doc. 118, Memorandum written by Ivo Andrić, 30 January 1939, 216–226, 221.

⁶⁵ ASANU, Nikola Pašić Papers, no. 11712, Popović to Pašić, 12 March 1920; Bora Dimitrijević and Jelica Ilić, *Zaostavština iz Toronta, 1903–1926* (Zaječar: Zadužbina "Nikola Pašić," 2015), docs. 41–42, Pašić to Popović, no date and 20 June 1920 respectively.

⁶⁶ Mitrović, Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira, 175; Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, 276–281.

⁶⁷ Desanka Todorović, *Jugoslavija i balkanske države 1918–1923* (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1979), 70–78.

The greatest danger for the SCS Kingdom and the newly-established order in Danubian Europe emanated from Hungary. The Treaty of Trianon was not signed before 4 June 1920 and the Hungarian ruling circles denounced the mutilation of the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen. Hungarian revanchist aspirations were linked with the possibility of a Habsburg restoration. For the SCS Kingdom, as well as Czechoslovakia and Romania, such prospect spelled an immense danger. These countries were unsettled with sizeable Magyar and German national minorities that would be naturally attracted to a Habsburg monarchy to which, after all, they had pledged their allegiance for centuries. All malcontents, especially in Croatia, could rally under the Habsburg banner to further their aims.⁶⁸ In the spring of 1919, Pašić and the entire Yugoslav delegation in Paris refused the Entente Powers' demand to contribute troops to suppress the Bolshevist revolution in Hungary, since they suspected a plot to restore the Habsburgs and revive some sort of a dual Austro-Hungarian state. To assist such a development in Hungary, Pašić was adamant, would be a "colossal sin that would destroy our unity and freedom".⁶⁹ In early 1920, there seemed to be the real danger of an attempt to reinstate the Archduke Joseph, and Belgrade and Prague joined forces to bring pressure to bear on the Conference of Ambassadors to prevent it. On 2 February 1920, the Allied Ambassadors accepted the resolution stating that the restoration of the Habsburg dynasty would be "neither recognised nor tolerated" by the Allied Powers.⁷⁰ The Yugoslavs, Romanians and Czechoslovaks wanted to have all the dynasties that had waged war on the Entente Powers and their smaller allies explicitly banned from taking the reins of government,⁷¹ but this was never effected.

The ex-emperor of Austria-Hungary, Karl I Habsburg – who had reigned in Hungary as King Károly IV – was in exile in Switzerland and he intended to reclaim his throne. It was with a view to preventing a Habsburg restoration and safeguarding the *status quo* that Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia signed on 14 August 1920 a defensive treaty directed against Hungary, thus initiating the alliance which came to be known as the Little Entente. Italy and Yugoslavia concluded their anti-Habsburg convention which formed part of the

⁶⁸ Bogumil Hrabak, "Frankovačka emigrantska secesionistička organizacija i Hrvatska legija u Madjarskoj (1919–1921)", *Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju* 56 (1997), 97–123.

⁶⁹ Nikola Pašić – Predsedniku vlade, doc. 20. Delegation to Prime Minister, str. conf. no. 13, 14 April 1919; for a discussion of the Habsburg problem see Mitrović, Jugoslavija na Konferenciji mira, 186–192.

⁷⁰ Documents on British Foreign Policy, ed. Ernest Woodward and Rohan Butler (London: HMSO, 1946–), ser. I, vol. XII, no. 80, Derby (Paris) to Curzon, 2 February 1920; the text of the resolution is annexed.

⁷¹ Archives of Yugoslavia [hereafter AJ], London Legation, fond 341, fascicle I, Pašić to Gavrilović, 28 February 1920, conf. no. 64.

Rapallo Treaty.⁷² The Little Entente soon came to be tested. On 24 March 1921, Karl Habsburg sneaked out of his exile and reached Hungary via Austria. The escapade was met by a firm attitude on the part of Pašić who embarked on an energetic action in order to evict Karl from Hungary. He immediately proposed to Czechoslovakia, Romania and Italy to make a joint demarche in Budapest to the effect that their ministers would be withdrawn from Hungary if Karl did not leave the country; to jointly request from France and Britain to support their action in Budapest; and to lodge a protest in Bern because it allowed Karl to endanger European peace.⁷³ However, the Hungarian Regent, Miklós Horthy, persuaded the ex-emperor to leave Hungary, which the latter eventually did under the protection of the officers of the Entente Powers.

Karl's adventure had an important and lasting consequence insofar Romania joined the Little Entente: she signed an agreement with Czechoslovakia just eighteen days after Karl's expulsion from Hungary (23 April). On 7 June 1921, Pašić and the Romanian Prime Minister, Take Ionescu, concluded an agreement on the same lines in Belgrade. As Pašić put it to Beneš, this was "a significant accomplishment the purpose of which is to maintain peace and secure the peace treaties which are the foundation of the future of our countries." To further stress Beneš's contribution, who was in London at the time and thus unable to come to Belgrade, Pašić wrote that it was the moment "when our plans are coming into being and our work is being completed".⁷⁴ However, on 21 October 1921, Karl and the ex-empress Zita flew into Hungary, gathered some loyal troops and again descended on Budapest. Horthy reacted with force and stopped him after a minor skirmish on the outskirts of the capital. The Little Entente reacted even more decisively than in March and mobilization was ordered and implemented in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, though not in Romania. The Conference of Ambassadors struck a balance between Hungary and her neighbours: Budapest was requested to declare all the Habsburgs barred from wearing the crown of St. Stephen and the Little Entente to refrain from military measures. In early November, the Hungarian National Assembly passed a law

⁷² Carlo Sforza, Diplomatic Europe since the Treaty of Versailles (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928), 101–102; Ivo Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, 307.

⁷³ AJ, London Legation, 341, fascicle I, confidential archive for 1921, Pašić to Prague, Rome and Bucharest Legations [forwarded to London Legation], 2 April 1921, conf. no. 4130; for an account of the Habsburg restoration attempts see Djordje Knežević, "Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca i dva neuspela pokušaja restauracije Habsburga 1921. godine", *Vojnoistorijski glasnik* 18/1 (1967), 117–138 and Vuk Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918–1933* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1971), 153–160.

⁷⁴ AJ, London Legation, 341, fascicle 1, confidential archive for 1921, Pašić to Gavrilović, 8 June 1921, conf. no. 7222; also Pašić to Gavrilović, 31 May 1921, str. conf. no. 486; Gavrilović to Pašić, 3 June 1921.

which excluded the House of Habsburg from the throne.⁷⁵ Pašić endeavoured in vain to utilise the crisis to wrest from the Entente Powers an effective disarmament of Hungary in which the Little Entente countries would take part.⁷⁶ Finally, the Conference of Ambassadors arranged for the former sovereign to be removed from Hungary – he was interned on the Portuguese island of Madeira where he died in April 1922. Pašić also had to comply with the terms of the Trianon Treaty unfavourable to Belgrade, after having attempted to retain the possession of the entire province of Baranja assigned to Hungary. He informed Bošković, now the SCS delegate at the Conference of Ambassadors, that the Serbian troops had withdrawn from northern parts of Baranja by 26 August 1921.⁷⁷

As has been seen, Romania's adherence to the treaties between Czechoslovakia and the SCS Kingdom completed the formation of the Little Entente, which would remain a permanent feature of international affairs in interwar Europe. Ionescu and Pašić also dealt with the final delimitation of the border between the two countries and, for that purpose, they decided to form joint committees.⁷⁸ The Romano-SCS alliance was further fortified through dynastic link. Pašić accompanied King Alexander in February 1922 to attend the betrothal ceremony in Bucharest between the latter and Princess Mărioara (Marija), a daughter of King Ferdinand and Queen Marie of Romania – their wedding followed in June. Notwithstanding some minor differences concerning the treatment of Romanian minority, relations between the two neighbouring countries were cordial, largely due to their foreign policy alignment.

In the Balkans, the main attention of Pašić's foreign policy was riveted to Albania and Bulgaria. As for the former country, Pašić renewed his efforts to ensure diplomatic support for the change of border in favour of the SCS Kingdom. On his instructions, Mihailo Gavrilović, the Yugoslav Minister in London, sounded the Foreign Office in June 1921 as to their attitude towards the delimitation on the Drin river which would leave the port of San Giovani di Medua on the Yugoslav side, but he was met with firm disapproval.⁷⁹ At the same time, the Yugoslav delegate at the Conference of Ambassadors explained at length to

⁷⁵ Knežević, "Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca i dva neuspela pokušaja restauracije Habsburga 1921. godine"; Vuk Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska,* 175–185.

⁷⁶ AJ, London Legation, 341, fascicle 1, confidential archive for 1921, Pašić to Gavrilović, 3 November 1921, conf. no. 277 [contains a copy of a note sent to the Czechoslovak and Romanian governments].

⁷⁷ AJ, Bucharest Legation, 395-5-50, Pašić to Čolak Antić, 24 September 1921, conf. no. 11538.

⁷⁸ AJ, Bucharest Legation, 395-5-57: Procès verbal I, Minutes from the meeting between Pašić and Ionescu, 7 June 1921.

⁷⁹ Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države, 128–129.

his French colleague Jules Laroche, the Under-Secretary at the Quai d'Orsay, the need for Yugoslavia of having a secure frontier line towards Albania. The Frenchman asserted, however, that diplomatic constellation was such as not to admit of any substantial changes in the status quo, and reminded of the great opportunity lost at the Peace Conference when what he termed "French project" had been seized on by Pašić but declined by the Belgrade government.⁸⁰ A later retrospective of Yugoslav policy during this time recorded that "Pašić conducted negotiations with the Italians in July 1921 and agreed on the division of Albania between us and Italy under condition that we got a more favourable solution than that envisaged by the Treaty of London of 1915."81 There is no documentary evidence to support this claim and it seems contrary to the thrust of Pašić's policy to keep Italy out of Albania and the Balkans - the Italians were then reduced to the island of Sasseno – although he did hanker after an opportunity to obtain the northern regions. Pašić certainly tried to create a favourable situation for the SCS Kingdom's interests on the ground. For that purpose, he covertly supported the Roman-Catholic tribe of Mirdites which occupied a strategically important curve along the Drin in their rebellion against the Muslim-dominated Tirana government and the proclamation of their independent Republic.⁸² This was a clear violation of the official policy of supporting an independent Albania in the 1913 borders. The Yugoslav military action in support of the Miridites uprising brought about the intervention of Great Powers as well as resignation of four Cabinet members.⁸³ The dissatisfaction caused within Cabinet indicated that Pašić's handling of Albanian affairs met with strong opposition in governmental circles. The assistance given to the Miridites was insufficient and their rebellion was quelled by the forces loyal to Tirana. Following strong international pressure from Geneva, Belgrade withdrew all its armed forces from Albania by the end of 1921. Pašić's policy failed which was acknowledged by the

⁸⁰ AJ, The Foreign Ministry of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 334-4-18, Jovanović to Ninčić, 2 June 1921, confidential no. 533; Circular dispatch from the Foreign Ministry to Legations abroad, 28 June 1921, confidential no. 5814. An exhaustive account of the Conference of Ambassadors' deliberations is given in ASANU, Subotić Papers, 14576-V-4, The history of our policy in Albania in 1921, Dossier Ar. 1 – The borders of Albania, folios 90–118.

⁸¹ AJ, Milan Stojadinović Papers, 37-28-208, Memorandum by Ivan Vukotić, 3 February 1939.

⁸² AJ, The Foreign Ministry of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 334-4-18, Todorović to Ninčić, 4 May 1921, confidential no. 601; Todorović to Pašić, 15 August 1921, confidential no. 1437. For a detailed account of the Yugoslav dealings with the Miridites tribe see ASANU, Subotić Papers, 14576-V-4, The history of our policy in Albania in 1921, Dossier Ar. 4 – Miriditska Republika, folios 126–144 and Bogumil Hrabak, "Mirditi izmedju Italijana, arbanaških nacionalista i Srba (1918–1921)," Istorija 20. veka 1-2 (1993), 35–51.

⁸³ Military Archives [Vojni arhiv – VA], registry 17, box 61, fascicle 14, doc. 1, unsigned memoirs, typed in Belgrade on 11 May 1952, folio 16.

resignation of his deputy in the Foreign Ministry, Tihomir Popović, who was in charge of Albanian matters.

Bulgaria was in the focus of Pašić's Balkan policy as that country sought to redress the consequences of her defeat in the Great War. In particular, the terrorist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) made incursions into the Serb Macedonia from its strongholds on the Bulgarian territory with a view to detaching that province from the SCS Kingdom. The government of Alexander Stamboliyski's Agrarians in Sofia was unable to rein in the "Macedonians." Stamboliyski condemned the pre-war policy of King Ferdinand and professed his desire for a close friendship, and even a union, with the Slav brethren in the SCS Kingdom.⁸⁴ Pašić had doubts about Stamboliyski soundness; moreover, he suspected Bulgarian hints at the common interest of Sofia and Belgrade to secure on outlet to the Aegean Sea of being mere tactics to compromise the SCS Kingdom's international position.⁸⁵ His government kept a watchful eye on Bulgaria's execution of the Peace Treaty of Neuilly, especially the clauses on disarmament and limitation of armed forces, and lodged protests, together with Romania and Greece, to the Conference of Ambassadors on account of Sofia's breaches. Nevertheless, Stamboliyski's persistence and attempts to suppress IMRO won him some recognition in Belgrade, which resulted in the conclusion of the Niš agreement of 22 March 1923 on the measures to secure the mutual border. This seemed to be a major success for Belgrade but a short-lived one. The 9 June coup in Bulgaria carried out by fiercely nationalist right-wingers, including army officers and IMRO, claimed the life of Stamboliyski and established the Alexander Tsankov government deeply distasteful to Belgrade.⁸⁶ The relations between the SCS Kingdom and Bulgaria markedly deteriorated again.

To pursue his Balkan policy, Pašić wanted good relations with Greece. This was a continuation of his pre-1914 policy, of which the Serbo-Greek alliance treaty of 1913 concluded with Eleftherios Venizelos was a corner stone. During the Peace Conference, he resumed his cooperation with Venizelos, but Greek doubts that the Serbs might have designs on their port of Salonica (Thessaloniki) – in which Serbia had been granted a free zone for her commerce as part of the 1913 agreement – raised difficulties in establishing a true entente

⁸⁴ Ivan Ristić, "Politika sporazumevanja u vreme nerazumevanja (rad Aleksandra Stambolijskog na jugoslovensko-bugarskom zbliženju 1919–1923)", *Teme: časopis za društvenu teoriju i praksu* 36/3 (2012), 1033–1046.

⁸⁵ Todorović, *Jugoslavija i balkanske države*, 100–102. For Pašić's attitude towards the Bulgarians, see Ivan Ristić, "Nikola Pašić i Bugari: geneza ideoloških i političkih stavova", *Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju*, 84 (2012), 87–109.

⁸⁶ Todorović, *Jugoslavija i balkanske države*, 200–206, 218–227; Živko Avramovski, "O stavu jugoslovenske vlade prema devetojunskom prevratu u Bugarskoj 1923. godine", *Istorija XX veka: zbornik radova* IX (1968), 133–155.

between the two neighbours.⁸⁷ As Slobodan Jovanović, his contemporary and famous historian, perceptively noted, Pašić believed that the security and stability of the Balkans required a firm Serbo-Greek axis as opposed to a Bulgaro-Albanian one; for that reason, he wanted as wide a Serbian-Greek frontier as possible.⁸⁸ Such policy informed the attitude towards Athens following the Greek disaster in Asia Minor in the war against the Turkish nationalists. Pašić and Momčilo Ninčić, Foreign Minister after January 1922, gave their guarantees to the Greek Foreign Minister, Nikolaos Politis, during his visit to Belgrade in November 1922 that they would keep in check Bulgaria and prevent her from exploiting Greek difficulties with the Turks.⁸⁹ Indeed, the SCS Kingdom supported the Greek claims in Thrace prior to and during the Lausanne Conference of 1923, disfavouring the establishment of a common Turko-Bulgarian border in that province. But Greek statesmen never dispelled their suspicions that the Serbs might join forces with the Bulgarians, their Slav brethren, for the purpose of ousting Greece from her Aegean littoral.

To discuss Yugoslav policy in the latter half of Pašić's premiership, it is crucial to appreciate that it was not entirely his handiwork. Regent and later King (after 1921) Alexander had been an important factor in the formulation and execution of foreign policy since 1914, partly because of the exigencies of war-time strategy and diplomacy and partly because of his personal ambitions. The British Minister in Belgrade, Sir Charles Young, described him in 1925 as "the guardian of the main lines of the foreign policy."90 The King's influence, however, increased with Ninčić's assuming the foreign ministry portfolio. Although a prominent Radical of long-standing, the latter immediately came into conflict with Pašić and, according to the well-informed Czech sources, saw the economic Genoa Conference of 1922 as an opportunity for personal promotion.91 Ninčić became King Alexander's man, acting, as his ministerial colleague would later recall, as something of a King's "secretary for foreign affairs"; he "personally informed the King of his every step in the Foreign Ministry, introduced the practice of sending the copies of all political telegrams coming from abroad to King, and, besides, he would go straight to the Court after every Cabinet meeting to

⁸⁷ ASANU, Pašić Papers, no. 14528/II-10, Venizelos to Pašić, 21 January 1919 [in French] and Pašić to Venizelos [in French with Serbian draft], 5 February 1919. For a discussion of the Salonica issue see, Dragan Bakić, "The Port of Salonica in Yugoslav Foreign Policy, 1919–1941", *Balcanica* XLIII (2012), 191–210.

⁸⁸ Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, 91–92.

⁸⁹ Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države, 173–183.

⁹⁰ Forthcoming Dragan Bakić, Britain and Interwar Danubian Europe: Foreign Policy and Security Challenges, 1919–1936 (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 38.

⁹¹ Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države, 160.

make a report."⁹² In addition, King Alexander was in direct contact with some of the diplomatic envoys, his personal friends, especially those who occupied the most important Legations. Cases in point were Miroslav Spalajković, Minister in Paris (1922–1935), and Živojin Balugdžić, whose posts abroad included Athens, Rome and Berlin, although the former was also a friend of Pašić.⁹³ King Alexander's impact on foreign policy, as will be seen, would be most tangible in the matter of SCS-Italian relations, the most troublesome aspect of international affairs for Belgrade.

Under Mussolini's direction, with his visceral anti-Slav prejudice and grand imperialist designs, Italian attitude towards the SCS Kingdom increased the anxieties among the Yugoslavs. After the 9 June coup in Bulgaria, the position in the Balkans opened new possibilities for Italian intrigue. To preclude trouble from that quarter, King Alexander was anxious to come to terms with Rome and make the necessary sacrifices for that purpose. Since the Fiume settlement had proved unworkable and the town had been effectively occupied by Italian army, it was clear that it would have to be abandoned in any agreement. In a conversation with an Italian delegate at Geneva in September 1923, Ninčić pointed out that the King was his only true supporter in a consistent policy of rapprochement with Rome.⁹⁴ And indeed, Pašić was in no hurry to make an agreement with Italy as he thought that he could extract greater concessions: he wanted to have Zara and the island of Lastovo in exchange for Fiume. He was also concerned that Paris and London might take a dim view of an Italo-Yugoslav settlement, but King Alexander was in no mood to procrastinate and did not consider Fiume too high a price.95 It was the King's conception that prevailed and the Pašić government agreed to Italian annexation of Fiume, while the port of Baroš and Delta were separated from the Fiume municipality and given to the SCS Kingdom. This final territorial arrangement was accompanied by a treaty of friendship that was intended to mark the improvement of Italo-SCS relations. Disputes emerged between Pašić and Ninčić during the drafting of that treaty, and King Alexander then entrusted Spalajković with completing

⁹² Milan Stojadinović, Ni rat ni pakt: Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata (Buenos Aires, 1963), 206; also Slobodan Jovanović, Moji savremenici, 68.

⁹³ Zoran Bajin, "Miroslav Spalajković (1869–1951): biografija" (PhD thesis, University of Belgrade, 2016), 355–384. There is no scholarly work on Balugdžić, but his portrait, based on the memoirs of his subordinate in Berlin, is given in Miloš Crnjanski, *Embahade* (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2009), ch. 1.

⁹⁴ Bogdan Krizman, "Italija u politici kralja Aleksandra i kneza Pavla (1918–1941)", Časopis za suvremenu povijest 7/1 (1975), 36.

⁹⁵ Branislav Gligorijević, Kralj Aleksandar Karadjordjević: u evropskoj politici (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2010), 35, 37; Enes Milak, "Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca i Rimski sporazum (1922–1924)", Istorija XX veka 14-15 (1982), 143–146, 153–154, 158, 161, 169.

this task.⁹⁶ Pašić's reserves, however, should not be overstated, as they presumably concerned minor issues rather than the fundamentals of the impending treaty. That is clear from the fact that Pašić traveled to Rome himself and signed the friendship agreement with Mussolini (the Pact of Rome) on 27 January 1924.⁹⁷ This treaty was a gain for Belgrade in that it left a free hand to the SCS Kingdom to deal with troubles in the Balkans, namely the expected IMRO's incursions into Macedonia – the Albanian question lay dormant.

The Pact of Rome was intended to usher in a new era in the relations between the two Adriatic neighbours, but that was not to be the case. To begin with, Italy and the SCS Kingdom were at cross purposes. For Mussolini, the treaty was designed to sever the ties between Paris and Belgrade, and break up the Little Entente, a pillar of the French security system in the Danube region.98 Thus he had played at first with the idea of a Franco-Italo-SCS agreement to neutralise French influence in Belgrade, only to drop it once he had realised he could make a bilateral deal with the SCS Kingdom. But he did not deceive Pašić. According to Jules Laroche, the latter saw through Mussolini's game and understood that an agreement with Italy could not be reached on a tripartite basis.99 Pašić was also correct in anticipating French, though not British, discomfiture with a treaty of the alleged French protégé concluded with Italy seemingly without much regard for the susceptibilities felt in Paris. The Italian treaty also raised doubts in the Quai d'Orsay about the real Yugoslav motives and intentions. King Alexander himself had to assure the French in April 1924 that the Pact of Rome was not aimed against Greece and that its sole object, as far as he was concerned, was to keep the Italians at arm's length from the Balkans.¹⁰⁰ The French also suspected the Serbs of planning to invade Bulgaria under the excuse of eliminating the IMRO strongholds but, in reality, for the purpose of acquiring the Pernik coal mines. In their perspective, the conclusion of a friend-

⁹⁶ Bajin, "Miroslav Spalajković (1869–1951): biografija", 407.

⁹⁷ Milak, "Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca i Rimski sporazum"; Alan Cassels, *Mussolini's Early Diplomacy* (Princeton University Press, 1970), 135–165.

⁹⁸ William Shorrock, From Ally to Enemy: the Enigma of Fascist Italy in French Diplomacy (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1988), 44–46; John Gooch, Mussolini and his Generals: the Armed Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy, 1922–1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 9.

⁹⁹ Vuk Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Mađarska, 253.

¹⁰⁰ Vuk Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Francuska izmedju dva svetska rata: da li je Jugoslavija bila francuski "satelit" (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1985), 65; Antonina Kuzmanova, "Sur la rivalité franco-italienne dans la Petite Entente en 1924", Etudes balkaniques 29 (1993), 24.



Nikola Pašić and Benito Mussolini sign the treaty of friendship (the Pact of Rome) on 27 January 1924 [National Library of Serbia, Af 42, from the album "The Little Entente Conference in Prague, July 1924"]

ship agreement with Belgrade would have the advantage of forcing it to be more amenable to advice of moderation from Paris.¹⁰¹

Still, the Yugoslavs were careful to cultivate Mussolini's goodwill and thus evaded to proceed with coming to an agreement with France despite the wishes of Paris. Pašić avoided visiting the French capital on his way back home from Rome, although Spalajković relayed to him President Millerand's and Prime Minister Poincaré's invitation.¹⁰² Belgrade continued to manoeuvre for the next two years, fearing Rome's ambitions in the Balkans and trying to stall them with a formal friendship and seeking for protection in Paris though without a formal agreement. Although the French suspicions of Yugoslav imperialist designs were much exaggerated, Belgrade was more assertive in its relations with the Balkan countries in the aftermath of the Pact of Rome. In November 1924, the Pašić government denounced the 1913 alliance pact with Greece due to the dissatisfaction over the Graeco-Bulgarian minority convention concluded two months earlier and the ineffectiveness of the arrangement concerning the Salonica free

¹⁰¹ Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Francuska izmedju dva svetska rata, 67–68, 75; Stanislav Sretenović, *Francuska i Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1918–1929* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2008), 307–309, 318.

¹⁰² Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Francuska izmedju dva svetska rata, 67.

zone. After prolonged negotiations, Athens surrendered to Belgrade's demands in August 1926 but the revolution that deposed General Pangalos prevented the ratification of the agreement – the dispute would be settled in 1929.¹⁰³ A study of Yugo-Greek relations has stated that it was Ninčić who drove policy in this case in the teeth of Pašić's opposition, but it offers no evidence.¹⁰⁴

The SCS Kingdom certainly pursued a determined policy in Albania, but this did not result from the accord with Rome. Quite the contrary, it was an expression of the unabated rivalry with Italy that would undermine the Pact of Rome and lead to a definite rupture between the two countries. When the pro-Italian bishop Fan-Noli overthrew Ahmed-Zogu in 1924, Pašić made an agreement with the latter, not confirmed in a written document, to support him to return to power in Tirana in exchange for Zogu's promise to settle the outstanding questions with the SCS Kingdom in Belgrade's favour. Although Zogu re-established himself in power, he turned into Italian protégé in the long run, as Rome provided financial means for the functioning of Albanian administration, which Belgrade could not afford.¹⁰⁵ The conversations that Ninčić held in Rome in February 1926 failed to find either a solution to the mounting Italo-SCS conflict in Albania or to settle the relations in the Franco-Italian-SCS triangle and stabilize the Balkans. Soon afterwards, in April, Pašić was forced to resign as Prime Minister on account of the corruption scandal in which his son was accused of being involved. Therefore, the handling of Italy was left entirely in the hands of Ninčić. It ended with the announcement of the Italo-Albanian treaty on 27 November 1926 (the Pact of Tirana), which stipulated that Italy would guarantee the "political, judicial and territorial status quo" in Albania. This was effectively the establishment of an Italian protectorate over Albania - and a heavy blow for the SCS Kingdom's foreign policy. It also set the stage for the conclusion of the Franco-SCS friendship treaty in November 1927 and a decade of hostile relations between Belgrade and Rome. But the foreign policy of the SCS Kingdom would then be in the hands of other governments. Ninčić, who banked his whole policy on the agreement and friendly relations with Italy, acting on instructions from the King, resigned from his position on 6 December 1926. Pašić passed away four days later.

Shortly after his death, Spalajković criticised Pašić that he had made a serious mistake concluding the Pact of Rome without making a simultaneous

¹⁰³ Bakić, "The Port of Salonica in Yugoslav Foreign Policy", 198–203.

¹⁰⁴ Aleksandra Pećinar, "Diplomatski odnosi Kraljevine Jugoslavije i Grčke u periodu poslednje vlade Elefteriosa Venizelosa (1928–1932)" (PhD thesis, University of Belgrade, 2012), 48–49.

¹⁰⁵ Bakić, "The Italo-Yugoslav Conflict over Albania", 597–601; Živko Avramovski, "Italijanska ekonomska penetracija u Albaniju 1925. do 1935. godine", *Istorija 20. veka* 5 (1963), 137–224.

agreement with France, because that created an illusion that the SCS Kingdom's Balkan policy would eventually have to be subordinated to that of Italy. "The late Pašić did not see clearly, and with old age his well-known caution was further increased."106 This was certainly not a fair critique of Pašić's policy and Spalajković should have known better. First, there was no possibility of concluding a treaty both with France and Italy, because Mussolini would not have it. The Pact of Rome was not a lasting achievement but it at least provided a short respite from rampant Italian intrigue in the Balkans. Second, Pašić alone had advocated a settlement with Rome in January 1920 and that under more favourable conditions than those obtained later in the ill-fated Rapallo treaty. In the run-up to the Pact of Rome, he wanted to make a harder bargain with Mussolini, and he was perfectly aware of the repercussions that an Italian treaty would have in Paris – after all, it was King Alexander who precipitated the 1924 agreement. The outcome was not Pašić's favourite solution but he accepted it nevertheless as there was no feasible alternative. Pašić's diplomatic skill was considerable but not even he could perform miracles. In the aftermath of the Pact of Rome, Pašić seems to have been somewhat less personally involved in the conduct of foreign policy, partly because King Alexander and his loyal Ninčić took a leading part in this field and partly because he was absorbed in internal politics, which was exceedingly turbulent in the nascent and unsettled SCS Kingdom.

UDC 929 Nikola Pašić:327(497.1:450)"1919/1926"

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A Difficult and Silent Return Italian Exiles from Dalmatia and Yugoslav Zadar/Zara after the Second World War

Abstract: The aim of this essay is to offer a brief analysis of the political activity of the Italian exiles from Dalmatia after the Second World War and their relations with their motherland and their hometown of Zadar/Zara. Their activities failed to bring about a change of the Italian-Yugoslav border established by the 1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy, but they displayed great activism and a strong determination to keep their cultural traditions alive not only in Italy but also in Yugoslav Zadar. After much effort the Italian exiles eventually succeeded in setting up a public Italian club in Zadar in 1991, after the end of communist Yugoslavia and the creation of independent Croatia.

Keywords: Dalmatia, Zadar, Italians of Dalmatia, Yugoslavia, Croatia

I n the post-Second World War period the town of Zara,¹ renamed Zadar after the Yugoslav annexation, went through a slow and difficult reconstruction process. Repeated air raids in 1943 and 1944 had reduced the town to ruins, leaving eighty percent of its central zone destroyed. After the loss of many lives to the Anglo-American air strikes and many departures to Italy in 1943–44, the town population was reduced to about six thousand inhabitants. In the following years, after the Peace Treaty with Italy of 1947, the terms of which included the cession of Zara to Yugoslavia and the possibility of opting between Italian and Yugoslav citizenship, most of the Italian population from the old part of the town situated on a small promontory enclosed by ancient walls, and quite a few of the inhabitants of the *borghi*, villages at the outskirts of the town, chose

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¹On the history of Zara/Zadar in the twentieth century see A. De Benvenuti, *Storia di Zara dal 1797 al 1918* (Milan; Rome: Bocca, 1953); L. Monzali, *The Italians of Dalmatia. From Italian Unification to World War I* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2009); L. Monzali, *Italiani di Dalmazia 1914–1924* (Florence: Le Lettere, 2007); L. Monzali, *Gli Italiani di Dalmazia e le relazioni italo-jugoslave nel Novecento* (Venice: Marsilio, 2015); *Zadar 1944–1954*, eds. J. Čogelja, G. Stipić and V. Zaninović (Zadar: Odbor za proslavu desetgodišnjice oslobodjenja Zadra, 1954); A. Seferović Sefi, *Stari Zadar, gospodar zlata i srebra* (Zagreb: AGM, 2012), 262 ff; O. Talpo, S. Brcic, *Vennero dal Cielo – Zara distrutta 1943–1944 – They Came from the Sky – Zara in Ruins 1943–1944 – Dodjoše s neba. Razrušeni Zadar 1943.–1944* (Campobasso: Associazione Dalmati italiani nel mondo, 2006); *Zadar i okolica od drugog svjetskog rata do domovinskog rata* (Zadar: Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, Zavod za povijesne znanosti Zadar, 2009).

to leave Zara and Yugoslavia² and to move to Italy or some other country of the West.

The Italian exiles from Zadar and Dalmatia who had resettled in Italy gradually created and set in motion several associations and societies. Their aim was to foster mutual economic solidarity and assistance and to start an organized struggle for the defense of their political rights. Among these associations we can mention the *Associazione Nazionale Dalmata*, founded in Rome and led by Antonio Tacconi³, former Italian senator, and Manlio Cace, a military doctor; the *Associazione Nazionale Venezia Giulia e Dalmazia* (ANVGD), the only Julian-Dalmatian refugees society which had branches all across Italy; the *Jadera* society in Trieste; and the *Circolo Giuliano-Dalmata* in Milan.⁴ Thanks to the arrival of many refugees from Dalmatia, the ancient *Scuola dalmata dei Santi Giorgio e Trifone*, based in Venice since 1451 and after the Second World War led by Giovanni Salghetti Drioli and Tullio Vallery,⁵ saw a strong revitalization.

It should be noted that only a minority of the Dalmatian refugees took an active part in the activities of these associations. Of some 20,000 Italian refugees from Dalmatia only 2,000 to 3,000 took an active role in the Julian-Dalmatian exiles network operating in Italy. This is hardly surprising: in the postwar period the most urgent need for many refugees was to build a new life in the new environments of exile. Too much indulging in the past was seen by some as an obstacle to integration into postwar Italian society. Integration in Italy, a defeated and depleted country after the war, was a difficult task. Many Italians in the *Penisola*, ignorant of the history and cultural peculiarities of Dalmatia and Istria, were parochial and indifferent to the needs and appeals of the refugees. Besides solidarity and generosity, there were also hostility and distrust. For many refugees the easiest thing to do was to hide their origins and roots and to accept swift assimilation into the different Italian regions where they had resettled.

There was no political and ideological homogeneity among the Dalmatian exiles, but a large majority of them were strongly opposed to communism. There was also diversity in the attitude towards Yugoslavia after the drama of the war and of the exile. Some sought reconciliation with the South Slavs, for instance by returning to Dalmatia for an occasional visit, others reacted to the

² On the conditions of the Italian population of Zadar in those years see G. E. Lovrovich, Zara. Dai bombardamenti all'esodo (1943–1947) (Marino: Tipografia Santa Lucia, 1974); T. Vallery, La "liberazione" di Zara 1944–1948 (Venice: Scuola dalmata dei SS. Giorgio e Trifone, 2011); G. Bedeschi, Fronte italiano c'ero anch'io (Milan: Mursia, 1987).

³ For a biography of Tacconi see L. Monzali, *Antonio Tacconi e la Comunità italiana di Spalato* (Venice, Padua: Società dalmata di storia patria, 2008).

⁴Monzali, Gli Italiani di Dalmazia, 459–470.

⁵ T. Vallery, *La Scuola dalmata dei Santi Giorgio e Trifone* (Venice: Scuola dalmata dei SS. Giorgio e Trifone, 2011).

pain and hardships of exile by espousing a strong and extremist Italian nationalism, often fiercely anti-Yugoslav.⁶

There is a peculiarity in the history of the Dalmatian refugees in comparison to those from Rijeka/Fiume and Istria. It saw the development of an association - the Associazione Nostalgica degli Amici Zaratini (ANDAZ) [Nostalgic Association of Zadar Friends] - which was active at both national and international levels, and able to reach from time to time not only the militants of the refugees network but also sections of the apolitical exiles. ANDAZ was founded in Ancona by two exiles from Zadar, Nerino "Rime" Rismondo and Antonio "Tonin" Tamino. Rismondo, a physician working for the Ancona town administration, was the Association's true charismatic leader for many decades.⁷ For him, exile was an indelible and unresolved trauma. Deeply and strongly Dalmatian in terms of mentality, customs and lifestyle, Rismondo suffered very much for having been uprooted from Zadar and found it very difficult to accustom himself to life in Italy. Rismondo's life in exile was dominated by nostalgia for Zadar and Dalmatia. He was a complicated man, but the other refugees found him fascinating and charismatic: a true Dalmatian and at the same time a strong Italian right-wing nationalist who refused political parties and criticized bureaucratic structures. His passion for Zadar and Dalmatia, at times visionary and mystical, but also highly contagious and mobilizing, made him the leader of a group of Dalmatian exiles, his friends and admirers.

At the beginning of the 1950s, Rismondo and Tamino were activists of the most important Julian-Dalmatian association, the ANVGD, but they grew more and more critical of its leadership. They criticized the ANVGD for being too close to the ruling centrist political parties, especially the Christian Democrats, and too keen on supporting the government so as to obtain financial resources. Rismondo and Tamino argued that the refugees from the Eastern Adriatic should refuse assimilation into Italian society and preserve their own distinctive identity. In July 1953, to keep the language, tradition and culture of the Italian Dalmatians alive, Rismondo and Tamino, together with other refugees residing in Ancona (Andrea Bullo, Giuseppe Candias, Bruno Rolli, Ervino Jarabek), founded ANDAZ. The Association's statute claimed that it was an

⁶ On nostalgia as an element and instrument in building a political identity see P. Ballinger, *History in Exile. Memory and Identity at the Borders of the Balkans* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); *Nostalgia. Memoria e passaggi tra le sponde dell'Adriatico*, ed. R. Petri (Rome; Venice: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura-Centro tedesco di studi veneziani, 2010).

⁷ For information about Rismondo and ANDAZ see S. Brcic, "Nerino (Rime) Rismondo", in *Personaggi dalmati vita e opere*, ed. S. Brcic and T. Vallery (Venice: Scuola dalmata dei SS. Giorgio e Trifone, 2013), 150–160; F. Rismondo, "La figura di Nerino Rismondo nel mondo degli esuli zaratini", in *Mosaico dalmata. Storie di Dalmati italiani*, ed. G Rumici (Monfalcone; Gorizia: Associazione nazionale Venezia Giulia e Dalmazia, Comitato provinciale di Gorizia, 2011), 282–288; Monzali, *Gli Italiani di Dalmazia*, 515–526.

apolitical and patriotic group whose aim was to "realize in any town in Italy and abroad events which could bring back to life typical aspects of the Zadar life as an instinctive expression of the feeling of strong and deep nostalgia for their own hometown: lost and destroyed Zadar". Eligible for membership of AN-DAZ were "all the 'true' people of Zadar, whether by birth or by adoption, who are homesick for Zadar and feel an insuppressible need to experience again local patriotism, the town atmosphere, the cult of the most specific traditions which constitute the holiest spiritual heritage for every Zadar exile".⁸

The patriotic appeal to nostalgia for the lost hometown was the most important reason for the success of ANDAZ, which was able to merge an oldfashioned Italian nationalism, strongly influenced by D'Annunzio and the irredentist tradition, and Zadar local patriotism, successor of ancient Dalmatian Italian-Slavic liberalism.⁹ Rismondo's appeal to look positively and proudly at the feeling of nostalgia for Zadar and not to forget one's own identity, language and culture touched a chord with many exiles and ANDAZ managed very soon to build a network of contacts and collaborators in all of Italy.

ANDAZ saw a resounding success when Rismondo organized the first national meeting of the Zadar exiles in Venice in September 1953. Thousands of *Zaratini* from abroad and from every part of Italy arrived in the capital of Veneto, flooding San Marco Square. Since then the national meeting of AN-DAZ became an event that took place every year around Italy. These meetings, and especially regional celebrations of Christmas, Easter and the feast day of the patron saints of Zadar, Saint Simeon (Simeone/Šimun or Šime) and Saint Anastasia (Anastacija), were able to attract many apolitical exiles or people who had no interest in the activity and militancy of the Association.

The same year, 1953, Rismondo and his followers launched a magazine, *Zara*, which became an important place for the Dalmatian diaspora to express ideas, moods and feelings.

In the 1950s, Rismondo began to think of establishing a "Libero Comune di Zara in esilio" [Free Zadar City Council in Exile]. According to Rismondo, the ANVGD and other refugees associations were committed to charitable activities, and not to irredentism and politics, which he believed to be a mistake that should be corrected. The Julian-Dalmatian exiles did not have to assimilate into Italian society and forget theirs origins and roots. To fight for their rights and avoid the danger of losing their own identity, they should establish a large

⁸ On the statute of ANDAZ see Monzali, Gli Italiani di Dalmazia, 518.

⁹ On Dalmatian liberalism see L. Monzali, "Dalmati o Italiani? Appunti su Antonio Bajamonti e il liberalismo autonomista a Spalato nell'Ottocento", Clio 3 (2002); L. Monzali, Gli Italiani di Dalmazia; J. Vrandečić, Dalmatinski autonomistički pokret u XIX stoljeću (Zagreb: Dom i Svijet, 2002).

irredentist network based on the community of free Julian and Dalmatian city councils.

The Libero Comune di Zara in esilio was founded in 1963 after a long debate among Dalmatian exiles.¹⁰ Its most prominent members were Edmondo Alesani, Italo Benevenia, Guido Fabiani, Maria Perissi, Biagio Rozbowski, Iginio Toth, Tullio Vallery, Ausonio Alacevich, Lidio Cristo, Gianni Fosco, don Luigi Stefani, Italo Trigari, Ferruccio Predolin, Alberto Calbiani, Lorenzo Salvini, Narciso Detoni, Carlo Steinbach and Narciso Detoni.

The purpose of the founding of the *Libero Comune di Zara in esilio* was to create a political organization of Italian exiles from Dalmatia and to dispute the legitimacy of the Yugoslav annexation of Zadar, demanding the right for the exiles to return to the motherland.

At the tenth meeting of Dalmatian and Zadar exiles organized by AN-DAZ in September 1963, the newly-created *Libero Comune* elected the engineer Guido Calbiani, managing director of Lancia (born in Zadar in 1904 as Guido Calebich), as its *sindaco* (mayor), while Nerino Rismondo was elected secretary general of the new organization.

Calbiani and Rismondo were men of different personalities and experience. The former was a successful international manager, the latter a provincial doctor with little world experience, but together they were able to transform the *Libero Comune di Zara* into the most dynamic and efficient Julian-Dalmatian exiles organization. In addition to organizing meetings and conventions, the *Libero Comune* engaged in cultural activities aimed at keeping the memory of the Italian Dalmatian traditions and culture alive in Italian public opinion. The *Libero Comune* created an international network of supporters and friends, trying to establish forms of cooperation among the Zadar exiles all around the world. Calbiani and Rismondo succeeded in establishing continuous relations between the *Libero Comune* and refugees communities in Canada and Australia, such as the *Circolo Giuliano-dalmata* in Toronto, the *Diadora Social and Sports Club* in Sidney led by Giuseppe Paleska, the Dalmatian club *Jadera* in Melbourne led by Tonci Meden.

The leaders of the *Libero Comune di Zara in esilio* always sought to defend the political independence of their organization from Italian political parties. Most of its leaders had right-wing ideological sympathies, were close to anticommunist parties (the Neo-fascists, the Liberals, the right wing of the Christian Democrats, the Monarchists), and had a clear nationalist program based on the irredentist struggle for making Zadar Italian again. But Calbiani and Rismondo despised political parties, accusing them of betraying the national interest and of dividing the Italian nation. Because of this they sought to keep their initiatives differentiated from those of the right-wing parties such as the Italian

¹⁰ Monzali, Gli Italiani di Dalmazia, 535–560.

Social Movement (*Movimento Sociale Italiano*) or the Monarchists. Thanks to its political autonomy, the *Libero Comune* was able to attract sympathies and attention also from apolitical and non-right-wing exiles.

As already said, a very important issue for the Italian Dalmatian exiles was the relationship with the motherland, Dalmatia, and the town of Zadar. In the postwar years, Zadar, having lost most of its inhabitants, was undergoing a slow and difficult process of reconstruction.¹¹ The Yugoslav government sought to repopulate the town by reinstating pre-war economic activities and by creating new ones. The factories of the pre-war period were nationalized: the famous spirits companies (Drioli, Luxardo, Vlahov) were merged into one statecontrolled enterprise called Maraska. The tobacco and tinned fish factories, as well as the pasta manufacturers, were also nationalized and put back into service by the Yugoslav state. The Yugoslav government set up some new manufacturing and service companies: Vlado Bagat (mechanics), Boris Kidrič (tinned fish), Jugoslavenska Tankerska Plovidba (marine shipping). To increase the population of Zadar, the communist regime established some army barracks and two aviation and infantry schools. New primary and secondary schools were opened in the town as well as some centers for higher education as a section of the Zagrebbased Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts and the Faculty of Philosophy as a branch of Zagreb University. The communist regime also sought to put an end to the isolation of Zadar from its hinterland by building new roads and a new railway line, completed in 1967, which connected the Dalmatian town with Knin and Zagreb.

Thanks to the Yugoslav government efforts, from the 1960s Zadar saw a strong demographic growth. Its population of 16,146 in 1953 rose to 25,243 in 1961; to 43,187 in 1971; and to 59,568 in 1981. Zadar's new inhabitants mostly came from nearby islands and the hinterland, but many came from various parts of Yugoslavia as well. From being an Italian town of Dalmatia Zadar transformed into the most "Yugoslav" Dalmatian town, with a population made up of 77.8 % of Croats and 13.6 % of Serbs, according to the census of 1961. For several centuries Zadar had had an important Serbian minority, as well as a Serbian Orthodox bishop. The Serbian community, which had survived unfriendly Italian rule, flourished again after the Second World War with the arrival of Serbs

¹¹On the reconstruction and economic development of Yugoslav Zadar see Z. Begonja, "Formiranje tvornice Maraska neposredno nakon Drugoga svjetskog rata", in *Bogatstvo Zadra i* zadarske regije/Marasca Cherry. Treasure of Zadar and Zadar Region, eds. A. Bralić and J. Faričić (Zadar: Maraska; Zavod za povijesne znanosti Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti Zadar, 2010), 185–199; A. Batović, "Povijest i razvoj Filozofskog fakulteta u Zadru od 1956. do 1974. godine", in *Sveučilište u Zadru. O desetoj obljetnici obnove* (Zadar: Sveučilište Zadra, 2012), 499–505; D. Magaš, "Prostorni razvoj Zadra 1945.–1991", in *Zadar i okolica*, 274–291.

from northern Dalmatia and of many Yugoslav Army men who were dispatched to serve there.

A peculiarity of Yugoslav Zadar was its being a town without a historical identity and a sense of community. After the departure of its Italian inhabitants, most of its population had been born somewhere else: in 1961 only about 15 % of its inhabitants were born in Zadar. The autochthonous inhabitants made up a tiny minority in a town repopulated with people coming from all over Yugoslavia, mostly Croats and Serbs. Most of the few autochthonous inhabitants left in Zadar, Croats and Dalmatians of Albanian origin, were concentrated in the old borghi of Borgo Erizzo/Arbanasi, Ceraria-Barcagno/Voštarnica, and had a hostile and cold attitude towards the communist authorities because of the harsh repression applied by the partisans after the Yugoslav occupation of the town in 1944. This anticommunist sentiment of the few autochthonous inhabitants explains the presence among the Borgo Erizzo people of pro-Italian sympathies and of nostalgia for the former capitalist and Italian Zadar, which was manifest in the continued use of the Italian Zadar dialect despite the nearly complete disappearance of Italians from the town. The census of 1953 still showed the presence of 5 % of Italians, but the figure dropped to 0.2 % in 1961 and to 0.1 % in the following censuses. Moreover, most of the Italians that remained in Yugoslav Zadar chose to declare themselves as Croats or Yugoslavs by nationality, national assimilation being seen as the best survival and integration strategy in the new communist Yugoslavia. In the 1950s the Zadar authorities, keen on Yugoslav nationalism, suppressed the last remaining Italian schools¹² and made it clear that the existence of Italian circles or societies was not welcome.

The new Yugoslav authorities did not like the fact that the Italian exiles from Dalmatia had organized themselves and pursued irredentist and anti-Yugoslav propaganda. The meetings of the Zadar exiles in Italy had a certain echo in Yugoslav Dalmatia as well. The Yugoslav Dalmatian press started attacking publicly these political meetings, describing them as the work of Italian reactionary, imperialist and nationalist groups that did not give up the idea of the Italian re-conquest of Zadar or hopes for the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

One of the consequences of the improvement of Italian-Yugoslav relations after the 1954 London agreement on Trieste and Northern Istria and the partial economic and cultural liberalization of Yugoslav society was the resumption of contacts between the Italian exiles and the motherland.¹³ It also became

¹² G. Bambara and A. Cepich, *La scuola della minoranza italiana a Zara* (Brescia: Tipografia Emmebi, 1990).

¹³ On Italian-Yugoslav relations in the 1950s and 1960s see Monzali, *Gli Italiani di Dalmazia*, 509–575; *Italian Balkan Strategies (19th–20th Century)*, ed. V. G. Pavlović (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2014); *Italy, Tito's Yugoslavia and International Politics in The Age of Détente*, ed. M. Bucarelli et al. (Brussels; London: Peter Lang, 2016).

very easy for the Italians who had left Zadar after Second World War by opting for Italian citizenship to obtain permission and visa to visit Dalmatia. Many Dalmatian exiles decided to go back home for short visits. At first their motivation was a very strong desire and need to visit the local cemetery, to rebury there the relatives who had died abroad, in exile, or to tend to family graves. Some people came back out of nostalgia for the hometown, to spend a holiday there or to meet relatives and friends who had chosen to remain in Yugoslavia; others wanted to go back to reaffirm the existence of an Italian identity and tradition in the hometown.

During the 1960s and 1970s the journeys to Yugoslavia aroused a fierce debate among the Julian-Dalmatian exiles associations, deeply divided between those who approved of such visits, perceiving them as a sort of a patriotic mission to keep the Italian traditions there alive, and those who strongly disapproved, believing that coming back to the lost lands of Istria and Dalmatia was a betrayal of the Italian national cause since it implied the acceptance of the Yugoslav annexation of those regions. One of the most fervent supporters of the duty of the exiles to return to the homeland and of the resumption of contacts between Italian exiles and the so-called rimasti, those who had decided to stay and live in Yugoslavia, was the Zadar-born journalist and writer Antonio "Toto" Cattalini.¹⁴ In the 1960s, Cattalini, a journalist of Catholic-liberal leanings living in Gorizia and working for the Trieste-based newspaper Il Piccolo, became one of the most prominent intellectuals of the Julian-Dalmatian diaspora. In those years he began visiting Zadar and Dalmatia, and urged other exiles to do the same. According to him, coming back to the hometown would be a response to the exiles' spiritual needs. At first it was very difficult and painful to accept what had happened to Zadar, its subsequent destiny and development, but it all was ineluctable and necessary for re-establishing contact with one's native land and its people, from which one could not escape because it was impossible to abandon one's own roots which were in Dalmatia, and not in Italy. It was not true, in Cattalini's view, that there were no more Italians in Dalmatia. Some Italians had remained in Zadar, by necessity or by choice and acceptance of the new political and national reality of communist Yugoslavia. The remaining Italians in Zadar were dispersed and lost in the town, without a voice and a sense of community. The reason for this was the moral crisis caused by the war, the as yet unresolved mental shock of adapting to a town which had underwent a profound change of population and values.¹⁵

¹⁴ For some information on Cattalini see D. A., "L'immatura scomparsa di Antonio Cattalini", Difesa Adriatica XXVIII (25 Nov. 1975); Antonio Cattalini: una giornata di viaggio nella memoria. Atti del convegno Gorizia 18-10-1995 (Udine: Associazione nazionale Venezia Giulia e Dalmazia Comitato provinciale di Udine, 1996); Monzali, Gli Italiani di Dalmazia, 590–593.

¹⁵A. Cattalini, La mia città. Zara oggi (Gorizia: Tipografia Budin, 1975).

As already said, for some exiles periodic returns to Zadar were not merely a way to spend a vacation or satisfy a spiritual need, but also a patriotic duty. The most interesting form of this patriotic activity of the Italian exiles in Yugoslav Dalmatia was an active commitment to the protection of the Italian graves in Zadar. A fever of political modernization and proletarianization during communist rule often led to the destruction of old cemeteries which were seen as relics of a distant and useless past. In Istria and Dalmatia the presence of Italian graves or of gravestones with Italian inscriptions provided an additional stimulus for destruction. During the 1970s the issue of defending the Italian tombs in Zadar became urgent. With the passage of time and the dispersion of the town's Italian inhabitants all around the world, the preservation of these graves was more and more difficult. In communist Yugoslavia foreigners were not allowed to purchase tombs, only to keep those that they had already owned or inherited. The graves whose owners failed to pay related taxes were nationalized by the cemetery administration or reused.

In 1972 a group of Italian woman exiles, mostly living in Veneto and led by Caterina "Rina" Fradelli Varisco, a teacher and an activist of the ANVGD and the Libero Comune di Zara, took on themselves the care of the Italian graves in Zadar. This group of exiles established regular communication with the cemetery administration, collected money to pay cemetery taxes and saw to the maintenance of the tombs. Connected to all this was the transcription of the inscriptions on the gravestones done by Tommaso Ivanov. In 1982 the group of women led by Fradelli was formally organized into the association Madrinato dalmatico per la conservazione delle tombe del Cimitero degli italiani di Zara seated in Padua.¹⁶ The defense of the Italian tombs in Zadar was possible primarily because of the ease with which the Italian exiles, often bilingual and with relatives left in Yugoslav Dalmatia, communicated with the rest of Dalmatian society. But the cooperation of some Italians still living in Zadar was also very important such as, for instance, that of Libero Grubissich, who was to become a founder of the Italian community in Zadar after the end of communist Yugoslavia, as well as the sympathies of some Dalmatian Croats and Serbs for the desire of the Italian exiles to preserve their family graves.

In the 1970s and 1980s the *Libero Comune di Zara* tried to develop a new approach to the situation in Zadar. After the death of its first mayor, Guido Calbiani, in 1975, the *Libero Comune* saw a period of political and organizational crisis and stagnation, which ended with the appearance of a new leadership, Tullio Vallery, Franco Luxardo, Giorgio Varisco, Honoré Pitamitz, Ottavio Missoni, who opted for a more modern and pragmatic political approach, less

¹⁶ C. Fradelli Varisco, *Il Madrinato Dalmatico*, in *Zara nel ricordo del suo cimitero* (Padua: 1986), 7–23; T. Ivanov, *Il cimitero di Zara* (Brescia: Edizioni del Moretto, 1986); A. Cuk and T. Vallery, *L'esodo giuliano-dalmata nel Veneto* (Venice: Alcione, 2001), 53; G. Varisco, *Mia madre*, *Caterina Fradelli Varisco*, available at: http://arcipelagoadriatico.it/saggdalmadrinato1.htm.

traditionalist and ideological, more open to political developments in Italian society at large.¹⁷ For instance, the Dalmatian exiles established contacts with some leaders (Antonio Borme and Giovanni Radossi) of the Italian communities in Yugoslavia (organized in the *Unione degli Italiani d'Istria e Fiume*), despite the fact that these were communists, strongly connected with the Yugoslav state and perceived by many Italian exiles as traitors.

The charismatic leader of the Zadar exiles, Nerino "Rime" Rismondo, also deemed it necessary to introduce a different political strategy in relations with the motherland. He saw as unavoidable the disappearance of the Italian exiles' distinctive identity, condemned to progressive assimilation into Italian and the western societies which had received them after their departure from Dalmatia. At the same time, the signing of the Italian-Yugoslav treaties of 1975 defining the borders between the two states had convinced Rismondo that no border change was conceivable any longer. So, to him, the preservation of the cultural heritage of the Dalmatian Italians became a matter of paramount importance. In collaboration with Tullio Vallery and many Dalmatian exiles living in Veneto, Rismondo decided to establish an archive and a museum dedicated to Dalmatia at the Confraternita dei Santi Giorgio e Trifone in Venice. Moreover, together with the *Libero Comune di Zara*, he supported Caterina Fradelli and the *Madrinato dalmatico* in their efforts to save the Italian graves in Zadar, and began visiting Dalmatia regularly again.

Coming back to Zadar and Dalmatia had a strong impact on Rismondo. He realized that, despite the war, the communist regime and the near-disappearance of Italian communities, Dalmatia had always been itself, with her typical and centuries-old identity and lifestyle based on a peculiar mixture of Mediterranean Italian civilization and the South-Slavic and Balkan world. By then the current inhabitants of Zadar, Šibenik/Sebenico, Split/Spalato, Dubrovnik/ Ragusa spoke only Croatian and Serbian, but they were Dalmatian like him in soul and mentality. Also, the settlers from the Yugoslav hinterland had been assimilated by the Dalmatian culture and lifestyle. According to Rismondo, the irredentist battle should now focus on the return of the exiles to the motherland. The future of the Dalmatian Italians could not be in Italy, where their unavoidable destiny was assimilation, but only in Dalmatia: "We must return", wrote Rismondo in 1980, "and we must do it in the only possible way: as friends and brothers, but always as Italians. In Dalmatia we are not even a minority. Practically we do not exist anymore. And then what? Do we defend the past by staying in Italy? But our future cannot be built in Italy, only in Dalmatia."18

¹⁷ On the *Libero Comune* of Zadar see L. Monzali, "La fenice che risorge dalle sue ceneri. Gli italiani di Dalmazia nella seconda metà del Novecento", *Nuova Storia Contemporanea* XI (2008), 103–118; Monzali, *Gli Italiani di Dalmazia*, 653–660.

¹⁸ Venice, Scuola dalmata dei Santi Giorgio e Trifone [Dalmatian School of Sts George and Tryphon], Archive, *Zara*, journal, box 1977–1980, Rismondo to Gozzi, 30 March 1980.

It should be said that not all Italian exiles followed Rismondo's advice to go back to Dalmatia. Those who did were often politically far from the rightwing nationalist Rismondo, being rather of Catholic and Liberal beliefs, like for instance Antonio Cepich, Sereno Detoni, Luigi Tomaz, Tommaso Ivanov. These returns of Italian exiles to Zadar, these recurrent visits, either for the summer holidays or for the annual celebrations of the town's patron saints' day and All Souls' Day, served to re-establish family ties destroyed by the exile, to establish new relationships between exiles and autochthonous Zadar inhabitants, and to rebuild a tiny Italian presence in the Dalmatian town. The coming back of Italian exiles to Zadar encouraged some local Italians to come out of silence and isolation. The Italian exiles associations became more and more vocal in their demand that the Yugoslav government allow the founding of an Italian club in Zadar. In the 1970s and 1980s Rismondo and the Dalmatian exiles of the Libero Comune got in touch with some Zadar inhabitants of Italian origin, for instance Libero Grubissich and Silvio Duiella, who would be among the founders of the Community of Italians of Zadar in 1991, after the end of communist Yugoslavia and the birth of independent Croatia.

The activity of Italian Dalmatian exiles was instrumental in the rebirth of the Italian minority in Zadar. The return to the Motherland, Zadar, was difficult but not useless.

> UDC 341.382(497.1:450)"1947" 94(497.1):314.745.3-054.73(=131.1)

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
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IN MEMORIAM



Borislav Jovanović (1930–2015)

I n November 2015 the Serbian archaeological scene has lost one of leading Serbian, Yugoslav and European archaeologists. Borislav Jovanović belonged to the first post-Second World War generations of archaeologists who set largescale excavation and research projects afoot and brought world recognition to Yugoslav archaeology in the 1960s and 1970s. He collaborated, debated and advanced prehistoric archaeology with other great figures in the discipline, such as Dragoslav Srejović, Draga and Milutin Garašanin, Vladimir Milojčić, Alojz Benac, Borivoj Čović, Stojan Dimitrijević, Stane Gabrovec, Šime Batović, who all left a deep trace and laid the groundwork for all further work in the field of southeast European prehistoric archaeology.

Borislav Jovanović was born in Kavadarci, Yugoslavia (Macedonia). He attended school in Skoplje, Kraljevo, and Novi Sad, where he found himself after he had lost his parents in the war. In 1955 he graduated with honours in archaeology from the Faculty of Philosophy of Belgrade University, which earned him a four-year scholarship for postgraduate studies in prehistoric archaeology. In 1964, he completed his PhD with the thesis "The emergence and development of the Eneolithic in Yugoslavia". He spent his whole working career, from 1959 to 1995, at the Institute of Archaeology in Belgrade, which he also led as director from 1978 to 1986. He was elected a corresponding member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SASA) in 2003 and a full member in 2009.

Borislav Jovanović did not live long enough to see the publication of the results of all excavation and research projects he had worked on during his fruitful career. He was director or a leading member of many major archaeological projects in the country: field survey and rescue excavation ahead of the construction of the Djerdap I Dam (1962–1970) (he excavated the sites of Padina, Hajdučka Vodenica, Stubica and Mrfaja); the long-term investigation of Vinča culture mining and metallurgy at Rudna Glava near Majdanpek (1968–1985); of mining on Mt Rudnik in prehistory, classical antiquity and the middle ages (1980–1989); the rescue and systematic excavation of the site of Gomolava near Hrtkovci (1965–1985); the excavation of the site of Pećine as part of the rescue excavation in the Kostolac open-pit coal mine area (1981–1982). He also explored many sites in collaboration with colleagues from local museums and heritage protection institutions, such as the Illyrian princely burial mound at Atenica near Čačak; Kormadin at Jakovo near Belgrade; Fafos II at Kosovska Mitrovica; Trnovača at Baranda; the tumulus at Vojlovica; Kuznjica near Majdanpek; Trnjane near Brestovačka Banja. From 2003 he directed archaeological research projects undertaken by the SASA, such as "Neolithic and Eneolithic cultures and copper finds in eastern Serbia" and "Metallurgy in prehistory and antiquity". He served as an expert consultant on many projects (rescue excavation at the Kolubara coal mine; systematic exploration of the sites of Belovode, Pločnik, Kraku lu Jordan, Zajačak near Kopaonik etc.); as a long-standing member of the editorial board and the chief editor of the journal Starinar; and as one of the editors of the Srpska enciklopedija (Serbian Encyclopaedia), a capital project of the SASA, and of the multi-volume Prehistory of the Banat, a collaborative endeavour of the Serbian and Romanian Academies. He was chair of the SASA Committee on Vinča, under the scholarly supervision of which the excavation of Belo Brdo had been conducted from 1998. He initiated the founding of the Commission for Archaeometallurgy and Industrial Archaeology Heritage at the Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments of the Republic of Serbia and, in 1995, the journal Arheometalurgija. He was a member of the Berlin-based Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, a lifetime member of the London-based Historical Metallurgy Society (HMS) and, from 1995 to 1999, president of the Serbian Archaeological Society. He participated in many national and international scholarly conferences in Europe, Asia and America.

Borislav Jovanović's prolific scholarly bibliography consists of some two hundred and fifty works, of which seven books he authored alone or as a co-author, several chapters in two volumes of the five-volume *Praistorija jugoslavenskih zemalja* (Prehistory of Yugoslavia) as well as more than fifty reviews. He was an archaeologist of many interests and achieved noted results in the study of all periods of prehistoric archaeology, but the field of his special interest and expertise, the one that took him to the top of European archaeology was archaeometallurgy, the discipline he pioneered nationally and was one of pioneers in the world. The beginnings of metallurgy and its impact on the development of human societies began to preoccupy him during his doctoral studies, and the parts of his dissertation that deal with the issue were published in 1971 in the monograph Metalurgija eneolitskog perioda Jugoslavije (The Metallurgy of Eneolithic Yugoslavia). By the time of its publication he had already been known beyond Yugoslavia for the investigation of the Vinča culture copper mine at Rudna Glava he had been carrying out together with Ilija Janković of the Museum of Mining and Metallurgy at Bor. At the very outset of the excavation Borislav Jovanović advanced a hypothesis which, however, was to be proved by exact analyses only at the beginning of the twenty-first century – that the earliest metallurgy originated in the territory of modern-day Serbia. The following years yielded a series of attractive new discoveries which fully confirmed the autochthonous Vinča origin of copper metallurgy in Europe. Borislav Jovanović presented his results at conferences across the world, the most important of which was certainly the one at Zhengzhou, China, in 1986, to which he was invited as a leading European archaeologist ("Early metallurgy in Yugoslavia", in R. Maddin, ed., The Beginning of the Use of Metals and Alloys: Papers from the Second International Conference on the Beginning of the Use of Metals and Alloys, Zhengzhou, China, 21–26 October 1986, MIT Press, 1988). His works were published in prestigious journals and edited volumes in Great Britain, Germany and the USA. Among the high points of his work on archaeometallurgy were the monograph Rudna Glava: Najstarije rudarstvo bakra na Centralnom Balkanu (Rudna Glava: The Earliest Copper Mining in the Central Balkans) which appeared in 1982, and the international conference Ancient Mining and Metallurgy in South-East Europe held in Donji Milanovac in 1990, which assembled the world's greatest authorities in this archaeological discipline.

Borislav Jovanović made a significant contribution in other areas of prehistoric archaeology as well. He explored Late Mesolithic and Early Neolithic sites in the Djerdap area, Padina and Hajdučka Vodenica, presenting the results in many articles and at international conferences. One of his last studies was published in Slovenia ("Micro-regions of the Lepenski Vir culture: Padina in the Upper Gorge and Hajdučka Vodenica in the Lower Gorge of the Danube", *Documenta Praehistorica* 35 [2008]).

His interest in the Vinča culture goes back to the very beginning of his career, and it is largely owing to him that it is now widely accepted to have been one of the most advanced prehistoric cultures in Europe, the one within which the oldest copper metallurgy in the world originated. Also important are his works devoted to the stratigraphy of the Vinča culture viewed from the perspective of its technological development ("Gradac Phase of the Vinča Culture: Origin of a Typological Innovation", in *Homage to Milutin Garašanin*, Belgrade: SASA, 2006).

Among the high points of his years-long study of the Eneolithic were the chapters in the third volume of *The Prehistory of Yugoslavia* (1979): "Mining and Metallurgy of Eneolithic Yugoslavia" and "Steppe Cultures in Eneolithic Yugoslavia". His last major work concerned with the Eneolithic is a monograph on the Eneolithic horizon at Gomolava, the site he explored as one of leading excavators (J. Petrović & B. Jovanović, *Gomolava: naselja kasnog eneolita* [Gomolava: Late Eneolithic Settlements], 2002).

Borislav Jovanović pursued his enquiries into the Bronze and Iron Ages with equal scrupulousness and success. He excavated the Middle Bronze Age necropolis at Trnjane near Brestovačka Banja ("Nekropola paraćinske grupe u Trnjanima kod Brestovačke Banje", *Zbornik radova Muzeja rudarstva i metalurgije* 5–6 [1991]). The results of the excavation of the burial mound at Atenica near Čačak with its complex architecture and opulent grave goods, which led some authors to designate it as a "princely" grave, were published in 1996 (M. Djuknić & B. Jovanović, *Ilirska kneževska nekropola u Atenici*).


Celtology was another field of study that earned him world recognition. He entered the circle of experts in the Late Iron Age through the excavation of the La Tène horizon at Gomolava and, later on, of the necropolis of the Scordicsci at Pećine near Kostolac. His results were published in leading specialised journals and edited volumes ("Le nécropole d'un grand camp militaire à Pećine en Serbie. L'expansion des Celtes de la Gaule vers l'Orient", Dossiers Histoire et Archéologie 77 [1983]), and in the last, fifth volume of The Prehistory of Yugoslavia devoted to the Iron Age ("Istočna grupa" [Eastern Group] and "Zaključna razmatranja o keltskoj kulturi" [Concluding Considerations on Celtic Culture]). In 1988 he published a co-authored monograph (with M. Jovanović) on the La Tène horizon at Gomolava (Gomolava: Naselje mladjeg gvozdenog doba/Gomolava: Late La Tène Settlement). And it was to wrapping up the results of his research into the Late Iron Age in the Central Balkans that he dedicated the last years of his life, but death found him in the middle of preparing a monograph on the necropolis at Pećine for publication. Yet, he presented the results of his years of study of the Celts in his inaugural address as elected full member of the SASA in May 2010 ("Походи Источних Келта на Грчку и хеленистичка краљевства Мале Азије", Glas SANU 414 [Campaigns of Eastern Celts against Greece and Hellenistic kingdoms of Asia Minor]).

The departure of Borislav Jovanović from this world means the loss of one of the greatest archaeologists in this region whose work etched a distinctive and influential mark on twentieth-century archaeology. The fact that this mark is visible in the study of all periods of prehistory in the former Yugoslavia speaks of Borislav Jovanović as one of the most versatile and productive archaeologists in the Balkans and certainly one of those to whom we owe most for expanding our knowledge of the prehistory of southeast Europe. He left behind not only his many publications and his rich excavation records kept at the Institute of Archaeology in Belgrade and the SASA but also successors who will round off his prolific life's work by preparing for publication that which death prevented him from completing himself. The Institute for Balkan Studies will not remember him only for the contribution to its work and policy he made as a long-standing chair of its scientific council but also as a man of kindness, integrity and generous spirit.

Dragana Antonović

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IN MEMORIAM



Dragoljub R. Živojinović (1934–2016)

D ragoljub R. Živojinović's research, writing and teaching in the course of his fifty-year scholarly and academic career in history carried on in the best possible way the tradition of Belgrade's school of historiography. A permanent and rigorous examination of primary sources, a historical curiosity, a diversity and large chronological span of research interests, a prolific scholarly production, an open-mindedness to historiographic traditions and trends, these are the most salient features of the legacy that Dragoljub R. Živojinović inherited from his professors and endeavoured to pass on to younger generations. What should be mentioned above all else is his continuous dialogue with world historiographies as his lifelong orientation and as a basis for his own work. The first step in that direction, and undoubtedly the most important, was his stay at Philadelphia University (1962–1964), from which he took his doctoral degree (1966) with the thesis "The United States and Italy, 1917–1919: A Study in the Origins and Development of a Dispute".

Dragoljub R. Živojinovićs doctoral dissertation announced a first set of topics on which his further work would focus: the history of the First World War, diplomatic relations between the USA and the region that would be called Yugoslavia, and relations between Italy and the lands that it would be composed of. The search for answers to historiographical challenges he had only touched upon while working on his dissertation led Živojinović to focus on relations between the Vatican and Serbia, later Yugoslavia as well, on Serbia's and Montenegro's international relations in 1878–1929 and, finally, a biography of King Peter I Karadjordjević. Another two sets of themes he was concerned with were his works on the history of Dubrovnik/Ragusa and on the history of modern Europe. The diversity of his historical interests resulted in an envious production of more than thirty books and three hundred articles.

In the best tradition of Belgrade's historiographical school, Dragoljub R. Živojinović built his research results into the lectures he held at the Faculty of Philosophy of Belgrade University, at first as assistant professor (1967), then associate professor (1973) and, finally, as professor of Modern History (1979). Focusing on the history of modern Europe in the sixteenth–eighteenth century, Živojinović enriched his lectures with the research on Ragusan mercantilism and finances, the relationship between the Republic of Ragusa and the American Revolution, Ragusan seafaring and health care. His lectures not only outlined the history of modern Europe for his students, they also acquainted them with the latest historiographical interpretations which he eventually rounded off in his book devoted to the history of Europe from Guttenberg to the French Revolution.

Professor Zivojinović pioneered the teaching of American history at the Faculty of Philosophy. Upon returning from the United States he not only introduced American studies in the curriculum but he also set up a specialist library, offering his students the first collection of reading materials on American history from the seventeenth to the twentieth century. The history of the United States was only a part of the teaching process through which he sought to acquaint his students with the results of Anglo-Saxon historiography, providing them with an insight into the contemporary method of historical research and its focuses.

With the book *America, Italy, and the Birth of Yugoslavia (1917–1919)* published in 1972 Dragoljub R. Živojinović resumed the dialog with American historiography he had opened during his doctoral studies. His study of the Wilson administration's policy regarding the Italian-Yugoslav conflict in the Adriatic did not go unnoticed by his American colleagues, as evidenced by the reviews published in the *Slavonic and East European Review,* the *Journal of American History,* and the *Journal of Modern History,* where a renowned expert on United States Central and Eastern European policy, Victor S. Mamatey, described Živojinović's book as a significant contribution to the history of American diplomacy during the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference. The next chapter in that dialogue was a book published by the Colorado University Press in 1978, The United States and the Vatican Policies: 1914–1918. That his analysis of the relations between the Vatican and the United States during the First World War was an incontestable contribution in a hitherto unexplored field was

confirmed by the reviews published in the *American Historical Review* and the *Church History*.

After his doctoral studies Dragoljub R. Živojinović paid several more research visits to the USA: he pursued postdoctoral research at Harvard (1971– 1972); as a recipient of the Fulbright scholarship he pursued research in New York (1977), and at Yale (1979); he was awarded a US government research grant (1980). Later on, he was a visiting lecturer at a number of American universities, giving lectures on Yugoslavia, the Eastern question, religious and political developments in the twentieth century, relations between Europe and the USA in the twentieth century (Woodrow Wilson Fellowship, Washington, 1987– 1988; University of Maryland, College Park, 1988; Cornell University, Ithaca, and New York, 1990, 1992; University of California, Santa Barbara, 1995, 1996, 1997; Lincoln University; Berkley, 2008). He was elected a corresponding member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences in 2006 and a full member in 2011.

Dragoljub R. Živojinović's presence on the international historiographical scene was also reflected in a number of scholarly conferences devoted to: American studies (Aarhus, Denmark, 1965; Seville, Spain, 1976, 1991; Norwich, UK, 1978; San Francisco, USA, 1980; Paris, France, 1983); to the issues of war and society in Eastern Europe (New York, USA, 1982; Bucharest, Romania, 1983; Belgrade, Serbia, 1984); and to Italian history (Rome, Italy, 1970; Genoa, Italy, 1972, 1985, 1989, 1992). Many of his articles found their way into the *East European Quarterly*, the *Journal of American History*, the *Florida State University Slavic Papers*, and into edited volumes published by the Istituto per la storia del Risorgimento italiano, the University of Sidney, the Presses universitaires de l'Aix-en-Province, the Brooklyn College Press, the Istituto di scienze storiche, Università di Genova, the Columbia University Press and the Cambridge University Press.

Owing to his familiarity with contemporary historiographical production and continual archival research, Dragoljub R. Živojinović was able to shed a new light on and challenge a number of commonly accepted interpretations in Serbian historiography. The starting point of his analyses was certainly the study of the diplomatic history of the First World War and the positions of major powers which had led to the Yugoslav state taking the form it did at its inception on 1 December 1918. Perceiving the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as a watershed in Serbian history, he analysed the course and outcome of the Great War in the light of the attitudes of Great Britain, Italy, the United States and the Vatican. He then analysed the foreign policy motivations of these powers within a larger span of time, from the Congress of Berlin in 1878 to the end of the Second World War in 1945, in order to establish if there had been continuity in their strategies towards two Serbian states, Serbia and Montenegro. Showing beyond doubt that these four powers were not friendly to Serbia and Montenegro, his findings disproved the widely accepted interpretation of the period. His analysis laid bare the motivations behind their attitudes, and offered the conclusion that the interests of the two Serbian states and the four powers had been frequently opposed and that the decisive factor for their relations had been the existence of a common enemy.

Živojinović's analysis of the Allied attitudes towards the Salonika (Macedonian) front in the book Nevoljni ratnici: velike sile i Solunski front 1914–1918 (Unwilling warriors: great powers and the Salonika front, 1914–1918) reveals to what lengths Great Britain was prepared to go to shut down the only front in the Balkans and in that way leave Serbia to her own devices. British generals and diplomats assessed that the defeat of Serbia in the autumn and winter of 1915 had sealed the fate of the Balkans and that the only way to reverse it would be a separate peace with Bulgaria. Behind such an assessment was Great Britain's clear intention to withdraw her troops from the Balkans and redeploy them in accordance with her own strategic interests, in the Middle East or on the Western front. Tracing British diplomacy's fundamental orientation to assess the developments in the Balkans only from the standpoint of its own interests from the Eastern Crisis to the outbreak of the Second World War in his book Nadmeni saveznik i zanemareno srpstvo (An arrogant ally and neglected Serbdom), Dragoljub R. Živojinović arrives at an unambiguous conclusion: British diplomacy's misgivings about the Serbian national demands was a constant from the 1878 Congress of Berlin to 27 March 1941.

Many works of Dragoljub R. Živojinović analyse the opposition between Serbian and Italian interests from the time of the secret Treaty of London in 1915. Based on his meticulous archival research, he was able to shed clear light on Italy's territorial pretensions, obvious in the text of the London pact and particularly insistent during the two last years of the First World War and in its aftermath. His book *Dalmazia o morte 1918–1923* elucidates the strategies Italy made use of on the ground with the view to annexing the territory definitively.

Uncompromising in his adherence to the highest standards of scholarly research and academic integrity, Dragoljub R. Živojinović sought to elucidate the true nature of the interests of the Serbs and their adversaries. He thus explored the policies of the Vatican at first as an Austro-Hungarian ally, and then as an opponent of South Slavic unification which would unite the Roman Catholic Croats and Slovenes with the Orthodox Serbs under the Karadjordjordjević dynasty instead of the Habsburg sceptre in his book *Vatikan*, *Srbija i stvaranje jugoslovenske države 1914-1920* (The Vatican, Serbia and the creation of Yugoslavia 1914–1920). As in the case of other actors in the diplomatic conflict during the First World War, he expanded his study of Vatican policy to include the Second World War and its aftermath in a separate book, *Vatikan*, *katolička crkva i jugoslovenska vlast 1941–1958* (The Vatican, the Catholic Church and the Yugoslav government 1941–1958). His analysis reveals a continuity of Vatican policy and the motivation behind it: the advancement of Catholic interests at all costs, even

when their promoters were representatives of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH). His meticulous archival research sheds a clear light on the role of the archbishop Alojzije Stepinac in the genocide against the Serbs, Jews and Roma perpetrated by the Ustashas in the NDH. He also shows that this genocidal policy was not a good enough reason for the Vatican to reconsider its support to Stepinac. The archbishop's subsequent conflict with post-war communist authorities was a decisive factor for the Vatican to perceive him as a Catholic hero of the struggle against totalitarianism. It is for its undeniable contribution to a comprehensive look at all these circumstances that his collection of source materials published under the title *Varvarstvo u ime Hristovo* (Barbarity in the name of Jesus), following in the footsteps of Viktor Novak's seminal work *Magnum crimen*, makes an important supplement to the bulk of the documentary material on the atrocities committed by the Ustashas.

The enquiries into the Vatican's Serbian and Yugoslav policies inspired Dragoljub R. Živojinović to devote his attention to the history of the Serbian Orthodox Church in a series of articles and, eventually, in the book *Srpska pravoslavna crkva i nova vlast 1944–1950* (The Serbian Orthodox Church and the new regime 1944–1950). Already targeted during the Great War in the South-Slavic provinces of Austria-Hungary, the Serbian Orthodox Church bore the brunt of repression by totalitarian regimes during and, especially, after the Second World War. The execution and persecution of its clerics and monastics, the destruction of its churches, the seizure of its property, were just some of the hardships that the Church went through, sharing the fate of the best part of its flock.

Dragoljub R. Živojinović's analysis clearly elucidates the fact that during the First World War the policy pursued by the United Sates, especially President Woodrow Wilson, was an exception among the powers whose decisions were critical for the fate of the Serbian people. President Wilson's effort to introduce a number of general principles into international politics was in stark contrast with the secret diplomacy that European powers made use of to carve the map of Europe. Wilson's support for the right of self-determination was, as Živojinović had showed in his doctoral thesis, and later confirmed by his further archival research in the USA, decisive for the Yugoslav question. Looking at the ties between the United States and Serbia over a longer period in his book U potrazi za zaštitnikom: Studije o američko-srpskim vezama 1878–1920 (In search of a protector: Studies on US-Serbia relations 1878–1920), he paid particular attention to the establishment of diplomatic relations, the US immigration policy, the position of the US administration on the July Crisis in 1914, the role of the US Navy in the Adriatic after the First World War and the position of the Roosevelt administration on the civil war in Yugoslavia in 1941–1945.

An important focus of Dragoljub R. Živojinović's research was a second Serbian state, Montenegro, before and during the First World War, which he studied in the book *Crna Gora u borbi za opstanak:* 1914–1922 (Montenegro in the struggle to survive: 1914–1922). The situation in Montenegro at the beginning of the war, and especially after the capitulation in 1915, put its very survival at stake. The efforts of King Nicholas and his ministers to maintain the country's statehood during the war and at the peace conference were an object of Živojinović's particular interest. A number of works devoted to Italo-Montenegrin relations are assembled in the book *Italija i Crna Gora 1914–1925* (Italy and Montenegro 1914–1925). Marriage ties between the two dynasties and Italy's geostrategic interests in Montenegro were the reason for Italy to keep a careful eye on the developments on the other side of the Adriatic. The role intended for Montenegro in the plans of Italian diplomacy, King Nicholas's territorial pretensions to Scutari, the capitulation of Montenegro and the revitalisation of its armed forces, its government in Neuilly, Montenegro at the peace conference, Italy's position on Montenegrin statehood after the war, are some of the topics which owing to Živojinović's scrupulous analysis have become part of our positive, well-founded knowledge.

International relations of the two Serbian states in 1878–1945 was another focus of Živojinović's interest, to which should certainly be added his three-volume biography of King Peter I Karadjordjević, practically a history of the decisive years in which the modern Serbian state attained its highest points. Looking at Serbia's first constitutional monarch in the true sense of the term as an expression of a full-fledged democratic system, Živojinović depicts all ups and downs Serbia went through in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

Making use of previously unexplored sources of mostly foreign provenance, Dragoljub R. Živojinović's prolific and diverse historiographical work, marked above all by the broad-minded curiosity of a scholar, has offered a clear and, even more importantly, a new picture of Serbia's and Montenegro's international relations with the western powers during the period in which the Serbian national programme was shaped and set afoot. Reviewing his fruitful and scrupulous scholarly contribution to Serbian historiography in its entirety, one inevitably seeks to pinpoint what may have crystallised as a central idea in the course of his fifty-year long research. It seems to be the realisation that the fate of Serbia has always depended on the strength, knowledge and aspirations of her statesmen and, of course, on the support they enjoyed at home. Opposed to that stands the evidence of a modest support of foreign powers, unfailingly determined by their own interests, in the times when Serbia practically had no true ally other than Montenegro.

Vojislav G. Pavlović

REVIEWS

23rd International Congress of Byzantine Studies Belgrade, 22–27 August 2016

Reviewed by Darko Todorović*

The 23rd International Congress of Byzantine Studies (ICBS) organized by the Serbian National Committee of Byzantine Studies and the Association Internationale des Études Byzantines (AIEB) was held in Belgrade on 22-27 August 2016. The Serbian capital, as in the now distant year of 1927 when it played host to the 2nd ICBS, once again brought together the most prominent names in Byzantine and medieval studies from all around the world. With more than 1,200 participants from 49 countries, it was the largest scholarly gathering in the century-long history of the Association (the previous, 22nd ICSB, held in Sofia in 2011, hosted 1,000 scholars). By way of illustration, the number of 60 participants in the 1st Congress in Bucharest in 1924 rose, at the next meeting in Belgrade, to 200 specialists in this, at the time still new, academic discipline. The central theme of this year's meeting, Byzantium - a World of Changes, was inspired by the epigram of the Byzantine scholar Maximus Planudes (c. 1260 - c. 1305) "Everything changes, but nothing perishes" (Πάντα μεν γαρ μεταβάλλεται, ἀπόλλυται δὲ οὐδέν). According to Ljubomir Maksimović, President of the Organizing Committee of the 23rd ICBS, this motto highlights the guiding idea of the Belgrade convention, which brought into focus "the question of institutional transitions and the phenomena which constitute Byzantium", viewing the millennium-long process from the perspective of its profound and palpable legacy which is indeed still influential.

The primarily Eurocentric character of Byzantine studies is easy to explain by the very nature of the field of study, as well as by the fact that the discipline originated in Europe (Russia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria, Germany, Italy, Greece, France, Great Britain). The presence of one Chinese scholar at the Congress obviously testifies to a rising interest in Byzantine studies in the Far East. American Byzantinology already has a well-established international reputation, while Canada and Australia have recently become major centres of Byzantine studies, mainly due to the significant Greek diaspora outside Europe,

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many of the scholars actually being of Greek origin. This was reflected in the ethnic composition of the participants in the 23rd Congress, where representatives of different national traditions in the field of Byzantine studies were in a position to compare and critically evaluate the scholarly achievements of their respective national schools. It was only natural that the Belgrade gathering was attended by a larger-than-usual number of Serbian Byzantinologists and experts in related medievalist disciplines.

The Congress was structured in six plenary sessions, numerous round-table discussions and thematic sessions. The main program was accompanied by eight thematic exhibitions, a book show (presenting the recent Serbian and foreign production in the field), a three-volume book *Byzantine Heritage and Serbian Art*, and numerous film and music events revolving around the theme of the Byzantine world. Apart from this, the attendees had an opportunity to visit several late antique and medieval archaeological sites in Belgrade and across Serbia.

The Congress was officially declared open at the Hall of Heroes of the Faculty of Philology of Belgrade University on 22 August. It was at this venue that the 2nd ICBS was opened 89 years ago in what then was the Great Hall of the recently founded New University. And this time, too, the most eminent figures of Serbian culture and public life were present at the opening ceremony: Mr Tomislav Nikolić, President of the Republic of Serbia, His Holiness Patriarch Irenaeus of Serbia, representatives of the diplomatic corps, and renowned figures of Belgrade University and the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. The Congress was held under the auspices of the Serbian President, who greeted the participants with his welcome speech, in which he emphasized, among other things, the fact that the Serbian-Byzantine heritage in Kosovo is endangered today "by untruths and attempts of forging historical facts as well as by physical destruction". The audience was

then addressed by Johannes Koder, President of the AIEB, by a representative of the Serbian National Commission for UNES-CO, and finally by Ljubomir Maksimović, President of the Serbian National Committee of Byzantine Studies, who declared the Congress officially open. The opening session was concluded with the inaugural lecture delivered by John F. Haldon, Professor of History at Princeton University, "Change" in Byzantium. Thinking about Stability, Resilience and Movement in Medieval East Roman Society, which re-examined the relationship between the historico-geographical environment and social and political change in the Byzantine world. In the evening of the first congress day, Mr Nikolić gave a reception at the Presidential Palace.

All plenary sessions (except for the opening one, which proceeded with the work program after the opening ceremony) were held in the Main Hall of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, while round-table discussions and thematic sessions took place on the premises of the Faculty of Philology. This year, the role of the moderator was somewhat different in comparison to previous practice. It involved more than providing usual technical support, but rather an active participation in the work of the session through presenting both broader introductions to the theme under discussion and recapitulations of the results of the day's work.

The first plenary session (*The Golden Age of Byzantine Hagiography*) was devoted to the innovative trends in the Byzantine hagiography of the eighth to the eleventh century, a flourishing period of this original and unprecedented genre of Byzantine literature. The Byzantine city, viewed in a diachronic perspective and in a broad spatial framework encompassing the Balkans, the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, was the topic of the second plenary session (*The Byzantine City and the Archaeology of the Third Millennium*). The third day's gathering was devoted to the interesting and hitherto barely explored area of the sensory

aspect of the Byzantine liturgical ritual (Byzantine Religious Practices and the Senses). The fourth plenary session was concerned with the historical connection between the Slavic world and Romanitas, embodied in Old Rome, as well as its two historical "reincarnations", the Byzantine and the Slavic one (Romanitas and Slavia: Political and Ideological Relationships between the Slavs and Old and New Romes). The complex issue of the reasons for Byzantine history writing and of the system of inherent rules guiding the process was the subject of the fifth plenary session (How the Byzantines Wrote History), while the last, sixth one (Byzantine Studies in the New Millennium) was focused on the future of Byzantine studies, especially in cultural environments that lack their own scholarly traditions in the field, such as China for example.

The topics that attracted the greatest interest at round tables and thematic sessions were those which traditionally constitute the core of Byzantine studies: political and military history, historiography, a broad spectrum of issues concerning literature, linguistics and philology, philosophy and theology, the arts, architecture, archaeology, the music and the theatre.

Various particular topics concerned with different periods of Byzantine history were grouped according to the chronological principle and discussed within separate thematic sessions arranged in three-day cycles (The Early [Middle; Late] Byzantine Empire), or according to both chronological and territorial criteria (Epirus Revisited - New Perceptions of its History and Material Culture; Islands of Byzantium between the 7th and 13th Centuries; The Black Sea Region between East and West in the 13th-15th Centuries; Latin Cyprus (1192-1571): A Case of Forced Coexistence; Exile: Continuity and Change in the Empire of Nicaea). Some of the cycles were, however, thematically focused on famous dynasties, considering their significance in a broader cultural and historical context (The Age of the Komnenoi; Thessaloniki in the Age

of the Komnenoi and Angeloi; Literature in the Age of the Komnenoi).

Byzantine historiography was the topic of thematic sessions which, divided into three-day cycles, looked at the origin and development of the genre within particular historical and literary periods (*Historiography of the 4th–gth* [10th–11th; 11th–14th] Centuries), and a separate round table examined the Byzantine world chronicle as an autochthonous genre of Byzantine historiographic prose (*Byzantine World Chronicle as Open Text*).

A series of thematic sessions covered various literary issues (Liturgical Poetry as Literature: Rhetoric, Exegesis, and Artistry; Poetic Circles and Anthologies in Byzantium; Byzantine Literature in the 11th Century), as well as particular genres (Hagiography; Liturgical Poetry; Hymnography), and some of the prominent authors whose work marked distinctive epochs in the history of Byzantine literature (Michael Psellos. One Thousand Years of a Polymath's Birth; Life and Works of Photius of Constantinople).

Several sessions discussed topics in linguistics and philology (Linguistics and Philology of the Byzantine Balkans; Byzantine Philology), medieval translations of Byzantine texts into Slavonic and other languages (Metaphrasis in Byzantine Literature; Byzantine Literature in Translation; The Role of the Slavonic Translation in the History of Byzantine Literature and Church Writing; Byzantine Literary Models and Patterns of Reception: Translation and Transformation in the Slavonic and Middle Eastern Traditions; The Translations of Latin Texts into Greek and of Greek Texts into Latin as an Expression of the Cultural Exchange between East and West (13th-15th Centuries)). A separate session brought together the papers concerned with different aspects of ancient literary and educational tradition with regard to their influence on the medieval culture of Byzantium (Byzantium Meets Ancient Literature; Imperial Responses to Pagan Hellenic Education in the 5th-6th Centuries).

Philosophical and theological questions have always been in the focus of Byzantine spiritual thought, and consequently held a prominent place in a series of thematic sessions and round tables (*Byzantine Philosophy* and Maximus the Confessor; The Early and Middle Byzantine Tradition of Aristotelian Logic: The Road from Alexandria to Constantinople; Philosophers and Philosophical Books in Byzantium; Saint Gregory Palamas and Barlaam the Calabrian in the Context of 14th-Century Byzantine Philosophy and Theology).

Considerable attention was paid to the area of civil and canon law in Byzantium, the development of legal theory and the implementation of elements of Roman law in societies of the Byzantine Commonwealth (Law as a Means of Change in Byzantium; Civil and Canon Law in Byzantium and Medieval Serbia; Crimes against State and Church; Du manuscrit de lois à l'acte écrit: la pratique juridique à Byzance).

A considerable number of round tables and thematic sessions were expectedly concerned with the vast field of Byzantine art, its styles, the enduring principles of its iconography, as well as the living tradition of icon painting in the modern era (Byzantium in Change. Art, Archaeology and Society of the 13th Century; Late Antique and Early Byzantine Art; Studies in Byzantine Iconography; The Artists of the Byzantine World and Stylistic Trends in Monumental and Icon Painting; Byzantine Art in the Modern Era: Issues of Emulation, Presentation, and Interpretation; Applied Arts of the Byzantine World; Serbian Medieval Art). A number of sessions covered the wide area of Byzantine archaeology as well (Art and Archaeology; Byzantine Archaeology). The thematic session that aroused most attention among those discussing Byzantine architecture was the one devoted to the recent discoveries at the site of Caričin Grad, one of the most important archaeological sites dating from the Early Byzantine period (Byzantine Architecture; New Insights on an Early Byzantine City: Caričin Grad (Justiniana Prima); Late Antique and Early Byzantine Architecture; Architecture of the Byzantine World).

Byzantine music was the topic of another separate session (Music and Hymnography, Melodies, Their Composers and Musical Instruments), while the performing arts, which have been a subject of extensive research over the last few decades, were looked at in the light of the evolution of liturgy (Theatre and Liturgy: Performance and Ritual in Christian Worship; Gesture and Performance in Byzantium).

The Belgrade congress was marked by the presence of a large number of prominent scholars in the field of Byzantine studies. Even their simple enumeration would take too much space and inevitably expose the reviewer to the risk of unjustly omitting many a meritorious author. Yet, at least some of the resounding names whose work epitomizes contemporary Byzantology should not be left unmentioned. Vincent Déroche, Bernard Flusin, John F. Haldon, Sergey A. Ivanov, Elizabeth Jeffreys, Anthony Kaldellis, Johannes Koder, Ruth Macrides, Paul Magdalino, Athanasios Markopoulos, Charis Messis, Margaret Mullett, Leonora Neville, Ingela Nilsson, Paolo Odorico, Günter Prinzing, Claudia Rapp, Diether R. Reinsch, Warren Treadgold, Mirjana Živojinović and others made it possible for this year's congress to become a scholarly event of the utmost importance.

Finally, one should not fail to mention a lasting result of the admirable effort, occasioned by the Congress, to bring the relationship between Byzantine heritage and Serbian art through centuries, and the achievement of Serbian scholarship, closer to foreign audiences: the publication of Byzantine Heritage and Serbian Art in three volumes (Sacral Art of the Serbian Lands in the Middle Ages; Processes of Byzantinization and Serbian Archaeology; Imagining the Past: the Reception of the Middle Ages in Serbian Art from the 18th to the 21st Century). Also, some of the thematic exhibitions which, along with other activities, accompanied the main program, deserve to be mentioned in more detail, considering the fact that a number

of renowned domestic and foreign experts in related disciplines took part in their preparation: The World of Serbian Manuscripts (12th-17th Century), curated by Irena Špadijer and Zoran Rakić (SASA Gallery); Byzantine Architecture as Inspiration for Serbian Builders in the Modern Period, by Aleksandar Kadijević (SASA Gallery of Science and Technology); Serbian Icon Painting in the Territory of the Renewed Patriarchate of Peć (1557–1690) (Museum of the Serbian Orthodox Church); Sounds, Reflexes and Rhythms of the Middle Ages in the Works of Serbian Artists in the Second Half of the 20th Century and the New Millennium, by Ivana Simeonović Čelić (Zepter Gallery); Visual Journeys through Mount Athos. Holy Mountain in the Drawings of Doug Patterson and Tim Vyner, by Anastasios Douros (Atrium Gallery of the Belgrade City Library); Athos. The Holy Mountain, by Kostas Mygdalis (Residence of Princess Ljubica); Life of the People and the Thriving of Temples.

Photographic testimonies, by Bojan Popović and Jelena Savić (Ethnographic Museum), and Dossiers of the 2nd (Belgrade, 1927) and the 12th (Ohrid, 1961) International Congresses of Byzantine Studies, by Predrag Komatina, Tamara Matović, Srdjan Pirivatrić, Bojan Popović and Miloš Živković (Courtyard of the Belgrade University Rectorate Building).

As the host of the 23rd International Congress of Byzantine Studies, the Serbian capital, long recognized as one of the oldest centres of Byzantine studies in Europe, proved for the second time in the past hundred years to be fully prepared to meet the demanding task of organizing the world's largest professional gathering of the kind. Thus, it once again confirmed not only the cosmopolitan openness of Serbian scholarship at its best, but also the traditional reputation of national Byzantinology on a world scale.

The Christian Heritage of Kosovo and Metohija. The Historical and Spiritual Heartland of the Serbian People. Editor-in-Chief Bishop Maxim (Vasiljević), Chief Contributing Editor Dušan T. Bataković.¹ Los Angeles² 2015, 1007 p.

Reviewed by Dušan Fundić*

The Christian Heritage of Kosovo and Metohija. The Historical and Spiritual Heartland of

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the Serbian people brings between its covers translations of documentary material and literary texts but also, and perhaps more importantly, new historical analyses organised into eight chapters and accompanied by more than eight hundred illustrations.³ The contributions by forty-six historians, theologians, artists, journalists, writers and experts in various fields, historical documents,

¹ Members of the Editorial Board are Bishop Atanasije (Jevtić), Bogoljub Šijaković, Predrag Puzović, Gordana Kelić.

² Jointly published by Sebastian Press, the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade, the Episcopal Council of the Serbian Orthodox Church in North and South America, the Faculty of Orthodox Theology, University of Belgrade, BLAGO Fund, Serbica Americana and Interklima-grafika, Vrnjci.

³ The illustrative material which includes photographs, maps, reproductions of paintings, icons and frescoes provides a visual insight into the Christian cultural heritage of Kosovo and Metohija.

medieval royal charters, historical chronicles and latest reports acquaint the reader with many aspects of the history and culture of Kosovo and Metohija. In the words of the editor, the book seeks to show how the Serbian Orthodox Church has been the driving force behind the creation of spiritual and material culture in the region over the centuries and how it has struggled for its preservation. Also, the book arose "in hope that peoples of Kosovo and Metohija will begin the discussions on what unites them emphasizing in positive and constructive ways the areas in which a Serbo-Albanian ethnic symbiosis has existed".

The opening chapter, "Spiritual Endowments and Aesthetic Insignia of Kosovo and Metohija", is devoted to Christian visual culture in the region, which includes four medieval churches and monasteries inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage Sites List: the Patriarchate of Peć, the Mother of God of Ljeviša, Gračanica and Dečani. Apart from the best known monasteries, this chapter offers an overview of the other medieval monuments in Kosovo and Metohija, the core land of the medieval Serbian kingdom, including the ruins of the monastery of the Holy Archangels near Prizren, and a separate text on Novo Brdo, the largest city of medieval Serbia.

The second and third chapters devoted to the notion of the Kosovo covenant and the 1389 Battle of Kosovo offer analyses and interpretations of their profound influence on the Serbian collective memory and on the Serbian culture of memory in general. The Kosovo covenant is looked at in the light of its grounding in the New Testament and Serbian historical experience. The Battle of Kosovo is approached in a similar manner, as the locus of the inception of the covenant, through a parallel with Christ's Last Supper. Its legacy goes beyond local and ethnic boundaries. Apart from theological interpretations, the chapters include texts that shed light on the framework of medieval Serbian culture and its contemporary echoes

("Patterns of Martyrial Sanctity in the Royal Ideology of Medieval Serbia: Continuity and Change", "Major Philosophical Texts in Medieval Serbia" and "Demythologizing the Kosovo Myth").⁴

The fourth chapter, in fact the "Memorandum on Kosovo and Metohija of the Holy Assembly of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church", offers a historical overview of the fate of the Serbian people and the Serbian Church in Kosovo and Metohija until the March pogrom in 2004, and supplies photographs of the thirty-one churches damaged or destroyed during the outbreak of violence on 17 and 18 March.

The following section of the book maps the exceptionally large number⁵ of Christian sacred sites, shrines and historical monuments distributed across all of Kosovo and Metohija. The sixth chapter, "History, Identity, Legacy", sheds light on the historical background of the "Kosovo question" based on the texts of Dušan T. Bataković ("Kosovo and Metohija: History, Memory, Identity") and Radovan Samardžić ("Kosovo and Metohija: the Rise and Fall of the Serbian People"). The central idea of the chapter is in fact to make a call for new approaches, interpretations and disputes along with new perspectives on the history of Kosovo and Metohija.

The overview of the region's post-1389 history in the seventh chapter offers texts on Serbs and Albanians under Ottoman rule. A section titled "Sources and Testimonies. From the 13th to the 20th century" assembles chronicles of various dates, old inscriptions and diplomatic documents of relevance for understanding social relations and everyday life in Kosovo and Metohija.

⁴ The authors of the texts are Smilja Marjanović-Dušanić, Boris Milosavljević and Milica Bakić-Hayden respectively.

⁵ The book contains the information that there are in Kosovo and Metohija some 1400 registered Christian shrines.

The chapter ends with a history of the region until 2005.

The concluding section of the book looks at the ghettoization of the Serbian population and the tragic fate of their cultural heritage in Kosovo and Metohija during the last two decades. If things stay as they are, one can hardly expect any other outcome but the eventual disappearance of the Serbian population of Kosovo and Metohija. Under such circumstances, this book is a scholarly attempt in defence of the spiritual and physical survival of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija.

Georgia Xanthaki-Karamanou, ed., H προσλήψη the apxaiothtae eto Byzantio, κυρίως κατά τους παλαιολογείους χρόνους [The Reception of Antiquity in Byzantium, with Emphasis on the Palaeologan Era]. Athens: Εκδοσείς Παπαζήςμ, 2014.

Reviewed by Bojana Pavlović*

The book reviewed here, $H \pi \rho \delta \sigma \lambda \eta \psi \eta \tau \eta \varsigma$ άρχαιότητας στὸ Βυζάντιο, κυρίως κατὰ τοὺς παλαιολόγειους χρόνους, is the proceedings of an international scholarly conference held in Sparta, 3–5 November 2012. The conference was hosted by the Research Institute of Byzantine Culture of the University of Peloponnese with the support of the Prefecture of Lakonia, Municipality of Sparta. The volume comprises fourteen articles which discuss the reception of antiquity in Byzantium from different disciplinary perspectives: history, philology, law, philosophy, archaeology, art history, architecture. The articles are grouped into four main sections according to the main topic - Byzantine history, philosophy and law, Byzantine philology and Byzantine archaeology, which reflects the aim of the Conference organizers to stress once again the extent and areas of influence of antiquity on Byzantine society in general. Every article has either a Greek or an English summary, and some are accompanied by high-quality illustrations.

The articles are preceded by the opening addresses of the editor of the volume, Dr Georgia Xanthaki-Karamanou, Prime Minister Antonis Samaras, and His Eminence Eustathios, Metropolitan of Monemvasia and Sparta.

The articles of the first thematic group discuss the influence of antiquity and the use by Byzantine authors of works of ancient writers and of literary genres established in antiquity. In his article Ἡ ἱστορία ώς ὅπλο προπαγάνδας στὸ Ὑστερο Βυζάντιο [History Writing as Political Propaganda in Late Byzantium] Apostolos Karpozilos presents the historians of the Palaiologan period and discusses their views and criticisms of the political situation of their time. Written under different circumstances and by members of the educated elite, and not by professional historians (for there were none in Byzantium), these historical works reflected the problems the Byzantine Empire had to deal with in the last centuries of its existence and described the rise of a new empire which eventually replaced the Eastern Roman Empire. Historians, who played an active role in the events described, either justified or sharply criticized the imperial authority and government policies, which made their works mouthpieces for political ideas and attitudes they or a group of their supporters shared.

Kostas Konstantinidis's article ή τύχη τοῦ χειρογράφου τοῦ Πλάτωνος τοῦ Ἀρέθα:

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Oxonii Clarke 39 [The Adventures of the Plato Manuscript of Arethas: Oxonii, Clarke 39] deals with the fate of a manuscript now kept in the Bodleian Library in Oxford which contains twenty-four dialogues of the ancient Greek philosopher Plato and which was copied sometime between 888 and 932 in Constantinople for one of the greatest Byzantine bibliophiles, Arethas, Archbishop of Caesarea. The manuscript seems to have been kept in Constantinople until 1453 and it might have belonged to the very rich library owned by the fourteenth-century polymath Nikephoros Gregoras. Apart from providing precious photographs of the manuscript, Konstantinidis includes excerpts from the book Travels in Various Countries of Europe, Asia and Africa, Part the Second, Greece, Egypt and the Holy Land, Section the Second (London 1814) written by the English traveller Edward Daniel Clarke who had found the manuscript in the island of Patmos on 11 October 1801. Clarke's Travels provide an insight into the problems the acquirers of the manuscript had to deal with and of the difficult circumstances of the Greek Patriarchate in the early nineteenth century.

Anthony Luttrell's article "The Reception of Antiquity on Rhodes after 1306" takes the reader to yet another island in the Aegean. During the fourteenth century the Greek element on Rhodes became very scarce and, although local people did have some consciousness and knowledge of belonging to a Greek and Hellenistic cultural entity, information on ancient Rhodes and interest in its classical culture was quite fragmentary. The arrival of some Greek scholars and Latin humanists in the fourteenth and fifteenth century and their scholarly approach and effort to provide Latin translations of Greek texts, thus making classical Greek literature more available to the Rhodians, did not, however, bring about a deepening of the knowledge of the island's ancient history and its civilization.

Influence of antiquity is to be found in every Byzantine author who mentioned barbarous peoples that were either foes or allies of the Byzantine Empire. This influence is reflected in the usage by the Byzantines of ancient appellations for other peoples (e.g. Mysoi, Persians, Skythai...) when referring to their contacts with the Empire. Alexios Savvides, in his article Oi ἀρχαισπρεπεῖς ὀνομασίες τῶν μεσαιωνικῶν λαῶν ἀπὸ τοὺς Bυζαντινούς [Antiquated Appellations of Medieval Peoples by the Byzantines], pays special attention to the Turkophone races, for whom the Byzantines used various terms.

The last article of the first thematic group, Προσλήψεις τῆς ἀρχαιότητας στὸ ἔργο τοῦ Νικολάου Μεσαρίτη [Receptions of Antiquity in Nikolaos Mesarites' Work] by Ilias Giarenis, deals with the usage of ancient forms, models and texts in Mesarites' literary work. Nikolaos Mesarites was a Byzantine intellectual who lived in the second half of the twelfth and first half of the thirteenth century, and held high ecclesiastical and civil positions in the Empire. As other Byzantine scholars, Mesarites also made use of ancient texts to describe contemporary works of art and architecture, and to depict the events and personages that marked his age. Apart from being regarded as mere topoi and as indicators of the learnedness and literacy of a Byzantine author, allusions drawn from ancient works were carefully chosen and employed by the author to express his own opinion about certain events and personages. Mesarites used quotations and parallels from Homer's Iliad and other ancient works to describe the conspiracy of Ioannes Komnenos Axouchos against the Emperor Alexios III. In another work he styled himself as a New Hercules, and depicted his late brother as a New Demosthenes.

The second thematic group, Philosophy and Law, comprises two articles. Konstantinos Boudouris's text Oi οἰκονομικοκοινωνικοπολιτικὲς ἀντιλήψεις τοῦ Γεωργίου Πλήθωνος Γεμιστοῦ καὶ ἡ Ἑλλὰς σήμερα [The Social, Economic and Political Views of Georgios Gemistos-Plethon with Regard to the State of Affairs of Hellas Today] raises the question of whether some views of the fifteenth-century Byzantine philosopher can be of use to modern society in overcoming the current crisis. Having arrived at a positive answer, the author analyzes social, political and economic aspects, and proposes some solutions to the problems of modern society of significance for the future of Modern Hellenism.

In her article Θέματα Δικαίαου τὴν ἐποχὴ τῶν Παλαιολόγων [Matters of Law in the Palaeologan Era] Kalliopi Bourdara focuses primarily on the premarital law and dowries. The Palaiologan period did not witness much legislative activity due to constant political problems. The Empire of Trebizond ruled by the Great Komnenoi, on the other hand, saw some activity in this field, which may find corroboration in the emergence of a Novel issued most probably by John Grand Komnenos (1282–1297).

The third thematic section is devoted to philological issues. Christian Gastgeber's article "A New Methodical Approach to Classical Literature in Byzantium: Prosopographic Palaeography" offers a new avenue for exploring and analyzing Byzantine texts. Showing the importance of examining various aspects of the creation and circulation of a manuscript, it stresses the importance of treating a manuscript as the product of a sociocultural environment for the audience that needed and demanded it. This approach can therefore lead to numerous discoveries not only about the person of the author or the copyist but also about his social network and the society in and for which the manuscript was produced.

Georgia Xanthaki-Karamanou's article deals with Χριστὸς Πάσχων: Πρόσληψη ἀπὸ «παθητικές» τραγωδίες τοῦ Εὐριπίδη [Cristus Patiens: Reception from Euripides' Tragedies of Passion]. Her thorough analysis reveals a strong influence of Euripides' tragedies (notably *Medea, Hippolytus* and *Bacchae*) on the Byzantine play *Christus Patiens*. Their influence is observable not only in the narrative and dramatic techniques used by the author but also in the use of Euripidean motifs and concepts so transformed as to fit into Christian cultural context.

The last article in this section, Stella Chrysochoou's Ἡ Πτολεμαϊκὴ Γεωγραφία στὸ Βυζάντιο [Ptolemaic Geography in Byzantium], discusses the reception of Ptolemy's Geographike Hyphegesis in Palaiologan Byzantium. The author also deals with the cartographical development of Ptolemy's work and raises the question of whether Byzantine intellectuals were able to draw Ptolemaic maps without provided exemplars and based only on reading and combining the ancient geographers Ptolemy and Strabo.

The last thematic section of the book, titled Byzantine Archaeology, consists of four articles, including those from the area of art history and architecture. In her article Μὴ θρησκευτικὲς παραστάσεις σὲ βυζαντινὲς σφραγῖδες μολύβδινες (1005 $ai\omega vac)$: Καταβολές καὶ ἑρμηνευτικὲς προσεγγίσεις [Non-Religious Images on Byzantine Lead Seals (10th C.): Origins and Approaches to Interpretation] Vassiliki Pena discusses quite frequent representations of animals and birds, as well as human figures or male portraits, on the seals dated to the Middle Byzantine period. These non-religious motifs that were common in Greco-Roman art testify to a growing reception of ancient culture in tenth-century Byzantium, the age referred to as the "Macedonian Renaissance".

Ioanna Spiliopoulou's article Ή πρόσληψη τῆς ἀρχαιότητας κατὰ τὴν περίοδο τῆς Μακεδονικῆς Δυναστείας: Πυξίδες ἀπὸ ἐλεφαντοστοῦν μὲ ἀρχαῖα εἰκονογραφικὰ μοτίβα [Reception of Antiquity during the Macedonian Dynasty: Ivory Caskets with Secular Decoration] reveals some of the finest examples of richly decorated ivory caskets carved with popular mythological scenes. The author argues that the artists used ancient manuscript illuminations as a source for the scenes decorating these secular objects intended most probably for the emperor, imperial family members or high court officials.

Ancient motifs and models in Byzantine art are further analyzed by Melita Emmanouil in her article H ἀρχαιότητα στὴν ζωγραφικὴ τῶν Παλαιολόγων: Εἰκαστικοὶ τρόποι, μοτίβα καὶ εἰκονογραφικὰ θέματα [The Influence of Antiquity in Palaeologan Painting: Artistic Ways, Motifs and Iconography]. The paper focuses in particular on the stylistic manners of Palaiologan painters and on the adaptation of ancient motifs to fit the Byzantine aesthetic. The author argues that Greek motifs were also used to strengthen Greek consciousness among the population in the period of decline.

The last article in the volume, Έπανάχρηση ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν μελῶν τῆς ἀρχαιότητας σὲ ἐκκλησιαστικὰ καὶ κοσμικὰ κτήρια τοῦ Μυστρᾶ [Reused Architectural Elements of the Antiquity in Ecclesiastical and Secular Buildings at Mystras] by Stavros Arvanitopoulos, offers an insight into an ongoing research project in one of the most prominent Byzantine cities of the Peloponnese, Mystras. The author does not propose any definitive conclusions on the reemployment of architectural elements but rather suggests some explanations regarding their original use.

The variety of topics addressed in this volume testifies to the diversity and, consequently, to the significance of the influence of antiquity on Byzantine civilization. It highlights the extent of convergence between the two cultures – Christian and non-Christian – and shows once again how a Christian society looked back to antiquity for motifs and themes, modifying them in such a way as to make them respond to the aesthetical, social, political and philosophical demands of their new users.

Pál Fodor, The Unbearable Weight of Empire. The Ottomans in Central Europe – A Failed Attempt at Universal Monarchy (1390–1566). Budapest: Research Centre for the Humanities, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2015, 175 p.

Reviewed by Ognjen Krešić*

Pál Fodor is a prominent Hungarian turkologist and historian who devoted most of his research attention to the history of Ottoman-Hungarian (and later Habsburg) relations and Ottoman rule over territories of the medieval Hungarian kingdom. He is director of the Institute of History of the Research Centre for the Humanities of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

The Unbearable Weight of Empire. The Ottomans in Central Europe – A Failed Attempt at Universal Monarchy (1390-1566) is an attempt by the author to reconsider his own previous research, to analyze and reassess trends in the study of the Ottoman Empire over the last twenty years, and to present to a broader public the results of the Hungarian specialists on Ottoman history. The book consists of an introduction (pp. 7-24) and two chapters (pp. 25-133), and is supplied with a list of references (pp. 135-160) and a combined index of persons, places and terms (pp. 161-175).

The end of the fifteenth and the sixteenth century is one of the most discussed periods in the field of Ottoman studies, but nevertheless it still represents an inspiring

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theme for researchers. The attention this period has been receiving has its negative effects too, as it is often included in broader discussions about the European sixteenth century with only superficial understanding of the Ottoman specificities in comparison to the contemporary western states. This is the reason why the tone of the book, especially the introduction, is often polemical. The author does not reject all the changes to the long-established paradigms about the Ottoman Empire brought about by the so-called imperial or post-colonial turn in Ottoman studies, but he calls for a more nuanced approach. As the author stresses: "the 'Europeanisation' of Ottoman politics and social history coupled with the depiction of the empire as a kind of idealized prototype for today's post-national global ambitions, seems to me to be a highly dangerous route, for under certain conditions it can even lead to the falsification of history" (p. 20). On the one hand, he accepts and welcomes the incorporation of the Ottomans into the studies of Early Modern Europe, because he considers the Empire as one of its constituent and important factors. But on the other hand, he rejects those approaches that seek at all costs to find similarities to the European states and societies, sometimes overlooking or paying inadequate attention to established facts.

In order to present Ottoman-Hungarian relations, with an emphasis on the conquests and policies of sultan Süleyman, Pál Fodor focuses mainly on diplomatic and military history. Adopting a chronological approach in presenting the results of his research, the author develops his main ideas about the Ottoman policies towards European states and the reasons behind some of the most important strategic decisions concerning the future of the empire.

The first chapter, "The Conquest of Hungary and the Road to Vienna (1370s-1530s)" (pp. 25-93),¹ supplies ample and detailed information not only about the Ottoman-Hungarian wars in the discussed period but also about the foundations of the Ottoman state and military system. Starting with the rule of Bayezid I (1389-1402), the author recognizes in the political and symbolic actions of the Ottoman sultans fairly consistent policies regarding the international position of the empire in the making. Their claim to universal imperial rule was based both on the Islamic tradition and on the idea that the sultans were successors both to the Roman emperors and to the previous Islamic ruling dynasties. Nevertheless, the issue of political supremacy was not the only impulse behind the expansionist policies of the Ottoman rulers; they were also driven by a number of social, economic and military reasons. The question of the causes and methods of Ottoman conquests is a well-researched one. and Pál Fodor offers its concise overview, stressing the importance of: the acquisition of booty and territory for the economic stability and sustenance of the army, the connection of military campaigns with a series of undertakings that ensured domestic stability, and the religious aspects of warfare. While accepting that the jihad as an ultimate cause of the creation and growth of the empire is an outdated concept, the author acknowledges that "the religious duty of jihad was an important element in Ottoman state ideology, one that was not used exclusively for the subsequent justification and sanctification of secular wars" (p. 45).

¹ As the author notes, this chapter is based on two of his previously published articles:

[&]quot;A Bécsbe vezető út. Az oszmán nagyhatalom az 1520-as években [The road leading to Vienna. The Ottoman great power in the 1520s]", in G. Barta. ed., Két tárgyalás Sztambulban. Hyeronimus Łaski tárgyalása a töröknél János király nevében. Habardanecz János jelentése 1528 nyári sztambuli tárgyalásairól (Budapest 1996), 63-96, and "The Simurg and the Dragon. The Ottoman Empire and Hungary (1390-1533)", in I. Zombori, ed., Fight against the Turk in Central Europe in the First Half of the 16th Century (Budapest 2004), 9-35.

After a discussion about the general situation in the empire and its development during the first two centuries of its existence, the author proceeds to the main subject of his book, that of the Hungarian-Ottoman rivalry. In his view, there is no doubt that the Ottoman plan from the very outset of hostilities was to conquer the Kingdom of Hungary and that the Hungarians were aware of that. Although weaker of the two belligerent sides, the Hungarian rulers undertook a series of steps to thwart Ottoman thrust into their lands (organization and support of crusades, offensive campaigns in the Balkans, maintenance of buffer states on the borders, fortification and military organization of border defences, conclusion of armistices with the Ottomans, and search for possible allies both in Europe and in Asia). The Hungarian-Ottoman conflict started to develop more decisively after the ascension of sultan Süleyman to the throne in 1520. Dismissing theories of some ottomanists that the incentive for the war came from the West and that it was merely a symbolical conflict between the most powerful rulers in Europe at the time - Charles V Habsburg and Süleyman, Pál Fodor claims that it was the young Ottoman ruler who chose Central Europe as the main field for his Empire's expansion.

Süleyman's father Selim I's obsessive campaigning against Iran did bring vast territories to the Ottomans but it also strained the imperial finances to the limit. Because of that Süleyman decided to make a strategic turn and to resume the military conquest of territories in Europe. Pál Fodor draws attention to the economic importance of the Ottoman Balkan provinces and to the widely held belief of the ruling group that further expansion into Europe was the best way to increase state revenues. At the same time, the situation in Europe was more favourable for the Ottomans than ever before, as the political and military conflict between the Habsburgs and the Valois, accompanied by a growing religious division in Europe,

considerably limited the Hungarians' room for manoeuvre and their chances to find allies. That was the beginning of a conflict that would become one of the defining aspects of Ottoman history.

Pál Fodor argues that sultan Süleyman had from the beginning a more ambitious goal than that of conquering Hungary - he planned to defeat the Habsburgs. Nevertheless, the quick victory over the Hungarian army in 1526 seems to have come as a surprise to the Ottomans and they postponed further conquest of Hungarian lands, a delay that had important consequences. In the author's view, it was then that the Ottomans missed their best opportunity to inflict final defeat to the Hungarian Kingdom and incorporate it into the Empire. Such a conjunction of favourable circumstances had never happened again. Süleyman chose to recognize a Hungarian noble, John Szapolyai, as king and to start a frontal war with the Habsburgs who, after the Battle of Mohacs in 1526, became entangled in Hungarian politics since Ferdinand I Habsburg was also proclaimed king of Hungary. As is well known, this confrontation led to two unsuccessful campaigns against Vienna in 1529 and 1532.

After analyzing all of the advantages, both political and military, that the Ottomans had over their European rivals, the author concludes that Süleyman's policy toward the Habsburgs during the 1530s gradually wiped out all of these advantages and opened the way for a centuries-long struggle. The new decade brought the renewal of Ottoman conflicts against the Spanish fleet in the Mediterranean, against the Portuguese in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and against Iranian forces on the empire's eastern borders. The Ottomans could no longer concentrate only on the northern front, but the sultan was under constant pressure from the military-bureaucratic elite to enable the acquisition of further territory in Europe. Besides that, the ideological aspects of the conquests should not be underestimated and, possibly, Süleyman's personal vanity; he might have seen Charles V as his only worthy rival.

When the conquest of Hungary was resumed in 1541 the Ottomans captured easily the territories ruled by the late king John Szapolyai, but the Habsburgs had in the meantime strengthened their hold over the northern and western parts of the Kingdom of Hungary. Thus, faced with the strong Habsburg presence and without secured and easily defensible borders, the new province of Buda imposed a considerable drain on Ottoman resources. The rivalries were put on hold for a while when the Ottoman-Habsburg peace was concluded in 1547. But the mistaken European policy of the Ottoman Empire, as Pál Fodor sees it, was firmly set in place by then.

The reasons why the author considers Süleyman's approach to the European front to be faulty are further analyzed in the second chapter, "The Capture of Buda and the Road to Szigetvár" (pp. 95-133).² In 1541 the sultan once again decided not to fully erase the existence of the Hungarian state and left the lands east of the river Tisza and Transylvania nominally to the son of king John Szapolyai, John Sigismund. Because he was just a child, the power was in the hands of two Hungarian nobles, Friar George Martinuzzi and Péter Petrovics. Two years later the Ottoman army successfully besieged a number of towns and reached Esztergom, but the campaign failed to completely end the hold of the Habsburgs over the northwestern parts of Hungary. The already mentioned peace concluded in 1547 turned out

to be a new source of conflicts between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs. According to this treaty king Ferdinand was obliged to pay 30,000 gold coins, which he viewed as a gift whereas the Ottomans interpreted it as the tribute for the Hungarian lands still in Habsburg possession.

The internal power struggle in the eastern Hungarian lands sparked the renewal of open warfare when George Martinuzzi recognized Ferdinand I's claim to Transylvania and invited Austrian troops. The group of nobles loyal to John Sigismund was defeated in 1550, and the Habsburgs proclaimed their occupation of Transylvania the following year. Pál Fodor gives a very detailed overview of the military campaigns in 1551 and 1552, paying special attention to Süleyman's and his military commanders' tactics. The Ottomans conquered Temesvár and the surrounding region, immediately organizing this territory as the new province of Temeşvar. Instead of continuing their conquest into Transylvania, the commander-in-chief of the Ottoman army Kara Ahmed Pasha decided to act upon suggestions presented by the governor of the province of Buda and to transfer the troops to the northern front in an attempt to finally wrest Upper Hungary from the Habsburgs. Trying to understand the possible reason behind this change of plans, Pál Fodor points to an idea that circulated prominently among the Ottoman ruling elite, namely, that financial stability could be acquired only by incorporating the mines of Upper Hungary. By the end of the hostilities that year it was clear that the decision was a bad one. Neither were important towns in northern Hungary conquered nor was the problem of Transylvania solved. In 1556 Transylvania became an autonomous principality under Ottoman suzerainty and with John Sigismund Szapolyai as its ruler, but the strength of Ottoman rule over it was subject to fluctuations and the Habsburgs continued to exert influence in the region.

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² This chapter is based on a study published in: P. Fodor and G. Dávid, "Az ország ügye mindenek előtt való". A szultáni tanács Magyarországra vonatkozó rendeletei (1544–1545, 1552) ["Affairs of State are Supreme". The Orders of the Ottoman Imperial Council Pertaining to Hungary (1544-1545, 1552)], História könyvtár. Okmánytárak, I (Budapest: MTA Történettudományi Intézete, 2005).

The author uses the course and outcome of these campaigns as one more proof of the mistakes the Ottomans made when planning their expansion. Many military successes notwithstanding, "the absence of clearly defined aims and strategies on the part of the leaders of the empire" led ultimately to failures on all fronts. The fight on five fronts (Hungary, the Mediterranean Sea, the Iranian border, Iraq and Hormuz) proved to be an overly ambitious task even for a state as resourceful as the Ottoman Empire was. "Although the sultan's court failed to abandon the wars of conquests for reasons of power politics and under the pressure of the oversized army and state apparatus, there was evidently a growing awareness of the futility and ever-decreasing profitability of these wars" (p. 127). The inability to prioritize its conflicts and to stick to long-term strategic objectives weakened the empire and brought about the collapse of the so-called classical Ottoman administrative and financial system.

The book is concluded with a concise account of Süleyman's last campaign against the Habsburgs in 1566. The old sultan died while his forces were besieging the fortress of Szigetvár and even though they were successful, Pál Fodor describes this event as a symbol of the failed Ottoman aspiration for world domination. The successors of the most revered sultan in Ottoman history failed to identify the flaws in his policies and, as the author reiterates, by repeating his mistakes they continued to strain the resources of the empire.

Although the book presented here is not a voluminous one, it provides a good starting point for anyone interested in the history of the Ottoman conquests in Hungary. The author's goal was not to offer an extensive account of the period under study, but rather to sum up the achievements of a decadeslong research, condensing in one volume his conclusions about the significance of Ottoman policies towards the Hungarian front for the future of the empire. Frequently taking a polemical approach when discussing the crucial issues, Pál Fodor shows that there still is room for further research and for reassessing the reign and achievements of Süleyman the Lawgiver.

Stephen Ortega, Negotiating Transcultural Relations in the Early Modern Mediterranean. Ottoman-Venetian Encounters. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2014, xiv + 198 p.

Reviewed by Marija Andrić*

Studies that deal with contacts between East and West and with the influence of the Islamic world on Europe in general have been growing in number, suggesting new analyses, proposing new answers and raising new questions that deserve closer examination. In his introduction to the book reviewed here, Stephen Ortega points to the need for a more in-depth study of relations between Venice and the Ottoman Empire, but we cannot subscribe to his view that the subject has been neglected. Because of the complexity of the subject, many authors have chosen to focus on a particular topic, seeking to examine it as comprehensively and profoundly as possible. In her numerous studies, Maria Pia Pedani has addressed the topic of diplomatic relations between Venice and Constantinople, Ella-Natalie Rothman has analyzed

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trans-imperial subjects between Venice and Istanbul, and Eric R. Dursteler has focused on the life of the Venetian community in Istanbul. Religious questions concerning Venetian and Ottoman subjects living in borderland areas between the Ottoman Empire and the Venetian Republic have been the focus of Giusepina Minchella's research.

Referring to a study by Paolo Preto (Venezia e i Turchi, 1975), Ortega points to the fact that it is mainly concerned with the manner in which Venetian politics and literature presented Ottoman culture and society, and that it fails to address many other aspects of this long history of exchange and cooperation. The main topic that Ortega identifies as being neglected is the Ottoman presence in Venice. This assessment, however, seems to be an overly critical one given that the topic has to a greater or lesser extent been addressed by all of the abovementioned scholars from the diplomatic, cultural, social and religious aspects. Besides, one should not lose sight of the conception of Preto's book, which is laid out at its very beginning and followed through all chapters. His central concern is the extent to which the Venetians were acquainted with the Ottoman subjects and how that shaped the perception of the Ottoman world in Venetian texts of political and social importance. That is the framework within which Preto approaches the problem meticulously, analyzing some great works of Venetian literature from the pen of travellers, politicians and philosophers. It cannot be said, therefore, that the only aim of his study was to look into the physical presence of Ottomans in Venice, but rather, to pay attention also to notions inspired by travels both of the sultan's subjects to Venice and of Venetians to the Ottoman Empire.

Although the topic of relations between Venice and the Ottoman Empire cannot be described as neglected, it has not been fully researched either, as the constantly growing number of historiographical works based on previously unknown primary sources raises new questions and offers new approaches.

In order to see if Ortega's approach manages to take a step further in this area, one should go through his book chapter by chapter, analyzing its conception and structure.

The first chapter deals with the Ottoman merchant community in Venice. The author brings some already familiar facts about the circumstances surrounding the founding of the first larger facility for the accommodation of Ottoman merchants. The main documents from the *Archivio di Stato di Venezia* analyzed there are: the petition for the foundation of a *fondaco* submitted by Francesco di Demetri Lettino, the records of the interrogation of Lettino and his family members, and of the hearing of a Paulina Briani who also provided accommodation to Ottoman merchants.

The second chapter is focused on petitions and other documents which show the types of administrative problems Ottoman subjects sought to solve with the help of the Venetian authorities. This chapter in particular provides a good insight into the life of Ottoman merchants in Venice, considering the fact that they are known to have lived in various private lodgings before the founding of the *fondaco*. In view of our very patchy knowledge of the conditions in which they lived in the city, it should be said that Ortega gives a good overview of the documents which may be used for a more detailed research into this topic. In addition to complaints concerning stolen goods and unpaid debts, and documents relating to the estates of merchants who died in Venice, there are also documents that show that the Venetian Senate had to cope with the problem of insults thrown at Ottoman merchants. The latter problem led to a proclamation being read on the Rialto Bridge in 1574 and again in 1594: it was strictly forbidden to insult or harass Ottoman subjects, under threat of penalty. Information of this nature shows us that it was a matter of great importance to preserve good relations with the sultan's subjects in order not to jeopardize peaceful relations and trade.

Life along the border between Venice and the Ottoman Empire is the focus of the third chapter. The author describes how the border was crossed in both directions. How easy or difficult it was for a person to convert to other religion and change the way of life depended on the effort of the family and their social status. The border was not always crossed voluntarily but, as some of the described cases show, could have been an act of sheer kidnapping.

The long history of diplomatic relations between Venice and the Ottoman Empire has left us a number of primary sources testifying to the influence of Ottoman representatives in the Republic. Describing that influence on the Venetian government's decisions in the fourth chapter, Ortega discusses some of the Porte's documents appealing to the Senate to help resolve a matter. His analysis of some cases of stolen goods or lost property suggests that the Ottoman authority acted efficiently in case of the disappearance of Ottoman possessions or subjects. In such cases, the Senate pursued the matter more vigorously in order to avoid it affecting their relations with the Ottomans.

Conflicts in the Mediterranean are dealt with in the fifth chapter. The author presents some of the reasons why sailing in the Adriatic was hazardous, focusing on the seventeenth century as a period of increasingly frequent attacks on merchant ships. At the centre of his attention is the conflict between Venice and Spain, which caused problems in relations with the Ottomans. The period in question starts with the year 1617, when Spanish galleys attacked Bosnian merchants in the Adriatic, and encompasses the Spanish conspiracy against Venice in 1618, which caused the latter a number of problems and strained its relations with the Ottomans.

After this brief overview of the major topics of Ortega's nook, it is pertinent to analyze whether his book provides new information and whether the author's approach helps better to understand transcultural relations between Venice and the Ottoman Empire.

There seems to be little connection between chapters, they do not seem to be kept together by a unifying idea. The first two chapters devoted to Ottoman merchants in Venice may function as an introduction to a study on the Ottoman merchants' life in Venice, but the third chapter switches to a completely different topic. What Ortega identifies as a shortcoming of Paolo Preto's study is that it devotes a single chapter to Ottoman merchants. Ortega does not devote them more than two. When it comes to the accommodation of Ottoman merchants in Venice, Ortega does not provide any significantly new information. Although he does offer a good introduction and then, in the second chapter, describes some situations that may be illustrative of the Ottomans' life in Venice, he does not elaborate further on this topic. More informative in this respect are studies by, for example, Uggo Tucci, Paolo Preto, Ennio Concina, Ella-Natalie Rothman and Maria Pia Pedani. Ortega's useful contribution to this topic concerns the status of Ottomans as foreigners in Venice. His analysis of sources from the Archivio di Stato di Venezia shows that it is possible to infer what rights they had when appealing to the Venetian authorities. Regrettably, Ortega has not recognized the crucial potential of this topic for understanding transcultural relation between Venetians and Ottomans enough to devote the whole book to it.

Mentioning the theory of "connected histories" (Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Connected Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia, 1999), Ortega is of the opinion that Maria Pia Pedani and Cemal Kafadar have managed to present them in their works. The structure of his own study does not manage to reflect his attempt to give a picture of the "connected histories" of Venice and the Ottoman Empire. The only connection between the chapters is that they all discuss an aspect of relations between Venetians and Ottomans, but the five different aspects of this "connected history" are not given the attention they deserve. As a result, each chapter is but a brief overview of what is already known since his study for the most part deals with problems which have already been more broadly treated by other authors. Ortega also points to problems that require further study.

It should also be noted that the problem that Ortega addresses in the third chapter has been given a more in-depth analysis by Giuseppina Minchela (Frontiere Aperte. Musulmani, ebrei e cristiani nella Repubblica di Venezia, Viella 2014). Minchela's book published the same year as Ortega's provides a rich account of the religious conversion of Christians, Roman Catholic and Orthodox, and Muslims motivated by various reasons. Ortega presents a few cases of women crossing from Venetian to Ottoman territory and the situations that they had to deal with in order to change their lives. Unlike Giuseppina Minchella's study, his examples do not provide a wider picture of this phenomenon.

What emerges as the central problem with Ortega's study is the fact it does not go beyond the results offered by previous research. In order to try to understand his intention choosing this particular approach, one should also look at it in the light of his academic predilections.

Stephen Ortega is an associate professor and director of the Graduate Program in History/Archive Management, he teaches at the History Department at Simmons College in Boston. The focus of his lectures is on Middle Eastern, Mediterranean and world history, and he pursues an interactive teaching style that involves analyzing and discussing a topic with a group of students, with special reference to the ways in which people in the Mediterranean defined their identity over time. Another study Ortega published the same year, this time in coauthorship with Adrian Cole (*The Thinking Past. Questions and Problems in World* History to 1750, Oxford University Press), is concerned with global history. Structured on the model of teacher/student discussion, it addresses topics such as the origin of war, the features of the empire, technology, religion and trade.

A comparative look at the two books reveals why the one reviewed here is organized the way it is. It comes as a result of the focus of Ortega's academic interest on working with students and enabling them to develop understanding of key concepts of history. Presenting some of the major problems and aspects of connections between Venice and the Ottoman Empire, the author outlines this "connected history" for his students.

More of a textbook than a research monograph, this book cannot be included among major scholarly works in its field. But, because of the way in which it is structured, with every chapter devoted to a separate aspect of the main topic, it may make useful reading for students who have only just begun to acquaint themselves with the history of the Mediterranean.

Dušan T. Bataković, Les sources françaises de la démocratie serbe (1804–1914). CNRS Éditions, 2013, 578 p.

Vojislav G. Pavlović, De la Serbie vers la Yougoslavie. La France et la naissance de la Yougoslavie 1878–1918. Belgrade: Institut des études balkaniques, Académie serbe des sciences et des arts, 2015, 500 p.

Reviewed by Veljko Stanić*

"Only Paris can be loved a thousand times", Rastko Petrović wrote to Milan Rakić and his wife Milica in the late 1920s which in the eyes of a benevolent observer may still have been an epoch of French cultural predominance in Europe. Milan Rakić emerged in Serbian literature in the first years of the twentieth century as a Baudelairean poet, and two decades later his young admirer Rastko Petrović chose the company of French Dadaists and Surrealists. Rakić served as Yugoslav Minister in Rome, a famous poet and a respected diplomat of refined manners, and Petrović, after his first literary accomplishments, also embarked on a diplomatic career. Even though they did not share the same aesthetic outlook and sensibility, both intimately lived in the European République des Lettres the tone of which, if truth be told, was still set by France. They represented the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS) which had won a place in the interwar Europe of constitutional, parliamentary and national states. The bond between them was forged through shared Francophilia and a dialog with French culture which the Serbian intellectual elite had been carrying on through a few generations. However, the liberal world in which they lived was coming to its end; irrationality, a crisis of democracy, and totalitarian ideologies would irretrievably take away the Paris that Rakić and Petrović had known.

The books of two Serbian historians recently published in French – Dušan T. Bataković's French Sources of Serbian Democracy 1804–1914 and Vojislav G. Pavlović's From Serbia to Yugoslavia: France and the Birth of Yugoslavia 1878–1918 – shed light on the unusual role that France had in the development of modern Serbia, offering a rare pleasure because they can be read productively in parallel. Characterized by meticulousness in approach, enviable erudition and marked reflexivity, they complement one another to provide a comprehensive overview of the past.

Dealing with political programmes and doctrines, and the development of institutions in Serbia, the voluminous work of Dušan T. Bataković focuses on the French influence observable in the ideological, political as well as legislative domains. Bataković sums up France's privileged legacy in Serbia as "a taste for freedom, revolutionary spirit, egalitarian democracy". Nineteenth-century Serbia was not in a position to follow only one model of political development; that possibility was precluded by the complexities of her history and her exposure to various and frequently opposing influences. This book depicts the step-by-step process of Serbia's modernization and the opening of her society to foreign influences - Austrian and Russian, but also British, Swiss and French. However. it would be more correct to speak of cultural transfers, of exchange and interaction, which were shaped by the needs of those who chose models to follow, while at once modifying and adapting them. In this respect, Bataković maintains that it was France with her system and values that was closest to the political needs of modern Serbia. The French ideas of popular sovereignty, natural rights and national state, as much as the revolutionary maxim liberty,

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equality, fraternity, made an unquestionable impression in agrarian and egalitarian Serbia. The French political imaginary shaped the Serbian understanding of nationalism and democracy, civil society and resistance to absolutism. In other words, the development of Serbian national identity in the nineteenth century may also be looked at against a transnational backdrop, through elements that are common to seemingly strictly separated entities. Furthermore, despite two very different political and cultural contexts, Bataković sees a similar political evolution in nineteenth-century Serbia to contemporary France: "at first a social and national revolution accompanied by a series of wars, then a defeat, occupation and restoration, then a series of new rebellions supported by an upsurge of democratic aspirations which end up in absolutism; then another series of wars, lost and won, and, finally, the establishment of parliamentary democracy." In France, this process lasted from 1789 to 1875, and in Serbia, a similar development from 1804 until 1903.

In this string of events, the Serbian Revolution at the beginning of the nineteenth century is portrayed as a Balkan-style French Revolution. It was very early on, in the Serbian Constitution of 1835, that influences of the French Charter of 1814 and of its revised 1830 version became observable. The revolution of 1848 spurred a new enthusiasm for liberal traditions of the French Revolution. By actively supporting national movements in Europe during the reign of Napoleon III, France acquired a foothold in the Serbia of the Constitutionalists (Ustavobranitelji) and Prince Michael. From the 1856 Paris Peace Treaty, France was building its presence in the Concert of Europe. Geopolitical reasons and ideological affinities favoured France's growing importance for Serbia in the late nineteenth century and, especially, in the first decade of the twentieth century. French steadily growing financial presence only buttressed that fact, and helped Serbia to free herself not only

from her economic dependence on Austria-Hungary but also from the Empire's political tutorship.

What provides the backbone of the book's narrative, however, are four generations of "Parisians", the Liberals, the Progressives, the Radicals and the Independent Radicals, whose different and opposing paths create the long road of struggle for constitutionalism and parliamentary democracy in Serbia during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Each of these four generations owed much to the French political ideas and doctrines. On the one hand the Liberals of the St. Andrew's Day Assembly of 1858 introduced the values of popular sovereignty into the political life of Serbia and stressed the importance of parliament, connecting them, in their romanticism, with the patriarchal principles typical of the Serbian past. On the other hand the Progressives, an urban, highly educated conservative elite, planned reforms inspired by July Monarchy France. Both were replaced by Radicals who, after initially Russian and Swiss influences, found a long-term model in the French radicalism of the Third Republic. These connections were based on ideological reasons, personals contacts, changing international relations, but also on the French notion of the nation as a civic community based on individual rights. The first modern, massive political organization in Serbia, the Radical Party, amalgamated democracy and nationalism by mobilizing the peasantry, and directed the struggle for constitutionalism and the rule of law towards national unification and gradual transition from the Serbian to the Yugoslav idea. Yet, culturally and ideologically, the Independent Radicals were the greatest Francophiles. They dominated Belgrade University and the Srpski književni glasnik (Serbian Literary Herald), they introduced the so-called "Belgrade style" which attained extraordinary heights in literary criticism, essay writing and modern historiography, and their public engagement, not only in Serbia but also in Europe, made the small Balkan kingdom into a "Republic of Professors" on the model of France. This confirmed the continuous attractiveness of French intellectual models, from Guizot, Sainte-Beuve, Renan and Taine to Barrès and Bergson.

At the end of Bataković's book, Serbia and France are at the threshold of the Great War. But Vojislav Pavlović takes up the story where Bataković leaves off. While Bataković deals with the problem of the transnational transfer of political ideas and institutions, Pavlović meticulously analyses the arena of international affairs. Even though his book covers the period from the Congress of Berlin in 1878 to the end of the Great War in 1918, the actual focus of his research is on Franco-Serbian relations during the war and the role of France in the creation of the Yugoslav state. Contrary to a view that is widely accepted even in academic circles, Pavlović demonstrates that France did not create the Yugoslav state, but rather that it grew on the foundations laid by the Serbian military victories and the Radical Party's policies pursued during the First World War. But, how did this atypical Franco-Serbian alliance look like?

Pavlović distinguishes four stages in the French attitude towards Serbian national policy. In the first phase, which began in the late nineteenth century, French financial presence in Serbia, even though not directly conflicting with Austrian and German interests, helped Serbia to wrest herself from Austrian dominance. The second phase, from the outbreak of the war in 1914 to the Italian defeat at the Battle of Caporetto in 1917, was the period when the Serbian government was the sole advocate of the Yugoslav programme. France, however, had no particular strategy regarding either Serbia or the Balkans, and, as in the years before the war, she followed Russian Balkan policy. Between Caporetto and the September of 1918 the activity of the Yugoslav Committee became more clearly manifested. Even during the last, fourth phase, from September

to December 1918, France continued her reactive style of policy, concerned above all else with the issue of Italian expansionism in the Eastern Adriatic.

There is no doubt, therefore, that France considerably helped Serbian national unification, but there was no particular plan behind it. Delcassé believed in an enlarged Serbia (with Bosnia and Herzegovina, an outlet to the Adriatic Sea, Slavonia, and Bačka, in exchange for Macedonia), and the London Treaty clearly showed that the Yugoslav option was not even on the Allied list of possibilities. Serbian defeat in the latter half of 1915 postponed all consideration of the Yugoslav question until the spring of 1918. It was only in April 1918 that Clemenceau consented to the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. The possibility of creating a Yugoslav state was not seriously taken into consideration until the summer of 1918, and even then Clemenceau was concerned with Germany. Moreover, France did not influence the internal organization of the future state. An alternative to the unitary system was Trumbić's confederal proposal, but the French were not too enthusiastic about the idea. They were even less enthusiastic about a Yugoslav state that would be composed of former Austro-Hungarian provinces without Serbia.

Can this désengagement of France be understood as lack of interest? In our view, such an understanding would be an erreur de perspective. The Kingdom of SCS/Yugoslavia was to have its place in interwar French foreign policy, and her cultural diplomacy was to pay it much of attention. Even before 1914, and especially during the war, Serbia had enjoyed much sympathy in French public opinion, as she did among scholars and political writers. Their influence on the political decision-making process may have been relatively small, but their influence on the public understanding of the world and of the spirit of the time was no doubt great. Yet, what seems to have been the main factor was the ability of the Serbian political

elite to grapple with high politics on a European scale, supported by the Serbian army's outstanding war effort. These skills of Serbian elites had for the most part been built in Serbia's close relations with the French Third Republic. Pašić was not merely a contemporary of Clemenceau and Poincaré; he was their Balkan counterpart. In this respect, Pavlović shares Bataković's views. If Serbia was on the same side with France in 1914, it was not by chance: French culture made a lasting imprint on Serbia's politics, society and culture through processes which had been taking place for a century. In the end, Pavlović concludes that the Radicals lost the battle with history. After the war ended in 1918, they were old and unwilling to change and adapt. There is some irony in the fact that they shared the fate of their French political allies.

A century later, it is easy to see that almost all features that made up this turbulent period of history are gone. French interest in the Balkans had its roots in romanticism and, at least in scholarly and intellectual circles, drew on the tradition of the Illyrian provinces. French universalism, which was not just Enlightenment-inspired but had its origins in the epoch of classicism, had a magnetic attractiveness for small European nations. France as a beacon of liberty carried with itself a civilizing mission and liberal ideas. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, anti-German sentiment and Franco-Slavic rapprochement only coalesced with these already established processes. Simultaneously, the development of French Slavic studies and of the so-called *science de l'étranger*, and the growing importance of academic forums and journals, allowed a more immediate contact with hitherto littleknown European nations.

Only liberal and democratic ideas have stood the test of time, but nowadays even they appear in new guises and overshadowed by a deep crisis. The Franco-Serbian alliance from the time of the Great War may also be seen as a *diplomatie de l'esprit* in which France generously offered the world her visions, and Serbia gave Europe the best part of herself. But a dialog with seemingly forgotten topics from the past, is it not also a road to a new understanding of the world which we all share? We can hardly find a better signpost than the books reviewed here.

A Scholarly Project of National Significance Accomplished. Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Serbia 1903–1914

Vasilije Dj. Krestić*

From 1964 the publication of the Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Serbia 1903–1914 series was overseen by a committee of the Department of Historical Sciences of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SASA), which was headed successively by Petar Popović, Jorjo Tadić, Vasa Čubrilović and Radovan Samardžić and, after them, by Vasilije Krestić as series editor. The editors of individual volumes were renowned historians, members of the SASA, senior fellows of its institutes or senior archival specialists: Vladimir Dedijer, Života Anić, Kliment Džambazovski, Mihailo Vojvodić, Andrija Radenić, Dušan Lukač and Ljiljana Aleksić-Pejković.

The aim of the project was to collect and prepare for publication the documents received or produced by the Kingdom of Serbia's Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Ministry's archive suffered much damage,

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often irreparable, in both world wars. It was seized by the Austro-Hungarian and German occupation authorities respectively, taken out of Serbia and distributed among their archives and museums in order for the documents to be used to prove that Serbia and Serbian people were to blame for the outbreak of the First World War.¹

From the middle of 1970 the Committee established collaboration with what then was the Diplomatic Archive of the Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, from 1982 with the Archives of Serbia and the Archives of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, where the material was finally deposited and where it is still kept, and with the Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts.

The chronological starting point for the series is the year 1903, in many ways a landmark year for the situation in Serbia and her twentieth-century politics, for the history of other Yugoslav lands, and for some countries which were Serbia's enemies in war. The period from 1903 until 1914 is covered by seven books, each in one, two or several volumes, and each of the books in 1000 or more pages. The series for the first time brings – in their original form, without any alterations or additions - all surviving Serbian diplomatic documents of significance for Serbia's wars for national liberation in the twentieth century prior to the outbreak of the First World War. Most of the material comprises diplomatic correspondence between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Serbia and its diplomatic missions: its legations and diplomatic agencies in the capitals of major European powers (London, Paris, St. Petersburg, Rome, Berlin, Vienna) and Balkan states (Constantinople, Bucharest, Athens, Sofia, Budapest) and its consulates in Turkey-in-Europe

(Skoplje, Salonika, Bitolj, Priština). It is supplemented with a selection of foreign policy documents originated by other ministries and their local bodies, as well as parts of the correspondence maintained between important actors of Serbia's foreign policy. Also included are various diplomatic acts and related correspondence presented to the Serbian government by foreign states as well as the Serbian government's aide-mémoires and analyses in French, German, English and Russian language.

The collected material sheds light on the international position of Serbia at the beginning of the twentieth century. She was under severe pressure from two hostile neighbouring powers, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, whose numerous Serb subjects naturally hoped for unification with Serbia as their mother state, which both empires endeavoured by all means to prevent. At the same time, the chaotic situation in Turkeyin-Europe, the religious fanaticism of local Muslim population, especially Albanians, the actions of Ottoman authorities, overtly or covertly supported by Austria-Hungary, were used in an organized manner to wipe out the local Serb population. Moreover, the Principality of Bulgaria had, ever since the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano, been harbouring pretensions towards the Slav-inhabited areas south of Serbia's border known as "Macedonia", and sought to annex them. Consequently, it denied the local Serb population, with the exception of those in the region's western part, the vilayet of Kosovo (Old Serbia), all historical or national rights and used terror, as did the IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) with the same goal, to force them into declaring themselves as Bulgarians.

The collecting and publishing of the diplomatic records is of paramount scholarly value for the recent history of the Serbs, the more so because many countries participants in the First World War had done the job long ago. Serbia was not able to do it earlier for a number of reasons, to mention

https://balcanica.rs

¹ For more on the subject see Vojislav M. Jovanović – *Marambo, Potraga za ukradenom istorijom* [The quest for a stolen history] (Belgrade: Jugoistok, 2010).

but the fact that her diplomatic records were an object of seizure in both world wars, by the Austro-Hungarians and Germans respectively; quite illustrative in that respect are the minutes recorded by the commissions set up immediately after their troops entered Serbia: the occupiers systematically collected Serbian archival materials and transported them to Austria and Germany.

Even during the First World War each warring side began to publish documents with the view to laying the blame for the outbreak of the war on the other side. Since Germany and Austria-Hungary were declared responsible for the outbreak of the war by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, which they denied, they published selected prewar diplomatic and political materials in order to justify their foreign policy.

Serbia set out on such a project with a great delay, partly because of the fact that her seized records were scattered in German and Austrian repositories. Many documents were lost, many damaged. The sorting of the material that was returned to the country in the state of disarrangement was a time-consuming and painstaking process. The situation was made more complicated by some internal political factors in the period after the Second World War. When, in the early 1960s, the materials kept in various repositories were at long last transferred to the Yugoslav Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, its Diplomatic Archive had a discretionary power to deny access to "dangerous" documents, i.e. those testifying to Serbia's national liberation policy, and it tended to exercise the power mostly to debar Serbian historians.

In 2014, the year commemorating the centenary of the outbreak of the First World War, this major project was finally brought to completion. The series consists of seven books in forty-two volumes. Those who are concerned with studying the history of Serbia, her aspirations and aims, her role, place and significance in the important period between 1903 and 1914, or with establishing whether Serbia wanted war or struggled to avoid it, whether she was responsible for its outbreak or not, will not be able to do it seriously and scrupulously without consulting the published corpus of Serbian documents.

The publication of the Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Serbia 1903-1914 is one of the biggest and most important scholarly projects of the Department of Historical Sciences of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts since its inception. The work took thirty years and two generations of historians to complete. All those who worked on it. and most of them are no longer with us, deserve our acknowledgement and respect. This acknowledgement goes also to members of the Academy, Milorad Ekmečić and Vladimir Stojančević, and to Dr Danica Milić, whose expert reviews and pertinent comments and suggestions greatly contributed to the quality of the series. With this series, Serbian historians fulfilled not only an important scholarly duty but also an important national duty. I would like to offer special gratitude to Dr Ljiljana Aleksić Pejković of the Historical institute in Belgrade who persevered in her selfless effort, hard work and expertise even when some colleagues lost their physical strength along the way and were unable to carry their share of work through. It is owing to her remarkable energy and her sense of professional responsibility that the series was carried out to its completion. It is my pleasant duty to express gratitude on behalf of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts to all those who financially supported the publication of the series, and they were not few. I should not fail to mention our very good collaboration with the Archives of Serbia, which provided all necessary assistance to our authors during their archival research. It is also my pleasure to express our gratitude to the Academy's publishing service, notably to Aleksandra Tomašević and Miljanka Zebić, who put much effort into freeing this multi-volume series from typographical errors.

The impressive set of forty-two volumes (now also available in digital format at: http://diplprepiska.mi.sanu.ac.rs/) stands as convincing evidence of an outstanding scholarly achievement made possible by the collaborative effort and under the auspices of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts.

The Serbs and the First World War 1914–1918, ed. Dragoljub R. Živojinović. Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2015, 474 p.

Reviewed by Dušan Fundić*

The book The Serbs and the First World War 1914-1918 edited by Dragoljub R. Żivojinović, one in the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts Department of Historical Sciences Series, is the proceedings of the International Conference held in Belgrade, 13–15 June 2014. During this three-day conference papers were presented by participants from several countries, including Serbia, Greece, Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, France, the United Kingdom and Russia. As stated in the opening address by Dragoljub R. Živojinović, the main goal of the conference was to "study the place and role of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Serbian people in general in the Great War".

The book assembles articles by thirtyfour authors organized in the order of their presentation at the conference, but they will be reviewed here grouped in three blocks according to their related subject matter. The first group of texts deals with a number of particular issues concerning Serbian history during the First World War.

Milorad Ekmečić offers a new reading of Renouvin's "triple conspiracy" and seeks to trace the motives of Young Bosnians for organizing the Sarajevo assassination. According to his interpretation, one of its causes was an organized colonization of Bosnia and Herzegovina with settlers from Austria and Galicia. This colonization went hand in hand with the steady emigration of Muslim population, which threatened to change the status of native local inhabitants. In his text "The Serbs in Hungary during the First World War" Vasilije Dj. Krestić describes the situation of the Serbian population in Austria-Hungary, including mass deportations to concentration camps in Hungary. He analyses the question of Austro-Hungarian army deserters of Serbian origin as well as the role of the Serbian elite in the process of taking over of power in the last days of the war. Special attention is paid to the status of labour force and food shortages in southern Hungary during the war.

Mihailo Vojvodić analyses the work of the Serbian parliament and the stances of its members on Austro-Hungarian pre-1914 policy towards Serbia. Basing his contribution on the minutes of parliamentary sessions, he draws the conclusion that Serbian MPs believed that Austria-Hungary had imposed a life or death struggle on Serbia by annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908.

Nikola B. Popović's contribution on "The Triple Entente and the idea of 'Greater Serbia' during the First World War" concludes that Serbia's goal was a unified South-Slav state, as laid out in the Niš Declaration of 7 December 1914, whereas the Entente, interested in attracting Bulgaria as an ally, considered the post-war creation of an enlarged, "Greater Serbia".

In his article "Young Bosnia and the 'Black Hand" Dušan T. Bataković explores entangled relations between the two

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organizations, emphasizing the role of the Black Hand leader Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis. Bataković concludes that Young Bosnia arose in resistance to Austro-Hungarian colonial rule over Bosnia and Herzegovina, and offers a new interpretation of its relationship with the Black Hand. Young Bosnia members were not a mere tool in the hands of the Black Hand but an active force which acted on its own agenda.

Draga Mastilović contributes a paper on Muslim youth in the Young Bosnia organization who were Serb nationalists, most notable of them being among the conspirators in the Sarajevo assassination, including the most prominent of them, Muhamed Mehmedbašić. During the war, many young Muslims fell victim to Austro-Hungarian persecutions.

The life and work of Jovan M. Jovanović, a Serbian diplomat and politician, is presented by Mira Radojević. During the 1920s and 1930s Jovanović wrote and published books and articles on the Serbian role in the outbreak of the war. The most remarkable in his writings is the explanation of his warning to Minister Bilinski prior to the Sarajevo assassination. The paper also offers examples of some of the earlier "war guilt" debates and allegations.

Radoslav Raspopović explores the question of Russian military aid to Montenegro, and its effect on Montenegrin foreign policy decisions. The aid that kept coming in throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was ceased in September 1912 due to Montenegro's secret alliance with Serbia and Bulgaria, which effectively crippled the political ambitions of its elites.

In her article "The Serbian Orthodox Church in the First World War" Radmila Radić gives an overview of the dioceses of the local Orthodox churches that would become part of a unified Serbian Orthodox Church after the war. She also analyses the available data in an attempt to establish the number of war victims among Orthodox clerics and monastics. She finds that some fifty percent of them suffered considerably during the war which, in the worst cases, meant being murdered or deported to concentration camps.

The focus of a second group of articles is on mutual influences and relations between Serbia, its neighbours and the great powers. Various aspects of the issues concerning Austria-Hungary are covered by several contributors.

Lothar Höbelt's text devoted to the question why Austria-Hungary started the war suggests that the Austrian army's mobilizations as a form of threat were too costly and could not go on indefinitely. Therefore, the first mobilization after the Balkan Wars would have necessarily meant war. Höbelt also concludes that the real reason for war was not Serbia's action in the southern provinces of Austria-Hungary but the prospect of an anti-Monarchy oriented Balkan league.

Václav Štěpánek describes failed attempts to improve relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary through the mediation of members of the Austrian parliament, Josef Redlich, Karel Kramář and Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk. The author focuses on a missed opportunity to arrange a Berchtold-Pašić meeting. The meeting eventually did take place but in different circumstances and when there was no more chance for peace.

Aleksandar Životić's contribution on "The Austro-Hungarian war crimes in Serbia in 1914" is based on various sources of Serbian origin. He analyzes the crimes committed against military officials, prisoners of war and civilians, concluding that those were not randomly committed crimes but an organized and premeditated undertaking.

The book Österreich-Ungarn und die Balkanländer mit besonderer Rücksicht auf okkupierte Serbien by Lajos Thalloczy, the Hungarian historian who served as deputy governor in occupied Serbia, is the object of Vladimir Stojančević's analysis. Thalloczy wrote the book for a pedagogical course which was to be held in Belgrade with the purpose of re-educating the Serbian population on the falsehood of "Greater Serbian propaganda".

The text co-authored by Árpád Hornyák and László Szarka reveals the views of Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza on the place of Serbia in an Austria-Hungarydominated Southeast Europe. They look at the evolution of Hungarian war aims during the war, which were based on the preservation of Hungary's territorial integrity and influence within the Monarchy. In addition, one more important aspect was to maintain presence and influence in occupied Serbia through Lajos Thalloczy.

The role of Germany, the most powerful member of the Triple Alliance, is addressed by the articles of John Röhl and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann. Röhl investigates German support to Austria-Hungary in July 1914. The German geopolitical decision not to allow the weakening of its ally resulted in its support to the Danubian Monarchy's intention to "punish" Serbia and quash its political influence. Through an analysis of the decision-making process, especially that of German Chancellor Theobald Bethmann Hollweg, Röhl depicts the road travelled to Germany's giving the blank cheque to Austria-Hungary to start the war. On the other hand, Strandmann looks at the early war aims in terms of political, territorial and economic ambitions, concluding that the German Empire did not fight a defensive war, but sought to achieve a hegemonic position in the European system of states.

The contributions of Holger Afflerbach and Massimo Bucarelli deal with two aspects of Italy's politics before and during the First World War. Afflerbach analyses the Italian decision not to enter the war in 1914. Without having been consulted by the allies, the Italian ruling circles had no intention of providing support to Austrian Balkan imperialism without compensation, and the Italian public was staunchly opposed to the war. Moreover, the Kingdom of Italy had a strong interest in preserving an influential Serbian state as a counterweight to Austro-Hungarian hegemony in the region. Massimo Bucarelli argues that relations between Italy and Serbia during the First World War were affected by the Serbian government's decision to pursue the Yugoslav programme by supporting Croatian and Slovenian pretensions to all of Dalmatia and Istria, which caused a great rift between the two countries.

One of the members of the Entente, France, had a very important role in various aspects that were of interest to Serbia in the First World War, which is the topic discussed by Georges-Henry Soutou. Soutou believes that the unification of Yugoslavs defined as a Serbian war aim was not a priority for the French government until the shift in its policy towards Austria-Hungary. At the instigation of the United States, the French government recognized the Czechoslovak state on 3 June 1918. This recognition paved the way for acknowledging the Yugoslav programme, albeit again delayed due Clemenceau's plan for a Franco-Italian alliance.

Jean-Paul Bled examines the writing of La Revue des Deux Mondes about Serbia during 1915. Its editor Francis Charmes celebrated Serbian victories in 1914. The magazine itself is important because it reflected the views of the French Foreign Ministry. In the course of 1915 Charmes argued that it would not be easy to convince Serbia to cede some of its territory in Macedonia to Bulgaria in order for the latter to be attracted to join the Entente bloc if Bosnia and Herzegovina was the only compensation to offer to Serbia because of the negotiations with Italy. Consequently, Bulgaria's attack on Serbia did not come as a surprise to him.

Frédéric Guelton presents "Papiers Fournier", the legacy of Colonel Pierre Fournier, the French military attaché in Serbia (1912–1916), which consists of 800 pages of telegrams and official reports. Fournier left important testimony on the military operations and Serbian victories at the battles of Cer and the Kolubara. Focusing on the period from July to December 1914, Guelton writes about the shortage of weapons and ammunition suffered by the Serbian army, but also about its impressive victories.

Looking at the Serbian defeat in 1915 and the exodus of its army and civilian population, Frédéric Le Moal analyses French support to the transportation of Serbian troops to the Greek island of Corfu as a founding moment of Franco-Serbian friendship. In subsequent decades the ties of friendship were strengthened by the creation of shared memory symbolized by the erection of a monument in honour of France in Belgrade in 1930.

In his article on Franco-Serbian relations from the perspective of the creation of Yugoslavia, Vojislav G. Pavlović makes an argument that the Serbian government's Yugoslav programme became a realistic prospect only after the breakthrough made on the Salonika (Macedonian) front in September 1918. French Prime Minister Clemenceau, however, refused to support the creation of a South-Slavic state because he had obligations towards the Italian ally which harboured ambitions to control both Adriatic coasts. An affirmative answer from France came only because its government had no viable solution to the problem of the power vacuum that had been left by the dissolution of Austria-Hungary.

Russia's support to Serbia in July 1914 is presented by Elena G. Kostrikova. She looks at several failed attempts of the Russian government to prevent the Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia, and points to widespread expressions of popular solidarity with the Serbs across the Russian Empire.

Miloš Ković looks into Great Britain's attempt to localize the conflict in the Balkans made on 29–30 July 1914. He describes the events surrounding the diplomatic initiative of Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, known as "Halt in Belgrad": Austria-Hungary would occupy Belgrade, Serbia would meet the demands of four great powers, Britain, France, Germany and Italy, and then the Dual Monarchy would withdraw. As a result of German decision not to cooperate with British diplomacy, Grey's initiative turned into a desperate attempt to repeat the diplomatic successes of 1913.

In his text "Aspects of Greek-Serbian relations in 1914 and the image of the Serbs in the Greek press", Spyridon Sfetas examines the conflict between Prime Minister Venizelos and King Constantine over whether Greece should enter the war on the side of the Entente or whether it should help Serbia only in the event of a Bulgarian attack, and suggests that Greece had less and less doubts about the issue after the battles of Cer and the Kolubara.

Dragoljub R. Živojinović discusses the stance of US President Woodrow Wilson on the issue of Austro-Hungarian responsibility for the outbreak of the war. In Wilson's opinion, there had been no reason for Austria-Hungary to feel threatened by a country as small as Serbia, and he intimately believed that the Double Monarchy had been the main culprit for the outbreak of the war.

A third group of contributions is devoted to various historiographical topics and to the question of the responsibility for the outbreak of the war. Slobodan G. Marković contributes an article devoted to the question of Serbian losses in the First World War. While Western specialists have estimated the losses at about 800,000 persons (16–17 % of the total population), two official Serbian estimates produced in 1919 are 1 and 1.25 million people respectively. Given the estimated total population of Serbia of 4.9 million in July 1914, as compared to 3.87 million in January 1921, the war losses are within the range of I to 1.3 million, or 21 % to 27.6 %, which confirms the generally accepted belief that Serbia lost a quarter of its population in the First World War.

Ljubodrag Dimić identifies several phases in the historiography on the First World War produced by Serbian historians, tracing the road travelled from works based on memories of war participants and propaganda material to a critical, scholarly approach to various types of historical sources. Dimić offers an analysis of the changing attitude towards the legacy of the Great War over time: from the period of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the new post-1945 socialist country to the latest trends in Serbian historiography.

The main trends in Russian historiography on the great powers' Balkan policies in 1914 are explained by Viacheslav Shatsillo, who suggests that during the Soviet period the assessment of the role of Serbia in the July crisis depended on the state of Yugoslav-Soviet relations.

Mile Bjelajac's contribution is devoted to the analysis of the most recent revisionist trends in interpreting the origins of the First World War. Bjelajac quotes numerous recent works to demonstrate that the revisionist authors rejecting Fischer's arguments advanced in the 1960s seek to formulate a new agenda: that the guilt for the outbreak of the war lies equally with all participants in the war. But, as Bjelajac's analysis shows, instead of developing a line of argument to support such claims, Serbia and Russia are simply denounced as the main culprits for the war.

Aleksandar Rastović shows that the debate on the responsibility for the war has in fact never ceased, being rekindled particularly at the time of severe political crises such as those of the 1920s and 1930s. Rastović focuses on one of the earliest public polemics, the one between Mary Edit Durham and Robert William Seaton-Watson which began in 1920 and lasted almost a decade. Whereas Durham claimed that the Serbian government had not only known about but in fact organized the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Seaton-Watson rejected such claims and eventually published a book exonerating the Serbian government of any blame.

Čedomir Antić gives an analysis of recently advanced interpretations of Serbia's alleged responsibility for the outbreak of the Great War. Identifying three moments of shift in interpretation in a process whose dynamics depended on political motives and cultural differences, he suggests that those shifts occurred at first almost immediately after the war, in the 1920s, then after 1989 and the end of the Cold War, and finally, during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, paving the way for the newest interpretations put forth shortly before the centenary of the outbreak of the war.

The Serbs and the First World War 1914–1918 explores the effects of the First World War on the Serb-inhabited lands from various viewpoints, focusing predominately on the dynamics between the Serbian state and the policies of the great powers. It covers a broad range of topics, from the origins of the war and the July crisis to the Paris Peace Conference, from political, cultural and diplomatic aspects of the war to the latest trends in the historiography of the First World War. What adds further quality to the book ensuring diversity of its contents is the presence of authors from various countries.

Reviewed by Miloš Vojinović*

James Lyon's book has been eagerly awaited by the historians of the First World War. As Lyon himself points out, the historiography of the Great War, after dealing with the events from the summer of 1914, usually loses sight of the Balkan front in the remaining months of 1914. If we look at the Cambridge History of the First World War: Vol. 1 Global War edited by Jay Winter, we can see that the Balkan front was not dealt with. Lyon offers several reasons why the Balkan front in 1914 should not be omitted from general overviews of the First World War. Firstly, relative to its size, it was as bloody as the Western or Eastern fronts. Five months of fighting in the relatively small northwestern quarter of the Kingdom of Serbia brought death, serious wounds, and captivity to 273,000 Habsburg soldiers and to 165,000 Serbian soldiers (pp. 234–236). Moreover, the Balkan front did not have to wait for 1919 and Spanish flu – at the end of 1914 typhus, diphtheria, and cholera were already taking lives. Secondly, Lyon demonstrates that events on the Balkan front were in focus of diplomacy of all belligerents, and of some countries that were weighing whether to enter the war or not. Finally, what is of special importance, the outcome of the war operations in the Balkans in 1914 had serious consequences for the Habsburg defeats by the Russian Empire on the Eastern front (pp. 4, 138, 149–150, 178–179).

The book is based on the author's PhD thesis defended at the University of California, Los Angeles, in 1995, before a dissertation committee which included Bariša Krekić and Dimitrije Djordjević. The published version also drew upon works published after 1995. Lyon's fluency in Serbian enabled him to research Serbian primary sources from the period, which he had done in a rather meticulous and diligent way. The detail in which the battles and troop movements are presented can even be described as burdensome by those who are not enthusiastic about military history. The narrative starts with chapters that are supposed to explain the origins of the conflict between the Kingdom of Serbia and Austria-Hungary, and ends with the last days of 1914, when hostilities ceased after the Battle of the Kolubara and the liberation of Belgrade.

Lyon states in the introduction that one of his goals is to demonstrate that most Western historians, due to the lack of knowledge of Serbian sources, have accepted the premise set forth by former Habsburg officers and politicians anxious to justify themselves, that the Habsburg army had been in a poor state whereas their foe had been better equipped and supplied (p. 2). Lyon is not the first to claim this. Historian Graydon A. Tunstall has spoken about "Habsburg command conspiracy", which was intended to hide the true reasons for the defeats of Habsburg armies in 1914.¹ Lyon provides a well-substantiated refutation of such claims, showing that the Habsburg troops outnumbered the Serbs by a ratio that went up to 3 to 1. Moreover, he clearly shows that the Habsburg forces were better equipped, that they had up to three times as many guns as the Serbs, and that they never faced problems with the lack of equipment, clothing and ammunition comparable to those that the Serbian forces did.

The first three chapters ("A Sunday in Sarajevo"; "A third Balkan war?"; "Parallel structures and hostile neighbors") cover the

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¹G. A. Tunstall, "The Habsburg Command Conspiracy: The Austrian falsification of historiography on the outbreak of World War I", *Austrian History Yearbook* 27 (1996), 181–198.

time before hostilities began. Lyon claims that "In 1914, influential elements in both Austria-Hungary and Serbia pressed diametrically opposed geopolitical and national aims that contemplated future programs of territorial expansion at each other's expense" (p. 2). What remains unclear is why Lyon has chosen to base his conclusions about some of the crucial events only on the work of Luigi Albertini. Being well acquainted with Yugoslav and Serbian historiography, he should have had no trouble noticing that some of Albertini's conclusions, at times based only on interviews made by his assistants after the Great War, have been disproved by the subsequent research based on the documentary material made available by the opening of archives.

Using Albertini's work as a source, Lyon claims that it appears that Gavrilo Princip was a fully inducted Black Hand member (p. 58), a notion which is not supported by any primary source or any research into Young Bosnia. He also argues that "Vienna's visible progress transforming and modernizing Bosnia-Herzegovina represented a threat to Serbia's national program", especially because, Lyon adds, Franz Ferdinand's triune ideas were an obstacle to the Greater Serbian national project (p. 56). What is questionable here is not just the fact that for Franz Ferdinand the triune solution was nothing more than an idea he briefly contemplated and discarded,² and that it is uncertain whether Serbian politicians knew about his plans at all. The main problem is that no evidence is given to support the claim that Austrian policy in Bosnia was a "threat to Serbia's national program". In fact, quite the opposite is true. As time went by, and especially after the Balkan wars, Serbia appeared more and more attractive to the South Slavs, and not just to those in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also to those inhabiting other parts of the Habsburg Monarchy.

It seems that Lyon devoted more time to researching hostilities than events that had preceded the war. The chapters describing the period before the war contain several factual errors. Belgrade did not become the capital of the Principality of Serbia after the rebellions of 1804 and 1815 (p. 91). The Serb-Croat Coalition in Croatia had not been in power from 1903 (p. 23), it did not even exist in 1903. Serbian chetnik units in Macedonia were not formed in 1902, and they were not formed by the Serbian state (p. 43). Lyon writes that in 1913 Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis maintained contact with Prime Minister Pašić via Milovan Milovanović. (pp. 58–59). It was hardly possible since Milovanović had died in 1912.

The major part of this book is devoted to war operations conducted from August to December 1914. The portrayal of the military preparedness of both the Kingdom of Serbia and Austria-Hungary is extensive and convincing. The descriptions of the battles and of the generals who led them are detailed and precise. The understanding of the battles and troop movements is made easier with six maps.

Lyon writes that at the beginning of the war Serbian army was "half uniformed and poorly equipped", while the Austro-Hungarian army "entered battle well-equipped, rested and possessing ample supplies" (pp. 88–89). He concludes that on paper the outcome seemed predetermined (p. 89). In the following chapters, Lyon depicts the Battle of Mt Cer, the Battle of the Drina with a special focus on the Battle of Mačkov Kamen, the Serbian invasion of Srem, and the Battle of the Kolubara.

Readers can follow parallel dynamics of decision-making processes in both General Staffs. While Oskar Potiorek set the imperative of fast victory in Serbia in order to be able to fight the Russian army with full capacity (pp. 116, 123), at the same time "Serbia's General Staff understood the

² J.-P. Bled, *François-Ferdinand d'Autriche* (Paris: Tallandier, 2012), 230–233.

strategic importance of the Morava-Vardar corridor, as well as the defensive advantages afforded by the country's mountains and rivers, and incorporated these natural obstacles into their defensive plans" (p. 109). Lyon argues that one of the reasons of Austro-Hungarian defeat and Serbian victory was the fact that, unlike the plans of the Habsburg army which were made almost exclusively in consequence of political imperatives, the Serbian generals made plans with military considerations foremost in mind (pp. 239–241). In this respect, Lyon praises General Putnik's decision to leave Belgrade undefended, since its defence did not have any military logic behind it. At the same time, Lyon shows that the only military decision that the Serbian generals made as a result of political pressure proved to be very costly: i.e. the decision to invade Srem taken after Russian and French repeated request to Serbia to attack Austria-Hungary on the latter's own soil.

What sets Lyon apart from some Serbian historians is his insistence on the importance of the role played by General Pavle Jurišić-Šturm: "Highly capable, he [Šturm] held what would turn out to be the most crucial assignment of any Serbian general in 1914" (p. 111). Lyon shows that Sturm's III Army was "by far the weakest" of the Serbian armies (p. 111); however, Šturm led it ingenuously against much stronger enemy forces, furthermore, he acted even when his superior, General Putnik, was hesitant about what should be done (p. 127). Sturm held his ground on Mt Cer in a way which Lyon describes as heroic (p. 143), and, during the most difficult days for the Serbian forces at the Battle of the Kolubara, "In contrast to other Serbian commanders, Jurišić-Šturm reported that even though he lacked artillery ammunition, telephone and telegraph cables for communications, and all units were seriously under strength, he could attack the following day" (p. 211).

The closing chapters deal with the Battle of the Drina, the short Serbian invasions of

Bosnia-Herzegovina and Srem, and, finally, with the Battle of the Kolubara. The battles are presented on various levels, mainly from the viewpoint of military history, with a focus on tactics, strategies, usage of weapons, and logistics. The author also provides an account of the diplomatic activities taking place in the background of the field of battle, the best example of which is the chapter about the Battle of the Kolubara and the efforts of the Serbian government to procure ammunition and supplies. As in many other books about the Great War, the readers can learn about the horrors that soldiers had gone through, and about the appalling ferocity of Habsburg troops towards local civilian population.

Like several Serbian historians, Lyon argues that General Putnik helped the Habsburg troops to escape encirclements, since he acted slowly or stopped the progress of Serbian advancement on more than one occasion (pp. 144, 223). However, in conclusion Lyon argues that "The primary reason for Serbia's success was brilliant strategy by the Chief of Serbia's High Command, Vojvoda Radomir Putnik, and numerous officers willing to take the initiative on the field of battle" (p. 241). Lyon also adds: "Other reasons for success include good generalship, the army's tactical doctrines, battlefield experience from the Balkan wars, and the psychological makeup of the Serbian soldier." Analyzing the reasons for the Habsburg defeat, the author claims that it was the consequence of poor strategic planning and leadership on the one side, and lack of tactical integration of artillery and infantry doctrine on the other.

The chapters of this book devoted to the war in the Balkans in 1914 make a fine contribution to the historiography of the Great War, and they will, without a doubt, fill the gap that has hitherto existed in it. Hannes Leidinger, Verena Moritz, Karin Moser and Wolfram Dornik, Habsburgs schmutziger Krieg. Vienna: Residenz Verlag, 2014, 328 p.

Reviewed by Rastko Lompar*

The centenary of the outbreak of the First World War once again sparked the debate in historiography about the causes and character of the first global mass conflict in the twentieth century. In the centre of this debate lay the question of the war guilt, and a vast number of works were published on this and many other aspects of the war. In the last few years, the Austrian historiography contributed numerous monographs to further the understanding of the First World War. One of the most notable works is the voluminous book by Manfried Rauchensteiner, The First World War and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy 1914–1918,¹ which provides an insight into multiple aspects of the Austro-Hungarian involvement in the First World War. As some reviewers have remarked,² however, some aspects of the Austro-Hungarian engagement in the war were intentionally left out of Rauchensteiner's book. Exactly those aspects are the focus of The Habsburgs' Dirty War authored by four prominent Austrian historians.

The author of the bulk of the monograph (five chapters) is Hannes Leidinger, and other authors (Verena Moritz, Karin Moser and Wolfram Dornik) have contributed a chapter each. Two of the authors (Leidinger and Moritz) have already collaborated on a similar project, being the authors of Habsburgs Black Book.3 In The Habsburgs' Dirty War, the authors' aim was twofold: first, to point to and describe the scale of violence against the civilians and prisoners of war in Serbia and Galicia during the First World War, and, second, to provide an analysis of the image of the war in the Austrian film and press or, in other words, to re-examine the "culture of remembrance" of the Habsburg Empire. However, such efforts are not free of controversies in contemporary Austrian society: the official newspaper of the Austrian Armed Forces (Bundesheer) Truppendienst branded such critical interpretations as an attempt to "demonize our old Habsburg army and portray it as being full of warmongers and war criminals" (p. 10).

In the first chapter entitled "The Question of War Guilt", Hannes Leidinger addresses this important topic, and gives an outline of events prior to the outbreak of the war. The author mainly focuses on Austria-Hungary and its rising war faction. He points out the growing animosity towards Serbia from the Bosnian Crisis to the last days of July 1914. The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia is thoroughly examined, as well as the crucial diplomatic activity surrounding it. The author emphasizes the "astonishing" Russian understanding for the Austro-Hungarian demands, which the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov deemed "fully legitimate". Regarding the nature of Russian efforts to de-escalate the crisis, Hannes Leidinger disagrees with those historians who see such efforts as "mere posturing". He insists on the Russian readiness for a compromise. The mobilization of the

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¹ Manfried Rauchensteiner, Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburgermonarchie (Vienna: Böhlau, 2013).

² Stephan Lehnstaedt, *Rezension von Habsburgs Schmutziger Krieg* (http://www.sehepunkte.de/2014/12/26312.html)

³ Hannes Leidinger, Verena Moritz and Berndt Schippler, *Schwarzbuch des Habsburger* (Vienna: Deuticke Verlag, 2003).

Russian army was, in his opinion, not an indubitable cause of war, but merely an attempt "to secure the most favorable position" in case of war.

In the next chapter "Escalation of violence", the same author portrays the methods employed by the Austro-Hungarian government in order to prepare its own citizens for the imminent war. By analyzing the press the author reveals how anti-Serb but also anti-Russian sentiments were inculcated in public opinion. Furthermore, he describes the anti-Serb riots in Sarajevo, carried out by Croats and Bosnian Muslims, which were condoned by Austro-Hungarian officials. These tactics were, in the author's opinion, aimed at polarizing the public and creating two distinct "fronts" in the minds of the citizens before the outbreak of the war (p. 69). Leidinger observes the use of the same tactics in the content of the orders given to the Austro-Hungarian army, which was instructed to fight "a culturally inferior nation" (p. 73). The author also notes identical tendencies on the Eastern front where the Austro-Hungarians fought the Russians.

The author of the next chapter, "Captivity", is the Austrian historian Verena Moritz, the head of a project examining the prisoners of war in Austro-Hungary during the First World War (Kriegsgefangene in Österreich-Ungarn 1914–1918). She provides a very detailed account (based on the materials both from the Austrian State Archives and the Archives of Serbia) of mass imprisonment of the captured soldiers and the civilians suspected of harbouring "Serbophile and Rusophile opinions".

Another Leidinger's chapter, "Establishing order", analyzes the methods employed by Austro-Hungary in order to establish and maintain order in the occupied areas. The application of martial-law in occupied Serbia constituted "a direct violation of the Hague Convention", which Leidinger sought to illustrate using numerous examples. such case, a woman, Milica Mitrović, accused of verbally insulting Franz Joseph, was hanged mere two hours after the alleged incident (p. 151). The scale of repression during and after the Toplica Uprising is also detailed. Furthermore, the author points out the problems on the Eastern front where, along with the crimes of armed militias, ethnic conflicts (mostly regarding Jews) contributed to the climate of violence and made it difficult to establish order. As the author points out, "shortly before the downfall of the Danube Monarchy the occupation troops became increasingly nervous", which led to the escalation of violence.

Wolfram Dornik begins his chapter "Reality(ies) of the occupation" with the assessment that the Italian and the Eastern front (in which he places the Balkan front) were completely different "theatres of war" and, therefore, the nature of occupation differed significantly. He explains the organization of the occupying authorities, details the differences in the occupying methods, and finally offers an assessment of the occupation regime from the economic point of view. When discussing the Balkan front, the author points out the entirely different treatment of the Albanians, who, unlike any other Balkan nation, were considered to be under Austro-Hungarian protectorate similar to that of Britain's in Egypt (p. 181). The author finds that the occupation of Romania, Serbia and Poland may be regarded as economically ""successful", whereas in the cases of Montenegro, Albania and part of Italy the gains were primarily strategic (p. 186).

In the chapter "Which law?", Leidinger seeks to present the legal side of the Austro-Hungarian war effort and to place the use and justification of violence in the broader context of the First World War. He surveys propaganda efforts of both warring sides to win over public opinion in neutral countries by portraying the enemy's use of force as illegal. In the case of Serbia the author describes the report of Archibald Reiss and the subsequent reactions of the Central Powers, most notably the brochure *Lies* about the Austro-Hungarian campaign in Serbia (Die Lügen über die österreichich-ungarische Kriegsführung in Serbien). The author examines the attempts made by Austria-Hungary to justify its actions, especially in Serbia. The Habsburg Monarchy issued 360 complaints for the violation of the law of war by the Entente Powers during the war. Serbia and Montenegro were accused in 58 cases, three times less often than Russia, and as often as Britain, France and Belgium with which Austro-Hungary had little military engagement. Most of these 58 complaints concerned the treatment of prisoners of war, and only eight were made on account of the illegal military actions undertaken by civilians (women, children and elderly) and the "crimes of komitadji" (pp. 100-101). In particular, the Austro-Hungarian leadership believed that it needed to justify the atrocities committed in Serbia, especially around the town of Šabac, and compiled a special report to that effect. This report concluded that "the states which are at war with less civilized peoples are compelled to adjust the law of war to the scale of their enemies' morality" (p. 201). The author argues that, despite severe repression and actions against intellectuals and politicians during the occupation, there is no evidence that Austria-Hungary intended to exterminate the Serbian nation. Therefore, the Armenian genocide remains the most drastic example of violence in the First World War (p. 204).

Leidinger's chapter "Distortion and fade-out" focuses on the ways in which post-war Austria denied, and shifted, the blame for the outbreak of the First World War. The efforts to ascribe the blame to the Habsburgs, the German Empire and, especially, to the "Hungarian foreign policy clique" are detailed. Furthermore, this chapter offers a comparative look at the memories of Austro-Hungarian warfare in the successor states of the Habsburg Monarchy (Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia), and points out the contradiction of memories: whereas in Austria the military "monopolized" remembrance and shaped it apologetically, in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes the main theme was "the repression and crimes of the Austro-Hungarians, brutal occupation, and the efforts to weaken and destroy their (especially Serbian) national identity" (pp. 225–228).

The author of the last chapter, "Visual remembrance", is Karin Moser, an Austrian historian whose research interests include film history and film propaganda in Austria. She provides an overview of the First World War-related films from the beginning of the Austro-Hungarian war cinematography in 1914 to the release of the monograph in 2014. However, the author does not merely list the films; she also points out different periods in filmmaking and emphasizes their main motives. During the war, film played a propaganda role in the country and was aimed at eliciting patriotic feelings amongst the population; it thus portrayed the war as "clean", with no casualties, devastation or blood. In the next phase, during the 1920s, films mostly depicted the House of Habsburg and "nostalgically evoked the good old times and the rule of the Habsburgs" (p. 238). With the rise of National-Socialism and Austrofascism, and the increasing militarization of society in the 1930s, the emphasis was placed on the glorification of the "heroes of the Great War". Furthermore, films with an anti-war message, such as the USA-made All Quiet on the Western Front, were banned after the fierce fights broke out during their screenings. The future Chancellor of Austria Kurt Schuschnigg demanded the ban as a "matter of moral, patriotic and national integrity" (p. 241). After the Second World War the paradigm shifted: it was the history of a family reflecting the Austrian society as a whole that now became the focus of filmmakers. The leading character was usually the "black sheep" of a family, a pacifist and a prophet thrown into the war that he opposed. In the last forty years, there have been multiple perspectives on the First World War, ranging from anti-war films to those which the author brands as an "abstruse Habsburg nostalgia" (p. 247).

Marvin Benjamin Fried, Austro-Hungarian War Aims in the Balkans during World War I. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, xviii + 294 p.

Jonathan E. Gumz, The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914–1918. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, xii + 275 p.

Reviewed by Dušan Fundić*

This review considers two books that deal with the period of the First World War in the Balkans, one from the perspective of Austria-Hungary's diplomatic service, the other from the perspective of its occupation troops. The book by Marvin Benjamin Fried devoted to Austro-Hungarian wartime diplomacy and decision-making process offers as its major conclusion that the Balkans held a superior place in the Monarchy's foreign policy over, for example, the Russian and Italian fronts. The book by Jonathan Gumz explores the mindset of the Austro-Hungarian army, its code of conduct, and its impact on the occupation policy in Habsburggoverned Serbia 1915-1918, and seeks to identify the driving motives of the occupiers.

Fried organized his book in six chapters preceded by an introduction and ending with a conclusion. All chapters with the exception of the first, "War Aims and Decision-Making in Austria-Hungary", follow a chronological pattern. He aims to demonstrate that the Double Monarchy had vital political, economic and military interests in the Balkans, which resulted in its aggressive and expansionist policies. The book is primarily an analysis of the development and changes of Austro-Hungarian war aims and the changing definition of acceptable peace conditions in the Balkans during the First World War. Fried calls attention to the fact that Austria-Hungary's war aims were by

no means more moderate than Germany's; but rather, that it simply focused on different parts of the continent. For the Habsburg ruling elite, the fronts against Russia and Italy were something of a distraction, although they were not completely uninterested. One of their concerns was, for example, the Polish question, but, in Fried's view, such aims were of secondary importance.

Unlike its German ally, the Habsburg Foreign Ministry retained control over the country's foreign policy. Fried shows that the Emperor and Apostolic King Franz Joseph played a rather insignificant role in decision making, which also goes for domestic public opinion, since it had no influence on policy shaping.

The chronologically organized chapters cover the following time spans: July–December 1914, January–September 1915, October 1915 – June 1916, June 1916 – May 1917, and May 1917 – November 1918. Each of them presents a period in which Austro-Hungarian foreign policy faced different challenges and was forced to take new solutions in consideration. The author's account is thick with detail, based on various, primarily archival, sources for documenting the consistency in Austro-Hungarian war aims.

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Between July and December 1914 the Empire, just like the other powers, was selfconfident and acted on the assumption that the war would be short and victorious, and that its main result would be to teach the Serbs a harsh lesson. As far as the shaping of foreign policy and war aims is concerned, Fried underlines the impact of Hungarian pressure embodied in Prime Minister Istvan Tisza, which lasted until May 1917. In the Adriatic region, the notion of negative war aims prevailed, the chief goal being to prevent the Italians from assuming control over both sides of the sea. Also, Berchtold and Tisza shared the view that it was necessary to defeat Serbia and diminish its influence in the region.

The next chapter of the book covering the period from the beginning of 1915 until September the same year is dominated by the portrait of Istvan Burian, new Minister of Foreign Affairs. Fried portrays him as an independent statesman with a mind of his own, not merely as Tisza's exponent in the Ministry as he is usually depicted. Burian was fully committed to the realization of war aims in the Balkans but military defeats in Galicia and Serbia crippled his attempts. Meanwhile, Austria-Hungary came under intense pressure from its German ally to redefine its aims in order to attract Bulgaria and Romania into the war on the side of the Central Powers.

In the period from October 1915 to June 1916 the Danube Monarchy finally achieved victory in Serbia, although not alone but with the help of its German and Bulgarian allies. The Bulgarian government almost immediately increased their territorial demands, which caused new complications to Austria-Hungary and its ambition to establish domination in the Balkans. Following the Bulgarian pressure and internal divisions that sprang from Tisza's intention to establish Hungarian control over Serbia, Burian had to endure the conflict with Chief of the General Staff Conrad who had been insisting on the idea of the annexation of Montenegro and Albania. Burian, on the other hand, was more in favour of the creation of small but viable states which would be able to check Serbian and Bulgarian influence in the future, and assigned Albania the most important role in such a geopolitical vision. Fried concludes that Burian pursued a Balkan-centric policy.

Under the new Emperor, Karl I, the new Foreign Minister, Count Ottokar Czernin, found himself in a difficult situation in the period of June 1916 to May 1917. Faced with the impossibility to pursue Burian's aims, Czernin sought to find an acceptable peace option. After the dismissal of Conrad in February 1917 and Tizsa in May 1917, Czernin obtained almost complete control but was unable to pursue his new goals because he could not get Germany's consent to consider peace. After the victory against Romania, his efforts only became more futile. The last chapter is a quite short overview of the last months of the Monarchy. The old war aims in the Balkans were overshadowed by the need to secure food supplies for the population and the army, and an honourable way to peace. Because of the complete lack of resources for waging war between May 1917 and November 1918, Austria-Hungary could not resist German political and military control.

The book written by Marvin Benjamin Fried is based on an extensive body of sources and literature. Apart from Austrian primary sources, Fried was able to read and use documents in Hungarian, which lends additional credibility to his interpretations of Tisza's and Burian's roles in Austro-Hungarian policies. The author advances an important thesis by treating Austria-Hungary as a great power which was an independent actor with ambitious aims and not merely a "weight" that Germany dragged behind it.

Jonathan E. Gumz organized his book into five chapters focused on the invasion of Serbia, the Austro-Hungarian occupation policy, including the organization and implementation of the legal system in occupied Serbia, the military view of the occupied country as a food source for the war effort, and guerrilla warfare.

One of the author's chief goals was to examine the nature of violence committed by Austro-Hungarian troops. Gumz finds that "much of the Serb historiography is on the mark" when exploring "executions, atrocities against civilians, military law, and the banishment and internment of the Serb national consciousness or at minimum Serb independence". On the other hand, he reinterprets the motives for the occupation. Rather than seeing it as the "intentional war of annihilation"," Gumz idealizes the Habsburg Army and suggests that it was guided by traditional, conservative values. Their mission, in his view, was to reshape Serbia into a province of an idealized bureaucratic empire, essentially supranational and free of politics and the notion of democracy. The Serbian population was to be transformed from a people of "king killers" into civilized subjects.2 In line with this logic, Gumz concludes that the complete devastation of Serbia was prevented by the adherence to conservative international values for which the Empire went to war. This limited the scale of violation of international law, such as the bombardment of Belgrade undoubtedly was.

Gumz makes his assumptions clear in the first chapter, "Facing a Serb Levée en Masse: The Habsburg Army and War on Civilians in 1914". In his view, it was the haunting fear of the so-called komitadjis, special Serbian units trained for close combat and guerrilla tactics, that caused a harsh and brutal response of the Austro-Hungarian troops. In this way, Gumz denies that anti-Serbian sentiment harboured by Austrian elites was a driving force behind the committed crimes. According to Gumz, the crimes were intended as a punishment for the Serbs who acted against the rules of war as imagined by the Habsburg officers. It seems that the author here succumbs to the apparently still lingering influence of the fear of the Serbian "irregulars" that was widespread in the Austro-Hungarian army, and to the point that one may almost be led to believe that it was them who defeated the invaders, not the regular Serbian troops.

In the second chapter, "Eradicating National Politics in Occupied Serbia", Gumz examines the mentality of elites in the Austro-Hungarian army. The proclaimed goal to reshape Serbia, which was possible only by force, was set in motion after the occupation. But was this really the policy of the "Army of 1848 in 1914" as Gumz defines it? The University of Belgrade was closed, the use of Cyrillic was officially banned and it was replaced by the Latin alphabet.³

As Guenther Kronnenbiter has remarked: "Wasn't the Habsburg authorities' policy in Serbia to denationalize the Serbs more than just a sign of the army's traditional aversion to nationalism? To ban the Cyrillic alphabet in Serbia – and in Bosnia-Herzegovina – and to use Croats as teachers in Serbian schools can be read as an indication that some nations were considered less of a threat to the empire's and its army's integrity than others. Was it really just another example of the long-established *divide et impera* tactics the Habsburgs had used time and again? Or should it not be understood as the Austro-Hungarian version of

¹ As interpreted in Alan Kramer, *The Dynamics of Destruction. Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

² The author makes a factual mistake naming the Serbian king assassinated in 1903 Milan, instead of Alexander Obrenović. In addition to that the book has a considerable number of spelling errors in writing Serbian names.

³ Milan Ristović, "Occupation during and after the War (South East Europe)", in 1914–1918 – online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed. by Ute Daniel et al., issued by Freie Universität, Berlin 2014-10-08. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15463/ie1418.10481, 6.

the quasi-colonial 'ethnic engineering' that Germany and Russia were tinkering with? To Germanize or – for that matter – to Magyarize Bosnia or occupied Serbia wasn't a realistic option, but to strengthen the position of the Croats vis-à-vis the Serbs was something that could and would be done."⁴

The chapters "Legal Severity, International Law, and the Tottering Empire in Occupied Serbia" and "Food as Salvation: Food Supply, the Monarchy, and Serbia, 1916–1918" addresses two of the most important aspects of the occupation for the Army. Gumz's central argument is that the main reason for the violence perpetrated by the military commanders was allegedly the enforcement of law and order, and not the unhidden intention to destroy the Serbian population and to force him to accept denationalization. In the chapter devoted to the question of food the author looks at the changing perspective of the military, which at first regarded Serbia as worthless, but by the end of the war came to the conclusion that it could be a source of food supplies for the war effort. Finally, the army blocked all attempts of civil authorities to use Serbia's food production for other parts of the Monarchy where civilians needed it. As a consequence, Serbian population was often on the edge of starvation.

The fifth chapter, "A Levée en Masse Nation No More? Guerrilla War in Habsburg Serbia", contains possibly the weakest set of arguments in the book. Without using any Serbian or Bulgarian sources, the analysis is vague and incomplete. The fact that significant Bulgarian forces were employed to crush the Toplica uprising (1917) is not taken into account at all, thus making the revolt look like a set of petty skirmishes. An illustrative example in this respect is that of Lieutenant Kosta Milovanović Pećanac. He was sent to the region by the Serbian military at the end of September 1916 to organize a revolt in the Bulgarian zone of occupation once the Serbian army reached the city of Skoplje. But the rebellion came too early because of the Bulgarian plan to mobilize local men. After two months of fighting and some 25,000 victims the rebellion was crushed.⁵ Instead of presenting all these facts, Gumz depicts Pećanac as a lonely komitadji who sought to engage local Serbs to attack the Serbs employed in local administration.

In general, Gumz offers a solid portrayal of the Austro-Hungarian army and its motives, but does not delve enough into its effects on the ground, avoiding to tackle the main problems: large-scale persecutions, dicrimination, mass interment of civilians, including women and children, as well as systematic attempts to denationalize the whole population of occupied Serbia That is why the author's arguments are stronger when he analyzes the Habsburg army's preconceived notions about Serbia before 1914 than during the occupation. As a result, the occupied population is seen only through the eyes of their occupiers.

⁴ Guenther Kronenbitter, "The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914–1918. By Jonathan E. Gumz. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 2009", *War Today* 9/3, 407–409.

⁵ Andrej Mitrović, *Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu* (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 20042), 347–348 (English edition: *Serbia's Great War*, West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2007).

Alberto Basciani, L'Illusione della modernità. Il Sud-Est dell'Europa tra le due guerre mondiali. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2016, 480 p.

Reviewed by Vojislav G. Pavlović*

The interwar history of South-East Europe has, as Alberto Basciani rightly observes, been widely considered as a mere period of transition from the era of empires (Habsburg and Ottoman) to the era of communist dictatorships, nothing more than an interlude between two great catastrophes that befell the region and the rest of Europe in the twentieth century. The Great War and the creation of the Soviet bloc produced the impression that the intervening years had had no particular importance. Furthermore, the Iron Curtain that descended on the major part of the region effaced the two decades from historical narrative.

Basciani decided to write a book in order to demonstrate the importance of the 1920s and 1930s for the history of South-East Europe, the years that, in his opinion, were marked by an undeniable striving for modernity, be it political, social, architectural or economic, which was motivated by the need to bridge the gap that separated the region from the rest of Europe. Basciani's intention was not to write a textbook but to trace the main lines of the region's political, economic and social evolution in the interwar years. Therefore he does not strictly adhere to a chronological approach and has no pretensions to an exhaustive analysis of the period. Having studied and written extensively on the region, he chose a number of salient events and changes which he sees as being the most descriptive of the evolution of the region. His book is based exclusively on works written in English, French and Italian. He decided to put aside those written in the languages of the region since he does not command them all.

The book is structured as a series of analyses of the Balkan kingdoms (Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes which was renamed Yugoslavia in 1929) divided chronologically into two parts, the 1920s and the 1930s. The first part, a time of challenges, demonstrates Basciani's approach, since the challenges that he focuses on vary from one kingdom to another. In the case of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the foremost challenge was its very existence, and then relations between the nations that the Kingdom was composed of. The kingdom of South Slavs was not only a successor state of the defunct Austria-Hungary, but also its heir insofar as the harmonisation of different political, economic and social legacies was its major challenge along with the national issues that were the reason for its structural instability. Bulgaria in the same perod witnessed the unprecedented rise to power of the agrarian party led by Alexander Stamboliiski with his particular vison of Bulgarian society with the peasantry at its core and the agrarian reform as the principal element of his political strategy. The assassination of Stamboliiski in June 1923 put an end to this unique experiment in making a peasant-centred society. The incorporation of Transylvania and Bessarabia into Greater Romania was the challenge that had to be addressed in the immediate aftermath of the war. The new electoral law introduced universal male suffrage, leading to the Liberal party coming into power. Albania came into existence only after the Great War, while a native dynasty led by King Zog faced the difficult task of creating the basic structures of the state. Greece came out of the Great War under the leadership of Venizelos, the advocate of the Allied cause and the architect of territorial expansion in consequence of the Allied victory. However, he lost the elections of 1920 and his arch-rival, King

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Constantine, was allowed to return to the country thanks to a quite dubious referendum. Thus, Greece under Constantine's leadership had to face the war with the Turkey of Kemal Ataturk and the subsequent population transfer codified by the Treaty of Lausanne.

The evolution of South-East Europe in the 1930s was interrupted by the Great Depression which the region began to feel only at the beginning of the decade. The progressive closing of European markets for agricultural exports from the Balkan kingdoms caused protracted economic and political instability in the region, leading to the emergence of authoritarian regimes. Democracy was a victim of the economic crisis, while the revival of German influence in the Hitler period created something of a German-dominated economic space in South-East Europe. King Alexander and Milan Stojadinović in Yugoslavia, King Carol and General Antonescu in Romania, Tsankov and Liapchev in Bulgaria, King Zog and his Italian mentors in Albania and, finally, Metaxas in Greece, were not in power at the same time, but taken together they demonstrate the fact that democratic processes in the Balkans were dying down. After Hitler's army overpowered western democracies, South-East Europe, already economically incorporated into Hitler's New Order, chose

to join it formally with the exception of Yugoslavia and Greece.

The Second World War and its aftermath confirmed the gap that had been created between Western Europe and its southeastern part from the mid-1930s onwards. The domination of two totalitarian regimes over the region created the impression that the efforts the Balkan democracies had made in the 1920s and 1930s had not produced any result, but rather had been a failed experiment which had proved the ineptitude of these societies for democracy. Basciani's book, however, proves otherwise. Its merit is in putting forward the fruits of an important bibliography on the region that provides irrefutable evidence for its evident evolution, the evolution based on the idea of democracy and free economy. The common effort to bridge the gap which separated the region from the rest of Europe was thwarted by geopolitical developments on a broader European scale. Nevertheless, the illusion of modernity, as Basciani's book is titled, cannot and should not obscure the efforts to modernise Balkans societies. Their results may have been annihilated by subsequent communist dictatorships, but historiography such as Basciani's excellent study has the obligation to rediscover and present the interwar efforts of Europe's "Third World" to join the mainstream of European development.

Milan Ristović, Na pragu Hladnog rata. Jugoslavija i gradjanski rat u Grčkoj (1945–1949). [On the Brink of the Cold War. Yugoslavia and the Civil War in Greece (1945–1949)]. Belgrade: Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, 2016, 461 p.

Reviewed by Radmila Pejić*

Milan Ristović, Professor of Modern History at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade, is a leading expert on the history of Yugoslav-Greek relations in the latter half of the twentieth century. He is the author of several distinguished monographs, which

have been translated into English (A Long Journey Home: Greek Refugee Children in Yugoslavia: 1948–1960, Thessaloniki: Institute

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for Balkan Studies, 2000) and Greek (To πείραμα Μπούλκες "Η ελληνική δημοκρατία" στη Γιουγκοσλαβία 1945-1949, 1η έκδ. -Θεσσαλονίκη : Κυριακίδη Αφοί, 2006). This monograph is a synthesis of two decades of research, based on the archival material of Yugoslav provenance and extensive literature written in several languages. In his theoretical introduction, Ristović examines conceptual differences in defining and exploring an internal conflict, i.e. the nature of a civil war. In this respect, Ristović concludes, "The experience of the Greek society and state during the Second World War and at the beginning of the Cold War in the 1940s is one of the most striking examples produced by modern European history in terms of its complexity, the number of participants and the effects of 'long duration.' The civil war in Greece, with its three 'rounds', is part of a wider phenomenon of modern European history; from the conflict of the warring factions of the resistance movement it transformed after the end of the Second World War into an all-encompassing, political, ideological and military confrontation, which, in the environment of the newly-divided Balkans, Europe and the world, assumed greater significance than that of a limited inter-Greek showdown. Political confrontation thus 'degenerated' into a 'total civil war''' (p. 43). Modern Greek historiography divides the civil war in Greece into three phases (1943/1944; 1944/1945; 1946/1949), and Prof. Ristović largely deals with the last phase in his monograph.

Drawing on the rich archival material, the author details the forms in which both Greek movements acted from 1941 onwards. The more massive one was the EAM (Εθνικό Απελευθερωτικό Μέτωπο – People's Liberation Front), founded in September 1941 at the initiative of communists and its military wing ELAS (Εθνικός Λαϊκός Απελευθερωτικός Στρατός – National Popular Liberation army). The other resistance movement was the EDES (Εθνικός Δημοκρατικός Εληγικός Σύνδεσμος – National Democratic Hellenic

League) under command of Napoleon Zervas, which was defeated and broken during the December 1944 uprising. The EAM was the largest resistance movement and it fought against the other movements as well as against the paramilitary formations of the collaborationist government. After the agreement in Varkiza in February 1945, the ELAS was disbanded. Next year the fighting was continued. The Democratic Army of Greece (Δημοκρατικός Στρατός Ελλάδας - DAG) was formed under the leadership of the ELAS veteran Markos Vafiadis, who commanded from a base located in Yugoslavia. Ristović demonstrates that the assistance given to DAG from Yugoslavia was extensive, varied and essential to DAG's fighting capabilities. Systematic supplying of DAG from Yugoslavia started in the second half of 1946 and continued on a large scale until the second half of 1948 – it was publically announced in October 1946. It lasted in different forms and with different intensity until the break-down of relations between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Communist Party of Greece in connection with the 1948 Cominform Resolution. The aid consisted of various war material, medical equipment, medicines, the treatment and rehabilitation of the wounded on Yugoslav territory, deliveries of foodstuff, clothes and footwear.¹ From July 1947 to the spring of 1948, there were

¹ Ristović has showed that Tito's envoy Svetozar Vukmanović Tempo was inaccurate in his brochure "O narodnoj revoluciji u Grčkoj", published in Belgrade in 1950, where he wrote that "we did not receive receipts for the aid in weaponry and war material which we gave to the People's Liberation Movement in Greece." Tempo's brochure was also published in English: *How and why the People's Liberation Struggle of Greece met with Defeat* (London, 1960). Such receipts, in fact, existed and they allowed the author to reconstruct the extent and the kind of assistance provided by the Yugoslav government.

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also radio shows broadcasted from Yugoslav territory (Slobodna Grčka – Glas istine) for the listeners in Greece, before the radio stations were transferred to Bucharest. Ristović reveals how "military advisers" were sent to Greece from Yugoslavia, who provided help in military training and handling of certain types of weapons in the headquarters of DAG. In a separate chapter discussing the case of a community of Greek communists in the Yugoslav village of Buljkes, Ristović shows how the Yugoslav territory constituted something of a logistic base, but also a training camp for the DAG fighters. The author precisely registers 6,317 wounded and sick members of DAG and civilians treated in Yugoslavia and 2,333 difficult surgical interventions for which more than 80 million dinars were spent in the period from June 1947 to August 1949. Besides the situation on the ground and the relations between the Yugoslav authorities and Greek communists, Ristović dedicates part of his study to reviewing the civil war in Greece in the wider, European and global, context, giving a title to one of his chapters "Truman's Doctrine,' 'Russian Baby' and 'British Child."² Ristović points out that, apart from the interference of Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the situation on the ground was influenced by the proclamation of the Truman's Doctrine in March 1947, which was followed by considerable American military and economic assistance to the official government in Athens.

To make a study of the civil war in Greece complete, it is necessary to look into

the conflicts arising from the Macedonian question both as it concerned the Yugoslav official relations with the government in Athens (which were nearly at the point of break-down) and the difficulties this controversy created in the relations between the Yugoslav and Greek communists. Special attention is given to the question of Slav-Macedonians or Slavophones in Greek Macedonia, who probably constituted the majority of the rank and file in the fighting forces of Greek communists in the latest phase of the civil war. The estimates of the total number of Slav-Macedonians in northern Greece after the First World War varies from 250,000 to 360,000. The influence from Skoplje on the "Slav-Macedonian" political and military organisations in northern Greece was an acute problem. It became even more pronounced and central to the fierce dispute between the Yugoslav and Greek communists after the conflict between Yugoslavia and Cominform emerged in 1948 and especially during the last months of the civil war. Archival research allowed the author fresh insights and new, original interpretations. Tito's systematic support to Greek communists had twin aims: first, to resolve the Macedonian question as a whole, in accordance with the Cominform's views; and second, to establish a "brotherly" ideological regime at the southern flank of communist Yugoslavia at the beginning of the Cold War. Logistic support of Tito's Yugoslavia to Greek communists became impossible after the split between Belgrade and Moscow in the summer of 1948. Following the conflict with the Cominform, Tito sought for support in the west and he could not receive it without dropping his backing for DAG. The closure of the Greek border and depriving Greek communists of logistic support allowed the pro-western government in Athens to win the civil war and to entrench Greece permanently in the Western bloc. The Eastern Mediterranean was crucial to the Western Powers and Stalin acknowledged this fact - he was

² This title is derived from a letter sent by Orme Sargent of the Foreign Office to the British Ambassador in Belgrade in November 1945, in which the former noted that it was "disconcerting that the Russian baby, Yugoslavia, shows all signs of vitality although it is underweight, whereas the British infant, Greece, remains a sickly child incapable of walking without considerable help and has a constant need for artificial nutrition."

unwilling to engage in a new conflict in the area in which his ideological protégés stood little chance of scoring a victory.

In conclusion, Ristović has produced a valuable monograph with a wealth of information, carefully balanced interpretations and excellent grounding in the wider Balkan and European context of the civil war in Greece, which will serve as a point of departure for all researchers of Balkan history in this period. In particular, he has convincingly proved that the Yugoslav dimension to the Greek civil war was of considerable importance for its outcome.

Bojan Mitrović and Marija Mitrović, Storia della cultura e della letteratura serba. Lecce: ARGO, 2015, 256 p.

Reviewed by Bojan Aleksov*

Italian publishing house Argo from Lecce in Puglia promotes the lands on the other side of the Adriatic Sea either with studies on the Balkan past or the translations of works of Balkan authors. Among hundreds of titles it published in recent years unfortunately only two address Serbian culture and history specifically - the Italian translation of Dositej Obradović's memoirs and Marija Mitrović's monograph on the Serbian culture in Trieste. Now professor Mitrović has teamed up with her son, historian Bojan Mitrović, to change that and produced a volume that introduces to the Italian public Serbian culture and literature from its Byzantine origins right to contemporary times. Given the interest and a great sympathy for Serbia and Serbian culture among Italian readers this book has been long overdue. It is thus with great relief to learn that the Ministry of Culture of Serbia recognised its value and supported publication.

Written decades after previous attempts, this volume not only updates them but brings a fresh and modern perspective. It rightly sees and interprets Serbian culture and literature as a symbiosis of foreign influences whereby both commonalities and particularities are singled out. This is a must when presenting a culture to an audience in the country whose art and culture have so powerfully radiated beyond their confines and inspired so many Serbian authors. First Serbian books were published in Italy after all, and from Dositej Obradović via Njegoš, Ivo Andrić, Laza Kostić, Jovan Dučić to recent times all significant Serbian authors spent time in Italy or grew with Italian culture. Many of these links and inspirations are duly illuminated by the well-versed Mitrović team.

Another novel and very useful approach in this volume is Bojan Mitrović's historical contextualisation of all literary and cultural trends and achievements. Furthermore, even though essentially a non-referenced textbook in its genre and thus necessarily of a general nature, this literature and culture overview on almost every page brings a citation, a footnote or a comment that explain or frame the material discussed. Usually these little vignettes discuss in more depth some interesting, often disputed issue, such as explaining the origins and development of slava celebration and its later-day appropriation by the Serbian Orthodox Church. The most numerous and relevant are those aimed at the Italian audience, documenting either political or cultural encounters between the two peoples, or making parallels, comparisons, links to Italian history and culture. Very usefully Italian translations

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of the literary works mentioned are always pointed out in footnotes and often other information on the publication given. Sometimes these vignettes take much longer form and become small essays about Njegoš, Dositej or Ivo Andrić. Marija Mitrović dedicates much space and attention to four most well-known Serbian literary authors of the late twentieth century (D. Kiš, B. Pekić, M. Kovač, F. David) as well as authors recently translated and popular among Italian readers (M. Pavić, D. Albahari, D. Velikić) which is necessary given that this is the first book to encompass and critically assess their work. Marija Mitrović also analyses contemporary literary production even though she is largely critical of it. In this regard, also praiseworthy is the inclusion of Serbianborn authors who live and write abroad or even those fully integrated in American culture such as Charles Simic or in Austrian such as Milo Dor given their inspiration and links with the old country in the age of mass migration and cultural transfer and entanglement.

Eventually, the volume's richness in focus and diverse length of its subject matters act in a useful way by maintaining reader's interest and keep the story dynamic. Similarly, while the narrative is divided in sections representing established movements and periods they are often interspersed with discussion on previously largely ignored women authors or for contemporary audience in Italy very relevant literary works with Holocaust as subject.

This reviewer would appreciate more balance in favour of popular instead of high culture which is difficult given that the book's main focus is literature, a mainstay of high culture. Also some minor factual errors creep in as in the portraits of Mehmed Paša Sokolović and Arsenije Jovanović Šakabenta. More troublesome is what is left out when selection had to be made. Anyone ever working on a textbook, anthology and/ or chronology knows how cumbersome if not impossible that task is. But if the Austrian military border is mentioned then an explanation is necessary let alone a reflection on its place in Serbian history and culture. Similarly, there is no mention of bishop Nikolaj Velimirović, Justin Popović or any other modern religious figure or author, which is an evident gap.

The volume boasts very useful appendices including maps, index, basic historical chronology, and the bibliography of key secondary works on several languages as well as of all translations of literary works from Serbian into Italian.

Anikó Imre, TV Socialism. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2016, 315 p.

Reviewed by Annemarie Sorescu Marinković*

Over the past thirty years, media studies have encompassed various disciplines and employed most diverse methodologies, spanning across all continents. However, most work in television studies, a paramount area of media studies, has remained restricted to American and West-European academic centres and traditions, developing mostly in reference to *capitalist television* – television systems fuelled by and entrenched in capitalist economies. The study of European televisions has recently rediscovered *socialist television*, and we have witnessed a rapid rise in scholarly interest in a new area of research:

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socialist television studies. Sabina Mihelj, one of its pioneers, points to the topicality of socialist television studies in a recent article: "Until well into the second half of the twentieth century, the vast majority of producers and audiences around the world have experienced the medium of television in the context of non-democratic or, at best, semidemocratic political regimes. Socialist television studies are particularly well equipped to address the specificities of television cultures in non-democratic political contexts."¹

The last five years have seen the publication of several articles, edited volumes and research monographs, which now form the basis of this emerging domain of study. International research networks on socialist TV studies have been founded, scientific conferences organized and research projects funded. In this very short period, the bipolar model commercial (Western) television/ public service (Eastern, socialist) television, which at first dominated this field and was deeply entrenched in the persistent Cold War way of thinking with its sharp East/ West divide, has been overcome. TV Socialism appeared at a point in time when socialist TV studies have been in full swing. Even though the field is a very new one, work on socialist TV is no longer in short supply and this book did not have to start from scratch, but was able to build on the already existing staples, outlining a methodological and theoretical framework which the field still misses. However, TV Socialism aims at - and manages to achieve - much more than that.

Anikó Imre, the author of the book, is Professor of Cinema and Media Studies at the School of Cinematic Arts at the University of Southern California. Her earlier books, *East European Cinemas* (editor, 2005), *Identity Games: Globalization and the Transformation of Media Cultures in the New*

Europe (2009) and Popular Television in Eastern and Southern Europe (co-authored with Timothy Havens and Kati Lustyik, 2011), recommend her as an authority in the field of global television, national and transnational media and European media. However, it was not until TV Socialism (2016) that nostalgia so profoundly permeated her scholarly work. As Imre mentions in the introduction, "TVSocialism bears the mark of having been written by someone who carries the bittersweet burden of the memory of really existing socialism in her very cells." Having decided not to cover up the visceral experience of watching the Hungarian television in the 1970s and 1980s, part and parcel of her upbringing, Imre capitalizes on nostalgia attached to socialist television and manages to write a lively and authentic testimony, in the form of a timely scholarly contribution.

The book is organized according to a broadly conceived generic logic, genre being understood here as "a trans-cultural form of expression rather than a set of specific television genres, since socialist genres do not exactly overlap with those derived from Anglo-American television". Divided into four parts - "Genres of Realism and Reality", "Genres of History", "Genres of Fiction" and "Genres of Humor" – the volume combines the logic of TV genres with the guiding force of several key concepts, such as: competition, consumption, education, emotion, entertainment, gender, history, humour, memory and nostalgia, as the author explains in the introduction. Each of the four parts explains how a certain generic dimension functioned within socialist television and in the end discusses how these dimensions have shifted since the end of the Cold War. This hybrid approach, based on a crisscross of genres and defining concepts, reveals that the topography of socialist television differs to a great extent from the image of uniform propaganda programming that one has tended to think socialist media looked like. Thus, under the widely encompassing umbrella of ideological commitment to Soviet principles, the author

¹ Sabina Mihelj, "Understanding Socialist Television: Concepts, Objects, Methods", VIEW: *Journal of European Television, History and Culture* 3/5 (2014), 7.

reveals a great variety of aesthetic and economic practices: frequent contacts and exchanges within the region and with Western media institutions, a permanent transborder broadcasting flow, a steady production and broadcasting of entertainment genres and transcultural, multilingual reception practices along the state borders.

The author argues that, unlike socialism, socialist television is a necessary construction, which proves to be a better platform for a historical revision of life under socialism than art films and literature. Television. Imre thinks, was a more reliable barometer of political, economic, social and cultural life under socialism: "In the most obvious sense, it was an institution that lived in the intersection of the public and domestic spheres, between top-down attempts at influencing viewers and bottom-up demands for entertainment. Where much of art and literature informs us of the relationship between the party leadership and the intellectual elite, TV gives us a sense of the real complexity of the relationship between the party leadership and the public." The book also stresses temporal continuity between socialism and post-socialism, as well as their shared historical roots in the pre-socialist era, showing, for instance, how contemporary reality programs dialogue with the documentary and educational programming that dominated socialist TV schedules, or how socialist superwomen characters who "did it all" as the anchors of 1970s-80s "socialist soaps" both paved the ground for and issued an early critique of post-feminist politics.

TV Socialism intends neither to draw up a chronological history of socialist TV, nor to provide a full geographical coverage, given the cultural and linguistic heterogeneity of the region and the span of the historical period in question, but rather to show how socialism and television function(ed) as a window onto each other. However, detractors might point to the preference given to the Hungarian TV, the only analysis supported by the author's interviews with Hungarian TV consumers, or to the preponderance of data about some socialist televisions at the expense of others, such as the Albanian one, for example. Nevertheless, one must acknowledge that the wide geographical area encompassed by the research and the unavailability of sources make it extremely difficult to allocate the same amount of space to the television of each country of the Eastern bloc. Rather, the author focuses on patterns that stretch across national borders, while national TV histories are in the making or yet to be written.

The book provides an innovative view on socialism, through the lenses of the television programs it produced, which shakes some fundamental assumptions of television studies as well as our ingrained notion of socialism. It is a fascinating and inspiring read as a whole, but it can also be read chapter-wise, for its wonderfully written miniatures, such as the one on socialist commercials ("Commercials as Time-Space Machines"), which discusses how the most liberalized socialist televisions of Yugoslavia and Hungary inherited advertising structures from the pre-war era and sustained their own marketing activities throughout the socialist period, and how these "time-space machines" represent testimonies to the surprising complexities of socialist television.

Apart from contributing to the still ongoing process of laying the foundation of the socialist television studies, *TV Socialism* is also a profoundly personal and exceptionally scholarly work, which challenges established views and places this emerging field on stable ground, providing it with a solid theoretical fabric and revealing different connections in time and space. Last but not least, its great merit is that it manages to escape the Europocentric perspective, which inevitably colours the work of so many scholars from European academic hubs. Konstantin Nikiforov, Srbija na Balkanu u XX veku [Serbia in the Balkans in the Twentieth Century]. Belgrade: Filip Višnjić/Igam, 2014, 236 p.

Reviewed by Dušan T. Bataković*

Histories of modern Serbia in general and of twentieth-century Serbia in particular are quite rare and mostly written by foreign experts. For the most of the "short twentieth century" the history of Serbia was by default integrated into the history of three Yugoslavias – royal (1918–1941), communist (1945–1991), and post-communist (1992–2006). Attempts at writing a history of the Serbs in this period were sporadic: they tended to look at the past of the whole nation and its destiny before and after three Yugoslavias. A notable exception are two monumental histories: Istorija Srba (History of the Serbs) by Vladimir Ćorović,¹ covering the period up to 1941, and Istorija srpskog naroda (History of the Serbian People) in six volumes and ten books covering the period until the formation of Yugoslavia in 1918.² Among the most recent efforts are Nova istorija srpskog naroda (A New History of the Serbian People), which covers the period until the outbreak of the civil war in Yugoslavia in 1991, and The Serbs by Sima M. Ćirković.3

Among the latest endeavours to identify, interpret and explain the major features of the twentieth-century history of Serbia is a synthesis by Konstantin Nikiforov, Director of the Institute for Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Science and Professor at the Lomonosov State University in Moscow. His main predecessors (Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Holm Sundhaussen) were under the strong impression of the tragic effects of the violent disintegration of Tito's Yugoslavia, which inevitably shaped their perspective on previous periods to a lesser or greater extent. In keeping with major trends in Western historiography, St. K. Pavlowitch strove, however, to offer a balanced account with an emphasis on recent events.⁴ In contrast to Pavlowitch. Holm Sundhaussen

2005). The Serbs, translated by Vuk Tošić (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Pub., 2004); Serbian edition: Srbi medju evropskim narodima (Belgrade: Equilibrium, 2004; Russian edition: Moscow 2009. Some efforts to open the way for new interpretations are made by Ljubodrag Dimić, Srbi i Jugoslavija : prostor, društvo, politika (pogled s kraja veka) (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 1998); Čedomir Antić, Kratka istorija Srbije 1804–2004 (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 2004), a collection of essays; Ljubodrag Dimić, Dubravka Stojanović and Miroslav Jovanović, Srbija 1804–2004: tri vidjenja ili poziv na dijalog (Belgrade: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju, 2005).

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¹ Vladimir Ćorović, *Istorija Srba*, vols. I–III (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1989). The manuscript of this book completed in 1941 shortly before the author's death was banned from publication in Titoist Yugoslavia for almost fifty years.

² Istorija srpskog naroda, vols. I–VI, R. Samardžić, editor in chief (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1981–1992).

³ Nova istorija srpskog naroda, ed. D. T. Bataković, co-authored by D. T. Bataković, M. St. Protić, A. Fotić and N. Samardžić (Belgrade: Naš dom/Laž dom, 2000; 2nd. revised edition 2002); Korean edition: Seoul 2001; French edition: *Histoire du peuple serbe*, ed. D. T. Bataković (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme,

⁴ Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Serbia: The History behind the Name (London: Hurst & Co., 2002); Serbian edition: St. K. Pavlović, Srbija. Istorija iza imena (Belgrade: Clio, 2004). A less successful and often biased approach is offered by John K. Cox, The History of Serbia (Westport, Conn. & London: Greenwood Press, 2002) and Yves Tomić, Serbie du prince Miloš à Milošević (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2003).

used a widespread German prejudice and presented Serbia as an allegedly doomed, failed state since the nineteenth century and its undeveloped society, haunted by the ghosts of the civil war in the 1990s which he describes as the "Serbian aggression".⁵

Konstantin Nikiforov, a witness of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995) on the ground and author of an important monograph on this issue (Between Kremlin and Republika Srpska),6 offers a more cautious analysis of the major phenomena that shaped contemporary Serbian identity. His book under review here, originally published in Moscow in 2012 and emerging from the courses he taught at the Lomonosov State University, takes a wider Balkan perspective in order to explain how the unstable geopolitical framework, marked by changing frontiers, waves of ethnic strife and national rivalries, ideological rifts, and regional rivalries influenced both the political and social position of Serbia in the twentieth century.7 Offering a panoramic view of various trends and schools of interpretation in Serbian historiography, as well as the results of his Russian predecessors, Nikiforov sheds light on several controversial questions that should be properly answered.

When writing on internal strife in Serbia before and after 1903, Nikiforov stresses that the influence of military circles on politics was both a guarantee of stability and a tangible threat to the parliamentary system. Due to the fact that some periods of Serbian history are understudied and interpretations often ideologically biased, Nikiforov does not appreciate too highly the democratic evolution of Serbia and her "golden age" (1903–1913) which, despite a fragile democratic system stifled by the autocratic rule of two last Obrenović monarchs, saw an unprecedented cultural rise, economic stability, unrestricted political liberties and spectacular military successes in the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) making Belgrade the Piedmont of the Balkan Slavs (short of Bulgarians). While analysing the interwar period, Nikiforov explains that king Alexander I Karadjordjević (1921–1934) believed that a decade of living together in a common state would be sufficient to proceed to the next stage: the creation of a single Yugoslav nation. This ambitious project was thwarted by the assassination of king Alexander in Marseille in October 1934 by Italian-sponsored Croat and Bulgarian terrorists, which opened the way for the establishment of Banovina Hrvatska in August 1939. Nikiforov sees the establishing of this corpus separatum within Yugoslavia as a "total defeat of Serbian parties" which woke up too late and did too little for the forgotten Serbian question (p. 53). Nikiforov shares the opinion of M. Ekmečić that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, had there been no Nazi invasion in 1941, would have survived and evolved into a federal state.

The post-war establishment of communist rule in restored Yugoslavia after the decisive support of Stalin's Red Army was a giant step backward, as stressed by Nikiforov, followed by the abolishment of political freedoms and of the multiparty system and by the persecution of political opponents as the "enemies of the people". He also underscores that not even the introduction of self-management in 1964 changed much: the iron fist of Tito's communist dictatorship remained in place in spite of frequent constitutional changes and decentralisation along the lines of six federal republics. The Yugoslav post-1945 experiment reproducing the Soviet model for at least two decades

⁵ Holm Sundhaussen, Geschichte Serbiens: 19.–21. Jahrhundert (Vienna: Böhlau, 2007); Serbian edition: Belgrade: Clio, 2009.

⁶Konstantin Nikiforov, *Mezhdu Kremlem i Respublikoi Serbskoi (Bosniiskii krizis: zavershaiushchii etap)* (Moscow: Institut slavianovedeniia, 1999).

⁷ K. V. Nikiforov, *Serbiia na Balkanakh: 20. vek* (Moscow: Indrik, 2012).

was doomed to fail due to the inefficient economy and the authoritarian political regime, further complicated by rising national rivalries. Despite ethnic proximity of Yugoslavs, the different levels of economic and cultural development among the republics made the country unsustainable in the long run. Nikiforov is of the view that despite all her shortcomings, Yugoslavia was by no means an accidental phenomenon. Nikiforov is somewhat ambivalent on the issue of Titoist policy and its impact on Serbia and the Serbian interest, highlighting Tito's controversial decisions motivated by the need to maintain his unchallenged dictatorial rule in the early 1970s.

Within this unfavourable context, Serbia experienced three failed modernizations – in the interwar period, after the Second World War, and after the fall of the communist regime in 1991. Nikiforov qualifies its post-2000 modernization, marked by a stepped-up privatization programme, as a "catching-up" and "imitating" modernization with mixed results.

The Kosovo crisis which enabled the rise of the populist and authoritarian regime of Slobodan Milošević from the late 1980s was fatal for liberal forces in Serbian society, and contributed largely to the disillusionment of the Serbian democratic elite and common people with Yugoslavism and Yugoslavia as the best political framework for the protection of Serbian vital interests.

Nikiforov dubs the post-Milošević period, marked by the October 2000 change, as the last "velvet revolution" in South-Eastern Europe, with pro-European governments and ambiguous policy towards NATO (pp. 152, 174). Looking favourably at Serbia's neutral policy towards all military alliances, Nikiforov warns that at least three national questions in the Balkans remain unsolved – the Serbian, Albanian and Macedonian, and he does not rule out new conflicts over these issues. Entering NATO or EU for all these nations, according to Nikiforov, as a long-term solution to the unresolved ethnic rivalries over disputed territories would be rather naive. As far as Russia is concerned, Nikiforov stresses that Moscow pursues a pragmatic foreign policy in the Balkans, including Serbia, based on economic interests in the region and energy projects regarding the supply of Serbia and neighbouring countries. Another important element of Russia's attitude towards the Balkans are the strong cultural and religious (Christian Orthodox) ties with Serbia, seen in the post-Soviet period as an important element of Slavic solidarity and Russian responsibility to maintain and foster Slavic culture and Slavic solidarity (p. 227).

Nikiforovov's overview of the history of contemporary Serbia makes quite useful reading which offers the Russian and international readership the author's own wellgrounded interpretation as well as a general Russian perspective on the problems in the Balkans. In this book, the author sums up the views of contemporary Russian historiography on Serbia, interethnic problems in the region and aspects of geopolitical changes within a wider European and Eurasian context.

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