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D. FILIPOVIĆ, *Crops and Wild Plants from Early Iron Age Kalakača, Northern Serbia* • V. P. PETROVIĆ & V. FILIPOVIĆ, *The First Cohort of Cretans, a Roman Military Unit at Timacium Maius* • S. PILIPOVIĆ, *Agriculture and Worship: A Contribution to the Study of Daily Life in Roman Singidunum* • V. ŽIVKOVIĆ, *Sentio me grauatum de malo ablato: Compensation for the Sin of Ill-gotten Gain* • R. ŠČEKIĆ, Ž. LEKOVIĆ & M. PREMOVIĆ, *Political Developments and Unrests in Old Rascia and Old Herzegovina during Ottoman Rule* • D. DJORDJEVIĆ, *The Austro-Hungarian Occupation Regime in Serbia and Its Break-Down in 1918* • R. SUBAEV, *Some Issues of Turkey's Entry into the First World War* • B. TRIFUNOVIĆ, *Occupation, Repression and Resistance: Čačak District, Serbia, in 1915–1918* • G. LATINOVIĆ, *Yugoslav-Italian Economic Relations (1918–1929)* • S. SFETAS, *The Legacy of the Treaty of Lausanne in the Light of Greek-Turkish Relations in the Twentieth Century* • D. BAKIĆ, *Apis's Men: the Black Hand Conspirators after the Great War* • J. MILOJKOVIĆ-DJURIĆ, *Great War Legacies in Serbian Culture* • Z. MILUTINOVIĆ, *Europe in the Balkan Mirror* • S. G. MARKOVICH, *Anglo-American Views of Gavrilo Princip* • M. KOLJANIN, *The Role of Concentration Camps in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) in 1941* ↻

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The origin of the Institute goes back to the Institut des Études balkaniques founded in Belgrade in 1934 as the only of the kind in the Balkans. The initiative came from King Alexander I Karadjordjević, while the Institute's scholarly profile was created by Ratko Parežanin and Svetozar Spanaćević. The Institute published *Revue internationale des Études balkaniques*, which assembled most prominent European experts on the Balkans in various disciplines.

Its work was banned by the Nazi occupation authorities in 1941. The Institute was not re-established until 1969, under its present-day name and under the auspices of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. It assembled a team of scholars to cover the Balkans from prehistory to the modern age and in a range of different fields of study, such as archaeology, ethnography, anthropology, history, culture, art, literature, law. This multi-disciplinary approach remains its long-term orientation.



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Crops and Wild Plants from Early Iron Age Kalakača, Northern Serbia: Comparing Old and New Archaeobotanical Data

Abstract: The “old” archaeobotanical analysis of charred plant remains hand-picked in the 1970’s from several pit-features at Early Iron Age Kalakača in Vojvodina, northern Serbia was conducted by Willem van Zeist and published by Predrag Medović. This work provided first information on the archaeobotany of the site and the plant material deposited in the semi- or fully-subterranean structures whose function has remained more-or-less enigmatic. These features were in the past filled with a mass of fragments of, primarily, large ceramic vessels, chunks of (burnt) daub, large quantities of animal bone, and burnt plant matter. The “new” archaeobotanical work at Kalakača included sampling and flotation in the field, and subsequent analysis of a fraction of the samples. The paper explores the composition of the two datasets from Kalakača, separately and combined; it identifies the spectra of crop and wild plants and discusses the quantitative representation of the crops. The paper concludes by broadly comparing the integrated crop record from this site with the crop datasets from few other Early Iron Age sites in Serbia in order to get a preliminary picture on the choice of cultivated crops and possible preferences for certain crop types.

Keywords: Early Iron Age, southern Pannonian Plain, Kalakača, Serbia, plant remains

Introduction

The site of Kalakača in northern Serbia (Vojvodina) is located on a loess terrace on the right Danube bank, some 40 km southeast of Novi Sad, near the Tisa-Danube confluence (Fig. 1). In the course of two series of development-led investigations remains of some 240 round or oval, deep or shallow, subterranean or semi-subterranean structures (pit-features) were recorded, along with a section of a defensive ditch and several surface structures (possible traces of a house and few clay ovens). On the basis of pottery shapes and decoration, and few other aspects of material culture (primarily metal objects), the site was relatively dated to the Early Iron Age (c. 1000–800 BC) in the regional chronological system (cf. Medović 1988: Fig. 324; Hänsel and Medović 1991: Fig. 4).

On the grounds of the pit morphology and, to some extent, pit contents, the investigators of Kalakača interpreted the majority of features as

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silos/granaries (large, deep, bell-shaped pits) and rubbish pits (large, deep, cylinder-shape pits and some small semi-dugouts); for a smaller group of relatively shallow structures other uses were proposed such as clay-borrowing and/or daub-mixing (small round pits), miscellaneous work space (large, shallow, irregularly shaped features), and residential use (large, shallow, finely finished semi-dugouts) (Medović 1988: 341–348; Jevtić 2006, 2011). It is noteworthy that the composition of the pit infill was very similar in the pits of different shape and size; it was, as a rule, composed of large amounts of pottery and (baked) daub fragments, animal bone, charred material and ash in the form of distinct lenses/layers or mixed with loose soil, some stone (ground and unworked), and occasional small objects (tools, ornaments, figurines). The virtual absence of above-ground features was explained as a likely consequence of soil erosion and land sliding, modern agricultural use and extensive road works in the area (Medović 1988: 9, 18).

Further, as a possible explanation for the large number of subsoil features *versus* a handful of surface structures, a view was offered that Kalakača may not have been a (long-term, permanent) settlement, but an area for keeping food (plant or animal), and particularly suited for this purpose because of its high elevation (relative to the surrounding plain) and dry loess conditions (Jevtić 2006; 2011). However, the reportedly abundant finds of daub in the pits (Medović 1988: 31–32, 300), especially of fragments bearing impressions of wattle and timbers, point to the existence of wattle-and-daub structures – conceivably huts or houses. This is also indicated by the find on the surface of a section of a rectangular daub floor and the remains of an oven floor on top of it (Medović 1988: 310). Clearly, for whatever reason, at least some of the above-ground elements ended up underground.

The first archaeobotanical analysis at Kalakača was conducted by Willem van Zeist during the initial archaeological investigations directed by Predrag Medović between 1971 and 1974. Van Zeist examined the material from six pit-features; the results were briefly presented in the Kalakača site monograph (Medović 1988: 348–349). This work provided an important insight into the spectrum of cultivated crops and some wild/weed plants found at the site. Moreover, at the time, these results constituted one of only few pieces of archaeobotanical evidence from post-Neolithic sites in Serbia; prior to this work, van Zeist conducted preliminary analysis of the material from La Tène-early Roman levels at Gomolava, and George Willcox carried out the analysis of plant remains from early Bronze Age Novačka Čuprija (van Zeist 1975; Willcox's results were summarised in Bankoff and Winter 1990: 181–182).

The initial report on the archaeobotanical results from the new excavations at Kalakača, which took place in 2003 and 2004 under the direction of Miloš Jevtić, was recently published (Filipović 2011). It offered an overview



Fig. 1 Map of Serbia showing the location of Kalakača and several other Early Iron Age sites mentioned in the text (Map base © 2015 Ezilon.com Regional Maps, downloaded from <http://www.ezilon.com/maps/europe/serbia-physical-maps.html>)

of the field and laboratory methodology, discussed the preservation of plant remains, presented the taxonomic diversity of the assemblage and briefly described botanical composition of the analysed archaeological contexts. The current paper combines the previous and more recent archaeobotanical results from Kalakača, reviews formerly made observations and conclusions, and examines the record from Kalakača alongside the data from several other Early Iron Age sites in Serbia.

Archaeobotanical analysis

Previous work

In the course of 1971–74 excavations, charred plant remains were regularly detected scattered through the pit fills containing potshards, fragments of (often burnt) daub and animal bone; or as discrete lenses in the loose soil; or as concentrations of wood charcoal; or as thick (up to 5 cm) layers of charred material mixed with small pieces of rubble and baked clay. From six of the pits charred material was hand-collected for archaeobotanical analysis; the results are shown in Table 1. In three features mass finds of (clean) seed of 1–2 crop types were discovered suggesting their derivation from a storage context. The results also showed the dominance of three crops – barley (*Hordeum vulgare*), einkorn (*Triticum monococcum*) and common millet (*Panicum miliaceum*). Additionally, the extensive use of cereal straw and chaff as temper for the building materials was noted by their significant presence in the daub (visible as impressions or charred fragments). On the basis of the occurrence of large concentrations of crops, the apparent widespread use of by-products as temper, and the discovery of about 90 grinding stones (complete and fragmented), it was concluded that crop cultivation was a major economic activity at Early Iron Age Kalakača. Also, the remarkably high representation of very large vessels (pots, pithoi, amphorae) in the pits, combined with the mass finds of plant remains (sometimes in the same feature) was taken as evidence of the storage of crops, and storage on a large scale given the number and size of vessels and pits probably used for this purpose (Medović 1988: 348–349).

Recent investigations

In the 2003–2004 campaigns archaeobotanical samples were regularly taken from deposits selected by the excavators – usually from visible concentrations or layers of charred material, deposits in which charred seeds were recognised, pottery concentrations or vessel contents, post holes or layers of dark soil. A total of 117 samples were floated using a flotation machine

and water from the Danube. Most of the samples had a standard volume of about 10 litres, but the volume ranged from as little as one litre (soil from a cluster of pottery shards) to 20 litres (from top layer of a pit fill); 1153 litres of soil were floated. Some 60 samples were made available for the analysis, and only light fraction of the samples. Since only archaeobotanically “rich” samples were desired for full analysis, the 60 samples were first “scanned” in order to assess their charred content. Namely, they were first sieved through a set of sieves with openings of 4 mm, 2 mm and 0.25 mm. The 2 mm fraction was placed in a Petri dish and rapidly examined with the naked eye; for each sample the rough number of identifiable items in the 2 mm sieve was recorded. Twenty-two samples from 11 different features were estimated to contain at least 30 remains and were selected for sorting and identification. Some of the samples were large in terms of the number of remains. In order to speed the sorting up, they were split using a riffle box into random subsamples of not more than 1/8 of the 4 mm fraction, not more than 1/16 of the 2 mm fraction and not more than 1/32 of the 0.25 mm fraction. The information on the sample volume, provenance (as stated in the flotation log and on sample labels) and sorted subsample is given in Table 2. The samples and subsamples were closely examined under a stereomicroscope of 10–40× magnification. Wood charcoal was not removed. Non-wood plant remains were sorted and identified. Seed atlases, various archaeobotanical reports (e.g. Schoch et al. 1988; Kroll 1983; Jones et al. 2000; Cappers et al. 2006) and the personal reference collection aided the botanical determination.

Structure number	8	55	72	112	121	131
CROPS						
<i>Triticum monococcum</i>	27	22	40	10	350	
<i>Triticum aestivum</i>					2	
<i>Hordeum vulgare</i>	245	20	12	497	30	
<i>Panicum miliaceum</i>	2	18	27		295	“a lot”
<i>Lens culinaris</i>			4		4	
WILD/WEED FLORA						
<i>Agrostemma githago</i>					4	
<i>Bromus mollis/secalinus</i>					20	
<i>Chenopodium album</i>		16	11		3	
<i>Polygonum aviculare</i>		1			1	

Table 1 Plant taxa identified in previous archaeobotanical analysis at Kalakača

All plant remains are charred. A number of them, especially cereal grain and chaff but also wild seed, are heavily eroded and/or fragmented,

which prevented their precise identification. Tables 3a-b provide the list of identified taxa and the quantity of remains per sample; the number of remains in the subsamples (1/2, 1/4, etc.) is here multiplied up to provide the counts for the whole sample (e.g. the counts obtained for 1/4 of a sample are multiplied by 4). A range of crop types, wild plants and plant parts are represented in the assemblage and they include the taxa formerly identified by van Zeist (Fig. 2). Moreover, the dominant crop types noted before are here also among the best represented. Additionally, some “new” crops were recognised: emmer (*Triticum dicocum*), “new type” glume wheat, pea (*Pisum sativum*) and flax/linen (*Linum usitatissimum*), as well as several wild plants with edible and thus potentially gathered fruit, reed stem most likely used as building material, and a rich and diverse arable/ruderal flora (which also includes taxa already observed by van Zeist). Of note is the significant presence of cereal chaff of hulled and free-threshing cereals indicating crop processing activities carried out at the site. Chaff was previously reported as used for tempering daub. A great number of glume wheat glume bases were eroded and poorly preserved and could not be attributed to a specific glume wheat type; it is possible that they derive from burnt daub and that they got damaged during the destruction and deposition of daub in the pits.

Structure number	Sample number	Volume (litres)	Excavation layer	Description of the sampled context/deposit	Sorted fraction/ subsample		
					4 mm	2 mm	0.25 mm
1	2	10	12	Central area of shallow semi-dugout (hut)	1/1	1/1	1/4
13	10	10	3	Base of structure, eastern half	1/1	1/1	1/8
18	15	10	4	Shallow semi-dugout (hut)	1/1	1/1	1/4
26	4	10	2	Base of structure, possible fire-place	1/1	1/1	1/4
24a	16	10		'Entrance' to structure 24 (hut)	1/1	1/1	1/4
32	12	4	6	Southwestern part of structure	1/1	1/1	1/4
	13	7	7	Soil from a large pot found at the base of structure	1/1	1/1	1/8
	6	10	8	Southwestern part of structure	1/1	1/1	1/8
	17	10	9		1/8	1/16	1/32
	20	10	9		1/1	1/8	1/32
39	7	10	5	Base of structure; charcoal concentration	1/1	1/1	1/8
	11	10	5		1/1	1/1	1/8
47	3	10		Base of structure; charcoal concentration	1/1	1/1	1/8
	8	10		Base of structure	1/1	1/1	1/8

48	14	10	3	Eastern half of structure	1/1	1/1	1/8
	1	10	4	Western half of structure	1/1	1/1	1/32
	18	10	6	Eastern half of structure, grain concentration	1/2	1/8	1/32
	19	10	7	Western half of structure, charcoal and daub pieces	1/8	1/8	1/16
	5	10		Base of structure, grain concentration	1/1	1/1	1/8
49	22	10	8	Charcoal concentration	1/4	1/8	1/16
	21	10		Base of structure, eastern half	1/1	1/8	1/16
54	9	10	6	Ashy layer	1/1	1/1	1/8

Table 2 List of recently analysed structures at Kalakača and the sorted samples and subsamples

Exploring and comparing the datasets

The differences between the previous and more recent investigations at Kalakača in the method of excavation and collection, and processing of charred plant material prevent direct comparisons of the two datasets. For instance, in the 1970s the pit-features were excavated by first emptying one half of the dugout in order to expose the vertical cross-section and understand the shape and size of the feature, and the composition of the fill. Afterwards, the other half of the pit was excavated (Medović 1988: 16). It is not clear whether the infill was removed in (arbitrary) layers. It is also unclear whether the recovered plant remains from a single structure always derive from one distinct concentration of charred material or whether they represent a combination of several such concentrations. The pit-features discovered in seasons 2003–2004 were excavated by removing arbitrary layers of the fill over the entire structure, or first in one and then the other half of the structure (Kalakača Field diary 2004). In most cases, the excavators seem to have taken separate samples from discrete concentrations of charred material or other “interesting” deposits (e.g. soil inside vessels) within the features. Thus, in the analysis, the samples from the same structure may represent different “events” and were, therefore, not amalgamated.

Despite the methodology-related limitations, it is useful to compare, very broadly, the two datasets. They derive from different structures and may reveal differences in the botanical composition of the pit fills. Since the assemblage analysed before comprised mostly crop remains, they form the basis for the general comparison of the two datasets.

Kalakača plant taxa	Structure	32										
		1	13	18	24a	26	number of items (multiplied up for subsamples)					32
Sample number		2	10	15	16	4	6	12	13	17	20	
CEREALS												
<i>Triticum monococcum</i> , one-seeded	grain	4	13		1	3	4	7	10	32	8	
<i>Triticum monococcum</i> , two-seeded	grain											
<i>Triticum monococcum</i>	glume base		1					24	58	96	224	
<i>Triticum dicoccum</i>	grain									16		
<i>Triticum dicoccum</i>	glume base		8				40	12	120	224	64	
cf. 'New type' glume wheat	grain											
'New type' glume wheat	glume base								224			
<i>Triticum monococcum</i> / <i>dicoccum</i>	grain		11	1		3	2	1			72	
<i>T. dicoccum</i> / 'new type' glume wheat	glume base								144	192	224	
Glume wheat indeterminate	grain											
Glume wheat indeterminate	glume base		8		16	12	112	60	464	992	480	
<i>Triticum aestivum/durum</i>	grain		7									
<i>Triticum aestivum</i>	rachis segment							4	48		32	
cf. <i>Triticum durum</i>	rachis segment											
<i>Triticum aestivum/durum</i>	rachis segment					8	8		16			
<i>Triticum</i> sp.	grain	5	24	1	3	10	4	6	6	32	32	
<i>Triticum</i> sp.	rachis segment						16					
<i>Hordeum vulgare</i> var. <i>nudum</i>	grain											
<i>Hordeum vulgare</i> var. <i>vulgare</i>	grain	1		1	2		2	5	4	8		
<i>Hordeum vulgare</i> , 6-row	rachis segment											
<i>Hordeum vulgare</i> indeterminate	grain	2	8	4		1	5	6	7		16	
<i>Hordeum vulgare</i> indeterminate	rachis segment									32	8	
<i>Panicum miliaceum</i>	grain	4	107	1	13		65	25	56	96	32	
cf. <i>Panicum miliaceum</i>	grain in glumes		24				8			96	32	
Indeterminate cereals	grain	18	119	7	21	23	41	12	48	48	48	
	silicified awns											
	silicified glumes											
	basal rachis segment											
	straw culm node					1			1		16	
PULSES												
<i>Lens culinaris</i>	seed		1									
<i>Pisum sativum</i>	seed					2						
Large pulse indeterminate	seed											
OIL/FIBRE CROPS												
<i>Linum usitatissimum</i>	seed											
WILD COLLECTED PLANTS												
<i>Cornus mas</i>	fruit MNI		1									
<i>Phragmites communis</i>	culm node				1				22	56		
<i>Prunus spinosa</i>	fruit MNI											
<i>Sambucus ebulus</i>	seed		3									
<i>Trapa natans</i>	nut MNI										1	
<i>Rosaceae</i>	seme		8						16			
nut meat fragments	volume (ml)	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.4		0.6	0.3		
fruit stone/nutshell fragments	MNI							1	1			
cf. parenchyma fragments	volume (ml)								0.3		2.4	

Table 3a List of crops and wild gathered taxa identified in the recent analysis of plant remains from Kalakača

Kalakača plant taxa	Structure	39		47		48					
	Sample number	7	11	3	8	1	5	14	18	19	
CEREALS		<i>number of items (multiplied up for subsamples)</i>									
<i>Triticum monococcum</i> , one-seeded	grain	11	10	11	18	7	12	15	24	24	
<i>Triticum monococcum</i> , two-seeded	grain				1						
<i>Triticum monococcum</i>	glume base			5	28				80	48	
<i>Triticum dicoccum</i>	grain	1			1						
<i>Triticum dicoccum</i>	glume base	32	48	48			56		160		
cf. 'New type' glume wheat	grain				1						
'New type' glume wheat	glume base	16							96		
<i>Triticum monococcum</i> / <i>dicoccum</i>	grain	11	8	4	9	4		5	32		
<i>T. dicoccum</i> /'new type' glume wheat	glume base										
Glume wheat indeterminate	grain			2	3						
Glume wheat indeterminate	glume base	72	216	296	264		128		128	80	
<i>Triticum aestivum</i> / <i>durum</i>	grain										
<i>Triticum aestivum</i>	rachis segment				8				256		
cf. <i>Triticum durum</i>	rachis segment										
<i>Triticum aestivum</i> / <i>durum</i>	rachis segment	2								32	
<i>Triticum</i> sp.	grain	29	15	9	11	7	3	11	16	16	
<i>Triticum</i> sp.	rachis segment			2							
<i>Hordeum vulgare</i> var. <i>nudum</i>	grain					2					
<i>Hordeum vulgare</i> var. <i>vulgare</i>	grain	3	3	2	3				8	16	
<i>Hordeum vulgare</i> , 6-row	rachis segment	60									
<i>Hordeum vulgare</i> indeterminate	grain	19	3	4	6	27	5	23	32		
<i>Hordeum vulgare</i> indeterminate	rachis segment	25			1						
<i>Panicum miliaceum</i>	grain	16	24	27	147	4387	2392	282	472	240	
cf. <i>Panicum miliaceum</i>	grain in glumes		8		2	32	9		24	16	
Indeterminate cereals	grain	54	45	26	55	48	11	15	152	80	
	silicified awns			2	10						
	silicified glumes				8						
	basal rachis segment								160		
	straw culm node			1	1				8		
PULSES											
<i>Lens culinaris</i>	seed					3	10	2			
<i>Pisum sativum</i>	seed										
Large pulse indeterminate	seed										
OIL/FIBRE CROPS											
<i>Linum usitatissimum</i>	seed			2	16	235		79	32		
WILD COLLECTED PLANTS											
<i>Cornus mas</i>	fruit MNI		1								
<i>Phragmites communis</i>	culm node		4	1	3		3		8		
<i>Prunus spinosa</i>	fruit MNI				1						
<i>Sambucus ebulus</i>	seed										
<i>Trapa natans</i>	nut MNI										
<i>Rosaceae</i>	seme										
nut meat fragments	volume (ml)	0.4			0.6	0.4	0.2	0.2		0.2	
fruit stone/nutshell fragments	MNI			1							
cf. parenchyma fragments	volume (ml)			0.1	0.1	0.3					

Table 3a (continued) List of crops and wild gathered taxa identified in the recent analysis of plant remains from Kalakača

Kalakača plant taxa	Structure	49		54
	Sample number	21	22	9
CEREALS		total items		
<i>Triticum monococcum</i> , one-seeded	grain		32	9
<i>Triticum monococcum</i> , two-seeded	grain			
<i>Triticum monococcum</i>	glume base	448	192	
<i>Triticum dicoccum</i>	grain			
<i>Triticum dicoccum</i>	glume base		32	
cf. 'New type' glume wheat	grain			
'New type' glume wheat	glume base	32		
<i>Triticum monococcum/ dicoccum</i>	grain	72	32	8
<i>T. dicoccum/ 'new type' glume wheat</i>	glume base			
Glume wheat indeterminate	grain			
Glume wheat indeterminate	glume base	576	336	
<i>Triticum aestivum/durum</i>	grain			1
<i>Triticum aestivum</i>	rachis segment		80	
cf. <i>Triticum durum</i>	rachis segment			2
<i>Triticum aestivum/durum</i>	rachis segment	32	16	3
<i>Triticum</i> sp.	grain		24	15
<i>Triticum</i> sp.	rachis segment			3
<i>Hordeum vulgare</i> var. <i>nudum</i>	grain			
<i>Hordeum vulgare</i> var. <i>vulgare</i>	grain		4	220
<i>Hordeum vulgare</i> , 6-row	rachis segment			1
<i>Hordeum vulgare</i> indeterminate	grain	16	24	110
<i>Hordeum vulgare</i> indeterminate	rachis segment			
<i>Panicum miliaceum</i>	grain	48	112	1
cf. <i>Panicum miliaceum</i>	grain in glumes		56	2
Indeterminate cereals	grain	96	168	262
	silicified awns			
	silicified glumes			
	basal rachis segment			
	straw culm node			8
PULSES				
<i>Lens culinaris</i>	seed	8	32	3
<i>Pisum sativum</i>	seed			
Large pulse indeterminate	seed		8	
OIL/FIBRE CROPS				
<i>Linum usitatissimum</i>	seed			
WILD COLLECTED PLANTS				
<i>Cornus mas</i>	fruit MNI			
<i>Phragmites communis</i>	culm node	24	20	2
<i>Prunus spinosa</i>	fruit MNI			
<i>Sambucus ebulus</i>	seed			
<i>Trapa natans</i>	nut MNI			
<i>Rosaceae</i>	seme			
nut meat fragments	volume (ml)	1.6	1.2	1
fruit stone/nutshell fragments	MNI			1
cf. parenchyma fragments	volume (ml)		0.4	

Table 3a (continued) List of crops and wild gathered taxa identified in the recent analysis of plant remains from Kalakača

Kalakača plant taxa	Structure	1	13	18	24a	26	32					39	
	Sample number	2	10	15	16	4	6	12	13	17	20	7	11
OTHER WILD PLANTS (arable/ ruderal flora)		number of items (multiplied up for subsamples)											
<i>Agrostemma githago</i>	seed				6						48		
<i>Alopecurus</i> type	seed								32				
<i>Anagallis</i> sp.	seed										32		
cf. <i>Avena</i> sp.	seed												
<i>Bromus arvensis</i> type	seed						1						
<i>Bromus secalinus</i>	seed	5					8					17	42
<i>Bromus</i> sp.	seed												24
<i>Carex</i> sp.	seed										32		
<i>Chenopodium album</i>	seed		42			12	24	4	72	432	320	33	80
<i>Chenopodium hybridum</i>	seed					1					32		
<i>Chenopodium</i> sp.	seed					1			8		32	16	
<i>Convolvulus arvensis</i> type	seed												
<i>Echinochloa crus-galli</i>	seed		16										
<i>Galium/Asperula</i>	small seed						8						
<i>Hordeum spontaneum</i> type	seed						1						
cf. <i>Lolium</i> sp.	seed												
<i>Papaver</i> sp.	seed												
<i>Phleum</i> type	seed								8	16		8	
<i>Poa</i> sp.	seed		16									8	
<i>Polygonum aviculare</i> ag- gregate	seed						16						
<i>Polygonum convolvulus</i>	seed		1				1				32	8	
<i>Rumex crispus</i> type	seed									32			
cf. <i>Secale</i> sp.	seed												1
<i>Setaria</i> sp.	seed		16					1	8				24
<i>Silene</i> type	seed								16				
<i>Teucrium/Ajuga</i>	seed									32			
cf. <i>Vicia</i> sp.	seed		1										
Caryophyllaceae	seed									32	32		
Chenopodiaceae/Caryo- phyllaceae	seed		8				16						
cf. Compositae	seed						8						
Cruciferae	seed							4			32		
Leguminosae	seed		16										
Poaceae	seed	5	8		4		8		16				2
	culm node												
	culm frag- ments												
Polygonaceae	seed									32			
Solanaceae	seed							4	8				
rhizome fragment													
culm base									9				1
unknown bud/shoot									29				
fragment of a pod													
indeterminate seed			8					8		64	32	8	8
mouse pellets			8										2

Table 3b List of wild/weed taxa identified in the recent analysis of plant remains from Kalakača

Kalakača plant taxa	Structure	47		48					49		54
	Sample number	3	8	1	5	14	18	19	21	22	9
OTHER WILD PLANTS (arable/ruderal flora)		number of items (multiplied up for subsamples)									
<i>Agrostemma githago</i>	seed										1
<i>Alopecurus</i> type	seed	16	8			8				16	
<i>Anagallis</i> sp.	seed										
cf. <i>Avena</i> sp.	seed			32							2
<i>Bromus arvensis</i> type	seed	3	10				16				
<i>Bromus secalinus</i>	seed		11	36		9	8			32	
<i>Bromus</i> sp.	seed			1			96			112	
<i>Carex</i> sp.	seed	8									
<i>Chenopodium album</i>	seed	58	177		8						1
<i>Chenopodium hybridum</i>	seed	8									
<i>Chenopodium</i> sp.	seed	24									
<i>Convolvulus arvensis</i> type	seed				1						
<i>Echinochloa crus-galli</i>	seed							56	16		
<i>Galium/Asperula</i>	small seed										
<i>Hordeum spontaneum</i> type	seed		1	1							
cf. <i>Lolium</i> sp.	seed					8					
<i>Papaver</i> sp.	seed									16	
<i>Phleum</i> type	seed		8					32			
<i>Poa</i> sp.	seed		8	32							
<i>Polygonum aviculare</i> aggregate	seed		8								
<i>Polygonum convolvulus</i>	seed	9									
<i>Rumex crispus</i> type	seed										
cf. <i>Secale</i> sp.	seed										
<i>Setaria</i> sp.	seed	9	8			1		32			
<i>Silene</i> type	seed										
<i>Teucrium/Ajuga</i>	seed										
cf. <i>Vicia</i> sp.	seed										
Caryophyllaceae	seed	2	1			1					
Chenopodiaceae/Caryophyllaceae	seed										
cf. Compositae	seed										
Cruciferae	seed	8							16		
Leguminosae	seed										
Poaceae	seed	10	8	33		16		8	24		2
	culm node		24								5
	culm fragments	16	1								
Polygonaceae	seed										
Solanaceae	seed										
rhizome fragment		1									2
culm base							8				
unknown bud/shoot							8		16		
fragment of a pod		8						8		16	1
indeterminate seed		8	8	64	16	32	40	56	80		
mouse pellets		8		2		1	32				2

Table 3b (continued) List of wild/weed taxa identified in the recent analysis of plant remains from Kalakača

Crops

Figure 3 shows relative proportions of the five crop types in the assemblage analysed by van Zeist; one of the analysed structures (131) is left out because, although it contained pure deposit of seeds of common millet, the absolute number of seeds was not provided (see Table 1). Also, since there is no note on whether van Zeist's quantitative data for cereals include both grain and seed, or only one of the two, it is here assumed that the counts represent the total number of both plant parts (if present) of a particular cereal type. Accordingly, for the here presented calculations of the data produced in recent analysis (Filipović 2011), combined counts of cereal grain and chaff are used. Figure 4 illustrates relative proportions of the five crop types based on the new data. Barley seems to dominate in the assemblage examined by van Zeist; however, the inclusion in this analysis of the large millet deposit from Structure 131 would certainly change the picture in favour of millet, whilst barley would come second. Common millet (also) prevails in the recently examined set of features; einkorn and barley are here less abundant, whereas free-threshing wheat is more visible. Figure 5 presents the proportion of structures or samples in the two datasets in which these crop types occur (Structure 131 is excluded). The frequency of occurrence of the five crop types in the different assemblages is very similar in all but one case; the exception is free-threshing wheat which appears both more ubiquitous and more abundant in the recently analysed features. Interestingly, einkorn, barley and millet have similarly high frequency across the datasets, indicating that they regularly occur in almost all of the examined fills/contexts and in different structures. This, combined with their abundance in the assemblages, suggests that they were (among) the most utilised crops at the site.

Further, the status of crops other than the five found in both assemblages from Kalakača (see above) is explored within the recently produced dataset. The apparent absence of these types in the previous analysis may be a result of differences in the method of excavation and collection of plant material.

Figure 6a shows relative proportions of the crop remains (grain and chaff combined) within the "new" assemblage, and 6b the frequency of their occurrence (as a percentage of the total number of samples). More than 60% of the crop dataset is composed of common millet, which is also found in almost all of the analysed samples. In one of the pit-features, an exceptionally large amount of millet seeds was discovered (Feature 48; see Table 3a) of which a great number was fused together in charring and some had glumes still attached to the grain (Fig. 2). This may be comparable to the pure deposit of millet seeds observed by van Zeist in Structure 131 (Table 1).

Glume wheats (einkorn, emmer and "new type" glume wheat) are together represented by about 20%. Einkorn seems to prevail over the other

two glume wheats, but this is questionable since a number of wheat grain and glume wheat glume bases remained unidentified due to their low preservation state. When just the amount of *grain* of the three glume wheats is considered, einkorn again appears much more abundant, as emmer and “new type” glume wheat are more-or-less represented only by glume bases (see Table 3a). Noteworthy, emmer, previously not reported for Kalakača, is quite frequent in this dataset. The overall quantity of barley seems low compared to millet, though the grain and/or rachis were encountered in all of the analysed samples (Fig. 6b). Remains of free-threshing wheat are present in small quantity, but were found in more than 50% of the samples.

Based on the abundance and frequency, pulse crops appear a minor component of the assemblage; lentil (*Lens culinaris*) occurs in about 30% of the samples and is much more frequent than pea. Flax/linseed seeds were recovered from only 5 samples (c. 22%), but in one of them a “cache” of over 200 seeds was discovered (Structure 48; sample 1 – see Table 3a).

Overall, the crop spectrum at Kalakača is remarkably wide and includes six cereal taxa, two pulse types and one oil/fibre crop. As is shown below (Table 4), the majority of the crop types identified here was also reported for other analysed Early Iron Age sites located in the southern Pannonian Plain and in the vicinity of Kalakača.

Wild plants

The seeds of few wild plants identified by van Zeist most likely derive from arable weeds that accompanied harvested crops. They were found in small numbers in the samples that contained remains of at least two crop types and it is thus impossible to associate them with any one crop in particular – even more so because, depending on the farming regime, they could have grown alongside any of the identified crops (e.g. Wasylikowa 1981; Froud-Williams et al. 1983; Jones 1992; Bogaard 2004).

Several wild plants producing edible fruit which was potentially gathered at Kalakača were detected in the recently analysed samples (Table 3a): Cornelian cherry (*Cornus mas*), sloe (*Prunus spinosa*), water chestnut (*Trapa natans*) and perhaps also dwarf elder (*Sambucus ebulus*) and a wild rose (*Rosaceae*). There were also a number of amorphous remains which, based on their internal structure, could represent fragments of nut cotyledons (“nut meat”) and tubers (parenchyma). The best represented collected plant is common reed; hard segments of reed stem (culm nodes) were discovered in about half of the examined samples. Reed was most likely used as a building material – impressions of reed culms in daub were often observed by the excavators (Jevtić 2006; Kalakača Field diary 2004). Reeds may have also been used for thatching and (floor) matting or as fire fuel.

Some of the plants listed as arable/ruderal flora are also potentially edible, if not their seeds, then their leaves and shoots. For example, seeds of fat-hen (*Chenopodium album*) – a common and persistent weed of cultivated ground – are edible, and so are its leaves (<http://pfaf.org/user/plant.aspx?LatinName=Chenopodium+album>). Among the wild/weed flora at Kalakača, fat-hen seeds are most frequent and abundant; they occur in over 50% of the samples and, in some instances, in very high numbers such as in two of the samples from Structure 32. By analogy to mass finds of *C. album* at some prehistoric sites in Europe (e.g. at the Eneolithic site of Pietrele – Neef 2008: 75–76; and some Late Bronze Age sites in France – Bouby and Billaud 2005: 266), one could explain this as a possible accumulation of the seeds intended for food. It is, however, much more likely that they here represent by-products of crop processing given that they, in these samples, co-occur with hundreds of glume wheat glume bases (i.e. the main component of residue from the cleaning of glume wheats) and a number of other crop and wild taxa. A possibility, however, should be acknowledged that, although arriving at the site as an arable weed in the crop harvest, fat-hen seeds may have been of some use to the Iron Age inhabitants (cf. Behre 2008).




Fig. 2a Common millet (*Panicum miliaceum*)




Fig. 2b Pea (*Pisum sativum*)



Fig. 2c-d Barley, hulled (*Hordeum vulgare* var. *vulgare*); some grains fused in charring




Fig. 2e Einkorn (*Triticum monococcum*) spikelet forks and glume bases




Fig. 2f Reed (*Phragmites communis*) culm nodes




Fig. 2g Water chestnut (*Trapa natans*) shell

Fig. 2 Some of the recently recovered charred plant remains from Kalakača

Most of the other identified wild/weed taxa commonly occur at pre-historic sites in the wider region. An excellent example is the Late Bronze-Early Iron site of Feudvar in Vojvodina (see Fig. 1) where more than 2000 archaeobotanical samples were collected and analysed, yielding an extremely large and highly diverse seed assemblage (Kroll 1998). The wild flora from Feudvar includes plants that may have grown in different habitats, including cultivated ground, steppe/pastures, wetlands (Kroll 1998: 308–310). At Kalakača, the taxa included in the arable/ruderal group are all considered potential weeds, although some of them can also grow in non-disturbed places (e.g. grasses like *Poa* and *Alopecurus* – Kojić 1990: 49, 171–177). A possible exception are members of *Carex* genus that generally occupy moist places not considered suitable for growing the identified crop types; however, some are also frequently found in arable areas (Kojić 1990: 67–69).

Inter-site comparison of the available Early Iron Age crop records from Serbia

Table 4 lists the Early Iron Age sites in Serbia for which archaeobotanical data are available, and gives absolute quantities of the crops represented at these sites. Only precisely determined remains are taken into account here




Fig. 3 Relative proportions of the five previously identified crop types at Kalakača




Fig. 4 Relative proportions of the previously identified crop types at Kalakača in the recently analysed samples




Fig. 5 Frequency of occurrence of the previously identified crop types in the “old” and “new” datasets from Kalakača




Fig. 6a Relative proportions of crop types identified in recent analysis at Kalakača

(categories such as *Triticum dicoccum/monococcum*, *Triticum* sp. etc. were excluded). Both grain and chaff of cereals are considered; in few cases only counts of spikelet forks were offered and they were multiplied by two to obtain the counts for glume bases. Barley totals include remains of hulled and naked barley. Three of the sites also contain archaeological remains from periods before and/or after the Early Iron Age, but only the information for the occupation levels of about the same age as those discovered at Kalakača were used here: (1) for Gomolava, crop counts for the samples labelled as “Hallstatt” (including the sample from “Bronze Age D/Hallstatt A pit”) were added up except for the sample H1 which turned out to be from a La Tène context (Medović, A. 2011: 338); (2) for Gradina-on-Bosut, totals for the occupation levels relatively dated to 850–500 BC (labelled Bosut IVa-b)

were summed; and (3) from Hisar, samples from contexts roughly attributed to 11–10th century BC (from the levels defined as Brnjica IIa-b culture) were included. Seeds of opium poppy (*Papaver somniferum*), recorded only at Gradina-on-Bosut and in a very small number, were here left out but may point to (limited) cultivation of this oil plant. The counts for Kalakača




Fig. 6b Frequency of crop types in the recently analysed Kalakača samples

combine “old” and “new” results. Although available, the results from Late Bronze–Early Iron Feudvar are not listed here as the published reports do not provide separate data for Late Bronze and Early Iron Age occupations of the site.

Based on the crop amounts presented in Table 4, the relative proportions are illustrated in Figure 7. The apparent prevalence of millet at four out of six sites is striking. In the Balkans, this crop may have started coming into use towards the end of the Neolithic/beginning of the Eneolithic, but it seems that its full cultivation did not begin until the (Late) Bronze Age (see e.g. the record from Hisar – Medović, A. 2012). The analysed assemblage from Early Iron Age Hisar, however, seems dominated by two pulse crops (pea and bitter vetch), but this is due to the inclusion in the calculations of the two samples composed almost entirely of pea and vetch and likely deriving from pulse storage contexts. In the rest of the Hisar dataset, deriving from mixed occupation deposits, millet is better represented than all the other crops.

Some crop types found in great quantities in the preceding periods, particularly einkorn and barley, seem to have still been of importance in the Iron Age of the region. In fact, at Crnoklište, barley largely outnumbers millet perhaps suggesting site-specific preference for this particular crop type; however, the greatest part of the Crnoklište dataset derives from a single pit-feature and is not sufficient for site-level observations. With the

possible exception of Hisar and Crnoklište, it looks like millet was the main crop of the period both in the north and in the south of Serbia.

The inter-site comparison also reveals significant quantities of emmer discovered at the majority of the sites, followed in some instances by spelt, bread/durum wheat and “new type” glume wheat. A range of pulse crops are found across the region, as well as two oil/fibre plants – flax/linseed, which has been in use here since the Neolithic, and gold-of-pleasure (*Camelina sativa*), a Bronze Age addition to the European crop spectrum (Kroll 1983: 58–59; Zohary and Hopf 2000: 138–139).

The relative amounts of wheat, barley, pulse and oil/fibre crops in the considered datasets may reflect their lower importance compared to that of millet in the Early Iron Age of the central Balkans, but to further explore this possibility more data are needed, and from other areas across the region. What is without doubt, however, is the remarkable diversity of the crop repertoire of the period – at least 14 different crops were cultivated in the region at the end of the 2nd and beginning of the 1st millennium BC. This period was in Europe observed as characterised by the increase in the number of cultivated crops observed already from the Bronze Age (e.g. Jacomet and Karg 1996; Kroll 1997). This may also have been the case in the central Balkans and will be explored in an ongoing study of change and continuity in the post-Neolithic crop range and crop cultivation in the region (Filipović, in preparation).

Conclusions

The initial analysis of the botanical material from Kalakača produced first information on the spectrum of cultivated crops in the Early Iron Age Serbia. The “old” datasets consist of plant remains recovered from hand-collected concentrations of charred material preserved in six of the pit-features – within the pit fill composed of diverse materials, mainly pottery, building material (daub), bone and stone. In this assemblage, the remains of common millet, barley and einkorn were most abundant and were found in (almost) all of the analysed features. Also present, but in very small quantities, were bread/durum (free-threshing) wheat and lentil, and few wild/weed taxa.

The recent archaeobotanical work at Kalakača included sampling of all excavated pits and recovery by flotation. About 20 samples from 11 features were examined. The analysis yielded a much more diverse assemblage than previously recognised. Also, the range of different plant parts represented was much wider and included cereal chaff and straw fragments, remains of fruit stones and nutshell, segments of reed stem and possibly rhizomes, and a number of small seeds of wild plants. This emphasises the

region in Serbia	southern Pannonian Plain (Vojvodina)			south-east Serbia (the Morava Valley)		
	KALAKAČA	GOMOLAVA	GRADINA- ON-BOSUT	HISAR	CRNOKLIŠTE	RANUTOVAC
<i>relative dating as stated in archaeological or archaeobotanical reports</i>	Early Iron Age (c. 1000-800 BC)	Early Iron Age/ Hallstatt	Early Iron Age (c. 850-500 BC); Bosut IVa-b culture	11-10th century BC; Brnjica IIa-b culture)	Early Iron Age	Early Iron Age
<i>analysed samples/ structures</i>	5+22	6	20	22	19	21
<i>Triticum monococcum</i>	1909	1693	7661	153	20	32
<i>Triticum dicoccum</i>	862	162	1367	129		7
<i>'New type' glume wheat</i>	369		196			
<i>Triticum spelta</i>		387	1095	63		
<i>Triticum aestivum</i> (<i>durum</i>)	557	6	104	27	16	3
<i>Hordeum vulgare</i>	1533	1299	6061	448	88	24
<i>Panicum miliaceum</i>	9198	9337	24018	1095	32	155
<i>Lens culinaris</i>	67	286	180	45	7	5
<i>Lathyrus sativus</i>			53			
<i>Pisum sativum</i>	2	3	5	2653		4
<i>Vicia ervilia</i>		8	18	3055	2	2
<i>Vicia faba</i>		4	23	37		
<i>Linum usitatissimum</i>	364		2	43		
<i>Camelina sativa</i>			25	56		
References:	Medović 1988: 348-349; Filipović 2011	van Zeist 2001/2002	van Zeist 2001/2002; Medović, A. 2011	Medović, A. 2012	Filipović <i>et al.</i> in press/2016	Filipović, unpublished

Table 4 Overview of the crop types identified at Early Iron Age sites in Vojvodina (northern Serbia) and in the upper course of the Morava River (south-eastern Serbia)

importance of archaeobotanical sampling and careful recovery of charred material.

In the “new” dataset einkorn, barley and common millet retain their status as the most abundant and frequent finds, and thus potentially most important crops at Early Iron Age Kalakača. Besides these, remains of four other crop taxa were discovered: emmer, “new type” glume wheat, pea and flax/linseed. Emmer and free-threshing wheat were quite common




Fig. 7 Relative proportions of crops identified at Early Iron Age sites in Serbia

(occurring in over 50% of the samples), followed by “new type” glume wheat and flax/linseed (encountered in *c.* 20% of the samples); pea grains were found in only one of the analysed contexts.

In addition to crops, the new dataset also contained seeds and fragments of fruit of edible wild plants such as Cornelian cherry, sloe and water chestnut. Seeds of possible arable weeds were also abundant, especially fat-hen. Fat-hen seeds at Kalakača most likely derive from crops processing (and represent a discarded by-product). However, by analogy to some prehistoric sites in Europe that yielded mass finds of fat-hen seeds, which were thus considered a potential food source, the seeds from Kalakača may indicate possible use of the plant.

Overall, the combined old and new crop datasets compare well with the crop assemblages from few other archaeobotanically analysed Early Iron Age sites in Serbia with respect both to the composition and the quantitative representation of different crops. The range of crop types is remarkably wide, perhaps in line with the broadening of the crop spectrum in later prehistory observed elsewhere in Europe. Based on its dominance in the available datasets from Serbia, common millet seems to have been a major crop across the region. There may, however, have been some local,

site-specific preferences, as indicated by the prevalence of pulses at one and barley at another analysed site, but this may well be the result of the nature of the sampled deposits (i.e. pulse storages at Hisar) or of the small size of the assemblage (as at Crnoklište).

A number of questions remain to be addressed in relation to crop cultivation and plant use at Kalakača and the Early Iron Age in the central Balkans in general in order to begin to understand the subsistence economy of the period and the nature of plant production and use. It is hoped that, as more primary archaeobotanical data continue to be produced, and more relevant archaeological information become available, it will be possible to address issues beyond the repertoire of plants and their relative proportions in the assemblages.

UDC 903-035.2(497.113 Kalakača)6383
58.08:902.67

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Original scholarly work
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The First Cohort of Cretans, a Roman Military Unit at Timacum Maius

In memory of Abram Kotik

Abstract: Archaeological investigations on the site of Niševac (*Timacum Maius*) have been conducted over a period of eight successive years by the Institute for Balkan Studies in collaboration with the Centre for Tourism, Culture and Sports of Svrlijig and the French Bordeaux-based Ausonius Institute. The 2014 campaign came up with nine Roman bricks stamped with inscriptions of the First Cohort of Cretans (*Cohors I Cretum*) built into the walls of a Roman bath. The inscriptions provide evidence for the character, chronology and history of the Roman settlement.

Keywords: Niševac, Timacum Maius, Roman bath, First Cohort of Cretans.

Archaeological investigations on the site of Niševac–Kalnica have been conducted over a period of eight consecutive years by the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in collaboration with the Centre for Tourism, Culture and Sports of Svrlijig and the Ausonius Institute (CNRS/Université Bordeaux Montaigne).¹ Put forward at the very beginning of the excavation, the bold hypothesis that the site might be identified as the Roman settlement Timacum Maius, the first station on the Roman road connecting Naissus (modern Niš, Serbia) and Ratiaria (modern Archar, Bulgaria), was becoming more and more substantiated by the significant results of every excavation campaign (see Map below). But until 2014 no discovery was made that could shed any light on an important aspect of the site: the military organisation of Timacum Maius. All the previously made discoveries – the building with a hypocaust and wall-embed-


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¹ The archaeological investigation has been carried out by the Belgrade-based Institute for Balkan Studies and is funded by the Ministry of Culture and Information of the Republic of Serbia, the Municipality of Svrlijig, and the Centre for Tourism, Culture and Sports of Svrlijig. Since 2013 it has been carried out jointly by the Institute for Balkan Studies and the Bordeaux-based Ausonius Institute as part of a Serbo-French research project.

ded flues (*tubuli*), a section of a main road running through the settlement, sewers, a portion of a bath (*thermae*), and plentiful and diverse small finds (pottery, including fine terra sigillata ware, coins, jewellery, weapons etc.) – were indicative of a sizeable Roman settlement which had been founded in the mid-first century and continued without a break until the Hunnic invasion of 441, when it had been ravaged and burnt down, as had been the nearby city of Naissus. Yet, what remained unknown was which military unit had been garrisoned there, taking part in the construction of public and military structures (Petrović & Filipović 2008: 29–43; Petrović & Filipović 2009: 25–30; Petrović & Filipović 2013: 35–50; Petrović, Filipović & Miliivojević 2012: 73–112; Petrović, Filipović & Luka 2014: 97–142).

During the 2012–14 campaigns a considerable portion of a Roman bath which had survived modern soil amelioration works done on the left bank of the Svrljiški Timok River was unearthed (fig. 1). It is 11 m by 9 m in area and oriented north to south, with minor deviations. It consists of two pools and two rooms with a hypocaust heating system. Both pools are damaged by heavy machines, one beyond the possibility of a more detailed reconstruction, while the surviving part of the other measures 7 m by 3 m. Neither of them was directly heated, but their use as warm baths (*tepidaria*) may be assumed from the fact that the adjacent rooms had hypocaust heating.

Embedded in the thickness of the exterior walls of the two rooms furnished with hypocaust systems were circular-sectioned clay flues (*tubuli*) connected with the subfloor cavity. The floor of both rooms, which collapsed into the cavity, was coated with hydrostatic plaster about 30 cm thick. Both the waterproof plaster and the hypocaust seem to suggest that those were hot baths (*caldaria*). The subfloor cavity contained portions of the collapsed ceiling, fragments of window glass, well-preserved *pilae* stacks which had supported the floor, traces of purple-painted wall plaster, remains of massive clay box flues, but also the stokehole of the furnace (*praefurnium*). The assumed use of the two rooms as hot baths seems to be corroborated by the vicinity of the furnace. The bottom of the subfloor cavity was paved with pebbles which kept the heat, thereby enhancing what we would call today energy efficiency. This type of paving is rarely found in Roman baths. The entirely preserved furnace chamber with thick ash deposits was discovered on the outer south side of the bath. The bath must have contained other rooms typically found in Roman baths but they will remain unknown as a result of the damage it sustained by modern land improvement work. The explored surviving portion provides a number of details which nonetheless allow some conclusions about the function and quality of the structure. The small finds recovered from the bath (pottery, animal bones, metal finds such as a silver pendant with bird motifs, and coins) indicate that the building



Map of the Roman roads in central and eastern Moesia Superior

lost its original function in the fourth century and was probably used as a dwelling instead.

The 2014 campaign was a turning point. Namely, the date of the bath was elusive since the discovered coins provided only a tentative *terminus post quem*. But in just a few days at the final stage of the campaign we discovered nine bricks bearing the stamps of the First Cohort of Cretans, and in the walls of the bath (figs. 2 and 3) The stamp inscriptions read: *Cob(ors) I Cret(um)*. This auxiliary unit of the Roman army had been created in pre-Flavian times and had some five hundred soldiers, infantry and cavalrymen. It was transferred to Upper Moesia between AD 78 and 80 and took part in Trajan's Second Dacian War, as suggested by the epigraphic evidence from *Apulum* (*CIL* III, 1163), *Sucidava* (*AE* 1975, 726, 2), *Banatska Palanka* (*AE* 1912, 78) and *Drobeta* (*CIL* III, 1703, 2; Marcu 2004: 13–14), and military diplomas from Dacia (from AD 110: *CIL* XVI 163, and AD 114: *RMD* IV 226). It was transferred back to Upper Moesia under Hadrian and in the second and third centuries was stationed in *Egeta* (modern Brza Palanka)

on the Danube (*AE* 1966, 336 = *AE* 1968, 453) with the assignment to guard the strategic intersection of two Roman roads: Trajan's famous *limes* road which connected the forts along the Iron Gates section of the Empire's border on the south bank of the Danube and the road which ran further inland and, circumventing the large river bend and the Iron Gates, led from *Taliata* (modern Gornji Milanovac) and across the ore-rich south slopes of Mt Miroč with the stations *Gerulata* and *Unum*, to Egeta (Petrović 2015: 274–278). Until the latest discoveries, the only known epigraphic evidence for the First Cohort of Cretans in the interior of Upper Moesia was an inscription from Naissus (*IMS* IV, 34 = *AE* 1964, 262). The inscription, which is in Latin and informs us of a certain *Tiberius Claudius Valerius*, a veteran of the First Cohort of Cretans born in *Hierapytna* (modern Ierapetra) in Crete, dates from the last decades of the first century but is not earlier than Vespasian's age. The veteran lived in Naissus towards the end of the first century, apparently before his cohort was pulled into Trajan's Dacian campaign. The presence of a veteran in Naissus at that particular time is indirectly indicative of the city's significant growth because retired soldiers usually settled in one of the main centres of a province, not far from the place where they had served. Naissus certainly had a military camp and a civilian settlement at the time, but the considerable number of inscriptions on the bricks of the First Cohort of Cretans recovered from the bath at Timacum Maius gives grounds to assume that the cohort, or at least a part of it, was stationed there, not far from Naissus. If it was, a first-century military fort may be expected to be found in the area of the site. Archaeological excavation of the nearby fortress known as *Svrljiški grad* (Fortress of Svrljig) might provide an answer to this question. Namely, apart from many chance finds, this fortified site has yielded an inscription of a *strategos*, *Tiberius Claudius Theopompus*, who dedicated an altar to a local deity of his native land, Thracian Denteletika, a region centred on *Pautalia* (modern Kystendil) in western Bulgaria (*IMS* III/2, 101 = *SEG* 45, 953; Petrović & Filipović 2013: 37–42). The altar has been dated to a period between AD 46 and 54, and indirectly suggests that the fortress was in use in the mid-first century. Theopompus could have reached Timacum Maius using the local road Kystendil–Bela Palanka–Niševac (*Svrljiški grad*), i.e. Pautalia–Remesiana–Timacum Maius, which intersected with the main road from Naissus to Ratiaria, i.e. to the Danube (Petrović & Filipović 2013; Petrović & Grbić 2014: 96).

The inscriptions of the First Cohort of Cretans from Niševac/Timacum Maius, which seems to have formed a whole with *Svrljiški grad*, provide evidence for the character, chronology and history of the Roman settlement. The Roman unit, or at least a detachment of it, could have been stationed at Timacum Maius to secure the important intersection of




Fig. 1 Aerial view of the Roman bath in Timacum Maius




Fig. 2 Brick stamp of the First Cohort of Cretans (*Cohors I Cretum*)




Fig. 3 Stamped brick *in situ*

the Roman roads running from Pautalia and Naissus. As we have seen, it would subsequently be on a similar assignment at Egeta on the Danube. It seems reasonable to assume that the First Cohort of Cretans was engaged in building major military and civilian structures, including the discovered bath. Timacum Maius could have also had a brickyard, and structural remains of the type may be expected to be found in the future.

By way of conclusion, it should be emphasised that the presence of the First Cohort of Cretans in Niševac/Timacum Maius, currently evidenced by a larger number of stamped bricks, is one of the main proofs that the site actually was the first station on the Roman road Naissus–Ratiaria. The settlement and the excavated structures are of an early date, from the last decades of the first century. The settlement was closely connected with the nearest large centre of the province, Naissus, based on the abovementioned inscription that points to a place of veteran settlement.

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Abbreviations

AE – *Année épigraphique*, Paris.

CIL – *Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum*, Berlin.

IMS – *Inscriptions de la Mésie Supérieure*, Belgrade.

RMD – *Roman Military Diplomas*, London.

SEG – *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*, Leiden – Amsterdam.

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Agriculture and Worship A Contribution to the Study of Daily Life in Roman Singidunum and its Environs

Abstract: The paper relies on epigraphic and archaeological evidence for understanding two aspects of everyday life in Roman Singidunum, agriculture and the worship of agricultural deities.

Keywords: Singidunum, Mt Kosmaj, agriculture, worship, Liber and Libera, Terra Mater, Silvanus, Persephone, Ceres

The focus of this paper is the farming and worship of agrarian deities practised by the inhabitants of Roman Singidunum and its broader surroundings, two phenomena that have not hitherto been studied from the perspective of their interrelatedness. Some aspects of the question have been looked into as part of various studies or merely referred to in archaeological excavation records.¹ The paper seeks to begin to understand the attitude of the local population towards the land as well as correlations between farming and the worship of tutelary deities of agriculture. The study of this complex topic is quite a challenge because of, among other things, the vary-

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¹ The earliest studies that pay some attention to agriculture in Upper Moesia are Mirković 1968 and Vasić 1970. There are also studies that provide indirect information about agriculture, such as those focused on ancient iron tools (Popović 1988); amphorae (Bjelajac 1996); the military supply system (Petrović 1981; 1984; and 1991; Ilić, Golubović & Mrdjić 2010). An unavoidable source of information is the journal *Singidunum* 1–5 (1997–2005, ed. M. Popović), specifically devoted to the exploration of Singidunum. Some archaeological sites have been excavated and protected by Belgrade's Cultural Heritage Protection Institute which keeps all the relevant records. There are two PhD and two MA theses focused on agriculture in Roman Serbia (Ilić 2012); cereals production and import in Upper Moesia (Živanović 2013); villae rusticae in Yugoslavia (Vasić 1967) and in Viminacium (Jovičić 2011), but regrettably the material is as yet unpublished. On the other hand, the epigraphic and archaeological material of relevance to the worship of agrarian deities has been published, to mention but: Mirković & Dušanić 1976; Jovanović, Pop-Lazić & Mrkobrad 1992: 140–141; Petković 2002; Glumac 2009: 221–232; Pilipović 2011 (with an overview of earlier literature).

ing state of exploration of different sites or the unknown find-spots of many relevant finds.

The Roman fortification of Singidunum, built as the permanent camp of *legio III Flavia* which was garrisoned there from the end of the first until early decades of the fifth century, flourished in the second and third centuries. Around the camp grew a civilian settlement which was granted the status of a *municipium* in 169 and of a *colonia* in 287 (Mirković 1968: 37–49; Mirković & Dušanić 1976; Popović 1982: 27–37). The question of Singidunum's municipal boundaries has not been fully resolved. Bounded by natural features or provincial boundaries on the north, north-west and west, it stretched towards the east, as evidenced by the information provided by Roman road maps and archaeological material. It could not extend too far to the west because of the vicinity of the boundary of Lower Pannonia which ran south of the confluence of the Sava and Danube rivers.² The town's territory, which was bounded by the Danube on the north, covered a broader area in the east and south with a number of smaller settlements and forts. In the east were the waypoints *Ad Sextum* (present-day Mali Mokri Lug), *Castra Tricornia* (Ritopek) and *Ad Sextum miliarem* (Grocka), and to the east of *Ad Sextum*, in present-day Višnjica and Vinča, were smaller fortifications protecting the road (Mirković 1968: 48–49). This study will also take into account the mineral-rich area south of Singidunum known for a significant mining activity on the slopes of Mt Avala (14 km from Belgrade) and Mt Kosmaj (40 km from Belgrade).³

The Singidunum area lay on fertile land, even though Kosmaj was primarily important as a mining centre. It was well connected by waterways and a network of roads,⁴ and a relative political stability in the second to fourth century was propitious for the development of farming (Mirković

² Provincial boundaries between Upper Moesia, Lower Pannonia and Dalmatia have been the subject of much research. Upper Moesia's boundary with Pannonia was marked by the confluence of the Sava and Danube rivers, while its boundary with Dalmatia extended south of the confluence (Mirković 1968: 48–49; Mirković & Dušanić 1976: 36f). Some suggest that present-day Mačva and the Tamnava and Kolubara river valleys were part of south-east Pannonia, and that the boundary between Lower Pannonia and Dalmatia was south of the Sava (Dušanić 1967: 70 and 78; Popović 1996: 137–142).

³ As shown by epigraphic and archaeological evidence, important mines of auriferous lead, possibly also gold and copper, operated continuously from the first to the fourth century on both Kosmaj and Rudnik (Dušanić 1980: 36–37; Tomović 1995: 121–125; Škegro 1998: 91).

⁴ Roads ran from the Danube and Singidunum to Viminacium and further south along the Zapadna (West) Morava valley to Naissus, Serdica and Byzantium, as well as from Viminacium to Ratiaria (Petrović 2007: 65f; 2009: 139f, 155f; Ilić, Golubović & Mrdjić 2010: 63).

1968: 137). The land along the Danube around every legionary camp, its so-called *territorium*, was allotted to legionaries so that they could meet their basic needs for food and building material (Ilić, Golubović & Mrdjić 2010: 62). Retired soldiers could also be granted a gift of land to practise farming. Inscriptions show that many veterans of IIII *Flavia* and VII *Claudia* settled, by deduction or individually, in the vicinity of the places where they had served, the military camps of Singidunum and Viminacium (Ferjančić 2002: 156, 161, 164). The process of veteran settlement has been attested as early as the end of the first century, but from the second century it becomes a rule. It may be assumed that there were farmers' estates in the broader surroundings of military camps, including Singidunum, where soldiers could procure food (Mirković 1968: 138f; Golubović, Ilić & Mrdjić 2010: 62). Farmers had probably owned some of the land even before active soldiers began to be tied to the land in the environs of the camps.

Ancient sources say little about the farming activities of the population of Singidunum and its environs. The only direct information dates from the sixth century. According to Theophylact Simocatta (*Hist.* 1 3–4, 46–47), the Avar attack on Singidunum in 584 found the urban population harvesting in the fields outside the city walls (cf. Mirković 1968: 138; Mirković & Dušanić 1976: 27; Ilić 2012: 46). Aurelius Victor, a Roman historian and politician of the second half of the fourth century, briefly the governor of Pannonia Secunda (361–363), refers to the city territory as *ager Singidunensis* (Aur. Victor, *Caes.* 44). That the land had been worked by local populations much before the Roman conquest is evidenced by prehistoric, especially Vinča culture and late Neolithic sites:⁵ the recovered archaeological material and paleoanalyses show that farming was their main occupation.

The epigraphic material that confirms the existence of farming estates is not ample. The existence of a village in the environs of Singidunum may be suggested by the inscription on a votive monument dedicated to Hercules discovered in Belgrade's neighbourhood of Julino Brdo (Mirković 1988: 99–104; *AE* 1989, 631). According to Mirković, the dedicant, *P. Flavius Felix*, held the office of a *vicomagister* of the village called *Buba* or *Bube*. He was a native, and his family members had probably been granted Roman citizenship as early as the Flavian age. The name *Bube* occurs on a headstone from Singidunum, where it probably functions as a cognomen (*IMS* I, 32; *CIL* III, 1666), even

⁵ One of the most important Vinča settlements sits on the bank of the Danube 14 km downstream from Belgrade. Its inhabitants grew wheat, and not only for their own use but also for exchange, as evidenced by numerous millstones, including complex types, large storage pits and carbonised remains of cereals and oil-bearing seeds (Vasić 1936: 171; Stalio 1984: 35; Jovanović 2004: 104; Tasić, Djuričić & Lazarević 2007: 211–218). On the working of land in the settlement of Banjica see Todorović & Cermanović 1961: 14; Todorović 1981: 14/H, 15.

though some believe it to be yet another reference to the village (Mirković 1988: 100; Zotović 2006: 284). The exact location of this *vicus* is not known, but it may be assumed that it could not have been far from the find-spot of the monument. These are the only known evidence for rural settlements in this area. Important information, though not about the production but about the use of cereals, is provided by the remains of wall painting in the area of Roman Singidunum (Vujović 1997: 175–176). It has been established that the fresco plaster contained rye or oat chaff,⁶ which indicates the availability of these crops as well as their uses other than as food.

Inhabitants of Singidunum, both of the military camp, *castrum*, and of the surrounding settlements, were engaged in farming. The fact that within the area of Belgrade Fortress, where the camp was situated, farming tools occur much more frequently in Roman than in later deposits suggests that farming was the prevailing economic activity in the period of Roman dominance.⁷ It may be assumed that the city was supplied by many small farms in its suburban area (Ilić 2012: 16). This is suggested by the large number of gravestones and votive monuments discovered on the periphery of Singidunum. Clustered burials registered in various parts of Belgrade (e.g. Karaburma, Vračar, Topčidersko Brdo, Voždovac, Banjica, Čukarica, Železnik) indicate the existence of smaller settlements with their own burial grounds (Pop-Lazić 2002: 89).

In addition to indirect evidence, archaeological excavations have provided direct evidence for farming in what may be called Greater Singidunum. The right bank of the Danube east of the *castrum* has yielded numerous sites where farming has been attested: the site of Ramadan south of Višnjica, or Dubočaj, Agino Brdo, Dražaj and Leštani near Grocka, which has been identified as *Mutatio ad sextum miliarem*.⁸ Ramadan, dated to the second to fourth century, has yielded residential architecture and diverse associated material.⁹ Dubočaj has yielded remains of second- and third-cen-

⁶ The presence of chaff, some husks being 40–50 mm in length, was established during conservation treatment. The characteristic elongated shape of the grain which left an impression in the plaster, occasionally an entire ear, points to rye or oat (Vujović 1997: 169–179).

⁷ Statistical analyses of the tools recovered from the area of Belgrade Fortress have shown a high proportion of farming tools from the third to seventh century (Špehar 2007: 108–109). In third to fourth century deposits a few hoes and one billhook have been discovered (Popović 1988: 15, 26, 42–43; Špehar 2007: 15, 17, 26).

⁸ Roman maps situate *Mutatio ad sextum miliarem* at the sixth Roman mile from *Castra tricornia* (Ritopek); they both guarded the road Singidunum–Viminacium (Mirković & Dušanić 1976: 38).

⁹ Trial excavations in 1964 discovered a wealthy Roman settlement over an area of about 800 m², including the walls of two houses up to 1.37 m thick, fragments of roof tiles

tury solid-built structures with relief decoration and architectural stone ornament, as well as more poorly built structures of the fourth century, which speaks of the continuity of occupation since the Neolithic Starčevo culture settlement.¹⁰ It was at Dubočaj that remains of a *villa rustica*, though in a poor state of preservation, were discovered for the first time in Serbia.¹¹ Continuity of occupation from the Neolithic to the Roman period and even later is also observable on the site of Agino Brdo (Grozdanović 2010, s.v. Agino Brdo). Farming tools have also been discovered at Dražaj¹² and Leštani (Popović 1988: 37, cat. no. 1).

In the area of Lazarevac there are three sites where farmsteads have been attested. The site of Batašina has yielded solid-built structures dated to the third and fourth centuries, remains of a *villa rustica*, as well as fragments of wall painting.¹³ The site of Katića Njive, village of Sokolovo, has yielded fragments of light grey ceramic *tubuli* (heating system flues), which suggests a larger and more sumptuous building.¹⁴ The site of Četenište near Kolubarski Leskovac has yielded structural remains of dressed stones and bricks, as well as remains of red and yellow fresco plaster (Ljubinković & Popović 1964: 122–124; Ilić 2012: 125). Despite the observable traces of a fire, the structure may be dated to the fourth century. Farming has also been attested on the site of Lisović to the northeast of Lazarevac, near Barajevo (Popović 1988: 41). The villages of Guberevac, Babe and Stojnik on Mt Kosmaj have yielded a large number of funerary and votive monuments, found isolated or clustered, suggesting smaller or larger rural settlements.¹⁵ Farming tools

(*tegulae*), potsherds, iron artefacts, finger rings etc. (Grozdanović 2010, s.v. Ramadan).

¹⁰ The site was excavated in 1963 and 1964 (Grozdanović 2010, s.v. Dubočaj; Popović 1988: 244).

¹¹ The villa had four rooms and a small central room, probably a hallway. To the left of the hallway were two rooms, and to the right a large room with a paved surface at one end where a considerable quantity of third-century tools was discovered. Adjacent to it was a fourth, incompletely preserved room. (According to V. Kondić's unpublished excavation records, see Vasić 1967: 25–26; 1970: 58–59, Pl. IV.)

¹² The site has yielded a mouldboard and two mattocks (Popović 1988: 36, 102, 243).

¹³ The masonry tomb of the fifth–sixth century also discovered on the site may be taken as further evidence for the continuity of occupation (Simić 1982b: 90–93; Grozdanović 2010, s.v. Batašina; Ilić 2012: 124).

¹⁴ The existence of a farmstead is also suggested by the finds of roof tiles, bricks and tools. It has been dated by coins to the fourth century (Simić 1982b: 88–90; Ilić 2012: 124).

¹⁵ Kondić & Popović 1968; Guberevac: *IMS* I, 102–103, 105, 107–108, 118, 125bis, 129, 133, 136, 142–143, 147–149; Babe: *IMS* I, 90–91, 93–94, 106, 111, 113–114, 138, 162–164; Stojnik: *IMS* I, 89, 92, 97, 99, 101, 104, 109, 110, 112, 116, 120–121, 125, 135, 140, 144, 151, 159.

have been discovered on several locations in Guberevac.¹⁶ Given that the area was a mining district, the question remains as to whether those settlements were attached to the nearby mines or they were independent farming estates.

The everyday life of the inhabitants of Singidunum and its environs, as that of all Roman citizens, was profoundly imbued with religion. While pursuing their farming activities, they must have developed a particular relationship towards the deities that were considered patrons of agriculture. The ancient sources and the modern literature classify different gods as agrarian. In his *Re rustica* (1.1.4–7) Varro cites twelve deities of the agrarian pantheon (*agricolarum duces*): Jupiter, Tellus, Sol, Luna, Ceres, Liber, Robigus, Flora, Minerva, Venus, Lympha and Bonus Eventus. On the other hand, some modern scholars, such as Dorcey (1992: 136), see the following deities as patrons of agriculture: Silvanus, Jupiter, Ceres, Liber, Venus, Flora, Pamona, Terra Mater and Priapus, while Mirković (1968: 137) lists Ceres, Terra Mater, Proserpine, Liber, Libera and Silvanus. As it seems, many deities were considered patrons of agriculture, but some others also had that aspect. We shall take the following deities as agrarian: Ceres, Persephone, Terra Mater, Liber and Libera, Silvanus and Priapus, but bearing in mind that they also could have had other aspects, for example chthonic.

The most explicit and most revealing evidence for the worship of tutelary deities of agriculture in Singidunum and its environs are dedicatory inscriptions on votive altars, followed by statuettes of the deities or their images on everyday objects. The epigraphic evidence amounts to a now lost dedication to Silvanus discovered in the Lower Town of Belgrade Fortress in 1962 (Kondić 1963: 79; Mirković & Dušanić 1976: 57) and three dedications discovered as far back as the eighteenth century in what now is downtown Belgrade – Vračar. Two of the latter come from the part of Vračar called Čubura: the votive monument to Jupiter, Terra Mater, Liber and Libera (*IMS* I, 16) discovered in a family vineyard and the monument to Liber and Libera found in the immediate vicinity (*IMS* I, 17). As for the monument to Silvanus (*IMS* I, 22), the exact find-spot is not known. All three Vračar monuments may be broadly dated to the first or second century, the one to Jupiter and other agrarian deities allowing a more precise dating to the latter half of the second century.

Both Vračar inscriptions where Liber figures as one of the dedicatees contain his usual epithet *Pater* (Pilipović 2011: 18, 58). In the one where Jupiter figures too, the supreme god was probably associated with the plebeian triad to endorse the protection of all aspects of well-being, including agricultural. There is only one other known dedication to Terra Mater from

¹⁶ E.g. a mouldboard and a hoe (Popović 1988: 101, 42).

Upper Moesia: an inscription from Rudnik (*IMS* I, 168) which dates from the age of Septimius Severus and attests to the renovation by the procurator *Cassius Ligurinus* of the shrine of the goddess at the entrance to a mine.¹⁷ That the *Vračar* inscription referred to the agrarian aspect of Terra Mater rather than having had any connection with mining is indicated by the type of local community (Sanader 1996: 152). Its dedicant, *Aurelius Atticus*, was one of the few veterans of *III Flavia* who took up a civil post in the administration of Singidunum as a *quinquennalis*, and of Sirmium as a member of the city council (Ferjančić 2002: 156; Zotović 2006: 283). Some believe that he was a native and that his cognomen, *Atticus*, suggests a north-Italian origin (Mirković & Dušanić 176: 53; Ferjančić 2002: 156). Some research links him to the mines on Avala, but there is no clear evidence to confirm such a link (Dušanić 1990: 588f). *T. Aurelius Atticus*, veteran of *III Flavia*, probably made this dedication on his own suburban estate (Pilipović 2011: 71, 87). The *Vračar* inscription to Liber and Libera is dedicated to the divine pair, patrons of fertility and vegetation, wine and vine-growing. It may be assumed that the monument was also erected on the suburban estate of its dedicant, of whom we know nothing. The epithet *Silvester* attached to Silvanus in the third *Vračar* inscription indicates that the dedication was made to the god as protector of everything that is associated with man outside his home, such as forests, pastures and livestock (Rendić-Miočević 1980: 112, n. 41; Zotović 1992; Jovanović 2000; Popović 2009), which is also suggested by Virgil (*Georg.* I, 16), who describes him as *Pan, ovium custos*.¹⁸ It may be assumed that in this case an autochthonous cult was assimilated to the Italic deity Silvanus through the process of *interpretatio romana* (Rendić-Miočević 1989 = 1955; 2007; Cambi 1998–2000; Rendić-Miočević & Pedišić 2005; Perinić Muratović & Vulić 2009; Bekavac 2011). The assumption seems to be corroborated by the only other Upper Moesian dedication containing this epithet, though now referring to the *Deae Silvestres*, i.e. the *Nymphae Silvestres*, from the site of Čair in Viminacium (Marić 1933, 60).¹⁹ The nymphs of this type were associated with Silvanus; they danced with him (Rendić-Miočević 1989, 483). The *Vračar* inscription says little about the origin and occupation of the dedicant, *Iulius Septimus*. It is

¹⁷ The renovation probably took place during Septimius Severus' tours of the interior of the Balkans in 193, 196 and 202. The shrine was subsequently destroyed in a fire (Mirković & Dušanić 1976: n. 168; Popović 1995: 152f).

¹⁸ The epithet *Silvester* is frequently encountered in the central Balkans, especially in the province of Dalmatia where the god was often depicted, and in theriomorphic form (Kirigin et al. 1987: 36; Perinić Muratović & Vulić 2009: 169; Bekavac 2011: 158).

¹⁹ Based on the name of the dedicant to the forest nymphs, *Achilleus*, his Greek origin and a lower social status may be assumed (Mirković 1986: 80, no. 41).

quite possible that he made this dedication to Silvanus Silvester on his own suburban estate hoping for its prosperity.

Another group of votive monuments comes from Kosmaj: one dedicated to Jupiter and Liber, three to Silvanus. The one dedicated to Jupiter and Liber comes from a hamlet (Reka) near Guberevac (Petković 2002). This cultic association of Jupiter and Liber was not unknown, given that both were considered patrons of the vine and wine. The question of which of the two had primacy has been a controversial one.²⁰ According to one view, each played a role as patron of a particular kind of wine, and so their roles were complementary.²¹ Jupiter was the patron of sacrificial wine, *vinum inferium*, Liber of profane wine, *vinum spurcum*, impure and thus inappropriate for libations (Cazanove 1988: 245; Pilipović 2011: 66–67). Some recognise a link between Jupiter and Liber in their patronage over mineral resources which symbolised the fecundity of earth in a broader sense (Popović 1995: 156; Dušanić 1999: 131; Petković 2002: 216ff). There is no information about the dedicant of this inscription.²² He might have made the dedication for the prosperity of his estate, but his link with mines should not be ruled out either since the settlement and cemetery at Guberevac were connected with the nearby lead and silver mines (Popović 1988: 244).

The inscription dedicated to *Silvanus Augustus Conservator* (IMS I, 108) also comes from Guberevac. The epithet *Augustus*, as in dedications to Mars or Saturn, may indicate a local deity's inclusion into the Roman pantheon and role as protector of emperors (Beard, North & Price 1998: 352).²³ In this way persons of a lower social rank sought to make their beliefs conform to the gods of the Roman pantheon and the emperors themselves. The epithet *conservator* suggests that Silvanus was seen as a protector in the broadest sense (Dorcey 1992: 30). But this epithet may be interpreted in the light of the deity's patronage of natural wealth, including mineral resources

²⁰ Liber is believed to have emerged from Jupiter Liber, patron of vine-growers' festivities (Preller 1881: 195–197), but also to have been a completely independent "god of wine" (Bömer 1957: 127ff). Liber's and Jupiter's role as patrons of wine is confirmed by an inscription from northern Italy (CIL V, 5543): *I(ovi) O(ptimo) M(aximo) C(onservatori) et Libero Patri viniarum conservatori*; for more see Pilipović 2011: 66–67.

²¹ Liber's role was to "ensure propriety, the material and ritual purity of the places where and the tools with which grapes were harvested", and the must obtained by pressing was consecrated to him (Cazanove 1988: 248, 258ff).

²² The same *nomen gentilicium* occurs in three inscriptions from Ravna (IMS III/2, 8, 9, 19) mentioning *C. Atrius Decorat*, the military tribune of the cohort *Aurelia Dardanorum* at Ravna between 208 and 211, the duty of which was probably to guard the mines in the Timok valley (Petković 2002: 221).

²³ The epithet *Augustus* had been attached to Silvanus as early as the Flavian and Antonine ages, becoming standard under the Severi (Skovgaard Jensen 1911: 11ff).

in the mountains, in this case Kosmaj (Mirković & Dušanić 1976: no. 108; Jovanović, Pop-Lazić & Mrkobrad 1992: 140). The inscription contains no information about the dedicant other than his name, *M. Ulpus Terentius*, and we cannot know if he had an estate there or was somehow connected with the mines. The now lost dedication found at Stojnik (*IMS I*, 109) refers to the dedicant as a *beneficiarius*. The third inscription, dedicated to *Silvanus Domesticus*, was found next to the apse of an earlier large structure in Sibnica.²⁴ The epithet *domesticus* refers to the god as protector of farming land, the household and all that is associated with it.²⁵ In Pannonia *Silvanus Domesticus* was second in veneration only to Jupiter.²⁶ Basically, *Silvanus Domesticus*, as the Italic *Silvanus*, may be seen as the antithesis of *Silvanus Silvester*, an epichoric, so-called Illyrian type; the worship of *Silvanus Silvester* in Upper Moesia has been attested in Viminacium too.²⁷ It appears therefore that *Oppius Maximus* made this dedication to *Silvanus Domesticus* for the protection of his farming estate. Archaeologists believe that future investigations on the southwest slopes of Mt Kosmaj are likely to come up with more substantial evidence for farming activity in the Roman period (Jovanović, Pop-Lazić & Mrkobrad 1992: 140–141).

Visual depictions of agrarian deities provide important evidence for the religious beliefs of the local population. For some of these kept in different museums in Belgrade the exact find-spot is unknown, which makes them difficult to contextualise. Many of the intaglios with images of Bacchus, Ceres or Priapus were donated to museums by private owners or collectors without any information of their find-spots (Kuzmanović-Novović 2005). Worthy of mention of these is the syncretistic depiction of Dionysus–Demeter on an intaglio set in a nineteenth-century golden ring.²⁸ Here Dionysus as the deity of renewal and vegetation is united with the agrarian and chthonic goddess Demeter, the one who invented viticulture with the one who gave the gift of grain to humankind.²⁹ Coming from an unknown find-spot are two bronze statuettes of Bacchus. One depicts him

²⁴ This structure might have been a bath which in late antiquity was used as a sacral building round which a cemetery developed (Jovanović, Pop-Lazić & Mrkobrad 1992: 139–140).

²⁵ *Silvanus Domesticus* may be seen as comparable to domestic Lares (Rendić-Miočević 1980: 111–113).

²⁶ While in Pannonia and Dacia *Silvanus'* epithet *domesticus* prevailed, in Dalmatia the deity was more frequently worshipped as *Silvester* (Dorcey 1992: 76; Perinić Muratović & Vulić 2009: 176).

²⁷ There are three dedications to *Silvanus* from Viminacium (*IMS II*, 297, 300 and 310), of which two (300 and 310) refer to *Silvanus Domesticus*.

²⁸ The image has been identified as Apollo–Dionysus (Kuzmanović-Novović 2006: 13, cat. no. 8) and Bacchus–Demeter (Pilipović 2011: cat. no. 54).

²⁹ On the syncretism of the two cults see Brühl 1953: 5.

with a large bunch of grapes and a knife, the other shows a satyr carrying the child Bacchus on one arm and holding a large pruning knife in the other (Pilipović 2011: cat. nos. 38 and 39). Monuments whose exact find-spots are unknown have been found in Singidunum itself: the male torso of Bacchus or a satyr with a nebris and a large bunch of grapes in hand (Pilipović 2011: cat. no. 15), a terracotta lamp with a Bacchus mask (ibid. cat. no. 44), or a bronze statuette of Ceres (Petrović 1997, 35, cat. no. 9). From the narrower area of Singidunum, the military camp and civilian settlement, comes the following evidence of worship: a bronze statuette of Bacchus from Belgrade Fortress (Pilipović 2011: cat. no. 32), and a bronze statuette of Priapus from Zmaj Jovina Street in the very centre of modern Belgrade (ibid. cat. no. 73). Discovered on the right bank of the Danube east of the *castrum*, in the municipality of Grocka, are: a terracotta lamp with a Bacchus mask from Ritopek (ibid. cat. no. 45); a fragment of a marble torso of Bacchus or a satyr with a nebris from Dubočaj (ibid. cat. no. 14); a female figure, possibly Persephone or Demeter, from the site of Begaljica.³⁰ In Ada Ciganlija, a Sava river island south of the *castrum* and settlement, was found a bronze statuette of Bacchus (Pilipović 2011: cat. no. 31), and further south, in Stepojevac (municipality of Sopot), was found a bronze weight in the form of Fawn/Pan (ibid. cat. no. 72). From Guberevac (municipality of Sopot) comes a mould for ritual cakes with the reclining figure of Terra Mater (Tellus) shown on the inside.³¹

* * *

The inhabitants of the *castrum* and settlement of Singidunum farmed the land and worshipped the tutelary deities of their activity. The periphery of the municipal territory abounded in farming estates. The owners of three such estates southeast of the *castrum* (Belgrade municipality of Vračar) made votive dedications to agrarian deities for the prosperity of their estates. A veteran, *T. Aurelius Atticus*, made a votive dedication to the supreme god and the plebeian triad. For the protection of his farmstead and small livestock *Iulius Septumus* made a votive dedication to *Silvanus Silvester*. The unknown owner of a nearby estate made a dedication to Liber and Libera. Northeast of the *castrum*, on the right bank of the Danube, were many farms which might have supplied the troops stationed along the river. Numerous archaeological finds, structural remains, stone sculpture, remains of

³⁰ Tomović (1993: cat. no. 50) identifies the figure as Persephone or Demeter, while Krunić (2003: figs. 2–5, 51–65) finds it difficult to identify the deity with precision and takes into account a Muse or a Grace.

³¹ Tellus, with a wreath on her head, is shown holding a child and surrounded with plants (Glumac 2009: figs. 2a and 2b).

fresco decoration and agricultural tools have been discovered on the sites such as Ramadan in Višnjica or those in the present-day municipality of Grocka. On some of these sites (e.g. Ritopek and Dubočaj), the cult of Bacchus has been attested, and perhaps that of Ceres (Begaljica). Farming has been attested also on the sites of Kolubarski Leskovac, Stepojevac and Sokolovo (Belgrade municipality of Lazarevac). Given that Mt Kosmaj was an important mining district, it cannot be known with certainty if the discovered material had a mining or an agricultural context. Farming has been attested by the finds of agricultural tools, especially in the vicinity of Guberevac (Belgrade municipality of Sopot). *Atrius Cornutianus* might have dedicated a votive monument to Jupiter and Liber as patrons of wine on his estate in the vicinity of Guberevac. On the southwest slopes of Kosmaj, in Sibnica, was probably the farming estate of *Oppius Maximus* who dedicated a monument to *Silvanus Domesticus* for the protection of both his land and household. Things become more complicated when it comes to the image of Tellus from Guberevac, who was patroness of agriculture but was also associated with the mineral fecundity of the earth. *M. Ulpius Terentius* made a votive dedication to *Silvanus Augustus Conservator*, probably for the protection of natural resources, perhaps those in mineral-bearing mountains.

Most of the evidence for farming has been dated to the third and fourth centuries, while most of the evidence for the worship of agrarian deities has been dated to a little earlier period, the second and third centuries. No doubt the most revered deities were Bacchus and Liber and Libera, followed by Silvanus, Terra Mater and Priapus. Apart from explicit, epigraphic and sculptural, evidence for the worship of these deities, it can also be read from everyday objects, such as intaglios and lamps. The archaeological and epigraphic finds have not shown a significant correlation between the evidence for farming and the evidence for worship of agrarian deities. Evidence for a correlation between farming and the worship of agrarian deities has been found within the *castrum* and civilian settlement of Singidunum, on the site of Dubočaj in Grocka and on Mt Kosmaj. Dubočaj has yielded a *villa rustica* as well as a marble torso of Bacchus or a satyr. On Kosmaj, especially near Guberevac, apart from farming tools, dedications to Jupiter and Liber as well as to *Silvanus Domesticus* have been discovered. Since more precise conclusions are difficult to draw given the fact that not all sites have been equally explored and that much of the territory under consideration is underneath modern Belgrade and thus inaccessible for excavation, this paper should be seen as just a first attempt to come closer to understanding the relationship of the inhabitants of Singidunum and its environs to the land through farming and through reverence for agrarian deities.

UDC 904:003.071](37 Singidunum)
255.6-5:63

Abbreviations

<i>AE</i>	<i>L'Année épigraphique</i>
<i>CIL</i>	<i>Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum</i>
<i>IMS</i>	<i>Inscriptions de la Mésie Supérieure</i>

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


Fig. 1 Structural remains. Višnjica municipality
(Cultural Heritage Protection Institute of the City of Belgrade [CHPIB])



Fig. 2 Site of Dubočaj. Grocka (CHPIB)



Fig. 3 Structural remains, floor of a room. Batašina, Lazarevac municipality (CHPIB)



Fig. 4 Votive altar dedicated to Jupiter, Terra Mater, Liber and Libera. Vračar municipality (*IMS I*, 16)



Fig. 5 Votive altar dedicated to Liber and Libera. Vračar municipality (after: *IMS I*, 17)



Fig. 6 Votive altar dedicated to Silvanus.
Vračar municipality (after: *IMS I*, 22)



Fig. 7 Votive altar dedicated to Silvanus.
Guberevac, Kosmaj (after: *IMS I*, 108)



Fig. 8
Bronze statuette
of Bacchus
(National Museum,
Belgrade)




Fig. 9 Lamp with the image of Bacchus.
Belgrade (Krunić 2008, fig. 8)



Fig. 10
Lamp with the
image of Bacchus.
Belgrade (Krunić
2008, fig. 9)



Fig. 11
Fragment of the
marble statue
of Bacchus
or a satyr
(photo: I. Stanić)



Map of Belgrade municipalities

(<http://beogradskonasledje.rs/kd/zavod/opstine.html>)

- 1) Barajevo; 2) Vračar; 3) Voždovac; 4) Grocka;
5) Zvezdara; 6) Zemun; 7) Lazarevac; 8) Mladenovac;
9) Novi Beograd; 10) Obrenovac; 11) Palilula;
12) Rakovica; 13) Savski venac; 14) Sopot; 15) Stari
grad; 16) Surčin; 17) Čukarica



Fig. 12 Bronze statuette
of Priapus
(photo: I. Stanić)

Sentio me grauatum de malo ablato
**Compensation for the Sin of Ill-gotten Gain in the Wills
of Kotor (Cattaro) Citizens 1326–1337**

Abstract: The focus of the paper is on bequests *pro male ablatis* in the wills of Kotor citizens drawn up between 1326 and 1337 against the backdrop of their own time and the dynamic relationship between Christian ethics and mercantile and banking practices. The concept of bequests *pro male ablatis* has been analysed as part of the well-developed practice, strongly influenced by confessors, of making testamentary gifts *pro remedio animae* and preparing for a good death.

Keywords: wills, *male ablata*, Kotor (Cattaro), legacies *ad pias causas*, usury, sin, confessors

The surviving fourteenth-century court and notarial records produced by the chancery of the commune of Kotor contain a body of documents from a period of eleven successive years, from 1326 to 1337,¹ which includes seventy-four wills. Among diverse bequests *ad pias causas* there frequently occurs a distinctive type of bequest veiled under the impersonal formula *pro male ablatis*. What exactly did the term *male ablatus* (*maltolto*, taken or acquired in a wrong way) refer to? The basic meaning of this testamentary formula was either restitution of ill-gotten gains, the gains acquired while conducting commercial or banking activities, or compensation for such gains in the form of gifts *ad pias causas*.² The legacies *pro male ablatis* were usually meant as restitution of usurious gains, but they could also concern

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¹ *Kotorski spomenici* [Monumenta Catarensia]. *Prva knjiga kotorskih notara od god. 1326–1335*, ed. A. Mayer (Zagreb 1951) [hereafter: MC I]; *Kotorski spomenici. Druga knjiga kotorskih notara od god. 1329, 1332–1337*, ed. A. Mayer (Zagreb 1981) [hereafter: MC II].

² Literature on the restitution of *maltolto*, *male ablata*, is relatively scant and the phenomenon is usually only cursorily mentioned in discussions focused on usury. It has as a rule been perceived as a mechanism used by the Church in its bid to moralise the economy which was out of its control and governed by the logic of making profit. The last ten years or so have seen the publication of a few studies focused on *male ablata* both in theological writings and in testamentary practice, e.g. G. Ceccarelli, “L’usura nella trattatistica teologica sulle restituzioni dei male ablata (XIII–XIV secolo)”, in *Credito e usura fra teologia, diritto e amministrazione. Linguaggi a confronto (sec. XII–XVI)*, eds. D. Quaglioni, G. Todeschini & G. M. Varanini (École française de Rome, 2005), 3–23; M. Giansante, “Male ablata. La restituzione delle usure nei testamenti bolognesi fra XIII

various forms of embezzlement, extortion, corrupt behaviour, appropriation of somebody else's property and other ways of acquiring gains which were considered immoral, such as gambling, especially in illicit secret places.³ The Church preached that the acquisition of such gains necessitated restitution either by repaying them to the victim directly or by leaving charitable and various devotional bequests. In the process of drawing up the last will and testament in general, and the legacies *ad pias causas* in particular, the main role was played by confessors. They were well trained and equipped to encourage the dying to remember if they had made profit in a sinful way, and to advise them how to avoid the torments of purgatory and prepare for a "good death". Confessors, as testators' spiritual guides, relied on the literature on the last rites which became exceptionally popular at the time the practice of drawing up wills was taking root in all strata of society. As far as the restitution of ill-gotten gains through legacies *pro male ablatis* is concerned, especially well trained were Franciscan and Dominican confessors.⁴ The restitution of *moltolto* had a complex social dimension. As evidenced by many late medieval wills (especially in Italian cities), *peccatum usurae* was what people would usually think of at their deathbed. Usury was classified as a *peccatum cupiditatis* and considered a *culpa contra caritatem Dei*. Faced with such a position of the Church, few would have dared not to leave something in the way of compensation for *moltolto*, proportionately to their involvement in the sin.⁵ The dying person's fear of what lay ahead was fertile soil, and the late medieval Church was its sovereign sower. Viewed in that context, legacies *pro male ablatis* clearly reflect the overall effort of the Church to moralise the economy and to retain religious control over secular life, time and commerce. The mechanism was also clear: absolution and

e XIV secolo", *Rivista Internazionale di Diritto Comune* 22 (2011), 183–216 (with an overview of earlier literature where *male ablata* is discussed or mentioned).

³ G. Ceccarelli, *Il gioco e il peccato. Economia e rischio nel Tardo Medioevo* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003); S. Florence Fabijanec, "Ludus zardorum: Moral and Legal Frameworks of Gambling along Adriatic in the Middle Ages", in *At the Edge of the Law: Socially Unacceptable and Illegal Behaviour in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Period*, eds. J. Gerhard and S. Miljan (Krems: Medium Aevum Quotidianum, 2012), 31–49.

⁴ At every confession, if it was obvious that a sin, such as the misappropriation of somebody else's property, theft or usury, had been committed, the confessor advised the sinner to bequeath a portion of his possessions *pro male ablatis*, cf. Ceccarelli, "Lusura", 9; G. Todeschini, *I mercanti e il tempio. La società Cristiana e il circolo virtuoso della ricchezza fra Medioevo ed età moderna* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2002), 135–140.

⁵ Ceccarelli, "Lusura", 10, 16.

reconciliation with God was only possible if all accounts were settled and if what had been dishonestly taken was returned.⁶

As may be seen from this introduction, the practice of making bequests *pro male ablatiis* was a complex phenomenon the understanding of which requires examination of different aspects of late medieval secular and religious life. We shall first take a look at a few general questions surrounding the phenomenon in order to be able to undertake a more detailed analysis of this practice in Kotor in the first half of the fourteenth century. One of those general questions concerns the relationship between the medieval economy and Christian ethics because it demonstrates the virtual inevitability of falling into sin in business dealings. An attempt to analyse the psychological, emotional state of a dying person is the last but important link in understanding the relationship between society, which laid down moral norms, and individuals, who sought to rise up to them. An emotion perceptible in the wills under study is the fear of death, or the fear of dying without having cleaned up the “balance sheet” and of the punishment that lay in store if ill-gotten gains were not given back through charitable bequests and devotional programmes. In the part of the paper discussing bequests *pro male ablatiis* in Kotor documents, this formula is seen primarily as a response to a sense of conscience awakened by the confessor. Issues deserving particular attention are the vocabulary used to formulate a legacy *pro male ablatiis*, its place in the structure of legacies *ad pias causas*, as well as references to confessors and the amount of money bequeathed.

In the late middle ages, mercantile and banking dealings were in fundamental contradiction to the doctrine of the Church. According to Christian ethics and decrees, the loan-taker was to repay only the loan, anything demanded beyond the principal was considered as usury, and the dictum of the Church was: *Usura solum in mutuo cadit*. It was irrelevant if the profit thus made was small or big or if the loan was given to a well-to-do businessman to invest in trade or to a poor person to eke out a living. Scholastic writers and ecclesiastical rhetoric denounced all forms of usury, looking upon it as one of the worst social evils.⁷ From the eleventh century in particular this question became the focus of intense scrutiny. After the decrees

⁶ B. N. Nelson, “The Usurer and the Merchant Prince: Italian Businessmen and the Ecclesiastical Law of Restitution, 1100–1550”, *The Journal of Economic History* 7, Supplement: Economic Growth: A Symposium (1947), 104–122; R. C. Trexler, “The Bishop’s Portion: Generic Pious Legacies in the Late Middle Ages in Italy”, *Traditio* 28 (1972), 424–425; M. Bacci, *Investimenti per l’aldilà. Arte e raccomandazione dell’anima nel medioevo* (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 2003).

⁷ On scholastic (ethico-economic) tracts on usury between the mid-thirteenth century and the first quarter of the fourteenth see T. P. McLaughlin, “The Teaching of the Canonists on Usury (XII, XIII and XIV Centuries)”, *Medieval Studies* I (1939), 81–147; II

of the Third Lateran Council in 1179, the Church threatened all who profited from lending money with excommunication and refusal of a Christian burial. The Second Council of Lyon in 1274 condemned usury, and denied usurers the last sacrament, assistance at their wills and a consecrated burial. At the Council of Vienne in 1331/2 punishment for those who died in the sin of usury included a ban on hearing their confession, giving them absolution and Christian burial, invalidation of their wills, and excommunication for rulers and magistrates of the states or communities which permitted usury.⁸ An absolute ban on the practice of making any profit from lending money is especially advocated by William of Auxerre (1160–1229), famous for his remark that the usurer sells time.⁹ In his *Tract on Usury*, a Franciscan, Alexander Lombard (d. 1314), argues that the Church condemns usury but encourages money changers, being of the view that *cambium* is not *mutuum*, but *permutatio pecunie*, which is not usury. Antoninus of Florence (1389–1459), in his *Summa theological moralis*, discusses *turpe lucrum* (greedy profit, filthy profit) or ill-gotten gain – any gain accruing from any illicit contract or from sinful and unlawful activities prohibited by either divine or human law or by both (such as prostitution, monopoly, gambling, tournaments, histrionics, simony...).¹⁰ While the official position of the Church on usury was exceptionally harsh, Franciscans and Dominicans tended to take as legitimate a number of activities and transactions that could be defined as usurious, and in doing so frequently resorted to casuistry.¹¹ Some Franciscan

(1940), 1–22; J. T. Noonan, Jr., *The Scholastic Analysis of Usury* (Cambridge 1957); Caccarelli, “Lusura”, 4–7, and passim.

⁸ C. M. Bellitto, *The General Councils: A History of the Twenty-one General Councils from Nicaea to Vatican II* (Paulist Press 2002), 57–64; Nelson, “The Usurer and the Merchant Prince”, 104–122; A. Kirschenbaum, “Jewish and Christian Theories of Usury in the Middle Ages”, *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, N.S. 75/3 (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 270–289; C. G. Reed & C. T. Bekar, “Religious prohibitions against usury”, *Explorations in Economic History* 40 (2003) 347–368.

⁹ G. Todeschini, *Il prezzo della salvezza. Lessici medievali del pensiero economico* (Rome 1994), 13–113. The most exhaustive bibliography on the subject furnished with a list of the archives which keep the relevant documentary material and a list of theological writings on usury is given by N. L. Barile, *Credito usura, prestito a interesse, Reti Medievali* (2010): <http://www.rmojs.unina.it/index.php/rm/article/view/9/6>

¹⁰ R. de Roover, “The scholastics, usury, and foreign exchange”, *The Business History Review* 41/3 (Autumn 1967), 263.

¹¹ Especially prominent was the Franciscan Alexander of Hales (1185–1245), who interpreted these practices in terms of social utility. Tracts on usury were written by the Dominicans Giles of Lessines (d. ca 1304) and John of Freiburg (d. 1314), see B. H. Rosenwein & L. K. Little, “Social Meaning in the Monastic and Mendicant Spiritualities”, *Past & Present* 63 (May 1974), 4–32.

theologians, on the other hand, took a rigid position on usury, expanding the concept to include *indirectum mutuuum*, which could encompass a whole range of contracts. The prominent thirteenth-century Franciscan theologian Peter John Olivi (1248–1298) was of the view that the profit made on the basis of a legally valid contract but corrupted by the intention of making profit should also be subject to restitution.¹²

The need for reinterpretation brought about by the rise of commerce had an impact on activities such as money lending, crediting, investing, the setting of buying and selling prices, etc. An important question is the extent to which the official doctrine of the Church on profit-making and usury was actually accepted by merchants and businessmen. Analysing late medieval commercial and banking contracts, many economic historians challenge the view that the Church had much influence on commercial dealings. Some sources, on the other hand, seem to suggest that it did.¹³

At the time the surviving fourteenth-century court and notarial records were drawn up, Kotor played a prominent role as a commercial, diplomatic and cultural centre within the medieval Serbian state under the Nemanjić dynasty (from 1185 to 1371), and borrowing money, usually for business purposes, was practised by local businessmen on a daily basis. That everyone could take a loan if the value of their property could cover the amount of the loan is shown by the contracts preserved in the notarial records. However, even though charging interest on loans was prohibited, it was collected in various concealed ways.¹⁴ The term interest (*lucrum*) was

¹² Ceccarelli, “Lusura”, 10.

¹³ On this see R. de Roover, “The Cambium Maritimum Contract According to the Genoese Notarial Records of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries”, *Explorations in Economic History* 7/1 (1970), 15–33.

¹⁴ Many agreed debt repayment contracts hid usurious profits, especially as far as merchant partnerships were concerned. St Bernardino of Siena (1380–1444), a fierce decrifier of usury, argued that it could be concealed in various types of contracts: *emptio venditio, locatio, societas, contractus commissions*, cf. R. de Roover, *San Bernardino of Siena and Sant’Antonino of Florence: Two Great Economic Thinkers of the Middle Ages* (Boston: Kress Library of Business and Economics, 1967), 30. A partnership was not a loan but a different contract, as the Venetian and Ragusan *colleganza* (one partner supplied all the capital and the other only his personal services). There was the danger, however, that an interest-bearing loan might be concealed under the colour of another form of contract. The scholastics called such a disguised loan a contract *in fraudem usurarum*. They distinguished between *overt* usury, which was charged openly on a loan, and *palliate* usury, which was cloaked in the garb of another contract. Usury could be hidden in an *emptio venditio* (purchase-sale) by simply charging a higher price on credit sales than on cash transactions. Mental usury, although it rested only on the hope of gain, thus become as grievous a sin as contractual usury: De Roover, “The scholastics, usury, and foreign exchange”, 260–263.

used rarely. It occurs in a notarial document of 1336 in which *Micho Buchia* confirms that *Luca Sisioye* paid interest on the loan.¹⁵ In practice, loans were normally given at an interest rate of 12–15 per cent. On the other hand, usurious interest rates were usually 25 per cent, and up to as much as 100 per cent.¹⁶ Hence every case of moneylending was suspected to be a violation of moral principles. The Statute of the commune of Kotor contains a number of rules regulating contractual relations, i.e. the obligations of the parties involved in lending and borrowing. Particular attention was paid to regulating the then widespread form of doing business, the founding of merchant associations (chap. 301 and 302). For a document concerning a debt to be valid it had to be drawn up before the judge, the notary and the auditor (chap. 45). The chapter titled *De instrumentis credentiae qualiter fieri debeat* (chap. 287) specifies the duty of the notary to include in such a document the notification that the failure to repay the debt by the due date (which was a rule rather than an exception) entails the penalty of *sint in pena de quinque in sex per annum super me et omnia bona mea*, i.e. six perpers for every five perpers a year, which was a penalty rate of 20 per cent.¹⁷

Apart from commercial dealings, hazardous moneylending and more or less overt usury, the danger of falling into the sin of making ill-gotten gains included games of chance. According to the Dominican Raymond of Penyafort, games of chance are a cardinal sin because they involve other sins, such as avarice, theft, usury, lie, blasphemy, corruption etc. The prevailing view on this point was that the torments of purgatory could be avoided if such a gain was returned through almsgiving.¹⁸ After Kotor came under

¹⁵ *Ego Micho Buchie confiteor michi esse satisfactum a Luca Sisioye de lucro totius temporis preteriti usque ad diem hodiernum illius carte notarii, quam habeo super ipsum Lucam et Triphonem Gusse, videlicet de parte dicti Luce tantum capitale dicte carte cum lucro venturo, saluo ab hodie in antea* (MC II, 1630).

¹⁶ I. Voje, *Kreditna trgovina u srednjovjekovnom Dubrovniku* (Sarajevo: ANU BiH, 1976).

¹⁷ *Statuta civitatis Cathari*, vol. 1, ed. J. Antović (Kotor: Državni arhiv Crne Gore, 2009), 29, 159, 166; A. Mayer, “Catarenisia”, *Zbornik Historijskog instituta JAZU* 1 (1954), 95–109; S. Ćirković, “Kamate”, in *Leksikon srpskog srednjeg veka*, eds. S. Ćirković and R. Mihaljčić (Belgrade: Knowledge, 1999) 273–274. On banking practices in Dubrovnik and Bosnia, cf. E. Kurtović, *Iz historije bankarstva Bosne i Dubrovnika u srednjem vijeku* (Belgrade: Istorijski institute, 2010).

¹⁸ The possibility of compensating for this sin by giving for charity was discussed by Saint Augustine and Thomas of Aquinas. However, both the Franciscan and many other theologians considered games of chance as dishonourable, *non honestum*, but legitimate and therefore not requiring amends to be made through restitution or charity giving. But Franciscan opinions on this issue diverged (Peter John Olivi), most of all as a result of different socio-cultural environments: while games of chance are mostly legal in Mediterranean areas, in northern Europe they are not. On the other hand, from the end

the suzerainty of the Venetian Republic in 1420 (until 1797), its Statute was amended with the chapter titled “On those who gamble or organise games in their houses or in taverns” (*De laudentibus ad azarium, & tenentibus ludos in domo, vel tabernis*), stipulating that “as of now”, “no one must dare gamble in caves and other secret places, where things are lost and gained, with the exception of playing dice in an honest game played in public and openly, by day, beneath the loggias and in three squares”.¹⁹

Dishonest gain was a sin that could be expiated by making bequests. Ill-gotten gain usually gave rise to restitution either in the form of donations to charities or to the person aggrieved. A thus defined practice of testamentary restitution enabled redistribution of wealth. The basic idea of restitution by way of the *male ablata* clause was to compensate the victims of usury or their heirs, which could be done in the cases when usury was overtly practised. But it was frequently unfeasible.²⁰ Bequests for pious and charitable purposes could be restitution of ill-gotten gain only if the identity of the aggrieved persons was impossible to establish reliably or if it was *lucra incerta*, i.e. if money was lent under the contracts which gave grounds to suspect the lender’s intention to charge interest. In such cases legacies *pro male ablatiis incertis* were usually intended for the poor, while the purpose of the act of donating was to compensate for the sin committed. This type of legacies could also take the form of works of charity or spiritual compensa-

of the fourteenth century the Franciscans, notably Bernardino of Siena and James of the Marches, become increasingly hard on games of chance, seeing them as a way for Satan to creep into a community and separate it from God, see Ceccarelli, *Il gioco e il peccato*.

¹⁹ “Likewise, the innkeepers and other persons who have allowed gambling in their houses or taverns shall be fined 10 perpers each time they act to the contrary”: *Statuta civitatis Cathari*, ordinances passed at the time of Antonius Abocolis, honorabilis Comitatus & Capitanei Cathari (1421), chap. V, p. 349. It was not much different in Dubrovnik, where games of chance were legal but confined to prescribed areas, see Z. Janeković-Römer, “Post tertiam campanam’ – noćni život Dubrovnika u srednjem vijeku”, *Anali Zavoda za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Dubrovniku* 32 (1994), 8–9; G. Ravančić, *Život u krčmama srednjovjekovnog Dubrovnika* (Zagreb: Dom i svijet, 2001), 82.

²⁰ In the thirteenth century the manner of restitution and compensation for *male ablata* was mostly discussed by Franciscan theologians, e.g. Manfredi da Tortona, *Summula de restitutione male ablatorum* (about 1250) and Pietro di Giovanni Olivi (Peter John Olivi), *De emptionibus et venditionibus, de usuris, de restitutionibus*, see G. Ceccarelli, “Concezioni economiche dell’Occidente cristiano alla fine del medioevo: fonti e materiali inediti”, in *Religione e istituzioni religiose nell’economia Europea 1000–1800*, Atti della Quarantesima Settimana di Studi 26/30 aprile 2009, ed. F. Ammannati (Florence: Firenze University Press, 2012), 271–280.

tion in the form of funds for the saying of masses or for a pilgrimage for the salvation of the testator's soul.²¹

Testamentary gifts *pro male ablatis* were the testator's way of repenting and an opportunity to exert a posthumous influence on the economic and social order disturbed by his lifetime greed. Legacies of this type were usually intended for the destitute strata of society. Bequests *pro male ablatis* intended for pious and charitable causes required mediation of a cleric as the executor of the will.²²

The Kotor wills drawn up between 1326 and 1337 provide a sample which has been systematically analysed. They only involve pecuniary bequests *pro male ablatis incertis*, which vary from humble to generous and are invariably donated for pious causes. Even though we are dealing with only eleven years of the first half of the fourteenth century, the practice under study was widespread during the entire late medieval and early modern period. This is why attention should be drawn to a different, late sixteenth-century source which may shed a more penetrating light on the significance of *male ablata* for the Kotor believers and on the attitude of the Bishopric of Kotor to the established form of testamentary restitution. It is an episode from the *Vita della reverenda serva di Dio la madre suor Ossanna da Cattaro, dell'ordine di San Domenico* penned by the Florentine Dominican Serafino Razzi in 1558 and published in Florence in 1592. The hagiography pays much attention to edifying stories about ties between the living and the dead, i.e. about the role that masses and prayers offered by the living play in delivering the souls of the dead from purgatory. The Blessed Osanna (1493–1565) had visions of the souls of Kotor citizens in purgatory imploring her to tell their living family members to pray and donate for the salvation of their souls. *Male ablata* is referred to in a story of a deceased patrician from an old and distinguished Kotor family. *Ieronimo Bisanti*, an “honourable and pious man, having received all the holy sacraments as befitting a good Catholic Christian, very contrite for his sins and after a good confession, passed to another life. He left many legacies to almshouses and to needy people, but they were less than mediocre” (*Ieronimo Bisanti, padre di Marino Bisanti, honesto, e religioso huomo, hauendo riceuti tutti i santi sacramenti, sec-*

²¹ On *male ablata* as a way of making amends for the sin of usury using the example of medieval wills from Bologna where the victims of usury were known and compensated, see Giansante, “Male ablata”, 183–216. On *male ablata incerta* as a matter of conscience demanding purification, see R. C. Trexler, *Church and Community, 1200–1600: Studies in the History of Florence and New Spain* (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1987), 274–276, 323; M. Ascheri, *The Laws of Late Medieval Italy (1000–1500): Foundations for a European Legal System* (Brill, 2013), 288.

²² Ceccarelli, “L'usura”, 21.

ondo che appartiene à vn buono, e cattolico christiano, assai bene contrito de suoi peccati, e bene confessato, sene passò all'altra vita, lasciando molti legati à luoghi pii, & à persone bisognose, delle sue facultà, le quali erano piu che mediocri). Thus his wife turns to the Blessed Osanna for help, imploring her to pray for his soul. While praying, Osanna “rises in spirit” and has the vision of the man’s soul suffering the most severe punishment in purgatory. She asks him why his punishment is so harsh and he replies: “Wonder not, sister and mother Osanna, I was a merchant and, in keeping with common malpractice, I used to buy cheaply on markets and fairs and sell dearly, I didn’t run the business in accordance with Christian mercy” (*non ti marauigliare, rispose, madre suora Ossanna di questo: pero che essendo io stato mercante, secondo il commune abbuso, io ancora nelle fiere, e mercati, comperando al vil prezzo, e vendendo al rigoroso, non eseritai cotale negozio, secondo la christiana pietà*). He adds that his charitable gifts for the poor are not his own property but restitution of ill-gotten gains (*incerta*) and that they are not enough to deliver him from the torments of purgatory (*E quelle cose che nel testamento mio, alle chiese ho lasciate, & à I poueri, per non essere istate mie proprie facultà, ma restituzioni d'altrui beni incerti, non hanno quella efficacia, che altramente ha uerebbono per liberarmi da questi cruciati*). He therefore beseeches Osanna to convey his appeal to his wife to bequeath a fourth of her dowry to the poor and to pay for masses for his soul. His supplication has been met, and soon afterwards his soul appears to Osanna saying that he can now leave purgatory to enjoy heavenly bliss (*me ne vado à godere i riposti beni del paradiso*).²³ The sin of the merchant was so severe that the restitution of *male ablata incerta* was not enough for him to be spared from the torments of purgatory. He should have made more and more generous bequests for charitable and pious purposes.

From the legal standpoint, this topic is addressed by a statutory regulation which was in force in the period under study. The chapter “On the distribution of the property of the husband when his time comes” (CLXXXII) begins with the explanation of its purpose: “In a wish that this statutory regulation may help not only the living but also the dying, we decree...” The husband leaving a wife behind is allowed to bequeath up to a fourth of his property (real and personal) for his soul, but what follows is of key relevance to our subject: “...or more than a fourth if he should swear that

²³ Vita della reverenda serva di Dio, Suor Ossanna da Cattaro, dell'ordine di San Domenico, Scritta da fra Serafino Razzi, dell'istesso Ordine, e Provincia Romana (Firenze 1592), 40–41, <http://books.google.rs/books?id=szJSAAAACAAJ&cots=Xb5-Mo63-S&dq=Viita%20della%20reverenda%20serva%20di%20Dio%20la%20madre%20suor%20Ossana%20da%20Cattaro&lr&hl=sr&pg=PP6#v=twopage&q&f=false>; *Analisti. Hroničari. Biografi*, vol. 10 of *Književnost Crne Gore od XII do XIX vijeka*, ed. M. Milošević (Cetinje: Obod, 1996), 102–129.

his property comes from dishonest gains” (*quātum iurauerit habuisse de malo ablato*).²⁴ This is an exceptionally important piece of information in that it sheds light on the relationship between the Church and Christian ethics on the one hand and profit-making on the other. It should be noted that confessors’ manuals specified what should be seen as *male ablata*; it seems certain therefore that the confessors would have reminded the dying testators to remember if they had ever made any dishonest gain and to repent for their sins. Judging by the statutory regulation cited above, the dying person’s affirmative answer might mean more funds for charity channelled to churches, hospices, vulnerable social groups.

Legacies *pro male ablatis* occur in twenty of seventy-four surviving wills drawn up in Kotor between 1326 and 1337. Sometimes the testators, if they are not certain whether they have made some profit in an unacceptable way, specify that their legacies are *pro male ablatis incertis* or *pro male ablatis si quos habui*.²⁵ Quite often the term *male ablata* is not even mentioned in the will, but rather the testator expresses his or her trust in the *epitropos*

²⁴ *Statuta civitatis Cathari*, 108. For the sake of comparison, the corresponding chapter of the Statute of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) stipulates nothing of the kind. On what a dying person can leave for his soul, see *Statut grada Dubrovnika: sastavljen godine 1272*, eds. A. Šoljić, Z. Šundrica & I. Veselić (Dubrovnik: Državni arhiv u Dubrovniku, 2002), chap. XVII, 254–255.

²⁵ The question of *male ablata* in Kotor has not been the subject of study. L. Blehova Čelebić, *Žene srednjovjekovnog Kotora* (Podgorica: CID, 2002), 137, parenthetically mentions legacies *per mal ablato*, *per mal toleto*, but misconstrues their purpose: for the inflicted injustices. Recently, a few Croatian historians who base their research on wills have taken a look at this type of bequests in Ragusa (Dubrovnik): Z. Janeković-Römer, “Na razmedji ovog i onog svijeta. Prožimanje pojavnog i transcendentnog u dubrovačkim oporukama kasnoga srednjeg vijeka”, *Otium* 2/3-4 (1994), 3–16: “Long years of doing business made the merchants suspect they might have forgotten an injustice they might have done in their lifetime. They settled their doubts by handing over to the treasurer of St Mary’s a sum, sometimes quite generous, with the remark that it was ‘pro male ablates certis et incertis, pro maltoletto’.” G. Ravančić, *Vrijeme umiranja. Crna smrt u Dubrovniku 1348–1349* (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2010), 107, gives a brief overview of the legacies *pro male ablatis*, *pro maltoletto*, defining them as atonement for the evil deeds done during a plague epidemic in Dubrovnik, and concludes that the Black Death must have made people think of their wrongdoings given that 21% of the wills drawn up then contain this type of legacies as opposed to 6.5% in previous periods. Z. Ladić, in his extensive study on testamentary legacies *ad pias causas* in Dalmatian communes (Zadar, Trogir, Dubrovnik and Kotor), *Last Will: Passport to Heaven. Urban last wills from late medieval Dalmatia* (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2012), 261, n. 735, mentions a generous bequest *pro maltolecto* stipulated in the joint will of a married couple from Ragusa: “This practice of using pious bequests for settling misdeeds performed during the lifetime was widespread at that time. Usually, this kind of monetary bequest was executed in two ways: the first that the testator made a strict plan for the distribu-

to distribute the charitable legacies according to his own good judgement and for the salvation of the testator's soul. Such examples have not been taken into account in this study. The last sentence in a will (in which *male ablata* is not mentioned) reflects the way of thinking and the belief in the connection of the dead and the living through prayer and works of charity. The testators placed trust in the executors of their wills to distribute legacies *pro remedio animae* as specified in their wills. A *Proslaus* ends his very short will with the expectation that the executors should oversee the legacies for the salvation of his soul because in that way they contribute to their own salvation: *Etiam facio meos epitropos Bogdanum Brato et matrem meam, quod teneant menti mortem meam, quod si moriar, quidquid ipsi fecerint de anima mea, deus faciat de suis.*²⁶

The amount of money bequeathed *pro male ablatis* varies greatly. Understandably enough, the smallest sum (two perpers) was left by *presbiter Marcius*,²⁷ and the largest (200 perpers), by two big merchants, *Nicolaus Glauacti* and *Matheus Iacobi*.²⁸ Nicolaus Glauacti left two hundred perpers *pro male ablatis* to his wife unless she remarried within a year after his death (*exire de domo et refutare lectum*), in which case the executors of his will should distribute the money according to their own good judgement.²⁹

The place in the will where the testator remembers to leave something *pro male ablatis* varies from one case to another. The ailing *Paulus Nycole Dabronis*, afraid that the illness will take him soon (*jacens infirmus, timens, ne mors me subito aggrediatur*), draws up his will and, bequeathing *in primis* (at the very beginning) funds for saying masses for the salvation of his soul, adds: *Item volo, quod dentur perperi triginta pro laborerio sancti Triphonus, qui sint pro male ablatis, si quos habui.*³⁰

tion of the money and the second when the decision about its distribution was left to the executors of the will.”

²⁶ MC I, 74 (7/9/1326).

²⁷ MC II, 886 (16/5/1334).

²⁸ MC I, 338 (20/6/1327); MC II, 1726 (30/4/1336).

²⁹ *Item relinquo uxori mee Drage de bonis meis pro male ablatis ducentos perperos, tali conditione, quod si post mortem meam infra annum ipsa uoleris exire de domo et refutare lectum, nichil habeat de dictis ducetis perperis, sed dentur ad prouidentiam epitroporum meorum, ubi eis melius visum fuerit* (MC I, 338). Namely, after the husband's death his widow had a year to decide if she would remarry. If she decided not to give up the marriage bed, which meant that she chose to remain living in her husband's house, she was allowed to dispose of his entire property. However, she was prohibited by the law from ruining and destroying her late husband's property, or else she had to compensate for the damage from her dowry. The Statute also regulated the situations when the widow did not want to keep her late husband's bed, cf. *Statvta civitatis Cathari*, chap. 194, 196, 115–117.

³⁰ MC I, 54 (27/8/1326).

A different type of bequests *pro male ablati*s is found in the will of *Basilius Mathei* which is quite distinctive in more than one respect by comparison to the other wills.³¹ Namely, Basilius admits that he feels that he has committed the sin of *male ablata* and therefore bequeaths one hundred perpers for a good man to take a journey (meaning to make a pilgrimage); should that not happen, the money is to be given to two poor girls so that they could get married (*Item sentio me habere de malo ablato perperos centum, quos volo, ut detis alicui bono homini, qui ire voluerit ad passagium, uel maritatis pro ipsis centum perperis duas orfanas, si passagium non fuerit*).³²

A larger amount of money *pro male ablati*s figures in the will of *Francius condam Marcii Basili*i. *Item volo, quod pro male ablati*s dentur perperi centum et quinquaginta.³³ The sequence of his bequests is enlightening for understanding the care for the soul as the motivation for making devotional legacies. Namely, the bequest *pro male ablati*s comes immediately after the bequest of funds for one thousand masses to be sung after his death. Quite atypical of the Kotor wills under study, in which the testators usually bequeath money *ad pias causas* at the very beginning of the will, Francius first looks back at his many trade dealings and debts. *In primis* he reports that he was in a merchant partnership (*societate*) with a Ragusan (*Iunio Milocasi de Ragusio*). It may be assumed that he had trading interests in Serbia. Francius also speaks of the *cere collate* that he owns and trades in, possibly in Prizren where Kotor citizens had a building for processing beeswax constructed on the land owned by the Bishopric of Prizren of the Serbian Archbishopric. In 1326 King Stefan Uroš III of Serbia granted the building to the Bishopric which was free to dispose of it at will, but was granted a monopoly on the straining of beeswax.³⁴

³¹ The content of the will and the mention in it of the excommunication of the clergy seems to suggest that it refers to a punishment incurred by the city before the well-known interdict caused by the appointment of Sergius Bolića as bishop of Kotor, cf. V. Živković, “Pretnje kaznom izopštenja u Kotoru (XIII–XV vek)”, *Istorijski časopis* LX (2011), 123–138.

³² MC I, 438 (22/10/1327).

³³ MC I, 732 (28/9/1331).

³⁴ “And the Cattarans had a house for wax making built on a market place, on the church land, and my kingship gave it to the church to have it forever, and the incumbent bishop to give it to whomever he pleases. Should anyone keep anything, he shall pay 500 perpers, and wax shall not be processed in any other place, nor shall another house be built in the city.” Cf. S. Mišić, “Hrisovulja kralja Stefana Uroša III Prizrenskoj episkopiji”, *Stari srpski arhiv* 8 (2009), 22; M. Blagojević, “Grad i župa – medje gradskog društva”, in *Socijalna struktura srpskih gradskih naselja (XII–XVIII vek)*, eds. J. Kalić & M. Čolović (Smederevo: Muzej u Smederevu, and Belgrade: Filozofski fakultet, 1992), 81–82. On Ragusan (Dubrovnik) families and their businesses in Serbia, see I. Manken,

Marinus Junii Boliçe makes several charitable bequests because ill-gotten gains weigh heavily on his conscience: *Nam quicquid suprascriptum est, totum michi sentio de male ablatis*. He bequeaths funds for repair works on the church of the Franciscan monastery in Kotor, and to the churches of St Mary of Ratac (*sancte Marie de Rotecçe*), St Mary in Ulcinj (*sancte Marie de Dulcigno*), St Mary on Gurdić in Kotor (*sancte Marie de Gurgite*) and, finally, to the Kotor cathedral of St Tryphon. The same motivation leads him to bequeath funds to *presbiter Vita*, abbot of the monastery of St Mary on Gurdić, and the Franciscan *Laurus de Catharo*, to pray for his soul (*ut roget deum pro me*). With the weight of *male ablata* on his conscience, he also leaves money to two vulnerable social groups: *pro maritandis duabus orphanis* and *pro pauperibus*.³⁵ Similar bequests figure in the will of *Johannes Marini Glauacti*, who emphasises that it is an *incerta*; hence restitution through charitable bequests is quite expected and in conformity with the prescribed ways of laying out a testamentary programme for the salvation of the soul: *Item volo, quod pro incertis male ablatis dentur perperi quadringenti viduis et orphanis non habentibus et egenis*.³⁶

To be singled out at the end of this overview of the selected examples of Kotor wills is the legacy *pro male ablatis* that *Matheus condam Triphonis Iacobi* bequeaths *in primis* (at the beginning of the will). It is the largest sum of all found in the wills under study: 200 perpers. He too specifies that it is the *incerta* category: *In primis volo et ordino, quod dentur de bonis meis pro male ablatis incertis perperi ducenti pro animabus illorum, quorum fuerunt, quos vere iuro in conscientia mea habuisse de alieno*.³⁷

The last question that will be discussed here may also be seen as a conclusion emerging from the overview of the practice and mentions of legacies *pro male ablatis* in Kotor wills between 1326 and 1337. It concerns the role of confessors and their influence on the testators. A fact of vital interest is that in almost all wills that contain legacies *pro male ablatis* the confessor, who is usually also the *epitropos*, is either referred to by name or as *pater meus spiritualis* without being named. There are only four wills in

Dubrovački patricijat u XIV veku (Belgrade: SANU, 1960); R. Čuk, *Srbija i Venecija u XIII i XIV veku* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1986), as well as her “Kolonije u srpskim srednjovekovnim gradovima”, in *Socijalna struktura srpskih gradskih naselja (XII–XVIII vek)*, 85–95.

³⁵ MC I, 802 (3/11/1331).

³⁶ MC II, 1042 (15/4/1336). On bequests *ad pias causas* by the Glauacti brothers see V. Živković, “On the trail of a painting bequeathed to St. George’s abbey on the islet near Perast. The testaments of Nycolaus and Johannes Glauacti (of 1327 and 1336)”, *Zograf* 38 (2014), 113–121.

³⁷ MC II, 1726 (30/4/1336).

which confessors are not mentioned at all.³⁸ The persons most frequently encountered in the role of confessor are Fra *Vita Ćutii* and the presbyter *Junius Chramoli*.³⁹

Fra Vita figures as *epitropos* in several wills that contain legacies *pro male ablatis*: those of *Marinus Junii Bolića*; *Obratus Gambe*; *Nycola, frater condam magistri Thomassi*, who calls him *patrino meo*. The same goes for the will of *Dome, uxor Martini de Panći*, where Fra Vita figures as *epitropos* and confessor, and he also served as confessor to *Dome, relictā condam Nuce de Gonni*. The testators bequeath money to him *ut roget deum pro me* and gifts to the church of *sancte Marie de Gurgite* where he served as abbot more often than to other confessors.⁴⁰ Even though Bogdan's will makes no mention of a confessor, the analysis of the type and sequence of his bequests seems to suggest that Fra Vita, *abbas sancte Marie de ponte*, was by his side, advising him on the path of salvation. Thus Bogdan *in primis* bequeaths a vineyard in Kostanjica (*Castanića*) to the church of *sancte Marie de ponte siue de Gurgite*, and specifies that his motive is the feeling of remorse over ill-gotten gains. It should be noted that the written will (*cedula scripta*) was submitted to the judge and the notary by the *discreti viri presbiteri Vita, abbas sancte Marie de ponte, et Marinus, eius ecclesie cappellanus*.⁴¹

Presbyter *Junius Chramoli* is another name that figures as confessor in several wills. The will of *Dompce, uxor Mathei Saranni*, is especially interesting insofar as the order of her bequests clearly reveals her confessor's influence.⁴² Namely, legacies *pro male ablata* are followed by a gift to the confessor, *dompnus Junius Chraoli*, who submitted her will to the judge and the notary. The will of *Mare, uxor condam Marini de Gamba*, is similar in this respect.⁴³ Her first pecuniary bequest goes to *presbytero Junio, patrino meo*,

³⁸ The wills of: *Paulus Nycole Dabronis*, *Nycolaus condam Marini Glauacti*, *Johannes Marini Glauacti* and *Matheus condam Triphonis Iacobi*, see MC I, 54 (27/8/1326); 338 (20/6/1327); MC II, 1042 (15/4/1336); 1726 (30/4/1336).

³⁹ Apart from these two confessors, the names are also known of: *Iohannes Capaci*, *Domagna Jaser*, *Iacobus de Milolo*, *Ricardo*, *Basilius*, *Franciscus* (*frater minorum et lector*), *Pascalus Bellossi*, *Marinus*, cf. MC I, 192, 338, 365, 438, 626, 628, 732, 1233; MC II 1435, 1604. References to the *summae* for use by confessors in Kotor do not occur until the fifteenth-century documentary sources. One of them was in the vernacular language, cf. L. Blehova-Ćelebić, *Hrišćanstvo u Boki 1200–1500: Kotorski distrikt* (Podgorica: Narodni muzej Crne Gore & Istorijski institut Crne Gore, 2006), 173–174, 307.

⁴⁰ MC I, 802 (3/11/1331); MC II, 10 (8/6/1332); 394 (30/6/1333); 646 (11/11/1334); 1142 (24/7/1335).

⁴¹ MC I, 225 (3/12/1326).

⁴² MC II, 23 (16/6/1332).

⁴³ MC II, 129 (8/10/1332).

and the second *pro malo ablato*. The same priest is the *epitropos* of the wills of *Scime, filius quondam Sabe*,⁴⁴ *presbyter Iacobus Mildo*,⁴⁵ and the presbyter *Marcus*, who made a small bequest of two perpers *pro male ablatis*.⁴⁶

Those were the clerics who provided guidance to Kotor citizens through their last days, advising them on how to prepare themselves for the path of salvation through various devotional and, especially, charitable gifts. Testators placed their hopes in the intercession of the living and, therefore, in addition to all the recommended legacies, left personal gifts to their confessors to pray for the salvation of their souls. In this carefully elaborated system of delivering from sin, settling the accounts and reconciling with God at deathbed, the category *male ablata* held an exceptionally important place.

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⁴⁴ MC I, 260 (31/12/1326).

⁴⁵ MC II, 1204 (18/8/1335).

⁴⁶ MC II, 886 (16/5/1334).

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Political Developments and Unrests in Stara Raška (Old Rascia) and Old Herzegovina during Ottoman Rule

Abstract: During the centuries of Ottoman rule the Tara and Lim river valleys (or *Potarje* and *Polimlje* respectively), the Pešter Plateau and Old Herzegovina saw much turbulence, wars, rebellions, population migrations. This chaotic situation was combined with the arbitrary and repressive conduct of local Ottoman feudal lords. Migrations, interethnic contacts and mixing of populations as well as an intensified Islamization process caused by a number of factors greatly complicated the situation. Albanian northward penetration along the Lim and into Pešter as well as the expansion of the Vasojevići tribe into the Upper Lim valley added to the complexity of the ethnic and demographic picture of the region. Perpetual rebellions against the Ottoman occupation eventually led to the liberation of the Serbian Orthodox population of these areas.

Keywords: Stara Raška (Old Rascia), Brda (Highlands), Old Herzegovina, Ottoman Empire, rebellions, migrations

Introduction

For the sake of clarity let us first define some terms used in this article. *Stara Raška* (Old Rascia) is the old name for the area between the rivers Drina and Ibar, the Tara and Zapadna (West) Morava. The backbone of the area is the river Lim, Pešter Plateau and Mt Zlatar. The area was the nucleus of Serbian statehood and culture both in the middle ages and later, and it has been known as a “link” connecting Serb-inhabited areas. *Brda* or Highlands is the old name for the area of present-day Montenegro between the rivers Lim and Tara in the north and the rivers Žeta and Morača in the south. It encompassed the tribal territories of Bjelopavlići, Piperi, Rovčani, Moračani, Kuči, Bratonožići and Vasojevići. The name became established in the eighteenth century for the areas of those highland tribes that did

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not manage to unite with the semi-autonomous region known as Nahiye Montenegro. In his *History of Montenegro* of 1754, the Montenegrin ruler and metropolitan Vasilije Petrović Njegoš describes the river Morača as the boundary between Montenegro and Brda. Piperi and Bjelopavlići united with the semi-autonomous Montenegrin state in 1779 de facto and in 1796 formally. By 1878 all Brda tribes were integrated within the Principality of Montenegro.

Until the conquest of Buda in 1541, the Ottoman Empire's Balkan possessions formed part of the eyalet of Rumelia with its centre in Sofia, and subsequently were divided into several newly-established eyalets (pashaliks). Pashaliks were subdivided into sanjaks, and these into smaller subdivisions such as kazas and nahiyes and administrative areas administered by mutesellims. Judicial districts, kadiliks, were considerably larger than nahiyes. Urban settlements were classified by importance and size into sehers, pazars and kasabas.


By the end of the fifteenth century Ottoman rule in the Lim (*Polimlje*) and Tara (*Potarje*) river valleys had been consolidated.¹ The process of consolidation was accompanied by the construction or renovation of towns and fortresses which were to serve as administrative and military centres. The town of Brskovo had been taken in 1399, Bihor in 1455. In 1530 the Bihor garrison held eight timars, and the town developed and became the centre of the kadilik of Bihor. Livestock breeders in the area between the rivers Piva and Tara and in the Middle Lim valley were organized into the nahiye of Nikšići or Linski Nikšići.² It was registered as a nahiye within the landholding of Isa Bey Isaković. The Upper Lim valley at first was incorporated into the sanjak of Prizren.³ Tarski Nikšići encompassed several villages gravitating towards the river Tara.⁴ It may be assumed with much certainty that the Kuči tribe recognized Ottoman authority after the fall of the fortified town of Medun in 1457, and that Ottoman rule in Zeta and Brda was consolidated after the conquest of Scutari.

¹ In the fifteenth century in these regions the construction of tribal society began on the ruins of the medieval Serbian feudal system. The organization of Ottoman rule in the tribal areas was based on lower self-governing units: *nabija*, *knežina* and *village*. Cf. Branislav Djurdjev, "Postanak i razvitak brdskih, crnogorskih i hercegovačkih plemena" (Titograd: CANU, 1984), 156.

² Hazim Šabanović, *Bosanski pašaluk* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1959), 34.

³ Miomir Dašić, *Vasojevići od pomena do 1860. godine* (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1986), 99.

⁴ E.g. the villages of Tvrtkovići, Bistrica, Stričina, Bobanovići, Gojakovići, Bratojevići, Zorojevići, Kulizići, Lepenac, Obod, Cer, Ravna Reka. Cf. Žarko Šćepanović, "Pregled prošlosti Bijelog Polja i okoline do 1918. godine", in *Bijelo Polje* (Belgrade: Stručna knjiga, 1987), 105.



Territorial expansion of Montenegro

After the Ottoman conquest the town of Pljevlja was renamed Taslija. The Slavic name Bijelo Polje was translated into Ottoman Turkish and so it figures in Ottoman administrative and court documents as Akova. Over time it developed as an extension of better-known Nikolj-pazar.⁵ During the seventeenth century it grew into a major commercial centre of Bihor, and in the eighteenth century had the status of a kasaba (palanka, varoš). Documents of 1707 and 1717 already refer to the fortress of Akova, its garrison and commanding cadre. In 1707 its military commander was Captain Suleiman Agha, and later documents make mention of the kadi of Bijelo Polje.⁶ The Orthodox merchants of the economically well-developed commercial quarter of Bijelo Polje had good commercial connections and traded in wax, hides, wool, livestock and furs. They would take their goods to the markets of Scutari and Dubrovnik (Ragusa), and return with weapons, clothing and copper. It has been estimated that their share of the wool im-

⁵ I. Stjepčević and R. Kovijanić, "Prvi pomeni Nikolj-pazara i Bijelog Polja", *Istorijski zapisi* 7.10 (Cetinje 1954), 610–611.

⁶ *Istorija Crne Gore*, vol. III (Titograd: Istorijski institut, 1975), 519.

ported into Dubrovnik in the eighteenth century was at least ten per cent.⁷ The nahiye of Komarani was in the Middle Lim valley, occupying most of today's Bijelo Polje and Prijepolje areas.⁸

Budimlja was from the beginning of Ottoman rule the centre of the eponymous nahiye and kadilik, as well as the seat of an Orthodox bishopric. In 1477 it was referred to as being situated in the sanjak of Herzegovina, in the kadilik which had its seat at Prijepolje. Somewhat later, it was incorporated into the sanjak of Prizren, and in the seventeenth century became the seat of a kadilik.⁹ In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century sources it figures as a pazar, or market place. Retaining a rural character, it never became developed enough to be granted the status of a kasaba and eventually lost all importance and was reduced to an ordinary village.¹⁰ There were in the Upper Lim valley three nahiyes: Budimlje (or Komnin), Plav and Zla Rijeka (or Zlorečica). Upon the establishment of the sanjak of Scutari, the nahiye of Budimlja, the abovementioned nahiyes and the nahiye of Komarani constituted the kaza of Bihor. At the end of the seventeenth century the kadi of Prijepolje had jurisdiction over Budimlja and the nahiye of Vraneš. Therefore Budimlja belonged to the sanjak of Herzegovina at the time, and later, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, to that of Scutari.¹¹

Rožaj (Trgovišće) figures as a fortification in the first half of the seventeenth century, and in the eighteenth century as a strong, heavily garrisoned fortress, especially during the Austro-Ottoman war of 1718–1739.¹²

The town of Plav was built in the early seventeenth century, by the order of the Ottoman central authority, on the site where the caravan route from Kotor to Metohija intersected with the road that ran along the river Lim and across the Prokletije Mountains to Scutari. The newly-built fortress, whose construction had been overseen by Bosnian Mustafa Pasha, had a permanent garrison tasked with watching and keeping in check restive tribes in northern Albania and Brda.¹³

Fortress Gusinje built in 1611 was subsequently enlarged, and in the eighteenth century had a permanent garrison with aghas and a captain.

⁷ V. Vinaver, "Trgovina Bara", *Istorijski zapisi* 6/9, 2, p. 472; M. Lutovac, *Privreda, saobraćaj i naselja u Rožaju i Bihoru* (Belgrade: Državna štamparija, 1930), 32.

⁸ Dašić, *Vasojevići*, 100.

⁹ Šabanović, *Bosanski pašaluk*, 165.

¹⁰ *Istorija Crne Gore*, vol. III, 518.

¹¹ Dašić, *Vasojevići*, 99, 100, 211.

¹² Gligor Stanojević, "Pokret brdskih i albanskih plemena uoči Kandijskog rata", *Istorijski zapisi* XVII (1960), 523–522; N. K. Kostić, *Naši gradovi na jugu* (Belgrade: Državna štamparija, 1922), 77.

¹³ Evlija Čelebija, *Putopis* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1957), 261, 262, 385, 404.

Over time the village below the fortress grew into a small town thanks to its position on a caravan route.¹⁴ During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Gusinje was not only a military but also a political and administrative centre of the whole Upper Lim valley controlling the Vasojević tribal area.

The fortress of Kolašin in the nahije of Nikšići built by the Ottomans in the mid-seventeenth century had a permanent garrison which was supported by the yearly tax (*jizye*) levied on the Christians of the nahije of Peć. In judicial terms, it belonged to the kadilik of Prijepolje.¹⁵ The building and garrisoning of Kolašin strengthened the Ottoman feudal class in the Tara valley, creating “a fierce and deadly Muslim frontier” which exerted a strong pressure on the Orthodox areas of Rovca and Morača.¹⁶ There was also an Ottoman fortification on the Tara, on the site where the river was crossed by the trade route running from Risan via Onogošt and Jezero to Pljevlja. It was referred to as the Tower of the Bridge of the river Tara. In 1707 its garrison numbered some fifty soldiers and, until the mid-nineteenth century, it enjoyed the status of captaincy.¹⁷

Prijepolje was the centre of a kadilik and a transit area on the “Bosnian road” between the south-eastern Morava–Ibar and north-western Bosnian regions.

In early 1470 the conquered territory in Herzegovina was formed at first into a vilayet, and then a sanjak. Incorporated into it was also the market (town) Pljevlja as the seat of the nahije of Kukanj. The kadilik of Pljevlja was established in the early decades of the sixteenth century and in the late seventeenth century encompassed three nahiyes: Krička, Poblacé and Podpeč.¹⁸ In 1576, until 1833, the seat of the sanjak of Herzegovina was moved from Foča to Pljevlja.¹⁹ At the beginning of the eighteenth century the kadilik of Pljevlja encompassed the nahiyes of Pljevlja, Kukanj,

¹⁴ *Istorija Crne Gore*, vol. III, 521.

¹⁵ G. Elezović, “Kolašin na Tari i Kolašin na Ibru, *Južni pregled* 1 (Skoplje 1931), 19, after *Istorija Crne Gore*, vol. III, 522.

¹⁶ Dašić, *Vasojevići*, 12.

¹⁷ “Turski popis gradova, kula i palanki bosanskog vilajeta iz 1707. godine” (ANU BiH, p. 113), after *Istorija Crne Gore*, vol. III, 525.

¹⁸ After *Istorija Pljevalja* (Pljevlja 2009), 91, 92.

¹⁹ T. Popović, “Kada je sedište hercegovačkog sandžaka premešteno iz Foče u Pljevlja”, *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju* 10–11 (Sarajevo 1961), 267–270, after *Istorija Pljevalja*, 92.

Vraneš, Krička, Poblacé, but Ottoman documents also mention the nahiyes of Drobñjak²⁰ and Bukovica.²¹

Tribes generally evolved from livestock breeders' villages and summer pasture camps, as pastoral communities based mainly on kinship, for defence and economic purposes. Livestock-breeding population that settled in agricultural lowland areas in the first century of Ottoman rule sought to preserve their tax privileges (filuri tax paid per household and not per head). The "vlach" herdsmen had even greater privileges than previously enjoyed in the medieval Serbian state, at least in the initial period of Ottoman consolidation in this area. Because of that policy, the ethnic picture of the Lim, Tara and Morača river valleys and Old Herzegovina (part in present-day Montenegro) remained largely unaffected,²² although some demographic change took place over time.²³ But if the Ottomans did not interfere much in the life of pastoralists scattered in mountainous regions, which were not a promising source of revenue anyway, they treated differently the population that inhabited more fertile agricultural areas. Therefore the transition of pastoralists to the agricultural way of life marked the beginning of the reduction of their former privileges. During the Ottoman-Venetian War of Cyprus, 1570–73, the tribes of these regions fought against the Ottomans. The end of the sixteenth century saw a broad rebellion led by *vojvoda*

²⁰ The area occupied by Drobñjak can be traced only from the second half of the fifteenth century, i.e. from the Herzegovina defter of 1477, which is when the area was seized by the Ottomans. Drobñjak or the nahije of Komarnica for the most part overlaps with the Drobñjak tribe in the nineteenth century. Cf. Žarko Leković, *Drobñjak u prvoj polovini 19. vijeka* (Podgorica: Grafo Crna Gora, 2007), 11.

²¹ Within the broader historic area of the Drobñjak tribe there eventually formed four groups and entities: Drobñjak, Šaranci, Jezera and Uskoci tribes. For more see Jovan R. Bojović, "Petnjica – postojbina Vuka Karadžića", *Istorijski zapisi* (1987), 4; Šabanović, *Bosanski pašaluk*, 230; and *Istorija Pljevalja*, 150.

²² Herzegovina encompasses areas from Duvno and Prozor in the west to the Lim in the east (Banjani, Piva, Drobñjak, part of sanjak of Novi Pazar, the Nikšić area etc.). Its boundaries generally coincide with the former boundaries of Herceg Stjepan's lands. Regardless of administrative and political divisions, the local people were aware of the historical ties, psychological traits and customs which distinguished them from Bosnians and Montenegrins, cf. J. Dedijer, "Hercegovina", *Etnografski zbornik XII* (1909), 6. After the death of emperor Dušan in 1355, the region of Drobñjak, Piva and Onogošt (Nikšić) was successively ruled by the Vojinović family, Nikola Altomanović, Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović, Sandalj Hranić (end of the fourteenth century), who was succeeded by Stefan Vukčić Kosača in 1435, until the fall of Herzegovina to the Ottomans in 1482. Cf. Leković, *Drobñjak*, 28.

²³ Miomir Dašić, "Političke i društvene prilike u oblastima današnje Crne Gore u drugoj polovini XIV i prvoj polovini XV vijeka", in *Kosovski boj u istoriji, tradiciji i stvaralaštvu Crne Gore* (Titograd: CANU, 1990), 63.

Grdan.²⁴ The Cretan War inspired further rebellions of Christian subjects against Ottoman rule and a broader cooperation with the Republic of Venice. Yet, occasional tribal alliances during the rebellions did not have any stronger support of Venice, even though the tribes of Herzegovina and Brda saw Venice as liberator and were ready to unite with it. Venice, for its part, pursued its own interests and saw the Balkan Christians merely as a tool against the Ottoman Empire, ignoring their liberation aspirations.²⁵ Russian influence in the region began to grow at the beginning of the eighteenth century, especially after the 1711 mission of the Russian emperor's envoy, Captain Miloradović. The geopolitical developments and conflicting interests of the great powers only added to the everyday tribulations of the Christian population.²⁶

The processes of islamization and population migration, rebellions and unrests

The ethnic composition of the population of the Lim river valley remained largely unchanged until the end of the seventeenth century.²⁷ The Ottoman conquest kicked off the process of islamization, which reached its peak in the eighteenth century. It should be noted that the acceptance of Islam was not only religious but also a state issue because it required of its adherents not to separate religion from politics. Conversion to Islam was expected to improve one's financial position (e.g. exemption from taxes levied on non-Muslims) and bring greater personal and legal security.²⁸ Some families converted to Islam either to preserve or to acquire privileges, but it was not at all unusual to find Orthodox Christian and Muslim family members living together in the same household or extended family community. A reason for conversion to Islam was also to avoid the so-called blood tax

²⁴ Leković, *Drobnjak*, 30.

²⁵ The War of Candia (1644–1669) marked the beginning of a Venetian-Montenegrin military and political alliance which would last until the beginning of the eighteenth century. Cf. *Istorija Crne Gore*, vol. III, 115.

²⁶ In the first half of the eighteenth century these areas were ravaged by famine and plague, and the emigration rate was high. Cf. Arhiv Srbije [Archives of Serbia; hereafter AS], Zbirka Andrije Luburića [Andrija Luburić Collection; hereafter: ZAL], N.P. 408.

²⁷ Vujadin Rudić, "Istorijsko-geografske karakteristike bjelopoljskog kraja", *Zbornik radova Geografskog fakulteta* 45 (Belgrade 1995), 61–62.

²⁸ Petar Vlahović, "Etnički procesi i etničke odrednice muslimana u Raškoj oblasti", in *Etnički sastav stanovništva Srbije i Crne Gore i Srbi u SFRJ* (Belgrade: Geografski fakultet & Stručna knjiga, 1993), 28.

(devshirme), levy of Christian boys taken away from home for training in the imperial administration or the janissary corps.²⁹

According to the 1485 Ottoman census, there were no Christian converts to Islam in the nahiye of Linski Nikšići and Bihor, while in the nahiye of Budimlja, which included the market place and 28 surrounding villages, there were 858 Serbian and four Muslim (Turkish) houses. According to the 1582/3 census, there were in the nahiye of Budimlja 32 villages with a total of 530 households, five heads of villages or group of villages (*knez*) and seven musellims. The 1614 report of a Venetian public servant and native of Kotor, Mariano Bolizza (or Marijan Bolica) also claimed that the number of Christians converts to Islam in this area was small. After the 1690 migration of Serbs led by patriarch Arsenije III Čarnojević the process of islamization gained momentum as a result of the strong influence of some Muslim families who had resettled in the largely depopulated Bihor area from the parts of Montenegro and the areas on the other side of the Sava and Danube rivers recaptured from the Ottomans.³⁰ The process of islamization in Bihor and Korita ran at a fast pace in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and members of one family of both faiths often lived side by side, even in the same household.³¹ Non-islamized Serb population tended to migrate mostly to Serbia, especially during the Cretan War (1645–69) and the Austro-Turkish wars of 1690, 1714 and 1737.

In the first decades of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire found itself in a crisis due to the declining authority of the central government and considerable territorial losses after the Treaties of Karlowitz (1699) and Passarowitz (1718). This led to a rise, often unlawful, in taxation by unruly local authorities. The Orthodox population revolted, notably during the Austro-Turkish war of 1737. One of the inspirers and organizers of the uprising was the Serbian patriarch Arsenije IV Jovanović Šakabenta. In late July 1737 he and chiefs of the Vasojevići and other Brda tribes went to join the Austrian forces led by Field Marshal Seckendorff whose headquarters was in the village of Tešić near Niš. The Austrians soon took Niš and entered Novi Pazar. The metropolitan of Raška Jefimije (Damjanović), in cooperation with Atanasije Rašković, the *knez* of the historic region of Stari Vlah, stirred Orthodox Christians of his diocese to rebellion. They drove the Ottomans out of Novi Pazar, suffering a loss of eighty men. The *oberkapetan* Staniša Marković Mlatišuma and his Serbian militia entered the town on

²⁹ Šćepanović, "Pregled prošlosti Bijelog Polja", 104.

³⁰ Dašić, *Vasojevići*, 246.

³¹ Milisav Lutovac, *Bihor i Korita* (Belgrade: Naučno delo, 1967), 40.

28 July. They were joined by *knez* Rašković with his 1,500 insurgents and two Austrian colonels with their forces.³²

The local Ottoman authority in the Upper Lim valley and Bihor was quickly broken down. The new situation encouraged the insurgents from the Vasojevići, Kuči, Piperi and Bratonožići tribes, i.e. from the region of Brda, led by the Kuči *vojvoda* Radonja Petrović, to head for Stara Srbija (Old Serbia) to meet the Austrian forces.³³ When Arsenije IV and some 3,000 Highlanders arrived in Novi Pazar, the town was empty because the Austrians had withdrawn a day earlier. Fearing the Ottomans, the patriarch chose to catch up with the Austrian army and a part of the chiefs and people of Brda. The rest of the Highlanders chose to return. In the general confusion Vasojevići and Kuči plundered and burned Bihor.³⁴ The rebels attacked Bijelo Polje, and “cut down Turks, and partly destroyed their fortresses from Brodarevo to Prijepolje”.³⁵

There are some data about the clergy of the Metropolitanate of Belgrade from the 1730s, i.e. the short-lived period of Austrian rule over northern Serbia, mentioning priests from the environs of Bijelo Polje, Pećarska, Bihor and Vraneš.

The building and growth of Kolašin as a fortified place was one of the reasons for the emigration of Orthodox population because it put an end to their relatively free way life and movement in the Tara river valley. The villages in the Mojkovac area found themselves trapped between the Ottoman fortified towns of Kolašin, Bijelo Polje and Pljevlja, and local population mainly migrated to the area of Ibarski Kolašin, Jasenica and Kosmaj.³⁶ Along with emigration from the Lim and Tara river valleys, there was a constant inflow of settlers from Brda, most of all from Morača, Rovci, Drobnjaci, Bratonožići and Piperi. From the beginning of the eighteenth century there was a steady increase in Muslim population in this area. Many landowning Muslim families resettled there from the territories across the Sava and Danube rivers that the Ottoman Empire had lost, such as Hajdarpašić, Šehović, Ćorović beys and others. Mehmed Ćor-Pasha came to Bihor from Osijek in Slavonia in the late seventeenth century, and was given a grant of

³² *Istorija srpskog naroda*, vol. IV-1 (Belgrade: SKZ, 1994), 149 (KA, AFA, 1737, 11, 25v, f. 393).

³³ Dašić, *Vasojevići*, 281.

³⁴ M. Kostić, “Ustanak Srba i Arbanasa u Staroj Srbiji protiv Turaka 173–1739 i seobe u Ugarsku”, *Glasnik Skopskog naučnog društva* 7-8 (1930), 208–210, after *Istorija Crne Gore*, vol. III, 294

³⁵ *Istorija srpskog naroda*, vol. IV-1, 150.

³⁶ Šćepanović, “Pregled prošlosti Bijelog Polja”, 112.

land as compensation for the property he had held in Slavonia.³⁷ The defeat of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslim forces, among which were a considerable number of sipahis and members of distinguished bey families from the Lim and Tara river valleys, by the Russians at Ochakov in 1737 made a strong impression in the region. From 1757 to 1831, the Upper Lim valley was part of the pashalik of Scutari.³⁸

Due to the deterioration of the traditional Ottoman feudal system, the subjugated population bore the burden of ever heavier taxation, which gave rise to rebellions and banditry. It was recorded that in Bijelo Polje in 1690, during the Great Turkish War, “people died from the plague in such numbers that the living could not manage to bury the dead”.³⁹ What remained of the Christian Orthodox population after migrations from this area was subjected to Ottoman reprisals. The late-twelfth-century church of St. Peter in Bijelo Polje, known for its founder’s famous illuminated manuscript, Miroslav’s Gospel, was converted to a mosque named Fethiye, or “victory mosque”, and was not reconverted until liberation in 1912.⁴⁰ It was in that period, more precisely in 1738, that the Šudikova monastery near Budimlja, which had an important scriptorium, was burned down.⁴¹

The main factors that affected the demographic, ethnic and religious situation in the Middle and Upper Lim valley in the seventeenth and eighteenth century are: the construction of a line of Ottoman fortified towns: Akova (Bijelo Polje)–Bihor–Trgovište (Rožaj)–Plav–Gusinje; the building of mosques and the bringing of religious officials from elsewhere, which helped the process of conversion to Islam; unrests, rebellions and emigration of Christian Orthodox and immigration of Muslim population; the beginning of the process of settlement of north-Albanian tribes; the rise and territorial expansion of the Vasojevići tribe from the area of Lijeva Rijeka into the Lim valley, especially during the second half of the eighteenth century. The expansion of such a robust and numerically strong tribe led to their conflicts with the Klimenti/Kelmendi who were being pushed out of the Middle Lim valley. The settlement of the Vasojevići and other Brda tribes and their mixing with the native population gave a boost to the Orthodox element, raising its spirits, strengthening internal cohesion and military power, the effects of which would be manifest in the nineteenth century leading to definitive liberation from the centuries-long Ottoman

³⁷ Lutovac, *Bihor i Korita*, 16, 31.

³⁸ Dašić, *Vasojevići*, 211, 278.

³⁹ Šćepanović, “Pregled prošlosti Bijelog Polja”, 109.

⁴⁰ Jovo Medojević, *Crkve u bjelopoljskom kraju* (Prijepolje: Muzej u Prijepolju, 2000), 22.

⁴¹ Mirko Barjaktarović, “Etnički razvitak Gornjeg Polimlja”, *Glasnik cetinjskih muzeja* 6.VI (1973), 178.

occupation. The expansion of the Vasojevići from the mountainous area into the fertile Lim valley also caused rivalries with the native Orthodox population (*Srbljaci, Ašani*). As a natural reaction to the aggressiveness of the better-organized Vasojevići, native population began to form groups. Such alliances were not an exception considering that tribes in Old Herzegovina, such as Banjani, Pješivci and Grahovljani, were formed from unrelated members under similar conditions.⁴² The defence of the Upper and Middle Lim valley against aggressive inroads and violent immigration of Albanian tribes helped the Vasojevići to become stronger as a tribe and to expand to the north, along the Lim, as far as the river Lješnica.

The years 1737, 1738, 1768 and 1790 stand out by the extent of brutality and destruction inflicted to the Upper and Middle Lim valley.⁴³ After the war years 1737/38 there was a mass emigration of Orthodox population from this area. At the end of 1737 Hodaverdi Pasha Mahmudbegović (Begolli) ravaged the Vasojević area. In 1768 Kariman Pasha Mahmudbegović attacked the area with a force of some 15,000 men (which was equal to the total population of the area)⁴⁴ from three directions, ravaging and plundering the villages of Trepča, Trešnjevo, Zabrdje and Slatina, Šekular, Dapšići and Polica. The region was also ravaged by the Bushatli Pasha of Scutari in 1790.

Rebellions and the oppression by local Ottoman feudal lords and Albanians

Domestic historiography has tended to focus on *hajduks* as a phenomenon associated with the Orthodox Christian reaya seen as a symbolic indicator of the people's patriotic consciousness and aspiration for liberation and socio-economic emancipation from the Ottoman Empire. However, no less important was the predatory behaviour of Muslim population, as the dominant class, especially because it frequently caused local rebellions and unrests. It was a clear sign of the profound economic and social crisis of the declining Ottoman Empire, and of the political decomposition of the state and society. Every new rebellion further weakened the Empire.

In the first decades of the eighteenth century, this area was afflicted by a wave of Albanian brigandage. As is well known, in 1700 the unruly Kelmendi/Klimenti⁴⁵ were resettled by Hodaverdi Pasha Mahmudbegović

⁴² Petar Šobajić, "Bjelopavlići", *Srpski etnografski zbornik* 27 (1923), 257, 314, 326.

⁴³ Radovan Bakić, "Stanovništvo opštine Berane", *Tokovi* 2 (2009), 51.

⁴⁴ Dašić, *Vasojevići*, 288, 302.

⁴⁵ Klimenti (Alb. *Kelmendi*) is a region in Albania (Alb. *Mali i Kelmënit*) and the name of the eponymous tribe whose members live in Albania, Montenegro and Kosovo. According to their tradition recorded in 1685 (August Theiner, *Vetera monumenta Slavoo-*

to the Pešter Plateau⁴⁶ in order to separate them from the tribe's rebellious core. But they did not abandon their previous lifestyle as *eshkiyas*, brigands, and the practice spread into the future sanjak of Novi Pazar. The resettled Kelmendi were under constant pressure to convert to Islam. The Ottoman census of 1703 mentions two villages near Plav inhabited by Kelmendi: Novšići and Martinovići.⁴⁷ Some researchers believe that the Kelmendi met with strong resistance from local Serbian population, and even were pushed out, and that they therefore began to settle in the neighbouring region of Rugova.⁴⁸ Albanian plundering raids into the Upper Lim valley started from their core lands, but they also had bases in the villages of Zabrdje, Slatina and Trešnjevo in the environs of present-day Andrijevica. In 1708 they attacked many houses in Bihor and Trgovište (Rožaje), killing many inhabitants, and they robbed travellers travelling from the direction of Kosovo towards Bosnia. Nine years later, in 1717, the aghas of the fortresses of Rožaje, Plav, Bijelo Polje and Kolašin, and local ayans, submitted a petition to the Sublime Porte begging that the brigands be caught and appropriately punished.⁴⁹ The area around the source of the river Ibar, Rožaje and its environs began to be settled by Kući, Klimenti and Hoti, Kući mainly on the left and Klimenti on the right side of the Ibar. This is why these areas were popularly known as "Kućnija" and "Latinija" (from "Latin", because

num Meridionalium historiam illustrantia), the Kelmendi are of Serbian origin. They claim their descent from a single ancestor who moved there from the upper Morača river valley, married a woman from the Kući tribe and had a son, Kliment, whose descendants founded two villages with Serbian names and after whom the tribe was named, Klimenti. The ancestor who had moved from Morača was an Orthodox Christian. Under the influence of the bishop of Scutari and very active Catholic missionaries, his descendants converted to Roman Catholicism. The missionaries taught them not only to see the Turks as enemies but also not to see the Orthodox as friends. In 1685 they helped the sanjak-bey of Scutari Suleiman Bushatli to defeat the Montenegrins at the Battle of Vrtijeljka, where the famous hajduk Bajo Pivljanin was killed. In 1692 they helped him to take Cetinje from a joint Montenegrin and Venetian force. Cf. Jovan Tomić, *O Arnautima u staroj Srbiji i Sandžaku* (Priština: Panorama, 1995; 1st ed. Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1913); Georg von Gyurkovics, *Albanien, Schilderungen von Land und Leute* (Vienna 1881), 160; Janez Rotar, "Slavensko-albanski nacionalni odnosi prema našoj putopisnoj literaturi (do 1914)", in *Stanovništvo slovenskog porijekla u Albaniji* (Titograd: Istorijski institut Crne Gore, 1991).

⁴⁶ Tomić, *O Arnautima*.

⁴⁷ *Spomenik Srpske akademije nauka* 42 (1905), 64, 74; after Barjaktarović, "Etnički razvitak Gornjeg Polimlja", 177.

⁴⁸ Andrija Jovičević, "Plavsko-gusinjska oblast", *Srpski etnografski zbornik* 21 (1921), 407.

⁴⁹ Bogumil Hrabak, "Nemirno stanje u kasabama na sjeveru Crne Gore u doba krize i naseljavanja (XVIII vek)", *Istorijski zapisi* 4 (1987), 64–66.

the Klimenti were Roman Catholic at the time of settlement).⁵⁰ “On the entire left side of the Ibar are Kuči, a huge islamized clan, and on the right side, a smaller, much smaller part which descends from Klimenti” (Vladimir Ćorović, *Istorija Srba*, vol. 1). Over time, Kuči prevailed, and so Klimenti and Hoti, although Albanians, came to speak Serbian as their first language. Jovan Tomić observed that by 1765 almost all resettled Albanians of Catholic faith in the area of Pešter and Rožaje had converted to Islam.⁵¹

In 1725 some Muslims of the Bijelo Polje area engaged in banditry crossed into the kadilik of Bihor and attacked the local courthouse, took all the money and humiliated the kadi.⁵² Local feudal families, keen on having local affairs under their own control, did not look benevolently to the Porte’s sending officials from elsewhere to fill vacant positions. It is known, for example, that the former agha of the Rožaje martolos Ibrahim and his son Omer were engaged in illegal activities. They not only refused to comply with the imperial order to appear in court, but they killed the new martolos agha, managed to attract some fifty nefers (soldiers) of Albanian origin from Rugova (they themselves probably were of the same origin) as well as thirty Christians, and the gang besieged the fortress of Rožaje. A weak central government in murky times provided much opportunity for abuse of power on local level, the brunt of which was borne by the Orthodox reaya. Military commanders in small towns were linked with representatives of the feudal apparatus, sipahis and zaims. Thus, in 1730 in the kadilik of Prijepolje the reaya who lived on the zeamet of zaim Mehmed, in the village of Žudže, revolted against payment of taxes. They attacked the fortress in Morača because its aghas and soldiers raided their villages, pillaging and carrying out violence. The trouble for the Porte was in that the rebelled reaya fomented unrest among the Orthodox population in neighbouring areas. In order to calm down the situation the Porte ordered the governor of Hercegovina and the kadi of Prijepolje to conduct an investigation.⁵³

There is evidence for the Empire’s troubles with ruthless Albanian settlers around the fortress of Onogošt (present-day Nikšić) as well.⁵⁴ At the time, Onogošt was in the nahiye of Drobniak and under the jurisdiction

⁵⁰ Barjaktarović, “Etnički razvitak Gornjeg Polimlja”, 193.

⁵¹ Tomić, *O Arnautima*, 91–92; Dašić, *Vasojevići*, 247.

⁵² Jovan Tomić, *Crna Gora za Morejskog rata* (Belgrade: Srpska kraljevska akademija, 1907), 249–274, after *Istorija Crne Gore*, vol. III, 558.

⁵³ Hrabak, “Nemirno stanje u kasabama”, 70 (Komisija za istoriju Bosne i Hercegovine pri ANBiH, inv. no. 139/6).

⁵⁴ After a failed siege of the fortified town of Nikšić (Onogošt) by Hercegovina and Brda tribes in 1789, the Orthodox population experienced much hardship and Trebešani from its surroundings emigrated to Upper Morača. Cf. M. Vujačić, “Dvije

of the kadi of Pljevlja. As reported to the Porte by the Bosnian mutesellim, a few Albanian families that had moved there from the troubled Albanian mountains would go on the rampage and rob Muslim families. Rioting, thefts and robberies were also recorded in the area of Kolašin fortress. In 1776 Kolašin Turks became so swollen-headed that they refused obedience to the Porte, and were ruthlessly sowing fear and causing bloodshed. The Porte ordered the Bosnian vizier to punish the lawbreakers severely. The vizier passed the sultan's order to Džafer Pasha Čengić. With the help of Herzegovina tribes (Drobnjaci,⁵⁵ Pivljani, Grahovljani, Banjani), Čengić defeated the renegade Kolašin Turks. Ten of them were hanged on the spot, and another forty somewhat later, in Travnik.⁵⁶ Rožaje, which belonged to the sanjak of Prizren, was a veritable nest of Albanian bandit groups. By robbing and murdering travellers and traders they made the roads in the area of Bihor and Stari Vlah that led to the vilayet of Bosnia unusable,⁵⁷ and all traffic had to be moved to less vulnerable routes. Thus, in the eighteenth century, trade from Bihor and Bijelo Polje to Podgorica and Scutari was re-directed from the Adriatic road which ran via Brskovo to the route through the Lim and Cijevna river valleys. Abuses by fortress garrisons in rural areas did not stop even in the middle of the century: in 1744 the captain of the fortress in the kadilik of Budimlja reported criminal behaviour of some from the fortress under his charge.

Those prone to abuse of power, theft, robbery and violence used their belonging to the state religion or the state's military or administrative apparatus to pursue their own unlawful interests. The end of the eighteenth century was a period of chaotic circumstances in the European part of the Ottoman Empire, a period of a noticeably weakening central government, unrests and rebellions. At that time the feudal Bushatli family became virtually independent in northern Albania and sought to enlarge territory under its control. Mahmud Pasha Bushatli sent his commander Hasan Hot to attack Sjenica, Prijepolje and Pljevlja, while Bijelo Polje was under his control. A unit of Sarajevo soldiers, from the expedition sent against Hasan

razure Trebješana i postanak plemena Uskoci u Crnoj Gori", *Glas CCLXXX* (Belgrade: SANU, 1971), 267.

⁵⁵ Drobnjak is a tribe in Montenegrin Herzegovina. Its eastern boundaries, finally established in 1860, are Šaranci and the upper Morača valley, in the south Nikšićko Polje and Župa, in the west the river Piva, and in the north the river Tara. For more see Leković, *Drobnjak*, 11; Svetozar Tomić, "Drobnjak, antropogeografska ispitivanja", in *Srpski etnografski zbornik* 4 (1902), 6.

⁵⁶ Leković, *Drobnjak*, 36.

⁵⁷ Hrabak, "Nemirno stanje u kasabama", 80 (Komisija za istoriju Bosne i Hercegovine pri ANBiH, inv. no. 139/5, p. 212-213).

Hot, was harrying the area of Vraneš.⁵⁸ In 1786, representatives of Akova and other towns in the sanjak of Scutari along with people from Plav and Gusinje submitted a petition begging the sultan to pardon Bushatli and let him retain his position, claiming that “the population of these areas are prone to troublemaking and feuding” and that it was the Bushatlis who had succeeded in suppressing disorder and banditry.

Expeditions against Brda were often sent from the Lim river valley, such as those carried out by the Ćorovići of Bihor which were even sung about in epic poetry. A major one was carried out in 1796 during Mahmud Pasha Bushatli's second campaign against Montenegro.⁵⁹ An Ottoman force mustered in the Lim valley, Pljevlja and Kolašin was sent to Bushatli's aid in the direction of the effectively independent Katun nahiye. However, in the village Lopate near Lijeva Rijeka they were engaged and routed by a joint Vasojevići, Moračani and Rovčani force. The metropolitan of Cetinje Petar I proved to be an exceptionally capable organizer of the struggle of Montenegrin, Brda and Herzegovina tribes, their unifier and conciliator. Two important victories in 1796, at Martinići and Kruši, allowed the unification of the Bjelopavlići and Piperi tribes with the four Montenegrin nahiyes. In that period Uskoci, Vasojevići and Moračani repulsed the attack of an Ottoman Herzegovinian force at the Battle of Lopate.⁶⁰

The introduction of the chiftlik system and abuse by Ottoman authorities had been exerting increasing pressure on the Brda and Herzegovina tribes, causing people to resist. *Ćetovanje* (from *ćeta*, a small armed unit) was not uncommon both as a subsistence strategy and as a liberation struggle, and it became more widespread in the region of the Lim and Tara valleys. In the area of Bihor, Rožaje and Tara valley the chiftlik system had become dominant in the first half of the eighteenth century and eventually prevailed in the Lim valley towards the end of the century.

Throughout the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was slowly declining despite occasional recoveries. The well-advanced process of converting land into chiftliks, unrests, general social insecurity and gross disregard for all law by local military and judicial officials created a state of anarchy which paved the way for a popular uprising at the beginning of the

⁵⁸ Šćepanović, “Pregled prošlosti Bijelog Polja”, 117.

⁵⁹ At the end of the eighteenth century, eastern Herzegovina suffered much in Mahmud Pasha Bushatli's campaign. Cf. Arhiv SANU, Belgrade [Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts], Legacy of Ignjat M. Žugić, p. 504.

⁶⁰ In February 1794 an assembly of the heads of Herzegovina and Brda tribes at the Morača monastery voiced their grievances to the Montenegrin *guvernador* (governor) Radonjić and Austrian General Vukasović as to the plight of their tribes. Cf. Nikola Tomić, *Pleme Drobnijak* (Temekula, 1980), 73.

following century. The Empire was going from one socio-economic crisis to another, and the attempts to fill the imperial coffers by levying additional taxes directly affected the peasantry, primarily the Christian reaya. Amid these crises, the Empire's military power was also declining. The lack of central control encouraged the ambitions of local lords, even some pashas appointed to high positions in the Balkan provinces mostly from the ranks of prominent Albanian feudal families. Having acquired a wealth through plundering and corruption, they created their own mercenary armies attracted by the prospect of loot. Occasional riots and mutinies of janissaries only added to the anarchy. This situation, which particularly affected the Orthodox population, created additional religious tensions and class antagonisms, inevitably leading to a general popular uprising.

Towards final liberation

The First Serbian Uprising, or Serbian Revolution, which broke out in 1804 resonated widely and strongly in Montenegro and in all neighbouring areas in which it had a political or any other influence. It was then that closer political ties and cooperation between the two national states in the making were established. The great interest in the First Serbian Uprising among the tribes of Brda and Herzegovina also stemmed from the fact that it opened the opportunity for settlement in uninhabited and fertile areas in Serbia with no feudal obligations.

The alliance between the tribes of historic Stara Crna Gora (Old Montenegro) and Brda, patiently and persistently built in the struggle against the Ottomans throughout the eighteenth century, would eventually grow into a small national state, in fact a union of tribes. This union was achieved by Petar I Petrović, and with pleas and curses rather than through the exercise of his authority as a ruler. The society of the Montenegro of the time, which was touched by the wave of the First Serbian Uprising, especially the northern and north-eastern area of present-day Montenegro, had not been integrated into a single community. There was Old Montenegro (four nahiyes) on the one hand and Brda on the other as two geographic and historic regions which would figure in the name of the state (*Crna Gora i Brda*) until the 1880s. The Brda tribes, especially the Vasojevići, Moračani, Drobnjaci and Rovci, established firmer links with insurgent Serbia.

A glimpse of the situation in the Lim and Tara valleys at the time is provided by an inscription on the wall of the Morača monastery dated 1803. According to the anonymous chronicler, there was a great hunger and

a “great bloodshed” and “worse than hunger was unrest”.⁶¹ From the testimonies left by contemporaries in the books of the monasteries of the Holy Trinity in Pljevlja and Nikoljac in Bijelo Polje, it appears that the previous year, 1802, had hardly been any better. The Kolašin captaincy was the site of bloody fighting, instigated by local Muslims. Villages waged wars with one another, clans with clans, and all of them together with local authorities. Robberies, thefts and murders were a daily occurrence. The chaos in the Kolašin captaincy stirred unrest in Bijelo Polje and Pljevlja as well. During the First Serbian Uprising the unrests ceased because the feuding Muslims came to see the Uprising as a threat to them all. Until then alliances were not uncommon between Orthodox Christians and Muslims against some other village, be it Orthodox or Muslim. However, after the Uprising broke out, religion prevailed as the criterion for their grouping together.

That Petar I Petrović was informed of preparations for an uprising in Serbia is evidenced by a letter he sent to the hegumen of the monastery of Dečani on 10 January 1804: “Montenegrins and, on the part of Belgrade, Serbs have the intention of rising to arms against the Turks.”⁶² Apparently the Vasojevići tribal leaders were also familiar with the preparations for a general uprising. There are indications that the monastery of Djurdjevi Stupovi maintained close ties with the monasteries of Morača, Ostrog, Piva and especially with those of the Patriarchate of Peć and Visoki Dečani. The Vasojevići also maintained direct communication with some leaders in Serbia, primarily those of their tribal origin, which would play a marked role in the course of the Uprising. A similar role was played by the Drobnjak leaders with respect to Herzegovina.

The First Serbian Uprising echoed broadly in the Lim valley and among the Brda tribes from the beginning of the armed conflict with the renegade janissary leaders (*dahi*), in the pashalik of Belgrade. The Uprising was also of great importance for relations between the Montenegrins and Brda tribes because it contributed to their closer cooperation. News about the rebellion of the Serbs in the pashalik of Belgrade in February 1804 was brought to the Lim valley by herdsmen and some hajduks who were spending winter in Serbia: Karadjordje’s rebels had seized a few thousand sheep from some herdsmen from the nahiye of Gusinje, and the herdsmen returned home empty-handed in early spring.⁶³ The Uprising stirred up guerrilla actions and brigandage in the Lim and Tara valleys. The tribes

⁶¹ Ljubomir Stojanović, *Stari srpski zapisi i natpisi*, vol. II (Belgrade: Državna štamparija, 1903), no. 3805.

⁶² Miomir Dašić, *Ogledi iz istorije Crne Gore* (Podgorica: Istorijski institut Crne Gore, 2000), 85.

⁶³ *Ibid.* 86.

of Brda and Herzegovina were ready to fight the Ottomans as early as the first half of 1804, and their chiefs only waited for a signal and support from Prince-Bishop Petar I. But as a result of Russia's strong diplomatic pressure on Petar I through the emissary Marko Ivelić, their urges bore no fruit. Petar I was unable to take any serious step without Russia's approval. Russia, the protector power of the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire, had a treaty of friendship with the Ottoman Empire since 1774. Petar I and his Montenegrins, as well as the Brda tribes in which he had a great influence, were advised to remain neutral. The Russian intelligence service controlled communication between Karadjordje and Petar I and channels of communication between Serbia and Montenegro on the one hand and Brda and Herzegovina on the other. The calming down of rebellious ferment in Brda was certainly the consequence of Montenegro's political reliance on Russia. At war with France, Russia sought to maintain peace with the Ottoman Empire in order to avoid being engaged on two fronts.⁶⁴ For these reasons, Montenegro could not even in 1806 provide assistance to the Serbian uprising, which had by then grown into a large-scale military conflict. Prince-Bishop Petar I was in a delicate position. The Serbs in Serbia and also in Herzegovina expected his (Montenegrin) participation in the struggle against the Turks. Aware of his position, and advised by Russia to maintain peace with the Ottoman Empire, the Prince-Bishop was reproached by Karadjordje: "We always have it in our heart and our mind that you will be, at some point, big and powerful support to the Serbian people and liberation."

In the summer of 1805 the insurgent ferment in Brda and Herzegovina grew into an open rebellion of some tribes.⁶⁵ The vizier of Scutari Ibrahim Pasha quelled the unrest in the areas under his responsibility by arms. Conflicts between Brdjani (Highlanders) and Turks were a normal occurrence at the time. In the Lim valley and Brda, hajduk groups flourished. This social phenomenon, a combination of guerrilla warfare and brigandage, resulted both from the dysfunction of local Ottoman authorities and from the need to survive. Among the Muslim population in the Lim and Tara valleys there was a feeling of great uncertainty and insecurity, as indicated by a contemporary reference to the situation in Bijelo Polje in 1806: "That summer we were building fortifications around Bijelo Polje, and the poor suffered much hardship and oppression, and we guarded border posts all

⁶⁴ AS, ZAL, b. IV, no. 32.

⁶⁵ In 1805 the Russian Consulate was opened in Kotor. Chiefs of Brda and Montenegrin tribes wrote to it about frequent border fights with the Turks. Cf. Arhiv i biblioteka Državnog muzeja, Cetinje [Archives and Library of the State Museum; hereafter, ABO DMC], Petar I, 1804, 983.

year long”.⁶⁶ Hajduk bands in the Lim and Tara valleys and the area of Stara Raška in general were highly mobile. They were robbing and raiding Ottoman territory, crossing into Šumadija and fighting there against the Ottomans under Karadjordje’s banner. According to some data, several hundred hajduks from the Lim valley and Brda tribes fought in the 1806/7 battles for Belgrade alone, and in those years many families emigrated from these areas. In March 1807, the insurgent Serbian army began an offensive from southwest Serbia towards Bosnia and the river Lim, but there was no contact between the Montenegrin and Serbian forces.

In the spring of 1809 Karadjordje launched an offensive in the direction of Sjenica, Novi Pazar, the Lim and Tara rivers, hoping to rouse to arms the entire area to the border of Old Montenegro and northern Albania. The beginning of a Russo-Turkish War in 1806 had created favourable conditions for a closer cooperation between Cetinje and Karadjordje’s Serbia. The Serbian Orthodox population of the Lim and Tara valleys and the surrounding Brda and Herzegovina tribes followed the insurgents’ liberation struggle with much sympathy. Only direct communication and synchronized military operations of Serbians, Montenegrins, Brda tribes and Herzegovinians⁶⁷ had a real chance of success. Therefore Karadjordje asked Petar I to take his Montenegrins and instigate the people from Brda to join the fight against the Turks, proposing that they meet somewhere on the Lim or the Tara.⁶⁸ He also believed that the time had come to join forces and strike out at the enemy together. Karadjordje addressed Bishop Petar I again: “For that reason we recommend that You too show love for the Christian people and strike out at the enemy and, advancing towards us, stir up all fellow Christians so that we could all strike out at the unbaptized enemy from all sides.”⁶⁹

The truth is that it did not take too much trouble to rouse the Orthodox population of the Lim valley to rebellion in 1809 because the area had already been in ferment. Large-scale fighting took place in April 1809, when Karadjordje’s offensive towards Sjenica threatened fortified Novi Pazar, Sjenica and the *Imperial Road* that connected the eyalet of Bosnia with Constantinople. He tried to take advantage of the fact that the bulk of the

⁶⁶ Ž. Šćepanović, *Srednje Polimlje i Potarje* (Belgrade: SANU, 1979), 175.

⁶⁷ In 1805 a large army under the command of Suleiman Pasha was sent from Bosnia to quell the rebellious tribes of Herzegovina. Cf. Arhiv Istorijskog instituta u Podgorici [Archives of the Historical Institute, Podgorica; hereafter: AIIP], folder no. 134.

⁶⁸ Gedeon Ernest Maretić, *Istorija srpske revolucije* (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 1987), 177.

⁶⁹ The region gained in geostrategic importance with the spread of the First Serbian Uprising to the south because it threatened to cut off the eyalet of Bosnia from the rest of the Ottoman Empire. Cf. ABO DMC Petar I, 1804, 1026.

Ottoman army was engaged on the Russo-Ottoman front to drive out the Ottoman forces from the territory of Old Montenegro. His war plan envisaged major operations in the direction of the Lim and Tara rivers, where his forces were supposed to meet with the Brda and Montenegrin rebels. He was convinced that the Orthodox population would take to arms as soon as his army entered Stara Raška. That fear reigned in the region seems to be evidenced by Karadjordje's letter to Russian Field Marshal Prozorovsky, commander of the Army of Moldavia engaged in fighting on the Danube: "in some places the Turks, when they heard I was coming with an army with many guns, did not even dare wait for me but fled, leaving many places empty, and those that stayed waiting for me were destroyed by our arms."⁷⁰

In the first phase of the offensive the insurgents liberated Sjenica and Nova Varoš and reached the Lim near Prijepolje, as evidenced by Karadjordje's letter to *vojvoda* Antonije Pljakić dated 23 April 1809: "Turks are nowhere to be seen all the way to the Lim."⁷¹ Ottoman sources also confirm that in April 1809 Karadjordje's army took Nova Varoš and Sjenica, and besieged Prijepolje. Thus the road between Bosnia and Constantinople was cut off, and the insurgent army's next goal was to advance further in order to join forces with Montenegrins. The advancement, however, was halted because the Ottoman forces in the region of Raška had in the meantime received reinforcement with troops from Bosnia and Peć. This compelled Karadjordje to withdraw from the environs of Sjenica on 29 April and return to Belgrade to confer with the Governing Council about further military and political action. The insurgent military leaders, *vojvodas*, Vujica Vulićević, Miloš and Milan Obrenović remained in the Sjenica area in order to proceed towards Prijepolje and Pljevlja. *Vojvoda* Milan Obrenović received a delegation from Vasojevići. The *vojvoda* of Stari Vlah Hadži-Prodan Gligorijević, a Vasojević by origin, was assigned to lead an insurgent force from Stari Vlah to Bijelo Polje and Bihor, and to call the Orthodox population there to rise to arms. The operations of the insurgents around Sjenica and Novi Pazar had caused ferment among the Christians of the Lim and Tara valleys. Hajduks and others who had been keeping track of the developments since the beginning of the Uprising now set out to rouse people to arms. At the same time, the Ottoman authorities in Scutari, through Plav and Gusinje beys and aghas, put pressure on the recruited Christians who fought against the insurgent army that was moving towards the Lim. The pressure was particularly strong on the chiefs of the Vasojević tribe, who were required to prevent the spread of the uprising in their respective areas.

⁷⁰ M. Djordjević, *Srbija u ustanku 1804–1813* (Belgrade: Rad, 1979), 265.

⁷¹ Dašić, *Ogledi*, 102.

In the second half of May Karadjordje returned to the position near Sjenica to resume operations for the liberation of the area between the Lim and Ibar rivers. Even though the Russian military headquarters raised objections to his placing the focus of operations on that area, he kept considering the offensive in the direction of Old Montenegro as his priority. Immediately upon his return to the environs of Sjenica, he had to prepare defence against an attack of the Bosnian army which had held back the Serbian forces on the river Drina.⁷² In the area between Sjenica and Prijepolje he first defeated the Bosnian army, and then, on 27 May 1809, at Suvodol, Numan Pasha's (Mahmutbegović) forces that were heading from Pljevlja to the aid of the Ottoman Bosnian army. The defeat of two Ottoman armies within a short span of time gave further boost to the insurrectionary movement in the area of Bihor, Bijelo Polje and Vasojevići. The news of Numan Pasha's defeat at the Battle of Suvodol was received with joy in the Lim valley. A contribution to the success of the rebel army was made by units from Brda, Vasojevići and Morača, which attacked the Ottomans in the rear. During the Battle of Suvodol forcibly conscripted Orthodox men from Bihor and Korita deserted from Numan Pasha's army and, led by *oborknez* Jovan-Sava, joined Karadjordje and contributed to the Ottoman defeat.

Shortly after the Battle of Suvodol, more than 350 rebels from Brda arrived in Karadjordje's headquarters in the environs of Sjenica. As evidenced by the letter of archimandrite Spiridon (Filipović) to Bishop Petar I dated 30 May 1809, and the testimony of a participant in the battle, Antonije Protić, Brdjani, Vasojevići and Moračani arrived in the rebel camp. Karadjordje received the Brda tribal chiefs and informed them about the plan for further operations in the direction of the Lim valley and Brda. He confirmed their old tribal titles and conferred new titles and ranks on some of them. In any case, this meeting convinced him that his insurgent army could count on full support of the population of the Lim valley and Brda. The rebel army's victories fuelled ferment in the area between the rivers Ibar, Lim and Tara. The cutting off of the imperial road between Rumelia and Bosnia had been confirmed by French sources as well. In fact, it seems that a French messenger sent by General Marmont to Constantinople was forced to give up his mission because the road was cut off by insurgents.⁷³ It was only in the late summer of 1809 that the Ottomans retook control of the road between Constantinople and Sarajevo, which was celebrated by Muslims in the whole of Bosnia. Battles and turbulence in the Lim and

⁷² Stojan Novaković, *Vaskrs države srpske* (Belgrade: Kultura, 1986; 1st ed.: SKZ, 1904), 112.

⁷³ Petar Popović, *Francusko-srpski odnosi za vrijeme Prvog srpskog ustanka* (Belgrade 1933), 105.

Tara valleys, Stari Vlah and Brda made all land routes between Bosnia and Scutari impassable, so all traffic was carried out by sea via Dubrovnik. By the Treaty of Pressburg signed in December 1805 Austria had ceded the Gulf of Kotor to the French.

In the entire area between Old Montenegro and the border of insurgent Serbia Ottoman forces were completely distraught. The pashas sent from Albania to the aid of the commander of the Ottoman Bosnian army Suleiman Pasha, fearful of the strong rebel movement in Brda, the Lim and Tara valleys, withdrew from Donji Kolašin without fight. According to a French source, Suleiman Pasha, having been defeated between Sjenica and Prijepolje, retreated to the vicinity of Bijelo Polje and encamped there for more than two months in anticipation of the outcome. This concentration of forces prevented the insurgents from liberating Bijelo Polje in the summer of 1809, although they controlled all of Bihor and the Middle Lim valley.

After his first meetings with the Brda tribal leaders, Karadjordje sent troops to the Lim valley, Vasojevići and Morača, which greatly encouraged the uprising in the Lim, Morača and Tara valleys. The establishment of direct military cooperation between Karadjordje's insurgents and Brda tribes boosted the combative spirit in the whole area towards Montenegro. In early June 1809 Karadjordje's troops arrived in the Lim valley together with the 350 soldiers from Vasojevići and Brda who had joined him near Sjenica in late May. On their way, these forces liberated Pešter, Korita and Bihor. Some Muslim clans, such as the Muratbašić of the village of Godijevo, joined the insurgents, and the insurgent army spared their homes and property.⁷⁴ This apparently was not the only case of Bihor Muslims' crossing to the side of the insurgents, especially considering that the process of islamization was still on-going and that Islam in this area had not been deeply rooted. The Orthodox population of Bihor and Korita hailed the uprising en masse. After the Ottoman defeat at Suvodol, the insurgent units in this area were led by *oborknez* Jovan Sava, a native of the village of Crnča, whose earlier title was confirmed by Karadjordje on account of his joining the insurgents' side during the Battle of Suvodol. There are indications that Karadjordje personally led the insurgent army through Bihor and, in the village of Crnča, met members of his own clan, the Gurešić. Tradition has it that on that occasion Karadjordje gave his relatives a gift of arms and ammunition. What of all this is true is difficult to establish because there are no written sources. However, there are indications that Karadjordje's ancestors had moved from the Lim valley to Šumadija during the Austro-Ottoman war of 1737–39, where he was born as Djordje Petrović (later nicknamed

⁷⁴ Dašić, *Ogledi*, 103.

Karadjordje or Black George), the family name Petrović being derived from his father's name Petar.⁷⁵

It is quite certain that following the Ottoman defeat at Suvodol rebel forces penetrated into the Upper Lim valley via Korita and Bihor. This is confirmed by a succinct contemporary record that in the summer of 1809 "Vasojevići and Has turned renegade and Šijaci [Serbians] arrived in Vasojevići and people from Vasojevići and Has burned down and looted Bihor". Vasojevići welcomed Serbian rebel forces at Polica in a ceremonial manner and under arms. Karadjordje's *vojvodas* convened several popular assemblies in Vasojevići, explaining the objectives of the general uprising to people. The *vojvodas* bestowed insurgent banners on some of the most prominent Vasojević leaders and clans, which were then, as well as later, seen as symbols of the liberation struggle in this area. Karadjordje's seven banners were kept there until the mid-nineteenth century, when, according to the research done by Pavle Rovinski, ten banners were bestowed on Vasojevići and their area became the centre from which the movement for the liberation of Brda and Old Herzegovina spread. A part of the insurgent forces was transferred from the Lim valley to Lijevo Rijeka, Morača and Brda to strengthen the insurrectionary movement. The other part remained in Vasojevići until autumn 1809. In this phase, Russia was content with the movement and encouraged cooperation between Karadjordje's and Montenegrin insurgents, expecting that their joint effort against the Ottomans would prove successful. In June 1809, a Russian army officer, notified that Karadjordje's army had reached the Lim valley, wrote to Petar I advising him to take his army to Karadjordje's aid. Karadjordje's commanders were in contact with Petar I through Vasojevići and Moračani. The rebel army assigned with operations in the direction of the Lim valley and Brda was quite large by contemporary standards: about 9,000 men with artillery and sufficient amounts of ammunition; or as many as 20,000 men according to some sources. At that point, the bulk of the rebel army was on the move towards the Tara with the intention of taking Kolašin and proceeding to operations for the liberation of Brda and Herzegovina. The rebels' base camp was in Has, probably at the monastery of Djurdjevi Stupovi. This is also suggested by Vuk Karadžić's statement that Karadjordje also came to the Lim valley at the time.⁷⁶

The military expedition against the insurrectionary movement in the Lim valley launched in May and June by the vizier of Scutari Tahir Pasha apparently failed to produce the desired result, because all indications are that the rebellion in the region was general and that it was given a boost by

⁷⁵ Momir Jović, *Srpske zemlje i vladari* (Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1990), 156.

⁷⁶ Dašić, *Ogledi*, 109.

the arrival of Karadjordje's army units. However, Karadjordje had to stop his operations in the southwest direction and to rush to the eastern border where the insurgent army had suffered a defeat. The defeat of the rebel army near Niš proved much worse than it seemed at first, and therefore Karadjordje was not able to realize his plan to join forces with Petar I on the Tara to liberate fortified Kolašin. Namely, the rebel army leaders, having been defeated at the gates of Niš on 19 May 1809 and, to make things worse, quarrelling with each other, had begun to retreat before the Ottoman army. Karadjordje was thus compelled to abandon operations in the direction of Brda and to transfer the bulk of his army from the Lim valley to Deligrad. In his letter of September 1809 Karadjordje informed Petar I about these events and explained him why he had been forced to leave the liberated Lim valley. He expressed his gratitude to the Montenegrin, Vasojević and Brda rebels for managing to hold back the Ottoman, Scutari and Herzegovina army and thus prevent it from reaching Serbia when it was due.

The rebel army's defeats on the eastern front led to the weakening of the liberation struggle in the Lim valley and Brda and to Petar I's conciliatory attitude towards the Ottomans in Herzegovina. The withdrawal of the rebel army from the Lim valley encouraged the vizier of Scutari to launch a campaign against the liberation movement in the region. The aim of the campaign was to force the rebels into submission. Faced with such a threat, Vasojević tribal chiefs managed to win over some leaders of the Krasniqi and Hoti tribes who then persuaded other Albanian local leaders to give up the attack on the Lim valley. After Karadjordje's withdrawal, the liberation movement in Vasojevići had been losing the initial self-confidence and enthusiasm, and in September was already in the phase of subsidence. A considerable number of insurgent families from the Lim valley, Bihor, the Tara valley and other areas of the sanjak of Novi Pazar had withdrawn with Karadjordje. Some insurgents stayed in the area of Morača during the autumn of 1809, and together with Brdjani looted Turkish spoils. They only returned to Serbia in 1812, and by sea, via Austria.⁷⁷ In the autumn of 1809, fearing Turkish reprisals, many Orthodox Christians of Bihor moved to Karadjordje's Serbia under their leader, *oborknez* Jovan Sava Bihorac, which weakened the Orthodox element in the area. There also was a mass migration from Donji Kolašin and the Middle Lim valley to Stari Vlah. It appears that the brotherhood of the monastery of Djurdjevi Stupovi and their hegumen also fled to Serbia. During the winter of 1809/10 the uprising in Brda and the Lim valley quieted down. As we have already seen, in late 1809 the vizier of Scutari managed to re-establish his authority in the Lim valley. The pre-uprising chiftlik system was also re-established and the peas-

⁷⁷ Ibid. 113.

ants had to pay their overdue taxes to the state and landowners. Petar I wrote to Karadjordje about the dire situation of the Orthodox population in Brda and Old Herzegovina and about his inability to help them because these areas were completely surrounded by enemies. However, the fear that the entire Orthodox population would move to Karadjordje's Serbia forced the Ottoman authorities to show some lenience. In 1810, when the fortunes of war tilted towards the rebels owing to a stronger Russian force deployed in Serbia, the insurrectionary spark in the Lim valley and Brda was rekindled. The local Orthodox population were convinced that the Serbian rebel army would once again reach their parts and made secret preparations to greet it. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that in 1810 hajduk and smaller rebel groups, mainly those composed of men that had fled to Serbia the year before, were very active in the Lim valley, but we have no information about any large-scale movement.

After the conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812 and Napoleon's Russian campaign, Karadjordje's Serbia was left to cope with the Ottoman army by itself. Petar I's preparations for recapturing the Gulf of Kotor with his Montenegrins, which he would achieve in 1813, also contributed to the dwindling of insurrectionary ferment in Brda and the Lim valley. That is why a strong Ottoman force was able to be sent from Herzegovina and the sanjak of Scutari against Serbia in 1813. The First Serbian Uprising was militarily defeated in 1813.

The collapse of the First Serbian Uprising echoed gloomily in Brda and the Lim valley. In the following years the Ottomans consolidated their power and stepped up the exploitation of the Orthodox population, especially in the Lim and Tara valleys, which led to further islamization and Orthodox emigration. But popular resistance did not cease altogether even then. Many remained in the woods and formed hajduk bands. It was quite certain that some hajduk bands from these regions took part in Hadži-Prodan's Revolt in 1814. The restoration of the Ottoman feudal system and administrative organization meant the restoration of local *nahiye* and *knežina* self-government in this area. Those who opposed Ottoman authorities in any way were subjected to rigorous measures, which blunted resistance. For these reasons, neither Hadži-Prodan's Revolt in 1814 nor the Second Serbian Uprising in 1815, which was the continuation of the 1804 revolution, found a stronger echo in the Lim valley and Brda.⁷⁸ Correspondence between Prince Miloš Obrenović and Prince-Bishop Petar I

⁷⁸ The Tara and Lim river valleys at the time were an area where interests of three pashaliks intersected: those of Herzegovina (the area of Mojkovac, Šahovići, Vraneš and Ravna Rijeka), Bosnia (Bihor) and Scutari (which included Bijelo Polje). Cf. Leković, *Drobnjak*, 105.

offers no evidence of concrete cooperation, it only reveals their views on contemporary political developments.

The temporary liberation of the Lim valley and part of Brda in 1809 with the support of Karadjordje's forces left a deep impression in the minds of the local population. The memory of Karadjordje's stay in this area lingered on for a long time, as evidenced by a number of toponyms, folk songs and the keeping of Karadjordje's flags as symbols of the joint struggle against the Turks. After the collapse of the First Serbian Uprising the population of the Lim valley and Brda would carry on the liberation struggle mainly with reliance on Montenegro.

The experience from cooperation with leaders of the Serbian Uprising was important for broader political strivings and prospects of the liberation struggle. After the defeat of the Ottoman campaign against Morača and Rovca in 1820/1, these tribes formally became part of effectively free Montenegro, which exerted a strong liberation influence on the Tara valley and the sanjak of Novi Pazar.⁷⁹ Rivalries among Ottoman notables and local feudal lords' breaking away from the central authority affected the Ottoman towns of Scutari and Kolašin as well. The year 1830 was a bad one for the Herzegovina tribes, especially the Drobnjaci and Uskoci, who suffered severely from Ottoman attacks. The period from 1831 to 1851 was marked by the Ottoman central government's military intervention against unruly local feudal lords. It was also the period of the reign of Petar II Petrović Njegoš, who sought to bind the Herzegovina and Brda tribes to Montenegro. He established political ties with Husein-kapetan (captain) Gradašćević through the hegumen of Djurdjevi Stupovi Mojsije (Zečević) for joint action against the sultan. After the death of Ismail Aga Čengić at Mljetičak, the following years, especially 1847/8, were also marked by conflicts between Christians and Ottomans in this region.⁸⁰ During the liberation wars of 1875–78 and 1912, these regions were finally liberated from the centuries-long Ottoman occupation.

Conclusion

The centuries of Ottoman occupation left an indelible mark on these areas manifest in demographics, religious diversity, cultural heritage, customs, many words of Turkish origin, epic poetry. The long-standing liberation struggle was inspired by the memory of the powerful medieval Serbian

⁷⁹ AS, Knjaževa kancelarija [Prince's Chancery], XXXII, 78, 79.

⁸⁰ "Typical of these areas was četovanje which differed from hajdučija in that četniks did not leave their homes, whereas the hajduks would be absent from home for several years." Cf. AIIP, printouts from Bogišić's library in Cavtat, folder 233.

state, the Battle of Kosovo, and over time Russia came to be idolized as protector. The Serbian Orthodox Church subsisted through those centuries, acting as a pillar of identity and traditional customs but also as the focus for popular rallying and inspirer of the hope of liberation. The tribal division created after the Ottoman invasion was a source of some peculiarities by comparison with other areas of the Balkan Peninsula. The Lim and Tara valleys, Old Herzegovina and Pešter were the source of constant migration of population to western, southern and central Serbia, Šumadija. On the whole, the period from 1455 to 1912 was marked by a permanent struggle for liberation, although some areas had been gradually liberated even before or were semi-free.

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The Austro-Hungarian Occupation Regime in Serbia and Its Break-Down in 1918

Abstract: This paper discusses the occupation of Serbia during the First World War by Austro-Hungarian forces. The first partial occupation was short-lived as the Serbian army repelled the aggressors after the Battle of Kolubara in late 1914, but the second one lasted from fall 1915 until the end of the Great War. The Austro-Hungarian occupation zone in Serbia covered the largest share of Serbia's territory and it was organised in the shape of the Military Governorate on the pattern of Austro-Hungarian occupation of part of Poland. The invaders did not reach a clear decision as to what to do with Serbian territory in post-war period and that gave rise to considerable frictions between Austro-Hungarian and German interests in the Balkans, then between Austrian and Hungarian interests and, finally, between military and civilian authorities within Military Governorate. Throughout the occupation Serbia was exposed to ruthless economic exploitation and her population suffered much both from devastation and from large-scale repression (including deportations, internments and denationalisation) on the part of the occupation regime.

Keywords: Serbia, Austria-Hungary, occupation of Serbia 1915–1918, Military Governorate, Great War

The Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia in 1914 was perhaps the most convincing confirmation of the truism that war is but a continuation of peacetime politics by extraordinary means. The declaration of war on Serbia was an attempt to resolve the precarious internal, national and social issues of the Habsburg Empire by violence. However, these issues would remain open during the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Serbia in the First World War.

The Austro-Serbian conflict in 1914 was an expression of deep-rooted contradictions in the recent historical development of the Balkans and Central Europe. The Balkan states of the nineteenth century were born in national and agrarian revolutions resulting from the application of the nationality principle which was increasingly predominant in modern Europe. By contrast, the Habsburg Empire was founded on the principle of historical legitimism and it of necessity had to come into conflict, sooner or later, with the developments on its own soil and in the Balkans. The formation of Serbia and Montenegro in the nineteenth century turned into an external and internal threat to Habsburg legitimism: externally, because it hindered aggressive tendencies towards the south; internally, because it benefited the process of emancipation of the peoples under the Habsburg crown. There-


fore, Serbia and Montenegro were not such a danger for the vast thousand-year-long Central European Empire in themselves, but rather as part of that broad and general movement for social and economic emancipation of the nations in Central and South-Eastern Europe. This was all the more so as the aggressive tendencies of the Habsburg Empire themselves foundered on the dilemma between demands for quelling these movements and impossibility to do so. Unresolved nationality issues within the Empire prevented the accretion of additional Slav population which, in turn, did not allow for a radical solution of the Balkan question. On the other hand, at the stage of European imperialism reached at the turn of the century the Balkan question was increasingly becoming part of European high politics. Blocked from within by resistance of the ruling circles of “historic nations” to the trialist solution for the internal structure of the Empire, suppressed from outside by rivalry on the part of Russia and western democracies opposed to German *Drang*, Austria-Hungary was forced to conduct *status quo* policy in the Balkans which manifested itself in stifling local development, suppressing Russia and attempting economic penetration in competition with stronger opponents. Such static and basically negative policy was bound to come into conflict with dynamical development of the new national states in South-Eastern Europe. The consequence of such policy was an attempt to resolve not just the Serbian but also the Yugoslav and Balkan question by violence, by declaring war in 1914. In the conditions of international tension and struggle for redistribution of world power, the Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia was as good excuse as any for the outbreak of the First World War.¹

This short introduction is necessary for understanding Austria-Hungary’s occupation policy in Serbia in 1915–18 because it reflected the same unresolved difficulties which had burdened the Habsburg Empire in the pre-war period. The war and the occupation of Serbia perhaps just highlighted those difficulties more clearly.

I

Entering into war against Serbia in 1914 Austria-Hungary had only one clearly defined goal – military annihilation of Serbia. There was an utter confusion as to what policy should be pursued further and what the Empire’s permanent objectives in Serbia were. There were three different conceptions regarding the future of Serbia. The military, in particular the Chief of General Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, advocated a long-lasting military occupation of Serbia with pronounced annexationist ambitions and

¹ D. Djordjević, “The Serbs as an integrating and disintegrating factor”, *Austrian History Yearbook* 3/2 (Houston 1967), 48–82. See more in D. Djordjević, *Révolutions nationales des peuples balkaniques, 1804–1914*. Belgrade: Institut d’histoire, 1965.



Austro-Hungarian occupation zones

intention to permanently secure the possession of the strategically important Morava-Vardar valley and eliminate any potential influence of Serbia on her co-nationals in the Monarchy. The Hungarian ruling circles headed by Prime Minister, István Tisza, set their faces against it refusing to have the Slav population of Austria-Hungary increased and seeing it as a threat of trialism. Rejecting the annexation of the entire country, Budapest envisaged annexing a smaller part of north-western Serbia to Hungary (the so-called bridgehead at Šabac and Belgrade). The Foreign Ministry in Vienna was in favour of a free hand policy towards Serbia refusing to prejudge her ultimate fate given the uncertain outcome of the war and peace negotiations and not excluding the existence of a rump weakened Serbia closely attached to the Empire through economic and political agreements.

Divergence of views and interests in relation to the future position of Serbia came to the fore and found its expression in the conclusions of the joint Ministerial Council's sessions held on 19 July 1914 and 7 January 1916. They contained the following provisions: 1) Serbia would not be annexed to the Monarchy; 2) a prospective peace settlement could provide for a rump independent Serbia; 3) the territories to be annexed in the south

would be annexed to Hungary, but their position would be determined by the legislative bodies of both constituent parts of the Monarchy.² Lack of clarity and incompleteness of these provisions, and especially the contradiction of interests from which they emerged caused considerable friction within the occupation authority and influenced, to a large degree, direction and extent of its operation.

II

The organisation of administration over certain occupied regions of Serbia was carried out in November 1914 when the Serbian Army was retreating to Mt Suvobor in preparation for the decisive Battle of the Kolubara. The entry into abandoned Belgrade on 2 December was declared a great victory by the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command.³ Penetrating into the interior of Serbia, however, the invader found desolate land because population was retreating along with the army which made it difficult to establish new authorities.⁴ The conquered area was divided into five county commands (*Etappenbezirkskommando*) headed by Military Governorate in Belgrade. Field-Marshal Stjepan Sarkotić was appointed Governor by imperial decree. Administrative staff was supposed to be recruited from civil servants from Austria, Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁵ But they did not have enough time to make it to Serbia and take up their duties because the Serbian army's counteroffensive at the Kolubara River resulted in the liberation of the whole country on 15 December.⁶

² N. Petrović, "Zajednički austro-ugarski kabinet i Jugoslovensko pitanje 1912–1918", in *Jugoslovenski narodi pred prvi svatski rat*, Department of Social Sciences series vol. 61 (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1967), 733–739.

³ D. Milikić, "Beograd pod okupacijom u prvom svetskom ratu", *Godišnjak grada Beograda V* (1958), 263; see also Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv Wien (HHSTAW) Polit. Archiv Liasse Krieg 2a (1914–1916), Telegramm von Masirevich, Koviljača 2. XII. 1914.

⁴ HHSTAW, P. A., K. 973, Krieg 32a, Masirevich an den k. u. k. Minister des Aeussern Grafen Berchtold, Koviljača 26. XI. 1914 – "Part of the country from the Drina to Valjevo," Masirević wrote, "is completely deserted and without population." County commands were located in Loznica, Šabac, Valjevo, Užice and Belgrade.

⁵ HHSTAW, P. A., K. 973, Krieg 32a, Abschrift eines Telegrammes des Feldzeugmeisters Potiorek vom 25. November 1914 an den Herrn k. u. k. Ministerpräsidenten; *ibid.* Der Vertreter des k. u. k. Ministeriums des Äussern in der Nachrichten Abteilung des Operationsoberkommando B Gruppe, Koviljača 6. XII. 1914; *ibid.* Militär Kanzlei Sr. Majestät No 3637, 24. XI. 1914.

⁶ D. Djordjevic, "Vojvoda Putnik. The Serbian High Command and Strategy in 1914", in Béla K. Király & Nandor Dreisziger, eds., *East Central European Society in the First World War*, Boulder: East European Monographs, 1985, 569–589.

The second occupation of Serbia lasted much longer – from fall 1915 to fall 1918. The Austro-Hungarian occupation area stretched up to the Morava River (from Smederevo to Stalać) and the line descending on Mt Jastrebac and, partly, Mt Kopaonik to the south-east of Kosovska Mitrovica and above Prizren to the Albanian border. Regions in the east and south including Serbian Macedonia were ceded to Bulgaria. The establishing of occupation zones in Serbia, Montenegro and Albania was informed by the frontiers established in Bucharest in 1913.⁷ The new administration was gradually formed in step with development of military operations through the so-called *Ettapen* system of county commands. Finally, the Military General Governorate for Serbia was formed on 1 January 1916 on the model of Austro-Hungarian occupation of the Russian part of Poland.⁸ It was under jurisdiction of the Supreme Command and headed by General-Governor with the rank of a corps commander appointed by the Emperor. A civilian commissary and chief of staff were added as auxiliary organs. Under General-Governor in Belgrade were the Command of the City of Belgrade, county commands and municipalities. The prior Serbian administrative division into counties was maintained for the sake of efficiency with certain modifications in the counties bordering on the territory ceded to Bulgaria.⁹ The Governorate encompassed four administrative departments: military, political, economic and judicial. The military one was under the command of the chief of staff and consisted of presidial, transportation, gendarmerie and supply sections; the political department headed by a staff officer had its intelligence and political-police sections (with offices for educational, cultural, police and medical matters); the economic department had economic and financial sections: the former had offices for trade, agriculture, forestry, mining and military production plants; the latter had offices for direct and indirect taxes. Finally, the judicial department had sections for criminal and civil law matters. County commands had executive and judicial authority in their respective counties. At the bottom of this ladder were municipalities with their mayors, elected from the ranks of reliable local people, and municipal court.¹⁰

⁷ HHSTAW, P. A. I, K. 975, Krieg 32g, Evidenzbureau des k. u k. Generalstabes, Hauptmann Julius Ledineg an das k. u k. Armeeeoberkommando.

⁸ Ibid. Armeeeoberkommando, General-Oberst Conrad an den Militär Generalgouverneur im Belgrad 1. I. 1916. A similar General Military Governorate was also established in Montenegro. See V. N. Rakočević, “Crna Gora pod austrougarskom okupacijom 1916–1918” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, p. 355ff).

⁹ Ibid. Der Vertreter des k. u k. Ministeriums des Äussern an den Minister des Äussern Baron Burián, Belgrad den 5. November 1915.

¹⁰ Ibid. P. A., K. 973, Krieg 32a, B. Behörden – Organisation und allgemeine Grundsätze für Ihren Wirkungskreis. Besides the Command of the City of Belgrade, there were

In such organisation of the occupation administration the army played a dominant role which was understandable in view of wartime circumstances. But because of the conflict of interests and aspirations in the conquered area frictions soon emerged in interpretation of the basic aims and tasks of the occupation. Those frictions came to pass first between Austro-Hungarian and German interests in the Balkans, then between Austrian and Hungarian interests and, finally, between military and civilian authorities.

III

Military operations carried out from 1914 onwards demonstrated Austria-Hungary's increasing dependence on its German ally. This caused among the ruling circles of the Habsburg Empire not just a sense of dwindling prestige, but also a fear that Germany would impose solutions which exclusively suited her own interests. On two occasions such fear was not unfounded: during German attempts to conclude a separate peace with Serbia and thus shake off the burden of the Balkan front and during German economic exploitation of the conquered Serbian land.

1) The failure of a rapid war operation on the Western front, the need to engage ever increasing number of troops against Russia and the siding of Italy with the Entente Powers made the Central Powers in May 1915 consider the possibility of a separate peace on the less important Serbian battlefield. The German plan was quite a large-scale one: to regroup the Balkan forces and form another Balkan alliance under the aegis of Germany for the purpose of pressurising Romania, relieving the forces on the Italian front and blocking the Entente's Balkan plans. These objectives could be achieved through a separate peace with Serbia which would obtain an outlet to the sea across northern Albania, unify with Montenegro and establish close ties with the Monarchy. Serbia would, in return, cede Serbian Macedonia to Bulgaria while Greece would receive southern Albania.¹¹ Doubting that it was possible to settle scores both with Italy and Serbia at the same time Viennese diplomacy was inclined to such solution as it believed that the Monarchy's prestige would not suffer following the success of the Central Powers on the Eastern front and preferring the entrenchment in Albania of a small Serbia to that of Italy.¹² Although in agreement with those com-

12 counties: Belgrade, Kragujevac, Gornji Milanovac, Novi Pazar, Šabac, Užice, Čačak, Kruševac, Mitrovica, Prijepolje, Smederevo, Valjevo.

¹¹ Ibid. P. A., K. 952, Krieg 25g, Auszug aus Aufzeichnung über die 24. V. 1915. erfolgte Unterredung in Pless; Ibid. Gesanschaft in Stockholm, Bericht n° 43 A-C/P, 18. VI. 1915.

¹² Ibid. Krieg 25g, Promemoria des Grafen Hoyos über die Möglichkeit eines Separatfriedens mit Serbien 22. Mai 1915.

binations Vienna was rather suspicious of German feelers cast through the intermediary of the Greek king and, even more so, German agents in the Balkans.¹³ In fall 1915, on the eve of the offensive against Serbia, Vienna and Budapest opposed the renewed German attempts to pre-empt military operation with negotiations. The Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza accused Germany of “intriguing” in Serbia behind the back of Austria-Hungary.¹⁴ Prince Hohenlohe openly requested from the German Foreign Minister, Gottlieb von Jagow, in Berlin that “German agents in the Balkans stop with this practice”.¹⁵ On the contrary, German diplomacy was dismayed by the lack of Austria-Hungary’s concrete plans for Serbia. When von Jagow instructed his Ambassador Tschirschky to sound out Vienna’s stance if Serbia in the last moment, facing annihilation, sought for a peaceful solution, the Foreign Minister, Count Burián, simply replied that he was against half-measures that would harm the Monarchy’s prestige.¹⁶ Vienna wanted an offensive, destruction of Serbia and occupation of her entire territory.¹⁷ After another German insistence, in October 1915, Vienna again evaded giving a specific reply.¹⁸ That was hardly surprising as Vienna did not have a clear idea as to her Balkan intentions. In early November, when General Falkenhayn urgently asked for conditions to be put forward before expected Serbian parliamentarians, von Jagow reproached Prince Hohenlohe stressing that “we must be clear in our mind as to what we want”. The only answer he received was a repetition of general request for “complete military capitulation of Serbia”.¹⁹ Informing Prince Hohenlohe in November 1915 that the fate of Serbia, Montenegro and Albania would be discussed at a forth-

¹³ Ibid. Telegramm Silaschi, Athenes 28. September 1915; Hohenlohe an Burián, Berlin 3. VIII. 1915; Ibid. 6. X. 1915; Burián an Czernin und Tarnowski, Wien 16. VIII. 1915.

¹⁴ Ibid. Krieg b-I, Tisza an Burián 2. X. 1915. Tisza threatened that German attempts to negotiate behind the back and on behalf of Austria-Hungary militate against the Monarchy’s favourable attitude towards Serbia. He requested that the two allied countries determine their objectives in the Balkans.

¹⁵ Ibid.. P. A. I., Krieg 25g, K. 952, Note des k. u k. Ministeriums des Äussern an Graf Tisza in Budapest.

¹⁶ Chiffre-Telegramm ddtto Berlin 27 September 1915, Prinz Hohenlohe an das k. u k. Ministerium des Äussern (Streng geheim). Hohenlohe was sceptical about ‘prestige’ since the subjugation of Serbia could only be carried out with Germany’s intervention.

¹⁷ Ibid. Telegramm in Ziffern des Ministers des Äussern Baron Burián an Prinzen Hohenlohe in Berlin, ddtto Wien 28. September 1915, Geheim.

¹⁸ Ibid. Telegramm in Ziffern an Gottfried Prinzen Hohenlohe in Berlin, ddtto Wien 30. Oktober 1915, Geheim! Ibid. Chiffre Telegramm des Prinzen Hohenlohe ddtto Berlin 31. Oktober 1915.

¹⁹ Ibid. Prinz Hohenlohe an Minister Baron Burián, Geheim – Berlin 3. November 1915.

coming meeting in Berlin, Burián limited his instructions to opposition to unification of these countries and demand for continuation of military operations.²⁰ Fearing that Germany might act on her own, the Ministry in Vienna demanded to have a representative in Field-Marshal August von Mackensen's army with the view to taking part in the acceptance of Serbian capitulation.²¹ However, contrary to expectations of the Central Powers, the Serbian government and Supreme Command did not offer capitulation but rather proceeded to retreat across Albania. The eagerly expected Serbian parliamentarians did not turn up at all.²²

2) The conquest of Serbia posed other problems before the Austro-German allies, particularly in the matters of administration, division of war spoils and economic exploitation of the occupied area. The Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza was the first one to be alarmed having heard that German military administration would be introduced in Serbia. On 7 November 1915, he vehemently protested in the Supreme Command requesting from Conrad von Hötzendorf to explain to the Germans that Serbia was in the Hungarian sphere of interest.²³ In a conversation held on 8 November with Conrad von Hötzendorf in Pless, General Falkenheyn accepted an Austro-Hungarian occupation administration in Serbia, but he refused to commit himself in written on 12 November using the on-going military operations as an excuse.²⁴ Besides, Germany did not intend to dispute Austria-Hungary's right to Serbia; she just wanted to buy some time in order to extract as much loot as possible and secure economic advantages in the occupation regime. Burián was, however, very suspicious; he insisted in Berlin on 18 November that, given its "immediate interests and contiguous position" Serbia belonged to the Monarchy which would introduce its own administration there in accordance with Falkenheyn's statement of 8 November.²⁵ Austro-Hungarian reports from this period were rife with bitter accusations on account of German ruthless exploitation of Poland and Serbia. According to those reports, the Germans had devastated forests, taken all food, coal, petroleum, introduced unrealistic exchange rate for ruble, damaged industry and deprived it of raw materials, transported field workers to Germany and imposed high railway and custom

²⁰ Ibid. Notiz: I. Herrn von Tschirschky; II. Prinz Hohenlohe, Burián Wien 5. XI. 1915.

²¹ Ibid. Baron Mussulin an Graven Thurn, Armeoberkommando, Wien 28. X. 1915.

²² News of two Serbian parliamentarians coming to negotiate on 11 November caused a great stir, but it turned out to be false.

²³ Ibid. K. 973, Krieg 23a, Abschrift – Note an Grafen Thurn, Wien 7. XI. 1915.

²⁴ Ibid. Der Vertreter des k. u k. Ministeriums des Aeussern beim k. u k. Armeoberkommando, Teschen 15. November 1915 (Wiesner an Burián).

²⁵ Ibid. Abschrift eines streng vertraulichen Erlasses an Prinzen Gottfried Hohenlohe, Wien 18. November 1915; Ibid. Telegramm Hohenlohe, Berlin 21. XI. 1915.

tariffs as well as tax rates. The Germans behaved the same way in Serbia and appropriated all resources, commandeered all wheat, flour, wine, cattle, salt, petroleum etc. The reports predicted that famine and permanent impoverishment of the population would reach such level that it would not just threaten the current situation but also cause infinite consequences in the future.²⁶ It would be Austria-Hungary that would suffer worst because of that as she counted on this area in post-war period. The reports of Austro-Hungarian occupation authorities reflected struggle between the allies over the loot in Serbia. To bring that conflict to an end Conrad von Hötzendorf stated to General Falkenheyn on 20 December 1915 that the Austro-Hungarian military administration in Serbia was an accomplished fact warning the German Command at the same time to moderate requisitions of Serbian supplies.²⁷ The German Command was prepared to cede Serbia to Austria-Hungary if the latter fulfilled certain conditions: 1) free and uninterrupted German transit for civilian and military purposes; 2) opening of the Serbian economic area to Germany for the purpose of supplying with foodstuff and raw materials; 3) equality of customs conditions in case a separate customs zone was created in Serbia; 4) the Smederevo-Niš-Skoplje railway and Kragujevac and its railway network remained in German hands; 5) German right to exploit copper in the mine of Bor.²⁸ The request for economic exploitation, particularly that of mines and railway, was a major concern for Vienna.²⁹ Ballhausplatz accused the Germans of deliberate procrastination with their temporary military administration in Serbia with the view to keeping railways and mines in their possession for as long as possible.³⁰ In order to back their mining requests, the Austrians invoked the pre-war rights of their StEG company (*Österreichisch-ungarische Staatseisenbahngesellschaft*)³¹ and fought tooth and nail in the Su-

²⁶ Ibid. On the economic exploitation of "Russian" Poland in Serbia on the part of the German army – a copy of a strictly confidential report to Prince Gottfried Hohenlohe, Wien 27. XII. 1915.

²⁷ Ibid. General Oberst Conrad an den Chef des Generalstabes des Feldheeres Herrn Erich von Falkenheyn, Standort des AOK, 20. XII 1915.

²⁸ Ibid. Notiz auf die Notizen vom 21. November, 24. November, 1. December und 12. December d. J. – Berlin 28. XII. 1915. The civilian and military views in Germany diverged. Civilians wanted Bor for Germany and were willing to cede Majdanpek to Austria-Hungary and Plakatnica to Bulgaria. The military insisted on maintaining control over Majdanpek mine. Germany granted to Austria-Hungary a third of copper from mine of Bor.

²⁹ Ibid. Thurn an den Minister des Äussern Baron Burián, Teschen 10. Jänner 1916.

³⁰ Ibid. Baron Burián an Grafen Thurn – Telegramm, Wien 11. XII. 1915.

³¹ StEG had signed contracts with the Serbian government in 1912 for exploration of the mining basin of Krajina in eastern Serbia, with the Belgian Company for explora-

preme Command to secure exploitation of Majdanpek mine for themselves.³² As for the railways, an agreement was reached in January 1916 which left the railway from Smederevo to the Greek border in German hands as long as German troops were engaged on the Balkan front.

The Bulgarian ally was not fully trusted either. Although the Foreign Ministry in Vienna did not oppose forced Bulgarisation of eastern and southern Serbia in principle, and even condoned it,³³ a number of documents in the Vienna archives point out the great extent to and suspicion with which Bulgarian propaganda in the provinces of Kosovo, Metohija and Serbian Macedonia populated by Albanians was followed.³⁴

IV

Just as the Hungarians feared in 1915 that Germany might present them with an accomplished fact, the Austrians suspected Hungarians of doing the same. Alarm was caused by *Korrespondenzbureau* on 10 November 1914, confirmed by the *Magyarország* nine days later, that the authorities in the occupied region of Mačva were of Hungarian character with a Hungarian commander, gendarmerie and clerks.³⁵ On 19 November, the Austrian Prime Minister, Baron Stürgkh, filed an energetic protest with the Foreign Ministry, the Budapest government and the southern front command describing such action as “a flagrant infringement on Austria’s rights” and warning that he would “deny his consent to any solution which would not be unequivocal about the fact that the conquered land was administered on behalf of the Monarchy through its plenipotentiaries and delegates”.³⁶ Facing resistance Tisza tried in early December to achieve his goal in a roundabout way. Complaining about bulkiness and inefficiency of the administrative apparatus consisting of clerks from Austria, Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina he suggested to Count Berchtold some sort of internal division of spheres of interest: Hungarian clerks in Serbia, Aus-

tion of Majdanpek as well as with the Majdanpek company. See *ibid.* The exploitation of mines in Serbia.

³² *Ibid.* Von Falkenheyn an Gen. Oberst Conrad, Teschen 28. XII 1915; Der Vertreter des Ministeriums des Äussern beim Armeoberkommando Wiesner an Baron Burián, Teschen 29. XII 1915,

³³ *Ibid.* K. 975, Krieg 32, Vize-Consul in Nisch an Grafen Czernin, 20. III. 1918.

³⁴ *Ibid.* K. 975, Krieg 32-i.

³⁵ *Ibid.* K. 973, Krieg 32a, Telegramm des Korrespondenzbureau 10. XI. 1914.

³⁶ *Ibid.* Note des k. u. k. Ministerpräsidenten Baron Stürgkh an den Minister des Äussern Grafen Berchtold, Wien 19. November 1914. Berchtold instantly admonished the commander of the southern front, General Potiorek – Note des Ministers des Äussern an den Ministerpräsidenten in Wien, Str. Vertraulich, Wien 20. November 1914.

trian in the so-called “Russian” Poland.³⁷ The proposal was rejected in Vienna.³⁸ In winter 1915/16, conflict broke out between military and civilian authorities in General Military Governorate in Serbia. The reasons for this conflict were twofold. First, Austro-Hungarian rivalry; then, annexationist plans of the military command in Serbia – all resulting from the divergence of views in respect of general policy towards Serbia i.e. the aims and tasks of occupation. Imposing an occupation regime, the Supreme Command unequivocally started introducing a regime of long-lasting military administration with annexationist objectives. The Hungarian government set their faces against it as it preferred – and it was backed by the joint Foreign Ministry – to keep the Serbian question open until the end of the war. That is how that dispute turned into the conflict between military and civilian authorities over the jurisdiction of civilians within military administration, educational policy in the Governorate and, in general, the regime in the occupied area.

Above all, soldiers took a dim view of civilian interference with what they considered exclusively military matters. In mid-October 1915, the Foreign Ministry in Vienna appointed its delegate with the Intelligence Department of the Third Army Command to represent its “administrative and political interests”. In early 1916, General Consul, Ladislaus Györgyey, replaced Von Storck and the latter was succeeded by Plenipotentiary Minister, Ludwig Graf Szechenyi, in February.³⁹ The statute of the Military Governorate envisaged the position of a civilian commissary and that duty was taken up by historian Thalloczy. It should be noted that these posts were filled by Hungarians alone. However, militaries systematically sabotaged the work of civilians, particularly that of the Foreign Ministry restraining its activities in Belgrade at every step. The Foreign Ministry complained to the Supreme Command on several occasions that its representative was blocked at every turn and that he had carried out his orders by constantly pleading with military authorities which censured his reports.⁴⁰ Typical of this kind of relations was the dispute over the Serbian state archives that arose in

³⁷ Ibid. Note des ungarischen Ministerpräsidenten Grafen Tisza an den Minister des Äussern Grafen Berchtold, Vertraulich, Budapest 2. XII. 1914. Tisza proposed the same to Potiorek.

³⁸ Ibid. Tisza an Erherzog Friedrich, Budapest 26. Mai 1916.

³⁹ Kriegsarchiv, Wien, Operationsabteilung des Armeeeoberkommando, No 19867, Jänner 1916; *ibid.* Berichte Wiesner, Teschen 3. I. 1916; *ibid.* Akt des Armeeeoberkommando (No 21540), 13. II. 1916.

⁴⁰ Ibid. Operationsabteilung des AOK, No 21302, Graf Thurn ddto Teschen, 5. II. 1916; HHSTAW, P. A. I, K. 973, Krieg 32a, Abschrift eines Erlasses an Grafen Thurn, ddto Wien 18. IV. 1916. The censure of those reports did not stop before 25 May 1916. –

late November and early December 1915. Since the military opposed the transfer of the archives to Vienna as it intended to look into their content in Belgrade, Von Storck had cases full of archival material secretly, under the cover of night, transported to Zemun and thence to Austria.⁴¹

Annexationist policy of the Military Governorate in Serbia caused a sharp conflict. The most prominent participants were Tisza, Burián, Szechenyi and Thalloczy. When Governor Salis-Seewis and the War Minister Krobotin referred to Serbia as “an area annexed to the Monarchy”,⁴² Count Tisza seized on that opportunity with vigour to point out to the War Ministry the inaccuracy of such a statement and invoke the conclusions reached by the joint Ministerial Council.⁴³

Educational projects of the Military Governorate provided another reason for intervention. In mid-January 1916, the occupation authorities produced a plan for opening elementary and secondary schools in Serbia. The exposition of this plan stressed that it was “the main task of elementary schools to educate children for civic life and create useful members of human society, then general education and the strengthening of character, an emphasis being on maintaining discipline, cleanliness and upbringing in terms of orderly conduct”.⁴⁴ The plan encompassed a broad education programme and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were appointed as school staff. The Supreme Command approved the plan on 27 January⁴⁵ and the first of the envisaged schools was ceremoniously opened in Bitoljska Street in Belgrade as early as 10 February.⁴⁶

School curriculum banned the use of Cyrillic alphabet. In a memorandum produced by the army which Count Thurn forwarded to Baron

Kriegsarchiv, Operationsabteilung des AOK, No 25388, Armeeoberkommando an das Militärgouvernement Serbien 25. V. 1916.

⁴¹ HHSTAW, P. A. K. 822, Krieg 2 (1914–18), Privatschreiben. Von Storck, Wien 4. XII. 1915.

⁴² Ibid. P. A. I, Krieg 32 b, d, e, k. u. k. Militärgouvernement in Serbien an das Armeeoberkommando, 16. I. 1916.

⁴³ Tisza spoke against “showering good deeds [sic] on the fanatical hatred of the Serbian people which is guilty of this war”. – Ibid. P. A. I, Krieg 32 b, d, c, K. 974, Tisza an den Feldzeugmeister und Kriegsminister Alexander Freiherrn Krobotin, Budapest 13. II. 1916.

⁴⁴ AS, MGG/S, box 1/48 Plt. 48, Die Grundsätze für die Errichtung der Normal und Mittelschulen in Serbien. Ibid. MGG/S an das AOK, Belgrad 14. I. 1916.

⁴⁵ Ibid. MGG/S, box 1/48 Plt, Armeeoberkommando, Standort des AOK, 27. I. 1916.

⁴⁶ HHSTAW, P. A. K. 974, Krieg 32 a-f, Vertreter des Ministeriums des Äussern Graf Szechenyi, Belgrad 10. II. 1916. – The representative of the Foreign Ministry was not invited to take part in this ceremony. For more detail about the opening of schools see AS, Plt box 2/205, 20. IV. 1916.

Burián, Cyrillic alphabet was termed *staatsgefährlich* [dangerous to the state] because under the aegis of Serbian ecclesiastical and school autonomy in Vojvodina it had served as an instrument of agitation for the Serb cause, it provided a link between the Vojvodina Serbs with Serbia and, in general, contributed to preservation of national individuality of Serbs in the Habsburg Empire. By banning Cyrillic alphabet and advancing the educational programme the army openly demonstrated its intention to annex Serbia on the grounds of “general benefit for Austria-Hungary and not particular interests of one of her nations”, a clear allusion to Hungarians.⁴⁷

The action of military circles met with resistance in Budapest and Vienna. The civil commissary in Belgrade Thalloczy warned Governor Salis-Seewis that this measure would draw Serbs closer to Bulgarians.⁴⁸ Stürgkh, Burián and Tisza each made strong protest to the Supreme Command. These protests underscored principled importance of that matter and the army was warned not to prejudice the future status of Serbia by measures which were not in keeping with the temporary character of military occupation. Burián used the opportunity to point out the existing divergence between military and civilian authorities in Serbia.⁴⁹ Tisza was even harsher: repeating Burián’s arguments, he disputed educational competence of soldiers, accused the army of eschewing deliberately Hungarian teachers and demanded the implementation of a “strict regime in Serbia” because “the Serbs must feel the consequences of their offences” in order to “break down the power of Serbdom and build a strong bulwark against it”.⁵⁰

Exposed to such criticism, Conrad von Hötzendorf found himself in an unexpected position to defend the army from reproaches for its “kind treatment of Serbia”. In a reply to Tisza, he fully agreed with the policy of harsh rule in that country: “At the beginning of the offensive against Serbia,” Conrad von Hötzendorf wrote on 15 March 1916, “the Supreme Command ordered ruthless exploitation of the area. The Military Governorate is now carrying out disarmament of population and securing the area by employing draconic measures while material resources of Serbia would be utilised to maximum extent regardless of population.” He explained the educational policy of the Governorate as resulting from aspiration to pre-

⁴⁷ HHSTAW, Krieg 32 b, d, e, Graf Thurn an den Minister des Äussern Grafen Burián, Teschen 11. IV. 1916.

⁴⁸ Ibid. Graf Szechenyi an Baron Burián, Belgrad den 24. II. 1916.

⁴⁹ Ibid. K. 973, Krieg 32a, Abschrift eines streng vertraulichen Erlasses: 1. An den Vertreter des k. u k. Ministerium des Äussern in Belgrad; 2. An den Vertreter des k. u k. Ministerium des Äussern bei dem k. u k. Armeeeoberkommando, Wien 18. III. 1916.

⁵⁰ Ibid. K. 974, Krieg 32e, Kon. Ung. Ministerpräsident an das k. u k. Armeeeoberkommando, Budapest 3. III. 1916.

vent passive resistance and enable the full use of local economic resources. He regarded the use of NCOs as teaching staff in accordance with education of “Serbian children in the spirit of discipline and order”. As for banning Cyrillic alphabet, it had already been prohibited in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the imperial decree of 15 October 1915 just like it had been similarly removed from schools in Dalmatia.⁵¹ In a directive issued on the same day, Hötzenndorf did not conceal annexationist intentions: Serbia had to be ruled with firm hand and economically exploited as much as possible, but it had to be taken into account that she was necessary to the Monarchy as an economic area in the future. Serbian intelligentsia should be dealt with severely whereas peasants and commercial circles should be won over. In the matter of schools it was necessary to limit them to elementary, and possibly vocational, schools, but Serbian teachers must be completely excluded “for they are imbued with hatred of us”.⁵² Such policy of the Supreme Command and Governorate in Serbia only deepened the conflict with the Hungarians and civilian authorities.⁵³

Tendencies of military authorities in Serbia to transfer responsibility for some local administration to native people caused further suspiciousness. Some members of conservative Serbian circles were employed in occupation administration. Claiming that such measures were devoid of political inspiration, Governor Salis-Seewis argued that local population could not be completely excluded from internal administration if full economic exploitation of the land was to be effected. They were “carefully selected persons” which “did not discredit themselves politically in the past with outbursts against the Monarchy”.⁵⁴

The municipal committee in Belgrade formed immediately after the conquest of the city on 10 October 1915, and reorganised into two bodies (*Uprava* and *Odbor*) in February 1916, was enlarged, following the resignation of Dr. Stevan Leway, with a number of well-known Serbian politicians from the pre-war period. Along with the president, Vojislav Veljković, formerly finance minister and one of the leaders of the Popular Party, the committee was joined by Mihailo Popović, also a former finance minister and prominent Radical, Vasilije Antičić, formerly foreign minister and

⁵¹ Ibid. Krieg 32 b, d, e, Conrad von Hötzenndorf an Grafen Tisza, Standort des AOK, 15. III. 1916.

⁵² Ibid. Conrad von Hötzenndorf an das k. u. k. Militärgouvernement in Belgrad, Standort des AOK, 15. III. 1916.

⁵³ Ibid. Abschrift eines Erlasses an Grafen Thurn, 28. III. 1916.

⁵⁴ Milikić, “Beograd pod okupacijom”, 280, 298–299. Szechenyi took a favourable view of the previous work of all members of the committee – HHSTAW, K. 973, Krieg 32a, Graf Szechenyi an Minister Baron Burián, Belgrad 18. März 1916.

well-known Independent Radical, Živojin Perić, Progressivist and university professor, Pavle Denić, formerly construction minister, and others.⁵⁵ The *Zentralwoltätigkeits-Komitée* was then formed for the purpose of collecting and distributing aid for population; it consisted of “prominent citizens who are generally trusted, politically are beyond reproach and assessed as reliable”. The committee started forming its subcommittees in the interior attached to the county commands.⁵⁶ Of course, these bodies were under strict control of the occupation authorities. Attached to the Belgrade Committee were a civilian commissary and a military advisor; the same went for the Relief Committee. The members of the committee were elected on the basis of their personal activities rather than party affiliation.⁵⁷ They were restricted to the bounds of their competencies. In January 1916, the former Serbian prime minister, Liberal Jovan Avakumović, suggested to Count Salis-Seeuwis a joint proclamation to the population. The Governor was so angry with Avakumović because of his impertinent idea of attaching his signature next

⁵⁵ Ibid. Berichte des MGG/S, März 1916.

⁵⁶ Dr. Vojislav Veljković, the chairman of the committee, tried in May 1915 through the agency of the journalist Lončarević, who was assisting the representative of the Foreign Ministry, to initiate a general discussion between the Austro-Hungarian occupation authorities and the representatives of Serbian political parties who remained in the country. He reminded of the example of the Russian Legation in Belgrade that had gathered together the Serbian opposition at the time of the last rulers of the Obrenović dynasty and proposed a similar action of the occupiers in gathering the opponents of the Karađordjević dynasty and Radicals. According to Veljković and Lončarević, it was up to the Austro-Hungarian Legation in Belgrade to attract those parties which had not been ill-disposed to the Monarchy in the past. This discussion would have resulted in an agreement concerning the future political relations softening at the same time the unnecessary strictness of military authorities. (HHSTAW, P. A. I, K. 977, Krieg 32k Aufzeichnung eines Privatgespräches des Endesgefertigten, Belgrad 13. Mai 1916). Živojin Perić expounded similar ideas at the end of September 1916 reproaching military administration for neglecting the supporters of the Serbian Conservative Party founded in 1914 with an anti-Russian and pro-Austrian political programme. Perić complained that the authorities were interning Austrophiles as much as Radicals. (Ibid., Krieg 32k-o, Note by Živojin Perić and Professor Jovanović, Belgrade, late September 1916). In spring 1918, Perić proposed the formation of a “constituent [assembly]” in Serbia which would explicitly separate the Serbian cause from the Entente Powers (ibid. Report by Major Safranek, Belgrade, 11 March 1918). It is interesting to note that the renowned Austrophile Vukašin Petrović did not play a major role under the Austro-Hungarian occupation, although he did offer his services to Vienna (K. 952, Krieg 25, Burián to Thurn, private, 17 December 1915). The Military Governorate entrusted Petrović with collecting harvest and cattle from the Bulgarian occupation zone (ibid., K. 977, Krieg 32 k-o, Kuhn to Czernin, Belgrade, 23 March 1918).

⁵⁷ HHSTAW, K. 973, Krieg 32a, Generalkonsul Györgyey an Ministar Burián, Streng Vertraulich, Belgrad am 18. Jänner 1916.

to that of Salis-Seewis himself that he ordered his arrest and internment.⁵⁸ The affair reached even the Emperor's office which required further information.⁵⁹ A statement of Vojislav Veljković to the effect that the "Belgrade Committee, *supported* [emphasis mine] by military authorities, will do a useful job" also gave cause for grievance. Szechenyi complained that this statement suggested that the Committee had priority over military authorities.⁶⁰ When, at a meeting, Milivoje Spasojević, a member of the Relief Committee, started to criticise the occupation authorities the civilian commissary interrupted him and asked the Governor to have him interned.⁶¹

Recruiting local people to committees, the public celebration of "County Day" (*Kreistag*) in Gornji Milanovac, propaganda conducted by the *Beogradske novine* (Belgrade Newspaper) to the effect that the Serbian people would have a better future within the framework of the new state, public opening of schools made Hungarian ruling circles suspect that the army not just carried out an annexationist policy in Serbia but also prepared political actions with the view to establishing some kind of domestic authorities under occupation. It was the fear of the Yugoslav question that accounted for such Hungarian attitude. The administration of Governorate recruited mostly clerks of Yugoslav origin due to their language skills. Szechenyi went so far as to accuse Count Salis-Seewis of having special sympathies for the "Yugoslav race" because of his mother's Croat origin. A breeze starting from the top, from the Governor, Szechenyi complained, was turning into a storm among clerks at the bottom causing frictions and awakening unjustified hopes among the Serbs contrary to ambitions of the occupation authorities.⁶² Tisza saw the Yugoslav civil servants and the Serbian Belgrade Committee as an embryo of something of a Serbo-Croat authority that smacked of Yugoslavism and trialism.⁶³ "All this indicates the formation of a permanent authority," Tisza wrote to the Supreme Command on 3 March 1916, "in a finally conquered country, with a specific [political] programme."⁶⁴

⁵⁸ Ibid. Copia pro actis ad Einsichtsstück der Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät vom 25. Jänner 1916. (betreffend den gewesenen serbischen Ministerpräsidenten Avakumović).

⁵⁹ Ibid. K. 977, Krieg 32a, Graf Szechenyi an Baron Burián, Belgrad den 18. März 1918.

⁶⁰ Ibid. K. 973, Graf Szechenyi an Baron Burián, Belgrad 4. IV. 1916.

⁶¹ Ibid, same as note 59.

⁶² Ibid. Tisza an Erherzog Friedrich, Budapest 26. V. 1916.

⁶³ Ibid. K. 974, Krieg 32e, Kön. ung. Ministerpräsident an das k. u. k. Armeekommando, Budapest 3. III. 1916.

⁶⁴ Ibid. K. 973, Krieg 32a, Abschrift eines Str. Vertr. Erlasses 1. an den Vertreter des k. u. k. Ministerium des Äussern bei dem Armeekommando, Wien 18. III. 1916.

In mid-March 1916, the Foreign Ministry in Vienna and the Hungarian government filed their protests with the Supreme Command and Governorate pointing to the stepping over the bounds of powers and to the political consequences of such actions. Count Szechenyi was instructed from Vienna to personally inform Count Salis-Seewis⁶⁵ but, as the representative of the Foreign Ministry expected, the Governor took shelter behind the Supreme Command referring to specific orders he had received and which he had to carry out as a soldier.⁶⁶ The Supreme Command was also uncompromising: Conrad von Hötzendorf defended himself that the writing of the occupation press could not be taken as a proof because that press was read abroad as well and “we have no interest in provoking foreign public opinion or presenting ourselves in an unfavourable light by describing our draconic repressive measures in Serbia”.⁶⁷

In order to find out what the real state of affairs was, Tisza himself undertook an inspection tour in north-west Serbia in early May 1916 including a visit to the General Governor in Belgrade. On that occasion he visited Šabac, Koviljača, Zabrežje, Valjevo and Lazarevac.⁶⁸ Upon his return, Tisza decided to finally settle the question. First in a written communication,⁶⁹ then in a conversation with Erzherzog Friedrich and Conrad von Hötzendorf at the end of May in Teschen, the seat of the Supreme Command, he requested a thorough reorganisation of the Military Governorate, the removal of Governor and condemnation of annexationist policy in Serbia. Since Hötzendorf again refused to accept Tisza’s reasons defending the army, the Hungarian Prime Minister addressed Baron Burián on 3 June with the plea to have the Emperor’s verdict in this dispute invoking the decisions of the joint Ministerial Council of 19 July 1914 and 7 January 1916. “The Hungarian government will not assume responsibility for events on the southern frontier and their impact on the hinterland,” Tisza concluded, “if the Military Governorate continues with its activities that run contrary to vital interests of the Hungarian state.”⁷⁰ That was an ultimatum on the part of Hungary and Burián understood it as such. In his note to the

⁶⁵ Ibid. Graf Szechenyi an den Herrn Minister des k. u k. Hauses und des Äussern Baron Burián, Belgrad 24. III. 1916. – Governor Salis-Seewis complained that Burián was ill-informed openly alluding to his interlocutor Szechenyi as a source of inaccurate information.

⁶⁶ Ibid. K. 974, Krieg 32 b, d, e, Conrad von Hötzendorf an Grafen Tisza, Standort des AOK, 15. III. 1916.

⁶⁷ Ibid. K. 973, Krieg 32a, Szechenyi an Baron Burián, Belgrad 17. Mai 1916.

⁶⁸ Ibid. Graf Tisza an Erzherzog Friedrich, Budapest 26. V. 1916.

⁶⁹ Ibid. Graf Tisza an Baron Burián, Budapest 3. Juni 1916.

⁷⁰ Ibid. Abschrift eines alleruntertänigsten Immediatvortrages ddo Wien, 9. Juni 1916.

Emperor on 9 June he reminded of the decisions of the joint Ministerial Council in respect of Serbia, repeated all the accusations against the policy of Military Governorate and used the opportunity to demand extension of authority given to the representative of civilian authorities.⁷¹ Both proposals were accepted: by the Emperor's decision of 6 July 1916 Count Salis-Seewis and his chief of staff, Colonel Gelinek, were recalled and replaced by General Adolf von Rhemen and Colonel Hugo Kerchnawe.⁷² The removal of Salis-Seewis was received in Belgrade, in the words of Szechenyi, as a "thunder from a clear sky". The Governor was angry and he instantly left Belgrade in a car. A protest addressed to the Supreme Command failed. Ironically referring to certain parts of Salis-Seewis's farewell order mentioning a "peaceful and content population", Szechenyi pointed out that a plot had just been discovered in Serbia involving 50 persons of which 12 had been hanged.⁷³

The Emperor's decision of 6 July authorised Baron Burián to submit the necessary proposals to the Supreme Command for the purpose of extending authority of a civilian commissary. He did it promptly on 10 July disputing the qualifications, previous knowledge and practical experience of military men in the matters of a political-administrative nature. The Statute of the General Military Governorate in Serbia considerably extended the power of civilian authorities. Civilian commissary was, just like Governor, appointed by the Emperor; he was charged with all matters of civilian administration, appointing, replacing and rewarding clerks; the entire political, economic, financial, and legal service of the Governorate, completely separated from military functions, was under him. Civilian officials headed all non-military departments.⁷⁴ The entry of Romania into war in August 1916 temporarily postponed coming into force of these changes – that finally took place on 15 October 1916.⁷⁵

The conflict of military and civilian authorities in occupied Serbia ended in the defeat of the Supreme Command's conceptions in summer 1916. In keeping with the interests of Hungarian ruling circles her fate

⁷¹ Ibid. Emperor's decision of 8 July 1916.

⁷² Ibid. Streng vertrauliches Privatschreiben des Grafen Szechenyi ddtto Belgrad, 12. Juli 1916.

⁷³ Ibid. Abschrift eines geheimen Erlasses an Grafen Thurn, Armeeeoberkommando, ddtto Wien. 10. VII. 1916 – The suggested changes were attached.

⁷⁴ Ibid. Telegramm an Grafen Thurn 20. IX. 1916; F. Kinsky an Baron Burián, Teschen 10. X. 1916.

⁷⁵ Kriegsarchiv, Operationsabteilung AOK, No 28818/I, Armeeeoberkommando an das Militergeneralgouvernement in Serbien 29. VIII. 1916; *ibid.* No 30219, 15. IX. 1916; *ibid.* No 30473, 13. IX. 1916 and No 30185, 9. IX. 1916.

remained uncertain in anticipation of the outcome of the war that was still in full swing. In the meantime, Serbia was going to be ruled with the iron fist of military occupation.

V

The occupation authorities in Serbia in 1915–1918 had three basic tasks: to secure peace and order, to conduct economic exploitation of the country and to create the necessary conditions for the life of population.

1) The shifting of the war theatre towards the south (the Salonica front), military operations on the Italian front, the increasing demands from the main theatres of war in the west and east of Europe constantly diminished military effectives stationed in Serbia. In mid-October 1915, the Command of the Belgrade Bridgehead (*Brückenkopfkommando*) was formed for the purpose of fortifying a defence line towards the south. The Command of the City of Belgrade was added to it later, but technical works of the Belgrade Bridgehead Command were ceased as early as spring 1916, a large number of men was withdrawn and the command itself was dissolved in August 1917. Romania's entry into war against the Central Powers in August 1916 brought the Serbian land to the vicinity of battlefield for a brief time. A strategic reserve was then formed in the Kragujevac-Palanka-Arandjlovac area which was also prepared to suppress hostile movements of the population. Mines were laid in the river. However, a rapid success on the Romanian front pushed again the Serbian land deeper into the background of military operations. The occupation forces adhered to the ratio of keeping 30,000 soldiers to control 50,000 civilians of military age.⁷⁶ However, this ratio could not be maintained: in summer 1917, the General Military Governorate had just 16,000 troops at its disposal many of whom were not of particular fighting capabilities.⁷⁷ Their duty was mostly reduced to securing the railway, harvest, occasional searching for guerrilla groups, particularly guarding against the crossing of such groups from the Bulgarian occupation zone during and after the well-known Toplica insurgency in spring 1917.⁷⁸ The stationed troops were increasingly ill-fed and ill-kept in

⁷⁶ HHSTAW, P. A. I, K. 977, Krieg 32a, Materieller Monatsbericht des MGG/S pro Monat August 1917.

⁷⁷ Kriegsarchiv, Operationsabteilung AOK, No 51692, Chef des Ersatzwesens für die gesamte bewafnete Macht, Wien 1. Juni 1917; HHSTAW, P. A. I, K. 977, Krieg 32k, Halbmonatsbericht für die Zeit vom 1. bis 15. Juli 1917.

⁷⁸ According to a table of food rationing, Austro-Hungarian soldiers daily received 280g of bread as opposed to 750g allotted to German soldiers. – HHSTAW, P. A. I, Krieg 32k, Monatsbericht MGG/S pro Jänner 1918.

comparison to German units.⁷⁹ Prolongation of war, military defeats, news of the revolution in Russia diminished the morale of the occupation troops, especially common soldiers and NCOs. At the beginning of June 1918 the *Ersatzbataillon* of the 71st infantry regiment in Kragujevac with 700 soldiers revolted. They were quelled with the use of artillery.⁸⁰

In order to keep subdued 1,375,000 people estimated to populate the Austro-Hungarian occupation zone in Serbia with the relatively small and weak contingent of occupation troops, severe preventive measures were undertaken against civilians: deportation (internment), disarmament and hostage-taking.

Deportations were carried out on several occasions: in late 1915, during the advancing of the Central Powers' armies in Serbia, then upon Romania's entry into war in 1916 and finally, during the Toplica uprising in spring 1917, and in late 1918.⁸¹ The largest-scale deportations were those undertaken from mid-August to the end of October 1916 in connection with Romania's declaration of war. On 31 August, the Governorate issued the following order to the county commands: "Die Ruhe und Sicherheit sind, wenn nötig, mit den schärfsten Massnahmen (Geiseln, Dezimieren, Niederbrennung etc.) unbedingt aufrechtzuerhalten" [Peace and security must be maintained if necessary with the most severe measures (deportations, annihilations, burning down, etc.)].⁸² On that occasion 16,500 people were interned in Serbia and then deported to camps in Hungary and Austria (Vacz, Czegled, Nezsider, Naymeguer, Arad, Aschach, Heinrichsbrün, Braunau). This action was systematically executed: the remnants of the Serbian army (soldiers, NCOs, officers) that had remained in the country and avoided being taken to prisoner camps were first interned; then intelligentsia was arrested, especially those which had been hostile to the Monarchy before the war or participated in the work of political, national, cultural and even sport societies;⁸³ then other

⁷⁹ Ibid. K. 977, Krieg 32 k-o, Berichte Kuhn, Belgrad 5. VI. 1918. – According to Kuhn, 4 soldiers were killed and 12 wounded on that occasion.

⁸⁰ J. A. Pisarev, "Okkupatsiia Serbii Avstro-Vengrii i bor'ba serbskogo naroda za svoje osvobozhdenie v 1916–1918 gg", *Sovetskoe slavianovedenie* 4 (1965), 33.

⁸¹ Kriegsarchiv, Operationsabteilung AOK No 30185, MGG/S an das Kreiskommando, Belgrad 31. VIII. 1916.

⁸² The Serbian societies were listed: the Black Hand [sic], National Defence, Yugoslav Club, League of Volunteers, Marksmen Society, Dušan the Mighty, *Obilić*, *Kolo jabača*, *Pobratimstvo* Football Club [sic], *Kolo srpske braće*, members of masonic lodges, male members of *Kolo srpskih sestara*, members of the editorial boards of all Serbian journals including the humoristic ones (*Brka*, *Spadalo*, *Djavo*).

⁸³ HHSTAW, P. A. I, K. 975, Krieg 32g, Telegramm in Ziffern an Baron Kuhn, Wien 15. IV. 1917.

people between 17 and 50 years of age who were capable of military service. The remaining peasants were organised in *Internierten-Arbeiterabteilungen* to work in the fields. Elderly persons with material resources were allowed to be confined in Austria-Hungary rather than interned.⁸⁴ In May 1917, around 40,000 Serb civilians were in the camps of Austria-Hungary.⁸⁵ These mass deportations caused alarm beyond Serbia's borders: even the Vatican intervened in April 1917 through the papal nuncio in Vienna against the internment of children.⁸⁶ Imprisonment in camps cut both ways and it considerably hampered agricultural production. That is why some of the interned peasants were sent back in 1917.⁸⁷

Disarmament of population was undertaken for the purpose of pacification. It took place on several occasions under threat of death penalty for hiding arms.⁸⁸ There were a lot of weapons remaining among the people: in March 1917, thirty persons were executed and 288 indicted for hiding arms in the Kragujevac County alone.⁸⁹ Upon the proclamation of amnesty, on 28 June 1917, 1230 rifles, 474 pistols, 54 hand grenades and other military material were turned in.⁹⁰ That large quantities of arms remained hidden despite all this would become obvious at the end of the war.

Taking of hostages was a similar security measure and it was increasingly applied as the war was drawing to an end and the resistance of the population was turning into armed struggle. Hostages were taken to secure harvest, threshers and railway or in the case of anonymous threats to senior officials of the occupation apparatus.⁹¹ The intelligence department, state police and gendarmerie, as well as financial organs within the General Governorate did their best to establish a wide intelligence network for gauging public opinion, espionage and counterespionage. The instructions prepared

⁸⁴ Pisarev, "Okkupatsiia Serbii", 33.

⁸⁵ HHSTAW, P. A. I, K. 975, Krieg 32g, Telegramm in Ziffern an Baron Kuhn, Wien 15. IV. 1917.

⁸⁶ Ibid. K. 977, Krieg 32k, Halbmonatsbericht für die Zeit vom 15. bis 31. Mai 1917. After this protest some 10,000 people were returned to Serbia to join working battalions.

⁸⁷ Ibid. Verordnung des AOK und des MGG/S betreffend den Besitz von Waffen, Munitionsgegenständen und Sprengstoffen im hiesigen Okkupationsgebiete, Belgrad 21. Oktober 1916.

⁸⁸ Ibid. Situationsbericht pro Monat März 1917.

⁸⁹ Ibid. Halbmonatsbericht für die Zeit vom 1. bis 15. Juli 1917, Belgrad 16. VII. 1917.

⁹⁰ E.g., an anonymous threat of an Austro-Hungarian intelligence officer was sent to the General-Governor in June 1917: *ibid.* Gesandte Kuhn an Grafen Burián, Str. Vertr. Belgrad 24. VI. 1917.

⁹¹ AS, MGG/S, Intelligence Department, box 1/3/42/45, Circular from the Intelligence Department and practical instructions.

by the intelligence service in Serbia emphasised the need for creating a network of trusted persons among the people for the purpose of gathering information on the general mood, deportations, intelligentsia's activities – especially that which was anti-Habsburg – anti-occupation movements, spreading of alarming news and texts, smuggling, arms hiding, abuse by officials etc.⁹² Monthly reports preserved in the archives of the Intelligence Department of Military Governorate reflect the vigilance with which the occupation authorities kept tabs on what was going on in Serbia. Denunciations demonstrate a specific psychological pressure exerted on population by means of accusations that were largely based on statements given in a state of agitation and anger.

2) Economic exploitation of Serbia was based on confiscations, requisitions, use of economic resources and labour. In June 1916, the property belonging to all persons considered associated with the Sarajevo assassination was confiscated.⁹³ In the wake of the entry of occupation troops in Serbia in 1915, large-scale requisitions of wool, copper, brass, nickel, zinc and its alloys, foodstuff and leather ensued. Special units for conducting searches, the so-called *Suchdetachment*, were formed; each consisted of an NCO, corporal, scribe, locksmith (for breaking in) and four or five soldiers. The requisitioned material was sent to *Materialsammelstelle* in Belgrade and then transported to Austria-Hungary.⁹⁴

At the end of 1915, a central administrative body was formed in Vienna for exporting raw materials from Serbia, Montenegro, Serbian Macedonia, Albania and Poland. In summer 1916, the *K. u k. Waren-Verkehrs Zentrale* was established in Belgrade as an agency of Governorate with the view to “mediating and furthering trading traffic between the occupation area in Serbia and Montenegro, on the one side, and Austria-Hungary, on the other”.⁹⁵ Under this new scheme, all companies abandoned by Serbian owners when retreating from the country became receivership. An artificial exchange rate of Serbian dinar to ruble was imposed and Serbian paper money was stamped over. It is interesting to note that this currency reform dismally failed: out of 150 million dinars estimated to circulate in the Austro-Hungarian occupation zone only 38 million were stamped over

⁹² HHSTAW, K. 975, Krieg 32g, Szechenyi an Baron Burián, Belgrad 9. VII. 1916.

⁹³ Ibid. K. 973, Krieg 32g, An das k. u k. Armee-Etappenkommando – Expositur Belgrad, Feldpost 211, 10. XII. 1915; *ibid.* Bestimmungen für die Suchdetachements; *ibid.* Organische Bestimmungen und Dienstvorschriften für die Materialsammelstelle.

⁹⁴ Kriegsarchiv, Operationsabteilung AOK, No 28418, Provisorische Bestimmungen für k. u k. Waren-Verkehrs Zentrale in Belgrad, Standort des AOK, 2. VIII. 1916.

⁹⁵ HHSTAW, K. 975, Krieg 32g, Vertrauliche Privatschreiben des Grafen Szechenyi ddtto Belgrad an Baron Mussulin, 16. VIII. 1916.

and the old dinar retained in Serbia greater value than the Austrian krone (100:102).⁹⁶ The occupiers opened branches of their banks, particularly from Budapest (Andrejević & Co). Fortnightly and monthly reports from Military Governorate preserved in Serbian and Austrian archives are rife with information on economic exploitation of the country, export of agricultural raw materials, use of forests and mines and penetration of Austro-Hungarian companies in Serbia. The wealth and diversity of this source material requires a special study on the economic policy of the occupation power in Serbia in 1915–1918.

3) All Austro-Hungarian reports on the conquest of Serbia in 1915 noted a desperate state of population and famine threatening the occupation zone. The return of refugees exacerbated shortage of food: the population of Belgrade rose from 15,000 in January 1916 to 50,000 in July 1917. Such situation created a twofold danger for the occupation power: local resources could not satisfy the needs of the occupation troops; destitution and desperation were not conducive to a peaceful rear.⁹⁷ Foreign propaganda caused much damage with its claims that Serbian population was dying of hunger.⁹⁸ Reports from Serbia in late 1915 spoke of the necessity of receiving urgent relief from Austria-Hungary to avoid disaster. The Austrian Prime Minister, Baron Stürgkh, was willing to respond to such appeals, but Conrad von Hötzendorf and Tisza were opposed. The Supreme Command suggested organising an international aid, but such action would take too long.⁹⁹ Indeed, it did not start to function, in limited conditions, before spring 1916; The International Red Cross, Swiss and Swedish humanitarian organisations embarked on transferring Romanian wheat to Serbia.¹⁰⁰ Meanwhile, the Governorate had to make do with the rational use of the existing supplies; some 1,000 wagonloads of crops were imported for the spring sowing in 1916 and then 600 wagonloads of flour and grains. Pensions of clerks were recognised in early February 1916.¹⁰¹ Foodstuff was

⁹⁶ Ibid. K. 974, Krieg 32 a-f, K. u k. Armeeoberkommando an das Ministerium des Äussern, Standort des AOK, 7. XII. 1915; *ibid.* Krieg 32 b, d, e, Militärgeneralgouvernement in Serbien Präz 576, an das Armeeoberkommando, 16. Jänner 1916.

⁹⁷ Ibid. K. 974, Krieg 32a-f, Baron Wiesner an Baron Burián 4. I. 1916.

⁹⁸ Ibid. Der Vertreter des k. u k. Ministeriums des Äussern beim k. u k. Armeeoberkommando, Teschen 20. XI. 1915; *ibid.* Conrad von Hötzendorf an das Ministerium des Äussern, Standort des AOK am 18. XI. 1915; *ibid.* Krieg 32b, Der Vertreter des Ministeriums des Äussern beim AOK, Teschen 6. I. 1916.

⁹⁹ Ibid. Krieg 32 a-f, Berichte des schweizerischen Gesandten in Wien, 11. II. 1916, 8. II. 1916.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. Krieg 32b, Draft for feeding civilian population in the occupied parts of Serbia.

¹⁰¹ AS, MGG/S, Military Department, box 1, Belgrade, 28 January 1918, Table of food.

rationed and increasingly reduced: in January 1918, children from five to thirteen years received 320 g of meat and 120 g of lard a week; adults were entitled to a weekly ration of 480 g of meat and 240 g of lard. In July 1918, the amount of meat was cut down to 200 g and 300 g respectively.¹⁰²

In order to fully control the youth and re-educate it in “the spirit of discipline and order”, the Governorate continued with its educational policy. During the last school year under occupation (1917/18) eight grammar schools with 4,000 in- and 3,000 out-school pupils, and 135 elementary schools (1916–17) with 24,000 pupils were operating in Serbia. Some 105,000 children could not attend school due to the lack of space.¹⁰³ Because of the ban on the use of Cyrillic alphabet there was not enough textbooks – even Serbian textbooks from Vojvodina which were printed in Cyrillic and approved in the Habsburg Monarchy were not allowed in Serbia. The University of Belgrade was closed down throughout the occupation.¹⁰⁴ The religion question also caused difficulties for the occupation regime as the highest-ranking clergy of the Serbian Orthodox Church had left the country with the Serbian army. The bishops of Niš and Šabac were interned in Bulgaria and some 200 priests were incarcerated in camps in Austria-Hungary. Illegitimate marriages were growing in number. Court Spiritual did not function and the Church as an organised institution did not exist. The canon law of the Serbian Church did not allow bringing bishops from Austria-Hungary to elect the new metropolitan.¹⁰⁵ In October 1918, the Bulgarians were requested to release the imprisoned bishops and return them in their dioceses, but this was a belated measure as the occupation was fast approaching its end.¹⁰⁶

VI

Despite physical and psychological pressure exerted on the population during the occupation in 1915–1918, the spirit of the Serbian people was not broken. Numerous reports of military and civilian occupation authorities are a testament to that. In one of those reports written in March 1917 it is

¹⁰² Out of 125 elementary schools, 95 were Serbian, the rest were Albanian and Muslim – HHSTAW, K. 977, Krieg 32k, Halbmonatsbericht für die Zeit vom 1. bis 15. Juli 1917; Ibid. Situationsbericht pro Monat März 1917; Ibid. Der Vertreter des Ministeriums des Äussern, Belgrad 13. III. 1918 and 13. II. 1918.

¹⁰³ Ibid. Krieg 32e, Militärgeneralgouvernement in Serbien, Einführung der cyrillischen Schulbücher in die Mittelschulen des MGG/S Bereiches, Belgrad 24. VIII. 1918.

¹⁰⁴ *Sto godina Filozofskog fakulteta* (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1963), 88–89.

¹⁰⁵ HHSTAW, K. 977, Krieg 32 k-o, MGG/S an das AOK, Ibid. Kuhn an Burián, Belgrad 28. VII. 1918.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. Weisung an Otto Czernin in Sofia, Wien 1. X. 1918.

said: “Im grössten Teile der Bevölkerung lebt noch immer die fantastische Hoffnung auf ein selbständiges Serbien” [Most of the population still maintains the fantastic hope of an independent Serbia].¹⁰⁷ News from the fronts and development of military operations received special attention; there was talk of the impending end of the war. “The Serbs hope for a better future and all that is displeasing to us is pleasing to them”, an intelligence report read.¹⁰⁸

Although there was armed resistance in the Austro-Hungarian occupation zone, it did not reflect the true intensity of popular feeling. Much of the male population had left the country when the Serbian army had broken through Albania to the sea; part of the army ended as POWs; large-scale deportations and interments, particularly in 1916, thwarted, to a large extent, the growth of the resistance movement. According to the Austro-Hungarians, these deportations were the main reason that prevented the spread of the Toplica uprising (*Toplički ustanak*) from the Bulgarian occupation zone to Šumadija. From fall 1916 onwards, reports of the occupation authorities more frequently mentioned “bands” operating in Serbia.¹⁰⁹ Three attempts at organising wider resistance in the country were discovered in 1916; in spring and fall 1917, similar attempts were suppressed in Brus, then in the vicinity of Kragujevac and Kruševac.¹¹⁰ The Toplica uprising encompassed the area around the Zapadna (West) Morava river spreading across Mali Jastrebac and Mt Kopaonik.¹¹¹ In the part of Serbia under Austro-Hungarian occupation, however, there were no mass movements like those in the Bulgarian zone. Units operating in this area and relying on a wide network of local people consisted of four to twenty men; they avoided fighting against occupation forces and were concerned with eliminating traitors (mostly the heads of rural municipalities). Regular fortnightly and monthly reports of the occupation authorities abounded with details about the activities of such groups. They emerged all across Serbia but operated locally.¹¹² Sabotages, particularly

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. Krieg 32k, Situationsberichte pro Monat März 1917.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. Major Safranek an das AOK, Belgrad 28. I. 1918; see also: Kriegsarchiv, Operationsabteilung AOK No 37388, Nachrichtenabteilung des MGG/S, Belgrad 15. XII. 1916; HHSTAW, P. A. I. K. 977, Krieg 32 k-o, Kuhn an Czernin, Belgrad 25. IV. 1917; ibid. Nachrichtenabteilung des AOK und Evidenzbureau des Generalstabes, Belgrad 1. VI. 1917; ibid. Monatsbericht vom 1. bis 31. März 1918, Belgrad 1. IV. 1918.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. Der Vertreter des Ministeriums des Äussern, Belgrad 17. I. 1917.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. K. 975, Krieg 32g, General von Rhemen an den Vertreter des Ministeriums des Äussern, Belgrad 10. VI. 1917.

¹¹¹ M. Perović, *Toplički ustanak* (Belgrade, 1959), 148.

¹¹² HHSTAW, K. 977, Krieg 32 k-o, Kuhn an Czernin, Belgrad 9. XI. 1917.

burning of harvest, also took place. The authorities did not have enough troops to undertake wider and stronger measures against the bands and thus reacted with repression against civilian population in an attempt to isolate the bands from the masses. Any person caught in an act of sabotage was shot on the spot. Municipalities to which a perpetrator belonged were also punished: grain and cattle was confiscated, pecuniary penalties were imposed, men between 16 and 60 years of age were occasionally interned, houses were set on fire etc.¹¹³ The Russian Revolution, the revolt of Austro-Hungarian troops in Kragujevac in June 1918 and the increasing devastation of land as the war drew closer to an end facilitated armed resistance. In July 1918, 32 attacks were recorded in the Kragujevac County alone; 105 took place in August 1918 in Serbia.¹¹⁴ Along with local population, deserters from military units and fugitives from camps also committed such attacks. The authorities suspected the existence of an organised network which operated in coordination with the operations of the Serbian army on the Salonica front.¹¹⁵ From September to mid-October the occupation forces tried to cleanse the ground from guerrilla groups. Not much was accomplished: 100 deserters and only one *komita* were captured. It was reported on 22 October that unrest among the people reached such proportions as to make access to the frontline extremely difficult.¹¹⁶ B. Hrabak's study amply documented the participation of Serbian population in driving the occupation forces out of the country in October 1918.¹¹⁷

Under the pressure from outside and inside the occupation system in Serbia was in full demise in October 1918. An attempt to take out food and material resources from the country and transport them to Austria-Hungary was the last spasm of the occupation regime. After the capitulation of Bulgaria on 29 September, the Serbian army and Allied forces were liberating the country with great rapidity. The last report of Baron Kuhn, the representative of the Foreign Ministry, was sent from Belgrade on 27 October. The next day he left Belgrade, along with General-Governor von Rhemen and his staff, and went to Subotica.¹¹⁸ Three days later, on 1 No-

¹¹³ Ibid. Kuhn an Czernin, Belgrad 31. VII. 1918, declaration is attached.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. MGG/S – Monatsbericht für Monat Juni 1918; Ibid. General-Oberst Rhemen an den Vertreter des Ministeriums des Äussern in Belgrad, 2. VIII. 1918 and 23. IX. 1918.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. Kuhn an Czernin, Belgrad 7. VIII. 1918. and 25. IX. 1918. Kuhn considered these movements "a general uprising".

¹¹⁶ Ibid. Kuhn an Czernin 22. X. 1918.

¹¹⁷ B. Hrabak, "Učešće stanovništva Srbije u proterivanju okupatora oktobra 1918", *Istorijski glasnik* 3-4 (1958), 25-50.

¹¹⁸ HHSTAW, K. 973, Krieg 32a, Baron Kuhn – Berichte, Belgrad 27. X. 1918.

vember, Belgrade was liberated. This brought to an end the tragic history of Serbia under the Austro-Hungarian occupation regime from 1915 to 1918.

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Some Issues of Turkey's Entry into the First World War

Abstract: The paper seeks to clarify some circumstances surrounding Turkey's entry into the First World War, focusing on the events that took place between 5 and 10 August 1914 including the negotiations between Enver Pasha and the Russian military attachée M. N. Leontiev.

Keywords: First World War, Turkey, Enver Pasha, Russian diplomacy, M. N. Girs, M. N. Leontiev

The issues surrounding Turkey's "sliding" into the war with the Entente after 10 August 1914 have been studied well enough in the historical literature.¹ But there still remains a lacuna as regards the events that took place between 5 and 10 August. As far as this "five-day" issue is concerned, Russian historiography has not yet overcome sensationalism in presenting facts and simplification in drawing conclusions from their analysis. Western historiography has not given an unambiguous answer to these questions

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¹ H. N. Howard, *The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1912–1923* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1931); U. Trumpener, "Turkey's Entry Into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities", *Journal of Modern History* 32.4 (1962), as well as his "Liman von Sanders and the Ottoman-German Alliance", *Journal of Contemporary History* 1.4 (1966), *Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1918* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), "Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire", in M. Kent, ed., *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire* (London: Frank Cass, 2005); F. G. Weber, *Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance, 1914–1918* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1970); G. Miller, *Straits. British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire and the Origins of the Dardanelles Campaign* (University of Hull Press, 1997); A. Emin, *Turkey in the world war* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930); Y. T. Kurat, "How Turkey Drifted into World War I", in K. Bourne and D. C. Watt, eds., *Studies in International History* (London: Longman, 1967); F. A. K. Yasamee, "Ottoman Empire", in K. M. Wilson, ed., *Decisions for War, 1914* (London: UCL Press, 1995); K. Karpat, "Entry of the Ottoman Empire into World War I", in *Türk Tarih Kurumu Belleten* 68/253 (2004); M. Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); A. F. Miller, "Vstuplenie Turtsii v Pervuiu mirovuiu voinu", *Izvestiia Akademii nauk SSSR, Serii istorii i filosofii* 3.4 (1946); F. I. Notovich, *Diplomaticheskaia bor'ba v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny* (Moscow-Leningrad: AN SSR, 1947); E. F. Ludshuveit, *Turtsia v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny* (Moscow: Moscow University, 1966).

either. So U. Trumpener, in his account of the facts and their analysis, makes an error strange for a scholar of his stature. M. Aksakal takes an approach which is quite reminiscent of the “figure of omission”. Other authors either mention this issue in passing or skip it over completely.

What happened between 5 and 10 August 1914? In those few days the Turkish leadership presented the Russian diplomatic representatives in Constantinople with proposals for a military alliance, which were eventually rejected by the Russian Foreign Ministry despite persistent urgings from the Russian Embassy. On 10 August the German warships *Goeben* and *Breslau* entered the Dardanelles and the situation radically changed, and even though the change was not in Russia's favour, things were still far from being hopeless.

Interpretations of these events in Russian historiography have been following a uniform pattern. Firstly, the Turks were deeply insincere when making their proposals because they had already, on 2 August, concluded a secret treaty of alliance with Germany. Secondly, the purpose of the Turkish initiatives was simply to buy the time needed to carry through the mobilisation ordered upon the outbreak of war in Europe. Thirdly, there can simply be no other explanation for those events given the Turkish war minister Enver Pasha's Germanophilia and Turkey's complete dependence on Germany at the time the war broke out. Fourthly, Russia was not even in a position to accept the Turkish offers of alliance because of her complete dependence on the Entente allies which would not have allowed her to pursue such an arrangement. Let us try to look into this tangle of events and circumstances.

Firstly, they were much more complex, multifaceted, contradictory and short-lived than most historians seem to think. Thus Trumpener, who is the main expert on the subject, is focused on refuting the thesis about Germany's overriding influence on Turkey, and indeed convincingly argues against it. But that is only one aspect of this multifaceted problem.

Secondly, Russian historiography has developed so strong a prejudice with regard to Turkey that it cannot help affecting the validity of scholarly conclusions. That pattern has arisen in consequence of an interweaving of approaches during the period of Russia's alliance with the Entente and the period of quite contradictory relations between the former USSR and Turkey: from a close friendship and alliance with the Kemalist regime to a new and open enmity culminating in 1947, when Turkey joined NATO. As a result, all that is accepted as being quite natural in the politics of other countries, such as pragmatism, patriotism, professionalism, is resolutely denied to Turkey. The Turks are still perceived as cunning and cruel, and the Young Turk regime of 1913–1918 also as “unrestrained adventurism”.

Thirdly, analyses of the actions of Russian diplomacy continue to suffer from the “fascination of power” syndrome. Despite a good deal of direct

evidence in the sources and literature, historians often find it difficult to accept that the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry can turn out to have been unprofessional. As far as his "master", Nicholas II, is concerned, the long-proposed thesis about his intellectual limitations, lack of principle and weakness of will remains unrefuted despite all the efforts to the contrary made in recent years.

F. Notovich purportedly sought to disprove the views of M. Pokrovskii, accusing him of oversimplification, even of falsifying the facts.² But his own considerable effort suffered from the same flaws: an arbitrary presentation of the facts in favour of a preconceived view. Both authors represent the official Soviet historiography of different political eras, the former of the late 1940s, the latter of the 1920s and 30s. E. Ludshuveit's interesting book, regrettably, barely touched upon the question of Turkey's entry into the war, and when it did, it beat a well-trodden path. What remains the worthiest of the old works regardless of the author's interpretation of events from a political rather than a scholarly perspective is a short article of A. Miller.

In the period between the end of the Balkan Wars and the beginning of the First World War Turkey faced several serious challenges on the resolution of which directly depended her survival as a state (even if of limited sovereignty): 1) the need to conclude an alliance with a great power to counteract the evident tendency towards the empire's further fragmentation, including the partition of Asia Minor; 2) the need to procure a large loan on the European financial market to rescue herself from looming bankruptcy the consequences of which would have been unpredictable; the urgent need for a loan was caused, apart from the ever weak Ottoman financial system, by the enormous costs of the Balkan War and, especially, by the Empire's loss of its most developed, European provinces; the loss of territory was accompanied by a mass exodus of Muslim population from Rumelia to Anatolia; this led to a huge decline in tax revenue on the one hand, and required huge financial resources for their resettlement in Asia Minor on the other; 3) the need for further internal reforms and modernisation, interrupted by the acute political crises of 1911–12 and the Balkan Wars. In that respect, Turkey's most important task, along with that of building her national economy which would not be based on ethnic minorities (Greeks, Armenians, Jews), was the abolition of the regime of capitulations.

A second level of problems involved: 1) the resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict over the Aegean islands, the possession of which by Greece was not recognised by Turkey; the proximity of these islands to the Greek-

² Notovich, *Diplomaticheskaiia bor'ba*, 286; M. N. Pokrovskii, *Imperialisticheskaiia voina* (Moscow 1931), 158.

inhabited coast of Asia Minor created a danger that the “armed propaganda” of the type carried out in Macedonia in 1903–12 might be resumed there; 2) the settlement, with Russia and other powers, of the issue of reform in the “six Armenian vilayets”, which produced another “Macedonian” version of gradual withdrawal of Turkey’s sovereignty and partition of her territory, this time in Eastern Anatolia;³ 3) the strengthening of naval forces necessary for resolving the Greek-Turkish conflict over the islands, as well as the reorganisation of the army; 4) the conclusion of an alliance or a treaty of benevolent neutrality with Bulgaria for the same purpose; 5) the strengthening of ties with Arabs, the second largest Muslim ethnic group in the Empire, with whom relations had been aggravated in previous years.

Turkey devoted the entire first half of 1914 to these foreign and domestic policy goals. She made attempts to conclude an alliance with any one of the great powers: Britain, France, Russia and Germany. All of them ended in failure.⁴ It should be noted that in her choice of ally Turkey definitely gave preference to Germany over Russia. To Turkey, Russia posed a direct threat, Germany only an indirect one. Germany had never taken part in the concerted actions of the powers against Turkey and never encroached on her sovereignty. What she had done was to allow her allies, Austro-Hungary and Italy, to bite off a chunk of the Empire’s territory, Bosnia in 1908 and Libya in 1911.

Before the July Crisis, Germany had not been interested in concluding an alliance with Turkey. The main opponents of such an arrangement were the German ambassador to the Ottoman Empire Wangenheim and the head of the German military mission General Liman von Sanders. Their reports described Turkey as completely unfit for alliance (*nichtbündnisfähig*) and expressed their belief that, due to her military weakness, she would not only be unable to engage Russian forces in the Caucasus on her own but would have to be supported there by the German army.⁵

³ J. Heller, “Britain and the Armenian Question, 1912–1914: A Study in Realpolitik”, *Middle Eastern Studies* XVI (1980), 3–26.

⁴ On Turkey’s attempts to conclude an alliance with Great Britain see F. Ahmad, “Great Britain’s Relations with the Young Turks, 1908–1914”, *Middle Eastern Studies* II (1966), 321–324; F. Ahmad, “The Late Ottoman Empire”, in Kent, ed., *Great Powers*, 11–13; M. Kent, “Great Britain and the End of the Ottoman Empire 1900–23”, in Kent, ed., *Great Powers*, 191; with France: Djemal Pasha, *Memoirs of a Turkish Statesman 1913–1919* (New York 1922), 104–107; with Germany: Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, 15–19; with Russia: Aksakal, *Ottoman Road to War*, 45; S. D. Sazonov, *Vospominaniia* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1991 [1927]), 160–165.

⁵ Jagow to German Ambassadors, Vienna and Constantinople, 14 July 1914, quoted in E. Jackh, *The Rising Crescent* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1944), 10.

The initiative to conclude an alliance with Turkey came from Austria-Hungary and was put forward by her ambassador in Constantinople Marquis Pallavicini. Austria-Hungary was interested in the anti-Serbian character of an alliance with Turkey (and Bulgaria) for defeating Serbia, revising the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1913, and creating an autonomous Macedonia. From Vienna, a new Balkan alliance was seen as the alliance of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey aimed firstly against Serbia and only secondly, on account of Turkish interests, against Greece as Serbia's ally.

The Turkish vision of a Balkan alliance was somewhat different. The Turks sought either an offensive alliance with Bulgaria aimed firstly against Greece and only secondly, on account of Bulgarian (and Austrian) interests, against Serbia, or a defensive alliance with Romania and, again, Greece for the purpose of maintaining neutrality under the auspices of Germany, and aimed against Russia and Bulgaria in case the latter should go to the side of the Entente. But the Turks did not look at an alliance with Austria-Hungary as a great power from a strategic perspective but rather in regional terms.

It was Wilhelm II's change of mind on the idea of Germany's alliance with Turkey that proved to be decisive. Under new circumstances the Kaiser believed that "every gun in the Balkans must be kept ready to be fired at the Slavs for Austria", and instructed the Foreign Ministry and the German Military Mission accordingly.⁶ The initiative group of Young Turk supporters of an alliance with Germany (in fact, with a great power), which included war minister Enver, grand vizier Said Halim, interior minister Talaat and justice minister Halil, promptly jumped at the opportunity. By 1 August Enver and Talaat had already been aware of the confiscation of two Turkish dreadnoughts by the British, and used it as an argument to win over the hesitant ministers, primarily marine minister Djemal and finance minister Djauid.

An alliance with Germany could give Turkey safeguards against the expected Russian landing on the Bosphorus. But it could not help her to solve the problems of the Aegean islands, Western Thrace, autonomous Macedonia, not to mention the abolition of the capitulations and the procurement of a loan. Therefore, her best option was to declare neutrality.⁷

The issue of a Turkish-Bulgarian alliance was closely connected with the Greek-Turkish conflict. The vicissitudes of its conclusion are quite well known. But the oft-overlooked fact is that, after the outbreak of war in Europe, the Turks, while trying to conclude an alliance with the Bulgarians,

⁶ Wangenheim to Foreign Ministry, no. 362, 22 July 1914; K. Kautsky, *Outbreak of the World War. German Documents collected by Karl Kautsky and edited by Max Montgelas and Walther Schücking* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), 156-158.

⁷ Miller, *Vstuplenie Turtsii*, 325.

also feared the possibility of their thrust towards Constantinople in order to reach the Enos-Midia line (and perhaps even beyond). Those very concerns were the main reason for the Turks to order mobilisation and concentration of troops in Thrace. Still, on 22 July, Enver revealed to Wangenheim another reason for Turkey's seeking alliance with a great power: to provide protection to her until she had an alliance concluded with one of the regional countries, either Bulgaria or Greece. The majority of the Cabinet leant towards Bulgaria, but negotiations with Greece about a defensive alliance based on a compromise on the islands issue were also to begin in Brussels, brokered by the British journalist E. Dillon. If both Bulgaria and Turkey, Enver stated, joined the German bloc, Turkey would reject the Greek proposal.⁸ The Balkan puzzle was intricate indeed.

The Turkish pre-war attempts to procure a large loan in Europe and to get the issue of the abolition of the capitulatory system to the table had been equally unsuccessful. The latter intention faced strong opposition both from the European powers and from the USA. The only power that was tolerantly disposed to the issue was Russia, though primarily due to her weak position in the Turkish economy and her correspondingly weak role in legal regulation of commercial and other disputes.⁹ In analysing the Turkish leadership's consideration of the "Russian option", this factor, underestimated in historiography, should be counted among the crucial ones.

The Greek-Turkish conflict was the acutest diplomatic crisis in Europe since the end of the one produced by the Liman von Sanders affair. It is believed that, had the shots not been fired in Sarajevo in June 1914, the shots that would have started a "third Balkan war", likely to escalate into a European one, would inevitably have been fired in the Aegean in July or August the same year. The conflict over the islands was only the tip of the iceberg that was a much broader Greek-Turkish conflict over supremacy in the Aegean, including the straits and Constantinople. Moreover, it was closely linked with Turkey's internal problems, namely the situation and destiny of national-religious minorities and the resettlement of huge numbers of refugees from Macedonia and Thrace expelled after the Balkan Wars. The utmost importance Turkey attached to the islands question may be seen from her offer to cede them to Serbia (!) and to transfer ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the Christians of Asia Minor from the Greek Patriarchate of

⁸ Kautsky, *Outbreak of the World War*, 156–158, doc. no. 117.

⁹ *Mezhdunarodnyie otnosheniia v epokhu imperializma. Dokumenty iz arkhivov tsarskogo i vremennogo pravitel'stv (hereafter MOEI)*, ser. 3, vol. VI, 1 (Moscow-Leningrad 1935), 141–143, 155–156.

Constantinople to the Serbian Church. Driven into a corner, Turkey was ready to try the most incredible diplomatic combinations.¹⁰

The naval arms race that had begun there before the Balkan Wars was rapidly gaining pace. In intensity it did not lag behind the arms race between England and Germany in the North Sea. After the onset of the July Crisis the interrelatedness of those two arms races proved to be fatal for the destiny of the Turkish navy and a very important factor in the decision making process in Constantinople in late July 1914, ending in the seizure by Britain of two Turkish dreadnoughts built in her shipyards.

This issue has been extensively described in the literature.¹¹ The funds for the procurement of the ships had been raised by national subscription, and not only in Turkey but across the Islamic world. Donations came even from India and Morocco. Turkish women would cut and sell their hair and their jewellery, schoolchildren gave up their pocket money to contribute to the national Navy League, army officers and state officials contributed a monthly salary. The building of the dreadnoughts was not perceived merely as the strengthening of the navy but also as a symbol of the country's renewal and further modernisation. To think of the seizure of the ships merely in terms of a convenient excuse for the Young Turks' campaigning against the Entente is clearly inadequate.¹² It was a deep shock for the nation, once again made aware of its humiliatingly unequal position in the contemporary world.

It is evident that the British confiscation of the Turkish dreadnoughts on 31 July and the escape through the Dardanelles of the German warships *Goeben* and *Breslau* on 10 August 1914 were closely linked in the political deliberations of the Turkish leadership in early August.¹³ To some extent (albeit very limited), the Turks could consider the German ships as a kind of compensation for their confiscated dreadnoughts.

But between those two dates something else that immensely outweighed the two "purely naval" factors occurred. On 4 August Great Britain entered the war. This factor upset all Turkish calculations on which their decision to conclude an alliance with Germany on 2 August had been based. Besides an abrupt change in the relative strength of the opposing sides, between 4 and 10 August there could be no guarantees that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* would manage to escape into the Dardanelles without being intercepted by the British fleet. All of that complicated the situation greatly and

¹⁰ V. N. Shtrandtman, *Balkanskije vospominaniia* (Moscow: Knizhnitsa, 2014), 330.

¹¹ R. Hough, *The Big Battleship* (London: Michael Joseph, 1966), 120; W. S. Churchill, *The World Crisis 1911–1914* (London: T. Butterworth, 1923), 209.

¹² Miller, *Vstuplenie Turtsii*, 326; Ludshuveit, *Turtsia v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny*, 38.

¹³ Churchill, *World Crisis*, 482.

led the Turks to improvise in anticipation of possible adverse developments. The Entente turned out to be much stronger than Enver and his group had expected, and Germany's victory did not seem so certain.

On the other hand, since 4 August, a new tune could be heard in German-Turkish relations. It was on that day that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* received instructions to head for Constantinople. So, was the fact that Enver was acquainted with the ships' destination in contradiction to his decision to slow down the German tune and start playing a Russian one instead? Not at all. It only meant that he kept his options open until making the final decision. Just as the offer of alliance made to Russia on 5 August was not in contradiction to exacting from Germany the following day, 6 August, much more favourable alliance terms than those agreed on 2 August. In those days Great Britain's entry into the war was a factor that played a decisive role not only for the Turks but also for the Germans. It led to the renegotiation, on 6 August, of the German-Turkish alliance because now Turkey became a much more useful ally to Germany not only against Russia but also against Britain.

In Russian historiography, much of which is obviously obsolete, it is taken as self-evident that the complex of domestic and foreign policy challenges with which Turkey had been faced in the first half of 1914 suddenly vanished after the outbreak of the war, and that it was replaced by one simple idea, that of entering into a war with Russia on the side of Germany. This point of view, inherited from the First World War military propaganda, cannot be considered scholarly acceptable now, a hundred years after the events studied. The complex of problems did not disappear. Moreover, their context became much more complicated with the ambiguous Greek and Bulgarian position on their own neutrality, Russia's fears that the straits might be closed, as well as her military incapacity to carry out an amphibious operation against the Bosphorus. To be able to interpret all of them properly, one should bear in mind that the political and diplomatic situation in the Aegean, in the straits area, and in the Balkans as a whole in the August and September of 1914 was changing dramatically on a daily basis. The decision-makers were often unable to respond with insight and resolve to this kaleidoscopic sequence of developments.

On 5 August war minister Enver Pasha met with the Russian military attaché General Leontiev to clarify the actual purpose of the Turkish mobilisation, but he also made an unexpected offer of alliance. Enver offered Russia to use the Turkish army "to neutralise the army of any one Balkan country that should act against Russia, to facilitate the actions of the Balkan states' armies against Austria should Russia manage to reconcile the Balkan states and Turkey on the basis of mutual concessions". The diplomatic combination of mutual concessions envisaged the cession of the Aegean islands

and Western Thrace to Turkey with compensations for Greece in Epirus, for Bulgaria in Macedonia, and for Serbia in Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁴

In Enver's view, such a "combination" would be accepted gladly by both the Turkish government and the people. If it materialised, the same day Enver would say to the Germans: "Now you are our enemies and I am asking you to leave." During his meeting with Leontiev, Enver repeatedly assured him that Turkey was guided only by her own interests.

Whom was the Turkish army supposed to "neutralise"? Taking into account the specific diplomatic circumstances of August 1914, there could have been two possibilities. One was an alliance of Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia against Austria-Hungary under the auspices of Russia. The other was a Turkish-Russian alliance to neutralise Bulgaria either in the event of her attack on Serbia or her encroachment on the Russian sphere of interest in Eastern Thrace and the straits. At the next meeting between Enver and Leontiev, on 9 August, things were made clear: "by order of Russia" the Turkish army could be moved against any of the Balkan countries, including Bulgaria, or together with them against Austria.¹⁵ A ten-year alliance treaty with Russia was supposed to turn her away as an immediate threat to Turkey.

On 5 August the Russian ambassador Girs sent five telegrams to Sazonov. Stating his position, Girs allowed for the possibility both of an alliance with Turkey and of a war against her, Germany and Bulgaria. Sazonov instructed him to continue contacts with Enver.¹⁶ Aksakal claims that Girs's telegram of 6 August (!) was intercepted by the Turks. Would that mean that the Turks read the other telegrams from the Russian Embassy too? Aksakal does not say. Moreover, he argues that the content of this telegram relating to Russia's ambition to finally assert herself in the straits made the Turks aware of Russia's insincerity and hostile intent against the very existence of the empire. This was, in his opinion, the motive behind their opting for an alliance with Germany.¹⁷ The Turks hardly needed to intercept telegrams to know the real intentions of Russia towards their country. This is certainly the weakest point in Aksakal's otherwise very good book, which does not make any further reference to the issue of Russo-Turkish negotiations of 5–9 August.

Trumpener, in line with Russian historiography, believes that "there can no longer be any doubt that these curious overtures by Enver [...] were insincere. Quite aside from the fact that Enver's proposals provided

¹⁴ *MOEI*, 3, VI, 1, 8–9.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 42–43.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 9, 19.

¹⁷ Aksakal, *Ottoman Road to War*, 92.

a perfect cover story for the intended concentration of Ottoman troops in Thrace, it is now also clear that he kept the German Embassy informed about his talks with the Russians.”¹⁸ To prove his thesis, Trumpener refers to Wangenheim’s two telegrams to the German Foreign Ministry, of 10 and 18 August respectively. But early in the morning of 10 August the *Goeben* and *Breslau* had already appeared off the entrance to the Dardanelles! Had Wangenheim’s first telegram been sent on 9 August, or at least in the night of 9/10 August, Trumpener’s argument would have some weight. But it was not, and the argument falls apart. And Enver could have been “sincere” both on 5 and on 9 August.

After all, what kind of “sincerity” can there be in diplomacy? One can only speak of professionalism and competence or lack thereof. And why would Enver’s “cunning and insincerity” have been necessarily directed only against the Russians? Since scores of recent works, including those by Trumpener himself, have refuted the view about Turkey’s dependence on Germany and debunked the legend of Enver’s being merely a “German protégé”, such views do not seem too credible. Enver was a calculating and cynical pragmatist.

Sazonov at last replied to Girs on 10 August. The content and style of, and corrections to, his telegram raise doubts about his adequate understanding of what was happening and his psychological condition. It seems that by then Sazonov had not yet realised on the edge of what an abyss Russia was standing. Nor did Tsar Nikolas II make things any clearer. His only comment on Girs’s main telegram of 5 August was: “Curious.”¹⁹

We know now that the closing of the straits by Turkey after she joined the Central Powers was one of the main causes of Russia’s defeat in the First World War and of the collapse of the Russian Empire. Some astute observers understood that as early as January 1915:

It should now be evident that there is much to be said for the view that the key to the present situation is Constantinople. We are dealing with world politics, with a world war which is being fought on the battlefields of Europe; but we are dealing with a world war whose results are not expected to develop in Europe proper. The key to this situation lies in Constantinople, and the Turk holds it.²⁰

Express instructions to Girs required a delay until a reply was received from Sofia. It turns out that it was Russian and not Turkish diplomacy that

¹⁸ Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, 25.

¹⁹ Quoted in Miller, *Vstuplenie Turtsii*, 328.

²⁰ R. G. Usher, “Why Turkey Entered the War”, in F. J. Reynolds and A. L. Churchill, eds., *World’s War Events*, vol. I (New York: P. F. Collier & Son Comp., 1919), 140. Usher’s chapter was originally published in the monthly *World’s Work*, January 1915.

was stalling on the matter or that, at least, both of them were. Sazonov wrote:

Until we get a response from Sofia [crossed out: "I ask you to sustain Enver's hope of obtaining a favourable response from P[e]t[ers]b[ur]g"], keep in mind the need for buying time in the course of negotiations with Enver. Keep in mind that we do not fear Turkey's direct actions against us. However, while maintaining quite friendly communication with the Turks, try to make them aware that, if they should act without our sanction they will risk all of Asia Minor because they are not able to harm us while we, and in alliance with France and England, can jeopardise their very existence.²¹

In the first days of August Bulgaria figured as an important factor in diplomatic calculations of not only Turkey but also of Russia and her allies, mainly in connection with the Austro-Serbian conflict and her potential involvement in it. For Sazonov, as we can see, the Bulgarian factor outweighed the Turkish one. It was a miscalculation which was impossible to correct.

We do not know when exactly Girs received this document but we know that the German ships *Goeben* and *Breslau* appeared off the entrance to the Dardanelles in the early morning of 10 August and, after the dramatic events in the building of the Turkish Ministry of War, entered the straits in the evening. Although the admission of the ships had been agreed between Germany and Turkey earlier, there arose some unexpected difficulties. The American historian B. Tuchman believes that Enver "was more than willing to give permission for entrance but he had to play a complicated game vis-à-vis his more nervous colleagues." In my opinion, it was Enver's nerves that gave in.

Later the same day an exchange took place between Enver and Lieutenant-Colonel Kress von Kressenstein of the German Military Mission. Kress von Kressenstein told Enver that the commander at Chanak requested instructions concerning the German ships. Enver replied that he was unable to grant permission without consulting the grand vizier. Kress von Kressenstein insisted that the Chanak fort requested an immediate reply. Enver was perfectly silent for a few minutes, and then said abruptly: "They are to be allowed to enter."

"If the English warships follow them in, are they to be fired at?" Kress von Kressenstein asked next. Again Enver refused to answer, claiming that the Cabinet had to be consulted; but Kress von Kressenstein insisted that

²¹ *MOEI*, VII, I, 44. See therein also the distortion of the document in the Russian "Orange book".

the fort should not be left without clear instructions. "Are the English to be fired at or not?" After a long pause, Enver finally said: "Yes."²²

Enver's indecisiveness seems quite strange for the Germanophile that historiography tends to make out of him, who should have been eagerly awaiting the arrival of the ships whose destination had been known to him since 4 August. Was it fear: did the ghost of Admiral Duckworth stand before him in the person of Admiral Milne? or calculation: did Enver expect until the last moment to receive St. Petersburg's positive reply to the offer of alliance and guarantees for the integrity of the Empire? We may never know.

It may seem that the choice that the Turks faced in the morning and afternoon of 10 August was the one between an alliance with Russia and the German warships. But things were more complicated than that. The Turks were not wrong in their assessment either of the chances for an alliance with Russia to last (not only on the basis of the intercepted telegram, of course) or of the future status of the *Goeben* in the Turkish navy in the event of their alliance with Germany. They also clearly understood the position of the Entente as regards their country's future. Their experience from the negotiations with the Entente's members in recent months had clearly showed them that it could not be trusted. But, at the same time, the strongest factor was Britain's entry into the war (and Italy's non-entry).

By 10 August Turkey could and should have made a choice (had Russian diplomacy been more professional) between Germany and Russia, and also between her entry into the war and neutrality. But Russian diplomacy was hopelessly belated in its actions, and naively self-assured of them.

After the entry of England into the war and the arrival of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, the structure of factions in the Young Turk leadership became much more complicated. Apart from supporters of a "great" and a "small" war, now there were also supporters of a prompt and a delayed entry into the great war, and a weak faction of neutralists. The multiplicity of diplomatic motivations led to differing positions on war objectives amongst the Young Turk leaders. While before 4 August Enver had anticipated a general European war from which he believed the Central Powers would soon emerge victorious, grand vizier Said Halim was still thinking in terms of a limited Balkan conflict in which Turkey and Bulgaria would ally against Greece and Serbia. Thus, for Said Halim, anxious about Russian interference, an alliance with Germany seemed to guarantee the empire's territorial integrity; for Enver, it provided the opportunity to launch military operations in the Balkans combined with a call to jihad in the rest of the empire and beyond.

²² B. Tuchman, *Guns of August: The Outbreak of World War I* (New York 1994 [1962]), 186. It is noteworthy that chapter X where these events are described is omitted in both Russian editions of Tuchman's book.

The difference in views on war aims entailed different views on the timing of military intervention: while Enver wanted to enter the war immediately, the more circumspect Said Halim was not willing to commit to military intervention until the Central Powers' victory became certain.²³ After Britain entered the war, the rift between Enver and Said Halim diminished but did not disappear. Some General Staff officers from Enver's inner circle, such as Ali İhsan Sabis, Hafız Hakki and Kazım Karabekir, also preferred to delay Turkey's entry into the war until the spring of 1915.²⁴

The question of the timing of the entry into the war determined the choice of ally – it was to be the victorious side. In this respect Turkey's stance was not any different from that of Italy, Romania and Bulgaria.

After 10 August every diplomatic action the warring sides undertook towards Turkey weakened or strengthened the position of one or another Young Turk faction. Since Germany, however reluctantly, did meet Turkey's wishes, whereas the Entente powers continued to hold her under the sword of Damocles of partition, it is not surprising that the scales had been slowly but surely tipping to the German side over almost three months. But German-Turkish relations were far from idyllic even after 10 August. They experienced two acute crises, first on 19–22 August, and then on 14–22 October. Yet, five weeks intervened between the resolution of the latter and Turkey's actual entry into the war. Aksakal correctly assesses these developments: "This was a classic deadlock: while the Germans demanded intervention to achieve military victory, the Ottomans demanded German military victory before they were willing to commit to intervention."²⁵ Yet, during the October crisis the Turks had to make the final choice.

Acting on instructions from Berlin, Wangenheim had made the German position absolutely clear at the meeting with the grand vizier on 19 September. By continuing to stall intervention, he stated, the Ottoman Empire was increasingly losing any claim to spoils. If the empire waited for victory to be ensured before it intervened, the German government would hardly reward the Turks for their participation.²⁶

²³ Yasamee, "Ottoman Empire", 238–239.

²⁴ Ali İhsan Sabis, *Harp Hatıralarım*, vol II (Istanbul: Yeni Asya Yayınları, 1992), 59–60, 63; Kazım Karabekir, *Birinci Cihan Harbine Nasıl Girdik*, vol. II (Istanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1995), 316–317.

²⁵ Aksakal, *Ottoman Road to War*, 138; on the two crises see pp. 137–141 and 156–163 therein.

²⁶ F. Ahmad, "Ottoman Armed Neutrality and Intervention. Aug. – Nov. 1914", *Studies on Ottoman Diplomatic History* 4 (1990), 68–69; Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, 40–41.

This date should be considered a turning point for the Turkish leadership's decision to enter the war on Germany's side. Now it was just a matter of time. The decisive factor was the prospect of a German loan of 100 million francs. Turkey had by then already resolved the capitulations issue unilaterally. On 9 September she had sent a note to the great powers notifying them of the abolition of the capitulations without any conditions or reservations with effect from 1 October. Germany's decision to extend a loan was the final argument that irrevocably tipped the scales to her side. However, the position of the moderate faction of ministers and military interested in postponing military intervention was not yet hopeless, for Enver and Admiral Souchon needed a provocation to finally draw Turkey into the war. All those issues are also very well known.²⁷ On 29 October naval hostilities commenced and a few days later war was declared.

The conclusion is that Turkey entered the war guided primarily by her own interests and pursuing her own political and economic goals. That she finally made a choice in favour of Germany was as much a fault of the Entente as it was of Turkey herself.

An alliance with Russia was nothing more than one of the options in the Young Turk leadership's bid to solve the general and regional problems the country was facing. Turkish diplomacy used every opportunity and kept open every alternative. That was pragmatic, patriotic and professional. As for cynicism, there is always some in diplomacy.

As for the Young Turk leaders' capacity for making strategic decisions, the notion of the "Young Turk triumvirate", Enver, Talaat and Djemal, as being the ruling core of Turkish politics should be revised. In fact, the governing body of the Young Turk regime was a narrow circle of about thirty people, both active and former members of the Central Committee of the Party of Union and Progress.²⁸ The highest-ranking leaders acting in the foreground could take very bold actions ("adventurous", according to historiography), and they did, but they nonetheless needed approval from the veiled collective leadership of the Young Turks.

Given the presently available sources, it is very difficult to unravel the motives of Russian diplomacy. There is no doubt that there was some cynicism in it too. Whether Russia's unwillingness to assume treaty obligations towards Turkey stemmed from the fear of the inevitable internationalisation of such a treaty (as it had already been the case in 1833–41), or from the desire to keep Turkey in uncertainty until the expected rapid victory over the Central Powers with the view to dividing her territory, or, quite the opposite, from the fear that such an alliance might strengthen Turkey in the

²⁷ Karpat, "Entry", 27–30; Aksakal, *Ottoman Road to War*, 178–182.

²⁸ Trumpener, *Turkey's Entry*, 371, n. 12.

course of a new Balkan war – is yet to be established. But in any case, Turkey did not want to be dismembered.

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Occupation, Repression and Resistance Čačak District, Serbia, in 1915–1918

Abstract: The paper analyses the Austro-Hungarian occupation regime in Serbia 1915–1918 from the perspective both of its treatment of civilians and of resistance to occupation, focusing on the Čačak District, western Serbia. It examines actions against the occupation authorities, the composition of k. u k. military presence in the district, the measures applied to suppress armed resistance (e.g. disarmament, internment, public executions), the estimated number of military and civilian casualties.

Keywords: First World War, Serbia, Čačak District, 1915–1918, Austro-Hungarian occupation, Military General Governorate, violence, resistance, victims

For the Kingdom of Serbia the outbreak of the First World War meant direct military confrontation with a much more powerful enemy, Austria-Hungary. Yet, during 1914 and 1915 Serbia did surprisingly well against her formidable opponent, winning all major battles with the Austro-Hungarian army in 1914 and effectively holding her borders well into 1915. She was militarily defeated only in the autumn of 1915 by the joint invasion of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, but the king, the government and the bulk of the Serbian Army, rather than to submit, chose to retreat across Albania to the Greek Adriatic coast. In late 1915 and early 1916 the Central Powers were in the process of dividing Serbia into zones of control: Germany chose to control the main land route and railway through the Velika (Great) Morava river valley and some mines in eastern Serbia; Bulgaria established two large occupation zones, the "Morava Military Inspection Area" with its centre in Niš and the "Macedonia Military Inspection Area" with its centre in Skopje; Austria-Hungary occupied twelve districts of the Kingdom of Serbia with a population of about 1.4 million and at the beginning of 1916 established military rule over this territory with its headquarters in Belgrade: *k. und k. Militärgeneralgouvernements Serbien* (Military General Governorate of Serbia – MGG/S).¹ In late 1915 Em-

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¹ Božica B. Mladenović, *Grad u austrougarskoj okupacionoj zoni u Srbiji od 1916. do 1918. godine* [The City in the Austro-Hungarian Occupation Zone in 1916–1918] (Belgrade: Čigoja štampa, 2000), 28; Andrej Mitrović, *Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu* [Serbia in the First World War] (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 2004), 284; an abridged version of this book was published in English under the title *Serbia's Great War* (London: Hurst & Co.,

peror Franz Joseph I appointed Johann Ulrich Graf von Salis-Seewis as the first governor of the MGG/S. In July 1916 he was succeeded by Adolf von Rhemen zu Bärenfeld.² The Čačak District was officially established on 1 January 1916 and incorporated into the MGG/S in February the same year³ with the following military county commands (*Bezirkskommanden*): Čačak, Kraljevo, Ivanjica, Guča, Ušće and (from August 1917) Raška.⁴ At the head of each district was a district commander (*Kreiskommandant*) who was responsible for all military and civil affairs. He exercised his authority through subordinated commanders of the district subdivisions, counties, as well as through municipality presidents who were chosen from among locally prominent Serbian citizens who were deemed loyal.

Occupation of the town and district of Čačak

The town of Čačak in western Serbia did not sustain any significant damage during war operations, with the exception of a bridge over the Zapadna (West) Morava river which was mined twice: by the retreating Serbian forces in 1915 and by the retreating Austro-Hungarian army in 1918. Most of the town remained intact, as did most district seats in the interior of the country.⁵ The greatest change in the life of its citizens before the occupation was the approaching of the front line in 1914, when many public buildings and all larger inns and taverns were used as hospital facilities.⁶ Austro-Hungarian forces entered the town without meeting any resistance on 1 November 1915 and by the middle of the month took the entire Čačak District. The beginning of the occupation found most citizens in the town, and the occupying forces promptly began to make lists of citizens suspected

2007). Very disappointing and one-sided is: Jonathan E. Gumz, *The resurrection and collapse of empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914–1918* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2009).

² Bogdan Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom: čačanski okrug 1915–1918* [Life under Occupation: Čačak District 1915–1918] (Čačak: Medjuopštinski istorijski arhiv, 2010), 27, 31.

³ Michael Jungerth, *Entstehung und Organisation des k. u. k. Militärgeneralgouvernements für Serbien* (Belgrade: K. u. k. Gouvernement-Druckerel, 1918), 5; Hugo Kerchnawe, “Die k. u. k. Militärverwaltung in Serbien”, in Hugo Kerchnawe et al., *Die Militärverwaltung in den von den österreichisch-ungarischen Truppen besetzten Gebieten* (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928), 56; Mitrović, *Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu*, 339.

⁴ Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 42.

⁵ Ibid. 19–20.

⁶ Bogdan Trifunović, “Perceptions of the Front by Serbian Civilians during the First World War, 1914–1918”, *InterCulture* 5.1 (Florida State University, January 2008), 55.

of being hostile to the K. u. k. Army and liable to deportation to camps in Austria-Hungary. The town commander ordered the taking of civilian hostages chosen from among prominent and well-respected citizens, whose lives and property were meant to serve as a pledge for the peaceful behaviour of the population.⁷ The early months of occupation were marked by the purge of well-educated social groups, including teachers, priests and politicians. With active army officers already interned in camps in Austria, Bohemia and Hungary, these groups were seen as the remaining agents of Serbian national identity and cohesion and, therefore, as a threat to the occupation regime.⁸

Another important aspect of the policy of denationalization in the MGG/S was the banishment of the Serbian language and Cyrillic script from both official and unofficial communication. Thus, soon after the occupation of Čačak all Cyrillic public inscriptions were replaced with those in Latin script. In February 1916 Serbian books were banned in all of the MGG/S and seized from bookshops, public and even private libraries. Raids in search of banned books were conducted in the Čačak District in July 1916, but few were found. As for official documents, they were either in German or in some sort of a Serbo-Croatian mix but invariably in Latin script. Official public announcements were printed in German, in Serbian in Cyrillic and in Serbo-Croatian in Latin. Although the occupation regime sought to banish Cyrillic script, as an obvious symbol of Serbian national identity, its use in municipalities in the Čačak District continued well into 1916, before it was finally banned in all of the MGG/S with effect from 1 January 1917.⁹ Also, in May 1916 the MGG/S Central Command replaced the Julian calendar with the Gregorian in all of the occupied territory.¹⁰

After the occupation of Serbia by the Central Powers, its citizens were denied citizenship rights. Both Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary publicly announced in 1916 that the Serbian state had been wiped off the political map of Europe. Therefore, its inhabitants could not invoke the international rules of war, such as those defined by the Geneva Conventions.¹¹ This fact contributed significantly to the unceasing repression by Austro-Hungarian occupying forces in the MGG/S in 1916–1918, which included various

⁷ Ibid. 22–26.

⁸ Bogdan Trifunović, “Prisoners of War and Internees (South East Europe)”, in *1914–1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, eds. Ute Daniel et al. (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, 2014).

⁹ Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 43, 44.

¹⁰ Ibid. 45.

¹¹ Rumen Cholakov, “Prisoners of War in Bulgaria during the First World War” (doctoral dissertation, Cambridge University, 2012), 56.

forms of ethnically-based discrimination, large-scale violence against and court-martialling of Serbian civilians, none of which had any grounding in law and court decisions. The first of four big waves of civilian internment, in November 1915,¹² was accompanied by requisitioning whatever was considered necessary for the war effort: wool, copper, brass, animal skins, food-stuffs, etc.¹³ The policy of repression and exploitation continued until the last days of occupation in October 1918. For instance, the MGG/S Central Command proclaimed more than once that only persons aged between 17 and 50 capable of bearing arms could be interned in labour camps in Austria-Hungary but, in reality, local commands regularly deported children, women and elderly people to camps.¹⁴ The biggest wave of internment both in the MGG/S in general and in the Čačak District took place in the autumn of 1916, following Romania's entry into the war. During that period a number of local priests were interned because they were part of the so-called intelligentsia regarded to be the most dangerous section of society (along with teachers and lawyers) to Austro-Hungarian rule. The district command compiled a list of fifteen priests to be interned, the oldest of whom was seventy-five at the time of deportation.¹⁵ According to Austro-Hungarian official records, between 30 August and 10 November 1916 a total of 928 persons were interned,¹⁶ and mostly in large camps in Austria-Hungary: Aschach an der Donau, Boldogasszony, Braunau, Nagymegyér, Nézsider, Heinrichsgrün and Czegled.¹⁷

In November 1915 a rear command (*Etappenkommando*) was set up in Čačak which had responsibility for all military and civil affairs in the district. It was basically temporary in character, between the military occupation by Austria-Hungary's regular army units and the establishment of the military government of occupied Serbia. By the end of 1915 the regular army units had left Čačak and were replaced by second and third call-up units which were to serve as a permanent occupying force. It was then that the *Etappenkommando* for the Austro-Hungarian 3rd Army was transferred

¹² Mitrović, *Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu*, 383–384.

¹³ Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 30.

¹⁴ In early June 1918 the Austro-Hungarian High Command (*Armeecoberkommando*) requested information on Serbian internees from the MGG/S command in Belgrade. Out of a total of 36,845 interned and confined persons 29,416 were capable of carrying arms (79.8%), 5,466 were unable to bear arms and older than fifty (14.8%), 779 were women (2.1%) and 1,028 were children aged fifteen or less (2.8%), cf. Trifunović, "Prisoners of War".

¹⁵ Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 74.

¹⁶ Ibid. 75.

¹⁷ Trifunović, "Prisoners of War".

from Belgrade to Čačak where it remained until the establishment of the MGG/S in January 1916.¹⁸ After the creation of the MGG/S the *Etappenkommando* was returned to Belgrade, the seat of the MGG/S, and its powers were transferred to the MGG/S for occupied Serbia.¹⁹

By the spring of 1916 the occupation power issued all necessary regulations for the organization and administration of occupied territory, including the *General outline for k. u. k. military administration in the conquered area of Serbia* (*Allgemeine Grundzüge für die k. u. k. Militärverwaltung in den besetzten Gebieten Serbiens*), the *Statute of MGG/S*, and *Directives for the political administration in the areas of the Military General Governorate of Serbia* (*Direktiven für die politische Verwaltung im Bereiche des Militärgeneralgouvernements in Serbien*).²⁰ The Čačak District was territorially the largest administrative division of the MGG/S, but it was also the least populated (about thirty inhabitants per square kilometre) and among the economically least developed districts (many small landholdings owned by individual farmers).²¹

Austro-Hungarian military presence in the Čačak District

Upon the transfer of Austro-Hungarian fittest army units to the front, a one-battalion force was deployed in the Čačak District. Divided into smaller units stationed in all counties of the district, this force was under the command of the district commander headquartered in Čačak, which was also the seat of the District Gendarmerie Command which was responsible for organizing policing in all counties.²² The feasibility of the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Serbia depended on the effectiveness of military and police forces. Communication with the native population was a necessary condition for it,²³ and the gendarmerie ranks were usually filled with

¹⁸ Jungerth, *Entstehung und Organisation*, 5.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 6.

²⁰ Božica Mladenović, "Promena naziva ulica u gradovima Vojno-generalnog gubernmana: prilog proučavanju odnosa između paralelnih društava" [The change of street names in the cities of the Military General Governorate: a contribution to the study of the relationship between parallel societies], *Istorijski časopis XLV-XLVI* (1998–1999), 289.

²¹ Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 194.

²² Bogumil Hrabak, "Čačak u doba austrougarske okupacije (1915–1918)" [Čačak during the Austro-Hungarian Occupation 1915–1918], in *Viševjekovna istorija Čačka i okoline* (Belgrade: Udruženje Čačana, 1995), 159.

²³ Arhiv Srbije [Archives of Serbia; hereafter: AS], Ministarstvo inostranih dela Kraljevine Srbije (1871–1918) [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Serbia; hereaf-

Croat, Czech or Serb subjects of Austria-Hungary due to their common or kindred language. Another condition was the presence of military and police units in all larger or strategically important settlements in the district. Basically, military units were permanently stationed in Čačak and in county seats (Čačak, Kraljevo, Ivanjica, Guča, Ušće and Raška), while the gendarmerie had stations set up in smaller towns and larger villages from which it patrolled remote areas. Such stations usually had twelve to fifteen men.²⁴

According to the analysed sources and available literature, the MGG/S had a relatively small number of Austro-Hungarian troops. In late 1917, after the uprising in the Bulgarian-occupied Toplica District (*Toplički ustanak*), the total number of troops in the MGG/S was about 23,000.²⁵ Apart from the two districts bordering the Bulgarian occupation zone of Morava, all other districts of the MGG/S had a similar number of troops.²⁶ During the occupation, the Čačak District was garrisoned with four infantry companies, each 150–200 strong. There were also one gendarmerie unit (200–300 strong) and an additional force (four detachments) assigned to protect the Lajkovac–Čačak railway.²⁷ No artillery units were permanently deployed in the district. There was also one detachment, the 16th Company of the *Streifregimente* (Raiding Regiment), armed with rifles and machine-guns.²⁸ Most gendarmerie troops were posted in rural areas covering the entire territory of the district, while the rest were based in Čačak, including mobile patrols (*Mobilpatrouillen*) of up to fifteen men tasked with tracking and catching brigands and smaller groups of insurgents.²⁹ Since the 16th Company of *Streifregimente* was also engaged in field operations against armed resistance, it appears that it was probably the fittest and most operational of all in the district.³⁰ Overall, in July 1916 there was in the Čačak

ter: MID], Političko odeljenje [Political Department; hereafter: PO], microfilm, r. 507, f. XV (1916), Dossier II–VI, XV/573, Athens, 23 April 1916.

²⁴ Dragoljub M. Pavlović, “Osnovna škola u Kaoni (1866–1941)” [Elementary School in Kaona (1866–1941)], *Zbornik radova Narodnog muzeja XIII* (Čačak 1983), 187.

²⁵ AS, Vojni Generalni Guverman [Military General Governorate; hereafter: VGG], XVII/198; Vladimir Stojančević, “Gubici u stanovništvu Srbije i Beograda pod austrougarskom okupacijom za vreme svetskog rata 1914–1918. godine” [Population Losses in Serbia and Belgrade under Austro-Hungarian Occupation during the First World War 1914–1918], *Godišnjak grada Beograda XXI* (1974), 64.

²⁶ Kerchnawe, “Die k. u. k. Militärverwaltung”, 96–97.

²⁷ AS, VGG, XVI/84, confid. no. 103, 18 May 1917.

²⁸ Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 52; Andrej Mitrović, *Ustaničke borbe u Srbiji 1916–1918* [Resistance movement in Serbia 1916–1918] (Belgrade: SKZ, 1987), 44–45.

²⁹ Kerchnawe, “Die k. u. k. Militärverwaltung”, 96–97.

³⁰ Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 54.

District an armed force of more than one thousand permanently deployed men against a local population of about 114,000.³¹ The number of troops grew in a later period of occupation, when armed resistance intensified, as well as after Romania's entry into the war, when additional infantry units were deployed in all districts of the MGG/S.³²

The narrative sources confirm this relatively small number of troops in the MGG/S. As reported by the wife of the Serbian parliament member Miloje Jovanović in Corfu in November 1916: "They have few or, better still, no permanently deployed military men in Serbia. All the service is being done by gendarmes."³³ As far as the readiness of the stationed force is concerned, it should be noted that most were of inferior quality because those younger or better trained were needed on the front.³⁴ The Austro-Hungarian armed forces consisted of three major components, which reflected the genesis of the Dual Monarchy and inherited military traditions: the common imperial-royal army (*K. u. k. Armee*), conscripted from all provinces of the Empire, as the most important force; the Austrian imperial-royal army (*Landwehr*); and the Hungarian royal army (*Honved*). Auxiliary troops, such as militia and various garrison troops were designated as *Landsturm*.³⁵ From 1916 there were no *K. u. k. Armee* units in the Čačak District; all infantry troops came from the *Landwehr* which was filled with second and third call-up conscripts. It is no wonder then that the main role of these units was to protect vital infrastructure in the district (railways, roads) and to track down and destroy smaller groups of insurgents. The goal of the occupation policy pursued by the military administration in Serbia was to forestall all possibility of a large-scale rebellion, which is why the weak military presence was made up for by enforcing harsh measures against the civilian population such as hostage taking, internment, deportation and disarmament.³⁶

³¹ Hrabak, "Čačak u doba austrougarske okupacije", 160; Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 53.

³² Kerchnawe, "Die k. u. k. Militärverwaltung", 91.

³³ AS, MID, PO, microfilm, r. 508, f. XV (1916), Dossier VII and VIII, XV/748, Corfu, 29 November 1916.

³⁴ Mitrović, *Ustaničke borbe*, 44.

³⁵ John R. Schindler, "Disaster on the Drina: The Austro-Hungarian Army in Serbia 1914", *War in History* 9.2 (2002), 160, 162.

³⁶ Dimitrije Djordjević, "Austro-ugarski okupacioni režim u Srbiji i njegov slom 1918" [Austro-Hungarian Occupation Regime in Serbia and its Breakdown in 1918], in *Naučni skup u povodu 50-godišnjice raspada Austro-Ugarske Monarhije i stvaranja jugoslavenske države* (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1969), 220.

Disarmament of civilians

Mass deportations of civilians to internment camps in Austria-Hungary in late 1915 were followed by the operation of civilian disarmament in which all occupation military and civil structures were engaged and which was carried out strictly and harshly. The next raid in search of weapons was ordered in March 1916. Even though a certain number of distinguished members of all local communities had to guarantee by their lives for the success of the operation, mostly old and unusable weapons were found.³⁷ In May 1916, disappointed at the result, the MGG/S tried a different tack by setting a fixed deadline for voluntary arms handover without any consequences for the holders or owners. Noncompliance with the deadline incurred severe punishment, including the death penalty. This approach proved much more successful, as evidenced by the total of 136 military rifles, 61 hunting rifles, 30 revolvers, 22 pistols, 9,600 bullets, 42 bayonets and four grenades turned in in June and July 1916.³⁸ Despite these numbers, the district authorities were aware that there still were many hidden weapons.³⁹ Therefore, from August 1916 the monthly *Official Gazette of k. u. k. Čačak District Command*⁴⁰ repeatedly warned that possession of arms and ammunition by the population was strictly prohibited: "The people are once more cautioned about the order of the General Military Governorate of July, current year, to the effect that whoever is found in possession of arms and munitions shall be executed together with a designated hostage; at the same this is to remind that the voluntary handover of arms and ammunition shall incur no penalty."⁴¹

Nevertheless, further raids in the Čačak District came up with a large quantity of small arms. In July 1917, 1,000 rifles and pistols, and 29 grenades were discovered in the Ivanjica County, and five persons were executed by the firing squad in Kraljevo after the discovery of 18 hidden rifles and 5,000 bullets.⁴² Earlier that year 200 rifles and 20 grenades had been discovered in the Čačak County.⁴³ Until the end of the occupation the MGG/S did not

³⁷ Mitrović, *Ustaničke borbe*, 98.

³⁸ AS, VGG, XVII/6, no. 8384, 24 August 1916.

³⁹ Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 55; Mitrović, *Ustaničke borbe*, 101.

⁴⁰ Marija Orbović, "Kulturna događanja u Čacku u delovodniku štamparije Stevana Matića" [Cultural Events in Čačak in the Register of Stevan Matić's Printing Office], *Zbornik radova Narodnog muzeja XXVII* (Čačak 1997), 262–263.

⁴¹ *Službeni glasnik c. i kr. okružnog poglavarstva Čačak* 1.3 [Amts-Blatt des k. u. k. Kreiskommandos Čačak], 15 October 1916, p. 4.

⁴² Mitrović, *Ustaničke borbe*, 476.

⁴³ Bogumil Hrabak, "Čačak u doba austrougarske okupacije", 172.

succeed in carrying out full civilian disarmament not only in the Čačak District but also in other districts, as evidenced by the fact that the withdrawal of Austro-Hungarian units from Čačak in late October 1918 was celebrated by gunfire in the town and surrounding villages.⁴⁴

Public executions

During the occupation years of 1915–1918 public executions were a measure taken only sporadically, at least in the Čačak District. Its main purpose, of course, was to intimidate the local population. There were only few public executions in the Čačak District, but almost every issue of the *Official Gazette* brought information about the executions of local Serbian civilians which were not carried out in public.⁴⁵ Public executions were usually staged as spectacles of power and terror in the presence of a large number of Austro-Hungarian officers and soldiers, occasionally also a photographer to record the event, as evidenced by the hanging of the priest Veljko Tankosić (of Guča County) in Užice on 21 July 1916. His execution was carried out in a prominent place, a small hill just outside the town, so that the gallows could be seen from a distance.

In the autumn of 1915, Čačak was visited by the war correspondent for the *Neue Freie Presse*, a former Austro-Hungarian army officer, Sandor Friedrich Ladislaus Rosenfeld (1872–1945). Rosenfeld was also a writer, and he left a written account of his travels under his pen name Alexander Roda Roda.⁴⁶ Remarking that the roads were covered in thick mud that threatened to suck off his boots, he described Čačak as a nice little town, the district seat where everything was in the service of the army and the war effort.⁴⁷ His impression was that the Austro-Hungarian army officers had good accommodation and felt at home. Many of them even spoke Serbian and were accustomed to the local circumstances.⁴⁸ Among the first occurrences that attracted Roda Roda's attention was the military commander's announcement of an execution: "The farmer Milan Cvetković was

⁴⁴ Siniša Paunović, *Pusta zemlja: roman* [An empty land: a novel] (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1948), 413; *Sloboda 1918*. [Freedom 1918], spec. issue of *Čačanski glas*, Čačak, 25 October 1993, 3.

⁴⁵ Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 57–58.

⁴⁶ Nikola Baković, "Odeljak iz *Srpskog dnevnika* Rode Rode o poseti Čačku i Ovčarsko-kablarskoj klisuri 1915. godine" [An Excerpt from Roda Roda's *Serbian Diary* on his visit to Čačak and Ovčar-Kablar Gorge in 1915], *Izvornik: građa Međuoštinskog istorijskog arhiva* 30 (2014), 156.

⁴⁷ Baković, "Odeljak iz *Srpskog dnevnika*", 159.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 161.

sentenced to death by hanging for the murder of four wounded soldiers. The sentence was carried out today, and his house was burnt down.”⁴⁹ This execution took place at the very beginning of the occupation of Čačak, as the announcement was combined with another one, dated 11 November 1915, which advised the local population to act peacefully and accept the new situation in the country.⁵⁰

A written account of an execution in Čačak during the occupation is left by the priest Sreten Mihailović.⁵¹ In early 1916 Mihailović was selected as a hostage to guarantee the peaceful conduct of the townspeople. He had to report to the District Command every morning at 8 am. On the morning of 14 February 1916, he was told that he had to administer the last rites to three Serbian soldiers who were to be hanged at 11 am. The rite was performed in the church of the Ascension⁵² across the street from the prison.⁵³ The three soldiers were neighbours from the village of Studenica (Raška County), Radisav Bačkulja (aged 27–28), Miloš Božić (30–32), and Milan Živković (25). Retreating with the Serbian Army after the Central Powers’ invasion in the autumn of 1915, they had reached Priština. Amidst all the disarray and confusion, they had decided to abandon their units and return home. They had arrived in the village before enemy forces. An Austro-Hungarian unit which had subsequently tried to enter the village had met with armed resistance from the villagers. A stronger unit sent the following day had managed to enter the village and the three men had been arrested.⁵⁴

The gallows were set up in the courtyard of the District Command, only fifteen metres from the prison. Fr. Mihailović was informed that his presence at the hanging was mandatory, a grim duty he vainly tried to evade. The Austro-Hungarian military code required that all executions be attended by the area commander (in this case the Čačak district commander), legal officer, duty officer, priest, physician and executioner.⁵⁵ The sentence was read out for every individual prisoner first in German and then in Serbian. Hanged first was Bačkulja who, according to Mihailović, held himself

⁴⁹ Baković, “Odeljak iz *Srpskog dnevnika*”, 161.

⁵⁰ Ibid. 161.

⁵¹ Sreten Mihailović, “Neispunjen amanet (istinit događaj iz vremena okupacije – pre 15 godina)” [An unfulfilled last wish (a true story from the time of occupation 15 years ago)], *Pregled crkve eparhije žičke XIII.2* (1931), 60–70.

⁵² The church was kept locked and the key was kept at the District Command, see Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 57.

⁵³ The prison was housed in a nineteenth-century building in the oriental Balkan style, which now is home to the permanent exhibition of the local museum.

⁵⁴ Mihailović, “Neispunjen amanet”, 63–64.

⁵⁵ AS, VGG, XVIII/619, undated.

bravely, followed by Božić and Živković. The priest obtained permission to bury them in the town cemetery according to the Orthodox rite, but by the time he managed to find a cart and men for the funeral, the bodies had been taken to the district nursery garden and buried in an unmarked grave.⁵⁶

Serbian armed resistance

Armed resistance to the occupation culminated in early 1917 when a large-scale uprising broke out in the Toplica District in the Bulgarian occupation zone of Morava.⁵⁷ Armed resistance in occupied Serbia has been given much attention in historiography, but the attention has been mostly focused on the Toplica Uprising.⁵⁸ It has already been observed that most of occupied Serbia under the Austro-Hungarians and Bulgarians lived its usual everyday life during the Toplica Uprising. The population of the northern districts of the MGG/S were virtually unaware of what was happening in the Bulgarian zone of occupation.⁵⁹

A stronger wave of armed resistance to the Austro-Hungarians in the Čačak District took place at the very end of the occupation, when the last train from Čačak to Užice and further to Bosnia-Herzegovina, was blown up. This was the single most important act of resistance which has been proved to be true and successful among a whole host of half-information, oral traditions and urban legends,⁶⁰ but actions against the occupation forces were organized throughout the period from late 1915 to 1918.

The earliest reference to armed groups in the Čačak District comes from late 1915. These groups consisted mostly of runaway soldiers who had kept their weapons and hence were a potential danger both to local population and to enemy soldiers.⁶¹ Austro-Hungarian officers' reports at first termed these groups as *bandits* or *hajduks*,⁶² but after a while the term *komite* (sing. *komita*, denoting a "guerrilla fighter") came to prevail in official correspondence to designate all armed individuals and groups that caused trouble in occupied territory.⁶³ Armed groups undertook actions against

⁵⁶ Mihailović, "Neispunjen amanet", 66–67.

⁵⁷ Mitrović, *Ustaničke borbe*, 13.

⁵⁸ Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 60.

⁵⁹ Mitrović, *Ustaničke borbe*, 355.

⁶⁰ Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 60.

⁶¹ Paunović, *Pusta zemlja*, 20.

⁶² *Hajduk* was the term for armed rebels in the Balkan part of the Ottoman Empire who frequently acted both as robbers and as insurgents against local Ottoman authorities.

⁶³ Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 60–61.

occupying forces from the beginning of the occupation. Thus, six Austro-Hungarian soldiers were killed near Čačak as early as the autumn of 1915. Budimir Stevanović from the village Baluga in the environs of Čačak was tried for the crime several times, but was invariably acquitted.⁶⁴ Ljubisav Perić (43) from Dolac and other four Serbian men fired at an Austro-Hungarian patrol assigned to requisition food, metal objects and other supplies in November 1915, killing one soldier. Perić was caught and hanged on 1 August 1916.⁶⁵

Resistance to the occupation in the Čačak District gained in intensity in the spring of 1916, when the Austro-Hungarian intelligence service reported the presence of *komite* and bandits in the district. In April and May 1916 there were arrests of a group of nine persons from Ročevići (Kraljevo County) for robbery, theft and rape, and of nine members of the Miložević family from Cervanja for killing and robbing an Austro-Hungarian soldier in December 1915.⁶⁶ According to an intelligence officer's report sent from Čačak to the MGG/S headquarters, a group of five bandits from Gornji Dubac (Guča County) attacked and killed a woman who had wanted to denounce them to the gendarmerie, and two groups of *komite* robbed and killed a merchant by the name of Lotinac from Vranovina.⁶⁷ After the appointment of von Rhemen as military governor in July 1916, more aggressive operations against *komite* and *hajduks* were undertaken, which coincided with Romania's entry into the war on the side of the Entente and the rising optimism of the people that the war might take a turn in the Entente's favour.⁶⁸ It was then that a more general term for such armed groups was introduced in the Čačak District – outlaws (*odmetnici*).⁶⁹ This change in official terminology possibly reflected the situation of frequent and fierce attacks on Austro-Hungarian forces in the district in 1916. Six men from the village of Premeća (Čačak County) as well as five men from Dolac are known to have carried out several attacks on k. u. k. forces in 1916. Some of the names of "outlaws" active in that period were recorded: Milosav and Milan Milošević from Cervanja; Pavle and Petar Čorbić from Reke (probably Ivanjica County) and Milovan Mihailović from Breževa (in fact Brezova,

⁶⁴ Istorijiski arhiv Čačak [Historical Archives of Čačak; hereafter: IAČ], Opština zablacška [Zablaće municipality: (OZ)], K-21, 26 November 1918.

⁶⁵ AS, VGG, XVII/6, no. 8384, 24 August 1916.

⁶⁶ AS, VGG, XVII/1435, 5 June 1916.

⁶⁷ AS, VGG, XVII/1436, 25 June 1916.

⁶⁸ Trifunović, "Perceptions of the Front", 64.

⁶⁹ Hrabak, "Čačak u doba austrougarske okupacije", 171–172.

Ivanjica County), who attacked and destroyed an Austro-Hungarian patrol near the Studenica monastery.⁷⁰

Actions carried out against the outlaws at the beginning of 1917 were more thoroughly prepared than before. Since Mt Kopaonik was marked as the gathering place of the outlaws, the MGG/S launched a search for rebels and outlaws on and around it. The Čačak District set up a 73-strong gendarmerie detachment to participate in the search, but the results were disappointing.⁷¹ This was also the period of significant resistance put up by the citizens of Čačak and surrounding villages who had chosen “to take to the woods”, which was a euphemism for taking to arms against the occupying forces.⁷²

Even though the Toplica Uprising which broke out in the latter part of February 1917 was mostly confined to the Bulgarian occupation zone, its direct consequences were felt in the Čačak District as early as March 1917.⁷³ Deportations of politically suspicious citizens of Čačak and other counties continued, as well as executions of those arrested on the grounds of illegal possession of weapons.⁷⁴ In April 1917 reportedly 200 rifles and 20 grenades were found in the district and, on 20 April, five *komite* were killed near Raška (two are known by name, Dragomir and Jevrem Živković), which may have been in connection with the collapse of the Toplica Uprising.⁷⁵ One of the leaders of the Toplica Uprising, Uroš Kostić, was killed somewhere between the Čačak and Novi Pazar districts. In May and June 1917 groups of up to twenty men were spotted around Čačak, and one of these was pursued by Austro-Hungarian troops. Armed rebels obviously moved from the south to the northern districts.⁷⁶

In the second half of 1917 the Čačak District saw frequent clashes between occupying forces and armed groups. The group led by Mašan Stojović, which operated mostly in the Dragačevo area (Guča County), has remained in the popular memory of local people. Oral tradition has it that Stojović arrived in Dragačevo in August 1917 with a group of six men in their early twenties (Stojović himself was born in 1887).⁷⁷ Interestingly,

⁷⁰ AS, VGG, XVII/1438, July 1916.

⁷¹ Andrej Mitrović, *Ustaničke borbe u Srbiji*, 204.

⁷² Bogumil Hrabak, “Čačak u doba austrougarske okupacije”, 173.

⁷³ Mitrović, *Ustaničke borbe*, 335.

⁷⁴ Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 62; AS, VGG, XVII/1450, 4 March 1917.

⁷⁵ AS, VGG, VIII/883, confid. no. 236, 8 May 1917; Mitrović, *Ustaničke borbe*, 377.

⁷⁶ Hrabak, “Čačak u doba austrougarske okupacije”, 172; Mitrović, *Ustaničke borbe*, 477.

⁷⁷ [Ljubomir Marković], Svetislav Lj. Marković, “Usmena svedočenja o pokušaju širenja Topličkog ustanka na moravički kraj” [Oral testimonies about the attempt to spread the

Stojović's main support came from municipality and village heads in the district, which indicates that his group's actions were mainly targeted at occupation forces and property. In late autumn 1917 Stojović's group spent nights in the house of Viliman Šarčević, president of Lisa (Guča County), and hid in a nearby cave by day. Other heads of local municipalities also helped Stojović, who presented his group as protectors of the weak and the poor against "Fritzes and their servants"⁷⁸. The fame created around Mašan Stojović and his comrades inspired common thugs and robbers to pretend to be his men.⁷⁹

Stojović's actions eventually drew greater attention and the county commanders notified the heads of all municipalities in which his group operated that the presence of *komite* had to be reported immediately to higher commands; in case a previously unreported *komita* was captured dead or alive the president of that particular municipality would be hanged. Later on, a considerable reward was offered for helping eliminate Stojović's group, 100,000 dinars for Stojović, 50,000 for each member of his group, a strategy which proved successful. In December 1917 the group was staying in the house of Andrija Grbić, president of Jevac municipality, who eventually betrayed them. His house was surrounded in the night of 20 December 1917. In the fighting that started at dawn and lasted until two in the afternoon, all *komite* were killed, but the Austro-Hungarian side also suffered losses: one officer killed and several soldiers wounded.⁸⁰

The death of Mašan Stojović and his group echoed so strongly among the local people that the house of Andrija Grbić was set on fire. After the war, in 1922, he and his helpers stood trial at the court of Čačak. Grbić was given a life sentence for treason and Marjan Ristić, president of Kosovica municipality, was sentenced to eighteen years in prison.⁸¹ To actually sentence somebody for unworthy conduct during the occupation was a rare court decision; most such cases ended in charges being dropped.⁸²

The elimination of Stojović's group made some impression on the people, but it did not prevent others from choosing the life of outlaws, as evidenced by the last year of the war. The number of armed groups rose, and so did the effort of the occupation authorities in the Čačak District to cope

Toplica Rebellion into the Morava region], *Zbornik radova Narodnog muzeja XXXVI* (Čačak 2006), 146–148.

⁷⁸ Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 64.

⁷⁹ Marković, "Usmena svedočenja", 150.

⁸⁰ Ibid. 151–154.

⁸¹ Ibid. 154.

⁸² Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 89.

with the situation. A group of three men was destroyed near Ušće (Ušće County) on 10 January 1918, and in March the MGG/S headquarters in Belgrade warned that Čačak is one of the districts where signs of approaching turmoil were obvious.⁸³ From spring 1918, every district of the MGG/S engaged an additional unit of 40 soldiers and mobile gendarmerie patrols to respond to such unrests.⁸⁴ Yet, the violence continued, affecting even civilians. In early March 1918 six unidentified men broke into the Serbian Orthodox monastery of Nikolje west of Čačak, tortured a monk and took all the money and valuable church objects.⁸⁵ By the summer of 1918 the number of armed groups of 10–20 outlaws multiplied. Resistance to the occupation became centred west of Čačak in the Ovčar-Kablar gorge of the Zapadna Morava and in the mountains Ovčar, Kablar and Jelica. Austro-Hungarian forces combed the area in early autumn 1918 but were only able to capture 20 Serbian deserters and one armed *komita*.⁸⁶ At almost the same time, on 16 September, two gendarmes were killed and one wounded in the vicinity of Čačak.⁸⁷

In mid-September 1918 Allied forces achieved a decisive breakthrough on the Salonika Front, effectively knocking Bulgaria out of the war by the end of the month. When the news reached the Čačak District the insurgents stepped up their actions,⁸⁸ all of which caused tension among the Austro-Hungarians and their nervous reactions. Acts of violence against civilians and arbitrary killings increased in number. In a bid to restore their shaken authority and deter those who were thinking of joining resistance, occupation forces fuelled the atmosphere of terror. The people were warned on a daily basis to remain calm, to comply with the closing hours for their shops and taverns, to obey curfew, to report all deserters, war prisoners or suspicious persons.⁸⁹ President of Atenica municipality Veljko Mišović was murdered just a few days before the liberation of Čačak in October 1918, when the Austro-Hungarian army was already retreating towards the west and north. In the state of collective euphoria caused by the false news that Serbian troops had entered Atenica (they were still in Kraljevo) the picture of the Habsburg emperor in the local courthouse was torn down, and

⁸³ Mitrović, *Ustaničke borbe*, 494.

⁸⁴ Mitrović, *Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu*, 463–464.

⁸⁵ Mitrović, *Ustaničke borbe*, 506.

⁸⁶ Hrabak, “Čačak u doba austrougarske okupacije”, 172–173.

⁸⁷ Mitrović, *Ustaničke borbe*, 516.

⁸⁸ Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 65–66.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* 66.

Mišović was accused of it without clear evidence. He was shot dead by three retreating gendarmes at the side of the road between Kraljevo and Čačak.⁹⁰

October 1918 marked the final stage in the occupation of Serbia. Many legends and oral testimonies depict clashes between Austro-Hungarian troops and insurgents in the Čačak District, but few can be verified by the surviving documentary sources. In October 1918 there was a clash between gendarmes and a large group of insurgents on the slopes of Mt Kablar, which ended in the gendarmes retreating back to Čačak.⁹¹ Another big incident took place in the Ovčar-Kablar Gorge on 25 October 1918, the day Čačak was liberated. The insurgents led by Mihailo and Vojko Čvrkić from Rošci (Čačak County) sabotaged the last Austro-Hungarian train from Čačak to Užice and caused it to fall into the Zapadna Morava river.⁹² During the evacuation of the last troops from the city the bridge over the Zapadna Morava was mined, but the retreating units were attacked by the *komite* led by Božidar Karaklajić on the hill called Ljubić.⁹³

Civilian victims of occupying forces

The outbreak of the First World War and the subsequent Austro-Hungarian occupation of the Čačak District inevitably changed the lives of the local people. A visible change was the emergence of new cemeteries for those who died or were killed in battle. They were established for both Serbian and Central Powers' soldiers, as well as for civilians who died in military hospitals. The biggest graveyard, just opposite the military hospital in Čačak, for all soldiers who were killed in the environs of the town or died in the hospital, was tended by the occupation forces. The graves were marked with wooden crosses and there was a central monument of white marble, visible from the town, which bore the inscription: *Es starb ein jeder für sein Vaterland* (All died for their fatherland). One part of it was reserved for the Serbian soldiers who died in the hospital.⁹⁴ After the war there was an ini-

⁹⁰ "Vešanje u Čačku" [Hanging in Čačak], *Čačanski glas* 2.7, Čačak 1933, 2.

⁹¹ Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 66.

⁹² Radovan M. Marinković, "Ginuli u osvit slobode" [They died at the dawn of freedom], *Čačanski glas* LXVII.39, Čačak, 25 September 1998, 9.

⁹³ Goran Davidović and Miloš Timotijević, *Zatamnjena prošlost. Istorija ravnogoraca čačanskog kraja*, vol. I [An obscured past. The history of the members of the Ravna Gora movement from the Čačak area] (Čačak – Gornji Milanovac – Kraljevo: Narodni muzej Čačak, 2002), 24.

⁹⁴ Teodosije Vukosavljević, "Spomenik ratnicima Prvog svetskog rata na groblju u Čačku" [Monument to First World War Soldiers in the Čačak Cemetery], *Zbornik radova Narodnog muzeja VI* (Čačak 1975), 233.

tiative in Čačak to collect all the remains of soldiers buried in the town or its vicinity during the war regardless of their nationality or army they had fought for. In 1934 a memorial of “four faiths” (Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Muslim and Jewish) was built to mark the ossuary with the remains of 918 recovered bodies (of which 262 Central Powers’ soldiers).⁹⁵

Other cemeteries and individual graves in the Čačak District show that danger to life during the occupation could come from more than one side. The practice of civilians denouncing other civilians to occupation authorities was not uncommon. Such allegations usually resulted in the interment of the denounced, as may be seen from the tombstone of Živko Četrović from Adrani (Kraljevo County) who was deported to Hungary upon denunciation by other Serbs in 1916. The inscription on a gravestone in Ušće claims that three members of the Planojević family were shot by Austro-Hungarian soldiers because they had been denounced by a certain Nikolija Barlova.⁹⁶

It is not yet possible to come up with the exact number of people from the Čačak District who perished during the First World War, particularly during the occupation period of 1915–1918. According to some estimates, the military and civilian death toll for Čačak alone exceeds 4,000 people, mostly Serbs.⁹⁷ After the war Serbian authorities tried to make a record of the names of all people who had been killed or gone missing during the occupation, but hardly completed the task. It came up with a total of 119 names for Čačak,⁹⁸ and 20 names (17 male and three female, some of them hanged in Guča) for the municipality of Kaona in Guča County.⁹⁹ According to the list of Čačak citizens compiled in February 1919 for the purpose of sugar rationing, the town had a population of about 4,800 compared to some 6,000 in 1914, which shows a wartime decline of some twenty per cent. According to the pre-war census of 1910, Čačak had 5,671 and the Čačak District 138,911 inhabitants. According to the census the Austro-Hungarian authorities carried out in the MGG/S in July 1916, there were 4,156 people in Čačak and 114,783 in the district, which shows that during the war and occupation the decline in urban population was greater than in rural. The 1921 census data for the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes

⁹⁵ Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 68.

⁹⁶ Ibid. 83–84.

⁹⁷ I express my gratitude to the historian Goran Davidović of the Historical Archives of Čačak for permission to publish this information from his as yet unpublished “List of Casualties during the Balkan Wars and the First World War in Čačak”.

⁹⁸ IAC, Opština čačanska [Čačak Municipality (OČ)] (1918–1941) K-1, no. 3194/21, 29 March 1921.

⁹⁹ Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 134.

show 121,888 citizens in the Čačak District, still 14 per cent less (over 17,000 people) than in 1910.¹⁰⁰

The Austro-Hungarian occupation system was quite systematic and meticulous in collecting data regarding the Serbian population in the MGG/S, as shown by the census carried out in 1916. So we know that in 1916 there were in the Čačak District a total of 1,931 births and 2,436 deaths, which is a negative population growth (a loss of 505 people).¹⁰¹ Of these 2,436 civilian deaths, only 14 were registered as violent (nine murders and five suicides), but the category “other” in the same group of statistical data contains 56 deaths not caused by diseases, tuberculosis, natural causes or acts of violence.¹⁰² It may be assumed that these 56 cases included people executed by the Austro-Hungarian authorities.

Conclusions

It may be said in conclusion that the Austro-Hungarian occupation authorities in the Čačak District pursued a repressive policy designed for the whole of the MGG/S with the initial aim of pacifying the hostile Serbian population. Even though the Čačak District was a relatively peaceful part of the MGG/S considering its sizeable territory and large remote areas in the south, many civilian and military victims provide enough evidence that its complete pacification was an impossible task. The described measures of the Austro-Hungarian military authorities such as mass civilian internment and disarmament and public executions probably helped prevent large-scale civilian unrest and deter some of those willing to put up armed resistance. But these often extremely brutal actions did not achieve their primary goal, to forestall every form of resistance, and therefore the problem remained unresolved of extreme violence committed by occupation Austro-Hungarian authorities or in response to it in the Čačak District throughout the occupation period of 1915–1918.

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¹⁰⁰ Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 133–135.

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¹⁰² Trifunović, *Život pod okupacijom*, 138.

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Yugoslav-Italian Economic Relations (1918–1929): Main Aspects

Abstract: The article looks at some aspects of Yugoslav-Italian economic relations from the end of the First World War to the beginning of the Great Depression. Those relations were not always driven by pure economic interests, but they also had political and strategic aims. Although Yugoslav-Italian political and diplomatic relations were well served in both Serbian/Yugoslav and Italian historiography, little has been written about economic relations between the two countries. Therefore, the article is mainly based on the documents from the Central State Archives (*Archivio centrale dello Stato*) and Historical-Diplomatic Archives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Archivio storico-diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri*) in Rome, as well as from the Archives of Yugoslavia (*Arhiv Jugoslavije*) in Belgrade.

Keywords: Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Yugoslavia, Italy, the Balkans, economic relations, trade exchange, exports, imports, merchandise, statistics

At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, Italy and the Balkans had already established some trade relations. However, trade exchange between Italy and the two Serbian states was fairly low. Only 0.5 per cent of all Italian exports found its outlet in Serbia and Montenegro. Italy imported from Serbia raw materials for her industry, as well as agricultural products, and it exported to Serbia construction industry products. Italy also traded with Austria-Hungary.¹ In 1881, there were around 2,000 Italian workers in Serbia building the Belgrade–Niš–Pirot–Caribrod railroad, and by 1888 their number was 4,000. Italians also found jobs building railroads in Bosnia and on the Adriatic coast. Most of those workers were from Abruzzo.² In 1898, Italian-Serbian economic relations were facilitated by the establishment of the *Agenzia commerciale italiana negli stati balcanici* in Belgrade. Its owner was Mosé Rocca from Milan. Nonetheless, Italy accounted for no more than 1.4 per cent of all Serbian imports. The most imported Italian goods in Serbia were paper, cotton and its products, silk, velvet, leather and wine.³

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¹ Ercole Sori, "La penetrazione economica italiana nei territori degli Slavi del Sud (1896–1914)", *Storia contemporanea: rivista bimestrale di studi storici* XII.2 (1981), 221.

² *Ibid.* 234–235.

³ *Ibid.* 221.

Italian politician and entrepreneur Giuseppe Volpi (1877–1947), minister of finance (1925–1928) and president of *Confederazione degli industriali* (1934–1943), as a young man in a difficult financial and family situation went to Serbia in search of a job. He founded the export-import firm *G. Volpi e Co.* and established contacts with the Serbian government. He was one of the most prominent Italian trading pioneers in Serbia, once he understood that the road to success led through ministerial offices in Belgrade. He often travelled to Serbia for business purposes.⁴ He also had some business plans in Montenegro concerning tobacco and traffic. In the first decade of the twentieth century he founded two companies there: *La regia cointeressata dei tabacchi* and *La compagnia di Antivari*.⁵ His business activities in the Balkans were connected with some political projects.⁶

Due to the economic conflict between Serbia and Austria-Hungary known as the Tariff War (1905–1911), trade exchange between Italy and Serbia increased. In 1906, Serbian imports from Italy amounted to 936,000 dinars, but next year the value of imports doubled (around two million). The value of Serbian exports to Italy was 572,000 dinars in 1906, but in 1907 it rose to about tremendous five million.⁷ Such significant increase was a good reason for the two countries to sign the Trade Agreement in 1907.⁸ However, in 1913, Italian exports to Serbia were only 0.10 per cent of total Italian exports to the European countries. In the same year, Italian imports from Serbia were only 0.26 per cent of all Italian imports from the European countries.⁹

Italy also had economic relations with the South Slavic provinces of the Habsburg Empire, especially with Dalmatia. Italy was second among exporters to Dalmatia. Moreover, the cement industry in Dalmatia attracted Italian investors. Thus, *Società Zamboni e Stock* was founded in 1904 and *Adria portland – Società anonima del cemento Portland dell'Adriatico* in 1907. Italian trade with Bosnia was slight despite the efforts of Carlo Brocchi, the only Italian representative in this region. Nevertheless, in 1903, Italy imported about 250,000 cubic metres of wood from Bosnia.¹⁰ On the eve of the First World War, Italy ranked as third exporter to Montenegro. The

⁴ Sergio Romano, *Giuseppe Volpi: industria e finanza tra Giolitti e Mussolini* (Milan: Bompiani, 1979), 12.

⁵ Ibid. 18–30.

⁶ Ibid. 240.

⁷ Sori, “La penetrazione economica italiana”, 224–225.

⁸ Ibid. 231.

⁹ Ibid. 265.

¹⁰ Ibid. 225, 237.

latter country imported more goods only from Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire.¹¹

During the First World War economic ties between Italy and the Balkans, not only with Serbia and Montenegro but also with South Slavic provinces in the Habsburg Monarchy, were endangered or completely broken. However, immediately after the war, business people from both sides of the Adriatic found their way to re-establish them. The first Italian analysis after the war noted that the newly-born state on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes,¹² did not have a well-developed industry and that it mainly depended on foreign imports, except in the food industry. According to some estimates made at the time, Italy would be able to export a high percentage of its industrial products to Yugoslavia, such as sugar, alcoholic beverages, beer, porcelain, glass, metal products, textile products, clothes and shoes, vines, cheese, chocolate, paper, brushes, soap, candles, automobiles, rice, oils, fruits, etc.¹³ First analyses showed that there were good prospects for Italian economic relations with Yugoslavia. As early as May 1919 the Italian Ministry of Treasure had an analysis by Dr. Moscheni who pointed out that Yugoslavia was an important transit area between Italy on the one hand, and Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia on the other. The Ministry had the information that the main merchandise which Italy had been importing from Yugoslavia were: wood, coal, cement, brick, grain, flower, bean, potato, plum, meat, and eggs. Italy had been exporting to Yugoslavia beer, rice, citrus fruits, vines, various food products, textile products, cotton, paper, brushes, soap, candles, cars, porcelain and tires. Some Yugoslav regions, such as Dalmatia, were so poor that they needed to import practically everything. In his letter to the Ministry of Treasure, Moscheni stressed that Yugoslavia had to import even some foodstuff, although it had great potential for food production.¹⁴

Bearing in mind all these facts, it was observed that there were great opportunities for the Italian economy, and not only for its exports but also for the use of Italian Adriatic ports for both Italian and international exports. The role of Trieste was especially stressed. However, Moscheni emphasized that Italian products had to be competitive in order to satisfy Yu-

¹¹ *Ibid.* 225-226.

¹² The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed on 1 December 1918. Its name was changed to Kingdom of Yugoslavia on 3 October 1929, but it is quite common in historiography to use the terms Yugoslavia and Yugoslav state even for the period before 1929.

¹³ Archivio storico-diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASDMAE), AC, b. 165, pp. 3-4.

¹⁴ Archivio centrale dello Stato (ACS), MT-DGT, UVCTP, el. 12, f. 1.

goslav consumers. The Ministry of Treasury was also aware of Italian industrialists' great interest in the cement factories in Split and the mines in the Promina Mountain. Moscheni concluded that it was important to provide advantageous conditions for trade with Yugoslavia.¹⁵

Besides the aforementioned cement plant in Split and the mines, Italian industrialists were also interested in companies engaged in using water potential in Dalmatia. During 1919 Italian businessmen were active in Split and Dalmatia preparing the ground for Italian economic penetration in this region which was a bone of contention between Italy and Yugoslavia. They perceived Split as an economic centre of a good part of Yugoslavia, and not only Dalmatia but also Herzegovina and Bosnia.¹⁶

Italian economic expansion into Yugoslavia and the Balkans was not driven by economic interests alone. Political considerations were of paramount importance, because Italy sought to assert herself as an imperialistic power and economic expansion was an instrument for achieving clear political aims.¹⁷ To prevent this, the Yugoslav government decided on 11 March 1919 not to allow the entry into the country of Italian-produced merchandise from the part of Dalmatia under Italian rule, local products from Dalmatia were exempted and even allowed to enter without paying any taxes.¹⁸ Moreover, Italian imports from Fiume (Rijeka) were prohibited unless the purchase had been made before 15 March 1919.¹⁹ Those were, in fact, countermeasures against the Italian blockade of the Adriatic because Italian authorities in Dalmatia had previously prohibited any traffic of Yugoslav goods to and from Dalmatia.²⁰ During Italian occupation, people in Dalmatia faced serious problems with food and other supplies.²¹ Due to those mutual impediments, it was the Greek port of Thessalonica that profited from Yugoslav-Italian trade.²² Italy suspended its blockade of the Adriatic and created preconditions for undisturbed traffic and trade exchange.

Trade exchange between two countries is usually one of the main indicators of their economic relations. After the war, Yugoslavia faced serious

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ ASDMAE, AC, b. 166, pp. 23–24.

¹⁷ Nicola La Marca, *Italia e Balcani fra le due guerre: saggio di una ricerca sui tentativi italiani di espansione economica nel Sud Est europeo fra le due guerre* (Rome: Bulzoni, 1979), 11.

¹⁸ Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia; hereafter AJ], 77–2–4.

¹⁹ AJ, 65–246–740.

²⁰ AJ, 77–2–4.

²¹ AJ, 77–55–152.

²² AJ, 65–242–733.

problems in providing food for its population and repairing war damages. The Serbian government-in-exile had imposed a ban on all exports and exempted imports from any taxes in 1917. This had been done in anticipation and fear of famine and shortage of goods expected after the war. However, the measures were untenable in practice due to tremendous needs for industrial material to repair war damages. Thus, both measures were modified on 5 November 1919 by proclaiming export customs and import contingents.²³

Although their trade exchange was free in principle, Yugoslavia and Italy occasionally placed bans on some products in an attempt to protect their own economy. The Italian minister in Belgrade wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome on 24 March 1920 that the Yugoslav government had lifted the ban on the importation of some Italian goods which had been marked as luxurious, but it is clear from the list of those products that they were quite common. On 5 April 1920 the minister sent to Rome the list of this merchandise consisting of 96 items such as mushrooms, citrus fruits, olives, flowers, leather, sea fruits, beer, wine, candies, soaps, syrups, perfumes etc. The Italian government responded on 30 December 1920 by imposing a ban on the importation of some Yugoslav products. It seems that this ban remained in place in the following years because the Italian authorities explained on 24 December 1923 that the ban on potato from Yugoslavia had nothing to do with the December 1920 ban, but rather with phytopathological reasons.²⁴

The Treaty of Rapallo signed on 12 November 1920 which settled the border issue between Italy and Yugoslavia also contained several economic provisions. Giovanni Giolitti, Carlo Sforza and Ivanoe Bonomi, on the Italian side, and Milenko R. Vesnić, Ante Trumbić and Kosta Stojanović on the Yugoslav, agreed to form a joint commission for the purpose of proposing to both governments certain measures in order to establish “the most cordial economic and financial relations between the two countries”.²⁵ They also agreed that Yugoslavia would recognize to Italian citizens in Dalmatia all economic concessions that had been made by Austro-Hungarian authorities as well as diplomas and other university titles.²⁶

The Ministry of Treasure in Rome formulated in mid-December 1920 the main questions to be settled in future economic agreements with

²³ Goran Pitić, “Karakteristike i organizacija spoljnotrgovinskog sistema Jugoslavije od 1919. do 1929. godine”, *Acta historico-oeconomica Iugoslaviae* 16 (1989), 112-113.

²⁴ ASDMAE, AC, b. 167, p. 23-4.

²⁵ *I documenti per la storia dei rapporti tra l'Italia e la Jugoslavia*, ed. Amedeo Giannini (Rome: Istituto per l'Europa orientale, 1934), 40; *Rapalski ugovor 12. novembra 1920: zbirka dokumenata*, ed. Vojislav M. Jovanović (Belgrade: Udruženje novinara NRS, 1950), 67.

²⁶ *I documenti per la storia*, 40-41; *Rapalski ugovor*, 67-68.

the Yugoslav state, including the division of archives (financial, railway, maritime etc.), transport through the ports on both sides of the Adriatic, banking, fishing, railways, post offices, telephone and telegraphic traffic, and pensions.²⁷

The Yugoslav statistics of Yugoslav-Italian trade exchange for 1920–1929 show that Yugoslav exports to Italy were at their lowest in 1920 and 1921, and highest in 1924, but relatively stable in this period (between 27 and 28.9 %). The most favourable years were those from 1923 to 1925, after which downturn followed.

Table 1 Yugoslav exports to Italy in dinars (1920–1929)

	Millions of dinars	Per cent of total exports
1920	356	27.0
1921	576	23.4
1922	1,035	28.1
1923	2,307	28.7
1924	2,757	28.9
1925	2,249	25.3
1926	1,960	25.1
1927	1,590	24.8
1928	1,680	26.1
1929	1,971	24.9

(*Jugoslavija 1918–1988: statistički godišnjak*, Belgrade 1989, 301, 304)

As for Yugoslav imports from Italy, they peaked in 1920 in terms of their share in total Yugoslav imports, and decreased from 1924 onwards. However, the value of Yugoslav imports from Italy was highest in 1924 and 1925.

Table 2 Yugoslav imports from Italy in dinars (1920–1929)

	Millions of dinars	Per cent of total imports
1920	1,268	36.6
1921	855	20.7
1922	985	15.3
1923	1,470	17.7
1924	1,688	20.5
1925	1,644	18.8
1926	1,054	13.8
1927	940	12.9
1928	939	12.0
1929	823	10.8

(*Jugoslavija 1918–1988: statistički godišnjak*, Belgrade 1989, 301, 304)

²⁷ ACS, MT–DGT, UVCTP, el. 12, f. 1.

It was only in 1920 and 1921 that Yugoslav trade balance with Italy was passive, i.e. Yugoslavia imported more from Italy than it exported to that country. From 1922 onwards Yugoslavia had favourable trade balance with Italy, especially in 1924 and 1929.

Table 3 Yugoslav trade balance with Italy
in millions of dinars (1920-1929)

Year	Balance	Year	Balance
1920	- 912	1925	+ 605
1921	- 279	1926	+ 906
1922	+ 50	1927	+ 650
1923	+ 837	1928	+ 741
1924	+ 1,069	1929	+ 1,148

(*Jugoslavija 1918-1988: statistički godišnjak*, Beograd 1989, 301, 304)

However, to understand whether or not imports and exports actually increased, current figures should be divided by inflation rates to get constant figures. In doing so, we reach different figures, which show that the most favourable years for Yugoslav exports to Italy were 1924-1926, as well as 1929, while Yugoslav imports from Italy were greatest in 1920.

Table 4 Yugoslav exports to Italy and imports from Italy
(at constant 1920 prices) in millions of dinars (1920-1929)

	Exports	Imports
1920	356	1,268
1921	652	967
1922	857	816
1923	1,372	875
1924	1,593	975
1925	1,461	1,068
1926	1,505	810
1927	1,194	706
1928	1,260	705
1929	1,504	628

Italian statistics show that Italian imports from Yugoslavia reached their zenith in 1926, which was marked as the year of the most valuable trade with Yugoslavia. However, the same year saw the beginning of a decline in Italian exports to Yugoslavia, which peaked only a year before. In 1925 and 1926, the value of trade between the two countries exceeded one billion Italian liras.

Table 5 Value of the Yugoslav-Italian trade exchange in liras (1922-1927)

	Italian imports from Yugoslavia	Italian exports to Yugoslavia	Italian trade balance with Yugoslavia
1922	367,015,818	255,002,409	- 112,013,409
1923	488,809,003	337,796,037	- 151,012,966
1924	553,006,694	371,619,700	- 181,386,994
1925	780,964,096	496,461,981	- 284,502,115
1926	973,408,281	379,636,029	- 593,772,252
1927	613,571,779	307,703,816	- 305,867,963

(ACS, MMM-DGPAG, b.137, c/14)

Another analysis of the Yugoslav economy and Yugoslav-Italian trade exchange in particular was written in January 1921 and submitted to the Economic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome three months later. It noted that Yugoslav imports in 1919 were valued at 2,982,067,276 dinars, but exports amounted to much less, 686,845,040 dinars. According to the same analysis, Yugoslav imports were valued at 1,850,104,633 dinars and exports at 465,086,161 dinars in the first half of 1920. The most valuable imports to Yugoslavia were: cotton cloths (786,876,820 dinars), hemp and linen cloths (154,376,926 dinars), wool and leather (124,007,560 dinars). As for exports, the most valuable merchandise was wood (207,122,873 dinars), tannin (25,054,100 dinars), meat (21,639,679 dinars), corn (21,390,000 dinars) etc. It is particularly interesting and important to note that in the first half of 1920 Italy absorbed almost one half of Yugoslav exports (226,072,043 dinars, or 48,61 %), much more than Austria (152,847,994 dinars, or 32,86 %) and other countries (Greece 18,361,920 dinars, or 3,95 %; Czechoslovakia 14,544,072 dinars, or 3,13%).²⁸ The Italians concluded that the Yugoslav export policy in 1919-1920 was impeded by an unstable customs system, unstable political strategy at international level (because Yugoslavia was a new state), agrarian reform, and unstable currency.²⁹

During 1920 Italy imported from Yugoslavia 500,000 tons of oak beams, 500,000 tons of beech beams, 500,000 tons of sawed fir, 150,000-200,000 tons of sawed oak, 80,000-100,000 tons of beech, and 20,000 tons of planks for barrels. As for minerals, Italy imported 500,000 tons of iron, 100,000 tons of iron scrap, over 200,000 tons of marl, 25,000 tons of mag-

²⁸ ASDMAE, AC, b. 165, pp. 3-4.

²⁹ Ibid.

nesium, 5,000 tons of chromium, 5,000 tons of lead, and certain unspecified amount of bauxite.³⁰

A report sent from the Italian Legation in Belgrade to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 14 August 1921 shows that in the first four months of 1921 Yugoslavia exported goods valued at 502,050,335 dinars, and that in the same period she imported goods amounting to 1,014,062,758 dinars, of which those from Italy accounted for 282,359,234 dinars, or 27.84 % of all Yugoslav imports. Austria (233,933,474 dinars, or 23.07 %) and Czechoslovakia (164,683,625 dinars, or 16.24 %) lagged behind.³¹

Trade between Italy and Yugoslavia remained lively during the 1920s. From 1 July 1921 to 30 June 1922, Yugoslavia exported to Italy merchandise at a total value of 452,000,000 liras, and Yugoslavia imported from Italy for 232,000,000 liras (138,000,000 cotton, 31,000,000 wool, 11,000,000 rice, 6,400,000 fruits and vegetables, 5,000,000 leather, 4,800,000 cloths, etc.).³² A certain discrepancy between political and economic relations of the two countries was evident from another report of 20 November 1922 sent from the Belgrade Legation. According to it, cotton products from Italy held the first place in Yugoslav imports of this merchandise in 1921 (433,910,262 dinars, or 37.80 %), with Czechoslovakia (256,637,125 dinars, or 22.36 %) and Great Britain (126,070,849 dinars, or 10.98 %). Italy also took the first place in Yugoslav imports of woollen products worth 82,769,617 dinars (27.99 %). Czechoslovakia was second (58,130,383 dinars, or 19.66 %) and Great Britain third (48,480,937 dinars, or 16.39 %) on the list. Yugoslavia imported from Italy petroleum at a total value of 24,033,706 dinars (23.18 % of petroleum imports). Only the United States of America exported more petroleum to Yugoslavia (33,413,258 dinars, or 32.33 %).³³

In 1921, Yugoslavia imported from Italy refined sugar worth 10,671,414 dinars (7.34 %). In this respect Italy was lagging behind Czechoslovakia (111,131,648 dinars, or 76.46 %) and Greece (10,994,115 dinars, or 7.56 %).³⁴

The value of Yugoslav exports to Italy in the first quarter of 1922 was 219,579,672 dinars, or 30.42 per cent of total Yugoslav exports in that period.³⁵ The Yugoslavs estimated that Italian trade exchange with the countries

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ ASDMAE, AC, b. 166, p. 23-4.

³² ASDMAE, AC, b. 168, p. 23-11.

³³ ASDMAE, AC, b. 167, p. 23-4.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ AJ, 76-78-147.

carved out of the former Habsburg Monarchy was greater from 1918 to 1921 than it had been with Austria-Hungary prior to 1914.³⁶

In early September 1921, a telegram from Brioni arrived in the Presidency of the Council of Ministers in Rome in which local authorities wrote about the great economic importance of reaching an agreement with Yugoslavia for the new Italian provinces. Brioni was the place where the two countries signed the Agreement for Regulating Fishing in the Adriatic Sea on 14 September 1921. Fulco Tosti di Valminuta and Ivo Krstelj agreed on the borders of the joint fishing zone, conditions for fishing there, supervision, and the formation of the Permanent Yugoslav-Italian Board for Fishing.³⁷ As early as 26 September 1921 the Italian Commission for Fishing in the Adriatic encouraged some local authorities to establish an association for the protection of fishing in the Velebit Canal (*Il Canale della Morlacca*), in which both Italian and Yugoslav capital would be represented. The significance of such an association was not disputable either from the political or the economic point of view. It was envisaged to be supported by banks and credit institutions. Count Bullo, president of a similar association in Venice, was willing to provide some means of transport and refrigerators. The General Inspectorate for Fishing notified the government on 26 October 1921 that Gustavo Brunelli, a technical inspector, doubted the legitimacy of founding such an association. The General Inspectorate was aware that the Yugoslav side was interested in those activities. The Brioni Convention on Fishing stipulated that regular meetings between representatives of the two countries be held annually. The Italians looked forward to discussing the work of an association for the protection of fishing in the Velebit Canal at one of those meetings.³⁸

A report of 1922 discussed what should be done in order to improve Yugoslav-Italian economic relations. According to this document, it was necessary to coordinate activities in the banking sector with the view to strengthening ties between the two markets. A joint bank institute with capital from both countries should be established in order to increase exchange between them. *La Banca Adriatica di Trieste* was recognized as a possible coordinator between the two economies, especially because it already had branches in Yugoslavia, as well as good relations with some other banks there. The program of cooperation between this bank and some Yugoslav bank (perhaps *Jadranska banka* in Belgrade) should be as follows:

³⁶ AJ, 65-241-731.

³⁷ *I documenti per la storia*, 46-58.

³⁸ ACS, PCM-UCNP, b. 62, c/49.

- 1) Intervene with relevant authorities in surmounting all technical and bureaucratic obstacles to economic cooperation between Italy and Yugoslavia
- 2) Encourage the press in both countries to promote all kinds of economic collaboration
- 3) Urge the authorities to improve transportation systems and, where possible, simplify customs formalities
- 4) Organize trade deposits for goods ordered in Yugoslavia to make business transactions easier
- 5) Facilitate the sale of Italian products to Yugoslav purchasers
- 6) Improve industrial collaboration.³⁹

The Conventions of Santa Margherita were signed in Rome on 23 October 1922 as a practical application of the Rapallo Agreement, as well as an attempt to solve those aspects of the Adriatic question that were as yet unsolved. It was agreed that Zara (Zadar) should remain out of the Italian customs system, although it belonged to Italy, and therefore all goods coming in and out of this town were exempted from all taxes or customs duties. Yugoslavia did not impose any additional measures against exports to Zara, especially of food and agricultural products. Also, products from Zara could be imported to Yugoslavia without paying taxes and customs. Merchandise exported from Yugoslavia to Zara encompassed: olive oil, wine, vinegar, meat, eggs, milk, cheese, fish, vegetables, fruits, cereal, wool and timber. Goods from Zara which were exempt from any payments were: olive oil, wine, vinegar, soap, candles, ropes, fishing nets, wool, wooden products, leather, glass, bottles, fish and insecticides.⁴⁰

One of the conventions regulated suppression of smuggling and financial offences. Both sides pledged to cooperation, particularly in exchanging useful information concerning smugglers. Information would be given to the *Direzione generale delle dogane e delle imposte indirette* and to *Guardia di finanza* in Italy, and to the General Directorate of Customs in Yugoslavia. However, this collaboration was not confined only to exchange of information but also included expert and technical assistance, if necessary.⁴¹

The Santa Margherita Conventions also provided for the assessment of real estate in Dalmatia, systematization of various types of property, and division of regional and municipal property. It should be mentioned that

³⁹ ASDMAE, AC, b. 169, p. 28.

⁴⁰ *I documenti per la storia*, 79-89.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* 90-97.

provisional stipulations on industrial and trade business were also concluded in expectation of a trade agreement.⁴²

Despite their financial acumen, Italian businessmen were sometimes concerned about political tensions that might thwart their economic activities. In early October 1923, the Italian Legation in Belgrade sent a letter to Rome explaining that Expedit, a company which represented various Italian exporters, had expressed its uneasiness with regard to political conflicts between Italy and Yugoslavia. Italian exporters complained that their position in Yugoslavia might be endangered because of aggravated political relations, which could, in turn, be exploited by rivalling companies from other countries.⁴³

The Yugoslav government started preparations for negotiations with Italy in 1919 and produced a list of measures for the protection of its economic interests. From 1919 to 1924 the negotiations gradually intensified. In January 1921, businessmen from the wood industry urged for better conditions in trade exchange with Italy, while wine-producers from Dalmatia and Herzegovina asked for the protection of their interests bearing in mind the quality of Italian wines. Matko Laginja, a member of the Yugoslav Parliament and one of the most prominent politicians from Dalmatia, gave his opinion on a draft agreement in May 1921. He critically evaluated several provisions and suggested some changes. His suggestions seem to have been influential in further negotiations. Well acquainted with the situation, Laginja especially emphasized the principle of reciprocity and parity. Another prominent Dalmatian, Niko Ljubić, a lawyer and the president of *Jugoslovenska industrijska banka* from Split also wrote to the Yugoslav delegation about the water potential of Dalmatia.⁴⁴

The Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce published in 1921 a booklet titled *Spomenica u predmetu uredjenja privredno-financijskih odnosa sa Italijom* which underlined two preconditions for negotiations with Italy: 1) full implementation of the Treaty of Rapallo; and 2) compensation for the damage caused by Italian troops in Dalmatia. The Yugoslavs demanded 3,950,000 liras, and the Ministry of Treasury in Rome had similar estimates.⁴⁵ The Chamber of Commerce also asked for bringing pressure to bear on the Italian side to suspend its import taxes on semi-manufactured wooden products and for paying strict attention to Italian fishing competition in the Adriatic Sea.⁴⁶

⁴² Ibid. 116–117.

⁴³ ASDMAE, AC, b. 167, p. 23–4.

⁴⁴ AJ, 65–243–736.

⁴⁵ ACS, MT–DGT, UVCTP, cl. 12, f. 1.

⁴⁶ AJ, 65–243–736.

The negotiations took place in Rome in March 1923. The Yugoslavs asked for suspension or reduction of Italian customs tariffs on cement from Dalmatia, which were 7.50 liras per quintal, and the implementation of the principle of reciprocity, which had been agreed upon by the Serbian-Italian treaty of 1907.⁴⁷

The Yugoslav authorities consulted various economic bodies for ideas, opinions and concrete suggestions regarding the on-going negotiations with Italy. In early June 1923, the Chamber of Commerce from Novi Sad opined that an eventual agreement with Italy should be concluded for a short period, preferably two years, and extended after further stabilization of the Yugoslav economy. The Federation of Industrialists from Zagreb pointed out on 9 June 1923 that Yugoslavia was the weaker side in the negotiations. The industrialists noted that most of the merchandise imported into Yugoslavia through Trieste was not of Italian origin. Italy benefited from the fact that Yugoslavia did not have a major Adriatic port. The Zagreb industrialists suggested that earlier tariffs be maintained in an interim trade agreement. Industrialists and businessmen from Skoplje and Veliki Bečkerek appealed to Belgrade not to give in to Italian pressure. The Industrial Chamber of Belgrade proposed on 21 June 1923 that the Italian import tax on Yugoslav wood amounting to eight liras per ton be cut by half. A similar suggestion came to Belgrade from Ljubljana in July 1923.⁴⁸ The Slovenes were much interested in the negotiations because their province bordered on Italy and they had had good trade relations with the Italians when they had been under Austria-Hungary.⁴⁹

In February 1924, two Yugoslav experts, Sava Kukić, the president of the Yugoslav delegation, and Milan Todorović, insisted on three crucial principles in the negotiations with Italy: 1) the Yugoslavs should proclaim minimal customs tariffs for Italian products in order to protect their industry; 2) some import relaxations for Yugoslav merchandise should be obtained; 3) special attention should be paid to the possibility of compensation for some goods.⁵⁰ During this month Yugoslav-Italian economic negotiations were in crisis.⁵¹

During April and May of 1924, the Italian government was preparing for the conclusion of a new agreement with Yugoslavia on trade

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ AJ, 76-78-147.

⁴⁹ AJ, 65-7-63.

⁵⁰ AJ, 76-78-147.

⁵¹ AJ, 65-7-63.

and navigation, and the question of cabotage was discussed in particular.⁵² Lucioli, the president of the Italian delegation for economic negotiations with Yugoslavia, reported on 16 May 1924 that the Yugoslav delegation was intent on excluding the Danube from the stipulations relating to river traffic. In late June, it was reported that, contrary to the request of the Italian delegation, the Yugoslavs denied a free status to foreigners in the border zone of 50 km.⁵³

The Italian authorities found out on 12 July 1924 that import taxes in Yugoslavia had been reduced (except for wine) as a result of the previous negotiations. The Yugoslav delegation asked the Italian representatives to reduce their import taxes for cement and agreed that Italian boats could sail on the Bojana river but without undertaking any commercial activities.⁵⁴

Finally, the Yugoslav-Italian Agreement on Trade and Navigation was signed in Belgrade on 14 July 1924, and the Italian minister in Belgrade, General Alessandro Bodrero, informed Rome about strong support to the agreement in Yugoslavia.⁵⁵

The Agreement had 32 articles plus 29 stipulations on border traffic.⁵⁶ The signatories were Bodrero and Lucioli for Italy, and Kukić and Todorović with three other delegates for Yugoslavia. The first sentence in the first article reads as follows: "There will be full and complete freedom of commerce and navigation between the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes." Article 2 provided for the equal treatment of Italian agrarian and industrial products imported into Yugoslavia and those that Yugoslavia exported to Italy without additional taxes. Businessmen from one country were allowed to buy goods in the other under the same conditions as its citizens. In this article the two countries recognized to each other the status of the most favoured trade partner, including customs duties. According to Article 6, exporters to both countries did not have to prove the origin of their merchandise if it had been made in either Italy or Yugoslavia. Practically, the most favoured status affected customs duties and formalities, transport of merchandise and traffic of goods. Both sides undertook not to impede mutual trade with prohibitions or limitations. However, there were some exceptions regarding military supplies, public security, and state monopoly which had been previously imposed. Article 16 provided for recognition of the legal existence of trading firms which had their head-

⁵² ASDMAE, AC, p. 3-1-e.

⁵³ ASDMAE, AC, p. 3-1-f.

⁵⁴ ASDMAE, AC, p. 3-1-e.

⁵⁵ ASDMAE, AC, p. 3-1-f.

⁵⁶ *I documenti per la storia*, 162-205.

quarters in either country. Cabotage was reserved only for domestic ships as stipulated in Article 28. Italian ships were allowed to sail into the Yugoslav rivers of Zrmanja, Krka and Neretva, while the Yugoslavs were allowed to enter into the Italian ports of Fano, Pesaro and Ravenna.

Although it was signed in July 1924, the Agreement did not come into force before November 1928. There was scepticism in both countries about the effects of the agreement. Some Yugoslav economists warned about the negative consequences it might have on the Yugoslav economy.⁵⁷ On the other hand, Ugo Sala, the attaché for economic affairs in the Italian Legation in Belgrade, warned Mussolini in January 1924 that such an agreement would not increase Yugoslavia's purchase of Italian products and thus make that country dependent on Italy.⁵⁸

However, in late July 1924, the Italian Consulate in Sarajevo sent a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome reporting on the writing of local newspapers about Italian economic penetration in Yugoslavia. Those writings uttered a warning about Italian large-scale impact on the Yugoslav economy which would turn the country into an Italian vassal (no doubt, this was an exaggeration). The author of one of the articles claimed that Italian loans were especially dangerous. His opinion was that Belgrade should take loans only from those countries which had no conterminous borders with Yugoslavia.⁵⁹

The question of cabotage was discussed again in Rome in early August 1924. The Italians wanted to be granted cabotage rights along the Yugoslav coast.⁶⁰

On 12 August 1924, the Convention on Livestock Diseases between Italy and Yugoslavia was signed in Belgrade for the purpose of making livestock trade easier and minimizing the danger of diseases spreading from one country to another. The Convention had eleven articles. Article 1 enabled importers to restrict the entry of livestock to those border stations where it could undergo veterinarian control. According to Article 2, all importers had to have a certificate on the origin and health of animals. The import of meat and poultry was allowed, but only with a clear health certificate. If veterinarian inspection discovered ill animals, the whole transport would be prohibited from crossing the border. Also, any transport suspected of containing sick animals or contaminated meat could be forbidden to enter the other country.

⁵⁷ Pitić, "Karakteristike i organizacija", 117.

⁵⁸ La Marca, *Italia e Balcani fra le due guerre*, 78.

⁵⁹ ASDMAE, AC, p. 4-6, s. 4.

⁶⁰ ASDMAE, AC, p. 3-1-e.

Given that livestock and meat products were among most important items in the Yugoslav-Italian trade exchange, the Convention on Livestock Diseases was one of the most important documents.

In November 1924, the Italians wanted to eliminate Yugoslav competition from Fiume by systematization of banks and unification of warehouse administration. It was thought that the Yugoslav-Italian tariff competition regarding warehouses and deposits in the Fiume region hindered the development of trade. The Italians were willing to offer special reductions to the Yugoslavs in order to facilitate unification of warehouse administration.⁶¹

From 1923 to 1926 Italy concluded trade agreements with Turkey, Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and Romania. Initial results were positive and Italian exports increased by nearly 25 per cent. However, at the end of 1925, Italy ran a trade deficit of a billion liras.⁶²

The Italian Consulate in Skoplje sent an official letter on 12 June 1925 in which the author, Antonio Luca, informed the Italian government about the economic crisis in Southern Serbia (Macedonia). The crisis was in part caused by the emigration of Muslim, mainly agrarian, population, to Turkey. The production of tobacco decreased and the shortage of working capital was evident; local banks did not have sufficient means for more considerable loaning. Conditions were favourable for further Italian economic penetration in Southern Serbia, mainly in the textile and cotton industries, as well as in the production of rice, olive oil, woollen clothes, leather etc. Therefore, Luca suggested that Italian businessmen should think about new initiatives, especially during the crisis.⁶³

Additional conventions between Yugoslavia and Italy were signed on 20 July 1925 in Nettuno near Rome. There were thirty-one conventions which concerned economic questions such as: railroad and maritime traffic, public and legal affairs (pensions, taxes, fishing, debts and insurance).⁶⁴ The Nettuno Conventions were vaguely viewed in Yugoslavia, and particularly in Dalmatia, as further Italian economic penetration of Yugoslavia, giving cause for public protests. It was believed that Yugoslav-Italian trade relations must be based exclusively on commercial interests and such as to preserve Yugoslavia's full freedom and independence in economic development. Concessions should be given to Italy, but only on the basis of mutual

⁶¹ ASDMAE, AC, p. 3-1-g.

⁶² La Marca, *Italia e Balcani fra le due guerre*, 29-30.

⁶³ ASDMAE, AC, p. 4-6, s. 4-5.

⁶⁴ Mladenka Ivanković, "Neptunske konvencije između Kraljevine SHS i Italije", in *Jugoslovenska država 1918-1998* (Belgrade: INIS, 1999), 188-189.

interest.⁶⁵ Facing strong resistance, the Nettuno Conventions were not ratified in the Yugoslav Parliament until August 1928, which aggravated relations between the two countries.

In early January 1926, the Yugoslav Trade Agency in Milan sent a report to Belgrade on the conditions on the Italian market in the previous year. This report listed the relevant goods and provided a short description of the market:

- Metals: the market was stable and an even better future was expected
- Copper: there were some oscillations on the market, while consumption was regular
- Lead: very good consumption and steady prices
- Steel: Italian production surpassed that of last year and a large amount was imported; thus consumption increased from 25 kg to 50–55 kg per capita
- Silk: there were no problems in relations with foreign partners, which created a measure of trust
- Cotton: consumption was satisfactory despite industrial depression in England
- Hemp: the price was low
- Flax: there was not enough flax on the market, which forced the Italians to consider increasing production
- Wool: 1925 was a difficult year due to reduced consumption in many countries
- Grains: 1925 was characterized by fluctuation and turbulence in this sector
- Wine: expected exportation to France did not take place, but another market was found
- Coffee: in 1925 the prices were 20 per cent lower than in 1924
- Sugar: importation from abroad was vast, and the price dropped
- Tea: the market was in excellent condition
- Leather: in the first half of 1925, the market was favourable, but then there was a stalemate
- Coal: overproduction caused a drop in prices in the second half of the year.⁶⁶

A report on the share of different countries in Yugoslav imports during 1925 was sent from Belgrade to Rome on 17 April 1926. According to the statistics enclosed, Italy ranked first among the importing countries.

⁶⁵ Jovan M. Jovanović, "Neptunske konvencije", *Srpski književni glasnik* 25 (1928), 60–61.

⁶⁶ AJ, 65–241–731.

Table 6 Yugoslav imports in 1925

	Main exporters to Yugoslavia	Value in Yugoslav dinars	Per cent
1	Italy	1,644,110,416	18.78
2	Austria	1,604,203,240	18.33
3	Czechoslovakia	1,558,846,101	17.81
4	Germany	866,323,055	9.90
5	Great Britain	713,169,114	8.15

(ASDMAE, AC, p. 4-6, s. 4-15)

This report noted that the Italian share of imports in Yugoslavia decreased from 28.91 per cent in 1924 to 18.78 per cent in 1925 because of German competition. The German share in Yugoslav imports in 1924 was 4.08 per cent, and it more than doubled in 1925.⁶⁷

Overall, Italian exports increased by 13.5 per cent from 1922 to 1925.⁶⁸ However, a considerable decline in trade exchange between Italy and Yugoslavia followed after 1926. Italian goods did not find their market in Yugoslavia as easily as a few years earlier. Bodrero observed that Italian exporters had made an excellent profit in Yugoslavia after the war (1919-1924) but then goods from Germany, Czechoslovakia, France and Great Britain started to push Italian products from the Yugoslav market. He held that Italian tradesmen did not cope well with their competitors on the Yugoslav market. According to the Italian minister, there were several reasons for the fall of Italian exports to Yugoslavia:

- 1) The Yugoslav market did not need all kinds of goods as it had been the case immediately after the war
- 2) The Yugoslavs' purchasing power decreased
- 3) Economic circumstances in Yugoslavia required more investment than earlier
- 4) Unlike their competitors, Italian businessmen did not want to commit to long-term business deals, which was more necessary than a few years earlier
- 5) Companies from Germany, Czechoslovakia and other countries had been lobbying in Belgrade, searching for people in important positions in order to create optimum conditions for their businesses. The Italians did not use such methods; instead of creating a net-

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Gualberto Gualerni, *Industria e fascismo: per una interpretazione dello sviluppo economico italiano tra le due guerre* (Milan: Vita e pensiero, 1976), 44.

work of offices and branches in Yugoslavia, their authorized missions were out of the country, in Munich, Trieste and Vienna.⁶⁹

As for trade exchange between Yugoslavia and Italy in 1926, wood, corn and livestock made up a lion's share of Italy's imports from Yugoslavia, while cotton and cotton products, rice, wool and woollen products were mostly exported from Italy to Yugoslavia.

Table 7 Italian imports from Yugoslavia in 1926

Main commodity	Value in liras
Wood	339,876,000
Corn	154,690,000
Livestock	56,597,000
Fire wood and charcoal	48,960,000
Horses	34,706,000
Eggs	26,206,000
Dry leguminous plants	20,958,000
Calcium Cyanamid	20,178,000
Coal	18,295,000
Lime and cement	14,591,000
Meat and meat products	13,690,000
Lead	13,324,000
Poultry	13,131,000

(ACS, MMM-DGPAG, b.137, c/14)

Table 8 Italian exports to Yugoslavia in 1926

Main commodity	Value in liras
Cotton and cotton products	111,775,000
Rice	40,188,000
Wool and woollen products	30,819,000
Rawhide	23,194,000
Citrus fruits	22,088,000
Hemp, flax, jute and their products	16,272,000
Caps and hats	12,887,000

(ACS, MMM-DGPAG, b.137, c/14)

The 1925-1929 was a period of relative prosperity in the European economy. Various trading prohibitions disappeared, as well as contingents and foreign exchange limitations in trade, which led to economic liberalization. It is interesting to note that Yugoslav-Italian trade exchange remained at a lower

⁶⁹ ASDMAE, AC, p. 4-6, s. 4-15.

level than it had been in the early 1920s. Moreover, Yugoslavia had better economic relations with Italy despite their quite strained political relations than with politically friendly France. By the 1929 trade agreement France granted to Yugoslavia the status of the most favoured nation, a unique case in French foreign policy after the First World War.⁷⁰ However, in the 1920s, trade exchange between France and Yugoslavia was insignificant because of financial reasons, lack of tradition, geographic distance and lack of direct transportation links between them.⁷¹ In the period between the two world wars Yugoslavia on average exported to France only three per cent of all its exports and imported from France only 3.9 per cent of her total imports.⁷² Yugoslavia's trade exchange with other Balkan nations was limited due to their similar economic structure. On the other hand, trade exchange with Italy, Austria and Germany accounted for 54.3 per cent of Yugoslav exports and 47.5 per cent of Yugoslav imports. It was complementary economic systems, tradition and excellent communications over the Adriatic Sea and the Danube that accounted for these strong economic ties.⁷³

Albania was of particular importance in Italian endeavours to take an economic hold of the Balkans. From 1924 to 1931, Italy tightened its control over the Albanian economy; Albania remained extremely undeveloped and did not have any basis for independent economic development. In asserting its economic and political influence in Tirana, Italy met with Yugoslavia's opposition.

On 19 March 1925, Mario Alberti, a representative of Italian banks, and the Albanian minister of finance signed an agreement on the establishing of the Albanian central bank, the National Bank of Albania. The Yugoslav government protested against this action. After the Yugoslav-Italian agreement of January 1924 (Pact of Rome), Belgrade intended to be on equal footing with the Italian side in the envisaged foundation of the Albanian central bank. This would allow the Yugoslavs to counterbalance Italian influence in Albanian economic and financial affairs.⁷⁴ Italian representative in Durazzo wrote about Yugoslav intentions to interfere with the Italian plan for economic penetration in Albania and suggested that Rome de-

⁷⁰ Vladimir Cvetković, *Ekonomski odnosi između Jugoslavije i Francuske 1918–1941* (Belgrade: INIS, 2006), 85.

⁷¹ Stanislav Sretenović, *Francuska i Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1918–1929* (Belgrade: INIS, 2008), 262–263.

⁷² Jozo Tomasevich, "Foreign Economic Relations 1918–1941", in *Yugoslavia*, ed. Robert J. Kerner (University of California Press, 1949), 170–171.

⁷³ *Ibid.* 171.

⁷⁴ Živko Avramovski, "Italijanska ekonomska penetracija u Albaniju 1925. do 1939. godine", *Istorija XX veka V* (1963), 151.

mand guarantees from Belgrade about its Albanian policy in line with the Pact of Rome.⁷⁵

The Yugoslavs managed to have three of their banks participating in the foundation of the Albanian central bank (*Srpska banka* from Zagreb, *Zadružna banka* from Belgrade and *Jadransko-dunavska banka*) along with *Banca Nazionale di Credito*, *Banca Commerciale Italiana* and *Banca di Roma*. However, the Italians gained a dominant position and used it to the full for their economic penetration of Albania.⁷⁶

In order to pursue her own economic interests in Albania, Yugoslavia established the Serbian-Albanian Bank in Scutari in 1925, but it remained a local institution in scope. The Yugoslav government took a passive stance on Italian economic penetration of Albania in order not to aggravate Yugoslav-Italian relations, which became very strained after 1926. There was another consideration: Yugoslavia negotiated with British and American banks about floating a loan of 50 million pounds, and to obtain such a loan Belgrade needed political stability, especially in its international relations.⁷⁷

After the 1926 Treaty of Tirana concluded between Italy and Albania, Yugoslav-Italian relations worsened. On 1 July 1927, Yugoslavia banished Count Conestabile della Staffa, which caused something of a diplomatic scandal. The Count had come to Belgrade in 1921 as a representative of two Italian companies: one of them wanted to build the railroad between Virpazar and Bar (Antivari), and the other had had a tobacco business in Montenegro prior to the First World War. The Italian government entrusted him with finding a solution for war damage compensation in the negotiations with the Belgrade government. With the help of the Italian minister in Belgrade, della Staffa organized an espionage network around the French Legation in Belgrade, managing even to recruit the typist of the French attaché for economic affairs. After a street brawl with a French diplomat in Belgrade, della Staffa was arrested and deported from Yugoslavia. However, he was allowed to return so as to prevent the affair from turning into a French-Italian incident and under pressure from the Italian companies represented by della Staffa.⁷⁸ The affair was indicative of tense relations in the Franco-Italian-Yugoslav triangle, which could not fail to influence economic relations.

However, Albania remained one of the hotspots in Yugoslav-Italian economic relations. Albanian foreign trade was under Italian thumb. Yugoslavia still managed to increase her trade exchange with Albania and to increase the effective value of her exports to Albania six times from 1924

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid. 152-153.

⁷⁷ Ibid. 157.

⁷⁸ Sretenović, *Francuska i Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, 437-438.

to 1929.⁷⁹ On the eve of the Second World War, Italy doubled her exports to and significantly increased its imports from Albania. But the entire trade exchange with Albania did not have much impact on the Italian economy in terms of volume. The Albanian share of Italian exports and imports was less than one per cent.⁸⁰ Therefore, Italian endeavours on the Albanian market were not motivated by economic interests, but rather by a desire for political domination that could serve as a bridgehead to other Balkan countries.

Italy covered 20.52 per cent of all Yugoslav imports in 1924, while in 1929 this share fell to only 10.84 per cent. On the other hand, Yugoslav exports to Italy dropped from 28.91 per cent in 1924 to 24.88 per cent in 1929. The decline in Yugoslav imports from Italy, mostly textile products, might have been caused by a considerable development of the Yugoslav textile industry in that period.⁸¹

Italy and the South Slavic states and the provinces within the Habsburg Empire maintained economic relations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, although trade exchange between them was quite low. Italian economic analyses after the First World War pointed out great possibilities for economic cooperation. However, political difficulties, particularly the question of borders, impeded the development of close economic relations. On the other hand, mutual interests were also strong, and Italy and Yugoslavia maintained dynamic economic exchange, especially in trade, during the 1920s. The Yugoslav-Italian agreements signed in that period contained certain stipulations relating to economic affairs, but the most important document in this respect was the 1924 Agreement on Trade and Navigation providing for full freedom of commerce and navigation between the two countries. Statistical data concerning the Yugoslav-Italian trade exchange show its great importance for these two countries. Italy ranked first in Yugoslav exports for many years and oscillated between the first and fourth place in Yugoslav imports. In 1926, Yugoslav imports from Italy declined due to an overabundance of Italian goods on the Yugoslav market, foreign competition, and the revaluation of the lira which made Italian products more expensive. It is evident that both countries were interested in maintaining good economic relations, although Yugoslavia more so than Italy since she would have suffered more in case of deterioration.

UDC 341.241.8:334](093)(497.1:450)" 1918/1929"

⁷⁹ Avramovski, "Italijanska ekonomska penetracija u Albaniju", 161.

⁸⁰ Ibid. 213.

⁸¹ Ivo Belin, "Italo-jugoslovenski privredni odnosi", *Nova Evropa* XXII-4 (Zagreb 1930), 250-252.

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The Legacy of the Treaty of Lausanne in the Light of Greek-Turkish Relations in the Twentieth Century: Greek Perceptions of the Treaty of Lausanne

Abstract: The Treaty of Lausanne and the compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey became the basis both for the reorientation of their foreign policies and for the establishment of close relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. But the Cyprus question and the Aegean conflict affected bilateral relations. It had a negative impact on the Treaty of Lausanne.

Keywords: Muslim minority, Christians in Turkey, Turkish identity, Greeks in Istanbul, Cyprus issue, Aegean islands, Western Thrace

The Treaty of Lausanne was a diplomatic victory despite all the negative conditions of the time, despite those who considered Turkey as a country losing World War I. Upon the foundation of this treaty rose the Republic of Turkey, a democratic, secular and social law state.

Behind this Treaty is our national struggle for independence that our nation self-sacrificially carried into victory with its blood, souls and determination. The Treaty of Lausanne which crowned our national struggle is also one of the milestones of our diplomatic history. Turkey, on the one hand, made historic attempts towards developments right after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, while on the other hand it began to pursue a peaceful foreign policy well beyond its time on the basis of the great leader Atatürk's principle "Peace at home, peace in the world". [...] The Treaty of Lausanne is a historical document that demonstrates our country's wish to live in peace, security and prosperity in the multi-dimensional geography where it is located. Our country established peace thanks to this treaty with the powers against which it had displayed its determination during the national struggle of independence and has become an ally of the western countries as well as being an integral part of the West on the foundation of their common values. [...] Turkey keeps the spirit of Lausanne alive with its tangible contributions to the regional and global peace.¹

These words are an excerpt from President Abdullah Gül's message on the occasion of the 87th Anniversary of the Treaty of Lausanne (2010). It was, and still is, a treaty of national pride for Turkey. It was an interna-

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¹ Presidency of Republic of Turkey: The 87th Anniversary of the Treaty of Lausanne, <http://www.teeb.gov.tr/speeches-statements/344/78923>

tional act signed by Turkey and the winners of the First World War, replacing the Treaty of Sèvres. In July 1923 the Turkish delegation in Lausanne had many reasons to celebrate the victory, having succeeded in abolishing the Capitulations and negotiating on equal terms with the winners of the First World War. Even though some questions – Straits, Mosul, Iskenderun (Hatay) – were not settled according to the suggested terms of the Ankara National Council, and even though the head of the Turkish delegation to Lausanne İsmet İnönü was not welcomed back by his prime minister Rauf Bey,² Ankara achieved its main goals, i.e. the national legislation of the new state and the warding off of any plans for the creation of an Armenian or a Kurdish state. In July 1923 the Treaty of Lausanne was perceived in Greece as “the lesser evil”, as one may conclude from the contemporary Greek press. The comments in the Greek press, which overlapped, focused on the following main points: The Treaty of Lausanne was a Treaty of defeat; there was no reason for triumph, but for contemplation. The road from Sevres to Lausanne proved to be painful because of the national split of the Greeks and the inconsistency of Greece’s former Allies. The revolution of the Greek Army in September 1922 and Venizelos, who opted for peace, saved Greece’s dignity in Lausanne. The Asia Minor debacle should be the beginning of Greece’s reconstruction and peaceful work. Greece’s only requirement was the implementation of the Treaty by Turkey. In that respect, Europe should exert pressure on Turkey using economic means.³

The Treaty of Lausanne had human and diplomatic-political implications as well. The official signing of the Treaty (24 July 1923) was preceded by the conclusion, on 30 January 1923, of the bilateral Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish populations⁴ which provided (Article 1) for the compulsory exchange of all Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Muslim religion established in Greek territory. The Convention exempted from the exchange the Muslim inhabitants of Western Thrace and the Greek inhabitants of Constantinople. It was the first time that a compulsory exchange of populations was legalized under international law with religion as the sole criterion.⁵ Lord Curson, President of the

² See Klaus Kreiser, *Atatürk. Eine Biographie* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2011), 182.

³ See Εμπρός (Emros), 23/7/1923; 25/7/1923; 26/7/1923; Νέα Αλήθεια (Nea Alitheia), 26/7/1923; Εστία (Estia), 22/7/1923; 23/7/1923; 25/7/1923.

⁴ See *Actes Signés à Lausanne le 30 Janvier et le 24 Juillet 1924. Lettres et Accords en date du 24 Juillet relatifs à aux dommages subis en Turquie* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1923).

⁵ See Kalliopi K. Koufa and Constantinos Svolopoulos, “The Compulsory Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey: the Settlement of Minority Questions at the Conference of Lausanne, 1923, and Its Impact on Greek-Turkish Relations”, in

Territorial and Military Commission at the Lausanne Conference, reiterated many times that all the delegates viewed the principle of compulsory exchange with abhorrence and dismay.

One need only read the papers to realize how widely this feeling of dissatisfaction had spread; and the conference had only yielded to the demand that the exchange should be compulsory because all those who studied the matters most closely seemed to agree that the suffering entailed, great as it must be, would be repaid by the advantages which would ultimately accrue to both countries from a greater homogeneity and from the removal of old and deep causes of quarrel.⁶

It is clear that homogenization of the nation-state underlay the compulsory exchange of populations. For the Greeks, it meant the eradication of millennia-long Hellenic presence in Anatolia. For Greece, it resulted in the continuous process of long-term economic, political, cultural, and social adjustment. The dramatic exodus of Greek populations from their ancestral homelands in Asia Minor, on the Black Sea and in Eastern Thrace meant the demise of any irredentist policy towards the new Turkey. But the concentration of the major part of the Greek ethnic family in the territory of the Greek state turned Greece into one of the most homogenous states in South Eastern Europe. After the accomplishment of the Greek-Bulgarian voluntary exchange of populations and the settlement of the Asia Minor refugees in Macedonia and Western Thrace, Greece believed that it was ethnically insulated against Bulgarian territorial claims. Christian refugees, although they did not speak Greek but Turkish, proved to be fanatical Greeks who saw Slavism and Communism as dangers for Greece. They easily became an integral part of the Greek nation-building process, shifting from the Orthodox millet to the Greek nation. Even if Greece had to meet the immense cost of settlement of the refugees in both rural and urban areas, the refugee population provided a hugely expanded market and labour force. The refugees' commercial expertise and skills in textile and carpet manufacturing, ceramics, metal work and silk production contributed to Greece's economic growth. At the same time there emerged a strong sense of nostalgia for the lost world of Anatolian Hellenism. Historical memories, fostered by countless refugee organizations, are still reflected in a number of archives, research institutes and publications devoted to the Greek communities of Asia Minor, in the urban popular music ("rebetica")

Ethnic Groups in International Relations. Comparative Studies on Governments and non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940, ed. Paul Smith in collaboration with K. Koufa and A. Suppan, European Science Foundation (New York: New York University Press, 1991), 279-287.

⁶ Ibid. 299-300.

and in a distinctive kind of literature inspired by the vision of the “lost” or unforgettable homelands.⁷

The Treaty of Lausanne defined the territorial status quo between Turkey and its neighbours. That was probably the main gain for Greece and Turkey after a period of war and animosities. Atatürk needed peace to consolidate the new state and to implement the reforms, Greece had no alternative than to get accustomed to new realities and to bury the so-called “Great Idea”. In the course of the nineteenth century the “Great Idea” was vaguely defined, leaving room for various interpretations. 1) That the free Greek state had the historical mission to civilize the East. 2) That the Greeks constituted a historical continuity from ancient to modern times through the Byzantine Empire. In other words, that Greek identity was inconceivable without a reference both to the achievements of Alexander the Great and to the Byzantine legacy. Only after the Balkan Wars did the “Great Idea” obtain a clear-cut meaning. The Greek victories re-established the reputation of the Greek state humiliated after its default in 1893 and the defeat in the Greek-Turkish War in 1897. The historical mission of the Greek state was not simply to civilize the Orient, but to unite the Greeks into one Kingdom in the name of liberty and Greek Christian civilization. All old concepts about Greco-Ottomanism (Zarifis, Ion Dragoumis, Athanasios Souliotis-Nikolaidis), about the transformation of the Ottoman Empire into a cosmopolitan one with Greeks as a dominant factor, were rejected. One made no distinction between the Greeks of the Kingdom and the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire (the *Rum Millet*) who allegedly did not have a Greek consciousness, but an imperial one, an eastern national consciousness deriving from the mixture of nationalities living in the Ottoman Empire.⁸ However, the destiny of the Ottoman Empire was in the hands of the Entente Powers. In 1919 Greece sent troops to Asia Minor as a member of the Entente. But for many reasons the war between the Entente and the Turks proved to be only a Greek-Turkish duel to the death. So, in 1921 not a military but a diplomatic solution was needed. Given the

⁷ For these aspects see Renée Hirshon, “Consequences of the Lausanne Convention: An Overview”, 13–20; Thanos Veremis, “1922: Political Continuities and Realignments in the Greek State”, 53–62; and Elisabeth Kontogiorgi, “Economic Consequences Following Refugee Settlement in Greek Macedonia, 1923–1932”, 63–77, all in *Crossing the Aegean. An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey*, ed. Renée Hirshon (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003).

⁸ About this kind of Greek perceptions after the First Balkan War see Spyridon Sfetas, “Greek perceptions of the First Balkan War and Venizelos’ s efforts to preserve the Balkan Alliance”, *Thetis* 20 (2013), 263–267.

new circumstances, had the insightful politician Venizelos been in power, he would have avoided fatal mistakes.⁹

Even if the Turkish delegation in Lausanne demanded a plebiscite for Western Thrace, Atatürk had waived any territorial claims to that region being part of the Kingdom of Bulgaria from 1913 to 1919. Recently published Atatürk's speeches in Izmit (16–17 January 1923) corroborate this thesis. He stated that the article about Western Thrace for the National Pact had not been his idea, but that it had been added by thoughtless persons. It was claimed that a referendum would secure Western Thrace for Turkey. However, Kemal argued that Western Thrace would be a liability rather than an asset for Turkey, since the advantages to be gained by holding it would not balance the forces needed to obtain it. Thus, "the real solution of the matter is to leave it to Greece".¹⁰ He knew that Western Thrace was claimed by Bulgaria and that it would turn into a constant source of conflict between Greeks and Bulgarians. He was right. In the interwar period Greek-Bulgarian relations were plagued by the question of Bulgaria's territorial outlet to the Aegean Sea. In Lausanne the Bulgarian delegation rejected all Venizelos's proposals for Bulgaria's economic outlet to the Aegean Sea.¹¹ During the Greek-Turkish War the Bulgarian prime minister, Aleksandar Stamboliyski, was in contact with Atatürk. Fuad Bey recruited Muslims from Bulgaria for the front in Anatolia, and a Thracian Turkish-Bulgarian organization started a guerrilla war against the Greeks. However, the Bulgarian-Turkish military cooperation was merely the result of their

⁹ Speaking at the session of 22 November 1922 Venizelos argued that Greece sent troops to Smyrna for the protection of the persecuted Greeks in the framework of the Entente policy towards the Ottoman Empire. But the war turned only into a Greek-Turkish rivalry. "Certes, la guerre, commencée au nom de tous les Alliés, a été poursuivie après l'avènement du roi Constantine sans l'assentiment des Alliés. Le retour du Roi a rompu l'alliance et, depuis lors, le duel s'est continué uniquement entre la Grèce et l'état Turc. [...] Sans aucun doute, ce fut une sottise de la part de la Grèce de continuer la guerre à l'intérieur de l'Anatolie à des centaines de kilomètres de ses bases militaires. Ella a payé sa faute en perdant l'Asie Mineure; quant à la Thrace Orientale, elle l'a perdue, non par à la suite d'opérations militaires, mais en vertu de la Convention d'armistice de Moudania. L'armée qui refusait de se battre en Asie Mineure, rentrée à Athènes, a fait la révolution et s'est réorganisée dans le but de sauver la Thrace Orientale." *Documents Diplomatiques. Conférence de Lausanne*. Vol. 1: 21 Novembre 1922 – 1er Février 1923 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1923), 15–16.

¹⁰ See Vemund Aarbakke, "The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace" (PhD thesis, University of Bergen, 2000), 25.

¹¹ About the Greek-Bulgarian diplomatic struggle over Western Thrace at the Lausanne Conference see Spyridon Sfetas, "Thrakien als Zugang Bulgariens zur Ägäis in der Aussenpolitik der Regierung Stamboliski (1920- 9. Juni 1923)", *Balkan Studies* 33/2 (1992), 266–273.

common struggle against the Greeks.¹² There is no evidence for any official Turkish-Bulgarian agreement concerning clear demarcation lines on Thrace as a whole. Besides, Atatürk might have calculated that Bulgaria might lay claim on Eastern Thrace after a possible annexation of Western Thrace. A defeated Greece would have been a reliable neighbour. In order to complicate Bulgaria's territorial outlet to the Aegean Sea, Venizelos consented to the cession of Karaagach to Turkey in Lausanne.¹³ The railway that connected Svilengrad to Alexandroupolis passed through Karaagach.

Since the territorial status quo between Greece and Turkey had been internationally recognized in Lausanne, the main questions affecting bilateral relations were minority issues and security matters. The Convention of Athens (1913) provided minority rights for Muslims in Greece in a liberal spirit. It was a bilateral Greek-Ottoman convention.¹⁴ But ten years later, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, a new situation emerged. The settlement of minority issues in Lausanne should be viewed in the general framework of the minorities policy of the European states after the First World War, when the empires collapsed and new states came into existence. In Paris the Committee on New States charged with the task of setting post-war boundaries became known as the Committee on New States and the Protection of Minorities. The provisions of these interwar treaties were guaranteed by the League of Nations. The Permanent Court of International Justice was attached to the League of Nations. But the term "minority" after 1919 lacked any conceptual clarity. The treaties themselves did not offer any definition of minority per se but simply made reference to persons who belonged to racial, religious or linguistic minorities.¹⁵ But, in fact, minorities were regarded by the kin-state as an integral part of the nation that remained in a host-state. Thus, the minority issue was closely linked with nationalism. The kin-state used objective criteria (ethnicity, language) and not subjective criteria, i.e. self-identification of the members of the minority that stayed in the host-state. The key question was to what extent the members of a minority had a clear-cut national awareness. For example, the

¹² See Spyridon Sfetas, *Makedonien und Interbalkanische Beziehungen 1920–1924*, Veröffentlichung des Instituts für Geschichte Osteuropas und Südosteuropas der Universität München, vol. 12 (Munich: Hieronymus, 1992), 105–108.

¹³ *Ibid.* 165–166.

¹⁴ About the Convention of Athens and its problematic implementation see Giannis N. Glavinias, *Οι Μουσουλμανικοί Πληθυσμοί στην Ελλάδα (1912–1923). Από την ενσωμάτωση στην ανταλλαγή* [The Muslim Populations in Greece (1912–1923). From Incorporation to Exchange] (Thessaloniki: Stamuli, 2013), 129–138.

¹⁵ For a first approach to this subject see Jennifer Jackson Preece, *National Minorities and the European Nation-States System* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 15.

Germans and Magyars in Romania and Czechoslovakia did not experience any identity crisis. They stemmed from the former imperial elites, they had a complex of superiority towards the Romanians, Czechs and Slovaks. They sent many petitions to the League of Nations. The Slavic-speaking inhabitants in the Greek and Serbian parts of Macedonia were divided into four groups. Some had Serbian national awareness, others Bulgarian, having attended Bulgarian schools or being associated with IMRO, some had a fluid identity, they were an amorphous mass, some had a pro-Greek inclination, having attended Greek schools or belonging to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. But Bulgaria, using objective criteria (a common Slav origin, the affinity of the Slavic dialects spoken in the region with the Bulgarian language), took it for granted the every Slavic speaker was a Bulgarian. The provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne on the protection of minorities placed emphasis on religious identity and freedom. Turkey's aim probably was to avoid any clear mention of the Armenians and Roma under the general term "non-Muslim minorities". The Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish nationals and the Treaty of Lausanne equated religion with national identity in a local context which was far too complex to sustain such simplistic dichotomies (Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities, Greeks in Istanbul, Muslim minority in Greece). In other words, Greeks in Istanbul were mentioned, but no Turks in Western Thrace. In subsequent decades this discrepancy gave rise to an enduring bilateral feud with significant legal implications but, in my opinion, in 1923 it did not seem to be contradictory.

Regarding Turkey, the Treaty of Lausanne reflected the transition from Ottoman patriotism to a Turkish ethnic nationalism. With the territorial dwindling of the Ottoman Empire, the rise of Balkan nationalisms and the enlargement of the Balkan states, all concepts set forth by the Ottoman intellectuals for the salvation of the Ottoman Empire since the Tanzimat period had failed, i.e. Namik Kemal's New-Ottomanism, Abdül Hamid's Panislamism, the Young Turks' Ottoman patriotism, Akçura's Panturkism. The total and permanent loss of the Balkan Peninsula in 1913 was a watershed that affected the existence of the Empire. The loss of many major Ottoman cities, property, human lives was unbearable to the proud Ottoman elite who originated from the Balkans and was dismayed at the powerlessness of the imperial army. From 1913 on the hitherto viable umbrella of Ottoman identity was no longer recognized by the hardliners in the inner circle of the Committee "Union and Progress". The Ottoman government, Ottoman literature and culture, even the Ottoman people, were built on an artificial edifice doomed to collapse. In his work *Will Turkey survive in Anatolia?* Naci Ismail urged the Turkish intellectuals and the political elite to bring about the formation of a Turkish nation, of Turkey in Anatolia,

abandoning territories that were not predominantly Turkish. The Turkish national awakening and the creation of a Turkish economy to the detriment of the Greeks and Armenians was emphasized. The corollary was clear: Anatolia should be turned into a homogenous Turkish state.¹⁶ To avert Europe's destructive plans, Naci İsmail argued that the Turks must unite in a nationalist movement, channel its unified strength and successfully defeat the enemy. The Turks were capable of such action because they were a true nation indeed; they required only awakening. "When the foreigners attack Anatolia, the Turks and the Turkish government will prove patriotism. Because Turkey exists,"¹⁷ he argued. But when Europeans attacked Anatolia after 1919, the Turkish War of Independence was waged not in the name of the Turkish nation, but for the salvation of the Caliphate from the infidels, from the crusaders. No matter what kind of reforms Atatürk had envisaged for the future,¹⁸ only Islam could mobilize the masses against the crusaders. The transformation from a Muslim to a Turkish identity was not unproblematic. In the Ottoman Empire the word Turk had acquired a derogatory sense. A gentleman would call himself an Ottoman, never a "Turk", which was a term associated with village bumpkins of Anatolia. For the majority of the rural Ottoman Muslim population, their Islamic identity superseded ethnic ones. In the first decades of the twentieth century large segments of Turkish-speaking Ottoman Muslims did not identify themselves with the concept of Turk. For them, in Eastern Anatolia, Turk meant "Kizilbash", and in Istanbul, a coarse person or a villager.¹⁹

After the Proclamation of the Turkish Republic and the abolition of Caliphate a large-scale operation was embarked upon for the construction of a Turkish identity by equating any Muslim with the Turk, according to Gökâlp's doctrine. This process went in parallel with the secularization of the society. It was a breakthrough with tremendous impact on religious tradition and household custom; it affected faith, time, dress, family, language. The adoption of the Latin alphabet and universally-used numerals, of the Gregorian calendar and the Western working week, the banning of the fez

¹⁶ See Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914. The Ottoman Empire and the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 25–26.

¹⁷ Ibid. 27.

¹⁸ At a night meeting with Mazhar Müfid (Kasnu) and İbrahim Süreyya in the summer of 1919 Mustafa Kemal disclosed his top secret for a future secular state (proclamation of the Republic, dethronement of the Sultan, adoption of the Latin alphabet, banning of the fez and of restrictions on women clothing). Both Mazhar Müfid and İbrahim Süreyya were amazed. See Kreiser, *Atatürk*, 145–146.

¹⁹ See Ugur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey. Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913–1950* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 39–42.

and the restriction on women's wearing the headscarf, with the enfranchisement of women, split the society. "Europeanness" and Turkishness moulded according to Atatürk's principles – known as "the six arrows" – were in tandem. A concept of Turkishness was constructed which glossed over real diversity in a bid to present the remaining population as homogeneous. A more ethnocentric Turkish consciousness evolved in which the Anatolian villager was transformed from the symbol of Ottoman backwardness to the guardian of the Turkish nation. Kemalism propagated an historical identity for the Turks as a people originating from Central Asia and spreading their civilization westwards.²⁰

The Greeks translated the term "Muslim minority"²¹ as Muslim minorities (μουσουλμανικές μειονότητες) to demonstrate the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the Muslims in Greece as those of Turkish origin, the Pomaks and the Gypsies (Roma). The minority was internally fragmented and it lacked the potential for action that derives from a sense of unity. The Muslim minority was neither socially cohesive nor geographically concentrated. It comprised the Turkish-speakers, concentrated largely in the lowlands in both homogenous and mixed communities, the Pomaks located mainly in isolated mountainous villages, and the Roma established on peripheries of the main towns. In Western Thrace the rise of Kemalism met with no great response, as the local Muslim community exhibited an Islamic outlook. The secularist, modernist ideology of Kemalism seemed alien to traditional Ottomans. But the Turkish nation-building process in Anatolia was combined with the diffusion of Kemalism and modernization into the Muslim minorities in the Balkans. In Western Thrace this role was assigned to the Turkish Consulate established in Komotini. Thus, the minority experienced modernity as an import. The rift between Kemalists (Young Turks) and traditionalists (Old Muslims) became more apparent with the arrival of a number of prominent Ottomans who fled Turkey as dissidents after the establishment of the new Republic. Among those who settled in Western Thrace was the last *Şeyhülislam* Mustafa Sabri, who became a vehement opponent of Kemalism in Western Thrace. Sabri's immediate family took control of key minority schools and published the influential Islamic newspaper *Yarin* (Tomorrow) and *Peyam-i Islam* (News of Islam). The Kemalist camp, supported by the Turkish Consulate, propagated its ideology through the creation of youth associations such as *Xanthi Youth Association* (1927)

²⁰ For the construction of Turkish identity in general see Soner Çagaptay, *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey. Who is a Turk?* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006).

²¹ Article 45 of the Treaty of Lausanne provides: "The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem Minority in her territory."

and *Turkish Youth Union* (1928). Thus, the minority split into two factions. It was the struggle between Islamists, who stressed the ecumenical quintessence of Islam, alien to nation, and the traditional Islamic way of life as well, and Turkish nationalists, who propagated the Turkish nation pattern after the Kemalist doctrine.²² Mustafa Sabri explained his opposition to nationalism through the three aspects of mentality, religion and international justice. In his poem “I am resigning”, published in *Yarin* (1927), he disavowed Turkishness.²³

In Istanbul the Greeks, like the Armenians, had a clear-cut national awareness. They were an urbanized community, engaged in business or trade or self-employed professionals such as lawyers, doctors, brokers, moneylenders etc. They could speak the official Turkish language. They were bearers of an ex-Ottoman cosmopolitan culture and more prone to integrate into their new host-state. The dichotomy between the Greek bourgeoisie in Istanbul and the rural Muslim minority in Western Thrace is important in understanding the different policy of the host-state towards minorities.²⁴ The Muslim minority in Western Thrace did not pose any threat to the Greek state. It was socially marginalized, but not subjected to religious oppression. The Greeks in Istanbul constituted a main hindrance to the creation of a Turkish bourgeoisie. One of the premises of Turkish nationalism was the creation of a Turkish economy as a backbone of the nation. Naci Ismail devoted a lengthy segment of his book to the dominant and undermining role of Greeks and Armenians in trade and business affairs, a common point of discussion in the press at the time. Greeks and Armenians controlled the economy with a devastating effect on the Turkish population: “Once the national movement has started, all patriots will patronize the shops of their fellow and this support will lead to the establishment of large companies. The Turk who is not a businessman today can be tomorrow.”²⁵ Etatism in the economy (state-run economy) was a main component of the Kemalist national doctrine. For that reason a clear anti-minority discriminatory policy was obvious in the economic realm in the 1920s. In the Treaty of Lausanne there was no

²² About this split see Aarbakke, “Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace”, 74–80.

²³ See Mehmed Nam, “Şeyhülislam Mustafa Sabri Efendi. Milliyetçiliğe İslamcı Bir Bakış”, in *Bir Fikir Hareketinin Yüz Yılı: Türk Ocakları. Uluslararası Sempozyumu BILDİLER* 7–9 Mayıs 2012, İstanbul, ed. Mustafa Özkan et al. (İstanbul: Aralık, 2013), 384.

²⁴ For this dichotomy see Şulen Chousein, “Unwelcome Citizens: Muslim Turks of Greeks and Orthodox Greeks of Turkey”, *Suleyman Demirel University Faculty of Arts & Sciences Journal of Social Sciences* 2. *Special Issue on Balkans* (2013), 72–77.

²⁵ As quoted by Aksakal, *Ottoman Road to War*, 26.

mention of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which was stripped of any political function and confined itself only to religious and spiritual matters. Turkey, equating the Caliphate with the Patriarchate, exploited this omission in the Lausanne Treaty to downgrade the position of the Patriarchate as a “tool of Greek nationalism”. It denied its ecumenical character. Turkey’s efforts to establish a Turkish-Orthodox patriarchate (the case of Papa Eftim) failed. The spiritual life of the Greek community in Istanbul was closely linked with the Ecumenical Patriarchate.²⁶

In general, one could say that the application or revision of the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty and the treatment of minorities was contingent on Greek-Turkish relations. The stability that came to Western Thrace in the interwar period was due to the detente between Greece and Turkey. When Venizelos came to power in 1928, he applied a conciliatory policy towards Turkey. Greece needed time to absorb its refugees and to modernize its economy and infrastructure; in Ankara, Atatürk, having launched a massive domestic reform program, had similar preoccupations. Both countries saw Bulgaria as a revisionist power that questioned the territorial status quo established in Lausanne. Particularly a possible Bulgarian-Yugoslav rapprochement was Greece’s nightmare (Western Thrace-Salonica). The possible creation of an anti-Slav front resulted in a Greek-Turkish alliance. The Greek-Turkish rapprochement began with the Ankara Convention (June 1930) which sought to address some of the thorny issues inherited from the population exchange in favour of Turkey. As “established” were recognized all persons exempt from exchange who had left Constantinople furnished with passports issued by the Turkish Republic. This provision excluded all persons who had been established in Constantinople before 1918 but left prior to 1922. Greece had to pay indemnities to the Muslims in Western Thrace for their properties passing to the Greek government, and also to Greeks in Constantinople for their properties seized by Turkey. Even if the latter payment was unjust, Greece wished to clear up the atmosphere of unfriendliness and alleviate the tension which the economic consequences of the exchange of populations had created. Greece hoped that, by consenting to certain sacrifices and losses, it might receive compensation through the reestablishment of friendly political and economic relations with Turkey.²⁷

²⁶ For the marginalization of the Patriarchate after 1923 see Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918–1974* (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1982), 144–173, and Stavros H. Gioljoglu, *Οι Ελληνοτουρκικές Σχέσεις (1922–1930). Από την αντιπαλότητα στην συνδιαλλαγή* [Greek-Turkish Relations (1922–1930). From Rivalry to Reconciliation] (Thessaloniki: Stamuli, 2011), 354–379.

²⁷ See Stephen P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities. Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1932), 575–583.

In October 1930, when Venizelos visited Ankara, a comprehensive friendship pact was signed which included a number of agreements ranging from naval armament to commercial cooperation (the Greek-Turkish Establishment, Commerce and Navigation Treaty).²⁸ In 1931 the Turkish prime minister, İsmet İnönü, visited Athens in an atmosphere of conciliation and friendship. The rapprochement was further developed by the Greco-Turkish Entente Cordial of 14 September 1933 for the inviolability of their common borders.²⁹ It referred only to the Greek-Bulgarian and Turkish-Bulgarian frontiers, not to the Aegean to avoid any challenge to Italy which controlled the Dodecanese Islands. Bilateral relations were strengthened as instability in Europe increased after Hitler's rise to power. The Balkan Pact was signed in Athens in 1934. It guaranteed the Balkan borders, an objective that was severely compromised by Bulgaria's refusal to join it. The secret protocol provided that if a non-Balkan power, assisted by a Balkan ally (Bulgaria or Albania), attacked one of the members of the Balkan Entente, all signatories would unite to fight against the aggressor Balkan state. Thus, they ventured to get embroiled in a war against a non-Balkan power. This clause met with reservation from Greece and Turkey, both of which wanted to avoid confrontation with Italy and the Soviet Union, and preferred to keep the mutual assistance clause within a purely Balkan framework.

The Ethiopian War in 1935/36 and the German reoccupation of the demilitarized Rhineland in March 1936 had important consequences for the Balkan Peninsula. Both cases demonstrated to the Balkan Entente members that they could not rely upon the League of Nations for security against aggression. Ioannis Metaxas, Greek prime minister, and Rüştü Aras, Turkish foreign minister, had agreed on a common policy before going to Belgrade to participate in the Balkan Entente Conference in May 1936. Turkey supported the Greek thesis that Greece's obligations towards the Balkan Entente would not involve it in a war with Italy.³⁰ Greece endorsed Turkey's demand to fortify the Straits. Despite strong opposition from Yugoslavia and Romania, the Greek-Turkish viewpoint prevailed in Belgrade. The sensitive issue of the status of the Straits was resolved with a *quid pro quo*: The Montreux Convention (1936) annulled the respective clauses of the Lausanne Treaty and ended the demilitarization of the Straits, handing over control to Turkey. Ankara, for its part, did not object to the *de facto*

²⁸ For the Greek-Turkish rapprochement in 1930, see Gioljölgu, *Οι Ελληνοτουρκικές Σχέσεις*, 437–465.

²⁹ See Alexandros Papagos, *Ο Πόλεμος της Ελλάδος 1940–1941* [The War of Greece 1940–1941] (Athens: Goulandri-Horn Foundation, rpt. 1995), 53.

³⁰ *Ibid.* 43–46.

remilitarisation of the Greek islands Limnos and Samothrace,³¹ which were initially part of a demilitarised zone defined by the Treaty of Lausanne.

The results were the further weakening of the Balkan Entente as a Balkan collective security front, a Bulgarian-Yugoslav rapprochement and a Greek-Turkish rapprochement. On 24 January 1937, Milan Stojadinović, Yugoslavia's prime minister, and Georgi K'oseivanov, Bulgaria's prime minister, signed a friendship pact that alarmed Greece. The literal interpretation of the Pact was vague, but its spirit was perceived in Greece as directed against Greece's territorial integrity in the long run.³² Both Greece and Turkey feared that the South Slav front would dominate the Balkans. For Metaxas, cooperation with Ankara was of paramount importance in order to deter Bulgarian aggression. New Greek-Turkish negotiations led to an additional treaty signed in Athens on 27 April 1938. Despite its friendly undertones, however, the Additional Treaty was ridden with contradictions and open to interpretations and diplomatic manoeuvring.³³

In an attempt to win over Bulgaria, the Balkan Entente signatories, complying with the British appeasement policy towards Germany, Bulgaria and Hungary, signed the Salonica Agreement on 31 July 1938. The agreement recognized Bulgaria's right to rearm. Bulgaria's rearmament had been restricted under the Treaty of Neuilly (1919), but Bulgaria had been rearming secretly for some time. In exchange for this, the clause of the Treaty of Lausanne on the demilitarized zones in Western Thrace was annulled.³⁴ Greece and Turkey were free to redeploy troops in the area, thus making it easier for both to reinforce their mutual guarantee.

As Ankara and Athens became increasingly dependent on each other for their respective defence, issues of minority protection almost disappeared from their bilateral diplomatic agenda. At the diplomatic level the Venizelos government came under strong pressure from Ankara in 1931 to expel the nucleus of the anti-Kemalist opposition from Western Thrace. The expulsion of Mustafa Sabri and other conservative leaders gave rise to

³¹ See I. P. Pikros, *Τουρκικός Επεκτατισμός. Από το μύθο της ελληνοτουρκικής φιλίας στην πολιτική για την αστυνόμευση των Βαλκανίων 1930–1943* [Turkish expansionism. From the myth of Greek-Turkish friendship to the policy of policeman in the Balkans 1930–1943] (Athens: Estia-Kollaru, 1996), 58–59.

³² See Spyridon Sfetas, *Εισαγωγή στη Βαλκανική Ιστορία. Τόμος Β'. Από τον Μεσοπόλεμο στη λήξη του Ψυχρού Πολέμου (1919–1989)* [Introduction to Balkan History. Vol. II: From the Inter-War to the End of the Cold War (1919–1989)] (Thessaloniki: Vanias, 2011), 76–77.

³³ *Ibid.* 78–79.

³⁴ *Ibid.* 138.

Kemalism and Turkish nationalism in Western Thrace.³⁵ Turkish language was used in private minority schools. Under other circumstances Western Thrace would have been a bulwark against Kemalist Turkey. Metaxas's dictatorship remained conscious of the need to maintain good relations with Turkey. The Kemalist wing of the Muslim community became a preferential interlocutor with the Greek authorities. It is significant that both the "Association of Turkish Youth" in Komotini and the "Association of the Turkish Teachers of Western Thrace" were first recognized by Greece's Court of First Instance. Although the Turkish-speaking population in the lowlands was not seen as a reason for concern, in 1936 the Pomak villages of North Xanthi and Rhodope were explicitly included in the areas under surveillance to reinforce security and prevent espionage from Bulgaria. The basically Bulgarian dialect spoken by Pomaks in the Rhodope Mountains was regarded by Greek authorities as a sign of ambiguity over their "national loyalty". In Western Thrace the areas designated as "restricted" were almost exclusively inhabited by Pomaks. The designation of restricted zones had an impact on the minority as a whole. It resulted in the economic and social isolation of the Pomaks and put impediments to their communication with the city of Komotini or Xanthi and the Turkish communities in the lowlands. However, neither the Pomaks nor the Roma tended to self-identify as Turks.

From 1930 onwards the Turkish government allowed the Ecumenical Patriarchate to operate in a freer atmosphere in compliance with the spirit of Greek-Turkish friendship. On the other hand it tried to contain any growth of the Phanar's ecumenical character. On many occasions the Turkish government demonstrated its good will towards the Patriarchate and the Greek community. But at the same time, in pursuit of its secular policy, it took some measures to curtail the role of the Greek Orthodox community. In December 1934 the Turkish parliament banned the wearing of religious-ecclesiastical dress by the clergy except in church, reserving the right only for the heads of religious denominations. In 1935 all religious foundations became accountable to the Turkish government. The Department of Religious Foundations was instructed to supervise the property owned by religious, cultural and charitable institutions of all faiths. The self-administration of the Greek Orthodox community in Imbros and Tenedos never came into existence. In 1942 the wealth tax was imposed.³⁶

³⁵ See Lena Divani, *Ελλάδα και Μειονότητες. Το σύστημα της διεθνούς προστασίας της Κοινωνίας των Εθνών* [Greece and Minorities. The League of Nations's system of international support] (Athens: Kastanioti, 2002), 189–192.

³⁶ For the Greek minority in Istanbul during the Greek-Turkish rapprochement in 1930–1940 and the Varlik Tax see Alexandris, *Greek Minority*, 190–193 and 211–233.

Nevertheless, minority issues did not plague Greek-Turkish relations in the 1930s. A wartime British Foreign Office report noted that:

There is no evidence that under Greek rule they [the Muslims] were in any way a discontented minority, or that the Turkish government is dissatisfied at the way the Greek Government has treated them. In any case, Greece and Turkey have recognized the Treaty of Lausanne as final.³⁷

During the Bulgarian occupation of Western Thrace in 1941–44, Greeks, Turks and Pomaks faced similar plights. The Turkish Consulate in Komotini, capitalizing on the predicament of the Muslims in Western Thrace, tried to keep them loyal to Turkey by inculcating in them the basic principles of Kemalism and by building strong bonds with Turkey. The strategy was to use minority education as a vehicle for overriding conservative elements and promoting Kemalism. Teachers were often subsidized by the Turkish Consulate. The Turkish Consul, Tevfik Türker, wrote in his report to the Foreign Ministry on 16 December 1944:

I visited one of the newly opened Turkish minority schools. Despite three years of Bulgarian occupation, I witnessed with amazement the achievements of the little Turkish pupils in such a small period of time. I am touched by their expression of loyalty and respect towards our national leader İsmet İnönü, by their commemoration of Atatürk, by the flowers in red and white colours that were offered to us and by the sorrowful songs they sang for Rumelia, which were composed after the Balkan Wars. I knew that if these songs were heard by any of the Greek administration they would not be allowed and the teachers told me that such kinds of performance are hidden from foreign eyes and they are very careful to share sad memories only with friends.³⁸

Yet, Pomaks and Roma kept away from the Turkish Consulate.

After the Second World War Greece and Turkey, under American tutelage and according to Truman's doctrine, became again Allies in the common struggle against Communism and Slavism. Turkey reneged on the traditional policy of neutralism and joined NATO. The years 1946–1955 were the golden age for the minorities in Greece and Turkey. Turkey recognized the ecumenical character of the Patriarchate. Without being a Turkish citizen, Athenagoras became Ecumenical Patriarch.³⁹ For security reasons Greece reestablished the "restricted zone" on the Greek-Bulgarian

³⁷ FO/37/33211, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Foreign Research and Press Service to Howard, Southern Department, Foreign Office "Minorities in Greece", 28 August 1942, as quoted in Kevin Featherstone et al., *The Last Ottomans. The Muslim Minority of Greece, 1940–49* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 165.

³⁸ Ibid. 155.

³⁹ Alexandris, *Greek Minority*, 234–251.

border. The minority schools were officially called Turkish instead of Muslim for the first time in 1954.⁴⁰ In the early 1950s Greek began to be taught in Imbros and Tenedos. Turkish was the official language in all minority schools, attended by both Turkish-speaking and Pomak-speaking children.

But between 1955 and 1990 the Cyprus issue and the Aegean crisis (1973/4), which could be explained by the putative oilfields in the Aegean Sea, marred Greek-Turkish relations. This proved to be fatal for the minorities. The results are well-known: deconstruction of the Greek community in Istanbul, closure of the Theological Seminary-School in Chalki (1971), election of the Patriarch with direct Turkish government interference (1972), emigration of Muslims from Western Thrace to Turkey.⁴¹ In 1955 Greece introduced the deprivation of the Greek citizenship from the Muslims who migrated to Turkey, but it was restrained from stirring up a counter-riot similar to that of September 1955 in Istanbul⁴² due to the internationalization of the Cyprus issue. To gain international support for the case of Cyprus's self-determination, i.e. unification with Greece, Athens assured that the Turkish minority in Cyprus would enjoy the rights of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace. In official documents the term "Turkish minority" was mentioned. For example, in an aide-memoire of 21 August 1956 on the Balkan Pact and the Cyprus Issue, submitted to President Tito, the Greek government said:

Quant à la minorité on pourrait invoquer les excellentes conditions d'existence qui, même en temps critique, sont celles de la minorité turque en Thrace. Mais indépendamment de cela les garanties suivants seraient accordées à la minorité turque en Chypre.⁴³

⁴⁰ On Papagos's educational policy towards the Muslim minority in Western Thrace see Kostis Tsioumis, *Η μουσουλμανική μειονότητα της Θράκης (1950-1960). Πολιτικοδιπλωματικές διεργασίες και εκπαιδευτική πολιτική* [The Muslim minority in Thrace (1950-1960). Political-diplomatic ferment and educational policy] (Thessaloniki: Stamuli, 2006), 90-116.

⁴¹ See Konstantinos Tsitselikis, *Old and New Islam in Greece. From Historical Minorities to Immigrant Newcomers* [Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012], 101-102.

⁴² Turkish authors admit the victimization of the Greeks in Istanbul as a state policy. The Ecumenical Patriarchate was not involved in the Cyprus issue. See Dilek Güven, *Nationalismus und Minderheiten. Die Ausschreitungen gegen die Christen und Juden der Türkei vom September 1955* (Munich: Oldenburg, 2012).

⁴³ Spyridon Sfetas, *Στη σκιά του Μακεδονικού. Διεθνείς ανακατατάξεις και βαλκανικές αντανακλάσεις. Από τις ελληνογιουγκοσλαβικές συμφωνίες της 18^{ης} Ιουνίου 1959 στην κρίση των σχέσεων Αθήνας-Βελιγραδίου του 1960-1962* [In the Shadow of the Macedonian Issue. International Realignments and Balkan Repercussions. From the Greek-Yugoslav Agree-

It might have been Greece's diplomatic manoeuvre to appease Turkey, but in the 1930s Greece had opened the way to the spill-over of Turkish nationalism and secularism into Western Thrace. After 1964 Greece imposed some restrictive measures on the Muslims: expropriation of land, difficulties in real property transactions, in starting and running businesses, in licenses for home building, tractor driving, hunting rifles etc. In 1972 by decree the Turkish schools were called again Muslim schools.⁴⁴ As a repercussion of the Greek-Turkish crisis in the Aegean Sea in March 1987, in November 1987 the Xanthi Turkish Union (1927) and the Western Thrace Turkish Teachers Union (1936) were closed down on the grounds that the word "Turkish" should only refer to citizens of Turkey and that its use to describe Greek Muslims put public order at stake.⁴⁵ When in the 1980s minority activists, supported by Ankara, campaigned for the election of the muftis by popular vote, Greece, fearing the predominance of political Islam, interfered in the election. Since 1990 a committee of eleven Muslim clergymen and laymen proposes a list of qualified persons eligible for the post. After formal consultations with the religious leaders, the mufti is selected from the list by the Greek authorities on the basis of personal qualifications.⁴⁶ He is subsequently appointed by ministerial decision for a ten-year term. The mufti is a religious leader with judicial powers.

Election of muftis by popular vote would politicize Islam and could create clientelistic networks. There have been precedents. For instance, Reisu-l-Ulema Adem Ziklič in Belgrade and mufti Muamer Zukorlič in Novi Pazar are at loggerheads not for religious, but for political matters. Besides, the minority has deputies in Parliament.

It is evident that the minorities became victims of vicissitudes in Greek-Turkish relations, being affected by their adverse side effects.

But after 1990 some substantial changes occurred in the minority policy of both countries due to the developments in Europe in the wake of the downfall of communism and bipolarism. The divided Europe has been transformed into one world market, free trade and cross-border market economies. The European Union was established. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to Europe based on a common identity in which the ethnic and cultural diversity of eastern and western Europe was united under a single

ments of 18 June 1959 to the 1960 Crisis in Relations between Athens and Belgrade] (Thessaloniki: Epikedro, 2007), 150.

⁴⁴ See Baskin Oran, "The Story of Those who stayed. Lessons from Articles 1 and 2 of the 1923 Convention", in *Crossing the Aegean*, ed. Renée Hirshon, 104.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 105.

⁴⁶ See Alexis Alexandris, "Religion or Ethnicity. The Identity Issue of the Minorities in Greece and Turkey", in *Crossing the Aegean*, ed. Renée Hirshon, 123.

geopolitical umbrella. Protection of European minorities has improved. The rights of the minorities are seen as human rights with emphasis on the self-identification of the members of a given minority.

Francesco Capotorti's post-war definition of minority, a combination of objective and subjective criteria, it still valid: "a group numerically inferior in the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the state – possess ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the populations and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language."⁴⁷

It is not only the kin-state that stresses objective criteria for the minority (ethnicity, language), but also the subjective sense of solidarity of the members of the minority that should be taken into consideration. The minority must show a desire to preserve its unique cultural heritage fighting against possible assimilation.

Getting accustomed to the new situation, Greece suspended the restrictions regarding the purchase and sale of real estate and home building. In 1996 Greece abolished the "restricted zone" in Western Thrace, because there was no danger from Bulgaria any more.⁴⁸ Theoretically, it facilitated contacts between Pomaks and Turks. In 1999 the Greek government officially recognized that the minority in Western Thrace was in part constituted by Turks who were entitled to identify themselves as Turks at personal level. But Greece did not acknowledge the minority as being officially homogenously Turkish as portrayed in the Turkish media. If one attaches importance to ethnicity and language, then the Pomaks are entitled to boost their culture as well, even if some Pomaks, having become Turkish speakers, feel an affinity towards Turkey. The Pomaks are a religious minority but, unlike the Turks, they are still an ethnic group, cramped by many impediments to develop a clear-cut identity. The main hindrance is the lack of a written language. A Pomak is a "torn personality". By origin he is neither a Turk nor a descendant of the ancient Thracians. He is of Slavic origin, stemming probably from the Bogomils, he speaks a Bulgarian dialect, but he is not affiliated with the Bulgarians, because of the bitter experience of the Pomaks by the Bulgarian rule in 1913–19 and 1941–44. He speaks a Bulgarian dialect in his inner family circle, he learns Turkish and Greek in school, but he does not master either Turkish or Greek. As the ethnographer Tatjana Seypell noted, some Pomaks claim to be Turkish, but in fact this means that they are Muslims, their relation to Turks may be generally described as "that of a client who seeks help and assistance from a stronger organization

⁴⁷ Jackson Preece, *National Minorities*, 19.

⁴⁸ Tsitselikis, *Old and New Islam*, 136.

that is recognized by law”.⁴⁹ Others prefer to utter the word “Pomak” only in a subdued way. Others, when asked about their identity, tend to hesitate. Today the Pomak youth is striving for the preservation of the Pomak ethnic and linguistic characteristics, but the creation of Pomak identity requires a scientific staff. Turkey sticks to the old obsolete Gökalpian concept that any Ottoman Muslim is a Turk. This concept failed even within Turkey itself. Gökalp’s mental imbalance was triggered by his identity crisis of being stuck between his Kurdish past and his Turkish future. In 1894 he attempted suicide, but survived. By the time the Committee of Union and Progress had risen to power and his theories had gain a foothold, Gökalp had firmly established his identity as Turkish and Turkish only. Accusations by the opposition that he was really Kurdish he dismissed with nationalist poetry “Even if I was a Kurd, Arab, or Circassian / my first aim would be the Turkish nation”. Later he repeated this assertion: “Even if I had found out that my grandfathers came from a Kurdish or Arab region, I would not have hesitated to conclude that I am a Turk.”⁵⁰

Being aware of the fact that Turkey uses the term Turk and Turkish when describing the Muslim minority as a whole, Greece denies permission to any association bearing the collective title “Turkish”, although Turkish identity within the framework of the Muslim minority is accepted. The basic principle underlying the Greek policy is the thesis that the self-identification of one group cannot infringe upon the self-identification of another group. Besides, Greece is still suspicious of Turkey’s intentions to enforce the full Turkification of the Muslim minority and to use it as a diplomatic means of pressure on Greece to haggle with Athens over favorable solutions in the complex of the Greek-Turkish outstanding issues.

Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Code, which allowed the Greek government to revoke the citizenship of non-ethnic Greeks who left the country, was non-retroactively abolished in 1998.⁵¹ Since 1994 university diplomas obtained in Turkey have been recognized in Greece except in two fields: Turkish language and theology.⁵²

The grievances of the minority focused on the appointment (instead of election by popular vote) of the Muftis and of the members of the Commissions for the Management of the Muslim Properties (Διαχειριστικές Επιτροπές Μουσουλμανικών Περιουσιών-vakif).⁵³ Even if these injustices are

⁴⁹ Alexandris, “Religion or Ethnicity”, 125.

⁵⁰ Üngör, *Making of Modern Turkey*, 36, n. 129.

⁵¹ Chousein, “Unwelcome Citizens”, 83.

⁵² Oran, “Story of Those who stayed”, 105.

⁵³ Tsitselikis, *Old and New Islam*, p.98.

perceived by members of the minority as soft discrimination, in no way is the minority's existence endangered. But the tiny Greek minority in Istanbul is scrambling for survival. Even if the principle of reciprocity is not mentioned in the Treaty of Lausanne, even if one speaks of parallel obligations, the numerical imbalance between Christians in Istanbul and Muslims in Western Thrace is irreversible. Some positive steps undertaken by the Turkish governments in recent years (cultural activities, restoration of old schools and churches) have given the Greeks some breathing space and enabled Turkey to develop a flourishing religious tourism. The opening of the Theological School of Halki has in fact emotional-symbolic connotations for the Greeks and should not be bargained with the election of the Muftis by popular vote.

After a centenary the Lausanne arrangements are still in force and constitute the legal framework in Greek-Turkish minority issues, even if both countries violated the Treaty of Lausanne when bilateral relations deteriorated. Disagreements regarding the literal interpretation of some minority terms and their readjustment to changing conditions should be referred to the European Court for Human Rights by individuals. The Court's verdict may not be binding for the host-state, but at any rate it is conducive to the clarification of the problem. The territorial borders and the Aegean Sea boundary between Greece and Turkey have been mainly established by the Treaty of Lausanne. This is the spirit of the Treaty of Lausanne. There was no Aegean conflict until 1973–1974. It came up in the wake of the Cyprus crisis in 1972, when the Greek junta, in compliance with the Turkish government of Nihat Erim set up after the military coup d'état in March 1971, tried to topple Makarios and find a NATO solution of the Cyprus issue. But this plan was thwarted by America's strong objections. The failure of this plan, coupled with the Greek-Turkish dispute over Aegean oil rights, gave rise to a new situation, alien to the spirit of the Treaty of Lausanne. The Aegean issue involves delicate national issues, as sovereignty, continental shelf, airspace, territorial waters, oil reserves and now the so-called "Exclusive Economic Zone". Keeping the spirit of the Treaty of Lausanne alive, both countries should officially claim that they harbour no territorial ambitions vis-à-vis the other side. It needs to be made clear that Greece does not want to strangle Turkey in the Aegean Sea and that Turkey for its part does not intend to grab any Greek islands.⁵⁴ At any rate the International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, is competent to clinch the matter, according to the principles of

⁵⁴ For a new approach to the subject in a conciliatory spirit see Alexis Heraclidis, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean. Imagined Enemies* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

International Law which Greece is sticking to. For instance, Greece invokes *Article 62 (Fundamental changes of circumstances) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)* to justify the militarization of Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Ikaria.⁵⁵ But the most crucial issue is the re-instatement of good neighbourly relations. Greece still feels that it is militarily threatened by Turkey which, according to the new Turkish national doctrine, aspires to become a nuclear super power in 2023. On the contrary, for Turkey Greece is rather a nuisance than a real threat. No matter what their governments are doing, the intellectuals of both countries should sweep away embedded in the collective memories prejudices and biases that poison the citizens of both countries. Balkan peoples do not know and do not understand each other. The ignorance of the Other and its demonization has proved to be a cause for conflicts in the Balkans. A reappraisal of history does not aim at moulding the past to fit in with the political requirements of the present, but at explaining the facts in their historical context with new evidence and a new approach, starting with the challenges of the present. This is the sense of Karl Popper's thesis that every generation has the duty to re-write its history. In the Balkans we have prejudices towards others. Following Hans-Georg Gadamer's *philosophical hermeneutic of the prejudices*, at first a prejudice is a pre-judgment that probably distorts understanding. But the temporal distance can play a useful role in enabling us better to single out those prejudices that exercise a problematic influence on understanding. We are involved in a dialogue that encompasses both our own self-understanding and our understanding of others. Our prejudices are being questioned in the process of understanding. Gadamer sees understanding as a matter of negotiation between oneself and one's partner in the hermeneutical dialogue in such a way that the process of understanding can be perceived as agreement about the matter at issue.⁵⁶

Greece and Turkey must revitalize the spirit of the Treaty of Lausanne, even if times moved on and readjustments to changing circumstances are necessary.

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⁵⁵ See Konstantinou P. Oikonomidou, *Θέματα Διεθνούς Δικαίου και Ελληνικής Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής* [Questions of International Law and Greek Foreign Policy], 2nd ed. (Athens and Komotini: Sakkula, 1998), 109–110.

⁵⁶ See Jörg Baberowski, *Der Sinn der Geschichte. Geschichtstheorien von Hegel bis Foucault* (Berlin: C. H. Beck, 2004), 110–125.

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Apis's Men: the Black Hand Conspirators after the Great War

Abstract: The activities of Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis and his clandestine Black Hand organisation in Serbia have long been scrutinised in connection with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914 and the outbreak of the First World War. Regent Alexander and the Pašić government dealt severely with the Black Hand in the Salonica show trial in 1917 when Apis and two of his friends were sentenced to death, a number of officers sentenced to prison and other Black Handers purged from the civilian and military authorities. The rest of Black Handers, particularly those more prominent, who survived the war found themselves in a position of pariah in the newly-founded Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia). They were constantly under the watchful eye of the authorities and suspected of plotting subversive activities. To be sure, the Black Handers remained in close contact and sought to bring about a “revision” of the Salonica trial and rehabilitate themselves and their dead comrades. This paper focuses on three particular Black Handers, Božin Simić, Radoje Janković and Mustafa Golubić – although their other friends are also mentioned in connection with them – who offered stiff resistance to the regime that had condemned them. Their cases demonstrate that some of former Apis’s associates in time came to terms with the authorities in order to secure peaceful existence or even obtain a prominent status, whereas other remained staunch opponents of King Alexander and their frustration took the shape of a left-wing opposition ranging from republicanism to outright communism.

Keywords: Apis, Black Hand, Salonica trial, Serbia, Yugoslavia, communism, Božin Simić, Radoje Janković, Mustafa Golubić

The Black Hand conspiratorial organisation has become known for its role in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince, in Sarajevo in 1914 that started a diplomatic crisis between the two opposing blocs, Entente Powers and Central Powers, which eventually escalated into the First World War. Much of historiographical debate has centred on the relationship between the assassin Gavrilo Princip and his comrades from Young Bosnia and the members of the Black Hand from Serbia, the *spiritus movens* of which was Lieutenant-Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević nicknamed Apis.¹ The latter and his supporters had been an important factor in Serbian domestic politics long before the Sarajevo as-

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¹ For the relationship between the two organisations see Dušan T. Bataković, “The Young Bosnia and the ‘Black Hand’,” in *The Serbs and the First World War*, Proceedings of the International Conference held at the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts,

sassination. A group of officers led by Apis brutally murdered the Austro-ophile King Alexander, the last of the Obrenović dynasty, and handed the crown to Peter I Karadjordjević in what is known as the May Coup of 1903 which ushered in a new era in Serbian history. The Black Hand was founded in 1911 – its official name was Unification or Death (*Ujedinjenje ili Smrt*) – mainly from the ranks of military officers for the purpose of fomenting revolution in order to liberate the Serbs still living under foreign rule, in the decaying Ottoman Empire and in Bosnia and Herzegovina which had been under practically colonial rule of Austria-Hungary since 1878. However, the Black Hand came into conflict with civilian authorities prior to the Great War: the government of Nikola Pašić's Radicals opposed the growing influence of the conspiratorial officers, particularly in the newly-acquired territory in the south as result of the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. Even if they shared the same ultimate national goals, the responsible government realised that Serbia was in a desperate need of a prolonged period of peace to digest her gains and recover her strength, whereas the Black Hand intended to press forward with its subversive activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Besides being a manifestation of its fervent nationalism, the complicity of Black Hand in the Sarajevo assassination was also a deliberate act of opposition to Pašić and his moderate policy – he tried and failed to curb its activities. The tensions between civilian and military authorities were pushed into the background with the outbreak of the Great War, but they resurfaced again in late 1916 when the remnants of the Serbian army and the government found themselves on Greek soil and joined their Allies in fighting the enemy in Macedonia. Regent Alexander, a group of his trusted officers hostile to the Black Hand – and thus called the White Hand – and Pašić's Radicals all combined for their own and different reasons to settle scores with Apis and his followers in the well-known Salonica show trial in 1917. Apis, Major Ljubomir Vulović and Rade Malobabić were sentenced to death for their alleged conspiracy against the government and constitutional order and an attempt on Regent Alexander's life; a number of persons were sentenced to prison, and the Black Hand organisation was effectively destroyed. These events have been well-served by historians although the fate of Apis and his supporters still remains a rather controversial matter and continues to fan the flames of popular imagination.²

13–15 June 2014, ed. Dragoljub T. Živojinović (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2015), 139–152.

² This and the preceding paragraph are based on Dušan T. Bataković, "Sukob vojnih i civilnih vlasti u Srbiji u prolece 1914", *Istorijski časopis XXIX-XXX* (1982–1983), 477–492, and Mile Bjelajac, *Vojaska Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, 1918–1921* (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1988), 39–45. For the 1903 coup see Dragiša Vasić, *Devetstotreća, Ma-*

Not surprisingly, historiographical interest in the Black Hand members focuses on the 1914–1917 period and stops with the brutal liquidation of that organisation. Yet, a number of its members survived the Salonica trial and the rest of the war; they became the subjects of the newly-created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS and after 1929 officially named Yugoslavia) which was, for the most part, governed by Pašić's Radicals with Regent and later King Alexander as a highly influential figure. This meant that the authorities frowned upon the surviving Black Hand members who remained suspected of surreptitious intrigue and political ambitions. The latter were naturally bitter on account of both their criminal prosecution in 1917 and the treatment they received after the war. Leaving aside the question of the Black Hand's activities prior to the Salonica trial and that troubled judicial affair, this paper will examine the lives of a few of Apis's close collaborators after the war with a view to identifying some common features and analysing the attitude of these ostracised national revolutionaries towards the regime and its consequences.

Apis's downfall in Salonica had an immediate effect on four Serbian officers who found themselves beyond the reach of Serbian authorities. In 1916, Lieutenant Colonels Božin Simić, Vojislav Gojković and Aleksandar Srb, and Major Radoje Janković were in the group of officers designated

jski prevrat (Belgrade 1928). For more on Apis and his followers see Andrej Mitrović, *Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu* (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1984), 306–321; Vladimir Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966); David MacKenzie, *Apis, the Congenial Conspirator: the Life of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Dragoljub Živojinović, *Kralj Petar I Karadjordjević, život i delo*, 3 vols (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1990), II, 315–340, and Vasa Kazimirović, *Crna ruka: ličnosti i događaji u Srbiji od Majskog prevrata 1903. do Solunskog procesa 1917. godine* (Novi Sad: Prometej, 2013). The troubled relations between civilian and military authorities are also discussed in the following articles by Dušan T. Bataković: “La Main Noire (1911–1917): l’armée serbe entre démocratie et autoritarisme”, *Revue d’histoire diplomatique* 2 (1998), 95–144; “Nikola Pašić, les radicaux de et la ‘Main noire’: Les défis à la démocratie parlementaire serbe (1903–1917)”, *Balkanica XXXVII* (2006), 143–169; “Storm over Serbia: the Rivalry between Civilian and Military Authorities (1911–1914)”, *Balkanica XLIV* (2013), 307–356. The Salonica trial is covered in Borivoje Nešković, *Istina o solunskom procesu* (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1953); Milan Živanović, *Pukovnik Apis: solunski proces hiljadu devetsto sedamnaeste: prilog za proučavanje političke istorije Srbije od 1903. do 1918. godine* (Novi Sad: Prometej, 2015, facsimile of the 1st ed. [1955]); David MacKenzie, *The “Black Hand” on Trial: Salonica, 1917* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) and Dušan T. Bataković, “The Salonica Trial 1917. Black Hand vs. Democracy (The Serbian Army between Internal Strife and Military Success)”, in *The Salonica Theatre of Operations and the Outcome of the Great War*, Proceedings of the International Conference organised by the Institute for Balkan Studies and the National Research Foundation “Eleftherios K. Venizelos” (Thessaloniki 2005), 273–293.

to leave the island of Corfu, in which the Serbian army recuperated after the disasters of retreating through Albania, and go to Russia. The goal of their mission was to enlist as volunteers in the Serbian Volunteer Corps as many Yugoslavs (South Slavs) from the Habsburg Empire who had surrendered en masse to the Russians.³ This would not just provide additional manpower for the Serbian army which was in dire need of it after the heavy losses suffered but also present a major political accomplishment insofar as such volunteers would justify the validity of the proclaimed war aim of Serbia: the unification of all Yugoslavs in a single state under the Serbian Karadjordjević dynasty. Judging the mission to Russia as very important for the future course of the war, the Black Hand managed to have considerable number of its officers sent to Russia, including the four more prominent ones mentioned above.⁴

In December 1917, the investigation into Apis's activities involved seven of his closest associates, including Simić and Gojković who were then in the city of Odessa – they would not be charged with any crime. The Supreme Command of the Serbian army demanded from the Army Minister to relieve Simić, Gojković and Srb from their duties in the Serbian Volunteer Corps. Their belongings were also searched but nothing that could incriminate them was found. The four officers, however, were firm in the defence of their indicted friends. During their interrogation the officers denied the charges made against Apis and offered information to the effect that the trial was the culmination of a conspiracy that had long been in the making.⁵ Major Janković even sent an open telegram to the Army Ministry advancing his defence against the trump-up charges, which caused great dissatisfaction as a breach of military discipline. Moreover, he and his fellow-officers in Russia embarked on an energetic campaign against the Salonica trial. They sent a dispatch to the Serbian Minister in St. Petersburg, Miroslav Spalajković, which they demanded to be urgently forwarded to the Serbian government in Corfu and Prince-Regent Alexander in Salonica. In this document, the officers claimed that the true “cause for this unexampled violence is personal hatred, spite, political short-sightedness and moral deg-

³ Ilija Jovanović, Stevan Rajković & Veljko Ribar, *Jugoslovenski dobrovoljački korpus u Rusiji: prilog istoriji dobrovoljačkog pokreta (1914–1918)* (Belgrade: Vojno delo, 1954).

⁴ Bogumil Hrabak, “Delatnost članova udruženja ‘Ujedinjenje ili smrt’ u Rusiji 1915–1918. godine”, *Istorija XX veka* VII (1965), 191–192.

⁵ Belgrade, Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts [hereafter ASANU], The Papers of Milan Živanović, 14434/141, Report of the Military Attaché in St. Petersburg, Colonel Branislav L. Lontkijević, on the interrogation of Major Radoje Janković, Lieutenant-Colonel Božin Simić and Aleksandar Srb, and the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Vojislav Gojković, May–August 1937.

radation in exile” and that the indictment was supported by “denouncers and false witnesses”. They requested that the accused Black Hand members be released at once and their rights restored; if the trial, however, was carried out to its end, they wanted a new trial to take place – and such that would be conducted by a British, French and Russian judge. Furthermore, the four officers threatened that unless they received a reply within fifteen days they would supply “all foreign representatives in St. Petersburg and all world newspapers” with their own information on the Salonica affair including their correspondence and other material.⁶

Indeed, the officers acted upon their threats. In order to bring pressure to bear on the Serbian government, they submitted a memorandum to Mikhail Tereshchenko, Foreign Minister of the provisional Russian government emerging from the February Revolution. Appealing to the fledgling Russian democracy, the officers pleaded for Russian intervention to save the lives of Apis and his comrades.⁷ Russian assistance was particularly valuable since the Pašić government was considered bound to heed advice coming from the great Slav ally which had stood by Serbia in 1914 and much suffered in consequence. The four officers also visited the French and British embassies in St. Petersburg and handed their memorandum. In addition, they found a sympathetic ear in the Russian press, favourably disposed to the victims of the Tzar’s close ally Pašić, and saw to it that several articles be published advocating the cause of Apis and his supporters.⁸ Tereshchenko did respond and appealed to Pašić to spare the lives of the alleged plotters against the Crown and state, but his intervention, as well as that of the French and British governments, was of no avail.⁹ The Serbian authorities also summoned the four officers to appear before the court in Salonica for their defiance and public opposition to their own government, but none of them did so. Finally, the government decided to retaliate and the officers were retired and thus stripped of any official capacity in which they could act in Russia. After the Salonica affair they were tried in absentia on the same charges as their friends and received substantial sentences: Gojković twenty years in prison and Janković and Simić eighteen years each; Srb was not alive by then.

⁶ ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/142, “The ultimatum” of the four from St. Petersburg, 23 May/5 June 1917 [Julian/Gregorian calendar – the former was in official use in Serbia until 1919].

⁷ ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/143, Memorandum by the four officers for Tereshchenko.

⁸ Hrabak, “Delatnost članova udruženja,” 210–213.

⁹ Živanović, *Pukovnik Apis*, 535–545; ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/354, Gojković to “Dear Mister Colonel” [Pilac?], Baden, 6 February 1922.

The retired officers were forced to fend for themselves. Simić, Gojković and Srb joined the Russian revolutionary army with a number of former volunteers – the rest of the Volunteer Corps was transported to Salonica and joined the Serbian army – and were promoted to the rank of colonel. Srb eventually found his death in the turmoil of the Russian revolution; he was murdered by a group of his own soldiers.¹⁰ Gojković became a commander of the first Yugoslav revolutionary volunteer regiment in the Red Army and left Russia in 1918. He remained in emigration until 1923 and then returned to Belgrade where he was tried again and sentenced to twenty years in prison of which he served three and a half in Sremska Mitrovica before he was pardoned and retired again.¹¹

The case of Božin Simić was particularly revealing with respect to the fierce opposition to the regime in the Kingdom in which some of the Black Handers would persist and the lengths to which they would go. One of the participants of the May Coup in 1903, he had a remarkable military career, especially in the Balkan Wars and the Great War when he was wounded three times. As has been seen, Simić was sent to Russia from Corfu in connection with the formation of volunteer units and he was later supposed to come to Serbia, according to the plan he had made with Apis, and instigate a rebellion in the enemy's rear. Simić was twice wounded on the Russian front in Dobruja as a battalion commander. Having healed, he went from Odessa to Bucharest with the intention to slip into Serbia, but this never occurred as he was ordered to appear before the court in Salonica. He did not try to eschew this unpleasant trip and made himself available to Minister Spalajković in St. Petersburg to organise a transport to Salonica for him but German submarine warfare made that impossible. Having been sentenced in absence nevertheless, Simić fought in the Russian army and was wounded; he then went to France via Scandinavian countries with the intention of returning to Serbia. Having been warned that he would be thrown into prison rather than tried again, Simić decided against going back to his country. "In emigration he lived in Vienna (for a year), Moscow (eight months) and the rest of the time in France. During his stay in Moscow he spent the whole time researching documents in 'Red Archives'."¹² It seems safe to assume that his academic research was focused on what had passed between the Russian and Serbian governments relating to the Salonica affair.

¹⁰ Hrabak, "Delatnost članova udruženja," 244–248.

¹¹ *Srpski biografski rečnik* (Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 2014), 731–732. One of his letters was written from Baden, Switzerland, although it is not known if he spent his whole time as an émigré there. See n. 9 above.

¹² ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/284, Biographical note on Božin Simić.

Indeed, Simić was consumed with the struggle to unearth what he considered the truth about Apis and his other persecuted friends and obtain satisfaction for the victims in a re-trial. In the early 1920s, the Belgrade press, and the journal *Novo vreme* in particular, abounded with polemical texts which demanded a "revision" of the Salonica Trial, the authors of which were often the proscribed Black Handers including Simić.¹³ He also produced a large number of brochures which were published in the press with the twin-aims of exalting Apis's patriotism and exceptional capabilities to which the Serbian army owed so much for its tremendous successes in 1912–1918, on the one hand, and condemning the corrupt and wicked ways of Pašić and Radicals, on the other.¹⁴ In doing so, Simić kept in close touch and cooperated with the former Black Hand members in Belgrade who had been granted amnesty in 1918. Yet, they were something of pariahs in the new Yugoslav state and exposed to constant suspicion on the part of the authorities. To begin with, the Black Handers had long been purged from both civil service and the military on Pašić's instructions circulated to all government departments and based on the decisions of the Ministerial Council of 24 March 1917 – the government had still been located in Corfu then.¹⁵ After the war, the harassment of the former conspirators carried on. For example, in March 1919, the retired officers were called to military exercise and, to make the matter more provocative, in the area under command of Božidar Terzić, formerly War Minister who had persecuted them. They refused unless they were given either full satisfaction for what they had suffered or a new and fair trial; needless to say, their conditions had no chance of being accepted.¹⁶

Moreover, the Black Hand members were under permanent surveillance. "The Black Handers maintain the closest connections not just with the republicans, but also with communists. Most often Black Handers gather together at the apartment of Bora Prodanović, a lawyer."¹⁷ It was also stated that the other place for their meeting was a cinema in the street across the building of the Academy of Sciences. Bora Prodanović was a son of Jaša Prodanović, the leader of the Yugoslav Republican Party, and known for his defence of communists in the court of law which in itself

¹³ Živanović, *Pukovnik Apis*, 7–9.

¹⁴ ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/617, Draft of Simić's article. He also condemned Petar Živković, the leader of the White Hand, who had risen to prominence through his surreptitious dealings against Apis and his supporters. See his draft article "Petar Živković" in 14434/620.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 14434/148, Circular by Pašić.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 14434/563, Note sent to the Cabinet, 19 March 1919.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 14434/262, Note by the General Staff department of the War Ministry, no date.

confirmed the accuracy of this intelligence report. Indeed, one of the most prominent Black Handers, Colonel Milutin Lazarević, himself pointed out that Jaša Prodanović was their most concrete supporter among politicians, along with Stojan Ribarac, formerly the leader of the Liberals. The Democrats, he wrote in a succinct political analysis, promised a lot but they asked for patience and wanted to wait for more propitious political circumstances in order to obtain a revision of the Salonica trial; they were afraid of the Crown and at the same time needed its support to come to office.¹⁸

Another intelligence report spoke of a trader Žika Ilić, a fervent Republican, who frequently travelled to Paris where he met with Božin Simić and maintained contact between him and Republicans in Belgrade. Ilić was said to have sent 4,000 dinars to Apis's widow, Zora Dimitrijević, "at whose place local Black Handers meet and where they were all gathered on the day of St. Vitus *atentat* in 1921 [a failed attempt on King Alexander's life] and spent the whole night in deciding something."¹⁹ The same report stated that Milan Gr. Milovanović nicknamed Pilac and other Black Handers were also frequent visitors to Zora's abode from where they wrote letters to Simić. Those letters were then sent to Simić by one of two young students, both of them Pilac's nephews; another sender was a female clerk working for Žika Ilić. This report also seems not to have been far off the mark. As the most active former conspirator in emigration Simić regularly corresponded with Pilac, the main figure among the remaining Black Handers in Serbia. The latter had been one of the ten members of the Supreme Central Committee of the Black Hand and he had been initially sentenced to death in 1917 but then to twenty years' imprisonment before being pardoned with the others. Pilac and Dragomir Ž. Stojanović coordinated the efforts of the Black Handers to gather as much material and testimonies as possible to use for "revision" of the Salonica trial, but they, like most others, did not live long enough to see it come true.²⁰ It was also Pilac, along with Milutin Lazarević, that responded to the well-known accusations against the Black Hand conspiratorial activities by none else than Stojan Protić, their arch-enemy and former Interior Minister in the Pašić cabinet, in the party organ of the Radical Party.²¹

In the early years of his exile, Simić was struggling financially in France and suffered from kidneys. He did not have enough money even for such basic necessities as buying clothes or paying rent; he hoped to receive

¹⁸ Ibid. 14434/371, Milutin Lazarević to Dragomir Ž. Stojanović, private, 10 July 1919.

¹⁹ Ibid. 14434/4243, Chief of the reporting section of the General Staff, General Petar Marković, to the Commander of the City of Belgrade, no date.

²⁰ Živanović, *Pukovnik Apis*, 13–15.

²¹ ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/940, *Samouprava*, no. 68, 1 January 1921.

some financial assistance from Stevan Šapinac and his brother, and eventually a cheque reached him for which he thanked Pilac and a "friend".²² It is clear from his references that he was in personal contact with a number of his old friends: Radoje Janković, Mustafa Golubić, Velimir Vemić were some of the people he mentioned. Simić seems to have been hopeful that amnesty would be soon granted to him and his fellows Black Handers. He sent three of his brochures to Milan Gr. Milovanović Pilac but asked him to have two of them printed prior to amnesty since they would have no effect afterwards; the third one could be printed after the granting of amnesty and it would contain things rather unpalatable to Radicals, and Pašić in particular. If financing these publications presented difficulties, Simić offered to arrange it with "certain persons".²³ Yet, as time went by and nothing changed in his unenviable émigré status Simić became increasingly despondent. He confided in Pilac his disappointment with the inactivity of his friends in Serbia: there was talk of grand political events which were awaited from time to time, but he was tired of living "provisionally" and considered giving up their common cause and going to America, perhaps forever.²⁴ In fact, his friends were not as inactive as Simić believed. A member of parliament Pavle Andjelić requested from the Justice Minister, Lazar Marković, to propose to King amnesty for Simić to be announced on the occasion of King's wedding with Princess Maria of Romania. Andjelić used this opportunity to advance certain questions for Marković which underscored political aspects of Simić's case and handed in a petition for his amnesty signed by a number of respectable citizens from Simić's home town of Kruševac.²⁵

At the end of February 1924, a group of convicted Black Handers and their supporters capitulated before the government. Having lost any hope that they would obtain satisfaction in a legal procedure in their lifetime, Milan Gr. Milovanović Pilac and Lazarević submitted on their behalf a statement to the National Assembly in which they renounced their demand for revision of the Salonica trial. Moreover, they expressed absolute loyalty to the state and the monarch and thus effectively absolved the regime of responsibility for the unsavoury methods employed against their friends.²⁶

²² Ibid. 14434/561, Simić to Milovanović Pilac, private, no date; 14434/616, Simić to Pilac, private, Paris, 22 novembar 1921.

²³ Ibid. 14434/368, Simić to Milovanović Pilac, private, no date.

²⁴ Ibid., 14434/334, Simić to Milovanović Pilac, private, 14 February 1924.

²⁵ Ibid. 14434/4279, Copy of Andjelić's interpellation, 10 June 1922; 14434/4280, Petition of 51 citizens of Kruševac, 29 May 1922. As opposed to Andjelić, this group of citizens appealed for amnesty on humanitarian rather than political grounds.

²⁶ "Solunski proces i današnja politička kriza", *Politika*, 2 March 1924, p. 3.

This was a culmination of the development in which some of the most implacable Black Handers and Simić's comrades from Russia caved in and returned to the country. Vojislav Gojković turned up in Belgrade in 1923 and was immediately tried again and sentenced to twenty years in prison, but he was pardoned in March 1927, returned to the army and subsequently retired.²⁷ Radoje Janković also came back to the Kingdom from Vienna; he was arrested and imprisoned in Sremska Mitrovica for two and a half years before being pardoned in May 1925.²⁸ He wrote to the King from prison with a plea to release him and grant him an audience to give his account of what had taken place.²⁹ Apparently, he had long abandoned the notion that the Black Hand victims could be best rehabilitated through parliamentary enquiry since he had been deeply sceptical to the possibility of a judicial revision of the Salonica trial – although “the monarchical principle has died” in him, he was still against the establishment of a republic which he though would lead to the demise of the country.³⁰ Whether it was because of this loyalty to monarchy, the fact that he had been a leading correspondent for the *Pijemont* [Piedmont] journal, an unofficial organ of the Black Hand, to which Alexander, then Prince, had contributed financially, or because Alexander had valued him prior to sending him to Russia himself, or combination of all these factors, Janković was finally restored to royal favour.³¹ He was even granted, unlike his friends, a pension for the years intervening between his retirement in Russia and return from emigration.³² In addition, Janković was appointed General-Consul in Chicago as soon as he was amnestied and later transferred to New York to do the same job; in

²⁷ ASANU, Živanović Papers, Decision on amnesty, 14434/3212, 8 March 1927.

²⁸ Ibid. Decision on amnesty, 14434/3211, 5 May 1925.

²⁹ Ibid. 14434/366, Janković to King Alexander, 8 October 1923.

³⁰ Ibid. 14434/369, Janković to “Dear Mister Colonel” [Pilac?], Anzio, Italy, 26 June 1919.

³¹ For Janković's work for the *Pijemont* and what had passed between him and Alexander before his departure for Russia see ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/569, Extract from the notes of Colonel Vladimir Tucović. Janković was also a respectable writer and that was perhaps another and important factor for the leniency with which he was treated. For an example of his literary accomplishment see *Dani i godine* (Belgrade: Magelan pres, 2013, rpt. of the 1926 edition). In Vojislav Gojković's account of the activities of the four officers in Russia Janković was said not to have been solidary with his colleagues from the start, but they later worked together to stop the Salonica trial and save their friends. Gojković also condemned Janković's later tendency to present himself as a main figure in those events at the expense of others. See 14434/354, Gojković to “Dear Mister Colonel” [Pilac?], Baden, 6 February 1922.

³² ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/4172, Decision of the Army and Navy Ministry – Judicial Department – Pension Section, 18 May 1925.

1936, he was sent to Tirana where he served as Minister until the Italian occupation of Albania in April 1939.³³ He was also politically active during Prince Paul's Regency as a close collaborator of Milan Stojadinović in his newly-formed Serbian Radical Party. He addressed Stojadinović's supporters at the gala dinner in Belgrade in March 1940 and became an editor of the party organ *Ujedinjenje* in recognition for his outstanding literary abilities.³⁴ Janković was arrested by the Gestapo in Belgrade in 1941 as a hostage and died three years later before the German occupation ended.

Coming after Gojković's and Janković's surrender, the statement that Pilac and Lazarević made to the National Assembly deeply embittered exiled Simić. He was not consulted about this step and, in a message sent to Milan Gr. Milovanović Pilac, resented it as "nonsense and a treachery to his own past".³⁵ This appears to have been a decisive moment for Simić; feeling betrayed by his friends he was pushed into even more determined opposition to the regime in his country. It was hardly a coincidence that he soon coloured his staunch anti-government stance with rather leftist argumentation. In his article reflecting on the statement of his friends, he particularly took issue with their avowed willingness even now to sacrifice everything for the good of the King and the country. In his view, this action of his friends had to do with removing Pašić from power which would eventually take place in a few months when the Democrat government headed by Ljubomir Davidović was formed. However, Simić professed that Pašić's downfall was far from what was required for internal settling of the country:

All those who think that our state crisis comes only from an excessive state corruption to which Nikola Pašić has always been a soul in our country are much mistaken. State corruption – to be true, far less than ours to which Pašić gives a strong imprint – is suffocating all nations today, because bourgeois system, as it has been until today, is about to die. The World War and the Russian Revolution caused the last brutalisation of the hitherto parliamentary democracy and thus threw all states in a conceptual turmoil from which a new democracy and a new state mechanism are yet to emerge. It took a world war and of such long duration so that it can be seen that we have been political slaves until this day just like before the French Revolution, because there cannot be either personal or political or

³³ Belgrade, Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia; hereafter AJ], Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia [collection no. 334, hereafter Foreign Ministry], Personal Files, Radoje Janković.

³⁴ Milan Stojadinović, *Dva sporazuma – uvodna reč od Radoja Jankovića* (Belgrade: Biblioteka Srpske radikalne stranke, sv. 1, 1940).

³⁵ ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/336, Simić's letter [the addressee is unknown due to the damaged paper] containing a protest to Pilac, 22 March 1924.

national freedom without certain material security and independence of each individual.³⁶

A crisis of national unity would not be resolved, Simić went on, with changes of personnel but rather with a thorough change of the entire state order and his friends were wrong because they opposed a change of that order. They were also wrong because they were renouncing a revision of the Salonica trial for it was impossible to obtain satisfaction for their sufferings from the same potentates who had sentenced them in the first place.³⁷

During King Alexander's reign Simić remained inflexible in his attitude towards the Yugoslav regime. He returned to the country in late 1935, a year after King Alexander had been assassinated in Marseilles; he was arrested at the very border and dispatched to prison in Požarevac but he was pardoned after sixth months, released and retired in the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.³⁸ This was a clear indication of the more liberal regime established under Regent Prince Paul and Prime Minister Stojadinović.³⁹ In fact, Simić was free to engage in political life and he had close relations with the members of the Serbian Cultural Club consisting of some of the leading intellectuals.⁴⁰

He re-emerged on the political scene in 1940 in connection with the establishing of diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in which he figured as an ardent supporter of close cooperation between the two countries. The Yugoslav Military Attaché in Moscow, Colonel Žarko Popović, witnessed Simić's role in these events. "In January 1941, the former Colonel, Black Hander Božin Simić suddenly turned up

³⁶ Ibid. Božin Simić, "Jedan koji postavlja stvari na svoje pravo mesto", *Republika* no. 27, 6 April 1924 [director of the *Republika* was Ljubomir Stojanović, one of the founders of the Republican Party]. Original emphasis.

³⁷ Ibid. It seems that one of the drafts for this article is contained in ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/617.

³⁸ ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/284, Biographical note on Božin Simić compiled by Milan Živanović. His main sources were presumably Pilac and Lazarević with whom Živanović, Apis's nephew, spent a lot of time collecting material about the Salonica trial which he eventually used for his *Pukovnik Apis*.

³⁹ It is also characteristic that Apis's sister, Jelena Živanović, together with her son and Apis's legal heir Milan asked Stojadinović in 1937 for permission to exhume her brother's body and transfer it from Salonica to Belgrade to be buried in a family tomb next to her other son Sanja, killed in action in 1912, and mother Jovanka. See ASANU, 14434/1807, Živanović Papers, Jelena Živanović to Milan Stojadinović, 19 May 1937. There is no record of any reply; Apis's body has remained in Greece.

⁴⁰ AJ, Foreign Ministry, Personal Files, Božin Simić, Biography [compiled by an anonymous author in the communist Foreign Ministry after the Second World War], 334-190-678.

in Moscow at the side of our Minister [Milan Gavrilović]. I did not know about his presence for a long time until he walked into my office one day and requested to see what I was doing." Popović believed that Simić wanted his position and that he was trying to undermine him in the eyes of Gavrilović. In late February, Simić disappeared from Moscow. Minister Gavrilović advised him before departure to meet with General Dušan Simović, the commander of Air Force, in Belgrade. The latter would soon become famous as a nominal leader of the officers who carried out coup d'état on 27 March 1941 and overthrew Prince Paul, a fateful event that brought Yugoslavia into the Second World War. Popović claimed that Gavrilović had advised Simović to proceed with a putsch. "On 2 April 1941, this mysterious man for liaison with the Soviet Union, Božin Simić, who bragged about his strong personal connections in the USSR, showed up."⁴¹ Popović also pointed out that Simić and Simović had been classmates in the Military Academy. Another account throws light on what happened later: "After the 27 March putsch the preparation for which had not been unknown to him [Simić], he was sent to Moscow as a second member of our delegation for the conclusion of a pact with Soviet Russia."⁴²

This pact was concluded practically simultaneously with the Axis aggression against Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941 so it was a dead letter for all practical intents and purposes. Simić's role in these events and the exact nature of his connections with the Soviets remain an important and controversial matter. His participation in the Russian revolution and his publically proclaimed leftist views were no doubt credentials that recommended him for a mission in the USSR. There is no firm evidence, however, that he was involved with the communist movement despite the fact that police reports in the mid-1920s mentioned his name among other communist activists and even dangerous terrorists.⁴³ On the other hand, Simić maintained contacts with communists and, in his own words, "just before the war had two meetings in Paris with the emigrant and revolutionary Josip Broz-Tito", the leader of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the future commander of the partisan resistance movement in the Axis-occupied country.⁴⁴ After the annihilation of Yugoslavia in the April War of 1941 Simić joined the government-in-exile in London. He wanted to be sent to the insurgents in the country but instead became a plenipotentiary Minister to the French

⁴¹ Dragoslav Djordjević, *Na raskrsnici 1941* (Toronto: Bratstvo, 1988), 162–164.

⁴² ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/284, Biographical note on Božin Simić.

⁴³ Kosta Nikolić, *Boljševizacija KPJ 1919–1929: istorijske posledice* (Belgrade: ISI, 1994), 137–138.

⁴⁴ AJ, Foreign Ministry, Personal Files, Božin Simić, Biography [written by Simić himself for the communist Foreign Ministry after the Second World War], 334-190-674.

National Committee of Charles de Gaulle until he resigned following the formation of the Trifunović-Grol-Živković government.⁴⁵ During the war Simić seems to have maintained his special interests for and links with the Soviets. In September 1942, he put forward suggestion that King Peter II make official visit to Moscow, but Prime Minister, Slobodan Jovanović, set his face against this proposal.⁴⁶

The case of another Black Hander Mustafa Golubić provides a spectacular example of a lifelong revolutionary career. Born in Herzegovina, he joined the ranks of Young Bosnians in their resistance to the colonial rule of Austria-Hungary over their native land. After the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 Golubić emigrated to Serbia, received a scholarship but never graduated. He was a volunteer in the Balkan Wars in the *chetnik* unit of the legendary Major Vojislav Tankosić. After the wars he returned to studies in Toulouse, France, where he planned, along with another prominent Young Bosnian, Vladimir Gaćinović, an assassination of the Bosnian Governor Oskar Potiorek. He re-joined Tankosić's volunteers in the First World War and became close with Apis in the spring of 1915. At the latter's initiative, Golubić and his fellow Bosnian Serb Dušan Semiz were dispatched to Russia to induce the Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war of Yugoslav origin to join the Serbian army – they were on the same mission as the four officers discussed above. The fact that they were from Bosnia and Herzegovina themselves was supposed to be an asset in this undertaking: indeed, they sent more than 1,000 volunteers to Serbia. Having returned from Russia in late 1915 Golubić took part in the retreat through Albania and found himself in Corfu. He then left for Switzerland and later for France which would be connected during the Salonica trial with the plans to assassinate German Kaiser Wilhelm II – besides Germanophile Greek King Constantine – with a view to incriminating Apis. Golubić was arrested in France, at the request of the Serbian government, and transferred to Salonica but he refused to denounce his friends. Therefore, he was brought before the Grand Military Court “in the unusual role of an accomplice of the accused, although he was not charged himself as he was questioned as a witness”.⁴⁷

Golubić returned to Belgrade after the war but the authorities interned him in the Rakovica monastery. He was soon forced to move to his home town of Stolac since the military authorities considered him and an-

⁴⁵ ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/284, Biographical note on Božin Simić.

⁴⁶ Milan Gavrilović, *Londonski dnevnik* (Belgrade: Žagor, 2013), 115.

⁴⁷ ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/3220, Biographical note on Mustafa Golubić. The author knew Golubić from the time of the war and the two of them met again in Belgrade in 1919.

other Bosnian Nezir Hadžinalić “two very dangerous criminal persons”.⁴⁸ Frustrated because of the treatment meted out to him, Golubić left for Vienna in 1920 where many political emigrants of all persuasions found their refuge. It was there that he became a member of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Entering into such subversive anti-state organisation was perhaps a logical course of action for an idealistic young man who was disappointed with and enraged at what he must have considered a grave injustice and senseless persecution. In addition, his restless and adventurous nature was conducive to embracing conspiratorial life style in by then illegal communist party. This is perfectly illustrated in an episode when, having heard that his brother was arrested and beaten in Herzegovina, Golubić sent a personal message to King Alexander warning him that he found him personally responsible for the treatment of his brother and that he would take revenge for that – and for the death of Apis.⁴⁹ This was not just an empty threat. In the mid-1920s, the police authorities in Yugoslavia had information to the effect that Golubić belonged to a particularly dangerous terrorist group in Vienna which enjoyed full confidence of the Soviets and was preparing assassinations of highest-ranking officials in the Kingdom.⁵⁰ It was no doubt part of his struggle against the Belgrade regime when he published under pseudonym an article in *La Federation Balkanique* in 1924 in which he alleged that Apis had prepared the assassination in Sarajevo with the knowledge of Russian Military Attaché Artamanov, Russian Minister Hartwig, Pašić and heir to the crown Alexander.⁵¹

The Yugoslav police was said to have attempted to eliminate him in Vienna; at the request of the Viennese police, Golubić was forced to leave Austria and he went to Prague and then to Paris. Throughout these émigré years Golubić was in contact with Colonel Vladimir Tucović, former Black Hand and brother of late Dimitrije Tucović, the leader of the Serbian Social Democrat Party. Tucović provided financial means for Golubić's subsistence and once paid him a visit in Paris. The latter was in close touch with other Black Handers as well, and Simić in particular. In one of Simić's letters to Pilac, he confirmed that he had received a cheque in Golubić's

⁴⁸ Ibid. 14434/4229, Report of Colonel Josif Kostić to the Command of the City of Belgrade, strictly confidential, no. 1881, 6 November 1919; and Commander of the City of Belgrade, Colonel Dragutin Uzun Mirković to Army and Navy Minister, confidential F.A.o.br.41353, 7 November 1919.

⁴⁹ Ibid. 14434/3220, Biographical note on Mustafa Golubić.

⁵⁰ Nikolić, *Boljševizacija KPJ*, 137–138.

⁵¹ Vasa Kazimirović, *Crna ruka: ličnosti i događaji u Srbiji od majskeg prevrata 1903. do solunskog procesa 1917* (Novi Sad: Prometej, 1997), 620.

name – it is not clear if that money came from Tucović or someone else.⁵² It should be noted that Tucović was first sentenced to death at the Salonica trial only to have his sentence relaxed to twenty years in prison. His right to receive state pension, along with that of another initially death sentenced officer Lieutenant-Colonel Velimir Vemić, was not restored before January 1935 after the assassination of King Alexander I Karadjordjević.⁵³ As will be seen, Tucović would again be of assistance to Golubić. Whether their ties stemmed solely from their friendship and Black Hand camaraderie or because of Tucović's involvement with the communist movement remains a moot point. Far more certain is the fact that Tucović, just like Golubić, was among those who suffered most at the hands of the regime in Belgrade and that consideration alone probably went a long way to make him eager to contribute to Golubić's cause.

In 1927, Golubić went to Moscow “where he completed some military course and was sent on ‘special assignment’ to Germany. Since then Mustafa has scoured Europe with a false passport in his pocket, carried out his ‘special assignments’ and from time to time come to Moscow for a longer or shorter vacation”, recorded his close friend Rodoljub Čolaković who spent a lot of time with him during his emigration in the Soviet capital in the 1930s.⁵⁴ This was the start of an extraordinary career as an undercover intelligence officer in the Soviet Red Army (“IV department”) that turned Golubić into something of a legendary figure for his friends and acquaintances among Yugoslav communists.⁵⁵ Stevan Dedijer, brother of Vladimir Dedijer, a close associate and later biographer of Tito, the communist dictator of Yugoslavia, helped Golubić to hide from the FBI in America for two months after the latter had abducted an American citizen (Kuntz) and smuggled him into Moscow. According to Dedijer's information, he assassinated people for the Soviets and even “took part in the murder of Stalin's opponent Leon Trotsky in Mexico”.⁵⁶ In Paris,

⁵² ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/561, Simić to Pilac, private, no date.

⁵³ Ibid. 14434/3213, Amnesty for Vladimir Tucović and Velimir Vemić, 31 January 1935.

⁵⁴ Rodoljub Čolaković, *Kazivanje o jednom pokoljenju*, 3 vols (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1980), II, 93–94.

⁵⁵ Ibid. III, 404. His life has even been the subject of a dramatic play in Sead Trhulj, *Mustafa Golubić: čovjek konspiracije* (Belgrade: Partizanska knjiga, 1986). The second part of the book provides explanations for acts in the play with plenty of historical information based on recollections of Golubić's friends. Plenty of material can also be found in Djurica Labović, *Tajne misije Mustafe Golubića* (Belgrade: Beleta, 1990).

⁵⁶ Stevan Dedijer, *Špijun kojeg smo voljeli* (Zagreb: VBZ, 2011), 122–123; Čolaković, *Kazivanje o jednom pokoljenju*, III, 409, confirms that Golubić stayed in the USA for a

Golubić became inseparable friends with a physics student and fellow communist Čedomilj Popović, a brother-in-law of Apis's nephew – this family connection appears to have played some part in the bonding between the two revolutionaries. In fall 1939, Golubić and Popović illegally crossed into Yugoslavia. The former removed his black glasses and started to freely walk across Belgrade after the putsch of 27 March 1941. Golubić stayed in Belgrade after the German forces had occupied the country and set up an intelligence centre for the Soviets. When the Germans undertook large-scale arrests of communists in connection with the impending aggression against the USSR in late May, Golubić and Popović were supposed to move in a place on the Zlatibor Mountain which Vladimir Tucović had prepared for them, but they did not do so.⁵⁷ This was another occasion on which Tucović provided valuable help to his former Black Hand comrade although this time it turned out to be in vain. Golubić was arrested on 6 June 1941 together with his hosts, the Višnjevac family, and the same happened to Popović three days later. Despite all the torture by Gestapo interrogators, Golubić remained firm and did not even admit his real name. Nevertheless, Dragi Jovanović, the head of the special police department in Belgrade during the occupation, recognised him as a dangerous communist whose activities he had followed for nearly two decades.⁵⁸ Finally, Golubić was shot and buried somewhere in a park in central Belgrade. Not even his death passed without controversy. Milovan Djilas, one of Tito's close associates, recalled that Golubić had been hostile to the leadership of the Yugoslav communists which feared that he could create trouble for them in Moscow. The Yugoslav communists thus followed him and were even prepared to kill him if he "proved to be a Trotskyite". They took his photos and showed them to Tito who recognised him as a high-profile secret agent, no doubt from his days in Moscow, and ordered that he be left alone.⁵⁹ The mystery surrounding Golubić's last months in Belgrade only served to enhance the myth of this elusive individual.

Looking back at the destinies of a few prominent Black Handers following the Salonica trial and the death of their three friends including their leader Apis, it should be noted that they proved to be a fairly close-knit group even at the time of hardship. "Every member of the organisation is obliged to provide any kind of assistance to a comrade", read one of the

few months and saw Dedijer and Srdjan Prica there.

⁵⁷ ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/3220, Biographical note on Mustafa Golubić; also 14434/701, Biographical note on Golubić by Vladimir Tucović.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*; also Čolaković, *Kazivanje o jednom pokoljenju*, III, 606–608.

⁵⁹ Milovan Djilas, *Memoir of a Revolutionary* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 375–376.

articles of the Rules of Procedure of the Black Hand.⁶⁰ The members indeed lived up to this obligation. They found themselves in a difficult situation in the newly-created Yugoslav state for which they had shed blood and considerably contributed to its coming into being only to become outcasts, subversive elements on which the authorities kept a watchful eye. The remaining Black Handers stood and worked together to bring about a revision of the Salonica trial, rehabilitate their fallen friends and restore their own reputation and social standing. However, the regime was too strong and had too much of a vested interest to allow them any kind of satisfaction which would at the same time mean a confession of its own sins.

In this uneven struggle, some of the Black Handers headed by Milan Gr. Milovanović Pilac gave in and abandoned their demands in return for a peaceful existence and lenient attitude on the part of the government. Pilac passed away in 1933 in a large farm in Vojvodina in which he worked as a superintendent; Lazarević dedicated himself to studying and writing about the history of recent wars. Some of them not just made peace with the authorities but also reacquired a prominent status within government establishment — Janković had a fairly successful diplomatic stint. The disappearance of King Alexander, whom the Black Handers regarded as personal enemy — Nikola Pašić died in 1926 — and the more liberal regime of the Regency enabled even those more intransigent, like Simić, to end their emigration and be eventually granted amnesty. However, the likes of Simić, Tucović and, in particular, Golubić remained much more embittered and their frustration took the shape of a left-wing opposition ranging from republicanism to outright communism. A recent study has noted that Golubić even organised his intelligence network in Belgrade on the pattern of small separate groups as had been the case with the Black Hand.⁶¹

After the Second World War, the new communist regime in Yugoslavia took a favourable view of the Black Hand and its national revolutionary struggle, but most of all embraced its hostile attitude towards King Alexander and Pašić. The surviving Black Handers who had demonstrated their leftist convictions before the war were included in the government. Having handed his resignation to the royal exile-government, Simić returned to Yugoslavia and became a member of AVNOJ, the main legislative and executive organ of the communist authorities, in 1945 and later a member of the provisional National Assembly. He was also appointed Ambassador to Turkey from which position he was retired and lived until 1966.

⁶⁰ Živanović, *Pukovnik Apis*, 672.

⁶¹ Kosta Nikolić, *Mit o partizanskom jugoslovenstvu* (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2015), 25.

Just like Simić, Tucović was a member of AVNOJ in 1945 and then of the provisional National Assembly; he died in 1947. Gojković was also elected a member of the latter organ in 1945 and then received in the Yugoslav Army where he had a nice career until his retirement in 1948.⁶² Tito's communists cared little for historical truth but rather seized an opportunity to utilise a retrial to Apis and others in 1953, something that their friends had long sought, in order to defame the royal Yugoslavia and her government. The verdicts from the Salonica Trial were annulled.⁶³ The controversy surrounding that dubious trial marked the accused individuals for life and involved them in often dirty political struggle. For those personally affected, it was, as has been seen, not just a matter of setting the historical record straight, but also a driving force behind their political activity which was by no means insignificant and without interests for the history of Yugoslavia.

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⁶² For biographical information in this paragraph see Živanović, *Pukovnik Apis*, 659, 664, and *Srpski biografski rečnik* (Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 2014), 731–732.

⁶³ Živanović, *Pukovnik Apis*, 619–637; David MacKenzie, *The Exoneration of the "Black Hand"*, 1917–1953 (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1998).

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Great War Legacies in Serbian Culture

Abstract: In the aftermath of the Great War, Ivo Andrić published a number of poems, essays and short stories describing the hard-won victorious outcome as transient to the dire reality of the inordinate loss of human lives and suffering. Yet, personal experiences, although perceived as ephemeral, helped to define the historical discourse capturing man's resolve to persist in his chosen mission. Over time, Serbian literature and fine arts sustained an unfinished dialogue of the past and the present, merging the individual voices with the collective voices to construct the national narrative. The young writer Miloš Crnjanski observed the sights of destruction and despair that seemed to pale in new literary works pertaining to the war. His novel *A Diary about Čarnojević* was closely related to his own perilous wartime journey as a conscript in the Austrian army. The vastness of Pannonian plains and Galician woods must have invoked a comparison of sorts with another historic chapter recorded in the collective consciousness of his nation: the Great Migration of Serbs led by Patriarch Arsenije III Čarnojević (Crnojević) in 1690. The very title of the novel contained a powerful reference to the migration, and its illustrious historic leader which has not been discussed or explored before.

Keywords: Great War, Serbia, Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Empire, Ivo Andrić, Miloš Crnjanski, Ivan Mestrovic, Ljubomir Micić, Arsenije III Čarnojević (Crnojević), 1690 Great Serb Migration

After the end of the Great War the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formed in Belgrade on December 1, 1918. Belgrade became the capital of the new state as well as the center of an intense revival in many fields of cultural endeavors. According to the testimony of the young poet Rastko Petrović, Belgrade gave the impression of a deserted, war-ravaged city. In spite of its bleak appearance, Petrović noticed a new spirit of lively collaboration in many avenues of cultural life. Everyday meetings of men and women who were also poets offered assurance that one was not alone. *Cafe Moscow*, illuminated with candles at the time, became the meeting place for the leading figures of the literary and artistic world.¹

The poets were not the only group to meet; there existed a broader context of spiritual association including visual artists and musicians alike, although the influence of young writers was decisive. Even a Croatian writ-

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¹ Jelena Milojković-Djurić, *Tradition and Avant-Garde: the Arts in Serbian Culture between the Two World Wars* (Boulder: East European Monographs; dist. by: Columbia University Press, New York, 1984), 9–10.

er, Gustav Krklec, eventually moved to Belgrade drawn by “the irresistible power” of the city, as he confessed. He wished to establish personal contacts with fellow writers and take part in literary life. Krklec stated that he and his contemporaries Donadini, Šimić and Krleža decided to write in the Eastern Štokavian dialect affirming their adherence to the Yugoslav ideology.²

Ivo Andrić left a valuable assessment of the literary scene that evolved following the end of the Great War. A young and knowledgeable writer himself, he knew well his fellow writers, their published works, and those still in progress. In the comprehensive study *Naša književnost i rat* (Our literature and the war) published in 1918 Andrić evaluated the aspirations and projected goals of Serbo-Croatian writers facing a new beginning and new endeavors.

In an introductory statement, Andrić suggested that his findings could be applied only to Serbo-Croatian literature in the regions that had been under Austro-Hungarian rule. However, his comprehensive evaluation included Serbo-Croatian literature as a whole. He noted that after four long years of incessant fighting, a new comprehension of life on all levels became apparent. A new era had begun and a variety of literary activities were gradually resumed. Every new publication was hailed joyfully, and there was a great demand for new reading material. Newly-published works were printed in high print runs and the number of translations of foreign writers substantially increased. Thus, the war that had initially silenced writers and their professional activities eventually encouraged a lively literary life in its aftermath.

However, Andrić believed that the writers were in a difficult position to record and express in a timely fashion all that had happened:

I only want to draw attention to the difficult moral circulus vitiosus of our writers ... we all know how much has changed during these years of suffering for the whole mankind and all of us ... Nonetheless, all this cannot prevent us from seeing the shallowness and dejection of the so-called literature written before the war and the triviality of its motifs. Presently, we can all appreciate ... that a different literature is in the making, and this fact is the only positive side of the war.³

Due to such circumstances, Andrić thought it unjust to expect a well-rounded literary rendering of the war or its chronology in recent works. The writers experienced the tragedy of this period as deeply as anybody else, and time was needed to recapture the lost strength and gain the necessary perspective. Consequently, Serbo-Croatian literature acquired a transitory

² Branimir Ćosić, *Deset pisaca, deset razgovora* (Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1931), 113.

³ Ivo Andrić, “Naša književnost i rat”, *Istorija i legenda, Eseji*, vol. 1 of *Sabrana Dela* (Collected Works) (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1977), 169.

character casting a long shadow of expectation for a promising future of literary creation.⁴

Andrić firmly believed that if the writers managed to sustain the intensity of their creative quest, as they had before the war, then they would accomplish an important goal:

The main task of contemporary literature is to maintain a continuity of the former spiritual life, to preserve the ideals of one's youth that became ideals of the whole people, and to uphold them through suffering and iniquity into better days.⁵

In addition, Andrić noted that many writers and artists showed a marked interest in creating literary associations, artistic unions and professional bodies promoting cultural enlightenment and raising awareness of the arts.

Among the first to be founded, in 1919, was the *Grupa umetnika* (The Group of Artists) which included Serbian writers such as Ivo Andrić, Rastko Petrović, Danica Marković, Todor Manojlović, Sibe Miličić, composers Miloje Milojević, Stevan Hristić and Kosta Manojlović, and painters Branko Popović, Kosta Miličević and Mirko Kujadžić, among others. The *Group* organized literary-musical evenings, and exhibitions featuring paintings of its members. Poetry remained a preferred literary genre as it had been even during the war years.⁶

The first recital, in November 1919, was promptly reviewed in the journal *Misao* (Thought). The reviewer, Velimir Živojinović, noted with pleasure that the recital offered a new and congenial collaboration of writers, visual artists and musicians:

This was probably the first effort in our midst of a planned cultivation and presentation of literary and art works as a joint manifestation. It was also an introduction to the contemporary artistic movements in our cultural life ... as well as to the manifold conceptions that have prevailed in literature. A similar situation is in the fine arts, the visual artists presented in their works varied directions supported by the participating members of the Group.⁷

Similar efforts on a more expansive and larger scale led to the formation of the *Cvijeta Zuzorić Society of Friends of Fine Arts* in Belgrade in 1922. Writer Branislav Nušić, who had recently assumed the new post of secretary of the Ministry of Education, offered his efficient support. The *Society* planned to build an exhibition hall on a prestigious location in Mali

⁴ Ibid. 172–173.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Milojković-Djurić, *Tradition and Avant-Garde*, 10–11.

⁷ Velimir Živojinović, "Akcija Grupe umetnika", *Misao* (December 1919), 317–318.

Kalemegdan Park. Most importantly, it aimed to sponsor exhibitions and concerts providing incentives and support to deserving young artists, composers and writers.⁸

The starting of the art magazine *Zenit* (Zenith) in Zagreb in February 1922 was yet another endeavour of congenial collaboration. The magazine was eventually moved to Belgrade in 1923. Its editors, Ljubomir Micić and Branko Ve Poljanski, managed to attract well-known writers and artists as regular contributors.⁹

Zenit published notable contributions discussing modern art by a plethora of art critics and writers including Ivo Andrić, Rastko Petrović, Miloš Crnjanski, Stanislav Vinaver, Avgust Černigoj, Marko Ristić, Sibe Miličić, Mihailo S. Petrov and Milan Dedinac. Moreover, it attracted the attention of foreign writers and artists including Anatolii Lunacharskii, Vladimir Mayakovski, Vasilii Kandinsky, Walter Gropius, Ivan and Claire Goll, Marcel Sauvage and Jean Epstein. Vignettes and drawings were supplied by M. S. Petrov, S. Miličić, J. Bijelić, F. Kralj, J. Havliček, L. Suss, K. Teige, A. Hofmeister, A. Wachsmann. Literary contributions were published in the original languages as submitted by various authors.

The founder and editor Ljubomir Micić together with Boško Tokin and Ivan Goll wrote the *Zenithism Manifesto* published in 1922 in the eleventh issue of the magazine. The *Manifesto* proudly stated that *Zenithism* was a new art form initiated in the Balkans, and at the same time a manifestation of the universal freedom of the human spirit. *Zenit* was the first Balkan art magazine in Europe and the first European art magazine in the Balkans. *Zenithists* intended to fight for the triumph of the *New Art* opposed to the “declining and decaying Europe”.

In their effort to gain recognition, the editors arranged an international art exhibition that was held in Belgrade in 1924. For this occasion more than one hundred art works from well-known artists were solicited, among others those of Archipenko, Delaunay, Moholy-Nagy, Zadkin, Kandinsky and Lisitskii were featured at the exhibit.¹⁰

The literary association *Albatros* managed to publish a series of books by young writers. Among them, three deserve special mention: *The Lightning-Rod of the Cosmos* by Stanislav Vinaver, *The Burlesque of Perun*, *God*

⁸ Cvijeta Zuzorić (1894–1968) was an educated woman and a famed poetess from Dubrovnik who actively supported writers and artists. The Pavilion that bears her name has been promoting public awareness of the fine arts ever since its foundation.

⁹ Irina Subotić, “Avant-Garde Tendencies in Yugoslavia”, *Art Journal* 49.1 (College Art Association NY, 1990), 21–27; Milojković-Djurić, *Tradition and Avant-Garde*, 27–29.

¹⁰ Ljubomir Micić, “V imja zenitizma”, *Catalogue of the First International Exhibition of Avant-garde Art* (Belgrade 1924), 3.

of *Thunder* by Rastko Petrović, and *The Diary about Čarnojević* by Miloš Crnjanski. Moreover, Crnjanski's collection of poems *Lirika Ithake* (The Lyrics of Ithaca), published in 1919, drew considerable attention of literary critics and public alike.

Crnjanski wrote some of his poems on the battlefields of Galicia fighting under the Austro-Hungarian banner or in hospitals while recuperating from wounds and illnesses. He recalled his own dire experience and that of his generation of young men questioning the devastating reality of war. A number of these poems were published in Zagreb in the journal *Savremenik* (The Contemporary) during the war, under his full name. Crnjanski openly sought to express his "patriotic, political and anarchist point of view".

Ultimately, he perceived these poems as commentaries referring to the epic poem *Odyssey* encapsulating the classical legacy of ancient Greece. Crnjanski found a measure of solace and self-confidence in recalling Odysseus' years of fighting during the Trojan war and his epic effort to return home to Ithaca. *Ithaca* poems pointed out Crnjanski's literary affinity with the classical tradition of ancient Greece perpetuated in Western thought.

The Trojan and Mycenaean allusions in these verses were intentional. The poet considered the *Odyssey* the greatest poem of mankind, and the return from war as the saddest experience of any man. Although his own poems lag behind these monumental creations, this consideration was their main content. During the war, given the limited number of readers assembled around this journal, these poems remained a literary episode. After the war, in Belgrade, these poems resonated like an explosion. They were enthusiastically received and accepted without any merit on the part of the poet. There lies their mysterious fate.¹¹

The *mysterious fate* of the lasting appeal of Crnjanski's verses was definitely the merit of the poet. The public recognized the lyrical eloquence of his verses, his keen ability to elucidate a wide range of social issues and his sincere concerns for the human lot.

Lyrics of Ithaca served well as a setting for his inspired poetic and lyric musings, and for the scrutiny of historical legacies of war and peace. Crnjanski decried the brutality of the war and pointed to the gallant resolve of legions of common soldiers to persist in their mission at any cost. These valiant and often overlooked fellow fighters bore the brunt of the war: celebrated victories were mostly the result of their selfless sacrifices and loyalty to their nation. Crnjanski suggested that various commemorations and the proposed *Vidovdan Memorial* should honor the people, the fighters, and not ladies and gentlemen.

¹¹ Miloš Crnjanski, *Itaka i komentari* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1959), 9–11.

“Spomen Principu” (In memory of Princip) was written in 1919.¹²

Let the clamor on Balša and Dušan the Mighty go silent.
Noblemen, Despots and Generals were a disgrace.
The outlaw’s blood should be acclaimed
To the murder set up the Vidovdan Memorial! ...
And the glorious past is a lie.

O Balši, i Dušanu Silnom da umukne krik.
Vlastela, Vojvode, Despoti, behu sram.
Hajdučkoj krvi nek’ se ori cik
Ubici diž’te vidovdanski hram! ...
A sjajna prošlost je laž.

In this poem Crnjanski referred to the plans for the *Vidovdans Memorial* supported by the *Council for Organization of Artistic Affair*. The Council was founded in 1913, prior to the outbreak of the Great War. Crown Prince Alexander sponsored the *Council* assisted by a plethora of its distinguished members including the member of the Royal Serbian Academy Bogdan Popović, the famed Slovenian architect Josif Plečnik and the Croatian sculptor Ivan Meštrović, among others. The painter Nadežda Petrović served in the capacity as the First Secretary of the Council.

Ivan Meštrović, who submitted a proposal for the *Vidovdan Memorial*, had previously completed the equestrian statues of *Kraljević Marko* and *Srdja Zlopogledja*. He had also created an equestrian statue of yet another epic hero, *Miloš Obilić*, cast in bronze. Meštrović, inspired by the Kosovo epic poems, created a number of remarkable sculptures comprising the *Kosovo Cycle*, completed during his residency in Paris, in 1910–1912. He planned to incorporate these sculptures into the proposed *Vidovdan Memorial*. Meštrović fully accepted Auguste Rodin’s objective that an art work should project an inner emotional context, *du dedans au dehors*, which would eliminate any verbal commentary. Shortly before the war, Meštrović emigrated to Britain, and eventually joined the Yugoslav Committee (*Jugoslovenski odbor*) in London. During the war, he organized several exhibitions of the *Kosovo Cycle* throughout Britain promoting the Yugoslav cause.¹³

¹² The poem was included in a collection by Vladimir Jovičić, *Srpsko rodoljubivo pesništvo* (Belgrade: Nolit, 1976), 472. (All translations of the poems cited in this article are mine.) The young student Princip was understood as the mentioned killer by Crnjanski in this poem. Princip fired the shot that killed Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. Crnjanski suggested that Princip should be honored for his bravery aiming to help the liberation of his people from foreign occupation.

¹³ Vladislav Kušan, “Moderna Skulptura u Hrvata”, *Forum* 1–2 (January 1980), 293–296.

After the end of the Great War, Meštrović was commissioned to construct the singular memorial to The Unknown Soldier (*Spomenik neznanom junaku*) on Mt Avala near Belgrade. King Alexander suggested that the monument should recognize the Yugoslav people while paying tribute to the heroic war effort and mourning its many victims. Therefore, Meštrović incorporated eight caryatides representing women in national costumes as a symbolic portrayal of the Yugoslav union.

In addition, Meštrović sculpted the powerful monument of *Gratitude to France* in recognition of the generous help of the French government and people during the Great War. His memorable statue, *The Victor*, dates from the same period. Both monuments are set up within the walls of the Belgrade Fortress dominating respective vistas.

However, the creation of Yugoslavia and the tenets of South Slavic unity were not readily appreciated by some young poets. Most notably, Miloš Crnjanski's poem *Jugoslaviji* (To Yugoslavia) expressed doubts and disturbing accusations as regards the creation of the new state. The terse, fleeting verses resembled an outburst, as if shouting in disagreement:

Nijedna čaša što se pije,	None of the toasts raised,
Nijedna trobojka što se vije	None of the tricolors unfurled
Naša nije. ...	Is ours. ...

The same poem was an oblique reply to the recently published poem *Prolog* (Prologue) by Aleksa Šantić, a fervent supporter of the Yugoslav idea. Šantić, a venerated poet of the preceding generation centered in Mostar, in Herzegovina, was a lifelong supporter of the liberation and unification of the South Slavs. Šantić's newly-published poem celebrated the fulfillment of cherished ideas expressed with great poise and sincerity. The poem, first published in 1918 in the journal *Književni jug* (Literary South) in Zagreb, became very popular and subsequently appeared in a number of publications.¹⁴

Very important in the ongoing lively literary debate was the role of journals and in particular of the prestigious *Srpski književni glasnik* (Serbian Literary Herald) founded in Belgrade in 1901. Newly established journals such as *Misao*, *Zenit* and *Putevi* promoted fresh literary voices.

Bogdan Popović, the distinguished editor of *Srpski književni glasnik*, also wanted to publish representatives of the *Moderns*, as the young writers were called at the time. Popović was aware that the new poetry was met with adverse criticism and underrated. He believed that poets rank higher

¹⁴ *Književni jug* 8 (1918). The poem was subsequently renamed *Novo pokolenje* (New Generation) in several other publications.

than critics, since poets are always in the vanguard, “even when they wander in the mist”.¹⁵

Popović invited Miloš Crnjanski to contribute a poem of his choice to the forthcoming issue of the journal. Crnjanski accepted the invitation and chose the poem *Sumatra*, accompanied by his commentary of the poem, at the request of the editor. “Objašnjenje Sumatre” (The Explanation of Sumatra) became a sort of a manifesto presenting Crnjanski’s views in a broader poetic and social context that permeated the current literary horizon.

Crnjanski acknowledged that the newly-written poetry was indeed often rejected and unjustly criticized. Some poems were singled out as expression of modernism, triviality and decadence. Crnjanski refuted such accusations by stating that the new poetry was not separated from the realities of life *like a sleeping beauty in an ivory tower*. The horrific experiences of the Great War were still painfully remembered:

There is a sense everywhere that thousands upon thousands passed past corpses, and ruins, and around the world, and returned home, searching for the thoughts, laws and life as they once were. For the old, customary literature, familiar and comfortable sensations, read-out thoughts. The lyrical poetry of eternal, banal metaphors, the likeable ease of verse, chrysanthemums that blossomed in our weekly literary supplements. But new thoughts have come, new raptures, new laws, new moralities!

Still, Crnjanski thought that the haunting sights of destruction and despair seemed to pale in any new literary work pertaining to the war. The battlefields of the Great War introduced a decisive divide questioning the trust in the humanitarian tradition of Europe and creating a veritable breaking point between the past and the present epochs.¹⁶

The world has not yet heard the terrible storm above our heads. While down there it has shaken, not the political relations, or literary dogmas, but life itself. These are the dead that are extending their hands! They must be paid! ... The newest art, especially the lyric poetry, prefers new sensibilities. Without crude quadruples and drummed up music of former metrics, we give the pure form of an ecstasy ... To use all the colors, wavering colors of our dreams and foreboding, the sound and whispering of things, until now despised and dead ... Once again we let our form be influenced by cosmic forms: clouds, flowers, rivers, brooks ... That is why our metrics are personal, spiritual, nebulous like a melody.¹⁷

¹⁵ Quoted after Mira Petrić-Petković, “Objašnjenje *Sumatre* na poziv Bogdana Popovića”, in *Zbornik radova nastavnika i studenata*, ed. D. Nedeljković (Belgrade: Filološki fakultet, 1975), 294.

¹⁶ Miloš Crnjanski, “Otkrovenje Rastka Petrovića”, *Srpski književni glasnik* VIII-5 (1923), 380.

¹⁷ Miloš Crnjanski, “Objašnjenje *Sumatre*”, *Srpski književni glasnik* I.4 (1920), 266–267.

Sumatra

Now that we are carefree, light and tender,	Sad smo bezbrižni, laki i nežni
It strikes us: how quiet and snowy	Pomislimo: kako su tihi i snežni
Are the peaks of the Urals. ...	Vrhovi Urala.

Crnjanski celebrated the healing presence of nature, real and imagined, that brought relief from the war memories and the debilitating fear of imminent death. He acknowledged the regained feeling of tranquility and awareness of being by recognizing Nietzsche's philosophical stance, *Bejahung des Dasein*. Everything was connected, distant and nearby places. As if in a dream, Crnjanski attained the vision of faraway landscapes, snowy peaks of the Urals, blue waters of the Indian Ocean and its enchanting island of Sumatra. The sights and beauty of nature expanded one's horizon beyond the familiar surroundings. The ideas centering around the vision of *Sumatra* aimed to promote appreciation and interaction with other cultures as well as appreciation of the other's points of view.¹⁸

In a conversation with the writer Branimir Ćosić, Crnjanski recalled his early poems and his first novel, *Diary about Čarnojević*, published in 1921:

I matured during the last year of the war and during the war. In prison and on the battlefield, as a simple Austrian soldier, I suffered, fell ill, ran away, and fought. I slept among the dead bodies. Thus, I cannot and do not want to forget the war. During those five years, I wrote *The Mask, A Diary about Čarnojević*, and my poems ... In the great chaos of the First World War, I became firm in my sorrows, pensiveness and gloomy feelings of solitude. Not even joyful events after the war could change me.¹⁹

Crnjanski's novel *A Diary about Čarnojević* was closely related to the poems collected in the *Lyrics of Ithaca* due to the shared temporal and thematic contexts. Crnjanski based the novel in part on his random notes written while fighting in Galicia. He chronicled his reassignments to several battlefields, transfers to hospitals, occasional reveling in nearby towns and villages, trying to desert and running away.

In his novel, Crnjanski recalled his recuperation in a hospital in Krakow. A nurse tending to his needs was taken aback by his emaciated body and feverish semiconscious state. She was placing bags of ice on his chest to stop the bleeding from his lungs caused by tuberculosis. She obviously took pity and confessed that she harbored wrong impressions about the Serbs. In

¹⁸ "Objašnjenje Sumatre" also reflected the idea of *Bildung* fostering understanding of distant cultures in time and space, as formulated by Novalis, Schelling, and shared by philosophers around the journal *Aetheneum*. The ultimate goal of *Bildung* was the expanding one's horizon by considering the point of view of others.

¹⁹ Ćosić, *Deset pisaca, deset razgovora*, 81. Crnjanski referred to his *Diary* as "kupasara", a sizable messy notebook that he carried with him at all times.

turn, care from people that Crnjanski did not know or trust in particular did result in his recovery from serious illnesses and wounds.

Gradually, Crnjanski attained a new understanding of life in all its manifestations of generosity amidst unexplainable cruelties, fleeting moments of friendship and kindness, as well as melancholy and loneliness. Crnjanski projected powerful images of the endless wandering of soldiers and populations not questioning the strategies or goals of the war theater. He summed up his impression of the war years in a short sentence as: *Life without meaning*.²⁰ Yet he managed to endure by observing and recording as a writer and mediator of his art.

Crnjanski's own perilous journey crossing the vastness of Pannonia plains and Galician woods, must have invoked a comparison of sorts with another historic chapter recorded in the collective consciousness of his nation: the Great Migration of Serbs under Patriarch Arsenije III Čarnojević [Crnojević] in 1690.

The migration of Serbs to Hungarian territory took place in the aftermath of a protracted Turkish-Austrian war. Kara Mustafa Pasha led the invasion of the Ottoman troops against the Habsburgs reaching as far as Vienna. The siege of the city in 1683 lasted two months and the Ottomans were finally defeated chiefly due to the gallant intervention of the Polish king Jan Sobieski. All along, the Austrian army was aided by the Serbian militia, *uskoks* from Dalmatia and Croatian fighters.

Ottoman forces continued with their warfare and in 1690 went into a strong offensive. Fleeing from Ottoman reprisals, Patriarch Arsenije III Čarnojević and a number of insurgents managed to safely reach Belgrade. At this point, the Austrian Emperor Leopold I asked the Serbs to resume the fight against the Turks. As the Ottoman pressure increased, the Patriarch dispatched his envoys to the Emperor explaining the gravity of the situation. Most importantly he also proposed the settlement of Serbian refugees on Hungarian territory while acknowledging Emperor Leopold I as the hereditary ruler. Upon the formal invitation by Leopold I with the official *Letter of Invitation*, Patriarch Arsenije III organized a national assembly in Belgrade (*Beogradski sabor*) on June 18, 1690 that endorsed the proposed plans for migration.

Based on the ongoing negotiation with the Patriarch, and in dire need of repopulating the designated regions of the Military Frontier and central Hungary Leopold issued his first *Chapter on Privileges*, on August 21, 1690 recognizing Serbs within the Habsburg Monarchy as a separate political entity (*corpus separatum*) under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Church.

²⁰ The novel *Dnevnik o Čarnojeviću* begins with the sentence: "Jesen, i život bez smisla" (Autumn, and a life without meaning).

After crossing the River Danube, around 30,000 Serbs led by the Patriarch arrived in Komarom and Szent Andre in October 1690. The Austrians sanctioned the Serbian migration counting most of all on the Serbian military help in the defense against the Turkish invasions as a powerful *ante murale*.²¹

While composing his novel, Crnjanski must have tried to reassess not only his immediate journey, but also the tradition of migrations of his nation that was repeated time and again. The recollection of the Serbian history provided a reassuring anchor in the midst of an unsettling time filled with violence and dark foreboding. Crnjanski came to realize that he was part of a shared tradition of his people that extended into his own time. These deliberations inspired as well his novel *Seobe* (Migrations), published in 1929.

In due course, it became apparent to this writer that Crnjanski's novel *A Diary about Čarnojević* included feasible references to the Serbian Migration under Patriarch Arsenije III Čarnojević (Church Slavonic version of Crnojević) not discussed or explored before. The very title of the novel contained a powerful rhetorical reference to an illustrious historic leader. Furthermore, the appearance of Egon Čarnojević in a dreamlike sequence in the novel attained a special connotation.

Egon Čarnojević was presented as a confounding personality, in all likelihood a former Russian naval officer. His fragmented recollections of his many journeys overseas provided another link to Patriarch Čarnojević and his descendants who resettled once again in Russia, more precisely in Ukraine.²²

It is recorded, that in addition to the previous settlements in the central regions of Hungary under Austrian jurisdiction, another migration took place in 1740 under Patriarch Arsenije IV Jovanović, and then in 1752, from the Military Frontier of the Habsburg Monarchy to the Russian Empire. The Serbs settled in the region *Novaia Serbia* in Ukraine bordered by the River Dnieper not far from the Black Sea. This region presently includes Novomyrhorod in Dniepetrovsk Oblast.²³

²¹ *History of Yugoslavia*, ed. Vladimir Dedijer et al. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1974), cf. chapter "The great Migration of Serbs to Hungary" by Milorad Ekmečić, 212–215.

²² Crnjanski's interest in the saga of the Čarnojević family prompted him to write about his visit to their family graveyard. A number of Patriarch Čarnojević descendants returned to the town of Kikinda in the Banat. His article, "Grobnica Čarnojevića" was published in the Belgrade daily *Politika* (n° 5623, Dec. 18, 1923). *Politika* published yet another article by Crnjanski, "Daća u Kikindi" (n° 5618, Dec. 13, 1923).

²³ Jelena Milojković-Djurić, *Srbi na putevima Balkana, Evrope i Sredozemlja* (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2011), 143–158. In the chapter "Poslednja seoba Vadima Černa – monaha Arsenija Crnojevića u Hilandaru", I discussed the emigration of a descendant of the Patriarch's, Aleksei Mihailovič Černusevič, born in 1889. I also wrote about his

Crnjanski continued to explore the historic resettlements and dispersions of the Serbian people. Prior to starting his novel *Seobe*, he studied folk songs and shorter epic poems recorded in the region dubbed *Vojna granica*, Military Frontier, and published in several collections.²⁴ After some thirty years, Crnjanski returned again to the topic of migrations in the second volume of *Seobe*, published in 1962. The topic of migration was also explored in his last novel, *Roman o Londonu* (Novel about London), published in 1971.

In the aftermath of the Great War, Ivo Andrić published a number of poems, essays and short stories, but did not start writing an extensive novel. In his poem *Iznad pobjeda* (Above victories), Andrić stated that the nature of any victory is ephemeral and non existing as opposed to the dire reality of death, loss of human dignity and debilitating suffering of mankind.²⁵

After long years of captivity during the Great War, Andrić became a disillusioned man. According to Radovan Samardžić, Andrić could not have summoned, at this point, the strength for an objective evaluation of the cataclysmic events of a world war and its consequences.²⁶ Moreover, Andrić was painfully aware of a growing ideological divide in Bosnia that resulted in an outburst of hatred and violence.

In his story “Jedno pismo iz 1920” (A Letter from 1920) published the same year, Andrić left a poignant assessment of the situation in Bosnia shortly after the end of the Great War.²⁷ He framed the story in the form of a letter from an old school friend, who decided to leave Bosnia shortly after the end of the Great War. Andrić mentioned that the letter resulted after an unexpected meeting of two friends at the railway station in Slavonski Brod after midnight. While waiting for a train that was running without a set schedule, they talked about their lives, since they had not been in touch for a long time. His friend became a physician in Sarajevo following in the footsteps of his father, a well-respected medical doctor himself. His father was of Jewish descent and his family was well established in Sarajevo. The

son Vadim, born in Sevastopol in 1912. The two of them emigrated from Russia after the 1917 Revolution. Prior to the October Revolution, Aleksei Černusevič served as Commander of the Russian Imperial Commercial Fleet stationed in the Crimea.

²⁴ Miodrag Maticki, “Graničarska epika u *Seobama* Miloša Crnjanskog”, in *Književno delo Miloša Crnjanskog*, ed. Lj. Jeremić and A. Petrov (Belgrade: Institut za književnost i umetnost & BIGZ, 1972), 209–234.

²⁵ Ivo Andrić, *Nemiri* (Belgrade 1919).

²⁶ Radovan Samardžić, “Andrić i istorija”, in *Delo Ive Andrića u kontekstu evropske književnosti i kulture* (Belgrade: Zadužbina Ive Andrića, 1981), 406.

²⁷ The story translated into English by Lenore Grenoble was published in the special issue of *Serbian Studies* (18.1) *An Anthology of Serbian Literature* edited by Vasa Mihailovich (Bloomington: Slavica Publishers, Indiana University, 2004), 184–194.

father had succumbed to typhoid fever during the war, and his mother had moved to Trieste to live with her relatives. After much thought, and with a heavy heart, his friend decided to sell the family home on the banks of the Miljacka, and all the books and possessions that the family once cherished. His friend confessed that he could not continue to live in a place where so much hate was all consuming.

The seemingly placid coexistence of Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim and Jewish communities, living side by side, had suddenly become a thing of the past. Andrić stated that after the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in June 1914, harsh persecution of the Serbian population had caused a precipitous change; almost in a single day the whole society had been transformed.

Many years later, during the Second World War, Andrić repeated his earlier deliberations about unforeseen hostilities and divisiveness occurring during unsettling times. He came to the conclusion that animosity in any society invariably occurs when an overwhelming enemy is nearby and great defeat certain. Under such circumstances, there appears violence and hatred followed by fratricide and mutual quarrels among all doomed peoples:

As has so often happened in the history of man, permission was tacitly granted for acts of violence and plunder, even for murder, if they are carried out in the name of higher interests, according to established rules and against a limited number of men of a particular type and belief . . . In a few minutes the business quarter, based on centuries of tradition, was wiped out.²⁸

Andrić repeated his understanding of the predicament of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian population on the crossroads between the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires in his novels *Travnička hronika* (Bosnian Chronicle) and in particular in his famed *Na Drini ćuprija* (The Bridge on the Drina).

Great writers, in crucial moments of social upheavals, have been able to safeguard the historic past, and the always present tradition, ever since the King of Ithaca set sail on the Mediterranean.

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Europe in the Balkan Mirror

Abstract: The article discusses the three dominant, Europe-wide, constructions of Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and claims that all three found their proponents in the Balkans in the same period, while no specifically Balkan construction of Europe can be identified. The discourses which constructed Europe were transnational, and every search for national discourses must recognize that they are always fractured and contradictory, composed of various elements originating in Europe-wide discourses on Europe. Throughout this period the dominant discourse of Europe was shaped by the discourse of modernity and modernization, not only in Europe but in other parts of the globe as well. Several commentators have already noted that the current challenge of the interwar construction of Europe – peace, prosperity, democracy and human rights – mirrors the crisis of Yugoslavia, and many examples point to the unsustainability of this construction at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Gadamer's hermeneutics offers a valuable lesson in humility and defines the oft-repeated phrase of "belonging together" as listening to the other in the belief that the other may be right, which should be taken as a starting point for any future construction of Europe.

Keywords: construction of Europe, modernity, modernization, anti-modernism, European Union, the Balkans, imperialism, post-democracy

What is "Europe's" mode of existence? As a geographical category, "Europe" is unstable: putting aside anecdotal but still indicative expressions – such as Napoleon's claim that Africa begins at the Pyrenees, or Metternich's that Asia begins in Vienna's *Landstrasse* – the borders of the continent have always been contested: to the east, the continent cannot be limited by any clear demarcation line, and looks more like a Eurasian peninsula than as a self-contained geographical entity; to the west, it may or may not include the British Isles. As a historical category, "Europe" is even more undetermined, and has always been defined relationally: in early modern times, it defined itself as Christendom, as opposed to the Islamic Ottoman threat; in the wake of the waning of Ottoman power, and coinciding with the progressive secularization of European societies and with their grabbing of other parts of the globe – which would reach 84 percent of the world at the peak of the colonial period – "Europe" self-styled itself as "civilization" opposed to barbarism and savagery, thus legitimizing its conquests; simultaneously, it became the "West", as opposed to the colonized Asian "East"; the

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catastrophe of the First World War briefly put “Europe” back on the agenda, but the ideological, political and military circumstances after the Second World War strengthened the West/East division, the “East” referring this time not to Asia, but to the eastern half of the continent. As a “spiritual essence”, as a number of interwar enthusiasts called the elusive something which allegedly defined Europeanness, or as a set of “European values”, as their contemporary counterparts prefer to call it, “Europe” is anything but unambiguous: it invented both human rights and Auschwitz; it promoted tolerance as well as racism and anti-Semitism; it patented democracy and absolutism, Fascism and other forms of totalitarianism; it simultaneously championed liberty and the slave trade; its thought was rationalist as well as irrationalist, religious and mystical. “Europe” exists only as a discursive construction; not as a fact, but as an interpretation.¹ And as such, it is not one but many – everywhere and at all times. All these various forms of “Europe” shape political, economic and social programmes, or what we grow accustomed to calling identities: who we think we are, what a life worth living is, and where we think we are going.

It becomes even more difficult to reduce these multiple forms of Europe to a single one when we remember that all European nations considered, and continue to consider themselves as part of Europe, and at the same time as something separate, different, capable of defining a relation to it.² The only two exceptions seem to be France, which inherited the early nineteenth-century tradition of equating the outcome of the French revolution with Europe, and for a brief period also Austria, which at that same time represented the opposite of French Europe, namely the Catholic, conservative Europe of the throne and the altar.³ For all other European nations, Europe has meant “all continental nations minus us”. We recognize ourselves as slightly different from the picture we constructed as Europe – which is only natural, as this construction is always an ideal, never something to be empirically confirmed – and this difference is experienced as a wound which hurts. At the same time, this wound we recognize as our own

¹ Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe. Idea, Identity, Reality* (London: Palgrave, 1995), 3; Bo Stråth, “Europe as a discourse”, in Bo Stråth, ed., *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2000), 13–44.

² Luise Passerini, “From the ironies of identity to the identities of irony”, in Anthony Pagden, ed., *The Idea of Europe from Antiquity to European Union* (Cambridge Mass.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Cambridge University Press, 2002), 205.

³ Gilbert Weiss, “A.E.I.O.U. – Austria Europeae Imago, Onus, Unio?” and Robert Frank, “The Meaning of Europe in French national discourse”, in Mikael af Malmberg and Bo Stråth, eds., *The Meaning of Europe. Variety and Contention within and among Nations* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2002), 263–283 and 311–326.

identity; we are, both individually and collectively, the map of our scars and wounds. Every psychotherapist can tell about the fear each patient has to overcome at the beginning of therapy: they know that something in them needs to change, but at the same time they fear change because they fear not being themselves any longer afterwards; they want to change and to remain who they are. Hence, therapists must convince them that they are going to change, and feel and live better, but that they are also going to remain the same. It is, of course, a paradox: one wants to preserve what one also wants to change. Nations do not seem to be much different: they also want to change, to partake in this idealization they have constructed and called Europe, but they also want to stay who they are. This is the meaning of the claim, often repeated in all national debates on Europe, that “we don’t want to be drawn into Europe, because we will cease to exist when we become like everybody else”. There is something touching, both amusing and sad, in this belief that one can ever become like “everybody else”, as if there were only one type of being outside us, as if all European societies and cultures were happily homogeneous, and only we were uncomfortably but proudly different. Hence the “bridge” metaphor, easily spotted in all national discourses of Europe: there are very few European nations which do not imagine themselves as a bridge between East and West, Europe and Asia, Europe and Africa, or Europe and America.⁴ As they are all the same – the Swedes and the Portuguese, the Irish and the Romanians, the Greeks and the Germans – and only we are different and insufficiently like “them”, we can put our insufficiently European part to good use by connecting Europe with something else. The bridge metaphor means: we will change, and we will remain who we are. Our being insufficiently like the rest of them will be only a consequence of our mission: our impurity, our difference from this idealized model, which is at the same time our deepest identity, can be preserved, because as a bridge we are allowed to stand on two different shores at the same time. The only European nation which never thought of itself

⁴ For individual European nations’ appropriation of the “bridge” metaphor see chapters by Törnquist-Plewa, Hroch, Jáuregui, Spohn, and Ludlow in Malmberg and Stråth, eds., *The Meaning of Europe*; Christopher Browning and Marko Lehti, “Beyond East-West: marginality and national dignity in Finnish Identity construction”, *Nationalities Papers* 35/4 (2007), 691–716; Tamás Hofer, “East and West in self-image of Hungarians”, in Teppo Korhonen, ed., *Encountering Ethnicities. Ethnological Aspects of Ethnicity, Identity and Migration* (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 1995), 215–238; Roumen Daskalov, *Images of Europe: A Glance from the Periphery* (Florence: European University Institute, Working Papers SPS No. 94/8, 1994); Antonis Liakos, “The canon of European identity: transmission and decomposition”, in Luisa Passerini, ed., *The Question of European Identity: A Cultural Historical Approach* (Florence: European University Institute, Working Papers HEC No. 98/1, 1998), 53–59.

as a bridge is – again – France, convinced as it is, that, as Stanislav Vinaver once said, everything of any value in this world can be traced back to some distant French origin.⁵

Nations construct “Europe” in different ways at different times, and these constructions are never smooth, coherent and consistent. On the contrary, each national construction of Europe resembles a battlefield, a stormy dialogue, a song sung by a choir which has not had enough time to practise: it is always a field in which ideas are put forward and fought over. Small wonder, if we keep in mind that the national debates about Europe most often have as their aim defining or constructing the national identity of the nation in question, its future direction as well as the version of its past which the nation cares to remember.⁶ These constructions resemble depositories of images, concepts and ideas, in which images able to arouse emotions predominate over clearly defined concepts and coherent ideas. Those who have constructed “Europe”, intentionally or unintentionally, have operated according to the model exploited by advertising agencies: connect images with emotional content, and only then engage rationality. The economic history of the continent, for this very reason, never arouses much passion; but histories which promote connections with emotionally charged images always do. Popular political discourses, as opposed to academic ones, operate in the same manner: it is a pity that those whose jobs involve defining measurements of time have not yet come upon the idea that a second can be defined as the period of time between the moment in which a crisis appear anywhere in the world and the moment someone cries “he is a new Hitler”. The politician in question, singled out for regime change, is thus associated with an emotionally charged image, and then the usual mechanism of regime change starts to roll. Rational assessment follows only twenty years later, when this crisis becomes an academic question. But it always follows, if this is any consolation.

There is always more than one “Europe” in any given national discourse, which are often incompatible and on a collision course. Thus, there are several Romanian “Europes”, sometimes so different that they have nothing in common; but all of these have much in common with various Polish or Spanish “Europes”. If we take a step back from national constructions of “Europe”, we see several larger discourses which operate across the continent, and find their proponents in every continental society. There is the Europe of antimodernists: a Europe of science and technology, the French revolution and secularism, and it allegedly destroys the soul of the

⁵ Stanislav Vinaver, *Evropa u vrenju. Putopisi i memoarski spisi* (Novi Sad: Dnevnik, 1991), 214.

⁶ Frank, “The Meaning of Europe”, 311.

nation, or soul as such, and the balance between nature and humans, or the God-given balance between classes, churches and states. There is a discourse of Europe of progress, education, civil liberties and democracy, rooted in the Enlightenment and its offspring, modern science; there is also a Fascist Europe, an integral part of Fascist ideology, which combines elements of the former two. Comparatively new and much less influential is the discourse of Europe of social rights, which still needs to find more vocal proponents. Each of them constructs an allegedly authentic European past and claims that it only furthers what Europe has always been about, and this is the reason why we have never agreed, and never will, which cultural traditions we want to include in our heritage, and which particular one defines Europe.

All these discourses have circulated in the Balkans since the late eighteenth century: Europe, with its avatars such as the “West” and “civilization”, was primarily constructed as progress, development, education, efficient administration, science, rationalism, and secularism. This list is evidence that Europe was a signifier for what in the twentieth century is known as modernity. This discourse was in the Balkans emotionally charged with mourning, shame and regret: the Balkan societies of the nineteenth century clearly perceived their belated entry into modernity, and complaints about being late are the most prominent element of this version of a broader continental discourse on Europe. In this respect, the Balkans is no exception: the same emotional tone, expressed in exactly the same words, can be found in Spanish, Italian and Polish constructions of Europe.⁷ It defined Europe in opposition to the East, Asia and Africa, and Asian societies readily adopted it as their own. In the Ottoman Empire, Japan and India it had the same effects as in the Balkans. It was created as a result of the interaction between the colonizing societies from the north-western part of the continent, with pretty much all other parts of the globe save North America, and disseminated not only by Western travellers, diplomats, journalists and scholars, but by their counterparts in other parts of the globe as well. When it began to dominate – and it was the original and still is the most influential discourse on Europe – and the Balkan elites started to enquire about the reasons for their belatedness, they came up with two sets of answers. They blamed their own mentality – in exactly the same manner as Spaniards, Italians and Poles – and their geographical position, which enabled contamination with what was non-European. Thus Spain and Italy were too “African” and had to “de-Africanize” themselves; Poland looked into the abyss of economic backwardness and stagnation, poverty, disorder and lawlessness, which for Poles was Russia; and the Balkan societies never tired of blaming the Ot-

⁷ See chapters by Törnquist-Plewa, Jáuregui, and af Malmberg in Malmberg and Stråth, eds., *The Meaning of Europe*.

toman Empire, their own East, for historical belatedness. In all these cases, one feature is strikingly similar: in all these societies the nation state was rightly perceived as the agent of modernization or Europeanization – and it was missing everywhere but in Spain, though throughout the nineteenth century it experienced such catastrophic erosion and decay that it could no longer be existent. Paradoxically, when in the early twentieth century Ottoman intellectuals opened the same debate, they too blamed the Ottoman Empire for the non-Europeaness of the Turks, and demanded a Turkish nation state.

What Italy, Poland and the Balkan societies had in common, was that these nations had no empires, and Spain and Turkey joined this club of the likeminded only when their own empires came to an end. This is what the largest European zone – Central Europe – has in common with the European peninsulas and Poland. The absence of the German nation state in the first half of the nineteenth century, the absence of an overseas empire and a comparatively late start in industrial revolution, all coalesced into a perfect background on which to develop a lack of confidence – in sharp contrast with the overconfident industrializing and imperialistic north-west – and contributed to the presence of this same discourse of the “West”, which was in Germany the preferred name for what in the Balkans was called “Europe”. This is why Germany and Austria were, during the Romantic period, the cradle of the second most important discourse of Europe: the Europe of Christianity, of the “soul”, especially the soul of the nation, of deep *Kultur* opposed to superficial and materialistic *civilisation*. There is nothing exclusively German about it: it is a Europe-wide discourse, and opposed to the Europe of progress and science, as anti-modernism is opposed to modernism. By way of illustration, if for Germans in the early nineteenth century France had stood for soulless *civilisation*, dehumanization, materialism and science, a century later the tables had turned: for Henry Bergson in 1915 anti-European Germany stood for mechanization, science and technology, and European France for culture, spirit and nature.⁸ In 1915, of course, France had good reason to feel less confident, and Bergson only repeated what German Romantics had discovered a hundred years earlier: that culture, spirit and nature can be claimed, as a sort of moral victory, by those who are plagued by feelings of insecurity and inferiority.

The equal weight and influence of these two master discourses can be seen even today in the absence of any mention of the dominant, foundational European cultural tradition in the draft of European constitution. Its authors long argued over which intellectual tradition is more central to

⁸ Henri Bergson, *The Meaning of the War. Life & Matter in Conflict* (London: T.F. Unwin, 1915).

Europe, the Enlightenment or Christianity, and since they could not reach an agreement, they eventually dropped the issue altogether.⁹

However, these two discourses could be claimed by very different speakers, who tried to isolate their elements – various representations and images – and combine them into new ones. And they need not be only Europeans: the discourse of Europe is as much an Asian as a European construction.¹⁰ Rabindranath Tagore in his book *Nationalism* (1917) eloquently praised Asian spirituality and preservation of the idea of fully human life, as opposed to the materialism, mechanical organization and greed characteristic of Europe, which brought him enormous reputation as an Eastern sage, as it neatly dovetailed with anti-rationalistic currents which dominated our supposedly hyper-rational continent at the beginning of the twentieth century.¹¹ It seems at first sight that Tagore was yet another Asian anti-modernist, who took at face value the flattering construction of India – put forward by similar European anti-modernists – as the cradle of all religions and spirituality.¹² But Tagore at the same time praised modernization as well, claiming that it was necessary and beneficial. It is very significant that Tagore did so in an address to a Japanese audience, in a country which was modernizing itself at great speed, but without becoming a European outpost in the Pacific. What seems obvious to us today – to be more precise, what is obvious to academics, but what has yet to become obvious in popular and political discourses of Europe – namely, that modernity is not one but multiple, that there are alternative paths to modernity, and that its origin in Europe need not be taken to mean that Europeans have a monopoly on it, Tagore diagnosed by uncoupling Europe and modernity.¹³

⁹ Tomas Majer, *Identitet Evrope. Jedinstvena duša Evropske Unije?* (Belgrade: Albatros Plus and Službeni glasnik, 2009), 16–17.

¹⁰ Bonnet even claims that the “West” has been entirely the invention of those who considered themselves “non-West”. See Alastair Bonnett, *The Idea of the West. Culture, Politics and History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 64.

¹¹ Rabindranath Tagore, *Nationalism* (London: Papermac, 1991).

¹² Throughout the nineteenth century, this image of India was gradually constructed by various European scholars, editors and translators of the Sanskrit canon. It reached its peak in Friedrich Max Müller’s “science of religion”, but its main popularisers and disseminators in the West were Indian scholars, such as Vivekananda. The idea of the “East” may have been invented by those who were “non-East”, but it eventually proved to be a joint enterprise, just like the idea of the “West”.

¹³ European and American social science accepted the idea of multiple or alternative modernities only quite recently. On alternative and multiple modernities see, for example, Dili Parameshwar Gaonkar, ed., *Alternative Modernities* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2001); S. N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities”, *Daedalus* 129/1 (2000), 1–29; Peter Van Der Veer, “The Global History of ‘Modernity’”, *Journal of the*

Modernization and Europeanization was not one and the same thing for him, and his Japanese audience certainly had good reasons to agree. And he was not the only one to put it into words in such an explicit manner: at about the same time, the Turkish writer and sociologist Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) made the same point in his programmatic article “Towards Western Civilization”. He accurately diagnosed the historical reasons for Turkish “backwardness”, blaming it on the rule of the Ottoman Empire over Turks, and claimed: “There is only one road to salvation: to advance in order to reach [...] Europeans in the science and industry as well as in military and judicial institutions. And there is only one means to achieve this: to adapt ourselves to Western civilization completely”.¹⁴ But Ziya Gökalp also pondered: “How can the Islamic world ultimately survive under such conditions? How can we maintain our religious and national independence?”¹⁵ In other words, how can the Turks modernize and remain “of the Turkish nation and Islamic religion”? It is not the point here to conclude that Gökalp worried needlessly, as we can see today that Turks can modernize and become even more Islamic in the process, but it is worth recalling that Europe, even if constructed only as modernization, always and everywhere prompts its adherents as well as its opponents to point out that they themselves happen to be something separate and different, that they are not “like everybody else”. At exactly the same time, Jovan Skerlić (1877–1914), a Serbian politician and literary historian, wrote: “For new nations there are but two roads – either to accept Western culture and live, as the Japanese have done, or to oppose it and be overrun, as has happened to the American Indians and Australian Aborigines.”¹⁶ Skerlić was the most fanatical European in the Balkans of his time – the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when there was no shortage of fanatical Europeans in the Balkans – whose whole work can be summed up in the sentence “either the West or death”. But he also wrote that Europe was a “cluster of mutually envious, predatory and soulless bullies”, imperialist, selfish and hypocritical in its policy, and unable or unwilling to uphold its own values.¹⁷ Yet, “one should be a good European,” Skerlić kept repeating. Tagore, Gökalp and Skerlić reveal what the message Europe sent to them was: faced with the threat of being crushed and annihilated by more powerful and already modernized

Economic and Social History of the Orient 41/3 (1998), 285–294; Timothy Mitchell, ed., *Questions of Modernity* (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

¹⁴ Ziya Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1957), 276.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Jovan Skerlić, *Feljtomi, skice i govori* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1964), 95.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 285.

societies, crush and annihilate yourself in order to survive, reinvent yourself in their image in order to be preserved, disappear such as you are in order to live. Skerlić was willing to sacrifice in the process whatever particularities his nation may have had; Gökalp worried about preserving his Turkishness and Islam; but Tagore – and these different scales of acceptance, worry and rejection most probably resulted from the different global standing, richness of tradition and confidence of their respective societies – rejected Europe as an imperialistic menace, from which other societies could be protected only if they managed, like the Japanese, to modernize while simultaneously preserving their cultural difference. Indeed, his book *Nationalism* should have been more accurately entitled *Imperialism*, as this is what he wrote about, which brings us to the third important discourse of Europe: the mighty continent which rules the world. While the previous two discourses are still very much with us, this one is quickly becoming historically redundant. Europe as the world empire – this was the third construction of Europe, which circulated at its fringes and in the rest of the world, but in the metropolitan areas of Europe as well. Pretty much as the former two discourses, this one could also have been accepted with pride or rejected in disgust and fear.

All these European constructions of Europe were also the Balkan constructions of Europe. There is not a single construction of Europe which can be said to be a specifically “Balkan” one. From the early nineteenth century, all Balkan societies were busy modernizing themselves by importing Western models, this importation being driven by the discourse of Europe as modernity. At the same time, there were voices of opposition to this process, but this opposition relied on the European construction of the Europe of Christianity, of the “soul”, especially the soul of the nation, of deep *Kultur* opposed to superficial and materialistic *civilisation*. “The opposition to the ‘import of Western models’ was itself essentially an adaptation of a Western import: the advocates of ‘organic’ development were as much a mouthpiece of European culture as were those who championed unconditional Europeanization,” claim Mishkova and Daskalov.¹⁸ Balkan scholars were always well aware of this: what today to an outside observer may come across as Romanian national traditionalism – Junimism – was in fact just a replica of German and English evolutionism, maintained Eugen Lovinescu, the leading theoretician of Romanian liberalism.¹⁹ Slobodan Jovanović, a Serbian liberal and a historian, also noted this in the 1920s: the enemies

¹⁸ Diana Miskova and Roumen Daskalov, “Forms without substance’: debates on the transfer of Western models to the Balkans”, in Roumen Daskalov and Diana Miskova, eds., *Entangled Histories of the Balkans*. Volume 2: *Transfer of Political Ideologies and Institutions* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 37.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* 37–38.

of liberalism in Serbia advocated a concept of strong government and monarchical authority, but this too was a foreign, Western political pattern.²⁰ The Balkan voices which are sometimes classified as anti-European were particularly loud between the two world wars: this is when, for example, a “third way”, neither European nor Asian, was contemplated in Bulgaria and Romania, or a “Slavic civilization” dreamed about in Serbia and Bulgaria. However, the interwar period was everywhere a break, a caesura in the development of discourses on Europe. Gerard Delanty claims that this was a period when historians, philosophers and writers – but not politicians – conceived modern European identity out of the sense of crisis which set in across the continent in the aftermath of the Great War.²¹ It was not only the unprecedented scale of destruction brought about by a war that demanded a new beginning; the crisis diagnosed by all who took part in the debate about “Europe” was, in fact, the realization that none of the former ways of constructing Europe could be sustained any longer. Their disappearance had left a void which was experienced as crisis. If “Europe” was to exist, it had to be constructed on ground firmer than Christianity, eroded by progressive secularization and the disappearance of religion from public life, or “civilization”, unsustainable after a war in which those who ruled the world fought each other with previously unseen ferocity, and after the realization that one of its components – which in the interwar years was to be theorized as modernity or modernization – also had many negative aspects to it. On what exactly it could be built was not quite clear. The title of Oswald Spengler’s book *The Decline of the West* accurately sums up the mood in the interwar years, and it was read carefully in the Balkans as much as elsewhere, fuelling the proliferation of negative constructions of Europe. But they proliferated as parts of this larger European discourse of the fall of Europe, not as some putative Balkan specificity.

The cold war froze the debate on Europe in the Balkans, with the sole exception of Greece, and Europe was off the agenda until the late 1980s – when it made a spectacular re-entry. But when it did, it was in the shape of the European Union, which now claimed everything European for itself. The initial reaction to this in all post-communist Balkan societies was confused: instead of insisting on the difference between the two, Balkan intellectuals and politicians wasted enormous energy on trying to prove the obvious – namely, that their societies, even though they are not in the EU, are just as European – and on elbowing for the position of sole representative of Europeanness in the Balkans. This latter phenomenon became known in scholarship as “nesting orientalisms”: trying to prove that one has always

²⁰ Slobodan Jovanović, *Kulturni obrazac* (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 2005).

²¹ Delanty, *Inventing Europe*, 110–111.

been the only guardian of European values and traditions, and that everybody else is a despicable Oriental, Byzantine and Asian.²² There was neither enough confidence nor wisdom to insist quietly on the position which Roberto M. Dainotto discovered in Michele Amari's work, who demanded that his Sicily be recognized as a part of Europe and universal history "not because it adhered to some putative European standards, but because of its unique history and difference": Sicily was for him a part of Europe not because it was reconquered by it, but, simply, because it was.²³ This aside, the direction was the same in all Balkan societies: towards the European Union.

Today, European integration is almost complete: there are very few areas of the continent which are not included in the Union, and these will no doubt sooner or later become full members. Yet it seems that, paradoxically, at the moment which its founders must have envisaged as the triumph of the idea of European unity, many feel that the heroic time of the European idea is behind us. This is painfully obvious from the Balkan perspective as much as from any other. For the sake of illustration, let us take a brisk walk through the landscape created by quite disparate examples, things that first come to mind; the examples will not be systematic, but only indicative of what a person surveyed by *Eurobarometer* could have in mind when replying to the usual types of questions put forward, and in this sense more important than they seem to be at first sight.

The discourse the EU has created about itself, or, to put it differently, the original aims of European integration and the chief sources of its attraction, were peace and prosperity in a continent exhausted by two wars, to which since the late 1980s were added – for the benefit of the former communist countries – democracy and the rule of law. Hardly anyone would be able today to assign these four values to Europe and keep a straight face. As for prosperity, Europe does not look like a model to be emulated any longer, something that Greeks and Bulgarians, regardless of the length of their membership in the Union, but also many other Europeans, would be able to go into in great detail.

Peace we do have, but only because European countries are powerful enough to fight their wars elsewhere. It cannot be denied that some European states have been in a permanent or intermittent state of war for many years now, though the streets of their cities are quiet. It is quite distressing that the European political elite remembered international law and the principle of sovereignty only in connection with the crisis in Ukraine, but

²² Milica Bakić-Hayden, "Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia", *Slavic Review* 54/4 (1995), 917–931.

²³ Roberto M. Dainotto, *Europe (in Theory)* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2007), 210.

not on any previous occasion in the last twenty years when European states found themselves in breach of both: Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and very nearly Syria, had it not been for the strong opposition from Russia and Europe's own public opinion. Europe, or at least its most powerful part, is not a force for peace. What Anthony Giddens termed "Euro-hypocrisy, uncomfortably widespread", of which European violations of international law and the principle of state sovereignty are just the most obvious examples, can be easily recognized everywhere.²⁴ If one compared readers' comments in the digital editions of major European newspapers, when with regard to Ukraine EU politicians brushed the thick layer of dust off their international law manuals, one could have noticed that the general public, although informed about the crisis from Europe's appalling mainstream media in which comment is sacred but facts are free, can easily see through smoke and mirrors, and achieve a remarkable level of unanimity. The intellectual capacity of the "European street", to modify the condescending expression regularly used to denote public opinion in Arab countries, is largely underestimated by the European political elite. And as for upholding international law and the principle of state sovereignty, it is not quite clear if those who have been undermining them for quite a while can be those who can uphold it. The farce with President Morales's airplane held and searched in Vienna – which was also a violation of international law, although on a much smaller scale – was an embarrassing reminder of how quickly Europe can forget the rule of law. The following example is even more telling: on 20 December 2013 *The Guardian* reported that a high court judge dismissed the case of Abdel Hakim Belhaj, who was in 2004 unlawfully abducted in a joint MI6-CIA operation, together with his pregnant wife; he was then rendered to Tripoli and tortured. Belhaj wanted a British court to declare this operation unlawful, a request certainly well-founded, but the judge concluded that to pursue the case might harm Britain's relations with the US and ruled against him. It seems that the rule of law in Europe has its limits there where the national interests of the U.S. begin.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century European democracy has become post-democracy, a historically new phenomenon which fuses together elements from the recent democratic and more distant pre-democratic past. Colin Crouch describes post-democracy in the following manner: "Under this model, while elections exist and can change governments, public electoral debate is a tightly controlled spectacle, managed by rival teams of professional experts in the techniques of persuasion, and considering a small range of issues selected by those teams. The mass of citizens plays a passive, quiescent, even apathetic part, responding only to the signals

²⁴ Anthony Giddens, *Europe in the Global Age* (London: Polity, 2007), 228.

given to them. Behind this spectacle of the electoral game, politics is really shaped in private by interaction between elected governments and elites that overwhelmingly represent business interests.”²⁵ It is small wonder that under these conditions European electorates in recent years have begun to give credence to political extremists, to antidemocratic political options, or that elected governments of Italy and Greece could have been replaced by technocratic cabinets under diktat from Brussels. It is, however, more puzzling that the highest elected body of the continent, the European Parliament, decided to discuss a resolution which would have barred former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder from publicly voicing his opinion about the crisis in Ukraine.²⁶ Although this motion failed, that such a resolution could have been discussed in a global bastion of democracy and, even worse, that 44.5 per cent of those present supported it, is an alarming reflection of the European Parliament’s understanding of freedom of speech and public discussion.

Yet, in spite of all this, what can be heard from the political and media elite is only a reiteration of the message of Europe as a paragon of social and political development to humanity at large – a clear sign of either an extreme lack of information, narcissism, or even disinformation. As Perry Anderson recently summed it up in his response to criticism of his book *The Old New World*: “That the treaty of Lisbon speaks not of the peoples but of the states of Europe; that it was rammed through to circumvent popular will, expressed in three referenda; that the structure it enshrines is widely distrusted by those subject to it; and that far from being a sanctuary of human rights, the Union it codified has colluded with torture and occupation, without a murmur form its ornaments – all of this vanishes in a stupor of self-admiration”.²⁷

When we add to this the unmistakable rise in national and ethnic sensibilities all over the continent, it is small wonder that some of those who witnessed first-hand the dissolution of Yugoslavia compare the present state of the Union with the initial stages of the former’s downfall. If Yugoslavia’s end-date was 1991, Joze Mencinger, a Slovene economist, recently claimed that Europe is living through its 1983: eight years to dissolution.²⁸ Mencinger offered this comparison in 2011; since then one EU state has already announced a referendum on continuing EU membership. Many elements are already there for all to see: for example, the economic crisis, in

²⁵ Colin Crouch, *Post-Democracy* (London: Polity, 2012), 4.

²⁶ <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/european-parliament-wants-to-muzzle-ukraine-comments-from-schroeder-a-958497.html#ref=rss> [accessed 15 March 2014].

²⁷ Perry Anderson, “After the Event”, *New Left Review* 73 (2012), 51.

²⁸ “Evropa kao bivša Jugoslavija”, *Vreme* no. 1088, 10 November 2011.

which those better off complain of having to subsidize those worst off, while the latter complain that they are being exploited by the former. Robert M. Hayden extended the list of similarities: each Yugoslav republican leadership worked only for the benefit of its own constituency; a high level of sovereign debt; a single currency which left the republics very limited scope for manoeuvre and set them on mutually antagonistic political courses, and since decisions could only be taken by consensus, as every republic had a veto power, with deadlock as a result; a group presidency with a rotating chairperson, operating in the same manner as the Council of the EU, which only formally led the country, while real power lay in the republics; the Yugoslav federal government, pretty much as the European Commission, was not accountable to voters, but to republican governments; as in Yugoslavia, in the EU neither the Council nor the Commission are accountable to the entire population, but only to one of the state members.²⁹ Neither Mencinger nor Hayden suggest that the EU will be dissolved in a war, and it does not have to; but Hayden reminds the reader that in Yugoslavia too no one believed in the possibility of war, even when it became known that several EU states, in addition to the Soviet Union, were secretly supplying arms and ammunition to the constituent republics. In Yugoslavia and its dissolution the Balkans offers Europe a mirror: it may choose to ignore it, but it would be wise to take a good look at it.

As between the world wars, “Europe” once again experiences a crisis: the cornerstones of the construction of “Europe” in the guise of the European Union – peace, prosperity, democracy, and the rule of law – do not have the power to convince any longer. This discourse has left a void in its wake, which is experienced everywhere as a crisis, and which political scientists describe as a mere “waning of enthusiasm” soon to be overcome.³⁰ Europe has already shown a remarkable capacity for re-invention. It re-invented itself after the Second World War, and the EU experienced several brief periods of slowing down; it may – hopefully without a new war – construct a new discourse about itself again. Whoever is about to embark on this project would be well advised to listen to the counsel of an eminent European, the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer: he did not have much to say about the pragmatic aspects of the EU integration, nor was he much interested in it, but he had something important to say about the conditions under which this integration can be carried out.

²⁹ Robert M. Hayden, *From Yugoslavia to the Western Balkans. Studies of a European Disunion 1991–2011* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 377–387.

³⁰ Paul Taylor, *The End of European Integration. Anti-Europeanism Examined* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008).

Almost at the end of his long life, Gadamer, who had rarely voiced his political opinions, published a brief book *Das Erbe Europas* (1989), or *The Heritage of Europe*. It seemed at first sight that Gadamer simply paid tribute to the then fashionable search for European identity, but he actually posed an important, perhaps the most important question: what does “belonging together” actually mean? European nations belong together, we hear all the time; they are in the same boat. And sitting in the same boat, how can they truly be together? Gadamer offered Europeans what he thought was missing the most, and it was *a lesson in humility*. Humility as a way of relating to others is indispensable in hermeneutics, Gadamer’s own philosophical discipline, it is the “soul of hermeneutics”, in the sense that by hermeneutics Gadamer understood “the ability to listen to the other in the belief that the other could be right”.³¹ We Europeans “must learn that we could be wrong”,³² wrote Gadamer. This cryptic half-sentence echoes Gadamer’s most important book *Truth and Method*, where he elaborated the same idea in the following manner: “Belonging together always also means being able to listen to one another. When two people understand each other, this does not mean that one person ‘understands’ the other. Similarly, ‘to hear and obey someone’ does not mean simply that we do blindly what the other desires. We call such a person slavish. Openness to the other, then, involves recognizing that I myself must accept some things that are against me, even though no one else forces me to do so.”³³ Understanding is not a one-way street, in which only I understand you, in the sense of having knowledge about you, which then I offer to you – better still, demand that you accept it – as your own self-knowledge. And the other way around: understanding does not occur when you listen to me and obey, either because you believe that I know better or that I have the means to force you into submission. In both these situations, no one understands anything, neither I, with my supposedly superior knowledge and power to impose it, nor you, with your admiration and slavishness. True understanding, openness to the other, without which there is no belonging together, requires that I also allow that my understanding reveals things which are against me, even if there is no one there to voice them, and that I accept them as such not only for the sake of being together, but for my own sake as well. If we were to follow Gadamer’s

³¹ Gadamer quoted in Jean Grondin, *Hans-Georg Gadamer. A Biography* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003), 250.

³² Hans-Georg Gadamer, “The diversity of Europe: inheritance and future”, in *Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry and History. Applied Hermeneutics*, eds. Dieter Misgeld and Graeme Nicholson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 233.

³³ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), 355.

advice, we would be immediately relieved from vanity and narcissism, the “stupor of self-admiration” and the stifling ideological atmosphere which emanates from much of what we hear about Europe these days.

But what does this “belonging together” mean when applied to Europe? How can peoples and states “belong together”? The feeling of belonging together is certainly one aspect of what in other contexts has been called European identity. It has been noted many times that European political identity can be built only if Europeans are allowed to debate freely and reach common decisions about their political future, binding for all, in a single public space – something that does not seem likely to happen any time soon. Quite naturally, the level of identification with the EU is only modest: according to the *Eurobarometer*, since 2010 the percentage of those feeling fully like EU citizens actually fell by one per cent, from 21% to 20%, and of those feeling European “to some extent” by three per cent, from 41% to 39%. On the other hand, everybody finds a unified European cultural identity even less achievable, because Europeans do not have a single cultural tradition and do speak many languages. This is exactly what Gadamer understood as the future European way of belonging together: Europe as a community which speaks many languages, not only many natural languages, but many complex second-degree languages – such as religion, historical narratives, poetry and philosophy – which preserve multiple records of our different values and different historical experiences. Being with the other would here mean participating in the other by understanding the otherness. The opposite of it is the drive to master and to control something. The attitude of humility, of knowledge that we could be wrong and that others could be right, of learning “that we may not simply exploit our means of power and effective possibilities, but must learn to stop and respect an other as an other, whether it is nature or grown cultures of peoples and nations”³⁴ is the only way of belonging and staying together. Realizing this – regardless of the possible outcomes – would at least make a good beginning.

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³⁴ Gadamer, “Diversity of Europe”, 235–236.

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Anglo-American Views of Gavrilo Princip

Abstract: The paper deals with Western (Anglo-American) views on the Sarajevo assassination/*attentat* and Gavrilo Princip. Articles on the assassination and Princip in two leading quality dailies (*The Times* and *The New York Times*) have particularly been analysed as well as the views of leading historians and journalists who covered the subject including: R. G. D. Laffan, R. W. Seton-Watson, Winston Churchill, Sidney Fay, Bernadotte Schmitt, Rebecca West, A. J. P. Taylor, Vladimir Dedijer, Christopher Clark and Tim Butcher. In the West, the original general condemnation of the assassination and its main culprits was challenged when Rebecca West published her famous travelogue on Yugoslavia in 1941. Another Brit, the remarkable historian A. J. P. Taylor, had a much more positive view on the Sarajevo conspirators and blamed Germany and Austria-Hungary for the outbreak of the Great War. A turning point in Anglo-American perceptions was the publication of Vladimir Dedijer's monumental book *The Road to Sarajevo* (1966), which humanised the main conspirators, a process initiated by R. West. Dedijer's book was translated from English into all major Western languages and had an immediate impact on the understanding of the Sarajevo assassination. The rise of national antagonisms in Bosnia gradually alienated Princip from Bosnian Muslims and Croats, a process that began in the 1980s and was completed during the wars of the Yugoslav succession. Although all available sources clearly show that Princip, an ethnic Serb, gradually developed a broader Serbo-Croat and Yugoslav identity, he was ethnified and seen exclusively as a Serb by Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks and Western journalists in the 1990s. In the past century imagining Princip in Serbia and the West involved a whole spectrum of views. In interwar Anglo-American perceptions he was a fanatic and lunatic. He became humanised by Rebecca West (1941), A. J. P. Taylor showed understanding for his act (1956), he was fully explained by Dedijer (1966), challenged and then exonerated by Christopher Clark (2012–13), and cordially embraced by Tim Butcher (2014).

Keywords: the Sarajevo *attentat* (Assassination), Gavrilo Princip, Rebecca West, A. J. P. Taylor, Vladimir Dedijer, Christopher Clark, Tim Butcher, *The Times*, *The New York Times*

There is a comprehensive literature on the assassin of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Gavrilo Princip, in both Serbian and English.¹ In this paper I have focused my attention on the articles published in two leading quality dailies in Britain and the USA: *The Times* and *The New York Times*. I will ad-

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¹ I would like to thank Dr. Lavinia Davenport and Dr. Eric Beckett Weaver for many valuable comments of the original text in English.

ditionally analyse the most important works and travelogues that deal with this issue in Anglo-American historiography and in publicist works.

The Kingdom of Serbia and Britain were allies during the Great War and the same was the case with the United States in the last nineteen months of the war. As a consequence of the alliance and joint sufferings, there was a positive tendency to cover inter-war royalist Yugoslavia in both countries. In Britain a different way of viewing Serbia had developed after the May Coup of 1903. This event, when Serbia's King Alexander Obrenovich and his wife Draga were murdered, deeply shocked the British public. The exploitation of the theme of the Belgrade regicide in Britain made Serbia look like an Oriental state beyond the confines of Europe.²

*Inter-war Anglo-American views of war guilt,
Princip and the role of Serbia*

After the Great War this negative attitude coexisted concomitantly with the positive appreciation of the new country – the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia, although it was substantially less influential.

Both views were united in the condemnation of the act of Gavrilo Princip and could find no sympathy for him. An avid supporter of Serbian aspirations during the Great War was Robert George Dalrymple Laffan (1887–1972), a fellow of Queens' College, Cambridge. In September 1917 he finished his book *The Serbs. The Guardians of the Gate*. The title is a metaphor borrowed from the speech held on August 8, 1917, in the Commons, by David Lloyd George, Britain's wartime Prime Minister who was very sympathetic to the Serbs. Vice Admiral E. T. Troubridge reflected widely held sympathies for the Serbs in Britain when he concluded his preface to Laffan's book with the following lines: "Serbia has indeed well and bravely answered the great question He asked: 'What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?'"³ From being regicides in 1903, during the Great War the Serbs became Britain's gallant little ally and "the guardians of the gate". Laffan sketched a review of Serbian history from Karageorge to 1917. A whole chapter out of eleven is dedicated to "The Murder at Sarajevo". In it he demonstrated his understanding for the circumstances that had led to the Sarajevo Assassination, but he also expressed hopes that "whatever the future may bring forth, the Serbs of every country

² D. C. Watt, "The British Reactions to the Assassination in Sarajevo", *European Studies Review* 1 (July 1971), 233–247. Slobodan G. Markovich, *British Perceptions of Serbia and the Balkans* (Paris: Dialogue, 2000).

³ R. G. D. Laffan, *The Serbs. The Guardians of the Gate* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1918), 2. The quote is from the New Testament: Mark 8: 36 (KJV).

will not again have recourse to such useless methods, which alienate from them the sympathies of those who do not deny their grievances.”⁴ He calls the conspirator Nedeljko Čabrinović “a young anarchist”, and Princip has also been listed in the index as “an anarchist”.⁵

In the thirty-page long chapter on the Sarajevo assassination, Princip is given only two and half lines stating that he “stepped off the pavement and with his revolver shot both the archduke and his wife.”⁶ Laffan emphasises that it was dangerous for the Archduke to come to Sarajevo on Vidovdan since there was example of “the hero of ‘Vidovdan’” Miloš Obilić who killed the sultan Murad: “and there would have been nothing astonishing if some young Bosnian Serb of unstable mind had taken it into his head to emulate that feat by putting an end to a representative of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.”⁷

Laffan holds that “nothing could have been more disastrous for Serbia at such a time than to provoke a conflict with a neighbouring Great Power.” He points out Germany’s desire to move defiant Serbia from the route of her advancement from Berlin to Baghdad, and directs his readers towards Hungarian responsibility for the assassination and the responsibility of Viennese circles. He concludes that through the presented arguments “an opinion can be based”:

It is that the murder was the work of one or two fanatics of Serbian race, but of Austro-Hungarian allegiance, who were roused to fury by the unsympathetic treatment of the Orthodox inhabitants of Bosnia-Hertzegovina; that these Serbs or Bosniaks were probably in touch with ‘comitadjis’ of Serbia, who were ignorant of Europe and did not realize with what inflammable material they were playing, that the Serbian government and public services in general did not know what was being prepared; but that the Austro-Hungarian government did know and used the plot as a Heaven-sent means to remove an undesirable heir to the throne and to incriminate Serbia in the eyes of the world.⁸

Laffan’s narrative clearly testifies that even those who were eager to celebrate Serbia, and to contribute to the creation of her new image as a brave ally worthy of British support, had to restrain themselves regarding Princip. It’s not only that Laffan does not know and does not want to know too much about Princip and Čabrinović, he even seems not to be aware of the other conspirators at all.

⁴ Ibid. 166.

⁵ Ibid. 170, 294.

⁶ Ibid. 171.

⁷ Ibid. 170.

⁸ Ibid. 179–180.

Another supporter of Serbia and Yugoslavia in Britain during the Great War was Robert William Seton-Watson (1879–1951). His attitudes were similar to Laffan's. From 1922 he was the first Masaryk Professor of Central European History at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies in London. He was considered the greatest authority on Central European history in Britain, including the history of South Slavs.⁹ In 1925 he published a special book to explain the origins of the First World War. In it he rejected most accusations against Serbia regarding the outbreak of the war.¹⁰ The sixth chapter is entitled "The Responsibility of the Crime". Seton-Watson was the first British author clearly to notice: "The real initiative for the crime came from within Bosnia itself", and that in addition to the Sarajevo plotters "a large number of other youths were sworn to attempt his [Archduke's] life, and that similar groups existed in Dalmatia and Croatia, eager to emulate their example."¹¹ In this discovery he was influenced by the book of Borivoje Jevtić,¹² but he also had a chance to interview some of followers of the Young Bosnia movement. Summarising the responsibility in the chapter Seton-Watson was led to conclude: "The crime of Sarajevo is an indelible blot upon the movement for Jugoslav Unity. But, unless we are to lose all sense of proportion, we must assign the main guilt to Austria-Hungary, who, by a policy of repression at home and aggression abroad, had antagonised all sections of the Jugoslav race."¹³ At the end of this book he makes the final verdict: "In a word, it is not too much to assert that by deliberate action, often thought out to the smallest details, Vienna and Berlin had by 23 July created a diplomatic situation from which nothing short of a miracle could have saved Europe, and that the main responsibility for the outbreak of war must therefore rest upon their shoulders."¹⁴

As early as 1925, Seton-Watson had warned: "But there are others who insist upon glorifying the assassins, and it is this section of opinion – naturally most vocal in Bosnia itself – which is responsible for the re-

⁹ Wickham Steed, Lillian M. Penson, W. J. Rose, Milan Ćurčin, Lev Sychrava and V. V. Tilea, "Tributes to R. W. Seton-Watson: A Symposium", *The Slavonic and East European Review* 30.75 (June 1952), 331–363. S. v. "Seton-Watson, Robert William", in *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography. From earliest times to 1985*, vol. III (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 698–699.

¹⁰ R. W. Seton-Watson, *Sarajevo. A Study in the Origins of the Great War* (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1925).

¹¹ *Ibid.* 144, 148.

¹² Borivoje Jevtić, *Sarajevski atentat* (Belgrade: "Petar N. Gaković", 1924).

¹³ Seton-Watson, *Sarajevo*, 155.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* 289.

removal of the memorial shrine erected at the scene of the crime, and for the reinternment of the assassins themselves in a special grave of honour at Sarajevo." He suggested that Armistice Day could be more suitable as "a day of national atonement" rather than "an annual celebration of the crime".¹⁵ Only five years after the publication of his book, he was prompted to voice his criticism against the erection of a plaque in Sarajevo in honour of Gavrilo Princip. In his letter to *The Times* he stated: "as one who was specially active in defending Serbia against the charge of precipitating the World War by her deliberate policy, I feel in honour bound to protest as publicly as possible against the decision, announced in *The Times* to-day, to erect a tablet in honour of Archduke's assassin on the scene of the murder in Serajevo." In the letter he bitterly concluded: "That a monument, not to the victims but to the murderer, should now be erected on the spot can only be described as an open affront to all right-thinking people inside Yugoslavia herself, and at the same time to her allies in the war."¹⁶

Two days later, in an editorial *The Times* mentioned that at the ceremony in Sarajevo "neither the Government nor any semi-official organization was represented, and speeches and demonstrations were forbidden by the authorities," but still condemned the Yugoslav Government for allowing "this ill-advised and insulting ceremony to take place at all". *The Times* concludes that "it is probably true that Serb opinion, outside an educated and occidentalized minority, has made heroes out of Princip and his fellows". It also had a recommendation that "even a democratic Yugoslav Government might have understood the inexpediency of shocking public sentiment in many European countries by permitting the public commemoration of an act which was the immediate cause of the Great War, of its attendant horrors, and of the general suffering which has been its sequel." The leading British daily also sent a warning that "this is not one of the cases where those who understand will be prompt to pardon".¹⁷

In the year that followed Winston Churchill (1874–1965), former holder of multiple ministerial offices in British governments, the last of which was Finance (1924–1929), published the fifth volume of his comprehensive work *The World Crisis* (1923–1931), with subtitle *The Unknown*

¹⁵ Ibid. 159.

¹⁶ R. W. Seton-Watson, Letter to the Editor, "The Serajevo Murder", *The Times*, no. 45426, February 1, 1930, p. 13. He reacted to the following article: From our Correspondent, "The Serajevo Murder. Memorial to be unveiled to Assassin", *The Times*, no. 45425, January 31, 1930, p. 13.

¹⁷ Editorial, "The Serajevo Tablet", *The Times*, no. 45427, February 3, 1930, p. 13.

War.¹⁸ Contrary to most Western authors, Churchill dedicated many pages to the Eastern Front, including the Serbian Front and the Salonica Front. He even provided detailed maps of the Battles of Jadar and Kolubara, the Serbian counterstroke in December 1914, and the invasion of Serbia in October 1915.¹⁹ Depictions of the war years in Serbia were given very correctly with sympathies shown for the Serbian Army. Yet Churchill was very reserved regarding two persons: Gavrilo Princip and Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis.

The fifth chapter of Churchill's work is entitled "The Murder of the Archduke" and it makes reference of the Sarajevo Princip memorial plaque. "He [Princip] died in prison, and a monument erected in recent years by his fellow-countrymen records his infamy, and their own."²⁰ For Churchill, Dimitrijević's secret organisation "The Black Hand" was "deadly association", which "nourished a fierce patriotism with the discipline of the early Jesuits and the methods of the Russian nihilists", and "there is little doubt that Dimitrijevitch organised the plot to murder the Archduke during his visit to Bosnia".²¹ Regarding the "mighty cause" of the Great War he mentions the mood of the men, the antagonisms of the Powers and "the clash of interests and deep promptings of self-preservation or self-assertion in the hearts of races". At the same time he singles out three men: the man "who fired the shots that killed the Archduke and his wife", the man who "deliberately, accepting the risk of a world war, told the Austrian Emperor that Germany would give him a free hand against Serbia and urged him to use it", and the man who "framed and launched the ultimatum to Serbia". The three men "took the fatal decisive steps".²² Without naming them, Churchill allocated responsibility for the outbreak of the war to Gavrilo Princip, the German Kaiser Wilhelm II, and Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Count Berchtold. In an article published on St. Vitus Day in 1937 in the Parisian daily *Le Journal*, Churchill attributed main responsibility for the organisation of the Sarajevo assassination/*attentat* to Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis "head of the conspirators".²³

¹⁸ Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis*, vol. V: *The Unknown War* (London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931). On the spine of this book another title is given "The Eastern Front".

¹⁹ W. S. Churchill, *The Unknown War*, vol. V of *The World Crisis* (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), 82, 183–18, 238, 240, 243.

²⁰ *Ibid.* 32.

²¹ *Ibid.* 31.

²² *Ibid.* 45.

²³ "chef des conspirateurs", Winston Churchill, "La vérité sur l'attentat qui déclencha la guerre", *Le Journal*, June 28, 1937, 1, 4.

There were people in Britain who openly attacked the Serbian Government for the organisation of the Sarajevo Assassination. The most vocal among them were Mary Edith Durham (1863–1944), and Herbert Vivian (1865–1940).²⁴ The two of them could not make a great impression on British public opinion, although Durham was more influential. She particularly exploited claims made by Ljubomir Jovanović (1865–1928), a high official of Pašić's Radical Party, and Minister of Education in Pašić's government in 1914 who for political feud falsely accused Pašić.²⁵ He claimed that Pašić at end of May or beginning of June "said to us (he conferred on these matters more particularly with Stojan Protić, who was then Minister of the Interior; but he said this much to the rest of us) that there were people who were preparing to go to Sarajevo to kill Francis Ferdinand, who was to go there to be solemnly received on *Vidov Dan*."²⁶ Edith Durham took advantage of this article to accuse the Serbian Government of 1914 of complicity in the Sarajevo Assassination in her public lectures and in her articles in several British journals.²⁷ Two British journals and one American even republished the translation of Jovanović's text, including a very influential *Journal of the British Institute for International Affairs*.²⁸ The authenticity of Jovanović's claims was strengthened in Britain by the fact that he was titled as "President of the S.C.S. [Serbs, Croats and Slovenes] Parliament" which was the duty that he performed in 1924.

Another Serbian publication stirred up debate in Britain and Germany on the role of Serbia in the events of Sarajevo. In 1923, a well-known

²⁴ [Herbert Vivian], *Myself not Least, Being the Personal Reminiscences of 'X'* (London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd., 1925). Herbert Vivian, *The Life of the Emperor Charles of Austria* (London: Grayson & Grayson, 1932). In the last title (p. 39) Vivian asked: "And why seek other culprits when the evidence is as clear as daylight that the murders were committed by agents of Serbian secret societies under the direct patronage of the Serbian Government, with Russia as an accessory before the fact?" He assessed the most famous Sarajevo conspirator as follows (ibid. 46): "Prinzip was emotional and unbalanced, perhaps diseased in mind as well as in body."

²⁵ Ljuba Jovanović published his article in the following collection of papers: *Krv slovenstva. Spomenica desetogodišnjice svetskog rata, 1914–1924* [The Blood of Slavdom. Commemorative edition of 10 years of the World War, 1914–1924] (Belgrade 1924).

²⁶ M. Ljuba Jovanović, "The Murder of Sarajevo", *Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs*, 4.2 (March 1925), 57. Cf. Seton-Watson, *Sarajevo*, 153.

²⁷ She made the most comprehensive attack on the Serbian Government in her book *The Sarajevo Crime* (London: Edward Arnold, 1925).

²⁸ Ljuba Jovanović, "The Murder of Sarajevo", 57–69. Jovanović's article was also printed in Britain in *The National Review* (April 1925), and in the USA in a prominent Bostonian journal: Ljuba Jovanović, "More Light on Serajevo", *The Living Age* (May 9, 1925), 305–311.

Belgrade historian and university professor Stanoje Stanojević, a personal enemy of Pašić, published a dubious pamphlet of 54 pages entitled “The Murder of the Heir Apparent Ferdinand. A Contribution to the Question of the Beginning of the World War.”²⁹ In it Stanojević overemphasised the role in the Sarajevo plot of the secret society “Unification or Death”, popularly known as the “Black Hand”, and of its leader Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis.³⁰ The pamphlet was immediately translated into German.³¹

Additionally, there was an influential section of British public opinion that supported the demands of Hungary aimed at alleviating conditions of the Treaty of Trianon (1920). These demands were not essentially anti-Yugoslav but rather pro-Hungarian, yet they aimed to challenge some stipulations of the Versailles Treaties. Harold Sidney Rothermere (1868–1940), an eccentric viscount, media magnate and owner of tabloid *The Daily Mail*, was particularly instrumental in such efforts. His tabloid had been the daily with the highest circulation in the world at the beginning of the twentieth century. He took over the daily in 1922, and since 1927 he personally run a campaign in it for the revision of the Trianon Treaty. That made him extremely popular in Hungary. The campaign of a part of British Press bore fruit and in November 1932, Sir Robert Gower proposed a resolution to the British Parliament demanding revision of the stipulations of the Treaty of Trianon so that the Kingdom of Hungary could gain all its former areas where Hungarians had majority. Two hundred members of the Parliament signed the resolution but its acceptance was prevented by the involvement of the Foreign Office.³²

The claims by Stanoje Stanojević and Ljuba Jovanović bore fruit on American soil as well. In 1929, a professor of Smith College, Sidney Bradshaw Fay (1876–1967), published a very influential book in two volumes

²⁹ Stanoje Stanojević, *Ubistvo austriskog prestolonaslednika Ferdinanda. Prilozi pitanju o početku svetskog rata* (Belgrade: Izdavačka knjižarnica Napredak, 1923).

³⁰ R. W. Seton-Watson, *Sarajevo*, 131, commented on this: “And he then concentrates upon the ‘Black Hand,’ whose importance is thus exalted out of all proportions to the true facts.”

³¹ Stanoje Stanojević, *Die Ermordung des Erzherzogs Franz Ferdinand: ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Weltkriegs* (Frankfurt a. M.: Frankfurter Societäts-Druckerei, Abteilung Buchverlag, 1923).

³² For more details see an unpublished Oxonian doctoral dissertation: Eric Beckett Weaver, “Revision and its modes: Hungary’s attempts to overturn the Treaty of Trianon 1931–1938” (2008). Cf. Ignác Romsics, “Hungary’s Place in the Sun. A British Newspaper Article and its Hungarian Repercussions“, in László Péter and Martyn Rady, eds., *British Hungarian Relations since 1848* (London: Hungarian Cultural Centre and School of Slavonic and East European Studies, 2004), 193–204.

entitled *The Origins of the World War*.³³ The first volume ends with the fifth chapter entitled “Balkan Problems, 1907–1914”. It covers 94 pages. In the summary of the chapter Fay claims: “Though M. Pashitch and the Serbian civil authorities did not want or plan war in 1914, they tolerated an agitation which contributed to a series of assassinations which culminated in the tragedy of Sarajevo.” Austria-Hungary did not give democratic rights to her Slav and Romanian subjects. “Instead she chose to see her salvation in a war in which Serbia would be reduced in power by having to cede territory to Bulgaria, Romania and Albania”, and she “welcomed the opportunity for a localized war with Serbia afforded by the assassination of the Austrian Heir to the Throne.” Fay insists that he did not believe that the war “was ‘inevitable’”, but is ready to admit “that, of all the major conflicts of interest which have been alleged as making it ‘inevitable’, the Balkan problems were those most nearly incapable of a peaceful solution.”³⁴

Fay dedicates fourteen pages of his second volume to the revelation by Ljuba Jovanović.³⁵ For him Jovanović’s testimony was “substantially accurate and trustworthy.”³⁶ He was also influenced by a collection of documents published and edited by pro-German Serb, Miloš Bogičević (1876–1938), a former Serbian diplomat who was dismissed in 1915 due to repeated disobedience of the Foreign Ministry of Serbia.³⁷

In Fay’s view, Princip was under the strong influence of the Black Hand and he became “filled with the ‘Black Hand’ ideas of terrorist action by political assassination”.³⁸ For Seton-Watson the idea of the assassination came from Bosnia. Fay, on the contrary, follows M. Bogičević’s account. Voja Tankosić “a Serbian officer and one of the most active ‘Black Hand’ leaders” initiated a meeting in Toulouse in January 1914 attended by Mus-

³³ Sidney Bradshaw Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, 2 vols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929): vol. 1: *Before Sarajevo: Underlying Causes of the War*, vol. 2: *After Sarajevo: Immediate Causes of the War*. Two years later the book was published in one volume: Sidney Bradshaw Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, 2nd ed., revised two volumes in one (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931).

³⁴ Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, vol. 1 (1929), 544, 546.

³⁵ Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (1931), 61–74.

³⁶ *Ibid.* 66.

³⁷ M. Boghitschevitch, *Die auswärtige Politik Serbiens, 1903–1914*, vol. 1: *Geheimakte aus Serbischen Archiven* (Berlin: Brückenverlag, 1928); vol. 2: *Diplomatische Geheimakten aus russischen, monetenegrinischen und sonstigen Archiven* (Berlin: Brückenverlag, 1929); vol. 3: *Serbien und der Weltkrieg* (Berlin: Brückenverlag, 1931). A. J. P. Taylor *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918* (Oxford: OUP, 1971, 1st ed. 1954), 582, called this collection “very unsatisfactory”.

³⁸ Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (1931), 101.

tafa Golubić, Muhamed Mehmedbašić and Vladimir Gaćinović and it was decided there that the Archduke should be killed. Independently of that Princip got orders from Belgrade that the Archduke should be murdered and the initiative for that “came not from Bosnia but from Belgrade from Major Tankositch”.³⁹

A special section is dedicated to the “motives of the assassins.” Fay discusses the “motives” of Princip and Čabrinović since they “may conveniently be considered together.”, and finds them to be threefold. The first is “a feeling of discontent with their own lives, of the desire to be martyrs and heroes after the fashion of Bogdan Zherajitch”. The second motive was “to take vengeance on Austria for the oppressive régime in Bosnia”, and the third, “to kindle further opposition and hatred for the Hapsburg rule.” In conclusion about the motives he states: “But which was the strongest of the three – their personal psychopathic condition, or their desire for vengeance on Austria, or their Serb nationalism – it would be difficult to say.”⁴⁰

Regarding responsibility of belligerent states he concluded the following about Serbia: “Serbia did not want war but believed it would be forced upon her. That Mr. Pashitsch was aware of the plot three weeks before it was executed, failed to take effective steps to prevent the assassins from crossing over from Serbia to Bosnia, and then failed to give Austria-Hungary any warning or information which might have averted the fatal crime, were facts unknown to Austria in July 1914; they cannot therefore be regarded as in any way justifying Austria’s conduct; but they are part of Serbia’s responsibility, and a very serious part.”⁴¹ He holds Austria-Hungary “more responsible for the immediate origin of the war than any other Power”, and he particularly accused Count Berchtold who “deliberately framed the ultimatum with the expectation and hope that it would be rejected... Berchtold gambled on a ‘local’ war with Serbia only, believing that he could rattle the German sword; but rather than abandon his war with Serbia, he was ready to drag the rest of Europe into war.” He also holds Russia “partly responsible for the Austro-Serbian conflict because of the frequent encouragement she had given at Belgrade...” As regards Germany, Fay fully rejects the verdict of the Versailles Treaty that she was responsible for the War as “historically unsound.”⁴² In his interpretation the responsibility for the war rests with Serbia and Austria-Hungary.⁴³

³⁹ Ibid. 105.

⁴⁰ Ibid. 128–132, 134.

⁴¹ Ibid. 550.

⁴² Ibid. 550–551, 554, 558.

⁴³ He repeated this in an article published on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the assassination of Francis Ferdinand in the same Bostonian journal where Ljuba

Upon publication of his book, Fay was made professor at the most prestigious American universities, Harvard and Yale, and his book had a substantial impact on American scholarship dealing with the First World War.

His claims were challenged by another American expert on World War One. In 1930 Bernadotte Schmitt (1886–1969), professor of the University of Chicago, published his book *The Coming of War 1914*,⁴⁴ also in two volumes. This work gradually became a standard American study on this subject. Contrary to Fay, who blamed Serbia and Austria-Hungary for the outbreak of the war, Schmitt found Germany to be the main culprit. In addition to sources in major European languages Schmitt also used sources in Serbian and even quoted in Serbian Cyrillic certain statements of Serbs and titles in Serbian.

For Schmitt, Bosnian students were attracted by Belgrade since they could “breathe the air of ‘freedom’” there. Their ideal was the unity of South Slav peoples in a kind of republic. They “thought that if Austria were thrown into difficulties then a revolution would come. But for such a revolution one must prepare the ground, work up feeling. Nothing happened. By assassination this spirit might be prepared.” Princip was “a revolutionist” who did not lack “in either determination or courage”, and who declared himself a “nationalist” and a “Yugoslav” at the trial in Sarajevo.⁴⁵

Prof. Schmitt was the first editor of *The Journal for Modern History* since its inception in 1929. On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Sarajevo Assassination he published an updated version of the findings from his book in this journal. His assessment of Princip was similarly phrased as in his book. Gavrilo Princip and his associates were “caught up in the revolutionary movement *Mlada Bosna* (‘Young Bosnia’) in the annexed provinces”. They were inspired by the ideal of Yugoslav unity, and in Belgrade they got associated with members of the “Narodna odbrana” and “Unification or Death”.⁴⁶ Schmitt accepted Lj. Jovanović’s claims with

Jovanović’s testimony had been printed four years earlier. “Suffice is to say that Serbia must share a deep responsibility, because there is evidence that Mr. Pashich, the Serbian Prime Minister, was aware of the plot several days before Princip... and took no effective measures to prevent it... But Austria-Hungary is also to be condemned for using the assassination as an excuse for presenting to Serbia a stiff ultimatum...” Sidney Bradshaw Fay, “Serajevo Fifteen Years After”, *The Living Age* (July 1, 1929), 379.

⁴⁴ Bernadotte Schmitt, *The Coming of the War 1914*, 2 vols. (New York and London: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1930).

⁴⁵ Schmitt, *The Coming of War*, vol. 1, 211.

⁴⁶ Bernadotte E. Schmitt, “July 1914. Thirty Years After”, *The Journal of Modern History* 16.3 (Sep. 1944), 171.

reservations in his book and in an article he was even more reserved. He did not hold the Serbian government responsible for the plot in any way. As he put it: “whatever the Serbian government may have known, there is no evidence to suggest that it approved of the plot or assisted in its preparation.”⁴⁷ Schmitt’s analysis of then available German and Austro-Hungarian documents led him to conclude that Count Berchtold wanted war with Serbia and that the Germans understood it and moreover “accepted and approved this policy and urged its immediate execution, even at the risk of war with Russia”, or as he phrased it later on in the article: “The crisis of July 1914 was not resolved peacefully because the Austrian demands of Serbia, which were supported by Germany seemed to Russia, and then to France and Britain, designed to establish Austro-German control of the Balkans and of Europe.”⁴⁸

His final verdict on war guilt is the same as in his influential book: “Since Austria would not have acted without German approval and support, the primary responsibility of Germany for the fatal ending of the crisis is clear and overwhelming.”⁴⁹ Winston Churchill was among the first who highly appreciated Schmitt’s work and his statement of the causes of the war. He held that Schmitt “marshalled in masterly fashion the whole series of official and authentic documents in an impressive array.”⁵⁰ Bernadotte Schmitt’s position on German war guilt would be strengthened after the emergence of Fischer’s theses in the early 1960s.

Combined claims made by Jovanović and Stanojević contributed to a general tendency in perceptions of the Sarajevo *attentat* since 1925 both in Britain and the United States, but also in Germany. In all subsequent analyses of the event four questions were crystallised as crucial and answers to them were almost always combined in such a way to offer either a clear pro-Serbian/Yugoslav consideration or anti-Serbian/Yugoslav condemnation. The questions have been the following:

1. Did Nikola Pašić, Prime Minister of Serbia in 1914, know of the preparations of the Sarajevo plot, and if so, how much did he know?
2. Was the role of Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis and his organisation “the Unification or Death” crucial in the conspiracy?
3. Were Princip and other Bosnians involved the real organisers of the murder, or were they only puppets in the hands of Apis?

⁴⁷ Ibid. 172.

⁴⁸ Ibid. 176, 203.

⁴⁹ Ibid. 204.

⁵⁰ Churchill, *The Unknown War*, xii.

4. Was Princip a Yugoslav idealist inspired by Young Bosnia, or a Serbian nationalist indoctrinated by nationalistic networks in Belgrade?

Since 1925, those who found Pašić co-responsible or even chiefly responsible for the outbreak of the war also held that the role of the “Unification or Death” was crucial for the conspiracy, while those who denied his responsibility also minimised the involvement of Apis in the conspiracy. Princip’s role was also seen in a duality. Critics of Serbia’s role considered Princip to be both a puppet of the Black Hand, and a Serbian nationalist inspired by Belgrade propaganda against Austria-Hungary. Those who did not find Serbia responsible for the war considered the assassination to be the principal work of Young Bosnia, and Princip to be a Young Bosnian idealist.

The publications of Lj. Jovanović, S. Stanojević and M. Bogićević evoked such great interest in the West because Yugoslavia was rare among former belligerent countries in that she did not publish a series of diplomatic correspondence aiming at exonerating her pre-war foreign policy – something all other major powers or their successors did. This task, due to a combination of circumstances, was initiated much later, on the 50th anniversary of the Great War (1964), by the Serbian Academy of Sciences. The task was completed another fifty years later, with 42 volumes of diplomatic correspondence of the Kingdom of Serbia for the 1903–1914 period.⁵¹ All major historians who dealt with the issue of the Sarajevo conspiracy expressed their dissatisfaction concerning the lack of published Serbian diplomatic documents regardless of their sympathies.⁵² Faced with the lack of Serbian primary sources, many historians unsurprisingly overestimated the value of the material that became available in the 1920s and therefore took Lj. Jovanović’s testimony and books by S. Stanojević and M. Bogićević too seriously and literally.

⁵¹ Vasilije Dj. Krestić, “A Note on Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Serbia, 1903–1914”, in Dragoljub R. Živojinović, ed., *The Serbs and the First World War 1914–1918* (Belgrade: SASA, 2015), 459–461.

⁵² S. B. Fay mentions “Serbian Government’s persistent failure to follow the example of other states in disclosing fully and frankly their secret pre-war archives”, in the “Preface to the Second Edition Revised” to his *The Origins of the World War* (1931), vii–viii. R. W. Seton-Watson also repeatedly asked the Yugoslav Government in the mid-1920s to publish documents on Serbia’s foreign policy. He expressed surprise by the lack of readiness of the Yugoslav government to reply to Jovanović’s article. In November 1925 he bitterly noticed (*Sarajevo*, 154): “A *Blue Book* was promised in April, but nothing more has been heard of it.”

Rebecca West on the Sarajevo attentat

The publication of a travelogue written by Cicely Isabel Fairfield, better known under her pseudonym Rebecca West (1892–1983), signalled a shift in the way the British viewed Princip. At the end of 1941, she published a book entitled *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon. A Journey through Yugoslavia*.⁵³ Over time this work has gained in prominence. Her obituary in *The New York Times* quotes the American literary critic Diana Trilling. For her R. West “was one of the major literary figures of this century”, and her travelogue on Yugoslavia “surely one of the very greatest books of the last 50 years”.⁵⁴ In this book she gave a new interpretation of the Sarajevo Assassination or *attentat* as she calls it in French echoing the word *attentat* from Serbo-Croat.

One may glean what kind of affinity Rebeca West had for Yugoslavs and Serbs throughout her life from an affair that took place when her Yugoslav travelogue was reprinted in 1977. She undertook a libel action against *The Spectator* that published two attacks on her and her travelogue. The journal agreed to pay substantial damages to her upon which she declared that she “would donate the damages to the Serbian Orthodox Community in London”.⁵⁵

A lengthy chapter of her travelogue is dedicated to Bosnia. There are 15 subchapters in the book of which eight are on Sarajevo. In the seventh she described her visit to the graves of the Sarajevo conspirators. The visit was a proper occasion for her to discuss the image that the plotters enjoyed in the West prior to World War Two.

It is all also that the conspirators were dangerous fanatics of maniacal or at least degenerate type. But actually their behaviour in court was not only completely sane but cheerful and dignified, and their evidence and speeches showed both individual ability and a very high level of culture.⁵⁶

She contrasts Čabrinović, whom she assessed as a pacifist, with Princip who did not share the same views, but she did not hold it against him. It is true that she condemns the act of assassination but she also relativises it by viewing Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia as a tyranny:

⁵³ Rebecca West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon. A Journey through Yugoslavia*, 2 vols. (New York: The Viking Press, 1941).

⁵⁴ Linda Charlton, “Dame Rebecca West dies in London”, *The New York Times*, March 16, 1983.

⁵⁵ “Libel Damages for Dame Rebecca West”, *The Times*, January 22, 1980, 23.

⁵⁶ Rebecca West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon. A Journey through Yugoslavia* (Edinburgh: Canongate Books, 1993), 375.

What these youths did was abominable, precisely as abominable as the tyranny they destroyed. Yet it need not be denied that they might have grown to be good men, and perhaps great men, if the Austrian Empire had not crashed down on them in its collapse. But the monstrous frailty of empire involves such losses.⁵⁷

R. West concluded that conspirators were “contemplating a mystery” which was different for Princip, for Čabrinović, for the other plotters and for peasants and merchants who helped them inadvertently.

But the deed as Princip conceived it never took place. It was entangled from its first minute with another deed, a murder which seems to have been fully conceived by none at all, but which had a terrible existence in fantasy, because it was dreamed of by men whose whole claim to respect rested on their realistic quality, and who abandoned all restraint when they strayed into the sphere of fantasy. Of these two deeds there was made one so potent that it killed its millions and left all living things in our civilization to some degree disabled. I write of a mystery. For that is the way the deed appears to me, and to all Westerners. But to those who look at it on the soil where it was committed, and to the lands east of that, it seems a holy act of liberation; and among such people are those whom the West would have to admit are wise and civilized.⁵⁸

She did not actually reveal what the mystery was about, she only remarked that “Sarajevo *attentat* is mysterious as history is mysterious, as life is mysterious”. She acknowledged that “the more one knows about the *attentat* the more incomprehensible it becomes”. At the end her conclusion on the outcome of the *attentat* is that “moral judgement sets itself an impossible task” because “the soul should choose life”, but “when the Bosnians chose life and murdered Franz Ferdinand, they chose death for the French and Germans and English”, and had the latter nations had their own chance they “would have chosen death to the Bosnians”. She was led to conclude somewhat desperately: “The sum will not add up. It is madness to rack out brains over this sum. But there is nothing else we can do except try to add up this sum. We are nothing but arithmetical functions which exist for that purpose...”⁵⁹

In this way, Rebecca West was among the first Western opinion makers who attributed humane characteristics to the Sarajevo conspirators.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Ibid. 379.

⁵⁸ Ibid. 381.

⁵⁹ Ibid. 382.

⁶⁰ There was another Brit who did it before her and who influenced her. He was a British travel writer and novelist Stephen Graham (1884–1975). In 1930 Graham published a documentary novel on the Sarajevo conspiracy, *St. Vitus Day* (London: Ernest Benn,

From persons of “psychopathic condition”, fanatics “of maniacal or at least degenerate type”, she turned them into healthy and joyous young men who were themselves victims of circumstances. The first review of her book in *The Times* did not fail to notice her sympathies with the conspirators: “Miss West tells about conspiracies and assassinations, often explains what manner of men or women the victims were, in such a way as to make it clear that there was little to be found in their favour and a good deal of excuse for those who removed them.”⁶¹ She preserved a condemnation of the *attentat*, but it is mild, diffused and put into background while the story of the young conspirators emerged as a focal point of her narrative, inspire the fact that their act triggered a war with millions of victims.

After the Second World War her book became obligatory reading for all diplomats from English-speaking countries coming to or dealing with Yugoslavia. Therefore her coverage of the Sarajevo *attentat*,⁶² as well as her

1930). His second wife was Vera Mitrović, a sister of the leading Young Bosnia writer and ideologue Dimitrije Mitrović.

⁶¹ “Book of the Week. Balkan Background”, *The Times*, no. 49177, March 6, 1942, 8.

⁶² The event that took place in the Bosnian capital on June 28, 1914 is commonly known in English as “The Sarajevo Assassination” and in Serbian (Serbo-Croatian) as *Sarajevski atentat*. *Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary* (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, Inc., 2001), 68, suggests two meanings of the verb *assassinate*: “1: to injure or destroy unexpectedly and treacherously 2: to murder by sudden or secret attack usu. for impersonal reason.” It adds as a synonym verb *kill*. For the noun *assassin* two meanings have been offered: “1: one of a secret order of Muslims that at the time of the Crusades terrorized enemies by secret murder committed under the influence of hashish 2: a person who murders; especially: one who murders a politically important person for hire or from fanatical motives.” The most comprehensive complete dictionary of the Serbo-Croatian language in six volumes designates *atentat* as: “a murder, or an attempt to murder a (usually politically prominent) person; figuratively an attack on someone’s rights, property or honour” (*Rečnik srpskohrvatskoga književnog jezika* [A Dictionary of Serbo-Croatian Literary Language] (Novi Sad: Matica srpska and Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 1967), vol. 1, 106). When English and Serbian meanings are compared some relevant differences are noticeable. From the Merriam-Webster dictionary follows that *assassin* may also be a simple murderer which the word *atentator* could hardly be in Serbian. In English *assassin* could be a person driven by “fanatical motives” while *atentator* is a person encouraged by “political considerations”. *Atentat* in Serbian can be both attempt and assassination. Therefore *atentat* may be a failed attempt to murder someone, and *assassination* is always equal to a murder and therefore may only imply a successfully conducted operation to murder someone. It is of particular importance that alternative use of *assassinate* and *kill* in English may never be applied to Serbian. *Izvršiti atentat* is very different from *ubiti* (to murder). It is also impossible to use synonymously *atentator* and *ubica* in Serbian while in English an *assassin* and a *killer* may mean exactly the same.

For the above reasons the translation of Serbo-Croatian *atentator* as *assassin* and *atentat* as *assassination* does not seem as a very fortunate choice. In using this translation

historical narrative on history and conditions in Yugoslavia are of special importance for Anglo-American perceptions. What one cannot fail to notice is that she interprets historical narratives from a country with conflicting stories of the past, but as a rule adopts the opinion of her Yugoslav travel companion Constantine (in reality he was a well-known Serbian/Yugoslav writer Stanislav Vinaver). That opinion was usually close to the mainstream of Serbian inter-war culture and its understanding of the past.

A. J. P. Taylor on the Sarajevo Assassination

It is clear that the work of Rebecca West influenced the most famous British post-war historian A. J. P. Taylor (1906–1990). Another historian, Lewis Bernstein Namier (1888–1960), professor of the University of Manchester, whose protégé Taylor had been, asked him to write a favourable review of West's travelogue for *Time and Tide*. Taylor did it, and as he himself wrote: "I greatly admired the book, now I think too much so, and gladly obliged."⁶³ Afterwards he befriended R. West. Nine years later he published his masterpiece *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918*, and then an essay entitled "The Outbreak of the First World War".⁶⁴ It seems that his view of the Sarajevo conspiracy, and the role of the plotters and Serbia as regards the Sarajevo *attentat*, is influenced by West's book. He additionally had personal experience of Yugoslavia, which he visited in 1947 when he received a travel award from the Yugoslav authorities for his help in promoting Yu-

from English into Serbo-Croatian one softens implicit overtones of fanaticism and condemnation that this word may include in English. By translating it in this way from Serbian into English one makes the meaning of these words more ominous and terrifying than it is in Serbian. Therefore the practice used by Rebecca West to alternatively employ both *assassination* and *attentat* is certainly better than to use *assassination* only, and I have tried to do it in this paper. This whole remark refers only to sources that have been translated from Serbian into English or vice versa.

Discussing expressive intentions in translations the leading Serbian professor of English language Boris Hlebec, "Stilska adaptacija ekspresivnih intencija", in Anette Djurović, ed., *Freiheit und Verantwortung – Ethik und Moral in Translation* (Belgrade: Philologische Fakultät der Universität, 2002), 15, has noticed: "If a translator translates a surface layer only, and leaves in darkness the underlying substance, the message could be transmitted only partially, and it would even be corrupted." I would like to thank Prof. Boris Hlebec for his comments regarding the translation of these words.

⁶³ A. J. P. Taylor, *A Personal History* (Coronet Books, 1984), 216.

⁶⁴ A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954); A. J. P. Taylor, "The Outbreak of the First World War", *Europe. Grandeur and Decline* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967), 183–189.

Yugoslav aspirations to incorporate Trieste.⁶⁵ Unexpectedly, Taylor asked the Yugoslav authorities to organise a tour around Serbian monasteries for him. In his autobiography, he stated that he had done so under the influence of Gabriel Millet's book on Serbian medieval churches. Although he did not mention it in his autobiography, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* cannot but have inspired him to visit the monasteries not only in 1947, but also during his next visit to Yugoslavia in 1969, since West's travelogue contains excellent parts on Serbian medieval monasteries.⁶⁶

In many of his works, Taylor discussed the role of the conspirators, the Sarajevo assassination, and the causes of the Great War. He went into detail about these issues in an essay entitled "The Outbreak of the First World War", first published in 1956 in his collection of essays *Englishmen and Others*.⁶⁷ This essay was later republished in a very popular collection of his short essays *Europe: Grandeur and Decline* (1967).⁶⁸ For Taylor "the plot was the work of six young high-minded national idealists. Two of them are still alive. One is a professor at Belgrade University; the other curator of the museum at Sarajevo."⁶⁹ He rejects ideas of the involvement of the Serbian Government. "No one has ever managed to show that the Serb Government had any connection with the plot, though they may have had some vague knowledge." One person from Serbia who knew about the plot was Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević. Although he "approved the plans, he did not initiate them, or give much serious help".⁷⁰ Taylor describes the very act of assassination and the motives of the Austro-Hungarian reaction to it:

The plans of such young men are not very skilful. In fact all six of them missed their mark. Princip, the strongest character among them, was standing disconsolately on the pavement about to go home when an open car, with Franz Ferdinand in it, stopped right in front of him. The driver had taken a wrong turning and was now about to back. Princip stepped on to the running board, killed Franz Ferdinand with one shot and, mistakenly, the Archduke's wife with the other – he had hoped to kill the governor of Bosnia. This was the crime of Sarajevo. The Austrian Government were not much concerned to punish it. They wanted to punish a different crime – the crime that Serbia committed by existing as a free national state. The Austrians wanted to prove that they were

⁶⁵ See A. J. P. Taylor, *Trieste* (London: Yugoslav Information Office, 1945). The pamphlet contains 32 pages.

⁶⁶ Taylor, *A Personal History*, 239–240, 320–321.

⁶⁷ A. J. P. Taylor, *Englishmen and Others* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1956).

⁶⁸ Taylor, "The Outbreak of the First World War", 183–189.

⁶⁹ Taylor refers to Dr. Vasa Čubrilović and Cvetko Popović.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* 186.

still a Great Power and somehow to destroy Serbia. They decided to go to war with Serbia, whatever her excuses and apologies. This was the first decision which brought about the world war. The man who made it was Count Berchtold, a frivolous aristocrat, but the Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary.⁷¹

In this way, as early as the 1950s Taylor formulated his views on the role of the Sarajevo plotters and the responsibility of Austria-Hungary for the outbreak of the Great War. He also held Germany responsible for the war and identified continuity between the Second and the Third German Reichs. In this way, his ideas preceded the famous Fischer thesis. This was most obviously done in his book on German history published at the end of World War Two, under the influence of Eckart Kehr, (1902–1933).⁷² Thus he and Serbian and Yugoslav historians independently reached very similar conclusions regarding the context and meaning of the Sarajevo *attentat*.⁷³

Contribution of Vladimir Dedijer

In 1959 a special monograph appeared on the Sarajevo plot written by Joachim Remak (1920–2001), a German-American historian, and professor at the University of California – Santa Barbara.⁷⁴ Regarding the background and planning of the Sarajevo conspiracy Remak merely explored points made by Sidney Fay. He openly admits that his version of the event “can claim no more than that it is based on the most likely among several stories and on the testimony of the more credible among the witnesses, and must remain open to some amount of doubt”.⁷⁵ After relativising his work in advance Remak follows the line in which Apis “quite possibly, the foremost European expert in regicide of his time”⁷⁶ is the real organiser of the plot. In his opinion Apis belongs to a line “that begins with Robespierre and ends, for time being, with Colonel Nasser”.⁷⁷

⁷¹ Ibid. 186.

⁷² A. J. P. Taylor, *The Course of German History: a Survey of the Development of Germany since 1815* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1945).

⁷³ For Yugoslav views on the Sarajevo Assassination/*attentat* the best review may be found in an encyclopaedic entry by Croatian/Yugoslav historian Bogdan Krizman written for the semi-official *Enciklopedija Jugoslavije*: “Sarajevski atentat”, *Enciklopedija Jugoslavije*, vol. VII (Zagreb: Jugoslavenski leksikografski zavod, 1968), 141–143.

⁷⁴ Joachim Remak, *A Story of a Political Murder* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1959).

⁷⁵ Ibid. 54.

⁷⁶ Ibid. 50

⁷⁷ Ibid. 53.

He admits that he does not know when Apis supposedly decided to murder Francis Ferdinand and insinuates that he might have told the Russian military attaché Artamonov of his plans for assassination.⁷⁸ In describing what Pašić knew he takes Lj. Jovanović's statement literally.⁷⁹

The description of Princip is moderately sympathetic: "Aside from their compulsion to commit treason and murder, they really were good and kindly fellows," and were "remarkably free of bad habits".⁸⁰ Yet, in his interpretation, Princip, Grabež and Čabrinović are merely puppets since it was the Black Hand that decided that the Archduke should be murdered. The title of a subchapter "The Clean Young Assassins" is suggestive enough. The Black Hand intentionally found the Belgrade troika consisting of clean young people to camouflage the real background of the plot. "They were merely engaged in carrying out a sentence and killing an enemy."⁸¹

In a word, Remak only systematised and updated what Fay had already written thirty years earlier. It seemed as if nothing new could be found on the Sarajevo assassination. It is for this reason that the appearance of a new book in 1966 dealing with the assassination of Sarajevo, based on an unprecedented plurality of sources, made a real sensation.

The second book, that after West's travelogue, to hugely influenced Anglo-American experts of Yugoslavia was a work by the Serbian/Yugoslav revolutionary, historian and a semi-dissident Vladimir Dedijer (1914–1990). It was first written and published in English in 1966, under the title *The Road to Sarajevo*. The book was the result of many years of work during Dedijer's professorship in Britain and the United States.⁸² Dedijer first published a summary of his findings in the influential journal *Foreign Affairs* on the 50th anniversary of the assassination. The article is entitled "Sarajevo. Fifty Years After".⁸³ For the British public, Dedijer prepared a slightly condensed version of the article from *Foreign Affairs*. It was published in *The Times* and was signed "Professor Vladimir Dedijer of Harvard".⁸⁴ At that time, Dedijer had an excellent academic career in the West.

⁷⁸ Ibid. 55–57.

⁷⁹ Ibid. 71–72.

⁸⁰ Ibid. 63–64.

⁸¹ Ibid. 66.

⁸² Vladimir Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966, and London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1967).

⁸³ Vladimir Dedijer, "Sarajevo. Fifty Years After", *Foreign Affairs*, 42.4 (July 1964), 569–584.

⁸⁴ Vladimir Dedijer, "Back to Sarajevo after 50 Years", *The Times*, June 26, 1964, 13.

The fact that a Serb/Yugoslav was given the honour to extensively interpret the Sarajevo *attentat* in English should be attributed to two facts. As a semi-dissident who supported Milovan Djilas, the leading dissident in Titoist Yugoslavia, he was quite famous in Britain and the US. Additionally, his knowledge of the Sarajevo *attentat* was already well-known in the circles of historians and subject specialists in the West. Whatever the reasons, the emergence of Dedijer as a chief expert on the Sarajevo events of 1914 signified a clear shift in Western perceptions of both the assassination and its chief protagonists. Both articles appeared two years before the publications of Dedijer's monumental work and helped him gain a reputation as the leading expert on the Sarajevo assassination even before his book was published. He is one of only six Serbs or persons of Serbian origin whose biographies may be found in the famous British lexicon *Who's Who* who died between 1897 and 2000.⁸⁵

Dedijer's reputation may be gleaned from a letter he sent to *The Times* in April 1966. In the letter he compares the Irish nationalist Patrick Pearse (1879–1916), the leader of the Dublin Uprising in 1916, with Gavrilo Princip and concludes: "One could be against the methods of political struggle of Pearse and Princip, but as men of conviction, self-sacrifice and heroism, they belong to the loftiest category of primitive rebels."⁸⁶ It is difficult to imagine how much more Dedijer could contradict the mainstream British mid twentieth century perceptions of the Irish struggle for independence than by considering Pearse to be the "loftiest" man. In the letter he honoured both Princip and Pearse, and the leading British daily agreed to publish it.

In his article published in *Foreign Affairs* Dedijer clarified the aim of this future book: "The least elaborated side of the Sarajevo story deals with the assassins themselves: their psychological and intellectual characteristics, the social and political milieu in which they grew up, the interrelations between their political and personal motives, and the relations of the secret Bosnian societies with other secret societies among the South Slavs. Therefore, we have to relate the Sarajevo assassination not only to the external relations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to the character and

⁸⁵ The other five persons are two American Serbs Nikola Tesla and Michael Idvorsky Pupin, an Oxford professor John Plamenatz, the Serbian diplomat Chedomille Mijatovich, and the writer and diplomat Ivo Andrić. *Who Was Who a Cumulated Index 1897–2000* (London: A. & C. Black, 2002), 18, 216, 566, 654, 670, 805. Both Andrić and Dedijer first appeared in the annual edition of *Who's Who?* for 1963, on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Sarajevo *attentat*. *Who's Who 1963?* (London: A. & C. Black, 1963), 71, 789.

⁸⁶ Letter of Vladimir Dedijer, "Ireland's Easter Blood Bath", *The Times*, no. 56604, April 13, 1966, 13.

actions of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, but also to the problems of life and society within the two provinces.”⁸⁷ In the book Dedijer was indeed able to offer very solid and psychologically well-nuanced character sketches of the key participants in the *attentat*, based on rich archival sources and on his conversations with witnesses. In the tenth and rather lengthy chapter of the book entitled “Primitive Rebels of Bosnia”,⁸⁸ Dedijer offered portraits of leading Young Bosnians, including the key conspirators. Among others, he covered: Vladimir Gaćinović, Danilo Ilić, Gavrilo Princip and Nedeljko Čabrinović.⁸⁹ For him, the Young Bosnians “were a kind of primitive rebels, whose restlessness was rooted in the realities of their own society.”⁹⁰ For Dedijer followers of the Young Bosnia movement, including Gavrilo Princip, were some kind of poets. The latter “did not have much talent for poetry, although he wanted very much to be a poet.” On the basis of Princip’s preserved lyrics, written in the souvenir book of a Bjelašnica Mountain hut on the occasion of his visit in 1911, Dedijer was led to conclude: “He was an immensely sensitive boy, acutely aware of the things around him.” Like Gaćinović he felt “the sufferings of people around him as though they were his own.”⁹¹

Dedijer was able to create characters from key conspirators who, in this way, became closer to both scholars and general public. They ceased to be seven participants in the plot devoid of personal biographies, feelings and motives. Instead, they became historical persons deeply rooted in Bosnian and European traditions, rich in ideas and full of political and ideological contradictions. Their involvement with literature, which Dedijer powerfully described, gave a lyrical note to their biographies. The conspirators were, in Dedijer’s interpretation, victims of the ideology of liberal nationalism that they absorbed concomitantly with certain socialist and anarchist ideas. The Young Bosnians were the followers of differing European politicians and thinkers, such as Mazzini, Masaryk, Chernishevsky, and Bakunin. They were enlivened by the finest works of European literature. Friedrich Schiller’s *Wilhelm Tell* was an encouragement for their ideas of tyrannicide as well as for their anti-Habsburg feelings. They were inspired by the works of Kierkegaard, Strindberg, Ibsen, Edgar Allan Poe, Walt Whitman, Oscar Wilde, Dostoyevsky, and Maxim Gorky and even translated most of these

⁸⁷ Dedijer, “Sarajevo. Fifty Years After”, 571.

⁸⁸ Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo*, 175–234.

⁸⁹ Ibid. 177–184 (Vladimir Gaćinović); 184–185 (Danilo Ilić); 185–197 (Gavrilo Princip); 198–202 (Nedeljko Čabrinović).

⁹⁰ Ibid. 233.

⁹¹ Ibid. 193, 195.

authors.⁹² Dedijer was able to take the Young Bosnians and the Sarajevo plotters out of the realm of an impersonalised narrative that placed them within the scope of otherness for Western European readers, and to bring them within epicentre of European cultural identity. He depicted them as the product of the admixture of the social milieu of Bosnia with European political concepts and intellectual ideas. Dedijer may be credited with completing what Rebecca West had initiated. He humanised the characters of the Young Bosnians before a European, American and worldwide readership.

The popularity of this book, and translations of the original English edition into French, German, and Italian meant that details on the key Sarajevo conspirators became readily available to any interested reader in the West. A review by A. J. P. Taylor, in a prestigious fortnightly magazine *The New York Review of Books*, is a testimony of the impression that this book left on most of Dedijer's British and American colleagues. On his competence Taylor remarked: "He has recently taught at Oxford and Manchester, Harvard, and Cornell. To crown all, he is an experienced journalist who knows how to write well. No other man in the world could have written this book with such competence, such mastery of sources, and such profound detachment." He considered this book "as the first to treat the Sarajevo assassination with complete scholarly impartiality and, as often happens when a truly honest historian goes to work, it is likely also to be the last word on the subject."⁹³

Now that the key conspirators had been personalised there was an increasing interest in them including two survivors of the plot. Even before the publications of Dedijer's book, one of the conspirators gave a short statement to *The New York Times*. He was Cvetko Popović, a retired curator of the Ethnographic Museum in Sarajevo. He was accidentally interviewed by David Binder on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Sarajevo assassination.⁹⁴ After Dedijer's book, more such interviews followed. *The New York Times* published a short conversation with Prof. Vasa Čubrilović in 1973, and *The Times* interviewed another follower of Young Bosnia, Yu-

⁹² Ibid. 161–163, 178–179, 230.

⁹³ A. J. P. Taylor, "The Great Assassination. The Road to Sarajevo by Vladimir Dedijer", *The New York Review of Books*, October 20, 1966.

⁹⁴ David Binder, "Sarajevo Marking First Shot of World War I", *The New York Times*, June 28, 1964, 20.

goslav émigré Ratko Parežanin.⁹⁵ Cv(j)etko Popović became so well known that his death merited a short article published by *The New York Times*.⁹⁶

The publication of Dedijer's book signified a new epoch in which participants of the *attentat* were seen in a different light. The most obvious example of this new approach is an introductory study for the American edition of the book *July Crisis* by German historian Imanuel Geiss, 1931–2012). He was a doctoral student of the famous German historian Fritz Fischer (1908–1999), and he assisted him in formulating Fischer's hugely influential thesis on the responsibility of Germany for the outbreak on the Great War and on the continuity of elites and policies of the Second and the Third Reich. These ideas were gradually accepted in Germany and then in other major historiographies.⁹⁷ Geiss concluded that “the outrage of Sarajevo was by no means the work of the Serbian government”, it was “planned and organised by the extreme wing of Serbian nationalism, the secret society ‘Death or Unification’,” but the idea of the attempt came from the circles of Young Bosnia. Geiss concludes: “In the last analysis, the murder at Sarajevo was thus primarily the deed of Princip himself and can only indirectly be charged to the ‘Black Hand’ and virtually not at all to the Serbian government (let alone the Serbian people).” In his opinion the responsibility for the assassination falls “on the ruling class of Austria-Hungary”:

Less because it sent Franz Ferdinand into an ‘alley of bomb-throwers’ than on account of its inability to satisfy the legitimate struggle of their various nationalities for freedom, equality and social justice (a motive which is generally overlooked in the wholesale condemnation by Germany and Austria of the conspirators of Sarajevo). By their rigid adherence to outdated political and social conceptions, the traditional Powers left no room for the political agitation of the young south Slav intelligentsia who, in their desperation, were finally driven to the crime of political murder. No historical account seeking to do justice to the complicated events of July and August 1914 can any longer afford to ignore this important aspect, neglected for so long in Germany and Austria. It becomes clear that the Austrian and German governments were in fact mistaken in their assumption about the background to the outrage.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Raymond H. Anderson, “1914 Conspirator Recalls Sarajevo Assassination”, *The New York Times*, May 27, 1973; Iain Macdonald, “Sarajevo: When a teenager with a gun sent the world to war”, *The Times*, no. 59125, June 28, 1974, 18.

⁹⁶ “Cvjetko Popovic, 84, Was Jailed In '14 Killing of Austria Archduke”, *The New York Times*, June 10, 1980, 79.

⁹⁷ See on this a special thematic issue of *Journal of Contemporary History*, 48.2 (2013).

⁹⁸ Imanuel Geiss, “Origins of the First World War”, in H. W. Koch, ed., *The Origins of the First World War* (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1972), 78. Idem

One can clearly see that many of Dedijer's conclusions had effect on Geiss and he indeed quotes him in his study.

Princip in the 1960s and 1970s

In 1964 Yugoslavia was faced with the dilemma of how to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Sarajevo *attentat*. It decided to organise a series of events in Sarajevo, but also to allocate all duties about it to Bosnia and Herzegovina, a member-republic of the Yugoslav communist federation. In this way, the event would be marked but the federal Yugoslav authorities could defend themselves against possible foreign complaints by claiming that it was a local rather than a Yugoslav event. In comparison with the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which failed to send a single official to Sarajevo to attend the unveiling of the memorial plaque in 1930, and in which a chapel to the "Vidovdan heroes" in Sarajevo was only consecrated in a private ceremony in 1939, communist Yugoslavia did more. Under the communists, Princip and his fellows were commemorated in 1964 more openly, but communist Yugoslavia faced similar dilemmas to those encountered by the Kingdom. Some data suggest that communist Yugoslavia also had to take into account the remaining Western hostility for Princip and his act. The leading Belgrade daily *Politika* announced in March that a model of the statue by Afan Hozić was "temporarily placed on the river bank of Miljacka, exactly opposite the historic site." *Politika's* correspondent was full of enthusiasm, and he reported impressions of a group of citizens of Sarajevo who "were unanimous in their opinion" that "a bronze monument should be placed on the spot from which Princip fired".⁹⁹ When foreign correspondents came in June to Sarajevo they noticed no statue of Princip. It is therefore clear that the model of the statue of Princip was removed and the final version was never erected.

From reports published in *The Times* and *The New York Times* the following picture emerges. Local officials were instructed to minimise the importance of commemorations in Sarajevo. As *The Times* reported: "Some 300 persons gathered to mark and not to celebrate the occasion, as speakers were at pains to emphasize, even if the shots fired at Sarajevo had paved

"Origins of the First World War", in Imanuel Geiss, ed., *July 1914. The Outbreak of the First World War: Selected Documents* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), 53.

⁹⁹ Asim Gruhonjić, "Gde postaviti spomenik Gavrilo Principu (Pred 50-godišnjicu Sarajevskog atentata)" [Where to place a monument to Gavrilo Princip. On the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Sarajevo *attentat*], *Politika*, March 14, 1964.

the way for the unification of the south Slavs.”¹⁰⁰ In his text published on the day of the 50th anniversary *The New York Times* correspondent, David Binder, noted that Princip “is now regarded as a hero of the movement to create a South Slav state free of the heels of Austrian and Turkish boots.” He noticed that there was a bridge with Princip’s name in Sarajevo but no statue “nor are there any souvenirs with his image on sale”. Yet, Binder found it appropriate to quote the following statement of a Sarajevo man: “Make no mistake, we are proud of the event, not because it started the war, but because it was the beginning of our liberation.”¹⁰¹

What the Royal Yugoslav Government had failed to achieve in 1930 – when it had to face a series of condemnatory articles in *The Times*, in spite of its efforts to make the unveiling of the plaque to Princip in Sarajevo a fully private affair – the Yugoslav Communist Government partially succeeded to do in 1964. This was in spite of the fact that the commemorations in Sarajevo were attended by the highest communist dignitaries of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Disregarding this, Binder concluded: “The ceremonies were not even acknowledged by the Yugoslav Government, a fact that seemed to indicate that the terrorist acts of June 28, 1914, were distasteful to it.” He was even led to believe that Sarajevo, a city of 200,000 people “virtually turned its back today on the young men who made it famous 50 years ago.”¹⁰² This is exactly how the Communist Government of Yugoslavia wanted the event to be seen in the West.

Yet, Belgrade’s *Politika* informed its readers that on June 28, 1964, a commemorative session was held in Sarajevo and attended by the then Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Džemal Bijedić, and other dignitaries of Bosnia and Sarajevo. It is true that the article also mentions many foreign tourists who came to Sarajevo, but it does not mention any domestic tourists.¹⁰³ This all indicates that the commemoration got the highest possible rank within Bosnia, but that no federal officials appeared and no domestic tourists were encouraged to attend. Another correspondent of *The New York Times* was more investigative, but was not able to decode the confusion. Joseph A. Barry wrote a lengthy article for the Sunday supple-

¹⁰⁰ Our own correspondent, “Sarajevo Shooting Commemorated”, *The Times*, no. 56050, June 29, 1964, 9.

¹⁰¹ David Binder, “Sarajevo Marking First Shot of World War I”, *The New York Times*, June 28, 1964, 20.

¹⁰² David Binder, “Only a Few in Sarajevo mark 1914 Assassination”, *The New York Times*, June 29, 1964, 3.

¹⁰³ Asim Gruhonjić, “‘Mlada Bosna’ – Borac za jedinstvo srpske, hrvatske i muslimanske omladine” [Young Bosnia – fighter for the unity of Serbian, Croatian and Muslim Youth], *Politika*, June 29, 1964, 5.

ment of *The New York Times*. He noticed that Yugoslav communists found themselves in an uncomfortable position in relation to the commemoration of Princip's act. "They are embarrassed for two reasons. First, the authorities know all too well that although Princip may be a national hero of the common people of Yugoslavia, he is the young madman of World War I to the rest of the world - including the rest of the communist bloc."¹⁰⁴ In Barry's opinion, the Yugoslav Communist Party acted in a similar way to the church. The latter turned a pagan rite into St. Vitus, and likewise "the Communist hierarchy of Yugoslavia had done its best to surround Princip with an acceptable mythology - of a 'Young Bosnia' group".¹⁰⁵

As a man in charge of "discouraging foreign correspondents" Barry identified Murat Kusturica "Sarajevo's Communist Secretary of Information", who gave the impression of being a friendly person. Barry noticed that "most of this month, Kusturitsa has been meeting with municipal officials on how not to help the newspaper men pouring into Sarajevo for the anniversary story."¹⁰⁶ He interviewed one of survivors of the plot, Hamdija Nikšić, and asked him if he knew "the authorities were playing down the anniversary?" He got the following answer: "I know, because of international relations. Kings and queens still exist." He wandered around and visited a workers' café. There he learned that Sarajevo workers supported the idea that their children should be taken to visit Princip's museum.¹⁰⁷

Barry complements Binder and clarifies that the commemoration in Sarajevo in 1964 was not a private act, but also witnessed the uneasiness of the Yugoslav League of Communists regarding the whole event. For Barry, Princip is still a "madman", but things changed in the course of the next ten years. In this shift Dedijer's book played a substantial role. Through Dedijer, followers of Young Bosnia were able to tell their life stories and thanks to him their names became known to interested readers in all major Western European languages. *The Times* honoured Dedijer by asking him to contribute an article on the 50th anniversary of the assassination of Sarajevo. Ten years later the same honour was given to a friend of Princip's, one of the survivors of the plot, Ratko Parežanin. In the months preceding the *attentat* Princip had been his room-mate in Belgrade. After the Second World War Parežanin was a political emigrant, and the correspondent of *The Times* interviewed him on the occasion of the publication of his book *Young Bos-*

¹⁰⁴ Joseph A. Barry, "Sarajevo Revisited, 50 Years After", *The New York Times Magazine*, Sunday, June 28, 1964, 15.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. 16.

nia and World War One published in Munich in 1974.¹⁰⁸ The conversation was published on the very day of the 60th anniversary of the *attentat* in *The Times*, and Parežanin was introduced as “a retired Yugoslav diplomat”. His own experience from 1914 was that Serbian politicians were against the war since “they were sure it [Austria-Hungary] would fall apart in any case”. Parežanin pointed out that both he and Princip “had no idea that the result of the assassination would be war”. In obvious reference to potential linking of the assassination of Sarajevo with terrorism of the 1970s he felt obliged to offer the following explanation:

Unfortunately today’s violence takes the worst form. Money plays a role, and many of the terrorists are well paid. Princip was a very different type. He was inspired by heroism and love of his country, and was prepared to die. We were poor but idealistic. When I left Princip that day at the river he asked if I could spare what was then about sixpence so that he could buy himself a meal.¹⁰⁹

In the wake of new possibilities, the next occasion to exonerate Princip was to make a high-budget film in Yugoslavia. In March 1974, a special correspondent of *The New York Times* Malcolm W. Browne reported on the plans in Yugoslavia to make a film on Princip, and that “some Sarajevo citizens are wrestling once again with the moral issues of political killing”. The article announces that the director, Veljko Bulajić, would “seek to justify the assassination”.¹¹⁰ Browne’s conclusion on official attitudes to the film was that it “has the tacit blessing of Communist party leaders, although they are clearly still troubled by the problem of whether assassination is justified as a political tool”.¹¹¹

A favourite film director of the Yugoslav dictator, Josip Broz Tito, Bulajić entered his new joint Yugoslav-Czechoslovak project with a huge budget. In addition to actors from the co-producer’s country, he engaged the Hollywood stars Christopher Plummer to play the role of Franz Ferdinand and Maximilian Shell for the role of Djuro Šarac. The film was among twenty-one submitted for nomination for the 48th award of the American Film Academy for the best foreign movie (1976), but it was not nominated. The very fact that the film was submitted for nomination and that it was aired in the USA, Britain, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia demonstrates

¹⁰⁸ Ratko Parežanin, *Mlada Bosna i Prvi svetski rat* (Munich: Iskra, 1974).

¹⁰⁹ Iain Macdonald, “Sarajevo: When a teenager with a gun sent the world to war”, *The Times*, no. 59125, June 28, 1974, 18.

¹¹⁰ The previous Yugoslav film on Princip was made in 1968, under the title “Sarajevski atentat”. It was directed by Fadil Hadžić and Bulajić probably refers to this film.

¹¹¹ Malcom W. Browne, “Sarajevo Hails Assassin but Debates Ethics of Deed”, *The New York Times*, March 30, 1974, 2.

what a great change had happened after the publication of Dedijer's book on the Sarajevo Assassination both in Yugoslavia and abroad. Bulajić wished to repeat Dedijer's success through a film narrative. The film was known as *Atentat u Sarajevu* in Serbo-Croatian, but in English it got a pompous title "The Day that shook the world". Yet, it failed to impress Western viewers. *The New York Times* was rather clear in its verdict. The title of the review was self-explanatory: "A Quaint Film."¹¹²

The new approach in perceiving Princip was partially challenged by the rise of Arab terrorism in the 1970s, when "Black September" conducted a series of bomb attacks and hijackings. Communist Yugoslavia broke off diplomatic relations with Israel in 1967, and supported the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. For this reason the celebration of the 60th anniversary happened in less than favourable circumstances for creating a new image of Princip, who had in previous decades been seen as a terrorist and fanatic by some influential parts of the Western public. All of this found some resonance in a text published by *The New York Times*. The correspondent was probably well aware of Yugoslav-Palestinian links,¹¹³ and therefore he was interested in the official views of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia regarding the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and the celebrations of an act of individual terror by Princip. A Yugoslav official, Vice President of the communist provincial government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dr. Marko Šunić, was obviously prepared for this kind of question, and his answers were ambiguous but sympathetic to Princip.¹¹⁴

¹¹² A. H. Weiler, "Atentat u Sarajevu (1975) 'The Day That Shook the World' A Quaint Film", *The New York Times*, January 24, 1977.

¹¹³ Communist Yugoslavia had certain contacts with the Palestinian terrorist group of Abu Nidal which the State Department did not fail to notice. Through WikiLeaks we now know of the assessment of the US State Secretary George P. Shultz of December 1985: "Some countries such as Yugoslavia have been more permissive than others in allowing Abu Nidal members freedom of movement, apparently hoping that this will buy them a modicum of immunity from terrorist acts" (Cable 85STATE371963, "Abu Nidal terrorist organization", December 6, 1985). One should also add that *The New York Times* reported in 1989 that the centres of Abu Nidal's major commercial company were in Warsaw and East Berlin, with branches in eight countries including Yugoslavia. Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Abu Nidal is reportedly placed under house arrest by Libyans", *The New York Times*, November 28, 1989.

¹¹⁴ "Revolutionary movements do not condone individual acts of terrorism. Terrorism is the last resort of young people who are disillusioned and can achieve their ends in no other way... The League never approved such acts, although the idea of individual sacrifice for a cause cannot help but inspire admiration. Even today young people are inspired by Princip." Malcolm W. Browne, "Sarajevo hails Assassin but Debates Ethics of Deed", *The New York Times*, March 30, 1974.

Re-evaluation of Princip in the 1980s and 1990s

The Winter Olympics were held in Sarajevo in the year of the 70th anniversary of the *attentat*. They naturally inspired American and other journalists to make historical retrospectives. A reporter of *The New York Times* from Olympic Sarajevo noticed: "No matter who the gold medallists are here, Sarajevo will continue to be known in history mostly for the 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria that triggered World War I." Having remarked that Princip is "revered here as a hero", Dave Anderson pointed out that shoeprints embedded in the concrete where Princip "the Serbian nationalist" had stood, became "a tourist attraction similar to the shoeprints of movie stars outside a Hollywood theater".¹¹⁵ In a rare article propagating winter tourism in Sarajevo, a New York Times reporter also described his visit to Sarajevo with an unavoidable reference to Princip. As Clifford May pointed out, the first stop in touring Sarajevo "was the Museum of Young Bosnia, situated on the corner where on June 28, 1914, a 19-year-old student and nationalist by the name of Gavrilo Princip assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian and Hungarian crowns".¹¹⁶ In the 1980s Princip's image in *The New York Times* tended to be reduced to a tourist attraction.

An important event from the 1980s unfortunately failed to make an impression in scholarly circles. Thirty years after the genuine transcripts of the Sarajevo trial had been published in Serbo-Croat by Vojislav Bogićević, an English translation of this book appeared with a new preface.¹¹⁷ It received only incidental attention.¹¹⁸ By the second decade of the 21st century when the centenary revived interest in Princip this valuable publication was quite forgotten in the West.

In the 1990s the image of the Serbs suddenly became very unfavourable in the Western European and American press. The personal role of Slobodan Milošević, persecution of political opposition in Serbia, and his role in the Wars of the Yugoslav Succession (1991–1999) have all contributed to this new image. The peak of negative representations of Serbs was reached in 1993–1995, and during and immediately after the NATO intervention

¹¹⁵ Dave Anderson, "Sports of The Times; Snowflakes and Shoeprints", *The New York Times*, February 5, 1984.

¹¹⁶ Clifford D. May, "On and Off the Slopes at Sarajevo", *The New York Times*, November 27, 1988.

¹¹⁷ W. A. Dolph Owings, Elizabeth Pribic and Nikola Pribic, eds. and trans., *The Sarajevo Trial*, 2 vols. (Chapel Hill: Documentary Publications, 1984).

¹¹⁸ Mark Wheeler, "Review of The Sarajevo Trial", *The Slavonic and East European Review* 64 (Oct. 1986), 650–51.

against FR Yugoslavia in 1999. Under such circumstances the American and British media particularly targeted Serbian nationalism. For this reason any linking of Princip with Serbian nationalism of the 1990s meant his automatic ostracism, and the path for the re-emergence of his previously abandoned maniacal image was opened.

Additionally, his image was contested by two major non-Serbian ethnic groups in Bosnia. In 1997 a well-known New York Times reporter for ex-Yugoslavia Chris Hedges, graphically informed his readers about what young Serbs, Croats and Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina had learned about Princip:

‘A hero and a poet,’ says a textbook handed to high school students in the Serb-controlled region of this divided country.

An ‘assassin trained and instructed by the Serbs to commit this act of terrorism,’ says a text written for Croatian students.

‘A nationalist whose deed sparked anti-Serbian rioting that was only stopped by the police from all three ethnic groups,’ reads the Muslim version of the event.

When the Muslims, Croats and Serbs belonged to Yugoslavia under Communism, they were all exposed to the same set of history books. In them Princip was a hero.¹¹⁹

The domestic ethnification of Princip certainly had an impact on both British and American correspondents since Bosnian Serbs were almost always seen as “bad guys”. If Princip was primarily a Serb, then connecting him to contemporary “bad guys” would almost automatically follow. In the 1990s Princip clearly became a Serbian nationalist in the American media. In May 1995, an influential columnist of *The New York Times* Roger Cohen began his article written in Split by reference to “a Serbian nationalist named Gavrilo Princip”. At the end of the column he mentions “Mr. Princip” and his “latter-day followers battling for Serbian national rights in Bosnia”.¹²⁰ In this way an invisible bridge was erected between Princip and the Bosnian Serbs of 1992–1995. In some Western reviews an impression was created that there was an invisible but strong link connecting Gavrilo Princip and the Bosnian Serb army, and the Srebrenica massacre with the Sarajevo assassination. They are linked through Serbian nationalism.

There existed a false consensus in the 1990s about Princip’s identity. Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim national activists all agreed about this, and

¹¹⁹ Chris Hedges, “Sarajevo Journal; In Bosnia’s Schools, 3 Ways Never to Learn from History”, *The New York Times*, November 25, 1997.

¹²⁰ Roger Cohen, “The World: A Small Bite at the Bosnian Bullet”, *The New York Times*, May 28, 1995.

the Western press followed them. For them all, Princip was without reservation only a Serb. Indeed, he was born a Serb and was raised in an area that revered the Serbian epic tradition with poems dealing with the Battle of Kosovo. He himself knew the *Mountain Wreath* of Prince-Bishop Njegoš by heart.¹²¹ But, in the turbulent years following the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbo-Croat rapprochement began, and this strongly influenced Princip's image. Therefore all those who Serbianised Princip deprived the historic Princip of his identity as he himself defined it in the time of the Sarajevo *attentat*. Asked by the presiding judge of the panel honourable Alois/Luigi von Curinaldi: "Of what opinion are you?", Princip replied: "I am a nationalist, a Yugoslav and I am for the unity of all Yugoslavs into any state form and that they are liberated from Austria."¹²² One should add that Princip belonged to the Serbo-Croat progressive organisation of secondary school pupils that had promoted the common Serbo-Croat identity since its inception in 1911. Cvetko Popović offered valuable details on this phenomenon: "For me 'Serbo-Croats' or progressives were a completely new 'nation', and I found out about them in Sarajevo only. They declared that they were neither Serbs or Croats but both. Up until the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) there were a few of them, merely a dozen members, more Serbs than Croats. We, both Serbs and Croats, attacked them as 'traitors' of their nation... In that group was also Gavrilo Princip."¹²³ From these quotes it clearly appears that since 1912 Princip had a wider identity than just a Serbian one; that he was convinced about the national unity of Serbs and Croats, and that he actually was attracted by a common Serbo-Croat and later by a wider Yugoslav identity.

The centenary celebrations and new dilemmas

On the eve of the centenary new interest in Princip emerged in the English-speaking world. In 2012 a book by a prominent Cambridge professor Christopher Clark (1960–) appeared in which Clark attempted to reveal

¹²¹ Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo*, 259–260.

¹²² Vojislav Bogičević, ed., *Sarajevski atentat. Izvorne stenografske bilješke sa glavne rasprave protiv Gavrila Principa i drugova održane u Sarajevu 1914 g.* (Sarajevo: Državni arhiv narodne Republike BiH, 1954), 62.

¹²³ Cvetko Dj. Popović, *Sarajevski Vidovdan 1914. Doživljaji i sećanja* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 2014) [1st ed.: Belgrade: Prosveta, 1969], 19. Cf. Drago Ljubibratić, "Gavrilo Princip", in Muharem Bazdulj, ed., *Mlada Bosna*, a thematic issue of the journal *Gradac*, no. 175–177 (2010), 139.

why and how Europe went to war in 1914.¹²⁴ The introductory chapter is entitled “Serbian ghosts”. Clark points out that there are no preserved documents on the plot since “virtually all those who took part were habituated to a milieu that was obsessed with secrecy.”¹²⁵ In spite of this correct observation, he could not resist the temptation of trying to make his own reconstruction of the event.

For him Princip, Čabrinović and Grabež “had little in the way of bad habits”, they were “rich in ideals but poor in experience”. Their focus was on the sufferings of the Serbs “for which they blamed everyone but the Serbs themselves”. Sacrifice was “almost an obsession” for them.¹²⁶ In Clark’s narrative, they became the part of a network headed by Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis, the leader of the Black Hand. He issued orders to Tankosić, and the latter to Milan Ciganović, also a Black Hand member. Finally, Ciganović was the “assassins’ handler”.¹²⁷ Therefore for Clark the assassination was the work of the Black Hand. The Sarajevo cell (Mehmedbašić, Cvetko Popović and Vasa Čubrilović) was a mere camouflage “to cover the tracks of the conspiracy” and connections with Belgrade.¹²⁸ Clark accepts the possibility that the Serbian Prime Minister Pašić knew of the conspiracy and that his informant was “probably” Ciganović, but he acknowledges that “this supposition rests on indirect evidence”. If this Ciganović-Pašić link is accepted, then it becomes possible to claim that Pašić “possessed detailed and timely knowledge of the conspiracy”.¹²⁹ Clark holds that “the fissures between the structure of civilian authority and military command substantially infiltrated by the Black Hand now ran all the way from the banks of the Drina to the ministerial quarter in Belgrade.”¹³⁰ In a fragile Serbian democracy “civilian decision-makers were on the defensive”. After more than three decades of involvement in Serbian politics, Pašić was “a product of its political culture: secretive, even furtive, cautious to the point of lassitude”. His attributes helped him to survive in turbulent Belgrade politics, but also made him “dangerously ill-adapted to the crisis that would engulf Serbia after the terrorists had accomplished their mission in Sarajevo”.¹³¹

¹²⁴ Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (London: Allen Lane, 2012).

¹²⁵ Ibid. 47–48.

¹²⁶ Ibid. 50–51.

¹²⁷ Ibid. 53.

¹²⁸ Ibid. 56.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid. 58.

¹³¹ Ibid. 64.

In his book Clark serbianises Princip and the other conspirators and makes them clear Serbian nationalists. Albeit with reservations, he attributes to the Serbian government shared responsibility for the assassination. Later he modified his views. In an interview for Radio Free Europe, Clark clarified that he did not consider Serbia responsible “since she was not an accomplice in the Assassination”.¹³² He described the Sarajevo conspirators in his first English edition as “terrorists”.¹³³ After many objections from Belgrade, he softened his terminology in the German translation of his work.¹³⁴

Yet, for Clark, the Serbian government is by no means the only or even the main culprit. All key decision-makers during the July Crisis in Berlin, Vienna, Saint Petersburg, London, Paris and Belgrade headed unheedingly into war. As Clark forcefully concludes in his book they were “sleepwalkers, watchful but unseeing, haunted by dreams, yet blind to the reality of the horror they were about to bring into the world.” He insists that the outbreak of the war “is not an Agatha Christie’s drama at the end of which we will discover the culprit standing over a corpse in the conservatory with a smoking pistol. There is no smoking gun in this story; or, rather, there is one in the hands of every major character. Viewed in this light, the outbreak of the war was a tragedy not a crime.”¹³⁵ Therefore, in his final analysis, Clark leads us to the conclusion that all the governments involved in the July Crisis share responsibility for the outbreak of war.

¹³² “Kristofer Klark for RSE. ‘Srbi ne treba da se stide Gavrila Principa’. Intervju Draganu Štavljaninu” [Christopher Clark for RFE. ‘Serbs should not be ashamed of Gavrilo Princip’. Interview by Dragan Štavljanin], Radio Free Europe, June 24, 2014: <http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/kristofer-klark-za-rse-srbi-ne-treba-da-se-stide-gavrila-principa/25432649.html>

¹³³ It is important to note that the occasional references to Princip as a terrorist have also come from Russia. Dmitriy Rogozin, for many years Russian Ambassador to NATO, used Princip as a metaphor during the war in Georgia in 2008. He said that “the current position reminds me of the situation in Europe on the eve of World War One when due to a terrorist major world states came into mutual conflict”, and expressed his hope that Georgian president Saakashvili would not “enter history as a new Gavrilo Princip.” <http://www.newsru.com/russia/26aug2008/matritzareset.html> Cf. Editorial, “The Princip Precedent”, *The Guardian*, August 27, 2008.

¹³⁴ Christopher Clark clarified his revised opinion: “I still think that the organisation ‘Unification or Death’ was terrorist, but Gavrilo Princip was not a terrorist. Under this term one today assumes extremists in Iraq and Al Qaeda as a whole who do not restrain from killing women and children in trade centres and elsewhere. On the eve of World War One the word ‘terrorist’ had a different meaning and adherents of the ‘Young Bosnia’ called themselves terrorists.” “Kristofer Klark for RSE. ‘Srbi ne treba da se stide Gavrila Principa’”.

¹³⁵ Clark, *The Sleepwalkers*, 561.

The key work in English dedicated to Princip on the occasion of the centenary of the assassination was published in 2014. It was written by a former correspondent of *The Daily Telegraph* for ex-Yugoslavia, Tim Butcher (1967–). He covered events in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1990s. In 2012 he followed Princip's footsteps from his native village of Obljaj in remote South-Western Bosnia, to Sarajevo and Serbia, and back to Sarajevo. His book is a combination of travelogue, an evocation of journalist memoirs from 1990s, and a history of Gavrilo Princip. In a wind shelter on Mount Šator he left a note defining his mission: "British author in search of Princip's ghost".¹³⁶ On his way he is followed by his guide Arnie, a Bosnian Muslim who as a boy survived horrors of war and continued to live in Britain. Contemplating Arnie's fate Butcher wonders who Princip really was. "Did he belong to the few identified by Arnie who exploited nationalism for their own ends, or did he withstand the toxicity and work for something higher?"¹³⁷ He had a similar conversation with Džile who survived the Srebrenica massacre. He was undecided about Princip and asked him: "He was the Serbian guy who shot the Archduke in Sarajevo, right?... Well, if he had anything to do with the sort of Serbs who attacked Srebrenica, then I would say I had to hate him. But did he have anything to do with the guys who attacked Srebrenica?"¹³⁸

Endeavouring to answer all these questions and dilemmas, Butcher followed Rebecca West and Dedijer whose book "had been a foundation stone for researching my journey".¹³⁹ He is both a writer and a researcher. Therefore he sees Princip not only as a historical character, but also as a transformed and distorted historical symbol one century later. Writing very critically on Serbian nationalism from the 1990s, Butcher does not yield to the temptation to project this nationalism back onto the past. He tries to find the genuine Princip by removing from him interpretations laid over him by ideology and politics. At the end Butcher concludes: "He was a dreamer whose short life had exposed him to the same political streams that inspired so many others fighting for freedom from unelected, reactionary structures." Princip had "the dream of liberation", and this dream was shared by various peoples in the Balkans, by Irish nationalists, Russian revolutionaries of Tsarist era and peoples from other continents. Nationalism only later proved to be potentially toxic, but Princip, in Butcher's opinion, had a special ideal that failed. "His goal of south Slavs living together was

¹³⁶ Tim Butcher, *The Trigger. Hunting the Assassin who brought the World to War* (New York: Grove Press, 2014), 91.

¹³⁷ Ibid. 154.

¹³⁸ Ibid. 234.

¹³⁹ Ibid. 123.

ultimately not strong enough to defeat chauvinism from within his own community.”¹⁴⁰

Butcher may be credited for making an important distinction. He separated contemporary Serbian nationalism from the nationalism of Young Bosnia and Princip that was Yugoslav in nature. In the 1990s all three nations in Bosnia, though for quite opposite reasons, agreed that Princip was a Serb and not a Yugoslav. Western journalists simply took over this idea. With Butcher’s book Princip is back where Dedijer’s superb research placed him. He is a Yugoslav nationalist aiming at the unification of Serbo-Croats and other Yugoslavs.

It was Butcher who was given the honour of publishing his text on the Sarajevo assassination fifty years after Dedijer’s on the centenary of the event. In it he made a parallel between the Chilcot Inquiry, which in Britain attempted to establish how Britain found itself involved in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and an imagined similar commission that would investigate how the world went to war in 1914. The collapse of the Yugoslav dream created a narrative on Princip that views him through the filter of the events from 1990s such as Srebrenica: “History should rid itself of such filters and focus on the contemporary context when events happen. Chilcot 1914 would surely have found that Princip was not a Serbian nationalist at all but a Yugoslav nationalist, and that Vienna’s claim of Serbian involvement was but a fig leaf by Austro-Hungarian hawks to conceal their desire to invade a neighbouring country regarded as an irritant.”¹⁴¹

The Times, through Butcher’s piece, advocated the removal of filters of contemporary events in viewing the past, but *The New York Times* demonstrated that this is more than a little difficult. Two days before the centenary, the leading New York daily published a piece by John F. Burns. He noticed that Sarajevo had become “the scene of duelling efforts to define Princip’s legacy”. This legacy is viewed differently by three national communities. Serbs regard him “as a heroic fighter against Austro-Hungarian rule on behalf of Serbs first, but also, they say, on behalf of Croats and Muslims and thus as an early standard-bearer for the South Slav kingdom of Yugoslavia.” The issue is seen differently by the two other communities: “Among the largely Catholic Croats and some Bosnian Muslims, many of whom looked to the authorities in Vienna at the time of the assassination for protection against Balkan domination by the mainly Orthodox Serbs, it is more com-

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. 296.

¹⁴¹ Tim Butcher, “Was the war to end all wars based on a lie? A Chilcot-style inquiry into the First World War would uncover spin and distortion that caused the death of millions”, *The Times*, June 28, 2014, 26.

mon to condemn Princip as an anarchist or terrorist, as the Sarajevo court did when it sentenced him to 20 years imprisonment.”

Burns could not fail to notice the alternative ways of marking the centenary. “Serb hard-liners have chosen to boycott events financed by the European Union in favor of their own ceremonies, complete with new statues and mosaics of Princip and speeches and banquets in his honor.” Fifty years after *The New York Times* had quoted his father its correspondent had a conversation with the famous Yugoslav film director Emir Kusturica who, for Burns, is “the driving force behind ceremonies honoring Princip” at Andrićgrad, a suburb of Višegrad. Burns reminds us that this town [Višegrad] was the place that “suffered some of the worst Serb atrocities, including mass rapes and incinerations of whole families locked into burning homes, in the first months of ethnic cleansing in eastern Bosnia in 1992.” Through this introduction the author unavoidably makes a parallel between the Princip of 1914 and the imagining of Princip in the 1990s, and therefore the words of Kusturica at the end of the article appear ominous. For Kusturica “political assassinations have been common drivers of history”, and therefore those Westerners “who condemn Princip but supported the hanging of Saddam Hussein or the mob killing of Muammar el-Qaddafi are hypocrites.”¹⁴²

In the period between the Sarajevo *attentat* and its centenary, Princip’s image in the Anglo-American public opinion was the subject of substantial fluctuations. From Princip’s original image of a fanatic and madman in pieces by Laffan, Seton-Watson and Joseph Barry, to an idealist and primitive rebel for R. West and V. Dedijer, he has remained an assassin which in English is not too different from being a simple murderer. In many articles, he is also referred to as a terrorist. He gets a more complicated role in Clark’s narrative. He remained an idealist, but was also a terrorist in the meaning of this word used at the beginning of the twentieth century.¹⁴³

¹⁴² John F. Burns, “In Sarajevo Divisions that drove an Assassin have only begun to heal”, *The New York Times*, June 28, 2014. The quotes are from the internet version of this article: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/world/europe/in-sarajevo-gavrilo-princip-set-off-world-war-i.html?_r=0.

¹⁴³ Clark later showed some sympathies for Princip. A leading Belgrade liberal weekly *Vreme* published on its cover a photo taken by Hitler’s personal photographer Heinrich Hoffman (1885–1957). The photo has immortalised the moment when the German Fuhrer, on April 20, 1941, received the commemorative plaque set up to Princip in Sarajevo in 1930 as a birthday gift. Reacting to this discovery made by Muharem Bazdulj, Clark gave an interview to *Vreme* (“Najbolja slika oba rata. Intervju – Kristofer Klark” [The best photo of both wars – An interview – Christopher Clark], *Vreme*, no. 1192, November 7, 2013) and said: “No, Princip and his company were not sleepwalkers. They were good guys and every mother could be proud of them. They were well-mannered,

At the end, Tim Butcher decoded him as a Yugoslav inclusive nationalist, similar to the one earlier elaborated by Dedijer. In terms of otherness, this meant that from being a radical other in early interpretations, he was regarded by R. West with implicit familiarity, and was upgraded to the level of full identification with him by Tim Butcher.

One is encouraged to quote two observations made by A. J. P. Taylor. Having read Dedijer's work *The Road to Sarajevo* he had a message for historians who had previously searched for conspiracies behind the Sarajevo Assassination: "Nine-tenths of what has been written about the Sarajevo assassination turns out to be unnecessary rubbish, vitiated by the determination to discover an elaborate conspiracy somewhere. Historians apparently find it difficult to believe that some men are prepared to die, without orders or reward, for their beliefs. So it was here. The simplest explanation proves to be the true one. This is often the case."¹⁴⁴ The other remark by Taylor is from 1956, when he drew attention to a very important aspect of the July Crisis: "We know what happened between 28 June and 4 August 1914 in more detail than we know of any other five weeks in history. Indeed, if we cannot understand these events and agree about them, we shall never understand or agree about anything."¹⁴⁵ As this paper may demonstrate, historians and journalists are still occasionally in search of conspiracies and the Sarajevo *attentat* has proved to be an attractive topic for such interpretations. It is for this reason that the second part of Taylor's observation is still a warning. Are historians indeed able to understand or agree about anything? About many things they certainly are. Yet, even a century after the Sarajevo Assassination/*attentat* they do not seem to be able to agree on Princip's role in the five weeks that preceded the fatal four weeks of the July Crisis.

UDC 929Gavrilo Princip
323.2(436:439.5)
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they were not in the habit of getting drunk or running after prostitutes as students usually were. The good guys who were selflessly dedicated to their cause and became part of a tragedy." Since I had to translate both quotes from Christopher Clark's interviews back into English, some of his original wording has certainly been lost.

¹⁴⁴ Taylor, "The Great Assassination.

¹⁴⁵ Taylor, "The Outbreak of the First World War", 184.

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The Role of Concentration Camps in the Policies of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) in 1941

Abstract: The paper based on archival, published and press sources, and relevant literature presents the ideological basis and enforcement of the Croatian policy of the extermination of the Serbs and Jews in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) which had its place within the New Order of Europe. Soon after the establishment of the NDH in April 1941, the destruction process was partially centralised in a network of camps centred at Gospić. After the outbreak of a mass Serb uprising and the dissolution of the Gospić camp, a new and much larger system of camps centred at Jasenovac operated as an extermination and concentration camp from the end of August 1941 until the end of the war. In November 1941, the mass internment of undesirable population groups was provided for by law, whereby the destruction process was given a “legal” form.

Keywords: Independent State of Croatia (NDH), Ustasha, occupation, New Order of Europe, Serbs, Jews, Roma, destruction process, Holocaust, concentration camps, Gospić, Jasenovac

The establishment of the Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna Država Hrvatska* – NDH) was made possible by the conjunction of opportune political and military circumstances following the military coup of 27 March 1941 and the attack of Nazi Germany and its allies on the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on 6 April the same year. It opened the way for putting in place the Croatian ultranationalist political programme which had been taking shape since the second half of the nineteenth century. It soon became obvious that the ideological profile and political practice of the Croatian puppet state was much closer to the German Nazi model than to the Italian fascist one, even though it was from Italy that a new Croatian king, Tomislav II, was supposed to come.

The new state structure was set up surprisingly fast, mostly because it was able to rely on the administrative structures and paramilitary forces of the former Banovina Croatia.¹ After the public appeal of the vice-president of the Yugoslav government, Vladko Maček, issued upon the entry of Ger-

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¹ Banovina Croatia, an autonomous region of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia with broad powers, was created by the agreement between the Yugoslav prime minister, Dragiša Cvetković, and the leader of the Croatian nationalist movement, Vladko Maček, concluded on 26 August 1939.

man troops in Zagreb, which, by the way, were hailed with enthusiasm by the crowd that took to the streets, the former banovina authorities placed themselves at the disposal of the Ustasha regime. The significant role of the Roman Catholic Church in the inception and policies of the new state gave the latter a markedly clerical character. In the predominantly agrarian Croatian society, the Church's approval or disapproval carried crucial weight on both individual and collective psychological levels.

The newly-established NDH encompassed not only Croatia but also the areas which were neither ethnically nor historically Croatian (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Srem). This is obvious from its own population census: according to the data of the Foreign Ministry of 1 May 1941, of a total population of 6,290,300, Croats made up a little more than one-half (52.46%), while Serbs accounted for nearly one-third (1,925,000 or 30.6%). Muslims were officially subsumed under Croats, while Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Slovaks, Jews and Slovenes constituted larger minorities.²

The archbishop of Zagreb and metropolitan bishop of Croatia Alojzije Stepinac, who had been a supporter of the Croat "revolutionary movement" since 1936,³ extolled the new Croatian state as a divine creation. The archbishop saw its inception as "God's hand at work", as he put it in his circular letter of 28 April 1941 inviting the clergy of the Diocese of Zagreb to set to "the blessed work of preserving and improving the NDH".⁴ This fitted well into the Vatican's plans for expanding its jurisdiction over the "schismatics", i.e. Orthodox Christian Serbs, a goal which was supposed to be served by the creation of a large Croatian Catholic state.⁵ The annihilation of the Orthodox Serb population within the boundaries of that state, the obliteration of their identity and of all traces of their existence was supported by the Roman Catholic hierarchy and clergy. Some measure of disagreement between the Ustasha authorities and the archbishop Stepinac and some other prelates, which occasionally surfaced to public notice, was

² Fikreta Jelić-Butić, *Ustaše i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska 1941–1945* (Zagreb: SN Liber, 1978²), 106.

³ Milorad Ekmečić, *Dugo kretanje između klanja i oranja. Istorija Srba u novom veku 1492–1992* (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2007), 415, 420, 423 and 431.

⁴ *Katolički list* no. 17, 197–198; Viktor Novak, *Magnum crimen. Half a Century of Clericalism in Croatia. Dedicated to Unknown Victims of Clericalism*, vol. II (Jagodina: Gambit 2011; English ed. of the book originally published in 1948), 720–721. The archbishop's circular letter was broadcasted on the radio for a few days in a row either in its entirety or in excerpts, ensuring its messages a much wider outreach than the printed version could have.

⁵ Carlo Falconi, *Il silenzio di Pio XII* (Milan: Sugar Editore, 1965); Avro Manhattan, *The Vatican's Holocaust. The sensational account of the most horrifying religious massacre of the 20th century* (Springfield: Ozark Books, 1988²), 89–104.



the result of divergent opinions on the methods of achieving the shared goal, not on the goal itself.⁶

As long as it was not a threat to German interests, the Croatian policy on the Serbs enjoyed Berlin's undivided support. The Italians had no doubts whatsoever that orders for the destruction of Serbs were coming from the government itself.⁷ As early as 11 June 1941 the Italian 2nd Army reported that Catholic priests and monks had been leading murderous raids on Orthodox Serbs and acting as promoters of Ustasha propaganda, being

⁶ Stella Alexander, *The Triple Myth. A Life of Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac* (New York: East European Monographs, 1987), 71–72; Jonathan Steinberg, "Types of Genocide? Croats, Serbs and Jews 1941–5", in *The Final Solution. Origins and Implementation*, ed. David Cesarani (London & New York: Routledge, 1994), 183.

⁷ Davide Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire: Italian Occupation during the Second World War* (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 186–187.

convinced that the Catholic faith could not rise and grow stronger unless all Serbs were destroyed.⁸

The premises of the ideology of the pre-war Ustasha terrorist organisation, notably its anti-Serbian and anti-Jewish component, were promptly incorporated into racist policies created by the newly-established power structure. Those policies were pursued throughout the existence of the Croatian state within the New Order of Europe. State repression was dressed up in a pseudo-legal form, which opened the door to conducting a policy at the heart of which was the idea of a homogeneous state of (Muslim and Roman Catholic) Croats achieved through the extermination of Serbs, Jews and, somewhat later, Roma, as well as of politically undesirable citizens, at first Yugoslav nationalists, and then communists as well.⁹

Immediately upon the declaration of the establishment of the pro-Nazi puppet Croatia in 1941, public discourse became saturated with ultranationalist and racist rhetoric, and targeted against two main groups: Serbs and Jews, though Serbs principally.¹⁰ One may therefore speak of two Croatian nationalist-racist policies, Serbian and Jewish. Those policies, although pursued simultaneously and with the same ultimate goal, had their distinctive features, from ideological to practical. Hence the process of stigmatisation, social exclusion, dehumanisation, expropriation and extermination of the two national-racial groups was not entirely the same. Somewhat later, the annihilation project was expanded to include the Roma, with the exception of Muslim Roma (“white Gypsies”), the majority of whom lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina which had been annexed to the Independent State of Croatia.

Even though there were clear differences in the enforcement and final outcome of the policy of annihilating the “undesirable” when it comes to Serbs on the one hand and Jews and Roma on the other, the key fact is that there was a publicly proclaimed state policy of destroying all these groups and that it was pursued using all available means, depending on the circumstances and resources. That is the reason why the Croatian policy on all three groups had all elements of the crime of genocide throughout the existence of the NDH.¹¹

⁸ Ibid. 186.

⁹ Jelić-Butić, *Ustaše i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, 158–184*; Bogdan Krizman, *NDH između Pavelića i Musolinija* (Zagreb: Globus, 1983²), 117–137; Milan Koljanin, “Zakoni o logorima Nezavisne Države Hrvatske”, in *Jasenovac, sistem ustaških logora smrti* (Belgrade: Stručna knjiga, 1996), 30.

¹⁰ Krizman, *NDH*, 119.

¹¹ In the view of Tomislav Dulić, *Utopias of Nation. Local Mass Killing in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1941–42* (Uppsala University, 2005), 365, the extermination of Jews and Roma

The plan for the extermination of Serbs faced the Ustasha state with the fact that they made up about one-third of the population. Therefore, its putting into practice required full mobilisation of state institutions and resources. Besides the already existing institutions, new ones were set up with this as their main responsibility. The annihilation policy was carried out both by the Ustasha movement – its organs (central and local) and its military and police forces – and by administrative bodies, from the government and ministries down to the lower levels of public administration, counties and districts (*velika župas* and *kotars* respectively). The Croatian regular army (*domobranstvo*, Home Guard) and gendarmerie (*oružništvo*) were also assigned a role in the carrying out of the policy.¹² This is not contradicted by the fact that Croatian army officers sometimes voiced their disapproval of the methods used against the Serbs or by the occasional cases of Ustasas being disarmed by Croatian army units.¹³ The systematic and mass killing of Serbs was committed primarily by Ustasha military units (*Ustaška vojnica*) and, together with them or independently, armed civilians (“wild Ustasha” or Ustasha militia) led by local Ustasha officials.¹⁴ All of that was taking place in accordance with the general policy of destroying undesirable groups, and concrete actions were undertaken on orders orally transmitted from highest places.¹⁵

in the NDH was a genocide because a “substantial part of the population” was destroyed, while the case of Serbs is downplayed as an “attempted genocide” or ethnocide. On the other hand, Alexander Korb, *Im Schatten des Weltkrieges. Massengewalt der Ustasa gegen Serben, Juden und Roma in Kroatien 1941–1945* (Hamburg: Hamburg Edition, 2013), 259 and 268–269, argues that the crimes against Serbs were not a genocide and, what is even more shocking, that there is no evidence for a planned annihilation.

¹² More recent Croatian historiography on the Ustasha military organisation completely ignores this role of the movement’s military wing; see e.g. Amir Obhodjaš et al., *Ustaška vojnica. Oružana sila Ustaškog pokreta u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj 1941–1945*, vols. I and II (Zagreb: Despot Infinitus, 2013). Works on the Croatian regular army (*domobranstvo*) are almost equally silent on its role in the destruction of Serbs, cf. Nikica Barić, *Ustroj kopnene vojske domobranstva Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941–1945* (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2003), 84 and 455–459.

¹³ Headquarters of the Croat Legions to the Commander of the Croatian Army, Main Headquarters, Bosanski Novi, 5 Aug. 1941, published in Slavko Vukčević, ed., *Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske 1941–1945*, vol. I of *Zločini na jugoslovenskim prostorima u Prvom i Drugom svjetskom ratu. Zbornik dokumenata* (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1993), 454–456; Barić, *Ustroj*, 455–459; Ervin Šinko, *Drvarski dnevnik*, ed. Ištvan Bošnjak (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1987), 150–151.

¹⁴ Contemporary Croatian historiography tends to ascribe the crimes against Serbs to the “wild Ustasha”, cf. Barić, *Ustroj*, 455–459.

¹⁵ “Zašto je došlo do zločina u Bač jamama”, manuscript, Papers of Petar Drakulić, Muzej žrtava genocida [Museum of Genocide Victims], Belgrade; Branko Vujanović

Even though the methods, dynamic and means of the annihilation process varied, its ultimate goal was the physical destruction of the Serb population and of all traces of their group identity, notably its religious, Orthodox Christian, dimension. A series of laws banned all Serbian national symbols and institutions, followed by the seizure of their public and private property, followed by increasingly frequent murders.¹⁶ The first to bear the brunt were the cities and ethnically compact Serbian areas in the former Austrian Military Frontier (Lika, Kordun, Banija, west Slavonia and Srem), then Bosanska Krajina, Herzegovina and eastern Bosnia, i.e. the areas bordering Serbia and Montenegro. The Serb social elite was the first to be subjected to physical extermination. The Serbian Orthodox Church was outlawed, its bishops, priests and monks tortured, murdered or exiled, churches and monasteries systematically ravaged, their properties looted or destroyed. Besides priests, teachers were also seen as bearers of Serbian national identity and were subjected to ruthless repression. According to the official Croatian records of the second half of July 1941, “there still are 2,204 male and female teachers of the Greek-Eastern [i.e. Christian Orthodox] faith, and the Ministry of Education suggests that they be transferred to concentration camps”.¹⁷

The programme of the destruction of Serbs had a foreign policy dimension to it. It fitted into the Nazi German plan for an “ethnic reorganisation” of Europe aimed at the national homogenisation of the Third Reich and germanisation of the annexed parts of the occupied states. It was in keeping with that plan that Slovenes from the German-occupied part of Slovenia were expelled to the NDH and the German-occupied part of Serbia. The conference of German and Croatian representatives held in Zagreb on 4 June 1941 decided on resettling (expelling) to the German-occupied part of Serbia, apart from Slovenes, an appropriate number of Serbs from the NDH.¹⁸

Croatian anti-Serbian discourse was essentially contradictory. It denied the existence of the Serbian people as such on the one hand,¹⁹ while

& Čedomir Višnjić, *Glina 13. maja 1941. U povodu 70. godišnjice ustaškog zločina* (Zagreb: SKD Prosvjeta, 2011), 31.

¹⁶ Jelić-Butić, *Ustaše*, 158–178.

¹⁷ Vukčević, ed., *Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske*, 392–393.

¹⁸ Slobodan D. Milošević, *Izbeglice i preseljenici na teritoriji okupirane Jugoslavije 1941–1945. godine* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1981), 31–34; Tone Ferenc, *Nacistička politika denacionalizacije u Sloveniji u godinama od 1941. do 1945* (Ljubljana & Belgrade: Partizanska knjiga, 1979).

¹⁹ That was part of Croatia's official policy which Pavelić presented to Hitler at their first meeting on 6 June 1941; cf. Andreas Hillgruber, ed., *Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei*

calling for, and working on, their elimination on the other. “Theoretical” basis for the dehumanisation of Serbs were the allegedly insurmountable civilisational differences between the Croats, as an eminently western people, and the Serbs, as the embodiment of an inferior and odious “Byzantium”. Overt or oblique, such a discourse had become commonplace in Croatian public life as early as the interwar period,²⁰ and so had the thesis about the Croat people being exploited, oppressed and existentially imperilled by “greater-Serbian” Yugoslavia and the Serbs as a whole.

The discourse about the necessity of defending the very existence of the Croat people that became prevailing immediately upon the establishment of the Nazi satellite state of Croatia came down to the following: the Croat people has been released from the unnatural and deadly political framework into which it was forced in 1918, and has now returned to its natural, civilisational, ideological and racial (Germanic) setting epitomised by Nazi Germany.²¹ Unlike the NDH, the other Slavic nations that had been given a place in Hitler’s “New Order” (Bulgaria and Slovakia) neither denied their Slavic origin nor sought to relate themselves to a Germanic ancestry. Continuing the nineteenth-century legacy of Ante Starčević, the originator of exclusive Croat nationalism, the Croatian state widened its distance from the Serbs in racial terms as well.

The basic discourse was disseminated to the propaganda beat set by the central press, notably the daily *Hrvatski narod* (Croatian People). Its editorial of 11 April 1941 claimed that never in its glorious and turbulent history had the Croat people paid such a high price “in blood and wealth” as it had in Yugoslavia, laying the blame for that on the “centuries-old enemy”, the local Serb population and the Serbs in Serbia, and their helpers, and

Hitler. *Vertrauliche Aufzeichnungen über Unterredungen mit Vertretern des Auslands 1931–1941* (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard und Graefe Verlag, 1967), 577; Krizman, *NDH*, 48–49.

²⁰ Milan Koljanin, *Jevreji i antisemitizam u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1918–1941* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2008), 299.

²¹ As reported by Edmund Veesenmayer, a member of the German diplomatic staff in Zagreb, to the foreign minister Ribbentrop, on the occasion of his meeting with the designated head of the Ustasha NDH, Ante Pavelić, in Karlovac on 14 April 1941, Pavelić stated that he was going to prove that the “Croats are not of Slavic but of Germanic ancestry. And finally, he offered assurances that Hitler would not be disappointed in him” (quoted after Slobodan Milošević, *Nemačko-italijanski odnosi na teritoriji okupirane Jugoslavije 1941–1942* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1991), 47. At his meeting with Hitler on 21 July 1941, Slavko Kvaternik, commander-in-chief of the Croatian army, also insisted on a non-Slavic origin of the Croats, cf. Hillgruber, ed., *Staatsmänner*, vol. II, 612.

driving the message home with an open threat that “the just Croat people” would judge them all.²²

Both the anti-Serbian and anti-Jewish discourses drew on the thesis about the Croat people’s imperilment by the Serbs and Jews who had been working together against its vital interests. So, the Croat people was compelled to secure its future by radically removing those threats from its body. Still, on the list of Croatian enemies, the Serbs held the place of honour. Whether communists or not, they had begun to be arrested and murdered even before the mass arrests of communists that ensued after 22 June 1941. The beginning of the “crusade” against the Soviet Union marked the beginning of a large-scale internment and killing of Jews. The Jews were identified with bolshevism, one of two archenemies of humankind (the other was plutocracy, i.e. liberal capitalism).

The anti-Jewish discourse drew on traditional and modern anti-Semitism, and so did the anti-Jewish laws, starting with the “Legal Decree on Racial Affiliation” and the “Legal Decree on the Protection of the Aryan Blood and Honour of the Croat people” which were passed on 30 April 1941 and which were soon followed by a number of other anti-Semitic laws.²³ Moreover, to the accusations against the Jews yet another cardinal sin was added: collaboration with the already demonised Serbs. Anti-Serbianism/Yugoslavism and anti-Semitism had already been commonplace in the interwar papers of the Croatian extreme right.²⁴ After the establishment of the pro-Nazi Croatia they came to dominate public discourse, from the printed media to public addresses of highest state officials.

The attack of Nazi Germany, its allies and satellites on the Soviet Union gave another strong boost to the NDH’s repressive policies towards the Serbs as well as the Jews. Anti-bolshevist/anti-communist discourse introduced then would become an essential part of anti-Serbian and anti-Jewish policies too. The ideological label “communist” was attached not only to the communist opponents of the Croatian state but to all Serbs and Jews, be they communists and communist sympathisers or not. Therefore, from 22 June 1941 the policy of the destruction of Serbs and Jews was pursued in the sign of the struggle against communism in which the Croat people took part both at home and, together with the other peoples of the “New Europe”, in the East.²⁵

²² Krizman, *NDH*, 123.

²³ Ivo Goldstein & Slavko Goldstein, *Holokaust u Zagrebu* (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2001), 117–124.

²⁴ Koljanin, *Jevreji i antisemitizam*, 395–462.

²⁵ Note on the conversation that Hitler and Marshal Slavko Kvaternik had at the Führer’s Headquarters on 21 July 1941, in Hillgruber, ed., *Staatsmänner*, vol. II, 575–580.

The invasion of the Soviet Union led the Croatian leadership to mobilise all resources for the struggle for the principles of the “New Order”. The Croat people was called upon to join the struggle of the great German nation in defence of Europe against “Jewish-bolshevist savagery”, the greatest enemy of humankind and the Croat people. According to the Croat leader Pavelić’s proclamation of 2 July 1941, calling upon the people to take part in the struggle against bolshevism, the Croats had yet another important reason for joining in: “The Moscow power-holders” had made an alliance with the “Belgrade power-holders” so as “to prevent”, at the last moment, “our national liberation and save the prison of the Croat people, the former Yugoslavia”.²⁶ That was a clear allusion to the Yugoslav-Soviet agreement signed on 5 April 1941, a day before the German and Italian invasion of Yugoslavia.

From the early days of Ustasha Greater Croatia there was an effort to bring system into the annihilation process. As far as the Serbs were concerned, the process began in their ethnic areas, and the countryside. Slowly but surely, however, an increasing number of executions were carried out in the newly-established system of camps. Until the end of the summer of 1941 the elimination of the Serbian population had the form of forced resettlement to the German-occupied part of Serbia, and therefore so-called resettlement camps for Serbs operated for a few months in Sisak (Caprag), Slavenska Požega and Bjelovar. Those camps were not intended for extermination, but acts of torture were carried out in them on a massive scale, and a large number of Serbs were killed either during transportation to or in the camps.²⁷ The “resettlement-to-Serbia” formula was useful in the process of physical elimination because it served as a pretext for concentrating Serbs in one place for execution.

Forced conversion of Christian Orthodox Serb population to Roman Catholicism was no doubt the main method of obliterating their national identity and of croatisation, and it was there that the symbiotic relationship between the Ustasha state and the Roman Catholic Church found its full expression. The Roman Catholic Church’s main motivation for supporting the Ustasha state was in that the latter was radically wiping out the Orthodox ecclesiastical organisation and was keenly committed to converting the Serbs to Roman Catholicism even at the cost of their large-scale

²⁶ *Poglavnik govori*, vol. 2 (Zagreb 1941), 51.

²⁷ Miodrag Bijelić, *Sabirni ustaški logor u Slavonskoj Požegi 1941. godine* (Belgrade: Muzej žrtava genocida, 2008).

physical annihilation. Members of the Catholic clergy and religious orders performed the conversion rite with the assistance of Croatian military or police forces, under the grisly shadow of mass massacres and the aggressive anti-Serbian and anti-Orthodox propaganda campaign. It was not by chance that the “Legal Decree on Conversion from One Faith to Another” was enacted as early as 3 May 1941.²⁸ But the opportunity for conversion was not to be given to members of the Serbian social elite. In its circular letter of 30 July 1941, the Ministry of the Interior ordered that certificates of conversion from Orthodoxy to Catholicism not be issued to members of the intelligentsia, save by exception;²⁹ and the order for their transfer to the camp at Gospić followed before long. This went well with the policy of the Roman Catholic Church not to permit conversion to those who would do it out of “self-interest”, alluding to the Serbs of good financial and intellectual standing.³⁰

Nor was “voluntary” conversion to Roman Catholicism in itself a guarantee of life; sooner or later, many a “convert” ended up murdered.³¹ The main criterion for applying repression was affiliation, whether current or former, to Orthodox Christianity. In July 1941 the Ustasha Police Directorate (*Ravnateljstvo ustaške policije*) ordered the counties to compile, within fifteen days, a register not only of all local Serbs but also of all those who had ever been Orthodox.³² In that way, the religious-racial criterion was introduced into the annihilation process, because one’s Serbian descent was equated with one’s membership of the Orthodox Church regardless of one’s possible subsequent change of religion. The same criterion was applied to the Jews; namely, the change of religion was not enough to save them from annihilation.

The outbreak of a Serbian uprising in Herzegovina in early June 1941, and with full force in Lika and Bosanska Krajina in late July 1941, was a development which increasingly influenced Croatian policies. Once Serbian ethnic areas were liberated by the insurgents, among whom those of communist persuasion would prevail, the destruction process was increasingly carried out under the umbrella of military actions against the insurgents. At first carried out by Croatian forces alone, such actions were

²⁸ *Zbornik zakona i naredaba Nezavisne Države Hrvatske* (Zagreb: Ministarstvo pravosudja i bogoštovlja, 1941), 56; *Narodne novine* no. 19, 5 May 1941; “Uputa prilikom prelaza s jedne vjere na drugu”, in *Zbornik zakona*, 122; *Narodne novine* no. 37, 27 May 1941.

²⁹ Vukčević, ed., *Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske*, 412–413.

³⁰ Dulić, *Utopias of Nation*, 94.

³¹ Milan Koljanin, “Akcija ‘Diana Budisavljević’”, *Tokovi istorije* 3 (2007), 193–194.

³² Vojni arhiv [Military Archives; hereafter: VA], Fonds NDH, b. 179, no. 13/2-1.

more and more often undertaken in collaboration with German and Italian military forces.³³

The first camps in the NDH were set up within a few days of its inception. Relying on those that had been established for political opponents in the former Banovina Croatia, the Ustasha authorities soon created an entire system of camps in which the central place was occupied by the one at Gospić. Apart from the facilities at Gospić itself, the camp included a network of provisional camps and execution sites, to mention but the goriest: the environs of the village of Jadovno on Mt Velebit, and Slana and Metajna in the island of Pag.

The Gospić concentration camp was jurisdictionally under the Gospić County Police Department (*Župsko redarstveno ravnateljstvo*), but its command structure was under the authority of the NDH's central police institution, the Zagreb-headquartered Directorate for Public Order and Security (*Ravnateljstvo za javni red i sigurnost* – RAVSIGUR). In organisational and executive terms, the command structure of the camp was to come under the authority of the central Ustasha institution, the Ustasha Supervisory Service (*Ustaška nadzorna služba* – UNS), and its 3rd Office, Ustasha Defence (*Ustaška obrana*) which was charged with setting up and operating camps.³⁴ From the very inception of the NDH the camps were under the authority of the narrow circle of Ustasha leaders,³⁵ which is quite understandable given the intended role of the camps in the pursuit of the Ustasha genocidal agenda. The speed and efficiency with which the camps were set up suggests that plans had been made even before the Ustashes came to power. In the early months of the NDH, camps were set up by one of Pavelić's closest associates from the period of their emigration, Mijo Babić ("Giovanni"), a commissioner of the Ustasha Headquarters. After he was killed in an encounter with Serbian insurgents in Herzegovina in July 1941, authority over the camps, and then over the 3rd Office of UNS, was taken over by Vjekoslav Luburić ("Max"), who remained, with a break, in position until the end of the NDH.³⁶

³³ Klaus Schmider, *Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944* (Hamburg: Mittler, 2002), 89–98.

³⁴ The section on the Ustasha Defence in Obhodjaš et al., *Ustaška vojnica* (pp. 91–99), makes no mention whatsoever of the operation of the camps and the Ustasha units that secured them.

³⁵ Dušan Lazić, "Organizacija policijsko-obaveštajne službe 'Nezavisne Države Hrvatske'. Ustaška nadzorna služba", *Zbornik za istoriju Matice srpske* 7 (1973), 144 and 176–177; Mirko Peršen, *Ustaški logori* (Zagreb: Globus, 1990), 76.

³⁶ Lazić, "Organizacija", 144 and 176–177; Peršen, *Ustaški logori*, 76; Koljanin, "Zakoni o logorima", 24–25.

The Ustasha Supervisory Service established under the law of 16 August 1941³⁷ was divided into four *branches*: 1) Ustasha Police; 2) Ustasha Intelligence Service; 3) Ustasha Defence; and 4) Ustasha Personnel Office. At the head of UNS was the *Ustasha supervisory commander* appointed by and accountable to the *Poglavnik* (title of Ante Pavelić, after the Nazi example, meaning a “leader”). The position was held by Eugen Kvaternik (“Dido”). Even though UNS ran affairs that fell in the purview of the police, it was independent of the Ministry of the Interior and answerable to Pavelić himself through the *Ustasha supervisory commander*, whereby the powers of Eugen Kvaternik, who had been holding the post of “director for public order and security for the NDH” (RAVSIGUR) since 7 May 1941, became even broader. He was vested with the power to exercise control “over the operation of the police districts in all branches of the police service”.³⁸ RAVSIGUR was the central police institution of the NDH. Formally part of the Ministry of the Interior, it was detached from it under the law on the government of the NDH of 24 June 1941.³⁹

Since the only purpose of internment in Gospić was the physical destruction of the interned, Gospić falls into the category of extermination camps (*Vernichtungslager*).⁴⁰ Gospić and Lika were chosen as the location for such a camp for several reasons. They had a great symbolic significance for Croat extreme nationalism and for the Ustasha organisation itself. Ante

³⁷ “Zakonska odredba o ustaškoj nadzornoj službi”, *Narodne novine* no. 111, 26 Aug. 1941; *Zbornik zakona*, 1941, 483. The *Zbornik zakona* published a second version of the law because the initial one, published in the *Narodne novine* no. 110, 25 Aug. 1941, gave UNS disproportionately broad powers, which met with opposition from other Ustasha structures. Jelić-Butić, *Ustaše*, 111–112; Lazić, “Organizacija”, 144–147.

³⁸ “Odredba o osnivanju Ravnateljstva za javni red i sigurnost za Nezavisnu Državu Hrvatsku”, Zagreb, 4 May 1941, *Narodne novine* no. 21, 7 May 1941; *Zbornik zakona*, 1941, 61; D. Lazić, “Organizacija policijsko-obaveštajne službe ‘Nezavisne Države Hrvatske’. Ravnateljstvo za javni mir i sigurnost”, *Zbornik za istoriju Matice srpske* 6 (1972), 184–189.

³⁹ “Zakonska odredba o državnoj vladi Nezavisne Države Hrvatske”, *Narodne novine* no. 59, 25 April 1941; *Zbornik zakona*, 1941, 204–208. Under art. 5 of the law on the division of the ministries into departments and on the purview of the departments (*Narodne novine* no. 99, 11 Aug. 1941), RAVSIGUR was reattached to the Ministry of the Interior as one of its two departments but was not under direct authority of the minister; *Zbornik zakona*, 1941, 381–393. The law stipulated that RAVSIGUR collaborate with UNS in all matters of public security, even though UNS was not established by law until a week later. In fact, RAVSIGUR was, as it were, the executive organ of UNS; Lazić, “Ravnateljstvo za javni mir i sigurnost”, 186–187, has a somewhat different view of the position of RAVSIGUR in relation to the Ministry of the Interior.

⁴⁰ *Encyclopedia of the Holocaust*, ed. Israel Gutman, s. v. “Extermination camps” (New York: Macmillan Pub. Co., 1990), 461.

Starčević and many prominent members of the Ustasha movement, including Ante Pavelić, were natives of Lika. The Ustasha terrorist attack on the Yugoslav gendarmerie post in the village of Brušani, assisted by Italy (from Zadar), in 1932, had been mythologised and celebrated as “the Lika Uprising”. The Ustasha organisation had already had fairly strong footholds in Lika, and agrarian overpopulation and poverty combined with religious fanaticism and militarist tradition ensured fast mobilisation. Last but not least, a convenience for the planned destruction of Serbs was the karst terrain of Mt Velebit with its many sinkholes suitable as mass execution sites. The importance of Gospić was emphasised by granting the municipality of Gospić the status of a city on 24 June 1941.⁴¹ On that same day, the largest camp in the Gospić system of camps was set up near the village of Jadovno, and a day later the Slana camp in the island of Pag received its first prisoners.

In the Ustasha system of concentration camps whence the road led to Gospić were the camps in Koprivnica (“Danica” factory) and Zagreb (“Zagrebački zbor”, a fairground facility). Political opponents were mostly held in prisons (Kerestinec and Lepoglava).⁴² There were also smaller camps and temporary detention facilities (in Petrinja, Jablanica, Trebinje, Mostar, Sarajevo and Kruščica), where mass killings occasionally took place.⁴³ As for the “final solution to the Jewish question” in pro-Nazi Croatia, it should be noted that the annihilation process was carried out in camps almost without exception. The Holocaust in the NDH began at the Gospić camp, was for the most part carried out at the Jasenovac camp, and was completed in the Nazi death camp of Auschwitz in August 1942 and May 1943.⁴⁴

The large-scale incarceration of Serbs and Jews was stepped up in the second half of June 1941, which coincided with the beginning of the war in the East and the propaganda campaign against Bolsheviks and their domestic following. To forestall mass protests expected to take place on St Vitus Day (28 June), the Serbian traditional holiday and historically important date, Croatian authorities made a mass arrest of hostages, mostly distinguished Serbs. Some were subsequently released, only to be become

⁴¹ “Zakonska odredba o proglašenju općine Gospić gradom”, *Narodne novine* no. 58, 24 June 1941; *Zbornik zakona, 1941, 197*.

⁴² Peršen, *Ustaški logori*, 40–75.

⁴³ Report of Major Nikola Mikec to State Directorate for Reconstruction, Zagreb, 7 Aug. 1941, in Vukčević, ed., *Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske*, 473–475.

⁴⁴ Holm Sundhausen, “Jugoslawien; Der ‘Unabhängige Staat Kroatien’ (einschliesslich Dalmatiens)”, in Wolfgang Benz, ed., *Dimension des Völkermords. Die Zahl der jüdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1991), 321–326.

the target of repressive measures: they would be interned in camps or “go missing”.⁴⁵

All those measures, including internment in camps, were sanctioned by law. Two days before St Vitus Day, on 26 June 1941, an *Extraordinary Legal Decree and Order of the Poglavnik* was issued. It guaranteed the inviolability of life and property to “a part of the population”, i.e. Serbs, with reference to the rumours that they would be subjected to persecution on 28 June. Whoever should commit “any violence against the life or property of any citizen or member of the Independent State of Croatia” would be tried by courts-martial. That this was an attempt to pacify the Serbian revolt may be seen from the following provision: wherever “chetniks or remnants of the Serbian army” should appear, local authorities should promptly call upon the assistance of the gendarmerie, Ustasha units and, in the last resort, the Croatian army against them, using “cold weapons and firearms”.⁴⁶

The law of 26 June 1941 was not directed only against the Serbs but also against the Jews. Its wording made use of standard anti-Semitic stereotypes about Jews spreading false news (a derivative of the accusation that the press was in Jewish hands and spread their destructive ideas) and preventing the supplying of the population by their speculative transactions. In line with the notion of collective responsibility, the Jews were declared guilty of those crimes as a group, and punished accordingly: by being sent to “open-air detention facilities”.⁴⁷

The importance that was attached to the decree of 26 June 1941 is obvious from the fact that an Order issued the same day by the interior minister Andrija Artuković required that its text be published on the front pages of newspapers for three days in a row, aired on the radio three times a day (in the morning, noon and evening), placarded in all towns, and announced in all municipalities. The order ended with a request of ecclesiastical authorities to convey the law “to spiritual shepherds”, i.e. priests.⁴⁸ On the day of their promulgation the law and the order were published in the *Katolički list* (Catholic Newspaper) as well, accompanied by the archbishop Stepinac’s instruction to the parish priests “to make the above law known to people from the pulpit on the earliest occasion, that is, when the congrega-

⁴⁵ Vukčević, ed., *Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske*, 233–290; S. Skoko, “Zločini genocida Nezavisne Države Hrvatske u Hercegovini tokom 1941”, in R. Samardžić, ed., *Genocid nad Srbima u II svetskom ratu* (Belgrade: Muzej žrtava genocida & Srpska književna zadruga, 1995), 266–274; Krizman, *NDH*, 64.

⁴⁶ “Izvanredna zakonska odredba i zapovjed”, *Narodne novine* no. 60, 26 June 1941; *Zbornik zakona, 1941*, 212–213.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Zbornik zakona, 1941*, 213.

tions gather in full attendance in church”.⁴⁹ The role of the Roman Catholic Church in propagating the law ensured not only its dissemination but also its acceptance. The fact that the law was backed by the authority of the Church brings to light the latter’s role in the carrying out of state policies.

By the beginning of July 1941, the stated policy of destruction of the Jews had been largely put into effect. In that respect, the highest officials had been given clear instructions from the top. In his address to the county prefects and Ustasha functionaries of 30 June 1941, Pavelić announced the imminent elimination of the Jews from Croatian society: “Jews cannot and must not stay in our midst; amidst the Croatian people; for all the reasons known to you, including the reason that they have done so much wrong to the Croat people.”⁵⁰

By July 1941 the system of camps centred at Gospić had been fully operational and integrated into the destruction process. On 8 July 1941 RAVSIGUR ordered all police departments that, when it should be required by the interest of public security, all “Greek-Easterners” (i.e. Serbs) and Jews be sent to the Gospić police department, i.e. to the camp of that department, and not any more to the camp “Danica” in Koprivnica. The order also applied to those who had converted to Roman Catholicism after 10 April 1941.⁵¹ The destruction process was thus stepped up because now Serbs and Jews were sent directly to Gospić. From then on, the camp at Koprivnica served for the internment of opponents of the regime, political above all.

The attitude of Ustasha authorities towards the communists tended to depend on their nationality. That it was so may be seen from the Ustasha police order of 23 July 1941 not to send Catholics and Muslims to Gospić,⁵² which implies that to be sent to Gospić meant a death sentence. The Muslim and Croat communists were exempted, at least temporarily, even though some groups of arrested communists were sent to Gospić nonetheless.⁵³ There followed new orders on sending Serbs to the Gospić concentration camp, both those intellectually prominent and those suspected, even if unproven guilty, of communist affiliation. The same applied to Jews. The arrest of Muslims and Croats of communist allegiance was still required, but they

⁴⁹ *Katolički list* no. 25, 26 June 1941, 285–286.

⁵⁰ *Poglavnik govori*, vol. 2, 42.

⁵¹ VA, Fonds NDH, b. 180, no. 10-1.

⁵² VA, Fonds NDH, b. 189, no. 31/7-1, Circular letter of the Ustasha Police Directorate, Zagreb, 23 July 1941; *Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske*, 366.

⁵³ *Kotar Gospić i kotar Perušić u narodnooslobodilačkom ratu 1941–1945* (Karlovac: Histo­rijski arhiv Karlovac, 1989); Peršen, *Ustaški logori*, 53.

were to be detained in the place of arrest, while the Serbs and Jews were to be sent to Gospić straight away.⁵⁴

Word about the existence of camps in Gospić, Jadovno and the island of Pag, and about Serbs and Jews being killed there en masse, spread relatively fast. It was brought to occupied Serbia by refugees and exiles from Croatia. Based on their accounts, the Serbian Orthodox Church compiled an exhaustive memorandum and, in early August 1941, it was presented to the German Military Commander of Serbia, General Danckelmann. It contained comparatively detailed data about the camps at Gospić and Jadovno and about the terror and death suffered by Serbs in them.⁵⁵ As the memorandum soon reached the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London, and was published in the *Amerikanski Srbobran* (American Srbobran), the crimes that were being committed in the Gospić camp became known to a broader public. Presented with information about the mass incarceration of Jews in the camp in the island of Pag in early September 1941, the World Jewish Congress appealed to the Yugoslav government for help in relieving the situation of the imprisoned.⁵⁶ Italian military representatives had much more detailed information about the concentration camps in Gospić and the island of Pag. Italian army commands reported in detail on mass and horrendous crimes against Serbs, but were under strict orders not to interfere in the internal affairs of their Croatian ally.⁵⁷ The course of events, however, would soon compel them to make a radical change of policy.

The Roman Catholic Church and the archbishop Stepinac himself took an active part in promoting and propagating the law of 26 June 1941, the law which, among other things, provided for “open-air” internment. Yet, less than a month later, Stepinac reacted, in his own way, to the news of Serbs and Jews being, “occasionally”, mistreated during transportation to and in the camps. Without questioning the justifiability of the internment of the Serbs and Jews, including the children, the elderly and the sick, Stepinac’s letter to Pavelić of 21 July 1941 pleaded for a more “humane and considerate way” of transportation to and treatment in the camps.⁵⁸ Although the archbishop was no doubt aware of the mass expulsion and killing of priests

⁵⁴ VA, Fonds NDH, b. 169, no. 8/2, Circular letter of the Directorate for Public Order and Security, Zagreb, 23 July 1941.

⁵⁵ VA, Fonds NDH, b. 312, no. 17/1; *Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske*, 594–625.

⁵⁶ Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia; hereafter AJ], Fonds (no. 371) Legation of Yugoslavia to the USA, 208, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to Royal Legation in Washington, London, 18 Sept. 1941, conf. no. 6355.

⁵⁷ Rodogono, *Fascism’s European Empire*, 186.

⁵⁸ *Fontes. Izvori za hrvatsku povijest*, vol. 2 (Zagreb: Hrvatski državni arhiv, 1996), 266 and 291.

and monks of the Serbian Orthodox Church, seventy-two of whom were murdered in the Gospić camp alone, he had never stood up for them.

Different indicators of the structure of the imprisoned in the Gospić concentration camp make it possible to trace the dynamic of the destruction process and to identify some of its essential features. In the earliest period of its existence, most Serb prisoners were male, ranging in age from older boys to old men. By social status, they were predominantly members of the social elite. Most of the imprisoned Jews were youths, i.e. members of the community's most vital part. In the second phase of the camp, from July to August 1941, all other categories of the Serbian population, women and children, were also interned, less so the Jews. This is corroborated by the statistics established by Djuro Zatezalo.

According to the research done by Djuro Zatezalo, of a total of 42,246 persons deported to the Gospić camp as many as 40,123 (94.97%) were murdered, of whom 38,010 (94.73%) were Serbs, 1,988 (4.95%) Jews and 155 (0.28%) others. Of a total of 10,502 identified victims, 9,663 (92%) were Serbs of both sexes, including 1,014 children up to the age of fifteen. Among the 762 (7.25%) identified Jewish victims there were 15 children. It is indicative that there were no children in the other groups of identified victims (77, or 0.74%).⁵⁹ The most numerous of the latter groups were Croats (55, or 0.52%), who were victimised for their political allegiances, but these did not entail the internment of their family members. Unlike them, the Serbs and Jews were subjected to total destruction as collectives, which explains the presence of women and children in those two groups of prisoners.

The list of identified victims,⁶⁰ however incomplete, permits some conclusions as regards the dynamic of the destruction process in some regions of the Ustasha state. The largest number of victims came from the region of Lika, and the part of it which was in relative proximity to the camp itself. Of the total of 10,502 victims, 4,335 (41.28%) came from Lika, mostly from Gospić/Perušić District, followed by the districts of Korenica, Ogulin and Otočac. The number of victims from Donji Lapac District, where Serbs accounted for the vast majority of the population, was conspicuously small. In the course of July 1941, Ustasha and Croatian army units joined by armed Croat and Muslim peasants were systematically destroying the Serbian population of this district in order to break up the continuous ethnic area that it formed with neighbouring Bosanska Krajina. From 1 July to 10 August 1941, in this and adjacent districts 3,500 persons, mostly women,

⁵⁹ Djuro Zatezalo, *Jadovno. Kompleks ustaških logora 1941*, vol. 1 (Belgrade: Muzej žrtava genocida, 2007), 373.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 422–732. The author specifies the names of the identified 10,502 victims, as well as the place of residence and the place and time of violent death.

children and elderly, were killed in a most cruel way. In early August 1941, 560 Serbs from Smiljan, the native village of Serbian-American inventor Nikola Tesla, were slaughtered. It was in the area of Donji Lapac and Bosanska Krajina that a mass uprising broke out on 27 July 1941, spreading fast to the neighbouring Serb-inhabited areas.⁶¹

Nor was western Slavonia spared, notably Grubišino Polje, Pakrac and Križevci, with its 985 (9.38%) identified victims. From the regions of Banija and Kordun, including the towns of Sisak and Karlovac, there were 879 victims (8.73%), followed by Zagreb (460), Mostar (440), Bosanska Krupa (201), Travnik (188), Sarajevo (179), Slavonski Brod (150), and other places.

It is obvious that the destruction process in the NDH, apart from urban areas, towns and cities, targeted ethnically compact Serbian areas, in particular Lika and western Slavonia. There were also local destruction centres, and most Serbs from a particular region were killed there without ever being transported to Gospić. The number of victims from the Cazin (104) and Bihać (43) areas is markedly small, which may be explained by the fact that the destruction of local Serbs was carried out mostly in those two towns and their environs (execution sites Garavice, Mehino Stanje etc.), and with a mass participation of local Muslim population.⁶² Much the same goes for the regions of Banija and Kordun from where a relatively small number of people were sent to Gospić. The largest regional destruction centre was Glina and its environs.⁶³

The Gospić concentration camp occupied a central place in the initial phase of the extermination of the Jews (Holocaust). The first to be targeted were the largest Jewish communities, above all the Zagreb one: of the 762 identified Jewish victims, nearly one half, 369 (48.42%), came from Zagreb. The communities of Karlovac and Križevci suffered stronger blows relative to their size (45 and 33 victims respectively). It is indicative that the large Jewish community in Sarajevo was not yet targeted, as shown by a total of 25 identified victims.

Even though the only purpose of the Gospić camp was the carrying out of the destruction programme, i.e. incarceration and killing, a germ of yet another purpose of the Ustasha camps began to take shape. Under the strict watch of Ustasha guards, internees from the camp facility known as

⁶¹ Gojko Vezmar, *Ustaško-okupatorski zločini u Lici 1941–1945* (Belgrade: Muzej žrtava genocida, 2005), 152–182.

⁶² VA, Fonds NDH, b. 153a, no. 23/1-1, Report of the Ministry of the Interior of the NDH, 10 Aug. 1941; *ibid.*, Ministry of the Interior of the NDH to the Ministry of Justice and Religion, 24 Sept. 1941.

⁶³ Djuro Aralica, *Ustaški pokolji Srba u glinskoj crkvi* (Belgrade: Muzej žrtava genocida, 2010); Pero Drakulić, *Korak do smrti* (Zagreb: Srpsko narodno vijeće, 2014), 18–45.

Ovčara (seized property of the Serbian Maksimović family), mostly women and children, worked in the fields of the Serb owners who had been either murdered or managed to flee. Some prisoners, mostly Jews, crushed stone on the road or swept the streets in Gospić.⁶⁴

Speaking of the camps where the policy was being put into effect of mass destruction of ethnic, religious, national and racial groups within the “New Order of Europe” under the dominance of Nazi Germany, the Gospić concentration camp had priority. The beginning of the “crusade” against the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 marked the beginning of the mass and systematic killing of Jews on occupied territories,⁶⁵ ushering in the last and most horrible phase of the Holocaust: extermination. It was unleashed in its full magnitude at the end of 1941 and beginning of 1942, when death camps in occupied Poland were set in operation one after another.⁶⁶ In the NDH the Holocaust had by then been for the most part completed, in accordance with the available means and resources of the Ustasha state. The NDH’s manufacture of death centred at Gospić, and from August 1941 at the concentration camp of Jasenovac, had preceded Nazi Germany’s industry of death centred in occupied Poland.

As the Serbian uprising was growing in number, as of 15 August 1941 the Italian High Command began the reoccupation of a considerable part of the NDH (“Zone II”), where the Gospić camp was located.⁶⁷ As a result, Ustasha authorities were compelled to dissolve the camps in the island of Pag and Gospić, and on 19 August 1941 the prisoners were transferred to a makeshift camp at Jastrebarsko. On 2 September the Jewish and Serbian women and children were transferred from Jastrebarsko to the Kruščica camp near Travnik, and thence to the Loborgrad camp in Hrvatsko Zagorje.⁶⁸ The Jewish and Serb male internees were transported from Jastrebarsko to the Jasenovac railway station, and thence to the newly-established camp near the village of Krapje. That was the first in the Jasenovac system of camps, and it was designated as Camp I. Preparations for

⁶⁴ Zatezalo, *Jadovno*, vol. 1, 155 and 162–163.

⁶⁵ Richard J. Evans, *The Third Reich at War 1939–1945* (London: Allen Lane, 2008), 217–259.

⁶⁶ Saul Friedländer, *The Years of Extermination: The Nazi Germany and the Jews 1939–1945* (New York: Harper Collins Pub., 2008), 294–560.

⁶⁷ Dragan Nenezić, *Jugoslavenske oblasti pod Italijom 1941–1943* (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut VJ, 1999), 98–101; H. James Burgwyn, *Empire on the Adriatic. Mussolini’s Conquest of Yugoslavia 1941–1943* (New York: Enigma Books, 2005), 72–75.

⁶⁸ *Zločini fašističkih okupatora i njihovih pomagača protiv Jevreja u Jugoslaviji* (Belgrade: Savez jevrejskih opština Jugoslavije, 1952), 74–76; Nada Trninić Šević, *U ustaškim logorima* (Novi Sad, Petrovaradin: Alfagraf, 2004), 29–65.

its establishing had begun on 24 July 1941 at the latest, which is the date when the Amelioration Directorate made an order for timber “for building wooden barracks in Jasenovac”.⁶⁹ At the same time or soon afterwards, yet another camp, Camp II, was set up near the village of Bročice. Only a month later, on 23 August 1941, the daily *Hrvatski narod* reported the completion of the barracks for workers who would be draining Lonjsko Polje. As it turned out soon enough, drainage work was just a front for the mass torture and killing of the imprisoned.

Command over the camps at Krapje and Bročice was headquartered in the village of Jasenovac, and every camp had its own command structure as well. The camps were guarded by members of the same Ustasha units that had guarded the Gospić camp. The Krapje and Bročice camps soon began to receive new groups of arrestees from various part of the NDH. Apart from Jews and Serbs, among them were also Croat communists and other antifascists.⁷⁰ In October 1941 the number of prisoners rose to between 4,000 and 5,000. The living and working conditions were horrendous. The prisoners building a levee along the river Strug were given only most primitive tools to work with, and many of them were killed on the site or died from exhaustion and diseases which soon began to spread. The situation was aggravated by heavy rains and the locations of the camps were threatened by floods.⁷¹

A new concentration camp began to be set up in the east part of predominantly Serb-inhabited Jasenovac on 20 October 1941. Prisoners from Bročice were taken daily to the site to build the fence and the levee. The camp made use of the buildings on the seized estate of the Serbian Bačić family which consisted of a large brickyard, sawmill, flour mill and chain factory. The transfer of prisoners from Krapje and Bročice to the newly-established camp was preceded by a large-scale killing. Thus, the number of prisoners transferred by 20 November was not greater than about 1,500 people. The estimated total deaths in those two camps range between 8,000 and 12,000 people.⁷²

The camp at Jasenovac itself was known as Camp III (*Cigłana*, “Brickyard”) or Concentration Camp III. It was to become the largest camp in the

⁶⁹ Nataša Mataušić, *Jasenovac 1941–1945. Logor smrti i radni logor* (Jasenovac – Zagreb: Spomen područje Jasenovac, 2003), 30.

⁷⁰ Ilija Jakovljević, *Konclogor na Savi* (Zagreb: Konzor, 1999), passim.

⁷¹ *Zločini u logoru Jasenovac* (Zagreb: Zemaljska komisija Hrvatske za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača, 1946), 4 and 40–41.

⁷² Antun Miletić, *Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac 1941–1945. Dokumenta*, vol. I (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga & Jasenovac: Spomen područje Jasenovac, 1986), 20; and vol. II, 898–900.

Ustasha system of camps, assigned to play the central role in pursuing the NDH's repressive policies. It was conveniently located near main routes and connected with the Zagreb–Belgrade railway by an industrial branch line. The river Sava ran just past it and the confluence of the Una and Sava rivers was not far away. Being set up in a flat floodplain, it was relatively easy to secure. Moreover, strong military and police forces were stationed comparatively near. On top of all that, the camp was near the main Serb-inhabited areas, and in the vicinity of cities where most of the Jewish population was concentrated.

The organisation of the concentration camp at Jasenovac was accompanied by setting up the Command Headquarters of Concentration Camps as part of the Ustasha Defence, i.e. of the 3rd Office of the Ustasha Supervisory Service. The camp's official name, the one on its seal, was "Ustasha Defence, Command of Jasenovac Concentration Camps". In fact, the camp was hybrid in nature because its two main purposes were the destruction of undesirable population groups and the use of slave workforce, which amounted to destruction by backbreaking labour. In that respect, Jasenovac was no different from large German concentration camps, notably Auschwitz, which had the same purpose. Since the camp's main purpose was destruction, it may be classified as concentration and/or extermination camp.⁷³

During the setting up of Camp III at Jasenovac, the question of internment was "legally" regulated:⁷⁴ the *Legal Decree on Forced Confinement of Objectionable and Dangerous Persons in Concentration and Labour Camps* of 25 November 1941 specified in detail who was to be sent to a camp and for how long, which authority was responsible for establishing camps and deciding on internment in a camp, and who was responsible for internal organisation in a camp. Quite in line with the earlier Ustasha legislation, notably with the *Legal Decree on the Defence of People and State* of 17 April 1941, it specified which authority was responsible for setting up, and sending to, camps: "Objectionable persons who are a danger to public order and security or who might endanger the peace of mind and tranquillity of the Croat people or the accomplishments of the liberation struggle of the Croat Ustasha movement may be subject to forced internment in concentration or labour camps. Authorised to set up these camps in particular places in

⁷³ Friedländer, *Years of Extermination*, 337 and 495. Evans, *Third Reich at War*, 159, classifies the Ustasha camps as concentration camps, but notes that their role was not to confine opponents of the regime, but to destroy ethnic and religious minorities. At any rate, the camp at Jasenovac cannot be classified as a "death and labour camp" as it is in Mataušić, *Jasenovac*.

⁷⁴ *Zbornik zakona, 1941*, 868–869; *Narodne novine* no. 188, 25 Nov. 1941.

the Independent State of Croatia is the Ustasha Supervisory Service.” Even though the camps had been under the administration of Ustasha police and military forces from the very inception of the NDH, it was only in this law that the central role of the Ustasha police and security apparatus in establishing and managing the camps was expressly mentioned.

The length of internment as specified by the law was not less than three months and not more than three years, but the head of the Ustasha Supervisory Service, the *Ustasha supervisory commander*, was authorised to shorten it at any time. That the latter provision had only a nominal and propaganda character may be seen from other sources which show that internment was frequently prolonged and practically never shortened. Those subjected to three years of forced internment were usually murdered immediately upon arriving in the camp, and the same fate would soon befall most of the others.⁷⁵

It is obvious from the law that the whole procedure, from arrest, detainment and interrogation to internment decision, was in the hands of the Ustasha police, and that it was to them that all bodies of authority were to report all persons liable to internment under the law. Even though the law required that a prior interment decision be issued by the police, ample sources show that huge numbers of people, above all Serbs, Jews and Roma, were deported to the concentration camp of Jasenovac and immediately executed without any prior police decision.⁷⁶ Just as the Ustasha police had in their hands all matters preceding the internment, which can be seen from the law, so the Ustasha Defence had in its hands all matters following the arrival of internees in a camp, which cannot be seen from the law. The person responsible for the enforcement of this law was the head of UNS, *Ustasha supervisory commander* Eugen Kvaternik, which means that he was directly carrying out the state policy of terror. His main tool was the Ustasha Defence, i.e. the 3rd Office of UNS, which administered all camps of the Ustasha state.⁷⁷

With the enactment of the law on interment in camps, the procedure for the treatment of undesirable groups, from arrest to execution in camps, became fully regulated. The whole procedure was in the hands of two executive institutions, RAVSIGUR and UNS, whose head, Eugen Kvaternik, was directly answerable to the head of state himself, *Poglavnik* Ante Pavelić. What seems to follow as an inevitable conclusion is that the policy of extermination of the Serbs, Jews and Roma was shaped by the very top of the

⁷⁵ Miletić, *Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac*, vol. I, 30.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ Lazić, “Organizacija”, 176–177; Jelić-Butić, *Ustaše*, 185; Miletić, *Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac*, vol. I, 17.

Croatian fascist state and pursued under its direct control. All mechanisms, from institutional to legal, necessary for carrying out that genocidal policy were set in place in the course of 1941, and the central role in it was assigned to extermination camps, at first at Gospić and then, from the autumn of 1941 until the end of the war and the Ustasha state, at Jasenovac.

The exact number of people murdered at Jasenovac has never been reliably established, nor has a serious effort ever been made to do that. Yet, the historians who rely on contemporary sources have no doubts that the number amounts to hundreds of thousands of victims. Even though the sources usually provide estimates for the total number of victims in the NDH, Serbian above all, there is no doubt that most victims were murdered at Jasenovac. As early as the end of summer 1941 German military and police authorities had estimates of about 200,000 murdered Serbs in the NDH.⁷⁸ In October 1942 the German Plenipotentiary General in the NDH Edmund Glaise von Horstenau described Jasenovac as the most horrible concentration camp in the NDH in which thousands and thousands of its citizens were being murdered.⁷⁹ In his memorandum of 27 February 1943 the Commander-in-Chief in the South-East Alexander Löhr quoted the Ustasha figure of about 400,000 murdered Orthodox Christians in the NDH.⁸⁰ In his report to Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler of mid-March 1944, Waffen-SS Major-General Ernst Fick stated that the Croat party troops Ustashes were known for having murdered in the most cruel way between 600,000 and 700,000 persons of different religious and political affiliations.⁸¹ Hermann Neubacher, Special Plenipotentiary envoy of the Reich's Foreign Ministry in the South-East, based on available reports, estimated the number of Serb civilians cruelly slaughtered in the NDH by 1944 at 750,000 people.⁸² According to an estimate recently put forth in historiography, in the Jasenovac camp were murdered about 300,000 Serbs, 30,000 Jews and most of the Roma population of the NDH.⁸³

UDC 323.12:329.18](497.5)"1941/1945"
341.322.5:341.485

⁷⁸ Miletić, *Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac*, vol. IV, 129.

⁷⁹ Glez fon Horstenau, *Izmedju Hitlera i Pavelića (Memoari kontroverznoj generala)* (Belgrade: Nolit, 2007), 527 (Serb. ed. of *Ein General im Zwielicht*, ed. P. Broucek (Böhlau Verlag, 1980–88).

⁸⁰ Ladislaus Hory and Martin Broszat, *Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1964), 146–147.

⁸¹ VA, Fonds Na, Microfilm NAW, T-175, roll 70, frames 888–890.

⁸² Hermann Neubacher, *Sonderauftrag Südost. 1940–1945. Bericht eines fliegenden Diplomaten* (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1956), 128.

⁸³ Evans, *The Third Reich*, 160.

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REVIEW ESSAYS

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Rudna Glava in the Foreground of Recent Overviews of the Beginnings of Copper Mining in Europe and of the Development of Archaeometallurgy

The site of Rudna Glava was discovered in the 1960's and investigated by Dr Borislav Jovanović. The site yielded extensive and well-preserved evidence of early copper mine works that provided an important insight into the prehistoric mining activities in Europe. This brief commentary aims to call attention to the most recent recognition in the literature of the importance of the Rudna Glava mining site for understanding the beginnings of prehistoric copper extraction in Europe and worldwide, as well as the development of the study of early metallurgy.¹

Rudna Glava: discovery and finds

In the mid-1960's modern opencast iron-mining activities in eastern Serbia cut across and exposed a series of prehistoric mineshafts and access platforms on Rudna Glava hill (also known under the old name "Okna", meaning "mineshafts") located some 20 km southeast of the town of Majdanpek (Fig. 1). The focus of mining around Rudna Glava at the time was the extraction of magnetite in which the area abounds. While following a

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¹ I sincerely thank Dr Borislav Jovanović for drawing my attention to the two recent accounts on the Rudna Glava mining site, for providing details on his work at Rudna Glava and for supplying the illustration in Fig. 2. I am very grateful to Dr Miljana Radivojević for making corrections to the text and suggesting relevant bibliographical references.

vein-like magnetite deposit, at about 12 m below the ground surface the miners found a small votive “altar” or “altar-lamp” made of clay and decorated with modelled deer heads. They took the find to the museum in the nearby town of Negotin, where it was put on display. The object soon attracted the attention of an archaeologist, Dr Borislav Jovanović, who had previously seen this kind of altars at Late Neolithic Vinča culture sites in the region. The find inspired him to survey the area where the altar was discovered. Together with Ilija Janković, director of the Museum of Mining and Metallurgy in Bor, he discovered the presence of a number of shafts and some surface finds of the Vinča culture type pottery on the slopes of Rudna Glava. In collaboration with the museum in Bor, Dr Jovanović initiated extensive archaeological excavation of the Rudna Glava site, which was carried out between 1968 and 1986, with the crucial help and advice provided by the staff of the modern Rudna Glava mine. Over this period some forty mineshafts (of which many completely intact) and five “hoards” containing pottery, and stone and antler tools were discovered and excavated. The fill material of the mineshafts contained numerous fragments of pottery and other artefacts (Fig. 2). Based on the pottery type and ornamentation, the use of the site could definitely be associated with the Vinča culture. Critically, by examining the morphology of the shafts and typology of the tools, the mining process could be reconstructed. The prehistoric miners of Rudna Glava followed oxidised copper ore veins, some of which were visible on the surface and distinguishable by the appealing green colour of secondary copper minerals (malachite and azurite). In order to fully expose the copper veins, they sometimes had to remove the top soil. Clearing up the surface soil resulted in the creation of funnel-shaped shafts, and platforms were built to allow access to the shafts and ore extraction from the underground. The ore was extracted by applying fire-setting: an alternating hot-cold treatment of the rock followed by breaking the rock with grooved stone picks made of large, hard river pebbles. Antler picks/mattocks were also used in this process. The shafts were up to 20 m deep and 1–2 m wide. Pieces of ore were brought to the surface in some kind of containers (perhaps textile or leather bags). Oxidised copper ore was extracted there, primarily malachite, but also azurite and cuprite. Radiocarbon dates show that the mine was in use throughout the late sixth and first half of the fifth millennium cal BC – during the regional Late Neolithic and spanning the entire duration of the Vinča culture. The mine seemed to have occasionally been in use in the Late Eneolithic, and quite certainly in Roman times (4th century AD). All these data point to Rudna Glava as the earliest documented mining site not only in Europe, but also globally (Jovanović 1971, 1978, 1982, 1986, 2009; Jovanović and Ottaway 1976; Borić 2009; Roberts et al. 2009).




Fig. 1 Location of Rudna Glava in eastern Serbia




Fig. 2 Drawing of the cross-section of Shaft 4a at Rudna Glava with find-spots of some mining tools (courtesy of Dr Borislav Jovanović, original field records)

Most recent recognition of the significance of Rudna Glava site in the international literature: O'Brien 2013 and Craddock 2013

Discoveries at the site of Rudna Glava provided unique evidence for the beginnings of copper mining in Eurasian prehistory. Further, they indicated that copper extraction in the Balkans likely began independently of similar developments in the neighbouring areas (cf. Renfrew 1969) and, most significantly, in Anatolia, where evidence of early copper mining is remarkable (e.g. Lehner and Yener 2015). A number of prehistoric copper mines have since been detected in the central Balkans and, similarly to Rudna Glava, they all show connection with the Late Neolithic/Eneolithic Vinča culture (c. 5400–4500 cal BC) (e.g. Jovanović 1983; Derikonjić et al. 2011). Importantly, these records of early mining activities in the Balkans have recently been complemented with the world's earliest evidence for copper smelting, dated to c. 5000 BC, from the site of Belovode (Radivojević et al. 2010), but also from other Vinča culture sites (Radivojević 2015).

Extensively published by B. Jovanović, the findings from Rudna Glava have been referred to in the international literature on many occasions (most recently Kienlin 2014), further examined (e.g. Tylecote and Craddock 1982) and discussed in a broader geographic and chronological context (e.g. Pernicka 1993; Borić 2009). Two works published in the UK in 2013 are of interest here and their contribution to the recognition and presentation of the results of investigations of Rudna Glava is described below.²

Prehistoric Copper Mining in Europe 5500–500 BC by William O'Brien is a book recently published by Oxford University Press in which considerable attention is paid to the importance of the archaeological site of Rudna Glava, Serbia, for understanding the emergence and development of prehistoric copper mining in Europe on the one hand and, on the other, to the key role of the Rudna Glava fieldwork programme in laying the foundations for current research not only in the study of ancient copper mining but also of the prehistory of Europe in general. Although, as noted above, the relevant European literature contains a number of references to the evidence from Rudna Glava, the chapter that O'Brien devotes to this site (pp. 40–47) stands out as highly detailed and informative. In addition to the description of the archaeology of Rudna Glava, the chapter discusses the wider regional context of the mine, lists other contemporary sites in the area that yielded finds of copper, and refers to the newly available data on early copper metallurgy at the site of Belovode (Radivojević et al. 2010). Also, throughout the book, references are made to the discoveries at Rudna Glava wherever relevant. The text is enriched with illustrations and photo-

² Opinions on the sections on Rudna Glava in the two publications expressed here are entirely mine.

graphs of the Rudna Glava site supplied by B. Jovanović. Particularly useful is the considerable attention paid to the description of the technology of mining reconstructed based on the spatial distribution and morphology of the mineshafts, the geological setting and the configuration of the ore veins (O'Brien 2013: 42–43). This is, perhaps, an even more scientifically important aspect of the prehistoric mine at Rudna Glava: not just that it currently is the oldest known mine in the world, but that its preserved features and artefactual evidence allow for a detailed reconstruction of the mining techniques, tools and process, and that they offer a rare glimpse of the social and symbolic meaning of (copper) mining in prehistory.

That the significance of Rudna Glava is manifold is further confirmed by Paul Craddock in his paper “Archaeometallurgy 1962–2013: The establishment of a discipline” published in the journal *Historical Metallurgy* 47. Craddock gives an overview of the key discoveries and achievements that marked the development of archaeometallurgy as a scientific discipline. In his selection of case studies, Rudna Glava figures as “the first European copper mine to be scientifically excavated...” (p. 2). This is a most direct acknowledgement of the great effort that Borislav Jovanović (in Craddock’s paper called ‘Boris’, which is how he has been referred to by his British colleagues) put into applying highest possible methodological standards and scientific approach at the time when experience with investigating prehistoric mining locations was, at least in the Balkans, lacking. The value of the research that B. Jovanović and his team carried out at Rudna Glava, and their discoveries, becomes even greater when considered against the general attitude of the archaeologists and historians working before and during the 1950s who ignored or even refused to accept the evidence of prehistoric ore extraction and metalworking (Craddock 2013: 1–2). Hence Craddock’s apt recognition of the importance of investigations at Rudna Glava for the establishment of archaeometallurgy.

It is worth noting that the publication of these two international accounts that place Rudna Glava in the foreground of the history of archaeometallurgical research comes at a contradictory time: on the one hand, thanks to the most recent discoveries, Serbia is in the focus of global archaeological attention as an area of the earliest mining and metallurgy in the world; on the other hand, the site of Rudna Glava, in theory protected as a cultural heritage site, is in reality being gradually swept away by soil erosion and landslides due to the absence of any protective structure over it. Decades ago, in 1984, B. Jovanović and the architect Čedomir Vasić submitted to the relevant Serbian authorities a thorough study of the geological and other natural processes at work at Rudna Glava, and proposed an excellent solution for the technical protection of the site that would also enable its conservation and public presentation (Vasić and Jovanović 1984). The

idea was subsequently elaborated (in 2001) and an action plan developed by Paun Es Durlić, a curator at the Museum in Majdanpek (<http://www.paundurlic.com/projekti/oplan.htm>). The project was supposed to be a collaborative undertaking of several relevant institutions in Serbia (local museums, Archaeological Institute in Belgrade, Department for the Protection of Cultural Monuments in Niš) and a partner-company from Germany. In 2001 an initial geodetic survey was carried out in preparation for further work; however, further work never took place because funding could not be secured either from Serbian state funding agencies or from private sources.

Several years ago, a large section of the unexcavated portion of the site collapsed due to a rockslide. It is quite possible that some of the prehistoric mineshafts got destroyed and are now lost, leaving behind only “scars” visible on the nearly vertical cliff at Rudna Glava into which prehistoric mining shafts were dug. This makes the completed archaeological work and discoveries at the site even more valuable and calls for urgent large-scale action towards public presentation of the finds from Rudna Glava, most of which are kept in the Museum of Mining and Metallurgy in Bor, and for the immediate protection of what has been left of this uniquely important archaeological site.

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On a One-sided Interpretation of the Yugoslav Past

Marie-Janine Calic, *Geschichte Jugoslawiens im 20. Jahrhundert*.
Munich: C.H. Beck, 2010; Serb. ed. *Istorija Jugoslavije u 20. veku*.
Belgrade: Clio, 2013, 490 p.

The author of this synthesis is the German historian of Croatian origin Marie-Janine Calic, daughter of the historian and writer Eduard Calic. Prior to her current position as professor of history at Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich, she was a researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Ebenhausen and Berlin (1992–2004). She also served as political advisor to the UN Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia in Zagreb (1995) and to the Special Coordinator of the Pact for the Stability of South-East Europe Bodo Hombach in Brussels (1999–2002). Calic also served as expert/consultant of the ICTY in The Hague. She is already known to Serbian readership by her book *Social history of Serbia 1815–1941. Sluggish progress in industrialisation* (2004) derived from her doctoral thesis.

Calic's book on the history of Yugoslavia, prefaced by Ulrich Herbert and the author, is divided into six parts (The South Slavic movement and the establishment of the state 1878–1918; The First Yugoslavia 1918–1941; The Second World War 1941–1945; Socialist Yugoslavia 1945–1980; After Tito 1980–1991; The Decline, since 1991) and ends with a conclusion and an appendix which contains abbreviations, tables, maps, information about political parties and coalitions, timeline and bibliography. The afterword for the Serbian edition in an unmerited complimentary tone is written by Ranka Gašić, the book's co-translator with Vladimir Babić.

The reasons for the creation, preservation and violent demise of the Yugoslav state are summed up into four rhetorical questions of which two, "Did people simply become victims of nationalist manipulation?" and "Was its violent collapse inevitable?", give a hint of Calic's line of thinking.

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She emphasises that her book is not primarily concerned with structures of *longue durée* or “distinctive roads” in the Balkans but rather with the dynamic of overall changes, interconnections and interactions, general “features and parallels”, and that its “most important question” is how “development and progress were conceived of in different times and what means were used to achieve them” (pp. 13–15).¹ The author’s attachment to “modernisation” theory, to a narrowed view of history as continuous advancement seems to be unquestionable.

Calic believes that her “approach to the problem distances the book away from popular interpretations of the Yugoslav problem, while drawing to the foreground structural factors, such as ethnocultural oppositions and civilisational incongruities”, and proceeds to put forward her central thesis that “what undermined the project of Yugoslav union was not the well-known Balkan intolerance or perpetual hatred between peoples” but “the politicisation of differences in modern twentieth-century mass society”. The central question of the book as defined by its author is “who, why, under what circumstances and how turned ethnic identity and diversity into an object of dispute”, and offers the answer straightaway: it was all about “the actors’ interests, worldviews and motives, socio-economic processes as well as cultural-historical dimensions of collective experiences, memories and interpretations of history” (p. 15).

A look at the contents of the book itself reveals a certain imbalance. If we take it as somewhat understandable that the period preceding the creation of Yugoslavia, 1878–1918, is given 78 pages, the criterion remains vague for devoting as few as 64 pages to the first Yugoslav state, and as two and a half as many, 166, to communist Yugoslavia, 1945–1991. On the other hand, the author puts much effort into making the book *appear* balanced by seeking to distribute her attention evenly among, and by taking a generally positive attitude towards, all Yugoslav peoples, including those that are not South Slavs (Albanians). There is also a tendency to compare phenomena and processes, which may be a very useful method in principle; but in her effort to be balanced, Calic not infrequently goes too far in that she constructs balance where there can be none, which results in “false equivalence” or “ethnic symmetry”, and compares incomparable phenomena and processes. By doing so, she “equates” them, i.e. places them symbolically on the same plane. Those who do not know much about the history of Yugoslavia may find the book quite balanced and impartial all through until the penultimate chapter which is devoted to the disintegration of the country and the wars of its succession and which uncritically retells the “politically correct” narrative of the ICTY.

¹ All bracketed pages in the text refer to the Serbian edition of the book.

The book is marked by inconsistency, selectiveness, contradiction, major factual oversights, confusion in some interpretations, even anachronisms. In the second subchapter, “Peoples, nations, identities”, Calic argues that “there was no Yugoslav nation at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries or a clear notion of what it meant to call oneself a ‘Slovene’, a ‘Croat’ or a ‘Serb’”, that “none of the subsequent constituent peoples of Yugoslavia had made up one integrated community” and that “the notion of the transhistorical existence of a people which may be objectivised by means of language, culture, religion or origin has remained widespread till this day, but historically the idea is completely erroneous” (pp. 26–27). “To put it more simply,” she concludes, “around 1900 the lands of subsequent Yugoslavia were mostly inhabited by South Slavs who were related by linguistic-cultural kinship” (p. 27).

If we assume for a moment that all the above is basically true and that the conclusion is value-neutral in principle, then it is completely unclear why Calic previously, on her “imaginary journey through the South Slavic lands around 1900”, explicitly names “Slovenes”, who lived in a “mixed community with Germans, Italians, Croats and others”, and “Croats”, who lived in their historical provinces and in “Bosnia and Herzegovina and southern Hungary” (pp. 22–23), while mentioning, on the same page, in reference to the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, “South Slavs of Orthodox, Muslim and Catholic faiths” even though the Serbs in Bosnia, evasively called “Orthodox Slavs”, had, according to most contemporary domestic and foreign sources, a clearly defined national consciousness (p. 23). Similar inconsistency occurs on the next page in connection with Montenegro, where despite its incontestable Serbian identity she claims lived “Orthodox Slavs” and a few thousand Turks, Albanians and Slavs of Muslim faith” (p. 24). For the vilayet of Kosovo (Stara Srbija/Old Serbia), she claims that “its more than 1.6 million inhabitants made up an ethnic and confessional hotchpotch”,² while in Serbia lived Serbs who also lived in the Habsburg Monarchy³ (pp. 25–26). Similar confusion can be found later in the book, for example, with reference to the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia

² Calic also claims that the population was half Christian and half Muslim, which is not true. For precise data that indicate a Muslim majority see M. Jagodić, *Srpsko-albanski odnosi u Kosovskom vilajetu (1878–1912)* (Belgrade 2009), 252–256 and 260–262.

³ The insignificant anachronism set aside – from the 1867 Compromise the Habsburg Monarchy was called Austria-Hungary – Calic offers inaccurate data on the population of present-day Vojvodina, relying on the pro-Croat historian Jozo Tomasevich, namely that of 1.3 million inhabitants Magyars accounted for 32%, Serbs for 29%, Germans for 23% etc. Calic is obviously unaware of the Austro-Hungarian census of 1900 which shows a population of about 1.43 million, of whom 33.7% Serbs, 26% Magyars, 23.5% Germans etc. For more detail see D. Djordjević, “Die Serben”, in *Die Habsburgermon-*

and Herzegovina in 1878: to the “South Slavs” already living in Austria-Hungary now “joined nearly two million Serbs,⁴ Bosniaks and Croats” (p. 56), and then, two pages later, we reencounter “Muslims” and “Orthodox and Catholic Christians” (p. 58). It is a mystery why she clearly identifies inhabitants of some Yugoslav areas (Slovenes, Germans, Italians, even Albanians and Turks) while subsuming others under more general categories (Slavs). In point of fact, the lack of clear-cut criteria is one of the major scholarly shortcomings of this book.

This as well as arbitrariness can best be seen in the case of the population of Montenegro. Calic unenthusiastically admits that “many Montenegrins considered themselves as being Serbs” because of the “association of Orthodox with ‘Serbian’, which in many areas continued into the 1930s” (p. 29), but she still insists that “a part of Montenegrins saw themselves as a distinctive people” (p. 59) and that “while supporters of the *Popular Movement* saw Montenegrins as ethnic Serbs and advocated the unification of ‘two Serbian states’, the monarch and the government insisted on separate historical-political identities” (p. 75).⁵

The Illyrian movement is presented as both Croatian and Yugoslav “given that it was open and inclusive” and that “it did not function only as Croatian national ideology but also opened a transcendental space to all South-Slavic peoples” (p. 54). However, an important component of the “Illyrian idea” is omitted: having been rejected by almost all Slovenes and Serbs in the 1830s, it came to be used as an exclusive model for the integration of Štokavian-speaking Catholics into the Croat nation in the following decades and in a large area considered as “Illyrian”. The author also seems to be unaware that the Habsburg Monarchy called Serbs an “Illyrian nation” in the second half of the eighteenth century, finally abandoning the appellation after 1804.⁶

archie 1848–1918, vol. III (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaft, 1980), 734–774.

⁴The first census of Bosnia and Herzegovina carried out by Austro-Hungarian authorities in 1879 shows a figure of about 1.15 million people. Cf. Dj. Pejanović, *Stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine* (Belgrade: Naučna knjiga, 1955).

⁵Calic either does not know or chooses to ignore the fact that throughout the nineteenth century and even before there was in Montenegro a strong, almost zealous sense of Serbian identity, a sense shared by Prince (from 1910 King) Nikola Petrović Njegoš himself. It is unscholarly to speak of Montenegrin identity – invented in the 1930s as part of the Yugoslav Communist Party’s policy against “greater-Serbian hegemony” and introduced by decree in 1945 – in the period of the past the author refers to.

⁶There were at the court in Vienna the Illyrian Court Deputation and the Illyrian Court Chancellery responsible for all Serbs of the Monarchy. Cf. V. Gavrilović, *Temišvarski sabor i Ilirska dvorska kancelarija (1790–1792)* (Novi Sad: Platoneum, 2005).

The South Slav idea, derived from Illyrianism in the 1860s, is associated with “enlightened elites who believed in progress”, i.e. with “the liberal middle classes, the intelligentsia and the Catholic clergy”⁷ headed by J. J. Strossmayer who “led the opposition to Austrian centralism” (p. 55). On the other side of the spectrum was, “as a rival”, the Croatian Party of Rights led by Ante Starčević and Eugen Kvaternik with its “irredentist and hegemonist nationalism” which “denied individuality to the other South-Slavic peoples” (pp. 55–56). Calic fails to mention that Strossmayer’s vision of the South Slav idea involved proselytic intentions (to bring the Orthodox Serbs to a union with Rome), which is to say, he did envisage a South Slav state but Catholic, with its seat in Zagreb and within Austria-Hungary.⁸

If Calic on the whole overestimates the strength of the South Slavic movement, she does not do so with Ilija Garašanin’s “Načertanije”, the first Serbian foreign policy programme drafted in 1844, “whose thought decisively influenced the Serbian national programme” until 1914. Yet, something of an exaggeration is her claim that with it began the “shaping of the *mental map* of a future (greater)Serbian state” (p. 60), borrowed from Holm Sundhaussen’s stereotypical, one-sided interpretation. The concept of mental map seems to imply that the entire Serbian society was imbued with the ideas contained in the “Načertanije”, while it in fact was a secret document only known to few Serbian politicians, a document inclusive in nature (the unification of Serbs in Turkey in Europe as the first phase towards a broader union, which would not become possible until twenty years later) and, finally, a document which did not become known to the public until the beginning of the twentieth century.⁹ The very active role of the Polish emigration headed by Count Adam Czartoryski in drawing up the “Načertanije” is presented as passive, while the fact remains unrevealed that a “draft” for Garašanin’s “Načertanije” was the work of a Polish agent of Czech origin, F. Zach.¹⁰ Finally, Calic offers a fairly one-sided assessment of Serbian na-

⁷ An interesting observation on Yugoslavism is offered by the British historian A. J. P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1809–1918. A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary* (London 1976 [1941]: “The ‘South Slav’ idea was an intellectual creation, not the outcome of national development” (p. 190), and “The South Slav idea, synthetic and intellectual, won only the educated middle class which looked at Strossmayer’s collection of pictures; mass nationalism, in Croatia as everywhere else, sprang from the soil and hated its nearest neighbours” (p. 223).

⁸ V. Krestić, *Biskup Štrossmajer u svetlu novih izvora* (Novi Sad: Prometej, 2002), as well as his *Biskup Štrossmajer: Hrvat, velikohrvat ili Jugosloven* (Jagodina: Gambit, 2006) and *Istorija Srba u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji 1848–1914* (Belgrade: Politika & SANU, 1991).

⁹ R. Ljušić, *Srpska državnost 19. veka* (Belgrade: SKZ, 2008), 140.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 133.

tionalism. She claims that it had a “tendency to marked self-awareness, irredentism and expansionism” – as if a movement for national liberation in the nineteenth century had been a bad thing and not a legitimate European model for unification which had given rise to Germany and Italy – and then softens the statement by allowing that one should “not necessarily infer some greater Serbian mania for conquest from that” (p. 60). Summing up the national programmes, Calic insists that “different national ideologies perhaps contributed more to differences between peoples than religious and linguistic differences”, but admits that Croats and Slovenes were “more disposed to a compromise with the Habsburg Monarchy” which would have involved a “federal reorganisation of the existing Habsburg system” given that “the Habsburgs, after all, imposed their rule through a contractual relationship (*Pacta Conventa*) and not through military subjugation”,¹¹ and that “the Catholic faith was a bridge between rulers and subjects”. The renowned Croatian historian Nada Klaić demonstrated as early as fifty years ago that the *Pacta Conventa* (1102) is a later forgery, that there was no contractual relationship between Croatia and Hungary or Austria but only classical conquest, which means that there was no legal continuity.¹² On the other hand, “opposite Catholic universalist state-building thought which invoked legal state continuity and the idea of a stable historical territory was more expansive Serbian cultural nationalism whose starting point was independent Serbia and its Serbian-Orthodox state church” (p. 64). If this is so, and it is, it is not clear why Calic chooses not to follow her own line of argument any further and infer that religious and linguistic differences, as a phenomenon of *longue durée*, determined some elements of the national ideologies.

Basic oversights can be found in the account of the Ilinden Uprising as well, where Calic attributes a Macedonian national character and the slogan “Macedonia to Macedonians” to the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) (p. 64) even though the organisation’s Bulgarian orientation is obvious from its very constitution.¹³ While mentioning the mass demonstrations against Ban Khuen-Hédervary in Zagreb and other parts of Croatia in 1903 and interpreting them as a sign that the Croats abandoned their loyalty to Austria-Hungary, Calic fails to men-

¹¹ The author seems to lose sight of all Austro-Ottoman wars waged from the end of the seventeenth to the end of the eighteenth century, notably the War of the Holy League 1683–1699 and the Napoleonic Wars that ended in 1815. In those wars the Habsburg Monarchy could hardly enlarge its territory by means of some willingly established “contractual relationships”.

¹² N. Klaić, “O jednoj ‘naučnoj diskusiji’”, *Historijski zbornik* 14 (Zagreb 1961), 259–267.

¹³ For more see J. M. Jovanović, *Južna Srbija od kraja XVIII veka do oslobodjenja* (Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1941).

tion major anti-Serbian demonstrations in Zagreb in 1902 (not to mention those lesser in 1899 and 1901) combined with ethnically motivated persecution and property destruction.¹⁴ Even though she speaks of political cooperation of Serbs and Croats through the Croat-Serbian Coalition in 1903–1905 as a strategic rather than a tactical cooperation forced by Austro-Hungarian growing repression (pp. 66–68), Calic admits that in ethnically mixed environments the public, the press, the cultural, political and sports associations, even savings bank were “increasingly divided along national lines” and that “with the exception of the Socialists and the youth movement there were virtually no supra-ethnic or supra-religious political organisations” (pp. 70–71).

Succumbing to the new, pro-Ottoman trend in interpreting the Balkan Wars in European and other historiographies, Calic claims that the armies of the Balkan states advancing into Ottoman territory “committed appalling atrocities against civilian population” and that “deportation, expulsion and partial destruction of undesirable minorities was common practice aimed at justifying territorial aspirations which were no longer legitimate”. To illustrate her claim, she chooses to speak of Serbs alone, and invoking the second-hand information Leon Trotsky gathered while sitting safely in a Belgrade hotel: so Serbs, she quotes the pro-Albanian lobbyist Noel Malcolm, “in order to correct ethnographic statistics in their favour, ‘simply engage in the systematic destruction of Muslim population’”, and then “balances” the claim by stating that the armies of the other Balkan states, which for some reason remain unnamed, carried out ethnic cleansing; their motive, however, was to “stifle resistance”. The paragraph ends with the detailed description of crimes against Albanians put together by “an independent international committee of inquiry” (p. 82), the very same committee, by the way, that the British expert R. Seton-Watson described as an instrument of Bulgarian propaganda.

The review of the context that led to the Balkan Wars leaves out the persecution of Serbs prior to 1912, especially in the vilayet of Kosovo in 1878–1912 when Muslim Albanians played the role as “bulwark” of the Ottoman Empire against Christian states, which was a good enough reason to turn a blind eye to their abuse and violence against Serbs and other non-Muslims and non-Albanians. Left out is also the fact that official Serbia took diplomatic action with the Sublime Porte in a bid to stop Albanian violence in the vilayet of Kosovo and that in 1899 it published a bilingual “blue book on Albanian acts of violence” which was to be submitted

¹⁴ Krestić, *Istorija Srba u Hrvatskoj*, 352–353.

to the international peace conference at The Hague.¹⁵ The consequence of those acts of violence was ethnic cleansing indeed but of 135,000 Serbs and other Orthodox Christians, of whom 100,000 fled the area north of the Šar Mountain (present-day Kosovo and Raška) and 35,000 the areas south of it.¹⁶ All of that was part of the policy of systematic expulsion with a view to weakening the claims of Serbia and Montenegro, as well of other Balkan states, on Ottoman-held territory. Despite all that, which Calic does not seem to know, on the eve of the war the Serbian government issued a proclamation which guaranteed property, religious, personal and linguistic rights to Albanians and stated that “all that came to pass between Serbs and Albanians is now committed to forgiveness and oblivion”.¹⁷

Calic is relatively objective in writing about the Sarajevo assassination, the July crisis and the outbreak of the First World War. The assassination is described neither as the cause of the war nor as organised by the Serbian government nor as predominantly orchestrated from Serbia. She believes that the conspirators “acted upon their own initiative, but with support from the Serbian military secret service and the organisation Black Hand”. She does not mention the indiscriminate destructive anti-Serbian demonstrations in the aftermath of the assassination, to which the authorities turned a blind eye, or murders, hangings, deportations to camps, high treason trials and various other forms of discrimination against the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁸ She discusses the drawing up of the ultimatum to Serbia and Austria-Hungary’s diplomatic preparation for war, defining very precisely that “the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne on 28 June 1914 was only a trigger for the military explosion of international power competition which had been exacerbating for years”, and that “emperor Franz Josef would have never attacked Serbia without ‘back-covering’ and encouragement from Germany” (p. 86).

¹⁵ *Documents diplomatiques concernant les actes de violence et de brigandage des Albanais dans la Vielle-Serbie (vilayet of Kosovo) 1898–1899* (Belgrade: Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 1899); see also Jagodić, *Srpsko-albanski odnosi u Kosovskom vilajetu*, 183–222, with a detailed list of recorded crimes on p. 205.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 366. Detailed documentation in *Pisma srpskih konzula iz Prištine 1890–1900*, ed. B. Peruničić (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1985); *Svedočanstvo o Kosovu 1901–1913*, ed. B. Peruničić (Belgrade: Naučna knjiga, 1988); *Zulumi aga i begova u kosovskom vilajetu 1878–1912*, ed. B. Peruničić (Belgrade: Nova, 1989). Additional documents about crimes of Albanian outlaws against Serbs in the late eighteenth and early twentieth century in *Zadužbine Kosova* (Prizren and Belgrade 1987).

¹⁷ Jagodić, *Srpsko-albanski odnosi u Kosovskom vilajetu*, 361.

¹⁸ In detail in V. Ćorović, *Crna knjiga. Patnje Srba Bosne i Hercegovine za vreme svetskog rata 1914–1918* (Sarajevo: B. Djurdjević, 1910).

Writing about Austria-Hungary's invasion of Serbia in the autumn of 1914, Calic remarks that Croats, Slovenes and Serbs "had to fight" in its army, and that they "accounted for up to 40% of some units" (p. 87). Her probably inadvertent oversight set aside – namely, members of these peoples, notably Croats, accounted for more than 50% of the army that invaded Serbia in the autumn of 1914,¹⁹ and 11% of the entire army on all fronts²⁰ – the remark that they had been coerced into fighting does not hold water. As observed by A. J. P. Taylor: "The Croat masses 'voted by their feet' by marching enthusiastically against Serbia."²¹

If Calic does not try to downplay crimes committed by Austro-Hungarian troops (pp. 88–89) or systematic pillage, persecution and discrimination under the occupation regime in 1915–1918 (pp. 91–92), she implies an equivalence between the "ruthless policy of bulgarisation, occupation and economic exploitation" in the Bulgarian zone of occupation in 1915–1918 and the policy allegedly pursued by Belgrade in the "areas acquired in 1912/3" which she describes as "merciless 'serbianisation'" (p. 91), however unfeasible it was within less than two years of Serbia's effective control over the New Areas of Serbia.

Speaking about the creation of the state, Calic offers a detailed account of the activities of the Serbian government but fails, for some impenetrable reasons, to mention the 1914 Niš Declaration, an intellectual such as Jovan Cvijić, the Croat and Serb politicians assembled in the Yugoslav Committee and the 1917 Corfu Declaration. She overrates the extent of acceptance of the Yugoslav idea in Slovenia and Croatia "where only some sections of the Catholic clergy were against" and unnecessarily introduces the question of self-determination in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia (pp. 97–98). In 1918 Serbian Macedonia was an ethnic mix-up (of Bulgarians, Serbs, Albanians, Vlachs, Greeks, Macedonian Slavs), while 42 of 54 counties in Bosnia-Herzegovina had voted for immediate and unconditional unification with the Kingdom of Serbia by 3 December 1918 when the voting process was ceased because it was learnt that unification had been proclaimed in Belgrade two days earlier. The reader learns nothing about Stjepan Radić's statement of 1914 that the Serbs are an "unscrupulous enemy of the August [Habsburg] dynasty, of our Monarchy, and especially of the Croat way of life"²² or of Antun Korošec's, relating to the

¹⁹ M. Ekmečić, *Dugo kretanje između klanja i ranja. Istorija Srba u novom veku (1492–1992)* (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2007), 354; A. Mitrović, *Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu* (Belgrade: SKZ, 1984), 100–108.

²⁰ P. Tomac, *Prvi svetski rat 1914–1918* (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1973), 53.

²¹ Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, 238.

²² *Ibid.*

May Declaration of 1917 – which the author believes had an “elating effect on the South Slaves” (p. 96) – that “our Croat-Slovene people is firmly and entirely resolved to be true and loyal, to the death, to the monarchy and the August ruling house of Habsburg”.²³

Describing the end of the First World War Calic quotes an interesting if quite ambiguous remark of Miroslav Krleža: “...when our Austro-Magyar reality drunkenly rolled down under the throne of the Karadjordjevićs like an empty beer bottle into garbage...” (p. 98). This remark perhaps unconsciously summed up the attitude of the dominant Croat elites towards the new state. What really inclined the Croat and Slovene elites to join, unwillingly, the new state was the “fear” of Italy which, among other things, had pretensions “to Istria and Dalmatia” (p. 99). On the other hand, Serbia saw the new state as the accomplishment of the national striving for the liberation and unification of Serb-inhabited areas. Underestimating the role of foreign factors, Calic argues that Yugoslavia “was by no means an artificial experimental state dictated by the Machiavellian interests of the great powers” (p. 98), even though, in the opening chapter of the following part titled the “Versailles system”, she clearly states that the great powers created a “belt of nation states” from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans which formed a sanitary cordon towards “revolutionary bolshevist Russia” and “Germany’s revisionist aspirations” (p. 103).

In the part of the book devoted to the Kingdom of SCS 1918–1929 and Yugoslavia 1929–1941, factual errors occur more frequently and so does the author’s effort to construct false equivalences and a negative image of the first Yugoslavia above all from the viewpoint of the idea of progress and modernisation in order to emphasise the purported superiority of the post-1945 federal system. In doing so, Calic fails to acknowledge the tremendous achievements the Kingdom made precisely in the area of modernisation: it carried out the agrarian reform and colonisation, built thousands of schools, educational facilities for women, hospitals and other health facilities, set up the universities of Ljubljana and Skoplje and a theatre in Skoplje, and emancipated, according to its means, a considerable part of backward and undeveloped areas from Kosovo and Macedonia to Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro. By the way, in the area of culture, Tito’s Yugoslavia could not boast as high quality magazines as the interwar *Srpski književni glasnik* in Belgrade and *Nova Evropa* in Zagreb.²⁴ In fact, the reader gets the impression that one of the author’s goals is to draw a strong contrast between an allegedly Serb-dominated centralist and unitary state whose society is

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ See Lj. Dimić, *Kulturna politika u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1918–1941*, 3 vols (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 1996).

oppressed by poverty and backwardness and its sheer opposite, modernisation that followed after the establishment of communist dictatorship in 1945. Calic overlooks that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was organised on the model of France, the most progressive European nation at the time, and that its demolishers, with the exception of Croat nationalists, were external forces of fascist and authoritarian persuasion: Hitler's Third Reich, Mussolini's Italy, and revisionist states with authoritarian nationalist regimes such as Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania.

In the foreground of Calic's account is the conflict between the unitary state concept championed by Serbian politicians and federalism championed by Croatian politicians. She gives a detailed description of the process of adopting the constitution of 1921 but nonetheless suggests that the entire process "was octroyed" and that "the state had a serious lack of legitimacy from the very outset" (p. 107). She proceeds to describe in detail the Yugoslavism propagated from "above" which was supposed to overcome internal divisions because, in Calic's view, "differences in culture, religion, dialect, temperament and mentality between Slovenes and Serbs did not seem any greater than those between Venetians and Neapolitans or Bavarians and Prussians"²⁵ (pp. 107–108). Yet, she remarks that by then "it probably was already too late" to create a Yugoslav nation and that "the idea of three tribes left enough room for the fulfilment and assertion of one's own national identity" (p. 109).

Mentioned in that connection are Slovenes who achieved national integration precisely within Yugoslavia given that they were free "for the first time to cultivate and develop their own language and culture" (p. 109), that the University of Ljubljana was established in 1919, Slovenian Radio in 1928 and, finally, the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1938. It is even safe to say that in 1929, when the Kingdom was reorganised into *bano-vinas*, they practically obtained a rounded-off ethnic territory: Drava Banovina. The fact is completely ignored that Slovenes had strong support from Belgrade and King Alexander himself who made considerable personal donations to various Slovenian scientific and cultural institutions. Calic is of the view that the same goes for Croats, integrated in the 1920s through the mass national mobilisation of the peasantry effected by the activity of Stjepan Radić's Croatian Peasant Party (p. 112). On the other hand, she claims ahistorically that the population of Macedonia "had already had a clear awareness of their distinctiveness but were not recognised as a 'tribe'" even though their grouping into Serbs, Bulgarians and Albanians was stronger

²⁵ Calic does not distinguish between regional and ethnic/national identities. An equivalent for her examples (Bavarians, Prussians) in the Yugoslav case would be, say, Šumadijans, Vojvodinans, Herzegovinians, Slavonians, Dalmatians etc.

than their local, geographically defined identity. As far as Bosnian Muslims are concerned, Calic claims somewhat confusedly that they “could cultivate a distinctive historico-religious, pre-national group consciousness which, in their view, only lacked a tribal name”, a consciousness which “had developed within the framework set by Islam” and, at the time, “did not necessarily imply a theological or an ideological or an ethnic-national affiliation” (p. 110). Yet, a little later she claims that the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation (JMO) had an “ethnic attribute” (p. 115). A similar if milder confusion about the identity of Bosnian Muslims can be found later in the book (pp. 142–143).

If Yugoslavism indeed enabled a practically unimpeded building of distinctive national identities, it is unclear why Calic seeks to suggest a greater-Serbian hegemonism. Apart from reiterating propagandistic allegations made by the Croat economist Rudolf Bičanić,²⁶ her key proof of the “privileged position of Serbs in the government, army, bureaucracy, police and many important sectors of society” is a quotation from the Croat historian Ivo Banac according to whom “out of a total of 656 ministers in Yugoslav governments, which as a rule did not remain long in office, 452 were Serbs and only 137 Croats, 49 Slovenes and 18 Muslims”, and to complement the impression suggested by the figures adds that “it was not much different in the army and state administration” (p. 113–114). Finally, there is a very explicit, and as uncritical, conclusion: “Social practice showed that the common Yugoslav house was nothing but greater-Serbian decor” where “many politically engaged people, disappointed with reality, turned against the idea of Yugoslavism” (p. 151). The only exception was the communists for whom “Yugoslavism was, as it had been for the Young Bosnians before the First World War, not just a vision but daily practice”. The truth, however, is that until Stalin’s directive for the creation of the Popular Front in the mid-1930s they, vociferously and often in collaboration with the Ustashas, decried “greater-Serbian hegemonism” and, acting upon the Comintern’s recipe, propagated the demolition of Yugoslavia. So, what we have here is not only an absurd confusion but also an injustice to the followers of the Young Bosnia movement, genuine supporters of Serbian and Yugoslav unification.²⁷

Recent research has seriously challenged the stereotype about the “greater-Serbian” character of the Yugoslav state.²⁸ The thesis about “great-

²⁶ E.g. that “parts of the country that belonged to the former Austria-Hungary pay 80% of all taxes, while Serbia and Montenegro take more than 70% of investments for their infrastructure” (p. 113).

²⁷ See D. Pešić, *Jugoslovenski komunisti i nacionalno pitanje 1919–1935* (Belgrade: Rad, 1983), 189–197 and 230–236.

²⁸ S. Božić, *Srbi u Hrvatskoj 1918–1929* (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008) as well as her “Serbs in Croatia (1918–1929): between the myth of ‘greater Ser-

er-Serbian hegemony” was in fact an instrument, propagandistic above all, of the Croat political elite for achieving the national homogenisation of the masses and for ensuring as good a position as possible in their escalating conflict with the Serb political elite.

The “greater-Serbian hegemony” thesis, a hollow phrase which was quite dear to the communists too, can find no support in the documentary sources for the simple fact that the Serb elites had no means to impose hegemony. As opposed to 960 factories in Slovenia and Croatia in 1919, Serbia had no more than 70, and the end of the war had found it ravaged in every way, including the loss of a third of its pre-war population. Of a total of 2.5 billion dinars deposited in all Yugoslav banks, two billions were in Zagreb banks and so Zagreb, formerly a provincial Austro-Hungarian town, practically became the financial centre of the interwar Yugoslav state. Slavonia provides a telling example of the actual scale of “greater-Serbian hegemony”. Of its 2112 civil servants in 1921, 206, or 9.75%, were Serbs even though they accounted for 23.4% of the total population. Calic also fails to mention the fact that a considerable number of officers of the former Austro-Hungarian army were admitted to the ranks of the new army of the Kingdom of SCS, even some known to have committed crimes against Serbs.²⁹

That Yugoslavism was not exactly a “vision” and “everyday practice” to the communists is evidenced by the Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) held in Dresden in 1928, which Calic does not mention. She mentions the Third Conference of the CPY held in January 1924, mistakenly calling it the Third Congress (which, however, was held in Vienna in 1926), which addressed the national question for the first time (p. 117) in terms of federalisation. The Fourth Congress, however, envisaged the demolition of the Yugoslav state and the creation of independent Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro and Macedonia (with support from IMRO), while expressing support to the “Kosovo Committee” in the struggle for “Greater Albania”, i.e. for the annexation of Kosovo and Metohija by Albania, just as it envisaged the annexation of northern Vojvodina to Hungary.³⁰

The part of the book devoted to the first Yugoslavia contains quite a number of unfounded assertions such as the one that the “Catholic Church for the most part took a loyal stance towards the state in 1918” or that the Catholic clergy, “with the exception of the archbishop of Sarajevo Josip Štadler”, “was pro-Yugoslav” (p. 140). Confrontation of the Catholic Church

bian hegemony’ and social reality”, *Balkanica* LXI (2010), 185–208.

²⁹ For more detail see M. Bjelajac, *Vojaska Kraljevine SHS 1918–1921* (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1988).

³⁰ *Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije* (Belgrade: Izdavački centar Komunist, 1985), 107.

with Belgrade is downplayed to a mere reaction to the failure to conclude a concordat, and there is yet another attempt to draw a false equivalence, in this case between the “laic” Croatian Catholic movement and the “pro-fascist and ultranationalist” *Orlovi* (Eagles) and *Križari* (Crusaders), on the one hand, and an “extremist Orthodox faction” (*svetosavolje*), on the other (p. 160). Calic is obviously unaware that the attitude of the Catholic Church at first towards the creation of the Yugoslav state and then the state itself was on the whole explicitly negative,³¹ while the Croatian Catholic movement can hardly be described as laic.³²

Calic states that J. B. Tito “returned to his homeland in early 1935” from training in the USSR, while he then in fact left for the USSR and returned in late 1936.³³ What should also be noted is her not overly critical portrayal of the communists who “believed in universal historical laws and in the building of humane society in the world in which revolutionary consciousness should triumph over ethnic intolerance”, were tied by “the faith in a just future and the unflinching will for change”, and enjoyed “an ever growing support of intellectuals, middle classes and youth” (p. 158). If the importance and extent of the support extended to the communists is played up, the importance of the Ustasha movement and the extent of support it enjoyed is, to put it mildly, downplayed, which is combined with an attempt to equate it with its ideological counterpart in Serbia, the Zbor movement, which had a negligible support in its environment (pp. 153–156).

Even though formally balanced and unbiased, the next part of the book, devoted to the Yugoslav space in the Second World War, suffers from serious shortcomings: numerous factual oversights, far-fetched constructions, selective presentation of facts, unqualified use of disputable casualty figures, the already observed tendency towards false equivalence and a quite partial portrayal of one warring party as morally superior to the others. Her account of Tito’s communist movement is slanted and uncritically dependent on the image the communist regime created of itself. Apart from some slight differences and scarce critical remarks, invariably made in passing, her interpretation largely coincides with the official Titoist narrative, or the official version of history imposed in the course of the thirty-five years of communist dictatorship in the second Yugoslavia.

Speaking about the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), she says that the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS)

³¹ D. R. Živojinović, *Vatikan, Srbija i stvaranje jugoslovenske države* (Belgrade: Nolit, 1980); N. Žutić & LJ. Dimić, *Rimokatolički klerikalizam u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1918–1941. Prilozi za istoriju* (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački novinski centar, 1992).

³² *Ibid.* 289–299.

³³ *Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije*, 152.

Vladko Maček declined the offer to be its prime minister (p. 172), which is true, but it is also true, and she remains silent on that, that he called upon the Croat people to be loyal to the new Ustasha regime and that most members of the Croatian Peasant Defence and the Croatian Civil Defence sided with the new regime.³⁴ She states that the Ustasha regime relied on “militia, army, secret police, special courts and more than twenty concentration camps”, but claims that “support to the new regime remained thin” and that it found approval only “in the right wing of the HSS, in a part [sic] of the Catholic Church and among intellectuals and nationalist university students”. Calic’s claim that “this anyway heterogeneous base crumbled within only a few months of the Ustasha taking power” (pp. 172–174) seems to be contradicted by the fact that the regime remained in place until May 1945.³⁵ On the other hand, speaking of General Milan Nedić, Calic seeks to equate him with D. Ljotić, leader of the pro-fascist Zbor, losing sight of the fact that Nedić did not command the Serbian Volunteers Corps which was organised by Ljotić and placed under direct German command. Nedić was and remained the local governor of an occupied rump Serbia with no power of decision.

Calic almost entirely accepts the official communist interpretation of the civil war 1941–45, especially as regards the relationship between Chetniks and Partisans (pp. 181–188). Even though she correctly identifies their respective social bases as well as the ideological differences between the two antifascist movements, she makes no distinction between Dragoljub Mihailović’s Yugoslav Home Army (YHA) and Chetniks. The latter is a general and imprecise term under which may also be subsumed smaller collaborationist groups such as the one of Kosta Pećanac. She argues explicitly that D. Mihailović “sent false news about military successes to London and at the same time received financial aid from the Serbian collaborationist government and served the Germans and Italians” (p. 181), that he, “in June 1941 circulated a memorandum titled ‘Homogeneous Serbia’ envisaging the expulsion of Croats and Muslims from a large part of territory”, which implies that he advocated ethnic cleansing (p. 184). Calic apparently is unaware of the reliably established fact that the memorandum was not Mihailović’s; it was put together by Stevan Moljević, a lawyer from Banjaluka, whom Mihailović first met in May 1942. She also seems to be unaware that this piece of writing had never been discussed, let alone adopted by Mihailović’s

³⁴ Paramilitary units set up by the HSS as “a state in the state” in the mid-1930s. Calic refers to them as “peasant and civil guard” and estimates their strength at about 200,000 men (p. 159).

³⁵ See e.g. D. Stranjaković, *Najveći zločini sadašnjice. Patnje i stradanja srpskog naroda u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj od 1941. do 1945* (Gornji Milanovac 1991).

movement, but remained Moljević's personal view. Moreover, she uncritically reiterates post-war communist propaganda about Mihailović's willing and earnest collaboration, thereby creating an ideological black-and-white rather than scholarly picture of the Second World War in Yugoslavia.³⁶ If Mihailović really was such an earnest collaborator with the Germans, how come that in a large number of German documents Mihailović, and not Tito, figures as the Third Reich's enemy number one in the Balkans almost until the end of the war.³⁷ As if the "wanted" circular for General Mihailović was not issued as early as 1941 and for them both in 1943 on the same poster. A photograph of the poster is available in books that Calic cites.³⁸

Many YHA members were incarcerated in the camps in Banjica, Sajmište and in Niš. The one in Banjica even had an alternative name, DM camp, camp for supporters of D[ragoljub] M[ihailović], while communist supporters did not begin to be incarcerated there until 1943. The book makes no mention whatsoever of thousands of Mihailović's men who were captured and sent to concentration camps at Mauthausen and Osnabruck, where many of them died. Nor is there any mention of many non-Serbs in the ranks of his army (e.g. Croats Niko Bartulović and Vladimir Predavec, Bosnian Muslims Mustafa Mulalić, Dr Ismet Popovac, Fehmija Musakadić etc.), of the YHA units in Slovenia (Karel Novak, Uroš Šušterčič – *Vojvoda Triglavski*, Mihailović's intelligence officer Aleksandar Bajt "Berman", subsequently a leading Yugoslav economist) even though the subject has by now received quite a body of useful literature – notably books by Kosta Nikolić, memoirs of Dimitrije Djordjević and Zvonimir Vučković, Western books on Mihailović and his soldiers – which offers a different picture from the one painted by Calic and her, primarily Croat, literature.³⁹

In Calic's view, on the other hand, Tito and the Partisans did "quite the opposite": they "preached concord among peoples"; "advocated a so-

³⁶ Calic does not seem to have consulted the best, now classical work on the issue of the relationship between Tito, Mihailović and the Allies: W. R. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies 1941–1945* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1973). See also B. Lazitch, *Tito et la révolution yougoslave* (Paris: Fasquelle, 1957); N. Beloff, *Tito's Flawed Legacy. Yugoslavia and the West* (London: V. Gollancz, 1985); K. Christich, *Les faux-frères. Mirages et réalités yougoslaves* (Paris: Flammarion, 1996).

³⁷ I. Avakumović, *Mihailović prema nemačkim dokumentima* (London: Naša reč, 1969).

³⁸ D. T. Bataković, *Nova istorija srpskog naroda* (Belgrade: Naš dom, 2000).

³⁹ Z. Vučković, *Sećanja iz rata. Od otpora do građanskog rata*, 2 vols (Belgrade: Čiča, 1990); D. Djordjević, *ožiljci i uspomene*, 2 vols (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1994–95); K. Nikolić, *Istorija Ravnogorskog pokreta 1941–1945*, 3 vols (Belgrade: Srpska reč, 1999); B. Dimitrijević & K. Nikolić, *Djeneral Mihailović* (Belgrade: Srpska reč, 2000); *Slovenački četnici* (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2006); Al. Bajt, *Bermanov dosije* (Belgrade: Srpska reč, 2006).

cialist revolution”; “built a combat force with firm leadership within a few months”; and were successful because “they managed to combine all those different forms of protest and resistance under the ‘popular liberation’ slogan”; given the Chetniks’ waiting strategy, Tito “challenged Mihailović’s title of not only the greatest hero of resistance but also of the future head of state [sic]” as early as 1941 (pp. 184–185), and by the time the uprising in Serbia collapsed in 1941 his forces had “about 80,000 men and women under arms” (p. 186). There are detailed descriptions of their difficulties in 1942 (p. 187), of German, Italian, Chetnik and Ustasha offensives against them (pp. 189–191) from which they emerged victorious; she uncritically attributes to Tito the “legendary qualities of a leader” and claims that he “radiated with self-confidence, determination and natural authority” (p. 189). She emphasises in particular the Partisans’ contribution to the emancipation of women who were given active and passive voting rights in 1942 (p. 207), and in general their positive achievements in the area of culture, the economy, education and progress under wartime conditions (pp. 205–208) even though the purpose of most of their activity was to spread communist propaganda and, ultimately, to establish a Stalinist type of government by revolutionary means.

As far as the uprising of 1941 is concerned, Calic does mention that Chetniks and Partisans fought together against the Wehrmacht, but fails to impart the important fact that the first liberated city in occupied Europe was Loznica, western Serbia: it was liberated in August 1941 by Chetniks under the command of Lt.-Col. Veselin Misita. She also mentions that the two parted ways in September 1941, but places the blame on the Chetniks (p. 185) without mentioning the fact that one of the reasons for the split was the overt establishing of communist authorities on the ground. Even though she is explicit about Mihailović’s collaboration, she claims that the Germans declined his offer and attacked his headquarters on Ravna Gora (p. 184). The Chetniks’ occasional and brief collaboration with the Italians is an incontestable fact – it was the result of their enmity towards the Germans, Ustashas, Partisans, Ljotić’s and Muslim supporters of Hitler – but it did not have the character Calic attributes to it in a bid to fit it into her black-and-white picture of the very complex processes that were unfolding in the civil war in Yugoslavia.

It is precisely into this black-and-white and consequently inaccurate picture of the Partisans fighting alone against all that the secret negotiations between Tito’s representatives and the Wehrmacht held in March 1943 can hardly be fitted. Highest functionaries of the communist movement (V. Velebit, K. Popović, M. Djilas) negotiated in Zagreb, the capital of the Ustasha NDH, about collaboration against the Allies whose possible landing on the Adriatic coast would have inevitably meant Allied support to

Mihailović. They expressed their readiness to fight the Western Allies and Mihailović's forces side by side with the Wehrmacht. Mihailović's YHA, as the bearer of pre-war Yugoslavia's state legitimacy, was the main in the eyes of Tito's communist forces and the latter did not even try to conceal it from the Germans. This is a clear example of how misleading can be the simplification of the exceptionally complex picture of the civil war in Yugoslavia where various armies – with the exception of the Croatian Ustasha and regular army forces (*domobrani*) who remained Hitler's faithful allies until the bitter end – and movements fought against one another, frequently “everyone against everyone” and occasionally collaborating with one or another occupation force.⁴⁰

Calic uncritically takes over the post-war propaganda claim that the Partisan army was a 300,000-strong force in 1943 (p. 190). According to the statement of Tito's main intelligence officer V. Velebit at the above-mentioned March 1943 negotiations, the Partisan army had about 50,000–60,000 combatants.⁴¹ Two quite serious oversights should also be noted at this point. Speaking of the Second Session of the Antifascist Council for Popular Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in Jajce on 29 and 30 November 1943, Calic claims that “142 delegates from all parts of the country proclaimed themselves to be the supreme legislative and executive body. Only Macedonians were unable to get to Bosnia due to fighting” (p. 191). The fact is not mentioned that these 142 delegates were a minority by comparison to 161 absent delegates and that the quorum problem was “solved” in such a way that the absent were declared to be present. Moreover, the AVNOJ was not even a representative body with any kind of legitimacy but rather an ad-hoc assembly of communist functionaries and few lesser pre-war politicians. The other oversight is one of selectiveness. In order to show that “none of the institutions of socialist Yugoslavia embodied the ideal of ‘brotherhood and unity’ as clearly as that multinational volunteer army” and to create the impression that all Yugoslav peoples equally contributed to the struggle against fascism, Calic offers the figures for the composition of the Partisan army in the spring of 1944: “44% Serbs, 30% Croats, 10% Slovenes, 4% Montenegrins, 2.5% Bosnian Muslims and other ethnic groups” (p. 207). But it should be borne in mind that she is talking about 1944, the year when, after Italy's capitulation and the Wehrmacht's defeat in the USSR, the Third Reich was evidently losing the war; therefore a comparison with the composition of Partisan and Chetnik units in 1941 would reveal a much higher percentage (more than 80%) of Serbs and, consequently, not as ideal

⁴⁰ M. Leković, *Martovski pregovori 1943. godine* (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1985).

⁴¹ For more detail see P. Simić, *Tito, tajna veka* (Belgrade: Novosti, 2009).

a picture as the propaganda one uncritically taken over from the Titoist literature and offered as a fact.

Both chapters devoted to ethnic cleansings, mass crimes and the dynamic of violence offer detailed accounts and rightfully point to the crimes committed by Ustasha, Chetnik, German, Italian, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Albanian forces (pp. 196–205). What is controversial is Calic's interpretation of Chetniks' crimes as resulting from a pre-existing ideologically coloured master-plan for ethnic cleansing. Such plans had indeed been there in all other cases, and in this one, the master-plan is supposed to have been the obscure brochure "Homogeneous Serbia" attributed once again to General Mihailović (p. 199) instead of its actual writer, Stevan Moljević. This is yet another attempt at false balance or ethnic symmetry, at equating D. Mihailović's antifascist movement with all collaborationist forces that committed ethnically motivated crimes, most infamously the Ustashes. The following two quotations of several similar in this part of the book would seem a good illustration: "Just as the Ustashes dreamed of an ethnically 'pure' greater Croatia, so the Chetniks trumpeted the idea of a greater Serbia" (p. 199) and "the Chetniks did not at all lag behind the Ustashes in barbarity" (p. 203).⁴² That the Chetniks, especially smaller groups that did not recognise Mihailović's command authority, committed crimes is not a matter of dispute. But then again they did not have the character that Calic ascribes to them given that they were more often than not committed against Serbs of different ideological persuasions (e.g. supporters of Ljotić and communists), and when committed against other national and ethnic groups, in the NDH, Montenegro and Kosovo, they as a rule were a retaliation for crimes previously committed against Serb population. What Calic also tends to overlook is that the captured Chetniks, whom she sees as classical collaborationists and not an antifascist movement, were sent to Nazi death camps, while the Ustashes, whom she equates with the Chetniks over and over again, fought shoulder to shoulder with Wehrmacht troops at Stalingrad in 1942 (Francetić's "Black Legion").

⁴² E.g. Calic says that "in the summer of 1941 the Croat and Muslim Ustasha militia murdered hundreds [sic] of Serb families and burnt down their houses", but adds straightaway that "thousands [sic] of Muslims in Foča, Goražde, Vlasenica, Srebrenica and many other places fell victims to massacres" (p. 203), leaving out the fact that these massacres were committed by Chetniks in retaliation for thousands and not hundreds of Serb civilians in eastern Bosnia massacred by Muslim Ustashes from the cited places. There is not a single word about the Ustashes' grisly crimes in Herzegovina whose brutality outstrips all other crimes committed in the NDH. For more on this see S. Skoko, *Pokolji hercegovačkih Srba '41* (Belgrade: Stručna knjiga, 1991) and his *Krva-vo kolo hercegovačko 1941–1942*, 2 vols (Pale: SKPD Prosvjeta and Belgrade: Planeta, 1999–2000).

On the other hand, what is worthy of mention and credit is Calic's account of the role of the Catholic Church in the NDH and, in particular, of the archbishop Alojzije Stepinac in the conversion of 200,000 Orthodox Christian Serbs to Catholicism or of the Catholic press which "extolled the Ustashes". Calic even mentions a few other clerics who took part in Catholicisation and crimes (p. 199, 202), although with the typical qualification that "the role of the Catholic Church in Croatia and its archbishop Alojzije Stepinac remains highly controversial till this day" (p. 198–199). *Magnum Crimen*, the monumental book of Viktor Novak,⁴³ a Croatian historian of Yugoslav orientation appalled at the complicity of the Catholic clergy in the Ustasha regime, amply furnished with archival documents, press excerpts and first-hand testimonies, is not even listed in the bibliography, let alone quoted from. Perhaps in order to downplay the extent of the Catholic clergy's collaboration with the Ustasha regime? Only those who have not consulted *Magnum Crimen* can be misled into believing that the Ustasha regime had the support of "only a part of the Catholic Church" (p. 173).⁴⁴

An aspect of wartime developments that remains unknown to the reader concerns the Partisans' crimes against political opponents committed in the name of the "revolution" and their onslaught on "class enemies", especially in 1941/2 in Montenegro and Herzegovina. Calic does mention but in passing the clampdown on "alleged traitors, spies and saboteurs" who were sentenced to death by makeshift "popular courts" without due judicial process, a fate that also befell "hesitants, deserters and collaborationists" (p. 206).

The last chapter of this part of the book devoted to the Second World War is concerned with the estimated number of war victims but most of all with how those victims, as a negative legacy, burdened relations among the Yugoslav peoples, notably Serbs and Croats. Calic rightly observes that the official figure of 1.7 million dead is an overestimation. The figure in fact represents the demographic loss submitted as the actual number of war victims

⁴³ Viktor Novak's classical, unavoidable work on the subject, *Magnum Crimen. Pola vijeka klerikalizma u Hrvatskoj*, was first published in Zagreb and had 1119 pages (1948), and then, in an abridged version, in Sarajevo (3 vols, 1960) and, finally, reprinted in Belgrade (1986, with a preface by Jakov Blažević).

⁴⁴ For a general introduction with an overview of the Ustasha regime see J. Steinberg, *All or Nothing. The Axis and the Holocaust 1941–1945* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990); M. A. Rivelli, *Un génocide occulté. Etat indépendant de Croatie 1941–1945* (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1999). Rivelli is also the author of the best work on Stepinac, based on foreign, mostly Italian source materials, *L'Arcivescovo del genocidio* (Milan: Kaos Edizioni, 1999). For additional documentary evidence for the mass collaboration of the Catholic clergy see D. R. Živojinović and D. Lučić, *Varvarstvo u ime Hristovo. Prilozi za Magnum Crimen* (Belgrade: Nova knjiga, 1988) and D. R. Živojinović, *Vatikan, Katolička crkva i jugoslovenska vlast 1941–1958* (Belgrade: Prosveta & Tersit, 1994).

by E. Kardelj at the Paris conference in 1946. She then relies on the amateur works of Kočović (1985) and Žerjavić (1989) and offers the figure of about one million victims,⁴⁵ of whom “500,000 Serbs, 200,000 Croats and up to 100,000 Muslims”, and another million as an indirect loss, to conclude that “all in all, Yugoslavia lost about two million people in the Second World War” (p. 209). The censuses of 1931 and 1948 were not sufficiently reliable, and there was no way to estimate how many people had been killed, how many had died in concentration camps, how many had never returned from emigration or managed to leave the country at the end of the war. The only accurate thing that can be said is that “the number of killed, tortured and exiled has become a political issue” as well as the rather general claim that “many subsequent Yugoslav problems had their roots in that epoch” (p. 210), which may be a euphemism for denazification that never took place.⁴⁶

As an example of such a political issue Calic gives the Jasenovac camp, the infamous symbol of the Ustasha regime of terror, and quotes the official Yugoslav figure of 700,000 victims and the figures put forth by Croat and Serb emigration circles, 30,000 and 1.1 million respectively. However, in his report to Himmler of February 1942, Glaise-Horstenau gave an estimate of more than 300,000 Serbs viciously murdered by the Ustashes.⁴⁷ Calic, instead of trying to explain why the communist authorities, which are the source of the abovementioned official figure (which she fails to mention), did not permit independent inquiries, simply states that they did not, and adds the fact that Jasenovac has become the place of opposing cultures of memory. And she does not stop there but proceeds to add a highly debatable assumption, which she even repeats in another place in the book, that “probably about 200,000 people perished in all Croatian concentration camps”,⁴⁸ relying solely on the Croatian-American historian Jozo Tomasevich (p. 210). To accept this figure would necessarily mean to accept that in 1941–1945 in “more than twenty concentration camps” an average of 10,000 people per camp perished, which is highly unlikely to say the least. Namely, as early as 1941, 38,000 Serbs, about 2,000 Jews and 188

⁴⁵ *Prilozi istraživanju zločina genocida i ratnih zločina*, ed. J. Mirković (Belgrade: Muzej žrtava genocida, 2009)

⁴⁶ See esp. Z. Djordjević, *Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u Drugom svetskom ratu* (Belgrade: ABC-Grafika, 1977).

⁴⁷ V. Kazimirović, *Nemački general u Zagrebu* (Kragujevac: Prizma and Belgrade: Centar film, 1966), 122. A reliable overview is provided by E. Paris, *Genocide in Satellite Croatia 1941–1945. A Record of Racial and Religious Persecutions* (Chicago: Institute for Balkan Affairs, 1962).

⁴⁸ See A. Miletić, *Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac*, 2 vols (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1986–87).

Croats carefully recorded by name were killed in the Jadovno camp alone (the Gospić-Jadovno-Pag system of camps).⁴⁹

Contrary to Calic's claim, what decided the outcome of the civil war in Yugoslavia was not the self-reliant fight of Tito's Partisans. The decision to relinquish Yugoslavia to communists and to shift military and political support from Mihailović to Tito had been made in Tehran in 1943 as a concession of the Western Allies, Roosevelt and Churchill, to Stalin and the USSR.⁵⁰ The liberation of Belgrade on 20 October 1944 is misattributed to the Partisans instead of the Red Army whose several divisions, hundreds of tanks and aircraft, motor corps and brigades, incomparably more numerous and better equipped than Tito's forces, were instrumental in establishing communism in Yugoslavia (p. 213). There is no mention in the book of the fact that the Soviets met a friendly reception from Mihailović's troops and that they jointly liberated several towns, from Kruševac to Kraljevo; in return, the Soviets turned Chetniks over to Partisans, who arrested them en masse. This policy is explained a few pages later, where we learn that Tito secretly flew from the island of Vis to Moscow to "persuade Stalin to send Red Army troops for the liberation of Belgrade" (pp. 217–218). Combined with the author's unqualified claim that communism in Yugoslavia "won on its own strength" (p. 218), this boils down to a denial of the historical fact – acknowledged even by the Titoist press until the split with Moscow in 1948 – that Soviet troops were instrumental in Tito's installing in power. Once the German troops were driven out, they handed over power to the Partisans.

In her account of the liberation of Yugoslavia and "consolidation of communist rule", Calic does not remain silent on the crimes the Partisans committed "systematically and extensively". What she remains silent on is the communists' crimes against "class enemies", mostly in Serbia where, according to the latest research data, there were as many as 57,000 victims known by name, much more than in other parts of Yugoslavia. A few dozen thousand farmers, lawyers, pre-war civil servants, small and big industrialists, merchants, artisans, priests and intellectuals were accused of collaborationism and, as a rule without due judicial process, executed while their property was confiscated.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Dj. Zatezalo, *Jadovno, kompleks ustaških logora 1941*, 2 vols (Belgrade: Muzej žrtava genocida, 2007).

⁵⁰ For more see V. Pavlović, *Od monarhije do republike. SAD i Jugoslavija 1941–1945* (Belgrade: Clio, 1998).

⁵¹ For more see Srdjan Cvetković, *Između srpa i čekića. Politička represija u Srbiji 1944–1953* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006).

As far as the establishing of “popular democracy” is concerned, Calic admits that the post-war elections can be considered as “neither free nor fair”. Yet, it seems that she finds arguments for justifying the imposition of the one-party system and dictatorship in a superficial and evidently unreliable report of a contemporary British diplomat that “the masses” in Central and Eastern Europe, “due to their war and post-war experience”, were willing to accept a “regime that promises order and security even at the cost of renouncing personal freedom and the freedom of political decision”, as well as Tito’s belief that democracy would lead to “ethno-political polarisation and the disintegration of the country” and thwart “politics based on industrial progress and social justice” (pp. 219–220). Speaking of the trials of major war criminals which were supposed to take place, she mentions A. Pavelić, M. Nedić and D. Mihailović in the same paragraph, thereby, inadvertently perhaps, subsuming them symbolically under one umbrella (p. 220). The reader is not informed about international mobilisation in Mihailović’s defence which, in addition to pre-war democrats, involved many European intellectuals and five hundred US army pilots rescued by Mihailović’s forces in the autumn of 1944 (Operation Halyard).⁵² On the other hand, a separate paragraph is devoted to the trial of archbishop Stepinac, his sentence to “sixteen years in prison he spent in house arrest” (p. 219) and the reaction or, more precisely, opposition of the Catholic Church which was what led to Stepinac’s transfer to house arrest after five years in prison, which Calic does not find pertinent to mention.

Tito’s alleged fear of “ethno-political polarisation” does not seem to have played any role either in the federal reorganisation of the country or in meeting national-political demands. Calic writes about the liberation of Istria and Dalmatia from the Italians, “whereby the process of the unification of Croats was rounded off”, but fails to mention the incorporation into Yugoslavia of the so-called Slovenian Littoral, probably subsuming it under Istria (p. 221). She proceeds to speak in detail about nation building from above carried out by the communists with a view to constructing Macedonian identity, and about the situation in Kosovo, where as early as 1943/4, at the Bujanovac conference, the Albanian communists stated that their co-nationals had always striven for unification with Albania (pp. 223–224). Calic mentions the quelling of the rebellion of the Ballists in 1945, their

⁵² The picture of the civil war would have been considerably closer to reality had Calic taken the trouble to consult the literature which does not go in favour of her black-and-white simplification, e.g. D. Martin, *The Web of Disinformation. Churchill’s Yugoslav Blunder* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990); M. I. Lees, *The Rape of Serbia. The British Role in Tito’s Grab for Power 1943–1944* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990); B. Miljuš, *Revolucija u Jugoslaviji 1941–1945* (Lausanne – Belgrade – Sarajevo 1991).

collaboration with the Germans and Italians, but leaves out the murdering and ethnic cleansing of Serbs during the war years (about 10,000 murdered and nearly 100,000 exiled). She unconvincingly explains away Tito's "conciliatory course" towards Albanians with the claim that "communists had never been strong in Kosovo, and many Albanians were nationalists", which was why he "subsequently authorised the expulsion of the Serb colonists, which was decisive for the pacification of Kosovo Albanians" and that he "decided that Kosovo and Metohija be granted the status of an autonomous region of the Republic of Serbia, which was a sort of a compromise between the Serbian demand to rule the territory and the Albanian desire for independence" (p. 224). Calic stops short of drawing the logical conclusion that in that way Tito in fact awarded Albanian nationalism which, as she does say accurately, had fought on the side of fascism in the Second World War even though the task he placed before the communists was to "uproot all forms of nationalist and religious hatred" (p. 220). Also, she just mentions in passing that Tito was thinking now and then of uniting "Kosovo to Albania" in order for the latter to "join a larger union of states in the Balkans" (p. 224).⁵³

The following two parts of the book devoted to the "second Yugoslavia" – "Socialist Yugoslavia 1945–1980" and "After Tito 1980–1991" – discuss the establishment of the communist regime and the country's reorganisation on federal principles. A piece of information that is missing, however, is that Tito's regime in four post-war years was a mere copy of the Soviet system, and the Constitution of the country, Democratic Federal Yugoslavia soon renamed the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, a copy of Stalin's Constitution of 1936. Calic admits that the communists gave up the idea of building "one supra-ethnic Yugoslav nation" and that "every people was given its own state", i.e. republic. Also admitting that it was important to Tito "to preclude the dominance of the most numerous people, Serbs", she does not find it in the least problematical that the Serbs, who even according to her own statistical data had made the greatest contribution to the struggle against fascism, were divided among three republics, that Montenegro was separated from Serbia (just as the Montenegrins became a separate people by decree) and that within Serbia itself were created "two autonomous regions", Vojvodina, which in fact was an autonomous province, and Kosovo and Metohija, which was not granted the status of an autonomous province until 1963 and whose full name the author reduces to

⁵³ For a good analysis see Dj. Borozan, *Velika Albanija. Porijeklo, ideje, praksa* (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut VJ, 1995). For an overview of the entire period see N. B. Popović, ed., *Kosovo i Metohija u velikoalbanskim planovima 1878–2000* (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2001).

“Kosovo”. She claims that “people were not required to identify themselves as members of an ethnic group or as citizens of a federal state because these were easily combined in Yugoslavia” and that federalism “institutionalised multiple identities and allegiances” (p. 225). Calic seems to overlook that it was federalism that over time deepened the divides between peoples and republics and set the stage for further ethno-political polarisation. In a bid to rationalise the obvious contradiction between the communists’ struggle against nationalisms on the one hand and their instigation of them on the other, she comes up with the communist belief that “national identities must not be suppressed because they are the historically necessary transition to socialism” (pp. 225–226). A more careful perusal of the ample critical literature on Titoist policies and inter-national strife might have hopefully led to more objective conclusions.⁵⁴

The chapters devoted to the post-war reconstruction, general population education, the building of the socialist economy, transition to industrial society, urbanisation, development of tourism, consumerist society, cultural opening to the West and social change in general (pp. 227–230, 242–245, 253–260, 263–265, 273–276), reveal particularly well the author’s understanding of Yugoslavia as a country that Tito “turned into a development-oriented dictatorship”, which in a way implies her subscription to the idea of “authoritarian modernisation” as a theoretical model. All these quite sympathetic accounts of the achievements of Yugoslav socialism are not devoid of some, though softened, criticism. For instance, Calic’s account of the infamous collectivisation of the countryside, the “absorption” of the agricultural surplus workforce by industry and the compulsory sale of agricultural products says that in addition to party agitators “the police often assisted in mustering the labour force: men were threatened with guns, women and children were locked in dark cellars. Be that as it may, results were soon there”, as if collectivisation or the “socialist transformation of the countryside”, unlike the USSR, was meant to be brought about “more slowly and, above all, on a voluntary basis”. The latter is certainly not true, as evidenced by thousands of first-hand testimonies about forced collectivisation, arrests,

⁵⁴To mention but a few relevant books such as N. Beloff, *Tito’s Flawed Legacy. Yugoslavia and the West since 1945* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985); K. Čavoški, *Tito: tehnologija vlasti* (Belgrade: Dosije, 1990); S. Djukić, *Kako se dogodio vodja* (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 1991); D. T. Bataković, *Yugoslavia. Nations, religions, ideologies* (Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme, 1994); S. L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington DC: Brookings, 1995); R. M. Hayden, *Blueprints for a House Divided. The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); D. G. C. Thomas, ed., *Yugoslavia Unraveled. Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention* (Lexington Books, 2003); G. Troude, *Conflicts identitaires dans la Yougoslavie de Tito 1960–1980* (Paris: Editions de l’Association Pierre Belon, 2007).

long prison sentences, pulling out men's moustaches and other ways of humiliating opponents to collectivisation.⁵⁵

The growing demands of Slovenia and Croatia for further decentralisation and economic liberalisation, met by the 8th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) and opposed by the alleged "Serbian centralists", led to the breakdown of many companies and, consequently, to a loss of jobs. The author accurately observes that "the regime turned the situation to its advantage" by opening up the borders and allowing "1.1 million" people to leave the country in search for a job, or "temporary employment abroad" as it was called (p. 283). Had it not been for these "guest workers" and the generous remittances they sent home, the Yugoslav economy would have collapsed. Speaking of ever growing regional differences despite the "economic miracle", Calic correctly observes that "the intra-Yugoslav terms of trade benefited only the industries of Slovenia and Croatia, while being detrimental to the structurally less developed parts of the country" and that "politically stronger republics", which she fails to name but obviously thinks of Slovenia and Croatia, "sought to channel investment towards their regions" (p. 284). On the other hand, describing the downfall of A. Ranković, she offers no evidence to support her claim that he "above all advocated discrimination against the Albanians, Muslims and Turks in Kosovo" and that "he was increasingly considered a liability even by his Serbian party fellows" (p. 285). Calic either does not know or does not want to say that Ranković's political belief was that of integral Yugoslavism. He was a proponent of centralism and, as such, a harsh opponent of separatism, Albanian included, and of the further crumbling of the Yugoslav state through further federalisation.

Calic takes a brief look at the Macedonians and their identity which, in her view, "grew roots very quickly because it was built on the real awareness of national distinctiveness", and puts forward the inaccurate claim that Macedonia was granted a national church after its separation from the Archbishopric of Ohrid in 1958 and the alleged recognition of the metropolitan of Macedonia by the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1967 as a result of "difficult negotiations". Established at the initiative of the Macedonian communists and in contravention to canon law, the Macedonian Orthodox Church has not till this day been recognised by any other Orthodox church in the world, the Serbian least of all.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ A detailed review of that period and the practices of the communist government in J. Popov, *Drama na vojvodjanskom selu (1945–1952). Obavezni otkup poljoprivrednih proizvoda* (Novi Sad: Platoneum, 2002). See also D. Tošić, *Kolektivizacija u Jugoslaviji 1949–1952* (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 2002).

⁵⁶ Dj. Slijepčević, *Makedonsko crkveno pitanje* (Munich: Iskra, 1969).

As for the cause of mass demonstrations in Kosovo in 1968 and the albanisation of the province, Calic puts forward her conclusion that “Tito’s attempt to create a distinctive Kosovo Albanian national identity failed” (p. 304). It remains completely unclear where the author could get the absurd idea of a “Kosovo national identity” when she says herself that it was after the downfall of Ranković that “liberalisation opened the way for a far-reaching albanisation of the province” (p. 304). Despite all concessions made to the ethnic Albanians since 1945 they were dissatisfied because “their province did not yet have the status of a republic and, consequently, the right to secession” and thus “in October and November 1968 violent clashes broke out in Kosovo and western Macedonia. The protesters demanded a republic and a constitution, and some of them, the unification of all Albanian-inhabited areas” (p. 305). An attempt at omission is obvious here considering that the central demand of the demonstrators, then as well as thirteen years later, was the secession of Kosovo, Metohija and western Macedonia from Yugoslavia and unification with Albania (“We are the children of Skanderbeg and the army of Enver Hoxha!”)

The author then proceeds to speak of “linguistic nationalism” (pp. 306–309) and the “Croatian Spring” or “Maspok” (abbreviation from “masovni pokret”, or “mass movement”) in 1971 (pp. 309–313), where the already mentioned tendency to draw false equivalence between Serbs and Croats is observable once again, and in the section concerned with language, Muslims are also included. Calic apparently believes that Serbian and Croatian and Muslim debates and disagreements reflected “the desire of national politics for greater independence” (p. 308), which makes her lose sight of the aggressive nature of Croat and Muslim national and linguistic policies and the defensive nature of the Serbian position, especially as far as the Maspok was concerned. She suggests that M. Nikezić and L. Perović wanted the same as the Croat political, economic and intellectual elites. The latter, however, contrary to the pro-Yugoslav policy of the Serbian communists, demanded their “own army and foreign policy, even the revision of borders with Bosnia and Herzegovina” (pp. 310–311). Also, Calic makes no mention of mass outbursts of hatred poured out on Serbs in Croatia during the demonstrations and other rallies in the Maspok period, including frightening slogans such as: “Comrade Tito [...] go and put on Ustasha uniform!”⁵⁷ Calic ends the section with a brief overview of the removal of leaderships in all republics from office, which also misleads the reader into

⁵⁷ On the nationalist mass movement, Maspok, in Croatia led by the League of Communists of Croatia see I. Perić, *Ideja Masovnog pokreta u Hrvatskog* (Zagreb: Narodno sveučilište grada Zagreba, 1974); additional documents in *Geneza Maspoka u Hrvatskoj*, eds. J. Keser, Dj. Bilbija and N. Stefanović (Belgrade: Književne novine, 1990).

concluding that there were equal shares of nationalism everywhere, which was not the case.⁵⁸

Contradictory is the claim that Tito decided to step up centralism and curtail the freedom of the media and that his “system punished critics and nationalists, but then made their demands its own” (p. 317). The amendments to the Constitution in 1968–1972 did not centralise but further decentralised the country, whereby Tito essentially met the demands of the nationalists of all peoples save the Serbs who, being dispersed across Yugoslavia, were interested in as unitary and as centralised a state as possible. Slightly impressed by Tito’s hedonist and luxury lifestyle, she claims that critics could object to it but that “open opposition was inadvisable because of his great popularity [sic]” (p. 322). She says herself that in the mid-1970s there were “4,000 political prisoners” in Yugoslavia, third “only to the Soviet Union and Albania” relative to the total population (p. 317).

The Constitution of 1974 indeed transformed Yugoslavia into a “federation with some elements of a confederation”. The author says quite precisely and accurately that the “decentralisation preached by Kardelj had little to do with democratisation because powers were simply transferred from the federal level to the republics without putting in place viable control mechanisms” and that the Constitution “made the federal state into an object of a complicated negotiation process among the republics where virtually all issues were imbued with a national charge” (pp. 319–320). The authors of the 1974 Constitution had no intention of creating such mechanisms; the purpose of the constitutional change was to cater to Slovenia and Croatia, the Croat Maspok in the first place. Serbia, on the other hand, was given a subordinate position not only in relation to the other republics but also to its two autonomous provinces. This highly unfavourable position is relativised by the author’s claim that Albanians were also dissatisfied because the province was not granted the status of a republic (p. 320) even though she is aware (p. 226) that Albanians were not a constitutive people even by the 1974 constitution but a national minority and consequently did not have the right to secession.⁵⁹ It is unclear why Calic claims that Albanians orchestrated violent demonstrations in all larger towns of Kosovo in 1981 because they believed “the time had finally come” to realise their “desire for full equality” (pp. 335–336) if then, as well as back in 1968, the main demand was the status of a republic as a transition to Kosovo’s unification with Albania (p. 336). She also gives the figure of “about 131,000” Serbs and Montenegrins that left the province between the Second World War and 1981 but, without going deeper into the reasons for the exodus,

⁵⁸ M. Djurić, *iskustvo razlike: suočavanja s vremenom* (Belgrade: Tersit, 1994).

⁵⁹ R. Rajović, *Autonomija Kosova. Pravno-politička studija* (Belgrade: Ekonomika, 1987).

is content to say that a “real migration boom” after 1981 was taking place in a “save-your-skin-if-you-can atmosphere” (p. 337). What lay behind it was the systematic intimidation of Kosovo Serbs; the albanisation of police, judicial and party structures, with the tacit approval of the federal and provincial authorities, left them without any legal protection and they moved en masse to central Serbia.

Calic is of the opinion that, in addition to other reasons, economic, political, ideological, international, the system lost legitimacy because “the communist policy of memory whose goal was to remove the civil war and nationalist persecutions from collective memory failed” (p. 358). Family memories obviously escaped the decreed version of the past built through Tito’s personal cult, the myth of the heroic Partisan struggle and “brotherhood and unity”.

Apart from the role of Germany in the Yugoslav crisis, Calic’s account practically comes down to retelling the politically correct narrative of The Hague Tribunal which places the blame for the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the wars almost solely on the Serbs, including almost unavoidable quotations from court proceedings. Had she consulted, say, the memoirs of Josip Boljkovac, Tadjman’s first interior minister, she would have found the claim that Croatia attacked the Yugoslav Army and started the civil war and not the other way round.⁶⁰

In the section devoted to ethnic cleansings, war crimes and destruction of cultural heritage, Calic describes at length and to the last detail the crimes committed by Serbs against Muslims, while Muslim and Croat crimes against Serbs are either not mentioned at all or are mentioned in passing and evasively, for instance, that “from 1993 Muslim and Bosniak forces also began to homogenise their areas” (p. 391). She does not take the trouble to mention that those forces also had camps where Serbs were imprisoned and tortured.⁶¹ As far as Croat crimes are concerned, in the section devoted to the outbreak of the Muslim-Croat conflict in the second half of 1992 Calic says that “ethnically mixed regions were meant to be

⁶⁰J. Boljkovac, “*Istina mora izaći van...*”: sjećanja i zapisi prvog ministra unutarnjih poslova neovisne Hrvatske (Zagreb: Golden marketing & Tehnička knjiga, 2009).

⁶¹For more detail see the collections of documents *Muslimanski logor Visoko. Dnevnik i kazivanje logoraša*, ed. M. Mitrović (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1994); *Stradanje Srba u Konjicu i Tarcinu*, ed. D. Bojić (Belgrade: Komesarijat za izbeglice R. Srbije, 1995); *Stradanje Srba u Sarajevu. Knjiga dokumenata*, ed. D. Bojić (Belgrade: Komesarijat za izbeglice R. Srbije, 1995); *Stradanje Srba u Mostaru i dolini Neretve. Knjiga dokumenata*, ed. D. Bojić (Belgrade: Komesarijat za izbeglice R. Srbije, 1995); bilingual Serbian and English editions: *Zatvori i logori u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini (kazivanje logoraša)*, ed. M. Mitrović (Belgrade: Vojska, 1997); S. Pašalić, *Stradanja Srba i srpskih naselja u bivšoj Bosni i Hercegovini* (Banjaluka: Banjaluka Company, 1997).

homogenised and proclaimed purely Croat” and singles out as the symbol of “devastation” the “destruction of Mostar, a former tourist attraction, and its historic 16th-century bridge by the Croat Defence Council [HVO]” (p. 389). The author does not find it relevant to mention the first war crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the village of Sijekovac on 26 and 27 March 1992, committed against local villagers by Croatian regular and HVO troops teamed up with paramilitary forces of Bosnian Muslims, nor any collective crime by Muslims against Serbs except the “bloodshed” committed by forces under the command of Naser Orić in the villages of Glogova and Kravica in 1993 (p. 400).

In her account of the 1995 operations of the Croatian army “Oluja” (Storm) and “Bljesak” (Flash), Calic mentions “150,000 to 200,000” expelled Serbs (p. 402) but fails to mention about 2,000 civilian victims of the operations, including women and children, and several thousand people still accounted as missing. The description of the situation in Kosovo in 1999 lacks the information about the number of Serbs, Montenegrins and other non-Albanians who fled the province after the arrival of UN peacekeeping troops: 246,000, of whom nearly 200,000 Serbs and Montenegrins as well as a large number of Goranci (Muslim Slavs) and Roma. After 1999 from UN-administered Kosovo migrated 60% of the Kosovo Serbs, 66% of the Goranci and as much as 70% of the Roma, and most never returned to their homes. Not a word about dozens of ethnically cleansed towns, more than 150 demolished and heavily damaged Serbian monasteries and churches, the necessity to place the most important Serbian monasteries under military protection, forcible takeovers of Serb-owned houses, flats and land by Albanians.⁶²

The author sheds light on the role of unified Germany in fuelling the Yugoslav crisis at its beginning in 1991 (pp. 385–386). Namely, eager to assert its political strength on the post-Cold War international scene, Germany’s initial political support followed by rash recognition of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence precluded a feasible solution for the status of the Serb community in Croatia and for reorganisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the contrary, this recognition gave a clear signal to Bosnian Muslims (and Bosnian Croats) to break away from Yugoslavia too, even at the cost of civil war. Calic, however, does not mention that Germany’s signature of the Treaty of Maastricht was conditional upon recognition of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence.⁶³

⁶² *Kosovo and Metohija. Living in the Enclave*, ed. D. T. Bataković (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, SASA, 2007).

⁶³ *Raspad Jugoslavije: produžetak ili kraj agonije*, eds. R. Nakarada, L. Basta and Sl. Samardžić (Belgrade: Institut za evropske studije, 1991); A. Pavković, *The Fragmenta-*

For all her undeniable effort Calic has not managed to produce a book that lives up to her own professed standards: “without prejudice but not without passion” (p. 17). As if her sympathy for the Titoist era and its official version of history came with prejudices, old and new. Considering her familiarity with the language, culture and literature of the western Balkans, the reader had every right to expect much, much more than a fairly one-sided portrayal of the recent and contemporary past of the Yugoslav space.

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tion of Yugoslavia. Nationalism and the War in the Balkans (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); R. Nakarada, *Raspad Jugoslavije. Problemi tumačenja, suočavanja i tranzicije* (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2008).

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IN MEMORIAM



Mirjana Detelić (1950–2014)

Mirjana Detelić, a folklorist, literary theorist, fiction writer, was born and educated in Belgrade. She graduated from the University of Belgrade (Faculty of Philology, Department of Literature and Literary Theory) in 1974, from which she also received her MA (1984) and PhD degrees (1992). She was employed as assistant to the Committee on the Study of Literary History of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SASA) from 1974 to 1994, when she joined the SASA Institute for Balkan Studies and remained its member until her death. In the academic year 1999/2000 she taught Folk Literature at the University of Niš. She was deputy director and director of the Language and Literature Department of the Centre for Scientific Research of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts and the University of Kragujevac from its inception in 1995 until its dissolution in 2011. She participated on a permanent basis in the work of two SASA committees, on the Study of Literary History and on Folk Literature, and was subject editor for folk literature for the *Serbian Encyclopaedia*.

Mirjana Detelić was concerned with the poetics of literary forms from the perspective of folkloristics and literary theory. Her book *Mitski prostor i epika* (Mythic Space and Epic, 1992), which was awarded the Stanislav Vinaver Prize (1993), set new parameters for the study of epic space predicated on structuralist-semiotic premises, and laid the groundwork for a new approach to the study of this cognitive and poetic category in folklore and beyond. In this book she demonstrated that epic space, unlike mathematical or physical space, which are homogeneous and continuous, is a discreet series of points, or fields, which have different semantic ranges. On the horizontal level, she identified closed and open spaces as carriers of opposing symbolic meanings: house, palace/tower and city – as the centre (because the epic perspective is shaped in relation to the hero) – take positive connotations, whereas mountain/forest, water, road and field – as distant peripheral points – tend to attract negative meanings. She also explored the vertical stratification of both open and closed spaces, identifying the centre (“central”, human space) and two (peripheral) poles of the vertical axis as points of symbolic and ideological marking. This seminal study with its basic stratification of epic space opened two other directions of research. The study of the *city*, a type of closed space, gave rise to the multimedia CD edition *Gradovi u brišćanskoj i muslimanskoj deseteračkoj epici* (Cities in Christian and Muslim Decasyllabic Epic Poetry, 2004; in co-authorship with Aleksandar Loma and Istok Pavlović), the monograph *Beli grad. Poreklo epske formule i slovenskog toponima* (*White City. The Origin of the Epic Formula and Slavic Toponym*, 2006; in co-authorship with Marija Ilić), and the encyclopaedic lexicon *Epski gradovi. Leksikon* (*Epic Cities. A Lexicon*, 2007), for which she was awarded the Vuk Foundation Prize for Scholarship and the Golden Serbian Literature Award (2008). The other direction of research was focused on the atypical semantics of the *house* in oral epic and of closed space in a broader sense (tower/palace, inn/tavern). In a series of studies Mirjana Detelić (in co-authorship with Lidija Delić) dealt with distinctive properties which dislocate the house in relation to the cultural standard.

One of Mirjana Detelić’s fundamental contributions is the one she made in the area of epic formula studies, both as an author: *Urok i nevesta. Poetika epske formule* (Evil Charm and the Bride. The Poetics of the Epic Formula, 1996), the already mentioned monograph *White City*, and a number of articles focused on particular formulaic combinations; and as an editor: the thematic block in the journal *Balcanica* (2013) and the volume *Epic Formula: A Balkan Perspective* (in co-editorship with Lidija Delić) resulting from it. The latter volume, which assembles contributions by both widely recognised and younger scholars of linguistics and folklore studies, looks at the Serbian oral material from a different angle and in the broadest framework of the study of formulaity in traditional cultures, from Indo-European

and Homeric to the still living oral traditions of the Balkans. The volume shifts the focus of research from virtually the only South Slavic corpus that is somewhat more widely known, Parry's and Lord's Harvard collections of songs recorded in the 1930s and 50s, to broader Balkan traditions, above all the classical recordings made by Vuk Stefanović Karadžić but also Albanian and Greek klephtic epic, as well as the Turkic epic tradition which was in indirect contact with Balkan folklore over a long period of time. Mirjana Detelić studied the stages undergone by an oral formula (the degree of the fixedness of oral text), its types and functions, using the example of concrete motifs, such as slavery, time, fog and, especially, burial in the mountain/forest, as well as the use of white as a modifier.

She also sought to develop a theoretical articulation of the influence of oral poetics on the work of Ivo Andrić. She edited or co-edited the following volumes: *Od mita do folka* (From Myth to Folk, 1996); *Kult svetih na Balkanu* in two volumes (The Cult of Saints in the Balkans, 2001 and 2002); *(Zlo)upotreba istorije u srpskoj književnosti 1945–2000* ((Mis)use of History in Serbian Literature 1945–2000; 2007); *Moć književnosti*. In Memoriam Ana Radin (The Power of Literature. In Memoriam Ana Radin, 2009); *Saints of the Balkans* (2010); *Živa reč*. Zbornik u čast prof. dr Nade Milošević Djordjević (Word of Mouth. A Festschrift in Honour of Nada Milošević Djordjević, 2011); *Ptice: književnost, kultura* (Birds: Literature, Culture, 2011); *Guje i jakrepi: književnost, kultura* (Vipers and scorpions: Literature, Culture, 2012) and *Aquatica: književnost, kultura* (Aquatica: Literature, Culture, 2013). She closely collaborated on the Leicester-led international project Transnational Database and Atlas of Saints' Cults (TASC).

Of fundamental importance was her work on the digitisation and electronic databases of oral folklore material. As part of the activity of the SASA Committee on Folk Literature, she designed a digitisation project for the Ethnographic Collection of the SASA Archives, an exceptionally important project given the fact that this material of outstanding national significance is threatened with irreversible deterioration due to the very nature of manuscripts and inadequate conservation treatment. The collected material is invaluable not only as a testament to a rich oral tradition, but also as a supplement to the classical corpus collected by Vuk Stefanović Karadžić since it comes from the areas that he did not get to cover (Kosovo and Metohija, eastern Serbia). With the technical support of the engineer Branislav Tomić, she created the database *Decasyllabic Epic Poems* which consists of twenty-one volumes of Christian and Muslim epic poems (classical recordings, more than 330,000 verses), available at: <http://www.mirjanaDetelić.com/e-baze.php> and <http://www.monumentaserbica.com/epp/>. She prepared (with Snežana Samardžija and Lidija Delić) an electronic edition of the Erlangen Manuscript (1716–33), the earliest known

collection of Serbo-Croatian folk poems written down in an exceptionally complex orthography, now available at: <http://www.erl.monumentaserbica.com>. The electronic medium has made it possible to present, side by side, the original manuscript (kept in Erlangen), Gesemann's transcribed edition (1925) and the new annotated reading, which is exceptionally important because of the diversity of the interventions made: from correcting the recorder's obvious mistakes to details the deciphering of which required a broader knowledge of oral poetics. A particular problem was the reading of the letter *yat*, which has three legitimate reflexes (Ekavian, Ikavian and Ijekavian). With her work on the digitisation of manuscript recordings and the development of electronic databases of oral epic poetry Mirjana Detelić not only contributed to the preservation of an invaluable aspect of intangible cultural heritage but she also made it available to all interested persons worldwide (statistics shows that the databases have been searched on all continents, even in Greenland!). Moreover, they usher in an entirely new era in the study of oral epic because they enable the user to handle an exceptionally large material with great precision on a micro-level (e.g. lexemes, syntagms, toponyms).

Last, but certainly not least, Mirjana Detelić has put humanities and story lovers in her debt by her splendid novel on *dorkasi*, ancient magicians who unravelled the mystery of time and, travelling through time, accumulated human experiences (*Legenda o nestanku*, Belgrade: Tardis, 2012). Through this imaginative and witty retelling of the legend of Atlantis, she left a testimony of herself. In her vision, the goddess who creates the city of Atlantis does not create humans. Atalanta comes down flying in the form of a large white bird, like the epic pen about which she wrote a remarkable study, and improves human life without asking anything in return. Being a shape-shifter, a deity capable of assuming a variety of forms, Atalanta abolishes the very possibility of being offered anyone or anything as a sacrifice on religious pretexts:

The structure of her being must have been fluid, for she was able to change shape easily and quickly, from a human to a beast to a bird, then to a fluid or a plant. Other deities later could do the same, but Atalanta was doing it in public, for all to see, and nobody in her city would lightly raise their hand to other beings, for they could never know for sure whether Atalanta herself was one of them.

When such a deity was nowhere to be found, Mirjana Detelić invented one to her own liking: one that gives and asks for nothing in return, one that has found a simple way to put an end to man's violence against other species, against nature and against other men. Her children's novel "Blue Fern" has remained in manuscript, a story about a boy, a girl and a dog who are trying to save a mountain forest with the help of fairies and two

aliens who have stayed in the forest longer than planned. A splendid storyteller and a splendid connoisseur of oral traditions, Mirjana had no trouble incorporating folklore motifs into various genre patterns, giving them a new life in an altered circle of reception.

In Mirjana, scholarship and literature and humanities in a broader sense lose much on the pan of the scales that weighs competence, hard work and a sense of responsibility towards others and towards one's profession against superficiality, improvisation and carelessness. To those who were fortunate to know her and to be her friends, the loss is much greater.

Lidija Delić

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Compiled by Valentina Babić

IN MEMORIAM



Miroslav Svirčević
(1970–2014)

It is a sad privilege to be given the opportunity of paying tribute to the memory of our beloved Miroslav Svirčević. But it is also an honour, as rare as was the privilege to know him and to share with him our Institute conversations, our time together when the passing of hours was of little consequence.

I first saw Miroslav on the occasion of the international conference “An atypical alliance: Franco-Serbian relations 1878–1940” which was taking place at the Institute for Balkan Studies in late 2007. Miroslav spoke about constitutionalism in Serbia from 1835 to 1903 and about the influence of Benjamin Constant on its development. Still an undergraduate earnestly listening to all speakers, I could not even imagine that I would soon become Miroslav’s colleague and that we would share the same office, desk to desk. It was even then that he drew my attention by his erudition, eloquence, talkativeness. Behind his somewhat baroque demeanour hid a meticulous scholar who left nothing to chance and was committed to pa-

tient, level-headed work, competently resolving even the knottiest questions he posed to himself.

Miroslav graduated from the Belgrade University Faculty of Law in 1994 as one of the best students. While his master's thesis, defended in 2000 and published a year later under the title *The Dawn of Democracy in Westminster*, was concerned with the development of the British Parliament in 1832–1911, he subsequently shifted the focus of his academic interest to the issue of local self-government in the modern Balkans, emerging as a leading Serbian scholar in the field. He defended his doctoral dissertation *Local Self-Government in Serbia and Bulgaria, 1878–1914* at the University of Belgrade, Faculty of Political Sciences, in 2008. In 2011 Miroslav published his voluminous synthesis *Local Self-Government and the Development of Modern Serbian State* under the auspices of the Institute for Balkan Studies.

Miroslav's interest in Benjamin Constant was not a random choice. He was very well acquainted with the classics of modern political philosophy. Although he did not devote much of his writing to them, it was obvious that he found in their work safe reference points and tools for moving through a field as broad as the history of ideas. It was that kind of reading, with its sweeping and well-organised knowledge, that enabled Miroslav to venture into bold research undertakings and to move confidently across the heterogeneous range of history topics to which he devoted his life. He was exceptionally proud of his unflinching libertarianism and his visits to the prestigious Cato Institute.

In the manner of the historians of old, Miroslav was preoccupied with the great issues of his day and did not separate that which he stood for as a scholar from civic courage to state and defend his stance. He devoted many texts to Huntington's *Clash of Civilisations* as a bitter metaphor for the time we live in; to the problems surrounding the disintegration of Yugoslavia; and, finally, to the question of neo-Ottomanism, in which he followed Professor Darko Tanasković. We used to debate passionately over all these topics. Always well versed and geared up, Miroslav felt them intensely, almost existentially, and that is why he was able to get so close to them and to elucidate them so comprehensively.

A restless mind as he was, Miroslav was always busy making grand plans. One of his unrealised ideas of which he often talked to me (apart from a book on the Balkan Wars in English which he finished but did not live to see it published), was a study on Banovina Croatia. He was doing background research for it and we were already exchanging books, articles, information, both looking forward to teaming up on the project. There is no doubt that Miroslav would have combined his legal education and historical vocation fruitfully in that area too. In fact, he had already come quite close to

the issue of the Croatian question in Yugoslavia, as evidenced by the study "Milan Stojadinović and the Croats" which he contributed to the edited volume on this politician and economist published by the Institute of European Studies to the activities of which Miroslav was favourably inclined.

Wholeheartedly supportive of his Institute for Balkan Studies' endeavours, Miroslav contributed to its journal *Balcanica* not only original scholarly articles but also regular and studious reviews of latest history books. He crossed swords with influential figures in the area of Balkan studies such as Richard Clogg, Richard Crampton, Mark Mazower or Robert Donia and John Fine, and levelled merciless criticism at pseudo-historical works such as those by Philip Cohen and Branimir Anzulović, in defence of the integrity of the historical science against the bias of propaganda disguised as history. His last review, devoted to the book of the American professor of anthropology and law Robert Heyden *From Yugoslavia to the Western Balkans*, once again combines the perspectives of a historian and an engaged observer to look at some of the most complex developments in our recent history.

A tireless traveller who did not seem ever to make a stop, Miroslav would return from his many destinations bringing new ideas and books, fresh experiences from the conferences he took part in, never failing to amuse us with his vividly told funny stories from his journeys. The list of the countries he visited, and more than once, is quite impressive: from the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, Switzerland, Ireland, Finland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia to Georgia, not to mention the Balkan countries.

In the end, a picture remains impressed on my memory: I'm in a hurry to leave the office, Miroslav stays behind, almost always until evening hours, "to do a thing or two more", as he used to say. He never complained; quite the opposite, ever sprightly and curious, happy to share information or a thought, Miroslav felt at ease at the Institute. I believe it would not be a mistake to say that he made it his second home, a place where he was giving his best, where he was really making a difference. We know now that his life courageously lived had an almost chivalric dimension to it, a mark of true gentility that is his legacy and that we shall remember him by.

Veljko Stanić

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Compiled by Valentina Babić

REVIEWS

VESELIN KOSTIĆ, *BRITANIJA I SRBIJA: KONTAKTI, VEZE I ODNOSI 1700–1860*
[GREAT BRITAIN AND SERBIA: CONTACTS, CONNECTIONS AND RELATIONS
1700–1860]. BELGRADE: ARHIPELAG, 2014, 536 P.

Reviewed by Miloš Vojinović*

Even a quick glance at the list of the awarded history books in the last decade reveals that those that cover long periods are not too popular. At a time in which historians tend to choose a narrower approach to the subject more often than before, Veselin Kostić published a book that makes an attempt to encompass more than a century and a half of relations between Great Britain and Serbia. This book is a continuation of the author's lifelong interest in British history and connections between the Serbs and the residents of the British Isles.¹

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¹ Veselin Kostić is a renowned Serbian scholar of English literature, Shakespeareologist, historian of literature and culture. Until his retirement in 1996 he was Professor of English literature at the Faculty of Philology, University of Belgrade. His most important works include: *Kulturne veze između jugoslovenskih zemalja i Engleske do 1700* (1972),

It is evident from the first pages that Kostić did an impeccable heuristic work. As a result of his diligent research in archives and libraries in Great Britain, this book is a meticulous piece of work. Be it a little known travelogue from the beginning of the eighteenth century or family letters of Irish mercenaries who fought for the Austrians, Kostić managed to discover all of them, so much so that it seems that no evidence escaped his careful eye. The book is organised into four extensive chapters. Each of the first three is devoted to the British of a particular walk of life who had contact with Serbia, namely soldiers, travellers and diplomats, and the last one discusses literary influences.

I am inclined to say that this book, apart from its scholarly merit, is first and foremost a good read. It is a story of many destinies, of mercenaries in search of a job, spies who wandered between empires,

Dubrovnik i Engleska 1300–1650 (1975) and *Šekspirov život i svet* (1978).

priests on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, merchants looking for new markets, and all sorts of adventurers who happened to tumble into Serbian lands.

Many readers will find the first chapter about soldiers the most interesting. Kostić's narrative flows smoothly between general conclusions and vivid details offered in corroboration of his assumptions. He shows that several generations of some British families served as mercenaries on the southern borders of the Austrian Empire. Major General Olivier Remigius Count von Wallis served under General Ernst Gideon von Laudon in the Austro-Turkish war of 1787–91, when Belgrade was taken. His grandfather George Wallis had fought near Belgrade exactly one hundred years earlier, in 1690. His father Francis fought alongside Eugene of Savoy and his uncle George Olivier was commander-in-chief during the war of 1737–39. The chapter on soldiers provides fascinating data regarding cooperation between British officers and local Serbs in wars against the Ottomans. According to the testimony of a British soldier about the war of 1735–39, he encouraged Serbs with the words "Heide, Heide", "an animating word used by the Rascians on the commencement of an attack".

It is unfortunate that the publisher did not take the trouble to furnish the book with illustrations because readers would definitely love to be able to see, for example, Sir Godfrey Kneller's painting *General Michael Richards and his brother John Richards with a view of the Battle of Belgrade in 1688*.²

² Kneller was among the most prominent portrait painters of his era. He was court painter from Charles II to George I, and his are also famous portraits of John Locke and Isaac Newton. The painting in question is now in the Slovak National Gallery.

If the chapter about soldiers is predominantly about the eighteenth century, the one devoted to travellers is mostly about the nineteenth century, when travelling through the Ottoman Empire became a little safer. Kostić does not simply retell the accounts of some thirty travellers but tries instead to explain the context of their occurrence against the background of the *Grand Tour* culture when the upper classes considered travelling as a school, a "moving academy".

The author presents numerous anecdotes from the writings of British travellers. For example, one of their most common complaints was that Serbs had too many days when they abstained from meat. On the other hand, Edmund Spenser's writings attest to the importance of folk epic for Serbs. He claims that shepherds from the environs of Mt Kopaonik told him that they were descendants of Miloš Obilić and other medieval Serbian noble families.

Readers interested in imagology will definitely be drawn to the pages that Kostić devotes to the phenomenon which he calls the "rite of crossing", a sort of a rite of passage. Many travellers crossing the river from Zemun to Belgrade had a distinct feeling of leaving one region and entering another. John Harwood describes his feeling before setting off across the river: "It was the first Turkish—the first Oriental city I had ever seen and I could hardly tear myself away from the prospect." In the middle of the nineteenth century another traveller wrote: "Europe and Asia in reality, if not geographically, meet one another here for the first time."

Harwood also gives his impressions about the relationship between British travellers and local Serbs: "Whenever we wanted anything in a Servian house, we ... imperatively demanded the first person we met to get it for us; and I must admit that they always executed our behests with unobtrusive alacrity. In the East, if

you do but usurp authority, the Orientals instantly, and as a matter of course, obey.”

The third chapter of the book is devoted to diplomats and deals with the first part of the nineteenth century. Even though Kostić makes use of some new sources, this chapter does not bring as much as the previous ones in terms of new ideas and new perspectives on the period that the book covers. The fourth and final chapter is about literature. Kostić starts with Dositej Obradović and his connections with Great Britain, but by far the most interesting section is the one about Petar Petrović, the Serbian Orthodox bishop of Timisoara in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Kostić’s analysis of the content of Petrović’s library introduces readers to the intellectual world of an Orthodox bishop whose library contained more than one thousand volumes, including Thomas Paine’s *Rights of Man*. As far as is known, he was also the first Serb who had William Shakespeare’s works in his library. Kostić pays attention not only to British influences on Serbs but also to Serbian motifs in British poetry and prose which, consistent with contemporary political developments, were mostly motifs of wars and battles.

Overall, the book reviewed here is a significant contribution to scholarship, especially to historiography on the eighteenth century. What seems to be its only flaw is its title. It is by no means a history of bilateral relations between two countries. It is unclear what Serbia was in, for instance, 1700 or in 1800? Contemporary cartographers did not have a clear answer.³ What adds to the confusion is the author’s statement that he had in mind Serbia in its present-day borders and, therefore, there is no reference to Serbs in Montenegro, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, etc. Readers should also be aware that the index, compiled with little care, is imprecise and that some names are missing.

³ E.g., in 1734 the British cartographer Herman Moll drew “A general map of Turkey in Europe” where Serbia, as a historic region, included areas as far south as Skopje. See *Belgrade above the Danube: According to European Cartographic Sources between XVI and XIX Century* (Belgrade City Library, 2008), xlvii, xlvi.

BILGIN ÇELİK, *İTTİHATÇILAR VE ARNAVUTLAR. II. MEŞRUTİYET DÖNEMİNDE ARNAVUT ULUŞÇULUĞU VE ARNAVUTLUK SORUNU* [THE UNIONISTS AND THE ALBANIANS. ALBANIAN NATIONALISM AND THE ALBANIAN QUESTION IN THE SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD]. ISTANBUL: BÜKE KİTAPLARI, 2004, 537 p.

Reviewed by Ognjen Krešić*

The author of the book reviewed here, Dr Bilgin Çelik, is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Literature of Dokuz Eylül University in İzmir, Chair in Modern History, and head of the Balkan Region Research Centre. His main area of interest is Ottoman politics during the last

decades of the Empire, and especially the Albanian component in the complexity of Ottoman politics and society.

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The place of Albanians in early twentieth-century Ottoman politics was quite prominent but it was also marked by some ambivalence. Some Albanian intellectuals were among the founders of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP, in Ottoman Turkish: *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*),¹ the reform political organisation which was to play a decisive political role after the reinstatement of the Constitution following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Involved in the activities of the CUP from its inception, the Albanians began to have disagreements with its policies soon after the promulgation of the Constitution. It was a turbulent and important period which, however, is not sufficiently studied in Turkish historiography. Bilgin Çelik addresses it from the perspective of the usual Ottoman concept of religious communities but also from the perspective of the creation and development of national identities. He reviews and sums up the relevant literature from the period under study until the present. His research also relies on the documentary sources produced both by the Ottoman central authorities and by the Albanian organisations and leading politicians, as well as the contemporary press.

A short foreword and introduction (pp. 11–15) are followed by the bulk of the book which is divided into four chapters (pp. 31–522) and ends with a conclusion (pp. 523–527) and bibliography (pp. 529–536). Çelik adopts a combination of chronological and problem-oriented approaches, which has its strengths and its

drawbacks. Selecting several important aspects or topics of the Albanian national movement in the Ottoman Empire and its relationship with the ruling CUP, the author seeks to present them in their chronological order. In that way, the reader can easily find an overview of each highlighted topic. On the other hand, some important topics are recurrently discussed and bits of information are scattered throughout the book, producing many overlaps between chapters and frequent repetitions.

The first chapter, “The Birth of Albanian Nationalism” (*Arnavut Usluşuluğu'nun Doğuşu*) (pp. 31–88), offers a historical overview of the cultural and political influences that inspired the creation of several Albanian movements of a national nature in the nineteenth century. Besides factors such as geopolitical rivalries and overlapping interests of the Great Powers and, later in the century, newly-independent Balkan states, the Albanian movements were marked by internal and mutual differences to a degree uncommon among the other peoples of the Empire. The Albanians were predominantly Muslims but the number of Christians was also considerable. Moreover, among the Christian Albanians were both Roman Catholics and Orthodox, and among the Muslims there was a considerable influence of the Bektashi dervish order. As a result, different sections of the Albanian people were responsive to different foreign influences and enjoyed different standings in the Empire. Yet, they developed common goals, and the aspiration for autonomy and the use of mother tongue as the language of instruction and local administration was gradually articulated. It was in order to achieve those goals that Albanian intellectuals entered Ottoman politics. Since the autocratic regime of Abdul Hamid II blocked any ambitious plan for reform, however, the need arose for closer relations between

¹ Although the CUP was strongly intertwined with the Young Turk movement, the two were not fully overlapping and cannot be fully equated with one another. For that reason the author chose to use the term “Unionists” commonly used for the members of the CUP in Turkish historiography, and not the term “Young Turks” common in the West.

prominent Albanian political figures and the Young Turks and the CUP.

The second chapter, "Constitutionalism and the Albanians" (*Meşrutiyet ve Arnavutlar*) (pp. 88–202), is focused on the Albanian attitude towards the new political system put in place by the Constitution, and on their relations with the most influential political organisation of the period, the CUP. Even before 1908, there had been internal disagreements in the CUP about the way in which the Empire should be reformed. The most prominent Albanian political figures, such as Ibrahim Temo and Ismail Qemali, supported Prince Sabahaddin's Private Enterprise and Decentralisation Association which gradually distanced itself from the CUP and its highly centralised vision of the Empire. The author also draws attention to the fact that Prince Sabahaddin and his supporters, unlike the other Young Turks who embraced the concepts of Islamism, Ottomanism and Turkism, envisaged a confederal state. Nevertheless, the CUP, exploiting the fear of foreign intervention and the imposition of reforms unwanted by the Albanian leaders, managed to secure Albanian support, especially in military circles, even though their interests and plans were sometimes diametrically opposite. Thus the role of Albanians in the Young Turk revolution was quite important.

In the second part of this chapter Çelik shows that this alliance was short-lived, and that soon after the restoration of the Constitution political dissent arose between Albanian proponents of different policies. Conservative Albanians, mostly from Kosovo, expected the Constitution to provide for a better implementation of the sharia law and the protection of their traditional privileges, while more liberal-minded Albanians supported the enactment of the highest law of the state because they saw it as an opportunity to finally obtain official support for the

opening and spread of Albanian schools and the use of mother tongue in education and the press, which they expected would eventually result in the achievement of territorial autonomy. The author gives exhaustive information about the participation of Albanian politicians in the work of the Ottoman parliament and their connections with different parties. The greatest attention is naturally paid to the question of the ambiguous relationship between Albanians and the CUP. From the information presented, it appears that the Albanian deputies devoted most of their time in parliamentary discussions to the question of education and the use of language.

Recognising the importance of these questions for the Albanian national movement, Çelik devotes a whole chapter to their analysis: "The Cultural Dimension of Albanian Nationalism" (*Arnavut Ulusçuşunun Kültürel Boyutu*) (pp. 203–344). The activities of the Albanian intelligentsia towards cultural and political development were diverse, and the author divides them into the founding of various societies and committees, the press, and the convening of a series of congresses. All those activities were initiated abroad because the sultan's autocratic regime did not look benevolently on the autonomous wishes of his subjects. The Albanian associations had both political and cultural aspirations from the start. Those founded before 1908 advocated the use of the Albanian language and, especially, the adoption of an appropriate alphabet, the improvement and expansion of education in Albanian, as well as the translation and publication of important books. At the same time, the secret society "Central Committee for the Defence of the Rights of the Albanian People", founded in 1878 in reaction to the significant change of the political map of the Balkans, formulated for the first time the idea of unification of the provinces inhabited by Al-

banians² and of political autonomy. Such ideas would be later propagated by organisations such as the Leagues of Prizren and Peć. The Constitution of 1908 gave rise to a further increase in the number of Albanian societies. Of special importance was the network of societies called Bashkimi (Unity), founded in major cities of the Ottoman Empire inhabited by Albanians. These societies continued the work on the question of alphabet and education in Albanian, although the political aspect of Albanian unification and autonomy was also present. Within the first ten months following the promulgation of the Constitution more than sixty cultural and political clubs were founded, which is telling evidence of the extent of Albanian activities. Among the most important centres were Istanbul, Thessaloniki, Monastir (Bitola), Shkoder, and Durres. The author also provides information about conservative Albanian associations which called for the preservation of traditions and the use of the Arabic alphabet. He also observes that Albanian intellectuals living abroad were by far more radical in their plans and expectations for the Albanian future than those who lived in the Empire. The former were eager to achieve Albanian interests through full independence from the Ottomans,

² Çelik repeatedly denotes four Ottoman provinces or *vilayets* (of Janina, Kosovo, Monastir and Scutari) as Albanian. Although they were so named in the Albanian proclamations demanding the creation of an “Albanian vilayet”, it was not their official denomination and they were far from being exclusively inhabited by Albanians. They accounted for 44% of the population in the four vilayets. Besides, the author often wrongly denotes the major towns in those provinces as Albanian. Presumably his motive was to avoid over-repetition of the terms, but they are anachronisms nevertheless.

while the latter retained a sense of belonging to Ottoman society and wished to have the backing of the central authority for their plans. All of these activities crystallised at the Albanian congresses, to which much attention is paid in the book. The main subject of dispute at the congresses, which were held successively in Monastir (1908), Debar (1909), Elbasan (1909) and again in Monastir (1910), was the question of the alphabet. Although the conservatives, backed by the CUP, kept on supporting the use of the Arabic alphabet as a symbol of belonging to a broader Islamic civilisation and a bar to Western cultural influences, the majority of Albanian intellectuals adopted a modified Latin alphabet as the most appropriate for the Albanian language. Besides the language issue, the congress participants insisted on the importance of education in mother tongue, and on the widening of the network of Albanian schools. Çelik stresses that the cultural aspect of these discussions was always combined with a political one because the achievement of cultural privileges and rights was seen as a step closer to political autonomy, even independence. The CUP was generally opposed to the activities of the Albanian societies and congresses, and relied upon the conservative sections of the Albanian people. Towards the end of the period the Unionists, faced with an increasingly complex geopolitical situation, tried to win over broader Albanian circles by partially consenting to their demands in the area of education, but these reforms were cut short by the Balkan Wars.

Throughout the period under study, 1908–1912, disputes between the ruling CUP and Albanians led to frequent armed conflicts. The Albanian armed revolts are the subject of the last chapter, “The Albanian Question and the Albanian Uprisings” (*Arnavutluk Sorunu ve Arnavutluk İsyamları*) (pp. 345–522). The roots of the Albanian Question, and of

the disagreements between the CUP and the Albanian leaders, lay in the basic political tenets of the new Ottoman government. The Unionists envisioned a unified and reformed Empire, free from both foreign influences and internal differences. Privileges and special accommodations to different ethnic and religious groups did not fit well with the policy of centralisation and promotion of common Ottoman identity irrespective of other affiliations. On the other hand, the Albanian political and intellectual leaders saw decentralisation and the achievement of broad cultural and political rights as the only way for them to remain within the Ottoman state. Some of the uprisings were local in character, motivated by opposition to the modernisation process or tax and mobilisation reforms launched by the CUP, but the author nevertheless draws attention to the fact that local Albanian notables on the one hand and politicians and intellectuals on the other eventually found common ground and began to work ever more towards Albanian independence.

Çelik describes every uprising in great detail and gives much attention not only to armed conflicts but also to political aspects and parliamentary debates. The first Albanian armed revolt, provoked by the attempt to collect weapons and levy new taxes, started in Peć in 1909 and was quickly quelled, but a more serious revolt broke out next year, again mainly in the province of Kosovo. This time it involved not only Muslim but also Catholic Albanians, and was also marked by foreign involvement, such as Montenegrin and Austro-Hungarian. Even more complex was the next year's revolt known as the Malissori Uprising. This uprising saw the proclamation of Albanian short-lived independence by Terenzio Tocci, an Albanian from Italy, but more important was the so-called Gerçe Memorandum or the Red Book drawn up by Ismail Qemali,

one of the most prominent Albanian politicians in the Ottoman parliament, and the Albanian tribal leaders. The memorandum stated Albanian long-standing demands such as the use of Albanian in schools, the employment of Albanian officials, the privilege of doing military service only in Albanian-inhabited provinces, etc. The Ottoman government soon decided that a peaceful way of ending the conflict was preferable to the continuation of fighting. A general amnesty was granted and the main Albanian demands were met. The last Albanian uprising took place in 1912, and was marked by cooperation between local leaders and the most prominent Albanian politicians and members of parliament, such as Hassan Prishtine and Nexhip Draga. They professed allegiance to the sultan, but claimed that the CUP's insistence on some constitutional changes and meddling into the ongoing election process called for a change of government. Based on the demands put forth a year before, they drew up a new list of demands where political autonomy for the Albanians retained the central place. The uprising spread quickly, and it was joined by deserting Albanian officers and soldiers. The government was compelled to enter into negotiations with Albanians, and the uprising ended when it conceded to their demands. Autonomy was finally gained, but it would soon become evident that the compromise was achieved too late as only a month later a war between an alliance of Balkan states and the Ottoman Empire began. Although the Albanians remained divided on the question of independence versus autonomy within the Empire until the end, the independence faction prevailed. Ismail Qemali presided over the congress in Vlore (Valona) where on 28 November 1912 independent Albania was proclaimed. Çelik ends the book by considering the course and results of the Balkan Wars, mainly subscribing to the views of Noel Mal-

colm. The Albanians, like the Ottomans, saw the outcome of the Balkan Wars as a defeat because they had failed to unite the four provinces of the Empire that were populated by Albanians in a greater or smaller degree, but the author stresses that the Unionists' policies, the Albanian armed revolts and the lack of military discipline due to conflicts between Albanian and Unionist officers greatly contributed to the final outcome of the war.

Çelik's book offers a comprehensive picture of Albanian political and cultural history in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. Being a broad overview, some topics are examined in more depth than others, and therefore the presentation of

the latter mostly relies on the existing literature (mostly Turkish or available in Turkish translation). A very prominent aspect of the book is in that the author gives the Ottoman perspective on many problems, which is very important for fully understanding some of the most crucial issues of Balkan history but which is often under-researched. This book can be highly useful to those interested in the extremely complicated political situation in the Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the roots and development of the so-called *Albanian Question*, but also to those interested in how contemporary Turkish historiography views this period.

KRÜST'O MANCHEV, *SÛRBILA I SÛRBSKO-BÛLGARSKITE OTNOSHENILA 1804–2010*
[SERBIA AND SERBIAN-BULGARIAN RELATIONS 1804–2010]. SOFIA: PARADIGMA,
2014, 499 p.

Reviewed by Jelena N. Radosavljević*

The author of the book reviewed here, Krüst'o Manchev, is a Bulgarian historian who, it may be curious to note, was born in the village of Verzar near Caribrod (present-day Dimitrovgrad) in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1926. He graduated in history from the University of Sofia, and then pursued his further studies in the Democratic Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union. He worked as a fellow of the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Manchev published several books on the history of Balkan peoples, but the area of his special interest is the history of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Serbia.

Manchev's book on Serbian-Bulgarian relations opens with a preface in which he expresses his view that Serbian-Bulgarian relations through history have not been adequately studied and that his book is an attempt to improve such a state of re-

search. The book is divided into two parts. The first part, *Serbia 1804–2010*, is subdivided into five chapters: "The Serbian national revolution"; "State and political development"; "National policy"; "Serbia at the time of wars (1912–1918)"; and "Serbia in Yugoslavia". The second part, *Serbian-Bulgarian relations*, consists of six chapters: "National-territorial demarcation"; "Serbia and Bulgaria in the wars of 1912–1918"; "Under the Versailles status quo (1919–1941)"; "In Hitler's 'New Order'"; "Under communism (1944–1989)"; and "Bulgaria and the end of Yugoslavia (1990–2010)".

The first two chapters span the period from the beginning of the Serbian revolution (1804) through the Principality of

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Serbia as an autonomous part of the Ottoman Empire to the Congress of Berlin (1878) at which it achieved independence. Manchev looks at the state of anarchy in the pashalik of Belgrade in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century which led to the outbreak of two Serbian uprisings, in 1804 and 1815. He describes the wartime and peacetime phases of the Serbian revolution, as well as the social, agrarian and cultural changes in Serbian society brought about during and after it. He also briefly describes Serbia's progression towards independence, the question of separation of powers in the Principality, the succession of several constitutions, the establishment of two dynasties, and the process of building administrative, judicial, military and other institutions. He looks at Serbia's relations with other Balkan peoples in the period and at the influence of major powers' interests in the Balkans, which inevitably had implications for the realisation of the interests of the Serbian people. He does not fail to emphasise that the Serbs were stuck between two empires, Habsburg and Ottoman, and hence were exposed to pressures from both. For that reason, he gives an account of not only the situation of the Serbs in the Ottoman Empire (pashalik of Belgrade, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Old Serbia), but also of the situation of the Serbian population in the Habsburg Monarchy, both in and outside the Military Frontier. He remarks that the term "Turkish bondage", or "slavery", frequently used in Balkan history writing, is a misconception because the Ottoman Empire was not a slavery system but a feudal one. It should be noted, however, that this term is not used in Serbian historiography, but that it occasionally is in Bulgarian, though not in reference to the Ottoman Empire as a slavery system but as foreign rule. Manchev describes the Ottoman Empire as a relatively tolerant state in which all peoples were able to use their own language and practise their own faith.

The chapter on national policy analyses the national policy of the Principality, subsequently Kingdom, of Serbia from the time of Kardjordje and Miloš Obrenović to the foreign policy pursued by the Constitution Defenders and Prince Michael, to the Eastern Crisis (1875–78), to the Serbian-Bulgarian War (1885), to the Annexation Crisis (1908). It looks at the issue primarily against the background of the Eastern Question and the division of Ottoman territories among Balkan peoples, and the influence of the great powers. It explains the significance of the Serbian population that remained outside Serbia (Old Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the aspirations for their union with Serbia. In his view, problems among the newly-created Balkan states arose from the insistence on the "one people, one state" principle, which was impracticable because of the region's ethnic and religious heterogeneity. Manchev looks at the issue of interaction between the national revivals of the Balkan peoples, whose conflicts resulted both from their invocation of their respective historical medieval traditions to back up their claims and from the region's ethnic heterogeneity. An example is the conflict of Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek interests in Ottoman Macedonia. Manchev singles out as important, and discusses, the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its occupation and annexation by Austria-Hungary whose foreign policy shift to the Balkans after the unifications of Germany and Italy put strong pressure on Serbia. Discussing different contemporary conceptions of how to resolve the Serbian question, he pays particular attention to the "Načertanije" of Ilija Garašanin, but overrates its significance by describing it as the main line of Serbia's national policy, and stereotypically misinterprets it as a greater-Serbian and hegemonistic project.

The following two chapters describe the period of two Balkan Wars, the war of allied Balkan states against the Ottoman Empire and the war among the former allies over the division of Macedonia, which Bulgaria lost, as well as the outbreak and course of the First World War, whose official cause was the assassination of the Austrian heir-apparent in Sarajevo, but whose real causes went much deeper, down to the conflicting foreign-political and economic interests of the great powers. Manchev describes the division of Serbia by the occupying powers, without remaining silent on the crimes of Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian troops against Serbian civilian population. In his view, the creation of the Yugoslav state was a process that unfolded under Serbian dominance and on the wrong premise that the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes are one three-named people. All of that was the reason why Yugoslavia collapsed. In his view, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, i.e. of Yugoslavia, was a greater-Serbian creation in which the other peoples were in a subordinate position. That situation changed after the Second World War, when the state was reorganised on the federal principle, but the “federal balance” was disturbed after the death of Josip Broz Tito. Even though Manchev does not fail to touch on the problems caused by Croat and other nationalisms, he places all the blame for the disintegration of Yugoslavia on Slobodan Milošević and Serbian political leadership, claiming that they waged wars for the “greater-Serbian” idea. As a matter of fact, Manchev tends to overuse the term *Greater Serbia*, a term which has been misinterpreted and misused in a number of historiographical works, his own included. On the other hand, the role of foreign factors in the disintegration of Yugoslavia is not taken into account. Manchev gives a summary outline of the military and civilian death toll in the wars of the Yugoslav succession. Yet, when discussing the Serbian-Albanian conflict in Kosovo and Metohija, he takes a biased, scholarly indefensible

perspective by describing the Albanian side as the sole victim, while completely ignoring the violence and ethnic cleansing committed against Serbs.

The second part of the book, *Serbian-Bulgarian relations*, opens with Manchev’s description of the Serbs and Bulgarians as two kindred peoples in terms of Slavic origin, culture, religion and language. Problems in their relations arose from the division of Ottoman Balkan territories which made it impossible for the Balkan states to establish themselves as fully national because of the region’s ethnically mixed populations. In his view, that was the cause of all problems in their relations. National doctrines, such as the Načertanije for Serbia and the San Stefano ideal for Bulgaria, i.e. the ideas of Greater Serbia and Greater Bulgaria, caused unnecessary problems between the two peoples. The idea of taking area as a measure of the greatness of a nation is wrong; the greatness of a nation should be measured by its form of government and the well-being of its citizens. In Manchev’s view, disputed territories were the Nišava and Morava valleys (*Zapadni bugarski zemlji*, allegedly “western Bulgarian lands”), Macedonia and the territory the Kingdom of SCS gained under the Treaty of Neuilly (*Zapadnite pokrajini* or “western provinces”). As far as the Nišava and Morava valleys are concerned, Manchev claims that the border established under the Treaty of Berlin is not subject to revision because it coincides with the line of demarcation between the two nations. With the remark that the national consciousness of the local population at the time was debateable, today, as a result of propaganda, wars, decades of living within the boundaries of one or the other state, the population to the west of the border feel themselves as Serbs and those to the east of it as Bulgarians. Manchev describes Macedonia as an area where Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek interests conflicted, with varying success, but remarks that Bulgaria

had an advantage in the nineteenth century because of the presence of the Bulgarian Exarchate and the fact that a good part of the population felt themselves as Bulgarians. Such a picture changed as a result of subsequent wars, and today the population of Macedonia is a nation in its own right, which Manchev finds to be quite natural. After all struggles for control over Macedonia, its population formed their own national consciousness in defence against outside influences and ravages of war. The chapters that cover the past hundred years offer a historical overview spanning the Balkan Wars, the First World War, and the interwar period, when the Kingdom of SCS/Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had divergent agendas, the former being interested in the maintenance of the Versailles system, the latter in its revision. Manchev also gives an account of the efforts towards a rapprochement between the two countries, which resulted in the signing of a pact of friendship in 1937, but before long they found themselves on opposite sides in the Second World War. Manchev depicts the positions of the two countries under communism when, after the Tito-Stalin split, they were also on different sides for some time. In Manchev's view, the cession of territory from Bulgaria to the Kingdom of SCS under the 1919 Treaty of Neuilly was a mistake both because the territory was inhabited by Bulgarian population and because of its geographical position which separated it from the rest of the Kingdom of SCS by a mountain massif and from Bulgaria by a simple border. Yet, Manchev argues that it is meaningless to consider revision of the treaty, given that the present-day structure of the population is different from what it was in 1919. Finally, Manchev discusses Bulgaria's position on the disintegration of Yugoslavia, notably on Macedonia's declaration of independence, Albanian-Serbian antagonism and the events in Srebrenica. In all of these cases, he sticks to his biased

perception of the Serbian side as aggressor and non-Serb populations as its victim. The crimes committed against the Serbian population in Kosovo and former Yugoslav republics are barely mentioned. The impression is that Manchev here tackles an all too recent past to be studied with any measure of credibility due as much to the lack of historical distance and the unavailability of all relevant sources as to the potential and actual exploitation of these issues for short-term political purposes and by different political groups. A biased approach or a lack of factual knowledge in this section of the book undermines its overall scholarly merit.

The book ends with an afterword which offers the author's main conclusions about the past history of the Bulgarian and Serbian peoples and guidelines for their good relations in the future. He emphasises that the two peoples should build mutual relations in tolerance and understanding, and reject expansionist aspirations which he believes have hitherto guided them. The book is furnished with historical maps and a bibliography. The biographies of major figures of Bulgarian and Serbian history at the end of each chapter constitute useful appendices.

Manchev's book is one more work whose purpose is to make a contribution to the study of Serbian-Bulgarian relations through history. In that sense, the author does his best to show that what matters for a state is the good life of its citizens rather than its endless territorial expansion, and he does not try to conceal the Bulgarian side's treatment of the Serbs during the two world wars when it committed horrible crimes in the southern areas of Serbia. As far as the history of Yugoslavia is concerned, and especially its disintegration in the 1990s, however, he was not able to peruse all the necessary sources which affected the quality of those sections of the book devoted to it.

DUŠAN BERIĆ, *HRVATSKO PRAVAŠTVO I SRBI* [THE CROATIAN RIGHTIST MOVEMENT AND THE SERBS], I-II. NOVI SAD: ORPHEUS, 2005, 720 + 698 p.

Reviewed by Dušan Fundić*

Dušan Berić, Professor of Modern European History at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Priština (temporarily seated in Kosovska Mitrovica), offers an extensive research into a Croatian movement of extreme right from its establishment as a political party (1861) under the name *Stranka prava*, or “Party of Rights” – hence its followers were known as *pravaši*, Rightists, from *pravo* meaning a “right” – led by Ante Starčević to some aspects of contemporary Croatian history in which the author detects the continuity of their politics. Berić’s bibliography includes: *Slavonska vojna granica u revoluciji 1848–1849* (Zagreb: Prosvjeta & Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju, 1984); *Ustanak u Hercegovini 1852–1862* (Belgrade: SANU, 1994; 2nd ed. 2007); *Srpsko pitanje i politika Austrougarske i Rusije 1848–1878* (Belgrade: Gutenbergova galaksija, 2000).

According to the author himself, his motive for writing this book has been his view that the question of the Rightist policy towards the Serbs has been central to Serbian-Croatian relations. The book is based on various published documentary sources, the contemporary press and the available literature. The main body of text is interspersed with frequent and extensive quotations from various sources and literature that Berić uses to illuminate all major topics, especially the ideology of the movement’s founding fathers. In this way, Berić seeks to clarify the essence of the right-wing party which generated the most aggressive form of Croatian nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth century. Its origins lie in the historical context of the Dual Monarchy and the nationalist rivalries of its different communities.

The book is divided into four parts devoted to particular aspects which Berić considers key to understanding the phenomenon under study. The first part explores the history and social situation of the historic regions of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria and the Dubrovnik area which were the focus of the Rightist politics and ambitions. Berić explains their status and various local and regional identities that flourished there around the middle of the nineteenth century.

Berić describes the basis of the constitutional position of these areas in the Habsburg Monarchy, which largely shaped Rightist ideologies, arguing that a “feudal view of the world prevailed over a democratic and civic one” there. The first part of his study ends with a portrait of the founder of the movement, Ante Starčević, who is often described as “the father of Croatian nationalism”. The programme of the Party of Rights was shaped during the constitutional debate in 1860 and 1861. The appearance of Ante Starčević on the Croatian political scene also introduced racism into public discourse. As a part of his political programme, Starčević invented the term “Slavoserb” which he eventually used to emphasise the alleged non-existence of any other South Slav identities in South-Eastern Europe except Croatian and Bulgarian. In Starčević’s interpretation, for example, the Serbs of Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina had no separate identity. As can be seen from his writings, the same went for Bosnian Muslims and all other cultural and ethnic minorities in the imagined Croatian state. Berić concludes

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that Starčević drew inspiration from the Hungarian politician József Eötvös's concept of a "political nation".

The second part of the book is concerned with three major ideas of the Rightist movement. The idea of a "Greater Croatia", the appearance and elaboration of the ideology of "Croatian state and historical rights", and the theory of "Croatian political nation" are all analysed and their ideological content studied in the context of the Rightist attitude and policies towards the Serbs. They all, each in its own way, led to the radicalisation of the Rightist policy towards the Serbs, with the conclusion that the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878) led to the further radicalisation of the Croatian extreme national ideology. The idea of "historical and state rights", according to Berić, had its roots in some elements of feudal estate autonomy and eventually led to the denial of "natural nationality rights". The "political nation" thesis was mostly based on pseudo-scientific theories postulating that in Croatia actually lived only Orthodox Vlachs who subsequently assimilated into Serbs. To illustrate this point, Berić offers numerous quotations from the contemporary Rightist press.

The third and fourth parts of the book, devoted to the continuation of Rightist politics, are chronologically divided by the period of the First World War. The third part describes the further extremisation of the Party of Rights, notably under the leadership of Josip Frank in the newly-created atmosphere of Roman Catholic clericalism and German "Drang nach Osten", especially after 1878. Describing the period between 1918 and the disintegration of the Second Yugoslavia in the 1990s the author underlines the aspects of the Party of Rights' ideology and ideas of Ante Starčević and Josip Frank in various Croatian movements with its most

radical culmination in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH, 1941–1945) whose leader Ante Pavelić, a former Rightist and leader of the fascist Ustaša movement, considered himself as someone who was putting their ideas into practice. The last hundred pages are devoted to contemporary proponents of Rightist ideas in Croatian political life, which Berić finds to be less flammable than before but still present.

The most visible flaw of the book is the lack of a list of the sources and literature used, which is necessary for a work as extensive as this one. It would have helped the reader to follow the text and find out what research material the author used for writing his study. A book which spans a period of a century and a half would much gain in quality with such a list.

What the book also lacks is a more theoretically founded approach to the nature and ideology of nationalism which would put the Rightist movement in a wider European context, thereby making it easier to understand how far to the right were the ideas for which Starčević and Kvaternik had paved the way. The author insists on the dependence of the Rightist movement on the Vatican's foreign policy and Germany's "Drang nach Osten" without any archival research in Austria, Germany and the Vatican. In this way, this remains a hypothesis that is yet to be tested.

On the other hand, Berić's book is the first in Serbian historiography that provides a complete chronological overview of the ideology of the Party of Rights and its evolution throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and offers an insight into the ideological and political history of Croatian extreme nationalism.

ΛΟΥΚΙΑΝΟΣ ΗΑΣΣΙΟΤΗΣ, *ΕΛΛΗΝΟΣΕΡΒΙΚΕΣ ΣΧΕΣΕΙΣ, 1913–1918. ΣΥΜΜΑΧΙΚΕΣ ΠΡΟΤΕΡΑΙΟΤΗΤΕΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΕΣ ΑΝΤΙΠΑΛΟΤΗΤΕΣ* [GREEK–SERBIAN RELATIONS, 1913–1918. ALLIES' PRIORITIES AND POLITICAL RIVALRIES]. THESSALONIKI: VANIAS PUBL., 2004, 442 p., tables, photos, maps and appendices

*Reviewed by Radmila Pejić**

There are topics in historiography that although widely considered as sufficiently studied are in fact underrated or unelaborated. Such is the case with Serbian-Greek relations during the First World War. Even a quick look at the available literature shows that until recently this chapter of one of the most critical periods in the contemporary history of both nations was not sufficiently covered, at least on the level of primary research. Between 1974 and 1991, a series of scholarly conferences (organised by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) and the Institute for Balkan Studies (IMXA) in Thessaloniki) were largely devoted to political, cultural and particularly literary relations between the two nations during the period of Ottoman domination (mainly between the eighteenth and early twentieth century). This astonishing historiographical lacuna may perhaps be attributed to technical reasons (i.e. difficult access to state archives in both countries in the past) or to scholarly or even ideological reasons. Be that as it may, since the end of the 1990s a new research impetus has given rise to a substantial number of studies on bilateral relations in the first half of the twentieth century. Despite this growing interest, however, some works show a tendency to an idealisation of Serbian-Greek relations and some, quite the contrary if rarely, tend to overemphasise their negative aspects – doubtless as a result of the impact of contemporary events in the former Yugoslavia and generally in the Balkans on the shaping of both aca-

demical and public discourse about intra-Balkan relations.¹

As far as Serbian historiography is concerned, quite a few notable exceptions to the abovementioned situation should be welcomed, notably a book by Miladin Milošević which is based on Serbian archival sources.² A work that is less known to the Serbian community of historians and broader public is Loukianos Hassiotis's *Greek–Serbian Relations 1913–1918. Allies' Priorities and Political Rivalries*, published in Greek. Hassiotis, currently Assistant Professor at Aristotle University in Thessaloniki, examines Serbian-Greek relations between 1913 and 1918, indeed a critical period in the modern history of both nations.

The first merit of Hassiotis's book is that it is based on exhaustive research

¹ For two opposite examples in the Greek literature see Stefanos Sotiriou, *Greeks and Serbs. History of Greek–Serbian Relations* (in Greek) (Athens 1996), and Tassos Kostopoulos, *War and Ethnic Cleansing: the Forgotten Side of a Decade of National Campaign, 1912–1922* (in Greek) (Athens 2007). See also Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, "Greek–Serbian Relations 1912–1913: Communication Gap or Deliberate Policy", *Balkan Studies* 45.1 (2004), 23–38.

² Miladin Milošević, *Srbija i Grčka, 1914–1918. Iz istorije diplomatskih odnosa* (Belgrade 1997). See also Dušan T. Bataković, "Serbia and Greece in the First World War. An Overview", *Balkan Studies* 45.1 (2004), 58–80; Aleksandra M. Pećinar, "Stvaranje Kraljevine SHS i Grčka", *Zbornik radova Narodnog muzeja, Čačak* XLI (2011), 101–124.

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of archival sources: Greek – the Diplomatic and Historical Archives of the Greek Foreign Ministry, the Historical Directory of the Hellenic Army General Staff, The Hellenic Literary and Historical Archive, and other political and private archives; Serbian – the Archives of Serbia and the Military Archives of Serbia; and international – the British National Archives, the French Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères and the Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre. The source material in Hassiotis's book also includes a considerable section of the Greek, Serbian and British press from the period under study. Another big merit of Hassiotis's study is his dispassionate and balanced approach to the subject, which stands in contrast to earlier works that tended to idealise Serbian-Greek relations using vague arguments inspired by national myths.

The first chapter of the book, "From independence to alliance", is an introduction to the subject from the creation of the two nation-states to the Balkan Wars. The second, "The Treaty of Alliance", is devoted to the factors that led to the signing of the Greek-Serbian Alliance Treaty of 1913, its provisions and its significance at that particular moment. The chapter "A short period of peace, 1913–1914" discusses various challenges that the Greek-Serbian Alliance faced as regards regional issues and disputes, and the mounting European crisis. The fourth chapter, "Diplomatic and political developments during the first year of the Great War", examines Serbia's appeal for military assistance, Venizelos's plans for the reconstruction of the Balkan Alliance and Greek official and unofficial support to Serbia until the autumn of 1915. The fifth chapter, "National dissension and the crisis in Greek-Serbian relations", analyses the impact of Greece's internal political strife on the Alliance and, inevitably, on bilateral relations. The following chapter,

"The provisional government at Salonika and Serbia", examines the role of the Venizelist movement in northern Greece and Serbian responses to the Greek crisis. The seventh one, "The revival of the Alliance", sheds light on several aspects (diplomatic, political and military) of Greek-Serbian cooperation during the last year of the Great War, but also on developments in Serbian political and military circles (the Apis Affair, the Yugoslav Union) as commented by Greek officials. The next two chapters are devoted to some lesser-known aspects of relations between the two countries which bring into question the myth of their unclouded and consolidated relations: one deals with Serbian propaganda activities in the Hellenic part of Macedonia and the other looks at Greek propaganda activities in the area of Bitolj (Monastir) between 1913 and 1918. Serbian propaganda was organised mainly by junior army officers and administrative officials, but it was tolerated by the political and military leadership, at least until Venizelos's return to power and the trial of D. T. Dimitrijević Apis in 1917. Greek propaganda in the Serbian part of Macedonia had from the very beginning an unofficial character, since Athens did not want to challenge Serbia's sovereignty in the area and to alienate the Serbs. The last chapter of the book, "The issue of citizenship", discusses the problems of defining nationality in the "new areas" of both the Greek and Serbian kingdoms, the motives behind the official policies of both sides and their impact on the local population. It also includes a brief reference to the little-known history of the Serbian community in Thessaloniki.

Hassiotis finds that Serbian-Greek relations in 1913–1918 were based on a curious balance which was convenient enough for the main interests of the political elites in both countries. The balance of interests was maintained for the most part of the period due to their awareness

of the threat that the Bulgarian national aims posed to both sides and to their mutual support regarding the territorial status in the Balkan Peninsula created by the Balkan Wars and the Treaty of Bucharest (1913). Cooperation between the two states in the subsequent years reinforced the prevailing notion of traditional and undisturbed Greek-Serbian friendship. In reality, according to Hassiotis, things were much more complicated. It is true that the alliance became a priority for the political leaderships in Serbia and Greece, but political rivalries both between them and

within them brought this option more than once to a deadlock and to apparent diplomatic shifts. Serbian and Greek propaganda activities are indicative of these contradictions. In the final analysis, the author of this interesting study attempts, and largely succeeds, to interpret the development of Greek-Serbian relations in a realistic context determined by international and regional geopolitical factors and by internal political antagonisms in two neighbouring, closely interconnected countries.

PRVI SVJETSKI RAT – UZROCI I POSLJEDICE [FIRST WORLD WAR – CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES], EDS. DRAGO BRANKOVIĆ AND NIKOLA B. POPOVIĆ. BANJA LUKA: AKADEMIJA NAUKA I UMJETNOSTI REPUBLIKE SRPSKE, 2014, 528 p.

*Reviewed by Goran Latinović**

The centenary of the Great War in 2014 was commemorated by various events, conferences, research projects and ceremonies around the globe. One such conference took place in Banja Luka, the administrative capital of the Serbian entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the aegis of the Academy of Sciences and Arts of the Republic of Srpska. Held on 30 and 31 May 2014, it was the most important scholarly gathering addressing topics about the Great War in the entity in 2014. The Academy published the collection of twenty-nine papers submitted by the participants of the conference. The volume is in Serbian, but every paper is furnished with a summary in English, with one French exception.

The book begins with a Foreword (pp. 9–10) and several photos taken during the conference (pp. 11–12), followed by an introduction to the topic by Rajko Kuzmanović (pp. 15–22), Drago Branković (pp. 23–28) and Nikola B. Popović (pp. 29–34), all of them drawing

attention to the First World War as the major history topic in 2014. Popović particularly emphasises the growing, politically motivated, tendency towards using unscholarly methodological approaches, which necessarily leads to the production of pseudo-scholarly books on the Great War. Dušan Berić (pp. 35–66) discusses the German *Drang nach (Sud-)Osten* and the question of responsibility for the First World War, while Boro Bronza (pp. 67–83) writes about the aspects of the continuity of Austrian expansive policy in the Balkans in 1683–1914. Galib Šljivo (pp. 85–114) gives an overview of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the beginning of the twentieth century, and Dušan Bataković (pp. 115–143) contributes one of the most instructive articles in the volume. His text on external and internal challenges Serbia was facing on the eve of the First World War, based on a

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wide range of sources, convincingly demonstrates that official Serbia, after the Balkan Wars 1912–13, by no means wanted a new war, especially not against Austria-Hungary. He concurs with Franz Fischer's view put forward in the 1960s that Germany pushed the world into the abyss of war by supporting Austria-Hungary.

Aleksej Timofejev (pp. 145–158) sheds light on Russian interest in the Balkans on the eve of the First World War. Milan Balaban (pp. 159–166) gives an overview of Czech public opinion in 1914, while Goran Vasin (pp. 167–178) does the same for the public opinion of the Serbian population in Austria-Hungary. Goran Latinović (pp. 179–186) analyses some perceptions by Western historians and popular history writers of the assassination in Sarajevo in 1914. Slobodan Šoja (pp. 187–209) discusses the Yugoslav youth in Austria-Hungary at the beginning of the twentieth century, while Dragiša D. Vasić (pp. 211–234) gives an account of the anti-Serb demonstrations and violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1914, illustrated by contemporary (1914) photographic material. He shows that the violence was apparently instigated, encouraged and controlled by clerical and military factors as the first stage in the Austro-Hungarian aggressive policy of breaking down the Serbian national movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Borivoje Milošević (pp. 241–253) examines the position of the Sokol movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war, and Dragan Šućur (pp. 255–273) looks into the tribulation suffered by the Serbian Orthodox clergy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His well-documented paper, to which a list of the murdered priests and their photographs is appended, explains why Austria-Hungary came down so brutally on the Orthodox clergy, perceiving them as a major bearer of Serbian identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Janko Ramač (pp. 277–290) contributes a paper on the Ruthenians/Ukrainians in Austria-Hungary during the war, while Ostoja Djukić (pp. 291–309) offers a philosophical discussion of the ethics and revolutionary zeal of Young Bosnia (*Mlada Bosna*). Several papers that follow – Slobodan Remetić (pp. 311–318), Rajko Petrov Nogo (pp. 319–333), Staniša Tutnjević (pp. 335–347) and Dragan Hamović (pp. 349–361) – discuss issues of language and literature, notably poetry.

Tijana Šurlan (pp. 363–382) deals with the international law approach to the crimes committed during the First World War, while Vladimir Umeljic (pp. 383–412) seeks to establish a relationship between the “theory of definitivism” and revisionism with special reference to the redefining of the responsibility for the war. Nikola Žutić (pp. 413–436) addresses the question of English public opinion about the Serbian “guilt” for the Great War. Ivana Krstić Mistrđzelović (pp. 437–463) analyses Archibald Reiss's inquiries into the Bulgarian crimes in occupied Serbia 1915–1918, while Zdrava Stojanović (pp. 465–484) discusses the Serbian conception of the solution to the Yugoslav question during the war. Vojislav Pavlović (pp. 485–498) looks at the Yugoslav programme of the Serbian government but with reference to the French plans in the Balkans. Čedomir Antić (pp. 499–504) deals with the Paget-Tyrrell Memorandum of 1916 and, finally, Zoltan Djere (505–528) presents Hungarian views on the question of nationalities in Hungary.

The participants in the conference and authors of the published articles looked at various aspects of the causes and consequences of the First World War. Although predominantly history-oriented, the conference had a multidisciplinary character, covering areas such as law, political science, literature, language, journalism, theology and military science.

Besides well-established scholars, whose participation certainly added weight to the conference, young scholars were also given the opportunity to present the results of their research. The resulting volume is a very useful read, but non-Serbian speakers will inevitably be limited to the summaries. The publisher might therefore

consider making an additional effort and either prepare an integral English edition or make a selection of the most important articles. Foreign scholars would certainly find even an abridged version useful for acquainting themselves with some Serbian views on the causes and consequences of the First World War.

JEAN-PAUL BLEDE, *L'AGONIE D'UNE MONARCHIE. AUTRICHE-HONGRIE 1914-1920*.
PARIS: TALLANDIER, 2014, 464 p.

Reviewed by Veljko Stanić*

In his recent essay "Austria-Hungary and the First World War" the distinguished British historian Alan Sked points out "two schools of thought regarding the role of the Habsburg Monarchy in the origins of the First World War". While one is traditionally focused on "the failure to implement domestic reforms ... as having forced it [Monarchy] in 1914 to go to war to prevent the 'nationality question' from destabilizing ... it from within", the other is rather preoccupied with the issues of foreign policy, especially in terms of "dynastic honour or prestige".¹ In a similar manner, the American historian John Deak denounces the old-fashioned historiography on Austria-Hungary inspired by Henry Wickham Steed, Robert William Seton-Watson, Louis Namier and Alan John Percivale Taylor describing it as a "Hegelian narrative in which the Habsburg Empire declines and collapses in order to give birth to a host of modern nation-states". More sympathetic to the Double Monarchy and inspired by a new research trend, Deak claims that "we must stop seeing the war in terms of liberation

and progress" and "focus our research and energies on what the process of arming, feeding, mobilizing and – especially, controlling the populace of Austria-Hungary actually destroyed". He therefore proposes a more careful examination of various aspects of Austria-Hungary's history in its last years which coincided with the First World War.² Undoubtedly, there is an important revival of Habsburg studies largely linked to the First World War that should be particularly welcomed.³

The book under review here clearly comes as a result of this renewed interest in the Habsburg Monarchy and the First World War. Its author, the renowned French historian Jean-Paul Bled is professor emeritus of the Uni-

² John Deak, "The Great War and the Forgotten Realm: The Habsburg Monarchy and the First World War", *The Journal of Modern History* 86 (June 2014), 336–380.

³ Samuel R. Williamson Jr., "Austria and the Origins of the Great War: A Selective Historiographical Survey", in 1914, *Austria-Hungary, the Origins, and the First Year of World War I*, eds. Günter Bischof and Ferdinand Karhofer, guest ed. Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., Contemporary Austrian Studies, vol. 23 (Innsbruck University Press, 2014), 21–33.

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¹ Alan Sked, "Austria-Hungary and the First World War", *Histoire@Politique* (P.F.N.S.P), 2014/1, no. 2, 16–49.

versity Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV), and since November 2015 a foreign member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. A leading French specialist in the history of the Habsburg Monarchy, Bled is the author of more than dozen books on Austrian and German history. Moreover, he authored important biographies of Franz Joseph and Franz Ferdinand,⁴ which naturally led him towards a single volume on the last years of Austria-Hungary. This book has all the qualities of Bled's previous works: reliable information, clarity and conciseness of narrative penned in a most elegant style. Based on the author's intimate knowledge of archival sources and vast literature, *L'Agonie d'une Monarchie* demonstrates Bled's rare ability for synthesis. In fifteen chapters on 450 pages, Bled takes into consideration political, ideological, military, social and cultural questions. He draws our attention to the problems of international relations in Europe, military operations, as well as issues of internal politics and social reality of home fronts. An accomplished biographer, Bled paints vibrant portraits of Leopold Berchtold, István Tisza, Stephan (István) Burián, Ottokar Czernin, Emperor Karl I and Conrad von Hötzendorf among others. This is the first monograph on the subject in French historiography and it stands as a counterpart, if more concise, of Manfred Rauchensteiner's *Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburgermonarchie 1914–1918* (Böhlau, 2013).

Rather than to present the content of the book exhaustively, we shall briefly focus on its few important aspects: the very nature of Austria-Hungary in Europe on the eve of the First World War, its role in the origins of the war, the reasons for

its disintegration and its antagonistic relationship with Serbia.

Although Bled chooses to discuss the last years of Austria-Hungary in terms of "agony", he does not believe that the Monarchy was bound to disappear. However, he clearly says that in 1914 a multinational empire such as Austria-Hungary was a *corps fragile* and an *anachronisme* with quite a few problems concerning the functioning of recently introduced universal suffrage, national strife between the Germans and the Czechs, the way the Hungarians treated other national groups. Surely, there were positive developments such as those in Moravia in 1905, Bukovina in 1910 and Galicia in 1914. The economy and culture counted among the factors that were contributing to the unity of the Habsburg Monarchy. Moreover, Bled points out that national pluralism did not exclude a special kind of Austrian supranational cultural identity. Bled, thus, highlights the "reality of a specific cultural area at the centre of Europe" influenced by the legacy of the Baroque, German language, distinctive urban identity and modern artistic paradigms. Further still, with the outbreak of the war, one can observe a particular form of *union sacrée*, the phenomenon of dynastic patriotism mainly directed towards the almost mythic figure of the old Emperor Franz Joseph. Bled suggests that this fact shows a certain vitality of Austria-Hungary. But a long war was by no means its ally. Had it lasted a year or two less, a reformed Habsburg Monarchy could have survived, Bled believes. From 1916 onwards, it becomes clear that the Monarchy could not sustain the war effort much longer. In a nutshell, it was the combined effect of several factors, such as the length and hardships of the war, internal national problems, economic decline, food crisis, failures on the fronts and the determination of the Entente powers, that would eventually bring the Monar-

⁴ See our review of J.-P. Bled's *François Ferdinand d'Autriche* in *Balkanica* XLIV (2013), 418–422.

chy to ruin. Bled offers a meticulous analysis of the Emperor Karl's vain attempts at finding a solution for a separate peace. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the Emperor would have had the necessary resources for this new politics. Austria-Hungary's increasing dependence on its superior ally, Germany, and political forces opposed to the young Emperor inside the Monarchy seriously challenged his ambitious projects.

As for the origins of the war, with its ultimatum to Serbia Austria-Hungary played a key role on a European scale. There is no doubt that after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, seen in Vienna as a blow struck against the dynasty itself, Austro-Hungarian civilian and military leaders including the Emperor Franz Joseph and the foreign minister Count Berchtold opted for war against Serbia. Although the planned military action was supposed to be limited, Vienna, provided with the German *chèque en blanc*, risked a general war in the event of Russian intervention on the Serbian side. According to Bled, the Austro-Serbian conflict in 1914 was above all a third Balkan war. This conflict had a long history. Faced with its declining dominance in the German world after Sadowa in 1866 and German unification in 1871, Austria-Hungary sought to reassert its supremacy in the Balkans. After 1903, the Monarchy's political and military leadership started to look upon Serbia as a potential threat. In this sense, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 was a blow aimed against Serbia. The next episode of this duel occurred during the Balkan Wars in 1912/13. While describing this mounting antagonism, Bled does not seem to shed a critical light either on Austro-Hungarian imperialism or on Serbian nationalism: he rather observes it as part of the complex European political scene. Further, although Young Bosnia organised the Sarajevo assassination, Bled

still ascribes a secondary role in this affair to the Black Hand. While the Serbian government's non-complicity is unquestionable, one can contemplate whether official Belgrade did enough to prevent this political assassination. The probable warning that came from the Serbian minister in Vienna Jovan M. Jovanović might have reached Leon von Biliński, but Biliński was not in charge of Franz Ferdinand's visit to Sarajevo. The question which haunted Austro-Hungarian leaders was: if we do not punish Serbia, what will other Balkan states do, will they not unite against us? It was not just Serbia that caused anxiety, but rather the contours of a new Balkan League directed against the Dual Monarchy. Besides that, Austria-Hungary had to settle its relations with Italy, Romania and Bulgaria.

In the summer of 1914 Austria-Hungary had no plans for annexing Serbia or some of its parts. It was rather a radical redefinition of their relations that Vienna had in mind, which in practice meant forcing Serbia into submitting to Austro-Hungarian influence and control. However, its Balkan policy would prove to be fatal. Defeated in two successive campaigns in 1914, Austria-Hungary only managed to occupy Serbia in coalition with German and Bulgarian forces in the winter of 1915/16. The situation changed dramatically when occupied Serbia was placed under military rule of the Central Powers. Bled describes the brutal methods of denationalisation and depoliticisation of Serbia but fails to mention the massacres of civilians committed by Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian forces. As the question of Serbia's future was still open, Conrad von Hötzendorf demanded its complete annexation. Opposed by Tisza and Burián, this scenario remained unrealised. Although Bled does not go any further, it should be added here that Marvin Benjamin Fried's new research casts an original light on Austria-Hunga-

ry great-power pretensions as elaborated in its Balkan policy. From this perspective, they appear to have been more offensive and expansionist, and a crucial reason for Austria-Hungary's staying in the war.⁵

Bled's concluding remarks in the melancholy tone of Zweig's *The World of Yesterday* offer a reflection on Austria-Hungary's fate: although it disappeared in 1918, the Monarchy was by no means ar-

tificial. Its historical existence was a "European necessity", "a factor of European balance". Its difficulties of transformation, accumulated problems, progressive agony in the First World War and ultimate dissolution left "a gap at the heart of Europe". Briefly, Jean-Paul Bled wrote a balanced, thoughtful and well-documented book based on his great knowledge and fine analysis. Being an important contribution to the historiography on Austria-Hungary, its translation into Serbian and other languages of the former Danubian Empire would be very welcome.

⁵ Marvin Benjamin Fried, *Austro-Hungarian War Aims in the Balkans during World War I* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

JOHN C. G. RÖHL, *KAISER WILHELM II 1859–1941: A CONCISE LIFE*. CAMBRIDGE: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2014, 261 p.

Reviewed by Miloš Vojinović*

To say that John C. G. Röhl is an expert in German history would probably be an understatement. His latest book *Kaiser Wilhelm II 1859–1941: A Concise Life*¹ under review here comes after half a century of research into Wilhelmine Germany. After the publication of his three-volume biography of the last German emperor,²

Röhl decided to do something that historians are not always willing to do: he accepted to make an abridged version and to condense more than 4,000 pages of his magnum opus into a book of less than 300 pages.

When Röhl started his research into Kaiser Wilhelm II in the 1960s the reputation of biography as a historiographical genre was in bruises. The golden days of the great man theory were long gone and the historical science was being shaped by influences coming from other disciplines with their spotlight on the significance of structures and quantification. Social history was gaining momentum and classical political biography was sidelined. Some even expected that historians would become computer programmers.³

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¹ Serbian edition: Džon Rel, *Kajzer Vilhelm* (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2015).

² The three-volume biography of Kaiser Wilhelm was first published in Germany by C. H. Beck, Munich, and then followed its English edition by Cambridge University Press: *Wilhelm II: Die Jugend des Kaisers 1859–1888* (1993)=*Young Wilhelm: The Kaiser's Early Life 1859–1888* (1998); *Wilhelm II: Der Aufbau der Persönlichen Monarchie 1888–1900* (2002)=*Wilhelm II: The Kaiser's Personal Monarchy 1888–1900* (2004); *Wilhelm II: Der Weg in den Abgrund 1900–1941*

(2008)=*Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile 1900–1941* (2014).

³ R. J. Evans, *In Defense of History* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2000[1997]),

Throughout his book, as if he chose to offer a veiled methodological background, Röhl suggests that biography writing is not only justifiable but also that the focus on Kaiser Wilhelm II is crucial for understanding the history of the German Empire in the last years of the nineteenth and early years of the twentieth century. This book is not the portrait of just another ruler. It is the biography of an emperor who, as Röhl undoubtedly shows, was the locus of power in the country, who dictated the course of foreign policy and who chose his prime ministers, ministers, chiefs of the general staff and navy commanders. It becomes evident to the reader that Röhl wrote the biography of a ruler whose importance and significance had no match among his European royal counterparts or heads of states. If Bismarck, in his time, had feared that the Hohenzollern king would be reduced to a machine for signing documents,⁴ Wilhelm II proved that such fears had been needless.

From the first chapters the author's attention is focused on the formation and evolution of Wilhelm's attitude towards crucial political questions, such as the question of the appropriate way of governing and his own role as a ruler. In the second section of his book, *1888–1909: The Anachronistic Autocrat*, especially in the chapter "Divine right without end", Röhl offers his judgment on Wilhelm II's ruling style: "The conception of the divine monarchical principle that the young Wilhelm had absorbed, not least as a counterweight to his parents' liberal ideas,

belonged to the eighteenth century, to the era before the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and Napoleon" (p. 41).

Depicting the era after Bismarck in his *Diplomacy*, Henry Kissinger titled the chapter "*Realpolitik* turns on itself". Similarly, Röhl believes that it was Bismarck who "had put an axe to the roots not only of his own position of power but also of the entire Reich structure he had built up. By ignoring the constitutional aspirations and the centuries-old experience of Europe, he had opened the door to arbitrary rule, sycophantic favouritism and strutting militarism at the court of Hohenzollerns" (p. 41).

In the following chapters, "The establishment of the Kaiser's personal monarchy 1890–1897" and "The Chancellor as courtier: the corrupt Bülow system 1897–1909", the author shows how the Kaiser established his personal rule over the years. The third section *1896–1908: The egregious expansionist* focuses on the ever more important questions of foreign policy and the growing antagonism between the countries ruled by the late Queen Victoria's son and grandson: Great Britain and Germany.

In the chapter about the Bosnian crisis Röhl writes that Wilhelm, even though initially dissatisfied with the Austrian decision to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, eventually changed his mind and supported Austria-Hungary until the very end of the crisis. Röhl believes that a European war was only avoided due to Russia's diplomatic withdrawal in the spring of 1909. Wilhelm learned two lessons from the Bosnian crisis: he came to believe that cooperation with Austria-Hungary would bear fruit and that Great Britain would not get involved in the European conflict that would start in the Balkans.

Perhaps John Röhl's greatest contribution to the historiography on the First World War is an insight into both how close to war Europe was in Novem-

21; P. Burke, *History and Social Theory* (London: Polity Press, 2005 [1992]), 34.

⁴ *German Diplomatic Documents: Volume 1: Bismarck's Relations with England 1871–1890* (New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1928), 366.

ber and December 1912 and how these events put an illuminating light on understanding the events from the summer of 1914. The chapters “Turmoil in the Balkans and a first decision for war (November 1912)” and, especially, “War postponed: the ‘war council’ of 8 December 1912” outline the reasoning behind the Kaiser’s decisions and point to the striking similarities between the July crisis and the crisis of November and December 1912. Both in 1912 and in 1914 an Austrian emissary was sent to Berlin to request German support for war against Serbia. In both cases, the Kaiser initially granted the request. It was the Kaiser’s fear of Britain’s involvement in war that had inclined him to revoke his support in early December 1912.⁵ Although Wilhelm had never looked forward to the prospect of a confrontation with the British navy, the fears he had had in 1912 did not have the same effect in the 1914.

The Kaiser’s only dilemma was what Great Britain would do should a European war break out. What can also be said is that Britain was the only power that Wilhelm did not want to have as Germany’s enemy. Röhl points to the fact that even few weeks before the Sarajevo Assassination Wilhelm was eager to find out what stance London would take in case of a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Röhl believes that Wilhelm “bears a heavy responsibility – perhaps the heaviest overall – for having brought about Europe’s great catastrophe” (p. 163). He also believes, and he offers strong arguments for his view, that the July crisis marked the point when the Kaiser’s authority began to erode. His officers were upset

because of his volatility and they were determined to keep him away from Berlin until his presence was needed for signing mobilisation orders.

In the author’s view, until the August of 1916, when Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff took command, the Kaiser still had a decisive influence in several fields, but his influence was diminishing. The collapse of Germany in the autumn of 1918 meant that the Hohenzollern monarchy was doomed. On 10 November 1918 the Kaiser was on his way to the Netherlands, where he was granted asylum. On 29 November he renounced “for all time his rights to the Crown of Prussia and thereby the right to the German Imperial Crown bound to it” (p. 181).

Despite the fact that thanks to the Weimar Republic Wilhelm lived a life without financial worries, and he kept ownership of numerous family estates in Germany, he called the new Germany the “swinish” republic. Wilhelm never stopped thinking of returning to Germany and even hoped that Adolf Hitler would restore him to the throne. He greeted the news about the Munich Agreement. In 1939 he glorified the invasion of Poland, and a year later congratulated Hitler on his conquest of France. The last German emperor died on 4 June 1941.

John Röhl is an experienced chronicler and his style and sentence fluency make this book a very pleasant read. The book is an authoritative overview of the life and times of one of the most important figures in European history at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Having read it, one is tempted to take in all 4,000 pages of the unabridged three-volume biography.

⁵ See also J. C. G. Röhl, “*Jetzt oder nie!* The Resurgence of Serbia and Germany’s first ‘blanque cheque’ of November 1912”, in *The Serbs and the First World War*, ed. D. Živojinović (Belgrade: SASA, 2015), 57–78.

SPYRIDON SFETAS, *Η ΔΙΑΜΟΡΦΩΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΣΛΑΒΟΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΙΚΗΣ ΤΑΥΤΟΤΗΤΑΣ. ΜΙΑ ΕΠΩΔΥΝΗ ΔΙΑΔΙΚΑΣΙΑ* [THE CONFIGURATION OF SLAVOMACEDONIAN IDENTITY. A PAINFUL EVOLUTION]. THESSALONIKI: VANIAS, 2003.

Reviewed by Athanasios Loupas*

The monograph titled *The Configuration of Slavomacedonian Identity. A Painful Evolution* by Spyridon Sfetis, Associate Professor of Modern and Contemporary History, Folklore and Social Anthropology at Aristotle University of Thessaloniki deals with a complex and controversial topic which has caused considerable disagreement among scholars. The study is divided into six chapters.

The first chapter is devoted to the Slavic awakening and the Serbo-Bulgarian infiltration into Macedonia until the Eastern Crisis in 1875–78. As the author indicates, Macedonia did not constitute a separate historical entity but a part of Bulgarian and Greek national claims. The Slavic awakening expressed as Bulgarian was carried out by young intellectuals such as Dimitar and Konstantin Miladinov, Grigor Parlicev and Kuzman Sapkarev, who graduated from Greek schools, were knowledgeable in the Greek language and inspired by Pan Slavist ideas. The dispute over the codification of a Bulgarian literary language between scholars from north-eastern Bulgaria and those originating from Macedonia was purely academic. Slavomacedonian dialect was left out of that process as unworthy, but the most important fact is that it was labelled as Bulgarian. The language dispute, however, gave the opportunity to the Serbs to contest the leading role of Bulgarian propaganda in Macedonia. The Ministry of Education, despite Stojan Novakovic's objections, financed the publication of a trilingual dictionary (*S. Makedonski, Arbanaski, Turски*) compiled by a self-taught seasonal worker, Georgi Pulevski, who was aware of local particularities in

Macedonia. The ambiguity of the term *S. Makedonski*, which could stand for either "Serbo-Macedonian" or "Slavo-Macedonian", was working to the advantage of Serbian policy which was trying to deal with the propagation of the Bulgarian Exarchate.

The second chapter discusses the Serbo-Bulgarian antagonism during the identity-building process in Macedonia from the Congress of Berlin to the First World War and the emergence of Slavomacedonian separatism. The author points out the different approach adopted by the Bulgarian Exarchate and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) which was founded in 1893 in Thessaloniki. While the Exarchate and the pro-Austrian Bulgarian government of Stevan Stambulov launched an ecclesiastical and educational campaign in order to create Bulgarian consciousness among the Slavic-speaking population of Macedonia, IMRO was propagating revolution, aiming at the establishment of an autonomous regime as the first step to unification with Bulgaria. On the other hand, Serbian policy attached major importance to the linguistic factor with the view to creating Slavomacedonian literary language in order to alienate Slav populations from Bulgaria and turn them towards Serbia. Stojan Novakovic, the architect of Serbian policy in the late nineteenth century, did not believe that Slavomacedonianism had the inherent strength to evolve into a significant Slavomacedonian identity and on account of this it could prove to be quite

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useful to the Serbian cause. In an attempt to counterbalance Bulgarian and Serbian propaganda and taking into consideration the neutral policy of Russia and the risk of territorial partition, a young group of intellectuals (Krstev Misirkov, Stefan Dedov, Diamandi Misajkov and Dimitrija Cupovski) introduced Slavomacedonian separatism and sought for the foundation of a Slavomacedonian *millet*. However, as Sfetas argues, the political conditions at the beginning of the twentieth century were not favourable to the advocacy of Slavomacedonianism as a new collective ethnic identity and this is demonstrated by the fact that the impact its early proponents had upon the masses was negligible.

The third chapter details the circumstances under which the issue of identity evolved during the interwar period, when the Communist International (CI) was promoting a United and Independent Macedonia within a Balkan Soviet Republic in an attempt to destabilize the Balkan states. Due to communist interference, a split of IMRO occurred in 1925 and IMRO (United) was founded in Vienna under the auspices of the CI. IMRO (Un.) accepted the slogan of "United and Independent Macedonia within a Balkan Soviet Republic" but the most important fact is that the new organisation identified all nationalities living in Macedonia as Macedonian people. What led, however, to the adoption of a different view by the CI in 1934 according to which the "Macedonian nation" was not a political but an ethnic category with exclusive reference to the Slavic group? Professor Sfetas explains that the key factor for this differentiation was Hitler's rise to power. As Ivan Mihajlov's pro-Bulgarian IMRO had adopted the position of "United and Independent Macedonia" as a second Bulgarian state, where the political label of "Macedonian" was compatible with Bulgarian national identity, the CI had concentrated its efforts on preventing the exploitation of the Macedonian Question by

Nazi Germany in favor of Bulgaria in the upcoming war. Although after its 7th and last Congress (1935) the CI had to abolish the slogan of an "Independent Macedonia" in an attempt to form a unified antifascist front along with the "bourgeois regimes" against the Nazis' advance, the decision on the existence of a "Macedonian nation" had already left its mark on the policy of the communist parties in Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

The following chapter covers the period of the Second World War. The Bulgarian army was welcomed as liberator in Serbian Macedonia, but the initial enthusiasm gave way to discontent due to the arrogance and arbitrary rule of the Bulgarian administration. The exclusion of the local intelligentsia from any political activity, on the grounds that the locals could not speak the official language, in combination with the rapid foundation of Bulgarian educational institutions, alienated the young generations which had graduated from Serbian schools during the interwar period. What is more interesting, though, was the rivalry between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) and the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP). The latter did not differ substantially from the official policy of the Bulgarian state, claiming that the organisational structures of Serbian Macedonia should fall upon the comrades of the BCP, who had not condemned, though, the region's unification with Bulgaria. Nevertheless, due to the fact that the main struggle had to be fought against the occupying forces, the CI decided to assign the political guidance of Serbian Macedonia to the CPY. The failure of the Bulgarian administration and the dynamics of Yugoslavian communism, which promoted the line of unification of Macedonia, gave the opportunity for the diffusion of Slavomacedonianism both in the Serbian and Greek parts, despite the fact that it lacked a clear-cut theoretical basis.

In June 1944 the First Antifascist Assembly of the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) proclaimed the foundation of the People's Republic of Macedonia (PRM), an event of paramount importance (chapter V). However, from the very beginning a saga for political power was obvious among ASNOM (Metodija Antonoc-Cento, Kiro Gligorov, Dimitar Vlahov) on one side and CPY as well as the Communist Party of Macedonia (CPM) (Tito, Tempo, Lazar Kolisevski) on the other. The first group was in favor of a unified Macedonia regardless of whether or not it would be part of Federalist Yugoslavia; they did not rule out cooperation with ex-IMRO supporters and opposed the communization imposed by Belgrade. The second group's priority was the unity of Socialist Yugoslavia. It was, therefore, an internal clash between a nationalistic and a pro-Yugoslav wing within the PRM, which ended in the prevalence of the latter. At the same time, a process of a Slavomacedonian ethnogenesis was embarked upon (codification of a Slavomacedonian literary language, changing family name endings from -ov and -ev to -ski, foundation of a Macedonian Orthodox Church and educational institutions, setting national anniversaries etc.). After the elimination of the nationalistic group, all questions at issue were resolved in the spirit of Serbo-Slavomacedonian reconciliation. As Sfetas notes, people with some grounding in Marxist theory had been charged with the task of documenting the "organic evolution of the Macedonian nation" at a scientific level. The cases of Vasil Ivanovski, an ex-member of the IMRO (Un.), and Kiril Nikolov are typical. According to them, the Slavomacedonian nation must be classified as a case of antithetical nationalism, since it was forged through a constant alienation and differentiation from the Bulgarian na-

tional idea. That is to say that the Slavic awakening in the nineteenth century took place as Bulgarian morphologically, but "Macedonian" in substance, and later managed to evolve autonomously by removing the Bulgarian label. In the same chapter, Sfetas also analyses the role that the concept of the "Macedonian nation" played in Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations, keeping in mind that the two countries were examining the possibility of a South Slav confederation, as well as the attempts of shaping a Slavomacedonian national identity in Greek Macedonia during the civil war in Greece.

In the last chapter the author presents the thesis of the BCP after the Tito-Stalin split and Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Comintern. During the Fifth Congress of BCP, Dimitrov condemned the policy of "Macedonization" and the uprooting of Bulgarianism in Yugoslav Macedonia, while the Bulgarian historian Dino Kjosev accused the PRM of a falsification of Bulgarian history and suppression of Bulgarian tendencies, just like Serbs had done during the interwar period. At the same time the Communist Party of Greece also promoted the line of a "United and Independent Macedonia in a Balkan Confederation" in order to undermine Tito's sovereignty in Yugoslav Macedonia. Under these circumstances an anti-Bulgarian hysteria prevailed in the ranks of the Yugoslav communists in the PRM. As the writing of history from an anti-Bulgarian perspective was urgent, Slavomacedonianism prevailed as the ruling national ideology. The "Macedonian nation" was presented as a historical nation with a medieval past, which was awakened in nineteenth century, resisted foreign propagandas, was recognized by the progressive forces during the interwar period, grew up in the Second World War and was acknowledged in 1944. A few years ago a Yugoslav-style Slavomacedonianism prevailed and the new genera-

tions were moulding a Slavomacedonian identity along with a sense of Yugoslav solidarity.

In his epilogue, Sfetas briefly describes the challenges which the new independent state has been facing after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and concludes that, despite the fact that Slavomacedonian identity has been called into question, it has proved that it is still an “identity in evolution”.

Having a strong theoretical grounding on the phenomenon of nationalism

(Hobsbawm, Hroch, Gellner, Anderson) and taking into consideration the Balkan particularities, professor Sfetas composes with remarkable sobriety a complex study on an extraordinarily thorny question – which still preoccupies public discourse – based on indisputable primary sources from the archives in Sofia, Belgrade and Skopje as well as an extensive literature, both Balkan and European. Although Sfetas’s book was written in 2003, it remains the most analytical and enlightening study on the matter.

HÉRITAGES DE BYZANCE EN EUROPE DU SUD-EST À L'ÉPOQUE MODERNE ET CONTEMPORAINE,
EDS. OLIVIER DELOUIS, ANNE COUDERC & PETRE GURAN. ATHENS:
ÉCOLE FRANÇAISE D'ATHÈNES, 2013, 522 p.

Reviewed by Miloš Živković*

In 2013 *Ecole française d'Athènes* published a collection of papers entitled *Héritages de Byzance en Europe du Sud-Est à l'époque moderne et contemporaine*, as the fourth publication in the series *Mondes méditerranéens et balkaniques*. All contributions except three are based on the papers submitted at the scholarly conference *La présence de Byzance dans l'Europe du Sud-Est aux époques moderne et contemporaine* held in Athens in September 2008.

Even a cursory look at the contents of the volume reveals a remarkably broad chronological range and multidisciplinary breadth. In addition to an *Introduction* by the editors, O. Delouis, A. Couderc and P. Guran, the book contains as many as thirty contributions, mainly in political and ecclesiastical history, the history of ideas and ideologies, the history of the cult of saints and the history of art and architecture.

The volume opens with the eminent byzantologist Hélène Ahrweiler's appropriate and inspired article *Conférence inaugurale – La présence de Byzance*, specifying many of the originally Byzantine

phenomena in the national cultures of South-East Europe. It is followed by Jack Fairey's study *Failed Nations and Usable Pasts: Byzantium as Transcendence in the Political Writings of Iakovos Pitzipos Bey*, devoted to Iakovos Pitzipos Bey (1802–1869), the leader of the organisation called *Byzantine Union*. As the ideologist of this initially secret society of rather modest capacities and influence, Pitzipos left behind several writings on problems in the Ottoman Empire of his time. Fairey thoroughly studies the biography of this ambitious European traveller originating from Chios, as well as his writings, unusual in their ideological dynamics and contradictions, and somewhat utopian political views. A useful historical overview of the study of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Ottoman Empire is given by Dan Ioan Mureşan. His *Revisiter la Grande Église: Gédéon, Iorga et Runciman sur le rôle du patriarcat œcuménique à l'époque ottoman* is devoted to three

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remarkable scholars – Manuel Gédéon (1851–1943), the official historian of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Nicolae Iorga (1871–1940), the one most deserving for bringing the so-called post-Byzantine epoch into historiographical sight, and Sir Steven Runciman (1903–2000), the author of a valuable synthetic overview of the history of the Ecumenical Patriarchate under the Ottomans. Petre Guran's *God Explains to Patriarch Athanasios the Fall of Constantinople: I. S. Peresvetov and the Impasse of Political Theology*, analyses several post-Byzantine writings in the light of their common elements, focusing primarily on the so-called *Tale of Constantinople* attributed to Nestor Iskander, and a version of this work by a Russian author, Ivan Peresvetov. Vera Tchentsova's article *Héritage de Constantinople ou héritage de Trébizonde? Quelques cas de translation d'objets sacrés à Moscou au XVII^e s.*, shows that the seventeenth-century Russian court, in collecting Byzantine precious objects, apart from Constantinopolitan, attached great significance to those from the former treasuries of the Empire of Trebizond. Relying on archival sources, many of which were previously unknown, she reveals and follows the significant circulation of illuminated manuscripts, saints' relics and icons whose origin should be traced back to Trebizond. The only work devoted to the Serbian reception of Byzantine heritage is the one by Smilja Marjanović-Dušanić, *Se souvenir de Byzance. Les reliques au service de la mémoire en Serbie (XV^e–XIX^e s.)*, which traces the history of the cult of relics in Serbian culture from the last decades of the independent medieval Serbian state to the age of national romanticism in the nineteenth century.

There follow three contributions devoted to Byzantine traditions in Wallachia and Moldavia. Andrei Pippidi's *Byzance des Phanariotes* reminds us of the great significance of the Byzantine written heritage for the culture of the Romanian

principalities in the eighteenth century. Andrei Timotin's *Prophéties byzantines et modernité roumaine (XVII^e–XIX^e s.)* looks at the rich tradition of Romanian apocalyptic literature, based on the translations of prophetic writings of different nature, contents and dates. Radu G. Păun's *Byzance d'empereur et Byzance d'Eglise. Sur le couronnement des princes "phanariotes" à Constantinople* seeks to clarify a very delicate question in a bid to reconstruct the structure and symbolic meaning of the rite of inauguration of the Wallachian and Moldavian Phanariote princes. The rite was performed in the patriarchal church in Constantinople, probably from the last decades of the seventeenth century onward. The author recognizes elements of Byzantine imperial ideology in the details of some, not too extensive, descriptions of the ceremony.

Several works that follow are devoted to Greek topics. Ioannis Kyriakantonakis's article *Between Dispute and Erudition. Conflicting Readings on Byzantine History in Early Modern Greek Historical Literature*, is focused on the writings of two Greek church historians from the seventeenth century – Dositheus, Patriarch of Jerusalem (1669–1707), and a Cypriote unionist, Aloysius Andruzzi. Differences between their views are detected and interpreted, especially regarding the relationship between church and state in Byzantium, with the focus on identifying several historiographical idioms in their works. These differences resulted, of course, from their conflicting polemical-apologetic positions: Dositheus's baroque theology used in defence of Orthodoxy on the one hand, and Andruzzi's promotion of the authority of the Pope on the other. Judith Soria's contribution *Les peintres du XVIII^e s. et la peinture paléologue: David Selenica et Denys de Fournas* presents the elements of the "neo-Byzantine" style in the work of the painter David, born in the village of Selenica, in

the south of present-day Albania. She uses the example of the frescoes painted in 1726 by David and his assistants Constantine and Christo in the Church of St. Nicholas in Moschopolis. Through comparing this fresco ensemble with the early fourteenth-century paintings in Protaton attributed to the legendary figure of Manuel Panselinos, Soria concludes that the younger wall painting is directly dependent on the older. Effie F. Athanassopoulos's extensive and richly documented contribution, *Byzantine Monuments and Architectural "Cleansing" in Nineteenth-Century Athens*, is devoted to the disappearance of rich architectural layers of the Byzantine, Frankish and Ottoman Athens during the process of urban remodeling of the capital of the modern Greek state, that is, in the period when appreciation was directed almost exclusively to its ancient heritage. In 1834, under the direction of Ludwig Ross, head of the Archaeological Service in Athens, there began an "architectural cleansing" of the city which stripped Athens of many religious and other medieval buildings, despite the attempts at administrative protection and personal interventions. The text by Marios Hatzopoulos, *Receiving Byzantium in Early Modern Greece (1820s–1840s)*, focuses on the reception of Byzantine heritage in the culture of modern Greece, showing that, until the second half of the nineteenth century, the Byzantine period was not considered as an integral part of the history of the Greek nation. Yet, as the author shows, apart from the generally negative perception of the Byzantine epoch, some of its segments reverberated positively in romantic national consciousness. Despina Christodoulou also writes about the reception of Byzantium in modern Greece in her *Making Byzantium a Greek Presence: Paparrigopoulos and Koumanoudes Review the Latest History Books*, focusing on the debate on Byzantium between nineteenth-century Greek histori-

ans. Ioannis Koubourlis's *Augustin Thierry et l'"héliénisation" de l'Empire byzantine jusqu'à 1853: les dettes des historiographes de la Grèce médiévale et moderne à l'école libérale française* clearly demonstrates the influence of French historians, especially Augustine Thierry and François Guizot, on the pioneers of Greek national historiography Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos and Spyridon Zambelios. These authors found some typically Greek features in Byzantium, along with those inherited from the ancient Roman Empire (monarchy, aristocracy) – the ideas of free spirit and democracy, detected even in institutions such as church councils.

Nicolae Șerban Tanașoca contributes the paper *L'image de Byzance dans la conscience historique des Roumains*. Using the most eloquent written sources, primarily those of historiographical character, the author reconstructs specific ideological dynamics in the development of the Romanian relation to the Byzantine legacy. He takes into account the writings of Romanian seventeenth-century humanists strongly marked by a "Byzantinophile" sentiment; eighteenth-century historical works by Greek-Catholic authors in Transylvania and, in the nineteenth century, by Romanian Enlightenment intellectuals whose work is characterized by sharp criticism of Byzantium; as well as the definitive formulation of Romanian byzantology as a discipline of critical historiography through the substantial work of Nicolae Iorga and his numerous disciples. A similar topic attracts the attention of Gabriel Leanca, but his *"Byzance" et la modernité roumaine: de la négation à la patrimonialisation sous l'influence française* covers a shorter chronological span and provides the picture of Byzantium in modern Romanian history. He first studies the period of the birth of the Romanian national idea, marked by romantic sentiment and a one-dimensional vision of the national past, which was typical of

all nineteenth-century European national ideologies, and then points to a turn caused by the emergence of critical historiography, with the decisive contribution made by Iorga.

Nadia Danova's article *L'image de Byzance dans l'historiographie et dans les lettres bulgares du XVIII^e au XX^e s.* analyses the image of the Byzantines in early modern Bulgarian historiography. She points to the predominance of negative perceptions of Byzantium and the Greeks in Bulgarian historical conscience from the end of the eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth century, followed by a kind of usurpation of Byzantine historical figures in a typically romantic and, of course, pseudo-historical manner. With the emergence of Bulgarian historians who had university degrees (S. Palauzov, M. Drinov), this dilettante approach to Byzantine history and Byzantine-Bulgarian relations was gradually abandoned. Dessislava Lilova's *L'héritage partagé? Byzance, Fallmerayer et la formation de l'historiographie bulgare au XIX^e s.* also contributes to the understanding of the specifically Bulgarian relation to the Byzantine heritage.

The collection of papers also includes works devoted to some aspects of the Russian reception of Byzantine tradition. Dimitrios Stamatopoulos's *From the Byzantism of K. Leont'ev to the Vyzantism of I. I. Sokolov: The Byzantine Orthodox East as a Motif of Russian Orientalism* makes a valuable contribution to the understanding of the specifically Russian view of Byzantine civilisation from the 1870s until the beginning of the twentieth century. He thoroughly analyses the image of Byzantium in the works Konstantin Nikolaievich Leontiev, the author of the influential essay *Vyzantinism and Slavism*, who considered the Empire on the Bosphorus as an ideal historical church-political entity. Furthermore, he shows that the historian Ivan Sokolov favoured Byzan-

tine civilisation over others, primarily on the basis of his own understanding of the relationship between state and church, in which he recognised balance and coordination, that is, a sort of organic unity. In his article *Byzantine Culture in Russia: Doesn't it Lose Something in Translation*, George P. Majeska reminds us of the traces of formulation of specific Russian reception of Byzantine traditions, using the example of the ruler's ideology and "political theology". The author explains Russia's way from the period of Christianisation under Prince Vladimir until the time of a truly imperial ideology under Ivan IV "the Terrible" (1547–1584).

Adriana Șotropa's *L'héritage byzantin dans la pensée artistique et l'art roumains au tournant du XX^e s.* looks at the creative interpretation of the medieval heritage in Romanian modern art. In this respect, the painting of Aparcar Baltazar, Octavian Smigelschi and Ștefan Popescu is very significant. They produced a "Byzantine-Romanian style" by combining a recognisable past iconography and an unequivocally modern visual language. In sculpture, on the other hand, some works were almost replicas of medieval pieces, such as Dimitrie Paciurea's *Dormition of the Virgin* from 1912.

Dimitrios Antoniu's *Le choix d'une résurrection partielle: l'introduction du droit civil byzantin dans le nouvel État hellénique au XIX^e s.* explains the process of introducing Byzantine civil law into the legal system of modern Greece, starting from 1835, when Constantine Arsenopoulos's *Hexabiblos* was published. Anne Couderc's *Byzance à la Conférence de la Paix (1919): Vénizélos, les revendications de la Grèce et l'idée d'Empire*, reassesses the significance of Byzantine tradition for the Greek demands at the Conference at Versailles, which also included territorial claims to Constantinople and parts of Asia Minor. She analyses the nature of these demands, focusing on the

Greek understanding of their own ethnogenesis and continuity, that is, the theory of the survival of Hellenism through the centuries of Byzantine history and Ottoman period. Tonia Kiassopoulou looks at the participation of the Greek delegation at the Second International Congress of Byzantine Studies held in Belgrade in 1927: *La délégation grecque au II^e Congrès international des études byzantines (Belgrade 1927)*, noticing that the rise in the number of Greek participants – twelve compared to only two at the first congress, held in Bucharest in 1924 – demonstrated growing awareness of the importance of Byzantine heritage both for modern national identity and for scientific and cultural policies. Maria Kambouri-Vamvoukou looks at Byzantine tradition in the architecture of Greece between the two world wars, *L'héritage byzantine dans l'architecture de l'entre-deux-guerres en Grèce*. A second wave of “neo-Byzantinism” was different in a way from the previous one that took place in the second half of the nineteenth century. Greek interwar architecture reflected a better understanding of Byzantine architecture.

In his exhaustive study *Théodore Stoudite, figure de l'Union des Églises? Autour de la renaissance d'un monachisme stoudite en Galicie (Ukraine) au XX^e s.*, Olivier Delouis thoroughly explores the character of the so-called neo-Studite monastic movement of the Greek-Catholic church in Galicia in the first half of the nineteenth century. The establishment of monasteries in which monastic life was regulated by the Typikon of the Constantinopolitan monastery of Studios, under the auspices of Andrei Szeptyckyj, Metropolitan of Lviv (1900–1944), is analysed in the light of the church policy of unionists in Galicia. Delouis convincingly shows that the choice of Theodor the Studite as an ideal monastic model was by no means accidental, but rather that it

was based on the opinions on this Byzantine saint in Catholic proselytic historiography, especially under Pope Leon XIII (1878–1903).

A very interesting note from the contemporary history of the Orthodox Church is given by Isabelle Dépret. In her *L'Église orthodoxe de Grèce et la condamnation de l'iconoclasme en 1987–1988: fidélité à la tradition byzantine, relectures, mobilisation*, she reflects on the conflict between the socialist government of Andreas Papandreou and the Archbishopric of Athens in 1987/8, at the time of the celebration of 1200 years since the ecumenical Council of Nicaea (787), which was caused by the government's plans for the nationalisation of church property. In its resolute and successful action, which ended in reconciliation between state and church, the Archbishopric resisted the state by using old Byzantine patterns, which aroused a considerable public response.

The book ends with a very interesting case study. Through analysing the view on Byzantine traditions in the Roman Catholic communities on the islands of Syros and Tinos, in a broad historical perspective, Katerina Seraïdari's *Byzance dans le discours d'un minorité religieuse: les catholiques de Tinos et Syros*, shows that the Latin occupation in 1204 was seen as a natural continuation of Byzantine government and as a basis for a new cultural identity.

The volume *Héritages de Byzance en Europe du Sud-Est à l'époque moderne et contemporaine* bears out once again not only the significance of “post-Byzantine” and “neo-Byzantine” phenomena in South-East European cultures but also the need for their further study. The precious heritage is approached in a remarkably comprehensive, thorough and provocative way, and from different disciplinary, theoretical and methodological positions, with all limitations result-

ing from the nature of an edited volume. However, along with all praises, there is a reason for some critical remarks. Thus, for example, a Serbian reader, especially the one interested in art history, might object to the poor presence of Serbian history topics, especially those concerning the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. Even though such an objection might be described away as sentimental, it seems that it should be expressed nonetheless, along with drawing the attention to a number of studies by Serbian scholars that demonstrate the considerable importance of the “Serbian-Byzantine” and “neo-Byzantine” styles in the Serbian art and architecture of the late modern

and more recent periods.¹ The intention of this criticism, to be sure, is not to devalue an impressive scholarly endeavour, the contents of which we have sought to review in a general manner.

¹ For this particular occasion, one should mention only the most recent books which include relevant bibliographies: M. Jovanović, *Srpsko crkveno graditeljstvo i slikarstvo novijeg doba* (Belgrade 2007²); A. Kadijević, *Jedan vek traženja nacionalnog stila u srpskoj arhitekturi (sredina XIX – sredina XX veka)* (Belgrade 2007³); N. Makuljević, *Crkvena umetnost u Kraljevini Srbiji (1882–1914)* (Belgrade 2007).

STEFAN ROHDEWALD, *GÖTTER DER NATIONEN: RELIGIÖSE ERINNERUNGSFIGUREN IN SERBIEN, BULGARIEN UND MAKEDONIEN BIS 1944*. COLOGNE – WEIMAR – VIENNA: BÖHLAU VERLAG, 2014, 905 p.

Reviewed by Dušan Fundić and Marija Vasiljević***

Stefan Rohdewald, Professor of Southeast European History at the University of Giessen, Germany, has since 2013 been co-editor of several publications that deal with various aspects of Eastern and Southeast European history: *Das osmanische Europa. Methoden und Perspektiven der Frühneuezeitforschung zu Südosteuropa*, eds. A. Helmedach et al. (Leipzig: Eudora-Verlag, 2014); *Religiöse Erinnerungsorte in Ostmitteleuropa. Konstitution und Konkurrenz im nationen- und epochenübergreifenden Zugriff*, eds. J. Bahlcke, S. and T. Wünsch (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2013); *Litauen und Ruthenien. Studien zu einer transkulturellen Kommunikationsregion (15.-18. Jahrhundert)/Lithuania and Ruthenia. Studies of a Transcultural Communication Zone (15th–18th Centuries)*, eds. S. Rohdewald, D. Frick and S. Wiederkehr (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2007).

His main areas of interest are discourses of remembrance, relations between European East and West in technology, science and sports, transculturality and transconfessionality.

The subject of the book reviewed here is the role of religious figures in the consolidation, transformation and restoration of collective identities from the middle ages to the middle of the twentieth century. Yet, the study is especially focused on the remembrance of particular figures during the formation of the independent states of Serbia and

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Bulgaria and its impact on the sense of national cohesion and allegiance. It may be pertinent to note that the name Macedonia in the book's title is bound to create confusion because it is the ancient name of a geographical region. A political entity under that name was formed only in 1945 (the People's, later Socialist, Republic of Macedonia) within communist Yugoslavia. The use of the name in reference to periods prior to 1945 creates additional confusion because the geographical region of Macedonia was part of several countries and empires, including medieval Serbia and Bulgaria. A portion of it was part of the Kingdom of Serbia from 1912 and of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from its creation in 1918.

The research is set in a regional post-Ottoman but also a wider European context in order to reassess the notion of the uniqueness of the case in question. The book is divided into seven parts designated with the letters A to G. Introduction (A) is accompanied by a review of the current state of research. It is followed by three central chapters (B–D) in which the author outlines his view of the problem and identifies three distinctive stages in the role of saintly figures of memory: Religious figures of memory until the eighteenth century; The invention of European Christian nations to overcome the “Asiatic yoke”: the long nineteenth century; and Mobilisation and sacralisation of the nation through religious memories (1918–1944). In these chapters, the author conducts a comparative analysis of the way in which local figures of memory are viewed in contemporary Serbia, Bulgaria and Macedonia. Detailed Conclusion (E) sums up the main findings put forth in the previous chapters. Given at the end of this extensive study are Bibliography (F) and Index (G).

The first chapter deals with a long period from the first South Slavic saints until the eighteenth century. The reason

for condensing such a long period of time into some hundred pages lies in the goal of the book: its main concern is the long nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. From that perspective, it has become possible to see nearly a whole millennium as a single, first, phase. The religious figures of memory are traced back to their origin, which is their inclusion among the saints. Consequently, the goal is to present the formation of saintly cults in their original historical context and in the first centuries of veneration. The author begins with the first Slavic saints in the Balkans, such as Sts Cyril and Methodius, St Clement of Ohrid, St Naum, Sts Boris and Peter, St Petka/Paraskevi, St John of Rila. The Serbian cults that are included are those of St John Vladimir, St Symeon (Stefan Nemanja), St Sava, the Nemanjić dynasty and, finally, St Lazar and the despots of the house of Branković. The examination of the cults is based on the texts written for the veneration of saints and, for later periods, historiographical works such as chronicles and annals, as well as epic poems. The vast chronological span and the complexity of the subject inevitably led to some shortcomings. One of them is an oversimplification of research questions, which has made it possible for the author to outline the examined cults. Another stems from the fact that an ample relevant literature which would have contributed to a deeper understanding of the problems under study has been left out.¹ If such flaws can be ex-

¹ Only a few works the peruse of which would have greatly contributed to this part of the book will be mentioned. The author obviously knows of Rade Mihaljić but passes over his book that deals with the formation of the Kosovo myth: *Junaci Kosovske legende* (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1989); and he seems unaware of Svetlana Tomin's

pected in an undertaking of such scale, what should not be expected is the failure to use rulers' charters as a source for the memory of saints given that they exemplify the use of saintly cults for ideological purposes. There are sixteenth-century Serbian documents of that nature which could have been used for this part of the study. The author's stronger reliance on the very fruitful scholarly tradition of studying and interpreting this kind of documents could have made it much better.² Nonetheless, the main directions of the development of memories of saints in the middle and early modern ages have been observed, which has provided a basis for further analysis. What may be seen as a merit of this chapter is that it introduces South Slavic figures of memory of the period in question to German-speaking readers.

After the introductory chapter, which seeks to give an overview of the cults of saints as a "symbolic capital", Rohdewald examines the most significant and popular ones. He discusses the ways in which the saints became religious figures of memory in the late nineteenth and twentieth century. The period of the creation and further development of nation-states can be described as marked by two major trends. In the context of nineteenth-century nationalism, the

important study on one of the last sainted members of the Branković family: *Vladika Maksim Branković* (Novi Sad: Platoneum, 2007). The author should have drawn more on several works by Smilja Marjanović-Dušanić and Miroslav Timotijević which are highly pertinent to the subject of his book.

² To mention but one monumental book that should not have been overlooked: S. Marjanović-Dušanić, *Vladarska ideologija Nemanjića. Diplomatička studija* (Belgrade: SKZ & Clio, 1997).

process of secularisation of saints takes place, while the period of 1918–1944 is marked by the sacralisation of the nation. These processes were championed and carried out by historians, journalists, politicians, statesmen and higher clergy through various associations and media. The essential goal of their endeavour was a rapid and energetic break with the Ottoman legacy. This kind of approach offers the reader an insight into the author's overall claims as regards the role of religious figures in the process of achieving political and social unity in Serbian and Bulgarian communities.

Throughout the book, the most influential religious figures of memory are comparatively analysed in Serbian, Bulgarian and Macedonian territories. The leading "secularised" saints in Serbia and Bulgaria were St Sava and St John of Rila respectively. Having been raised to the status of a national patron by the Serbs of Southern Hungary in the Habsburg Monarchy, St Sava became the patron saint of education in the Kingdom of Serbia in 1894. In the narrative of Bulgarian national ideology St John of Rila was elevated to a similar status, while the region of Rila was, since the 1860s, promoted as a "holy place" to all Bulgarians.

Another comparative analysis is focused on the legitimisation of the modern Bulgarian and Serbian dynasties which sought to strengthen their position and prestige through their imagined connection with medieval ruling families. The Bulgarian ruler Boris-Michael was celebrated as the "creator of Bulgarian nationality", while in Serbia the Nemanjić dynasty was promoted as the predecessor of the new ruling dynasties. One of the earliest examples in modern Serbian history is the use of St Stefan the First-Crowned for the political mobilisation of the population in the early phases of the Serbian uprising against the Ottoman Empire. Religious figures

of memory could have been used as a means of justifying national assimilation. In order to legitimise their occupation of Macedonia in 1916 the Bulgarians celebrated St Clement of Ohrid as the “Alpha and Omega of Bulgarian character”. A similar method was used during the Bulgarian occupation of the same territory in 1941–1944.

After 1918 in both the Serbian and Bulgarian cases discourses of ideologisation, militarisation and sacralisation of the nation formed part of a widespread, “pan-European” phenomenon. The already mentioned process of de-Ottomanisation continued after the demise of the empire throughout the twentieth century. In addition to the Serbian and Bulgarian cases the author briefly looks at the publications of exiled Macedonian nationalists who sought to promote a rivalling discourse of their own. In order to underline the most important aspects of the politics of memory in twentieth-century Bulgaria and the newly-created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (from 1929 Kingdom of Yugoslavia) Rohdewald continues to use the approach of selecting memory discourses on the religious figures which he considers the most influential. St Sava (“svetosavlje”) and the perpetuation of the Kosovo myth now existed in a context that was broader and more complex than it had been in the pre-1914 Kingdom of Serbia. As a culmination of Kosovo discourse in Yugoslavia, the author points out the commemoration of the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in 1939. In Bulgaria, St Clement, Sts Cyril and Methodius and St John of Rila continued to be in the centre of a discursive narrative of religious memory figures. There is also an interesting analysis of the promotion of the Bulgarian ruler Boris III as a “God-sent leader”.

The author is of the view that there is a continuity of the role of religious fi-

gures of memory since the time of their creation in the middle ages. This view is disputable because as extensive a geographical, chronological and thematic research framework as the one the author chose to tackle but focusing on one particular period tends to lose sight of or ignore changes the veneration of saints and later religious figures of memory underwent in response to changing times and needs, religious, political, ideological, social and other (for instance, the concept of legitimacy of power is historically highly variable). As a consequence, by organising the book in the way he did and with its last pages the author seems to imply that the extreme nationalism of the 1980s and 1990s had its roots in the middle ages or in the early modern period. Such conclusions tend to lead to one-dimensional understanding of the topics that are very complex and require a more in-depth and balanced scholarly approach.

On the other hand, this kind of research is much needed because there are not many studies that deal with this topic in Southeast European historiographies. One of Rohdewald’s relevant conclusions, and one that will be useful for further research, is that a connection between modern national identity, politics and religion is not an Eastern European but a common European phenomenon. This is the reason why much of further research should be conducted using the comparative method.

SABRINA RAMET, *THE THREE YUGOSLAVIAS: STATE-BUILDING AND LEGITIMATION, 1918–2005*. WOODROW WILSON CENTER PRESS WITH INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2006, XXII + 817 P.

Reviewed by Dragan Bakic*

Professor Sabrina Ramet is a well-known author specialising in the history of Yugoslavia and post-Yugoslav era who distilled her decades-long study of the subject in this book. Being a political scientist, she analyses the tormented history of the South Slavs' state in the twentieth century through the paradigm of their inability to establish political legitimacy as the basis for state-building project. Ramet explains the tenets of political legitimacy in the first chapter setting a theoretical framework for her writing; these are equated with the values of liberal project comprising, above all, the rule of law, individual rights, tolerance, respect for the harm principle and state neutrality in religious matters. The central argument of political legitimacy is, of course, unobjectionable in itself but also rather self-evident, which thus raises doubt as to its utility as historical explanation. Tito's Yugoslavia, for example, was communist dictatorship emerging from civil war and relying on terror and repression for its continued existence; it was, as any other dictatorship, an antithesis of liberal values and free expression of popular will. What is then the point of proving something that is axiomatic, namely that a communist dictatorship collapsed because it failed to establish the rule of law and lacked political legitimacy? Another problem is that retrospective measuring of historical events against the criteria firmly grounded in our times is always at serious risk to neglect or misinterpret contemporary historical context and consequently present a distorted reflection of the past.

Be that as it may, Ramet embarks on a lengthy exposition of the history of three Yugoslav states – the interwar Kingdom

of Yugoslavia (1918–1945), Tito's communist Yugoslavia (1945–1991) and the rump Yugoslavia consisting of Serbia and Montenegro alone (1992–2003), the final stage of the country's demise – with a view to vindicating her hypothesis. Unfortunately, even the most cursory glance at the content of Ramet's book reveals glaring methodological deficiencies that render it completely and utterly unreliable. To begin with, one would expect the writer of a Yugoslav history to thoroughly research primary material in the Yugoslav archives unless he/she opted to draw entirely on secondary sources – which is also legitimate. Ramet has done neither. She has undertaken research primarily in the National Archives of the USA instead and managed to consult a single fond in the Croatian national archives in Zagreb (*Hrvatski državni arhiv*). She did not set a foot in a single archive in Belgrade, not even the Archives of Yugoslavia (*Arhiv Jugoslavije*) the very name of which suggests its indispensability for what she was doing. In addition, her secondary sources clearly show the tremendous extent of her pro-Croat and anti-Serb bias. Ramet heavily draws on a number of Croat authors many of whom were not reputable scholars or, for that matter, not scholars at all; they are often people who had participated in the events they wrote about later or recounted in interviews that Ramet conducted with them; some are widely regarded as prominent Croat nationalists. It should be obvious to any undergraduate student that their accounts could not be taken at their face value before being critically examined and compared with other sources includ-

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ing those from “the other side”. The same can be said of Ramet’s use of newspapers including the most extravagant propaganda. Needless to say, secondary sources and literature of Serbian provenance are conspicuous by their absence. Even non-Serb authors offering more balanced assessment of Yugoslav history are ignored, except in a few instances where their works were dismissed, although the latter are given in the bibliography for the sake of appearances.

A full list of factual errors, misinterpretations, intentional omissions, contradictions, not to speak of typos would be impossible to compile here due to the space constraints of a review. What follows is just a brief overview of the most astonishing instances of the abovementioned which proves beyond any doubt that the author was not entirely guided by scholarly agenda. From the very beginning, Ramet presents a picture of the failed attempts to form a viable Yugoslav state in which the Serbs are invariably cast in the role of vicious villains. The principle of national self-determination to which royal Yugoslavia owed its birth is disputed but Ramet does not suggest what the alternative was. With the benefit of hindsight, she inveighs against the fact that no referendum was held concerning the issues of union, dynasty and internal organisation of the state, i.e. constitutional framework (p. 36). It seems that it does not occur to her that referendum was not deemed necessary because of what she notes herself: the Corfu Declaration of 1917 settled the first two issues by an agreement between the representatives of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (p. 42).

Nevertheless, the author is certain that the Serbs never entertained the possibility of treating the others as equals (pp. 35–39). To prove this point, Ramet puts forward a number of blatant falsehoods – to be sure, the Serbs did have a preponderant position which is hardly surprising given that Serbia had been an

independent country for four decades and a member of the victorious Entente Powers coalition. She claims all Macedonians to have been pro-Bulgarian because of which the Serbs terrorised them and “the Macedonians fought back”, a reference to pro-Bulgarian Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation’s (IMRO) “resistance” (p. 47). This is certainly a novel interpretation of what is generally agreed upon in historiography – leaving aside the question of the competing Serbian and Bulgarian claims on Macedonia – namely, that IMRO carried out terrorist campaign in Macedonia against the Yugoslav authorities and those among local population who were loyal to the new state, and that the authorities consequently clamped down on IMRO and their supporters among native population. In Montenegro, Ramet goes on, civil strife was waged between “the widely popular pro-independence ‘greens’ and the less popular but better armed pro-Serbia ‘whites’” (p. 47). In fact, the whites were more numerous, but perhaps that is less of a mistake than presenting the greens as willing to accept a union with Serbia provided that Montenegrins were recognised as citizens with equal rights when they actually wanted Montenegro to be part of a Yugoslav federation and maintained their loyalty to the ex-king Nikola Petrović. Incidentally, the greens regarded themselves as Serbs and not a separate Montenegrin nation, but that is not mentioned in the text. In her treatment of religious matters in this region, Ramet should rectify her factual error that there existed “the Montenegrin patriarchate”. The Croats are said to have been repressed by Serbs and the competency of what had been the Croatian autonomous province within Hungary severely reduced. This is backed by the often repeated but nevertheless inaccurate claim that Belgrade dissolved the Croatian Assembly (*Sabor*) (p. 52) which, in fact, dissolved itself more than

a month before the creation of Yugoslavia after having proclaimed itself unnecessary in the new Kingdom. Other false claims are simply bizarre: Ramet would have us believe, placing her trust in the brochure of an IMRO/Bulgarian propagandist published in Budapest in 1929, that the Yugoslav authorities “shipped large quantities of books from Croatia to Belgrade on the argument that they were no longer needed in Croatia” (p. 50). Another such source is sufficiently reliable for Ramet to reproduce from it that “more than 100,000 Croatia Catholics converted to Serbian Orthodoxy in 1935 alone” (p. 96).

Ramet’s account of the Second World War in Yugoslavia could best be described as closely following the lines of the communist-partisan mythology which served to justify Tito’s dictatorship after 1945 and have long since been deconstructed. Although she acknowledges the *Ustasha* genocide committed against the Serbs in the fascist Independent State of Croatia (NDH), she does not fully appreciate that the Yugoslavs mostly killed each other during the war. The revolutionary agenda of Tito’s partisans that put the seizure of power before the fighting against the Axis troops – though they certainly fought against the occupiers – is entirely overlooked. On the other hand, her interpretation of the royalist *Chetnik* movement might as well have been written by a communist apologist. Brushing aside that Dragoljub Mihailović’s fighters constituted a legitimate movement supported by the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London and were the first guerrilla force that rose to arms against the Germans in occupied Europe, as well as one of the participants in the waxing civil war, Ramet portrays them as refusing to engage against the Wehrmacht from the start and turning against the partisans despite Tito’s pleas to join forces (pp. 143–144). Nothing could be further from the truth. The Serbian insurrection start-

ed as early as 31 August 1941 when the *Chetniks* liberated the town of Loznica in western Serbia. Anyone slightly familiar with the history of Yugoslavia in the Second World War must be equally stunned to read that after the defeat in December 1941 “Mihailović’s Chetniks barely maintained any presence in Serbia” and that the centre of their “activity moved to the NDH” (p. 145). Ramet insists on the instances of *Chetnik* collaboration with the Axis, particularly with the Italians, although it is perfectly clear that such activities were designed to facilitate the struggle against the *Ustasha* and, as she unwillingly concedes, partisans were also prepared to make arrangements with the Germans, as in March 1943. All this does not prevent Ramet from laying down that “it is more than a bit disappointing that ... people can still be found who believe that the Chetniks were doing anything besides attempting to realise a vision of an ethnically homogeneous Greater Serbian state, which they intended to advance, in the short run, by a policy of collaboration with Axis forces” (p. 145). The true significance of this blatant misinterpretation becomes clear in later text covering more recent events.

Communist Yugoslavia emerged from the war and it was founded on the complex and often contradictory constitutional settlement that breaded the seed of nationalist discontent – the federation consisted of six republics and two autonomous provinces within Serbia. Ramet’s treatment of the developments under Tito runs along the same pro-Croat and anti-Serbian lines as in the case of the interwar Kingdom. She sympathises with the surge of Croat nationalism peaking in 1971 (the so-called Croatian spring or MASPOK meaning “mass movement”). Ramet considers the nationalists from the ranks of the League of Communists of Croatia liberals just as Serbian liberals from their own section of the communist party – the latter, how-

ever, renounced nationalism and insisted that Serbia should mind her own business and not interfere with other republics. The opponents of Croatian nationalists within Croatia are dubbed “conservatives” although one should expect that Ramet would find their more liberal antinationalism closer to her heart. More specifically, Ramet discusses four alleged grievances of Croatian nationalists: “the use of textbooks to suppress Croatian national sentiment, the Serbianization of the Croatian language, the demographic displacement of Croats by Serbs, and the encouragement of Dalmatian sentiment in order to split Croatia in two” (p. 230). Without explicitly saying so, Ramet takes these complaints quite seriously although at least the latter two were unfounded to the point of being absurd. The claim that emigration of Croatian workers to Western Europe, for example, was a plot “to move able-bodied Croats out of the country, so that Serbs could take their places” (pp. 232–233) could only serve to point out pathological manifestations of chauvinistic hate. The language issue, in particular, reflected the depths of nationalistic frenzy as the Croatian intellectuals gathered in the cultural association *Matica hrvatska* repudiated the 1850 Vienna agreement between the prominent Serb and Croat philologists establishing the common Serbo-Croat language. Perhaps Ramet did not perceive this linguistic controversy as a manifestation of nationalism since, in her view, “pupils in Croatian elementary schools were exposed to the Cyrillic alphabet” (p. 312). She presumably knows that pupils in Serbia or, for that matter, Macedonia were equally “exposed” to the Latin alphabet in what was envisioned as a policy of upholding the equality of both alphabets throughout the country.

If Croats’ grievances were legitimate, then they must have been provoked from some quarters. Indeed, Ramet charges the Serbs with being affected with “nationalist chauvinism” both before and after the

fall of Aleksandar Ranković, a Serb and head of the security service; in fact, nationalism “animated a large portion of the Serbian population, from the peasantry to those on the rungs of power”. And yet all the evidence that the author advances for such a sweeping assertion amounts to a cryptic reference in a newspaper and the lame jibe uttered by the prominent Serbian communist Slobodan Penezić–Krcun who “sought to pay Tito a compliment by saying that he had only one shortcoming – he was not a Serb!” But this sort of logic does not come as a surprise when Ramet even explains the flare-up of Croatian nationalism in 1971 as a “reaction to the hegemonistic posture adopted by the Serbian and Montenegrin parties, the Serb communists within Croatia, and Ranković’s people in general” (pp. 242–243). The concrete nature of the hegemonistic posture during this time, however, is not addressed at all, whereas Ranković was ostracised from political life of Yugoslavia in 1966. The fixation on Ranković is very revealing as he is presented as something of a communist equivalent of Nikola Pašić and his Radicals, or “the Devil” as Ramet prefers to refer to them (p. 67). She professes that Ranković conducted “repressive Serbianization policies” which “were concentrated in Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (i.e., against the Albanians, the Hungarians, and the Muslims)”; the elevation of Bosnian Muslims to the status of one of the constituent Yugoslav nations is also construed to have been facilitated by Ranković’s downfall (p. 286). Once again, not a shred of evidence is provided for these categorical statements. One might wonder how it was possible for Serbian communists to suppress all other Yugoslavs at will and yet be so impotent at the same time to prevent virtual confederalisation of their own republic with anomalous status of the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina which

remained in Serbia but nearly became republics in their own right.

As for nationalism among Serbs in Croatia, it is said to have derived from their religious distrust felt towards Croats – perhaps a reference to their centuries-long experience with proselytism of the Roman Catholic Church, but the author remains vague – and the activities of the Serb cultural society *Prosvjeta*, “a forum for former Chetniks” (not a single name is given). In particular, Ramet finds it inadmissible that “Serbian nationalists” wanted an autonomous province within Croatia, or that *Prosvjeta* demanded that both Croatian and Serbian be recognised as official languages in Croatia and that the interests of the Serb community be protected through the agency of a Chamber for Interethnic Relations within the framework of the Croatian Assembly. It seems almost incredible that the author does not comprehend, for example, that the request concerning language was but a reaction to the Croatian nationalist demand for separation of Croatian from Serbian language: the use of Serbian as an official language in Croatia would be a logical ramification of what was, after all, championed by *Matica hrvatska*. This is a fine example of how Ramet turns hard facts upside down. She even poses a rhetorical question: “What would have been the reaction in Serbia if the Croats of Vojvodina had made the equivalent demand?” This would suggest that the Croats constituted a sizeable minority in Vojvodina and that was not the case – Hungarians were the largest minority there – and Vojvodina did enjoy autonomous status on account of its ethnic diversity (pp. 242–243).

The account of the history of both interwar and Tito’s Yugoslavia with all its blunders and distortions is but a prelude for the discussion of the latter’s breakup. This is explained in simple black and white terms: for all the deficiencies of other non-Serb actors, Slobodan Milošević

bore sole responsibility for the bloody war that ensued through his pursue of the Greater Serbian project. In Ramet’s view, that conflict was not a civil war, but rather Serbia’s war of aggression against Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH, and later Kosovo). The utility of Ramet’s previous gross distortions and misinterpretations of earlier history becomes evident in her account of the War of the Yugoslav Succession (1991–99). To begin with, she designates all “Serb nationalists”, which in her narrative means the vast majority of Serbs, as *Chetniks*. Since Milošević is said to have masterminded what Ramet qualifies as the Greater Serbian aggression, which is, as she assures us, the same political program as that pursued by *Chetniks*, it is only natural that the Serbian president rehabilitated the *Chetnik* movement and “even erected a monument to Chetnik leader Draža Mihailović” (p. 389). The said monument is a sheer fabrication and, in general, Milošević embraced communist legacy and partisan movement whereas his political opponents from the right stood for rehabilitation of *Chetniks*. But if facts do not fit in with Ramet’s construction, so much worse for the facts.

Historical falsification dating back to the Second World War is compounded here by another intentional misinterpretation: Ramet denounces “the Chetniks” for imposing the principle of ethnic condominium over majority rule in Bosnia insofar as they denied the right of Croats and Bosnian Muslims to detach BiH from Yugoslavia. She would no doubt be correct unless the constitution of BiH had been predicated on the principle that the three ethnic groups were constituent nations whose consensus was therefore necessary for any substantial change in the status of their republic. However, Ramet chooses to pass in silence over this crucial fact for understanding the outbreak of war in BiH (p. 419). Instead she proceeds with the list of pathological deviations typical of “Chetniks” which

includes their pride of “enjoying superior capacities for sexual performance” (p. 420). If one would expect that the author is, for good measure, equally harsh in her treatment of Croatia’s role in the war, one would be very much mistaken. Despite admission that Croat veterans’ organisation displayed the *Ustasha* version of Croatian flag and that Tudjman’s government fulfilled Pavelić’s dream of uprooting the Serbs from Croatia and strove to extend the Croatian borders at the expense of BiH, Ramet saw no parallel with the political program and practice of the NDH. In fact, she almost excused Tudjman’s territorial ambitions on the grounds that he truly believed what Ante Starčević and *Ustasha* had believed before him – that all Bosnian Muslims were Croats (pp. 421–422). More broadly, Ramet sees no inconsistency, to say the least, in the proposition that a multiethnic Yugoslavia had to disappear as an illegitimate creation while at the same time BiH had to be preserved at all costs regardless of the fact that it was a miniature version of Yugoslavia riddled with the same ethnic conflicts between its constituent nations and no more “legitimate” than Yugoslavia was.

The anti-Serbian pattern is also applied to what was going on in Kosovo. Ramet admits the pressure exerted on Serbs by their Albanian neighbours in the Albanian-run autonomous Serbian province which resulted in a massive exodus of the former throughout the 1980s and earlier. Nevertheless, she claims that the Serbs who had fled Kosovo from Albanian terror “began to talk of their own alleged sufferings and to demand special benefits in Kosovo”; because of that Serbia was “afire with nationalism” by 1986 (p. 305). Ramet would have us believe that from the 1970s until the late 1980s just a minority of Albanians favoured separatism (p. 511) although she herself described nationalist rioting in Kosovo in 1981 which has universally

been recognised as separatist manifestation. She would also have us believe that an estimated 400,000 Albanians fled from Kosovo from 1987 to 1989 (p. 512), a fantastic piece of information no doubt designed to justify what would happen in the following decade. “Albanians knew instinctively that the time for armed struggle had arrived”, reads Ramet’s explanation for the outbreak of insurgency led by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1998 (p. 513). Ramet admits that the findings of Finnish pathologist Helena Ranta gave lie to the official version of the alleged Račak massacre confirming that rather than being innocent Albanian civilians some of the dead were members of Serbian forces and others KLA terrorists (p. 511). Nevertheless, the refutation of this fabrication exploited as an excuse to threaten Serbia with force does not evince any kind of explanation. The ensuing negotiations at Rambouillet are grossly misinterpreted as having failed because of Belgrade’s rejection of a compromise which sought “to find a middle ground between the Serbian and Albanian positions” (p. 516). In reality, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was demanded under the threat of NATO military intervention to abandon Kosovo to NATO troops and agree to an eventual referendum in that province about its status which in practice meant to agree to an independent Kosovo. Since Belgrade refused this ultimatum reminiscent of Hitler’s dealing with Czechoslovakia in 1938 NATO embarked on the illegal bombing of Yugoslavia – without UN authorisation.

As it is well-known, the NATO campaign ended in the establishment of the UN-mandated Kosovo in 1999 which later, after the publication of this book, was recognised by a large number of states, but not the UN as a whole, as an independent state. Particularly cynical is Ramet’s subsuming of increasing ethnically motivated kidnappings of and assaults on

Kosovo Serbs after 1999 into the ordinary criminality rubric (p. 539). Such attitude is further emphasised when often fatal attacks on Serbs by “vengeance-minded Albanians” are simply put down to “the anger which had built up over more than a decade of repression by Milošević’s agents” (p. 542). Striving to vindicate her version of the conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo in the late twentieth century Ramet again resorts to rewriting earlier history. One is simply astonished to read that the Albanians and Serbs “maintained civil and often friendly relations with each other well into the 1980’s” (p. 541). This incredulous claim designed to support the incredulous argument that it was Milošević’s rule alone that was responsible for what happened in Kosovo in the late 1990s runs contrary even against the evidence provided in the book. Indeed, Ramet herself identifies five periods since 1878 during which the Serbs were persecuted by Albanians and four periods during which the roles were reversed (p. 552).

The account of the War of the Yugoslav succession amounts to little more than a reproduction of wartime propaganda from the media outlets including, for example, the accusation levelled at the Bosnian Serb forces of systematically using rape to spread terror and drive non-Serbs from their homes (p. 430). Ramet is especially prone to turning a blind eye to the raging nationalism of the Franjo Tuđman government in Croatia and minimising its unashamed flirtation with the *Ustasha* legacy. In her interpretation, it was “rising Serbian nationalism” emerging from the Kosovo crisis that “in turn infected Serbs in Croatia, leading to renewed difficulties in Croatia” (p. 306). Ramet would even have us believe that the Croatian communists were about to win the elections in 1990 but “the rising tide of Serbian nationalism, both within Serbia and among the Serbs of Croatia, produced a backlash among Croats, who steamed to Tuđman’s

banner”. If Tuđman was guilty for anything that was his decision upon assuming the office to authorise the firing of Serbs from Croatia’s police because they constituted 75 per cent of policemen (p. 356)! One can only guess what the source for this extravagant claim was since the author omitted the reference. Ramet is also more than generous in treating Tuđman’s military involvement in BiH as opposed to the assistance that Milošević provided to Bosnian Serbs portrayed as aggressors – and war criminals – in their own native land. In a small but telling example she refers to “the Croatian liberation of Sanski Most” (p. 465) when speaking of the conquest of the predominantly Serb-populated town in western Bosnia in 1995 by the regular Croatian army.

Ramet’s interpretation of Yugoslavia’s demise is perhaps best summed up in her endorsement of the Croatian Deputy-Prime Minister in 1991/2, Zdravko Tomac’s “comparison of U.S. president [George] Bush’s handling of Milošević with Neville Chamberlain’s handling of Hitler in 1938” (p. 411). In addition to her profession that the Greater Serbian project was “articulated by Ilija Garašanin, Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, Vladimir Karić, and others, and embraced by Nikola Pašić and ... King Aleksandar” (p. 99), a series of most important Serb political and cultural personages from the nineteenth and twentieth century, it becomes clear that she views the entire modern Serbian history as an uninterrupted quest for nationalist expansion. Such naked condemnation of an entire nation comes close to ethnic-cultural prejudice at best and spreading dangerous intolerance thinly veiled as scholarship at worst, something that is exact negation of Ramet’s avowed espousal of the liberal project, to borrow from her discourse. With this in view, an important question springs to mind: is there such a thing as illegitimate scholarship?

BILGIN ÇELİK, *DAĞILAN YUGOSLAVYA SONRASI KOSOVA VE MAKEDONYA TÜRKLERİ* [KOSOVO AND MACEDONIAN TURKS AFTER THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA]. ANTALYA: YENİDEN ANADOLU VE RUMELİ MÜDAFAA-I HUKUK YAYINLARI, 2008, 180 p.

Reviewed by Ognjen Krešić*

The book *Dağılan Yugoslavya sonrası Kosova ve Makedonya Türkleri* was written by Dr. Bilgin Çelik of the Dokuz Eylül University in İzmir. He is Chair of Modern History at the Faculty of Literature and head of the Balkan Region Research Centre. His main area of interest is Ottoman politics during the last decades of the Empire, and especially the Albanian component in the complexity of Ottoman politics and society. His interest in the Turkish population of Yugoslavia, as he himself noted, also stems from personal reasons because he is descended from a family that emigrated from Kosovo after the First World War.

Believing that the political situation in the Balkans is frequently of global importance, the author takes upon himself to present one of its aspects – the issue of the Turks living in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Çelik analyses the problem from a historical perspective, organising the account in the chronological order. The book consists of an introduction (pp. 11–18), three chapters covering the period from the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 to the first decade of the twenty-first century, a conclusion (pp. 167–171) and bibliography (pp. 173–180). Apart from the available literature, the author makes ample use of newspaper articles and documents issued by political parties and relevant institutions.

The introduction gives an account of the modern history of the Balkan Peninsula with special reference to the importance of interventions and influences of foreign powers. The author sees the period following the end of the Second World War as one marked by political

stability but also as one that, in his opinion, ended in a crisis caused mainly by the rise of nationalism. He chooses to devote the first chapter, “The Course of the Disintegration of Yugoslavia” (*Yugoslavya’nın Dağılma Süreci*) (pp. 19–58), to the history of the Yugoslav state. His detailed account, which includes different views on political complexities, may be interesting to the Turkish public but the readership in Serbia would be quite familiar with its contents.

The second chapter, “The Kosovo and Macedonian Turks in the Yugoslav Period” (*Yugoslavya Döneminde Kosova ve Makedonya Türkleri*) (pp. 59–102), focuses on the Turkish population of Yugoslavia from its creation in 1918 until its disintegration in the 1990s. One of the period’s most striking trends was Turkish emigration, mostly organised, from Yugoslavia. Another factor that contributed to their decreasing number was national assimilation, mostly in the form of albanisation. One of the most important moments for the Turkish community of Kosovo and Metohija was their recognition as an ethnic minority in 1951. The Yugoslav government was encouraged to take that step by the improvement of the country’s relations with the Turkish Republic which, being a NATO member, had hitherto been looked at with distrust. Interestingly, relations between the two countries reflected directly upon the number of persons declaring themselves as Turks in the censuses. In 1948, 1,300 inhabitants of Kosovo declared themselves as Turks. Only five years later, in 1953, the census showed the figure of

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35,000. In the former census Turks chose to declare themselves as Albanians in order to dodge the repercussions of being associated with a hostile country. The new minority rights enabled the Turkish community to establish several cultural societies and to have their children educated in their mother tongue. Nevertheless, they were exposed to pressures from the Albanian majority, especially after the enactment of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, and the number of schools providing instruction in Turkish varied. At the end of the 1980s the Turks found themselves amidst the Serbian-Albanian conflict, but they predominantly took a neutral stand.

The Turks in Macedonia mostly shared the experience of their co-ethnics in Kosovo. Still, there were differences that deserve to be separately examined and analysed. The number of Turks in Macedonia followed the same trends as that in Kosovo. In 1953 they accounted for 15.6% of the population (the second largest group after the Macedonians), but by 1991 the figure dropped to 3.9%. Macedonian Turks were also subjected to assimilation by Albanians when their number began to dwindle. In the People's (later Socialist) Republic of Macedonia the Turks were recognised as an ethnic minority from the beginning, and thus they developed diverse educational and cultural activities. The most important newspaper of the Turkish community was the "Unity" (*Birlik*), the first Turkish newspaper printed in Latin alphabet by The Progress Organisation.¹ After the war it was under the control of the Communist Party. Beside newspapers, the Turks pub-

lished several magazines, the most influential of which was the "Voices" (*Sesler*).

The third part of the book is titled "The Kosovo and Macedonian Turks after Yugoslavia" (*Yugoslavya Sonrası Kosova ve Makedonya Türkler*) (pp. 103–166). The author stresses that the Yugoslav Turks also experienced anxieties and pressures from various sides in the period between 1989 and 1999. The Turks, common religious ties notwithstanding, could not decidedly choose one side in the Serbian-Albanian conflict and generally tried to remain neutral. Nevertheless, the historical ties and common religion contributed to a closer connection with the Albanians. The period after the 1999 NATO bombing and the establishment of UN administration in Kosovo was marked by the pressures put upon the Turkish community from extreme Albanian nationalists, some of whom demanded a ban on the use of the Turkish language. The situation was improved after the Turkish Republic intensified its diplomatic activity and Turkish soldiers became part of the KFOR troops.

Çelik devotes his greatest attention to an overview of Turkish political parties and civil society organisations in Kosovo. The first political party of Kosovo Turks was founded in 1990, the Turkish Democratic Union (*Türk Demokratik Birliği/TDB*). Afterwards, several other political organisations have sought to act as representatives of Turkish interests. In the first post-1999 parliamentary elections, the two biggest Turkish parties TDB and THP (Turkish People's Party, *Türk Halk Partisi*) formed a coalition, the Kosovo Democratic Turkish Party (*Kosova Demokratisi Türk Partisi*), which won three seats, using the position to promote the interests of the Turkish minority. During the drafting of the new Kosovo constitution, the Turkish delegates focused on the question of the formal status of Turkish, with a view to achieving the official lan-

¹ *Yücel Teşkilatı* (The Progress Organisation) was the most prominent Turkish organisation founded before 1950, and it was tied to the Turkish Consulate in Skopje and the Embassy in Belgrade. It was founded by intellectuals and conservatives, and had an anticommunist agenda, which is why it was banned in 1947.

guage status. The basis for their claim was found in the laws and constitutions from the Yugoslav period, all of which (from 1969 until the disintegration of Yugoslavia) provided for the status of Turkish as an official language along with Serbo-Croatian and Albanian. The author is of the view that the constitutional framework established by UNMIK violated the rights guaranteed by the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution given that the 2001 document stated that the formal and equal versions of the highest law were in Albanian, Serbian and English. The only provision taking Turkish into account was that the laws and the said constitutional framework be published in Turkish as well. According to Çelik, the stance of the UN Special Representative Bernard Kouchner was generally believed to be the reason for that situation. According to Mr Kouchner's spokesperson, they considered that, previous constitutional stipulations notwithstanding, the Turkish language had never been an official language in Kosovo in practice. The presented evidence to the contrary was not accepted. According to the Law on the Use of Languages adopted in 2006, apart from Albanian and Serbian, a language can be accepted as official and equal if its speakers account for no less than 5% of the total population of a municipality, with one exception: in Prizren Turkish is an official language irrespective of the actual number of its speakers. The Turkish politicians in Kosovo were and still are dissatisfied with the solution to the language issue because the use of Turkish for official purposes is hindered outside Prizren. They view as double standards the fact that Serbian is accepted as an official language in the whole territory of Kosovo regardless of the number of Serbs. Nevertheless, after Prizren, Turkish became an official language in Gnjilane, Kosovska Mitrovica and Priština. The 2008 Constitution drew ambiguous

reactions from Turkish politicians, some acknowledging that the constitutional provisions protect the right of the Turks to use their own language in local institutions and the Assembly, and the others remaining dissatisfied with the achieved level of minority rights.

After a short review of the Turkish cultural organisations and press in Kosovo, Çelik proceeds to discuss the position of the Turkish minority in Macedonia after its secession from Yugoslavia. The new Macedonian constitution of 1991 stipulated that the national minorities, Turks included, were to have the same rights as the Macedonian majority. The continuous decrease in their numbers (mainly due to emigration) and territorial dispersion creates problems as regards the electoral process and the exercise of the right to education in their mother tongue. Moreover, the attempts at the albanisation of the Turks only intensified after the Ohrid Agreement signed between the Macedonian government and the Albanian representatives in 2001. On the other hand, according to the constitutional provisions adopted after the Macedonian-Albanian negotiations, in every municipality where a minority accounts for at least 20% of the total population their language becomes a second official language. The Macedonian Turks acquired this right in four municipalities: Centar Župa, Vraneštica, Mavrovi Avnovi and Plasnica. The constitution also guarantees the right to elementary and secondary education in mother tongue to members of every minority. The author draws attention to the fact that the decreasing trend in the number of schools with Turkish classes has already started in the Yugoslav period and merely continued after independence. Hence only half of some 10,000 Turkish pupils are receiving education in their mother tongue, and the percentage of those having secondary education in Turkish is below one per cent.

Like in the subchapters on Kosovo, the author outlines the political activity of the Turkish parties in Macedonia, as well as the Turkish community's activities through numerous cultural and civic organisations. As already mentioned, the dispersion of the Turkish population is a limiting factor as regards their representation in the parliament and local councils, and impedes more ambitious political engagement. Moreover, as is often the case, political, ideological and personal divisions within the Turkish political class further complicate political life. The main division is into adherents of a moderate liberal political stand and nationalists who accept the Turkish-Islamic synthesis.

The political situation in the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo and in Macedonia remains problematic and volatile. Albanian-Serbian and Albanian-Macedonian relations are always first to come to mind when trying to explain the complexities of the region's recent history, and they certainly are key to understanding its past and future. But Çelik offers the readers of his book a new perspective, that of the region's Turkish minority. Although the numerical strength and political and cultural influence of the Turkish population is relatively weak, they form an integral part of these societies and are active participants in political events and developments in the central Balkans, especially given the support they enjoy from the Republic of Turkey.

KOSTA NIKOLIĆ, *MIT O PARTIZANSKOM JUGOSLOVENSTVU* [THE MYTH OF PARTISAN YUGOSLAVISM]. BELGRADE: ZAVOD ZA UDŽBENIKE, 2015, xvii+502 p.

Reviewed by Dragan Bakić*

Many generations of Yugoslavs born after 1945 thought that their socialist homeland had been forged in the Second World War in the heroic armed struggle fought by Tito's communist partisans against the occupiers and their collaborators (*narodnooslobodilačka borba*). It was then, as the communist origin myth expounded, that the nations and national minorities of Yugoslavia forged their brotherhood and unity (*bratstvo i jedinstvo*) which laid ground for the post-war socialist federation. That new country replaced the "rotten monarchist dictatorship" that was the Kingdom of Yugoslavia destroyed in the Axis invasion of 1941 and put an end to national discrimination of non-Serb peoples that was synonymous with the rule of a "Greater-Serbian hegemonic clique". The legacy of communist Yugoslavism, however, seems to have survived the break-up of the country nearly twenty-five years ago. In

Serbia, in particular, a section of population, not limited to youth-nostalgic older generation, still maintains a strange affection for dead and buried Yugoslavia. All this makes the necessity of scholarly examination of the phenomenon more pronounced. That is exactly what Kosta Nikolić, one of the most gifted Serbian historians, embarks on in his most recent monograph. His analysis is a continuation of what he had already discussed in his excellent *Srbija u Titovoj Jugoslaviji (1941–1980)* [Serbia in Tito's Yugoslavia] (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2011). Nikolić has presented a thorough deconstruction of what he terms "the myth of partisan Yugoslavism". It should be noted that his study is not that of the history of the Yugoslav idea or the Yugoslav state from

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1918 onwards. It focuses on the official discourse of Yugoslav communists and draws largely on the impressive range of sources of their own provenance and not that of their opponents.

Nikolić analyses the communist view of Yugoslavism from the inception of the bolshevised Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) at the Vukovar congress in 1920. This included the struggle for proletarian dictatorship and terror as means of achieving it and ensured that the CPY became but a mere section of the Comintern whose policy it would blindly follow. It also meant that Lenin's view of Yugoslavia as an artificial Versailles creation that needed to be broken became the guiding principle of CPY; the exploitation of the national question in this country became "the most efficient method" to accomplish its dismemberment and seize the power (p. 26). Rather than adhering to their international doctrine, the communists thus opted for "national communism" as the author aptly puts it. Based on Lenin's interpretation that communists should support revolutionary national liberation movements in "backward" countries, the "left faction" of CPY insisted on encouraging national differences with the view to bringing down the Kingdom. Those Serbian communist such as Sima Marković and Filip Filipović who believed that the national question was democratic and constitutional had to renounce their views and accept those of their Croat and Slovene party colleagues. The latter proclaimed Yugoslavia to be a "dungeon of nations": the "ruling" Serbian nation – and not just a "Greater-Serbian bourgeois clique" – suppressed the other nations, Muslims, Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians, and the struggle for their national liberation was instrumental in the struggle against capitalism and imperialism. Such attitude led to the CPY's cooperation with nationalist and even terrorist organisations of all anti-Yugoslav shades, the Croatian Peasant Party, Ante Pavelić's

Ustasas, Montenegrin separatists, pro-Bulgarian IMRO, the Albanian Kosovo Committee. Complying with Stalin's turn "to the left" into world revolution to topple European fascist regimes which were about to start a military crusade against the Soviet Union, the CPY codified its anti-Yugoslav orientation in the decisions of the 1928 Dresden congress.

As a corollary of this emphasis on a national-revolutionary agenda came the transformation of the CPY from a single working class party organisation into several national parties. Serbian communists were completely marginalised in this ideological shift and their role was reduced to extending help to the struggle of communists from the "oppressed" nations for their national liberation. This process was rounded off with the elimination of the most prominent Serbian communist, at least partly independent-minded Marković; after that, the next generation of Serbian communists trained their revolutionary consciousness "with no regard for national interests of their own people" which was "a unique phenomenon in the political history of the European twentieth century" (pp. 144–145). The founding of the Communist Party of Croatia and the Communist Party of Slovenia in 1937 was a concession to separatist tendencies of Croat and Slovene communists and prepared the ground for (con)federalisation of the Yugoslav party and later the communist Yugoslav state. This was the organisational structure of CPY that Tito sanctioned when he became its leader in 1940 emerging from Stalinist purges.

The true role of Tito's partisans during the Second World War in establishing their own brand of Yugoslavism is perhaps the most revealing part of the book. Far from the official narrative about the joint struggle of all Yugoslav nations and national minorities against the Axis invaders forging *brotherhood and unity*, the partisans were participants in, and

one of the initiators of, the horrible civil war fought along ethnic and ideological divides which claimed the lives of the majority of war casualties. Nikolić convincingly argues his case in an analysis of partisan war effort in each of Yugoslavia's regions with their different national structures. After having abstained from fighting the occupiers as long as the 1939 German-Soviet pact of non-aggression was in force, communists rose to arms at the Comintern's order following Hitler's attack on the USSR in June 1941. The insurrection was quickly quelled by German troops but not before the partisans initiated a civil war in Serbia against another resistance movement, Draža Mihailović's royalists. In doing so, Tito discarded the Comintern's instruction that "class struggle" was a second phase of revolution that should follow, and not precede, national-liberation struggle in which communists needed to join forces with all anti-fascists. Tito and his Serbian partisans found refuge in Montenegro and spread a civil war there, even crueller than that in Serbia. Their main enemies became not German and Italian occupiers, but rather Mihailović's chetniks labelled "Greater Serb nationalists" who acted as military forces of the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London. Nikolić demonstrates how the civil war in Montenegro was in fact "a war for identity because communists fought for Montenegrin and royalists for Serbian statehood" (p. 303). The rhetoric about fighting "the traitors" and "the fifth column" was conveniently employed to justify a ruthless struggle for power.

In June 1942, Tito's partisans were expelled from Montenegro and they arrived in western Bosnia, the heart of the Nazi-puppet Independent State of Croatia. Their ranks and files were recruited from the Krajina Serbs subjected to genocide by the Ustashas whereas the Croat masses – and Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina – supported an independent Croatia,

if not the Ustaha regime. In order to gain support of Croats and Muslims, Tito and the CPY revived the bogey of "Greater Serb chauvinism" and went as far as to intimidate them with the prospect of being slaughtered by Mihailović's chetniks unless they joined the partisans. Even such tactics did not yield much result until the capitulation of Italy in September 1943. Party headquarters in Croatia as well as in Slovenia had an absolute autonomy in the conduct of military operations and acted without coordination with each other or Tito's Supreme Command. In January 1943 when the survival of the main partisan forces in Bosnia was at stake, the commander of Croatian partisans, Ivan Rukavina, refused direct requests for assistance; Tito himself never set foot in Croatia during the war (p. 459). He had no less trouble with the disobedient and particularistic Communist Party of Croatia led by Andrija Hebrang which, in Tito's words, leant towards Greater Croat nationalism and separatism. Thus, there was no overall Yugoslav strategy and it was not before mid-1943 that the CPY started to insist on Yugoslavism and Yugoslavia for the sole purpose of acquiring legitimacy among the Allied Powers.

Elsewhere was the same. In Slovenia, communists were practically independent of the CPY and promoted Slovenian national interests alone, including irredentist claims at the expense of Italy – Yugoslavia was not even mentioned. The fact that Slovenian partisans did not carry out a single military action outside their province throughout the war speaks for itself. In Macedonia, Metodije Šatorov went as far as to attach Macedonian party committee to the Bulgarian communist party and he was expelled from the CPY in July 1941 because of his hostile attitude towards Serbs (pp. 367–368). A rift between pro-Yugoslav and pro-Bulgarian Macedonians remained the main fea-

ture of the partisan movement in that province.

It was in Bosnia that the partisan movement managed to take root and prepare the ground for taking power in the entire country. *Brotherhood and unity* policy was most successful in this ethnically-mixed area as a strategy of defending those who struggled for their life and offering Yugoslav solidarity and common army as a solution – Muslims were allowed to preserve their special identity among partisans and given the opportunity to escape their share of responsibility for Ustasha atrocities. It was in Bosnia that the national policy of CPY was finally shaped and formulated. This was a balancing act: Tito embraced the restoration of Yugoslavia unpopular with non-Serbs, but inevitable in order to maintain his movement which mostly consisted of Serbs; on the other hand, he underscored the full national self-determination that non-Serbs would have in a new Yugoslavia and passed over in silence the genocide committed against Serbs. Finally, the foundations of communist Yugoslavia were laid at the second meeting of the partisan supreme governing body, AVNOJ. It was then envisaged that federal Yugoslavia would consist of six units (republics): Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia – BiH was the only one that was not based on national principle as it had no absolute ethnic majority among local Serbs, Croats and Muslims.

Serbia was a clear loser in the new communist re-composition of Yugoslavia although Serbian communists alone called their compatriots for the restoration of that country. Nevertheless, Tito and his Supreme Command maintained firm control over Serbian communists, the treatment of whom was sometimes humiliating. The formation of Serbia as a future federal unit bore witness to the utter inability and unwillingness of Ser-

bian communists to protect Serbian national interests. The Sandžak area nearly became a separate entity outside Serbia; it was because of the unwillingness of local Muslims to join partisans and the formation of two other autonomous regions within Serbia that such designs were dropped. Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija were these autonomous regions – the latter despite the fact that the local Albanians supported the Axis occupation and offered armed resistance to partisans as late as December 1944 (the Serbs in Croatia did not receive autonomous status although they were the backbone of partisan forces). This was effectively a concession to Albanian nationalism and an attempt to placate it, a policy that would carry on in post-war Yugoslavia. In fact, during the war Tito even considered ceding Kosovo to communist Albania. It was a measure of Serbian communists' impotence that their party was not formed until May 1945, at the end of the war and eight years after the formation of the parties of Slovene and Croat communists. In addition, repression against all anti-communists was by far most ruthless in Serbia – this was a continuation of the struggle against "Greater Serbianism", the most dangerous enemy of CPY since its inception.

In conclusion, Nikolić has produced an excellent book which presents a well-documented account of the evolution and nature of partisan Yugoslavism. His findings will be quite surprising to many a reader but lucid and convincing nevertheless. Contrary to partisan mythology, Nikolić has proved, partisan Yugoslavism was a thin veil designed to cover rampant nationalism of Yugoslav communists, with the noted exception of those of Serb origin, and to provide a framework for dictatorial rule of Tito and CPY. As such, it planted the seeds of destruction of Yugoslavia in a civil war just a decade after Tito's death.

MARIJA ILIĆ, *DISCOURSE AND ETHNIC IDENTITY. THE CASE OF THE SERBS FROM HUNGARY*.
 TRANSL. EDWARD ALEXANDER. BERLIN – MUNICH: OTTO SAGNER VERLAG,
 2014, 344 p.

*Reviewed by Aleksandra Djurić Milovanović**

During the last few decades sociological, anthropological and linguistic studies have shown a keen interest in phenomena associated with diaspora, the ethnic and religious identity of minority groups, identity construction and change, discourse and narrative, precisely the issues that the book on *Discourse and Ethnic Identity: The Case of the Serbs from Hungary* by Marija Ilić, a research associate at the Institute for Balkan Studies SASA, is concerned with. The book was published in 2014 by the renowned European publisher Otto Sagner Verlag in the Studies on Language and Culture in Central and Eastern Europe Series edited by Prof. Christian Voss. In the course of several years of her research interests in ethnolinguistics and anthropolinguistics and extensive fieldwork in Hungary, Marija Ilić has recorded a valuable collection of interviews with members of the Serbian minority in the village of Szigetcsép (Serb. *Čip*). The Serbian minority in Hungary has its long historical continuity and is more numerous in the south of the country, but the case study presented in this book is concerned with a small rural Serbian-speaking community in the vicinity of Budapest. After the Second World War, according to Ilić, this community “started to abandon traditional cultural practices and endogamy and shift from Serbian to Hungarian language” (p. 14). Therefore, in the field of anthropolinguistic studies it makes a valuable contribution for analysis of the language shift process and ethnic identity changes in diaspora communities.

Apart from an introduction, the book has four chapters, a conclusion, an appendix providing background historical information and an extensive bibliography.

In the introductory chapter, the author describes her book as an attempt to elucidate some current issues in anthropological linguistics and critical discourse analysis. More precisely, the book explores the complex relationship between oral discourse and ethnicity by using the case study of Serbs in Hungary. Her analysis is based on qualitative research conducted in 2001 and 2008 by a research team from the Institute for Balkan Studies, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. The fieldwork was focused on the older generation given that they are the only fluent speakers of Serbian, while Hungarian has come to prevail among the younger generations. The author focuses on the discursive construction of ethnic identity which is understood as a form of narrative identity. Furthermore, Ilić introduces the concept of *collective narrative* which is “based upon collective memory and refers to collective sense of belonging. Thus, collective narratives unequivocally belong to cultural memory, which is directly related to group identity” (p. 44).

The first chapter, “Theory and Method: Discourse, Narrative, Identity”, outlines the theoretical and methodological framework of the study, defining the main analytical categories: discourse, narrative and identity. The research in Hungary initially used the (Russian) ethnolinguistic methodology, but ended up coming closer to the American school of anthropological linguistics. The author elucidates with clarity and precision what anthropological linguistics is and how this interdisciplinary approach links anthropology and

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linguistics. She is especially interested in the use of anthropological linguistics as an approach to discourse and discourse analysis, applying the Bakhtinian concept of *heteroglossia* and *dialogism*. Besides discourse, Ilić uses the concept of narrative relying on Labov's model of personal narrative experience. In this chapter, the interested reader can find the concepts of narrative identity, ethnic narrative identity and national narrative identity.

"The Serbs in Hungary: a Minority Community" is the title of the second chapter which, among other things, gives an overview of the migrations of Serbs and other Christians to the Hungarian and later Habsburg lands which began after the Ottoman conquest in the fifteenth century. It offers data on the historical development of the Serbian minority, especially following the creation of new nation-states after the First World War. Community history constitutes a significant part of Ilić's interlocutors' narrative identity, and she finds that "their oral history is marked by a tripartite structure: memories of the legendary past (15th–17th c.) alongside memories of the more recent past (20th c.) are regularly recounted, while other historical periods mostly fell into oblivion" (p. 64). This is why the role and importance of oral history for this community is stressed at the beginning of the chapter. However, a more recent history of the Serbs in Hungary required a detailed account of the legal framework of the minority, the status of the Serbian language and its vitality as well as demographic characteristics. In order to explain the current position of the Serbian minority, the author provides valuable data on the community's social history, the legal framework of minority rights after the Second World War, the status of the Serbian language, minority languages and ethnolinguistic vitality. Ilić identifies interethnic relations as one of the most significant factors in language

vitality, and especially the influence of interethnic marriages on language use.

The third chapter, "The Szigetcsép Community and Fieldwork", starts with the local history of the village of Szigetcsép, one of the oldest Serbian communities in Hungary which claims the settlement of its ancestors to the fourteenth and fifteenth century. Until the Second World War, as the author observes, "the Serbian community was especially closed and densely linked in many ways – through endogamy, kinship, neighbourly relations, the agrarian way of life, common language, tradition and religion" (p. 121). After the Second World War, various social changes had an impact on the position of the Serbs too. They also had an impact on language when, after the 1950s, Hungarian became the first language and Serbian was used in very restrictive domains on special occasions (p. 137). The author's fieldwork involved twenty-eight interlocutors, mostly women and mostly elderly – those born between the two world wars (1918–1945). The interview questions concerned linguistic, social and cultural specificities of the local community. The recorded material was transcribed using the method of verbatim transcription, which presents "one to one" relationship between the words spoken and transcribed, i.e. all of the spoken expressions (p. 151). The included interview transcripts are furnished with information on the interlocutors' gender, age, education and occupation.

The last chapter, "Ethnic Narrative Identity in Szigetcsép", uses the collected interview material to analyse the construction of ethnic narrative identity among Serbian speakers from Szigetcsép. Based on the interviews, the author introduces the concept of collective narratives and distinguishes several types: argumentative narratives, narratives of shared memory, narratives of a common culture and perspectivation narratives (p.

153). The structure of interaction in the research interview is analysed as well as power relationships, which is important in gaining a perspective on the interaction between researchers (linked to the authority of the “motherland” and standard language variety) and interlocutors (linked to the diaspora situation and nonstandard Serbian) (p. 157). Since all interlocutors are bilingual or multilingual, awareness of language use becomes very important and it is analysed within the concept of metapragmatics. This chapter provides examples of code-switching during the in-group interaction among bilinguals. Ilić points out that “the narrative evaluation reveals that linguistic behaviour of the Serbian minority speakers is not being accepted as adequate by either speakers of standard Serbian or native Hungarian speakers” (p. 191). Considering the constant demographic decline of this community it was important to analyse in-tragroup boundaries and ethnic relations with neighbouring communities. Not to be neglected is the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church, especially in language vitality. The maintenance of boundaries to others is based on ethnic or religious categorisation: Bulgarians, Croats, Germans (Swabs), Gypsies, Magyars, Jews, Rác; Catholic, Orthodox, Reformists. In this way, discourse is one of the most important social practices in the structuring of self/other and the author emphasises the role of linguistic construction of ethnic boundary and common culture. In this chapter the author shows how collective narratives play an important role in cultural memory and in the confabulation of the common past. Ilić explicates three types of narratives on migration: the Great Serb Migration (migration to Hungary), “optation” narrative (migration from Hungary to the Kingdom of SCS in the 1920s) and narrative on the expulsion of Germans. The role of the past for the author’s interlocutors is based on the

temporal frame of reference *then/now*, which mainly refers to the period *before/after the Second World War* (p. 270). Faced with various social changes during the twentieth century, the Serbs in Hungary have redefined their traditional symbolic values, experiencing also a language shift.

In the final chapter, “Discourse and Ethnic Identity: Conclusion”, Ilić highlights the main goal of the book and the importance of this particular case study, drawing two conclusions. One is theoretical in nature and refers to the existence of collective narratives as a special group of narratives within one community. Using ethnolinguistic and anthropolinguistic methods, this research has shown that collective narrative is based on collective memory. Collective narrative is seen as a counterpart to the personal experience narrative (p. 289). The other conclusion is given in the form of a rhetorical question: “Can the study about an elder generation identity discourse tell us something which could concern our own selves in the current moment?” (p. 290). It is the question of power and powerless discourse in negotiating ethnic and national identity and its boundaries.

On the whole, the monograph is a valuable contribution to minority and diaspora studies, but it is also useful for scholars concerned with theoretical and methodological issues related to ethnicity, discourse and narrative. Apart from providing numerous fieldwork examples, this book offers an important analysis of the language and ethnic identity changes and challenges of a Serbian diaspora community.

ANDRÉ MICHAEL HEIN, *DOES TRANSNATIONAL MOBILIZATION WORK FOR LANGUAGE MINORITIES? A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON ROMANIAN IN SERBIA, BULGARIA, UKRAINE AND HUNGARY*. MÜNSTER – BERLIN – LONDON: LIT VERLAG, 2014, 257 p.

Reviewed by Annemarie Sorescu Marinković*

In the study of Romanian “old” or historical communities in Romania’s neighbouring countries, significant attention has been devoted in the past decades to issues regarding their origin, history, identity, folklore, traditions and language, both by researchers from the kin-state and from the host country. Recently, members of the international academic community have also started showing a vivid interest in these communities, adding new dimensions to their research by putting them within the frame of globalization, Europeanization and transnationalization. However, the Romanian communities around Romania have so far rarely been the subject of research in the political science, hence the overall shortage of material in this field. Therefore, writing a book about the transnational political mobilisation of Romanian minorities from the European countries that formerly belonged to the Soviet sphere of influence is a salutary initiative meant to fill an important gap. In order to do so, one needs a broad knowledge of the political science apparatus, familiarity with the theories in the field of social movements and nationality studies, consistency in interpreting and applying them, exceptional knowledge of the contemporary situation of the Romanian minorities and of their recent history, as well as the ability to draw pertinent conclusions from the analysis of such a broad set of variables.

André Michael Hein’s book is thus a very ambitious pioneering study. It aims not only at illustrating and sustaining the leading theory(ies) in the field of political mobilization with empirical material from the Romanian communities outside Romania, but goes beyond that by putting

together more theoretical concepts from different fields and skillfully building an understanding of the phenomena currently taking place in the studied communities. Also, it does not look at one country and one Romanian minority only, but encompasses the entire space around Romania where Romanians form a national minority: Serbia, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Hungary, and tries to compare the vastly different situations.

However, the reader might at first be puzzled since the title of the book *Does Transnational Mobilization Work for Language Minorities?* is more catchy than clear, containing two phrases that need to be further clarified: what exactly does *transnational mobilization* and *language minorities* refer to? The author is also aware of the non-transparency of the two phrases and devotes a great deal of text to explaining in detail what *transnational mobilization* is, which actors are involved in it and what the national and international factors which either promote or inhibit transnational mobilization are. Thus, Hein pleads for the understanding of this phrase in the widest possible sense, that a multitude of political processes can be defined as transnational mobilization: the sustained cooperation of social movements within transnational networks, the framing of political declarations of a social movement in the language of European integration, the physical movement of people etc. On the other hand, in the first footnote of the book it is said that *language minority* is to be understood as “a maximalist definition that can mean-

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ingfully include all potential members of the minority group that will be observed here”, with the proviso that minority movements normally advocate ideas of common ‘national’ and ‘ethnic’ roots for minority groups that go far beyond the claims for a common ‘language’ only. As the author further on in the study excludes from his analysis those groups that do not aim at the promotion of a Romanian identity and culture or that do not declare themselves as parts of it, one might find the use of the phrase *language minority* superfluous: for the sake of brevity and clarity, *minority* could have been used instead, or *Romanian minority*. Nevertheless, the subtitle *A Comparative Study on Romanians in Serbia, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Hungary* is a fitting description of the topic explored in the book.

The aim of the study is to relate the existing theories in the field of social movements, cosmopolitanism, nationality studies and Europeanization to the empirical observations on the Romanian communities in Serbia, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Hungary in order to explain why transnational mobilization is likely or not to work for the Romanians in the four countries. As it aims at delivering an encompassing analysis of complex situations, in different regions with diverse political settings, it is argued that only a combination of these theories is capable of offering a qualified contribution to the topic rather than using the main theories within only one discipline. Accordingly, the book employs an inductive approach and aims at “theory building”: starting with the critical analysis of the existing theories, it moves to the empirical level, using a variety of sources, in order to refer back to the theoretical explanations for the observed phenomena and to adjust them accordingly.

The author draws attention to the fact that, when talking about minority activism, the current literature has two main

shortcomings: one is that there is still a shortage of literature on civil society development in those European countries that formerly belonged to the Soviet sphere of influence, the other, that most of the case study research on transnational minority mobilization has so far focused on groups with a significant amount of such an activity, priority being given to identifying certain patterns of already existing mobilization, rather than questioning whether transnational mobilization is at all a feasible option for the minorities in question. As Hein accurately notices that the existing studies prefer to look at successful examples of transnational actions rather than to examine why transnationalization attempts may not perpetuate in some situations, he chooses to take a look at the Romanian communities in Serbia, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Hungary, as he considers them an interesting case for transnational minority activism in post-communist Europe. Why? Because of several reasons: they are traditionally not mobile; they do not benefit from the support of any institutionalized representation at the European level; they are not visible enough in numerical terms; they do not have secessionist aims; their members do not seem keen to engage with the European ideas to a large extent.

An important part of the discussion on case selection is dedicated to reviewing how the ethnic boundaries of “Romanianness” are defined by the three decisive actors: the Romanian government, the communities themselves and the governments of the host states. Hein’s research builds upon transnationalization literature that has already identified two main sets of actors: the *transnational activists* who are actively involved at the international level, and the *sedentary locals* who remain rooted in their native places and engage in external actions in a far more restricted manner. The book tries to see, on the concrete examples of the Roma-

nian communities in the four countries studies, which of these internal actors are performing at a local level and what frameworks and actors at the international level exist that Romanians may refer to. The author uses a variety of sources to back up his analysis, such as: international treaties, information provided by governmental institutions of Romania, interview data, secondary literature, press articles, census data provided by the host states and reports of international governmental and non-governmental organisations.

The four chapters, each devoted to a case study, offer extensive and valuable comparative information on the system of protection of minorities in each of the four countries with Romanian communities and on the level of political and civic engagement and mobilization of the members of these communities. The chapter devoted to Serbia is probably the most detailed and well documented. The fact that the author has done field research only in Serbia and Bulgaria clearly shows both in the length of the chapters and in the depth of the analysis, while those devoted to Ukraine and Hungary seem rather superficial in comparison. The author, aware of the very complex and disputed situation of the Romanian communities, chooses to focus only on the Romanian movement within the Vlach community in Central Serbia. After a thorough overview of the situation of minorities in Serbia, constitutional provisions and administrative capacity, public opinion and governmental behaviours, regional differences and centralisation tendencies, the local influence of international institutions and the Romanian communities in Serbia (Romanians in Vojvodina, Vlachs and Romanians in Central Serbia), the author goes on to show how the Romanian movement in Central Serbia cannot be considered a forerunner of transnational civic society. The Romanian movement has neither

proved itself to be successful on factors such as internal cohesion or resources, nor has it managed to become a more important political player through coalition building. The conclusion is that, "while there has been some awareness of the European level as a helpful institutional framework, engagement with these institutions has not exceeded the level of mere declarations and memoranda".

Even though Hein states at the outset that his work "cannot and does not wish to resolve the several disputes that have been held on the communities" and that "it is not useful to imply the terminology of ethnologists in a political science study", we cannot help noticing that more detailed linguistic and ethnographic knowledge about the Romanian communities in the four countries would have helped him build a more accurate image of the complex interplay of issues, would have provided a more nuanced understanding of the social and political phenomena and would have avoided inconsistency. Precisely, mention is made in a footnote about the Rudari and Băieși groups from Serbia, who also declare a Romanian identity, but nowhere are the numerous Rudari in Bulgaria mentioned, even though, unlike the ones in Serbia, they are politically active. They all speak Romanian, their overwhelming majority claims a Romanian identity and there exist several Rudari NGOs there. On the same note, the author does not seem to be aware that the Boyash from Hungary, present in two tables about minority language use and attitudes to language shift and maintenance that he took from a Hungarian language study, are part of the same ethnic group originating in Romania and spread all over the Balkans and partly in Central Europe, which speak an archaic dialect of Romanian. Also, given the significance and overarching nature of this research, the author should have incorporated better ethnic maps of the

regions inhabited by Romanians in the four countries, as some of the ones taken from different sites are of very low quality and have an effect opposite of the one intended, as they can even hamper understanding in the reader.

In his book, André Michael Hein offers a great deal of relevant information on a very dense subject which has not hitherto been tackled in a scientific manner. Due to the wide area the author tries to encompass, to the intense debates currently taking place in these Romanian communities and to the sharp divisions within them, to the complexity of their relations with the kin-state, with the host state and with Europe, to the multifarious interplay of the phenomena from the respective communities, the author had to be extremely selective in his work. This is obvious in the last two chapters, dedi-

cated to the Ukraine and Bulgaria, which would have probably deserved a more detailed analysis, but which are nevertheless a useful starting point for future investigations. To sum up, Hein's book *Does Transnational Mobilization Work for Language Minorities? A Comparative Study on Romanians in Serbia, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Hungary* convincingly argues that Europeanization research should be further extended to the sphere of civil society activism and should also start looking into Eastern Europe, as it has so far shown a clear geographical bias towards Western Europe. The book will surely be a starting point for future research on European engagement of understudied minorities and a challenge to those who have investigated Romanian minorities to reconsider their current positions in the light of Hein's findings.

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Corrigendum

In the issue no. XLV of *Balcanica* the source of the illustrations accompanying the article of Ljiljana Stošić “The Bay of Cattaro (Kotor) School of Icon-Painting 1680–1860”, pp. 187–202 (DOI: 10.2298/BALC1445187S), was left out by mistake. The photographs in question come from the photo archive *Bokokotorska slikarska škola* of the author Aleksandar Rafajlović.

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