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V. P. PETROVIĆ, *Pre-Roman and Roman Dardania* • S. PILIPOVIĆ, *Heroic Themes of the Trojan Cycle in Roman Funerary Art* • T. PETROVIĆ, *Serbian Peasant Women and the Stories of Their Lives* • I. LIKOMANOVA, "People of My Life" • S. MARJANOVIĆ-DUŠANIĆ, *Patterns of Martyrial Sanctity in Medieval Serbia* • B. BOJOVIĆ, *Mont Athos, les princes roumains, Jean Castriot et la Tour albanaise* • M. TATIĆ-DJURIĆ, *La Theotokos LYCHNIA* • LJ. TRGOVČEVIĆ, *The Enlightenment and Modern Serbian Culture* • M. SVIRČEVIĆ, *The Establishment of Serbian Local Government 1876–1878* • M. ST. PROTIĆ, *Sources of the Serbian Radical Movement* • D. T. BATAKOVIĆ, *Nikola Pašić, les radicaux et la «Main noire»* • V. PAVLOVIĆ, *La France et le programme yougoslave* • A. S. TRBOVICH, *Nation-building under the Austro-Hungarian Sceptre* • A. TROUDE, *Les relations franco-serbes au sein de l'Armée d'Orient* • T. SANDU, *Les relations roumano-serbes et la question du Banat* • S. MIŠIĆ, *Serbo-Albanian Bank* • J.-P. BESSE, *L'éphémère Eglise orthodoxe croate* • M. RISTOVIĆ, *L'insurrection de décembre à Athènes* • G. N. BARDOS, *The Balkans' New Political Dynamics* ☞

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The origin of the Institute goes back to the Institut des Études balkaniques founded in Belgrade in 1934 as the only of the kind in the Balkans. The initiative came from King Alexander I Karađorđević, while the Institute's scholarly profile was created by Ratko Parežanin and Svetozar Spanačević. The Institute published *Revue internationale des Études balkaniques*, which assembled most prominent European experts on the Balkans in various disciplines. Its work was banned by the Nazi occupation authorities in 1941. The Institute was not re-established until 1969, under its present-day name and under the auspices of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. It assembled a team of scholars to cover the Balkans from prehistory to the modern age and in a range of different fields of study, such as archaeology, ethnography, anthropology, history, culture, art, literature, law. This multidisciplinary approach remains its long-term orientation.



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Vladimir P. Petrović

Pre-Roman and Roman Dardania Historical and Geographical Considerations

The Balkan Peninsula, in the south-east of continental Europe, with its abundant forests and mountains, and, accordingly, with remote and hard-to-reach places, for a long time was believed to be a barely accessible region. However, the region is criss-crossed with valleys, such as those of the Morava, Vardar, Nišava, Timok, Ibar, Toplica and Drim rivers, opening up obvious directions of northward communication. The rivers, as if following a rule, cut narrow gorges in the rocks, connecting spacious and fertile basins. On the rims of the basins, mountain ranges often rich in ores offer a good raw material base for the development of metallurgy as well as impetus for trade. Hospitable fertile zones and other natural resources of the Balkans have attracted human communities from the earliest times. The Dardani, a pre-Roman people, had occupied the central areas of the Balkans¹ from prehistoric times.² The focus here being on the antique period of Dardania, the ethnogenesis of the Dardani will not be dealt with. *Terminus post quem*

¹ The central part of the Balkan Peninsula, with the basin of Niš (Roman Naissus) in its midst, is criss-crossed with natural communications the courses of which follow some geological constants both longitudinally and transversally. The most important longitudinal courses have been the valleys of the Morava and the Marica rivers, on the one side, and those of the Morava and the Vardar, on the other. The main transversal communication was between Scutari, the basin of Kosovo and Metohija and the Morava, as the most convenient natural connection between the interior and the Adriatic coast. A series of depressions, separated by low barriers between the mentioned three areas of this important route, together with the valley of the Drim river, made a clear line of communication. With all the advantages of the configuration taken into account, it becomes obvious that the transportation of goods and persons have followed the courses outlined above from early prehistoric times, antiquity and the Middle Ages to modern times. On natural communications in the central Balkans, see Cvijić 1966, 15-19.

² For the area of proto-Dardanian and pre-Dardanian material culture, see Tasić 2003, 40-51.

for this paper will be the time when Greek authors first took interest in the Dardani, an already formed people established in a territory they were to inhabit throughout antiquity. I believe it important at this point to suggest that this paper should be seen as an attempt to shed some light, from several perspectives, on the complex issue of the Dardani and their society in antiquity, and on their integration into the territorial and social framework of the Roman Empire. Historical developments prior to Dardania's inclusion into the Roman Empire will be looked at, as well as the question of identifying the boundaries and character of the Dardanian areas within the Roman administrative organization. Special attention will be paid to the ways in which the establishment of Roman rule affected the development of Dardanian society, economy, settlement and communications. Methodologically, the approach to the subject will be based on different classes of material, from the available literary sources and epigraphic evidence to some valuable results of archaeological research.

The earliest reference to the Dardani can be found in Justin,³ listing the tribes forced by Philip II to recognize the supreme power of the Macedonians, as suggested by Fanula Papazoglu.⁴ During the wars of the Diadochi, at the time Lysimachus created his empire, from 284 to 281 B.C., the Dardani seem to have evaded Macedonian rule, and very soon they became a constant threat on the northern borders of Macedonia. More important references to the Dardani in the sources date from the times of the great Celtic invasion, 279 B.C., when the Dardanian land was overrun by numerous Celtic tribes on their campaigns aimed at looting the treasuries of Greek temples. The Roman historian Livy gives the following account of these events:⁵ *A large and mighty crowd of the Gauls, goaded on by the poverty of their land or the desire to plunder, thinking that none of the peoples whose territories they had to pass could rival their power in arms, led by Brennus, came to Dardania.* The Dardanian king, whose name, unfortunately, was not recorded, offered the Macedonian king Ptolemy Keraunos his 20,000 soldiers to counteract the invading Celts. Keraunos declined disdainfully the offer of his barbarian enemy, somewhat underestimating the strength of the Celtic warriors, and he himself died fighting them. It is a well-known fact that the Celts were eventually stopped and defeated only at Delphi. Withdrawing towards the north, they passed through Dardania, where, as the sources record, they were completely destroyed. Justin recounts these events in the

³ Iust. VIII 6, 2.

⁴ On the political history of the Dardani, see Papazoglu 1969, 104-143.

⁵ Liv. XXXVIII 16.

following passage:⁶ *The peoples and the tribes ... squabbled about them, when they would find them wandering about the fields, worn out by hunger, cold and exertion, as if they were spoils, while another classical writer expressly states: ... and when passing through the Dardani land, they were all destroyed, so that there was no one left to go back home.*⁷ This, however, is a serious exaggeration, since we know that smaller groups of Celts settled around the confluence of the Sava and Danube rivers under the name Scordisci.⁸

There are no further references to the Dardani until the 230s B.C. Then there ensued their constant wars with the Macedonians. With the arrival of the Romans in the territory of Illyricum in 200 B.C., the Dardani took the side of the Republic and significantly strengthened their positions against Macedonia by occupying the area of Paenonia. However, after the defeat of Perseus in 168 B.C., and especially from 148 B.C., when Macedonia ceased to be independent and fell under Roman rule, the Dardani, left without constant raids against their southern neighbour, now entered into confrontation with Rome. The Roman occupation and annexation of Dardania was not carried out in a short time – it was a process unfolding through several war conflicts and, I would say, with certain reluctance. Namely, the first contacts of the Dardani with the Roman army are thought to have taken place in the early first century B.C., but it was not until Scribonius Curio's campaign against the Dardani, *bellum Dardanicum*, from 75 to 73 B.C., that Dardania experienced the might of the Roman conquering force. At the head of a huge army of about 30,000 troops, Curio seized the whole of Dardania, thus becoming the first Roman military leader to reach the banks of the Danube.⁹ Curio was extraordinarily cruel in crushing the resistance of the most powerful people in the inland Balkans, but this victory did not immediately result in the annexation of Dardania to the Roman state. There are no reliable data as to when this actually occurred. Caesar's data are also worthy of note, informing us that in 48 B.C. Pompey recruited the Dardani and Bessi to his cavalry, both by force and through friendly relations.¹⁰ However, it cannot be clearly understood from this report what the status was of the Dardani cavalrymen used by Pompey. It seems quite certain that the Dardani had the obligation of providing troops

⁶ Iust. XXXIV 8, 13-16.

⁷ Diodor, XXII 8.

⁸ Papazoglu, 1969, 110.

⁹ Fest. *Brev. c. 7: Dardanos et Moesicos Curio proconsul subegit et primus Romanorum ducum ad Danuvium usque pervenit.* In F. Papazoglu (1969, 179 ff) all the important sources on this campaign are quoted and translated into Serbian.

¹⁰ Caes. *Bell. civ. III, 4, 6: Dardanos, Bessos partim mercenarios, partim imperio aut gratia comparatos.*

for the Romans, but they are also likely to have been Pompey's mercenaries or allies during the civil war.

Little is known of Mark Antony's campaigning against the Dardani, but the fact that such a campaign was launched at all leads to the assumption that not all of Dardania was conquered and defeated. The wars Marcus Crassus waged in the Triballian lands and in Moesia in 29–28 B.C. involved the Dardani.¹¹ Speaking of the causes of Marcus Crassus' campaign against the Dacians and Bastarni in 29 B.C., Cassius Dio says: *Bastarni, having then crossed the Ister, conquered Moesia which was opposite their land, and then also the Triballi who were her neighbours, and the Dardani living in their (Triballian) land. And all the time they did that, they had nothing to do with the Romans, but when they crossed Mount Haemus...* (present-day Stara Planina or the Balkan Mountains).¹² This remark about the Dardani living in the Triballian land may refer only to the area of the Južna (South) Morava and Nišava rivers, which then means that this territory was not of immediate interest to the Romans until Crassus' campaign. There are no reports in the wake of this campaign either on the Dardani, or on the Romans fighting them. It seems quite probable that the Dardani actually lost independence in 28 B.C. Thus, the final occupation of Dardania by Rome has been connected with the beginnings of Augustus' rule, while its administrative inclusion into the Empire to form the province of Moesia appears to have taken place in 15 B.C.¹³ As a result of the division of Moesia under Domitian, the Dardanian territory became part of the newly-established province of Upper Moesia or *Moesia Superior*.

However, it is virtually unknown when Roman legions were transferred from Macedonia to Dardania.¹⁴ It may be assumed that no permanent garrisons had been stationed in Dardania prior to 16 B.C., the year the last Scordisci attack against Macedonia met with no organized resistance in

¹¹ Marcus Crassus' campaign was provoked by the Bastarnian attack. Cassius Dio (Cass. Dio LI 23, 2 ff) reports that the Bastarni crossed the Danube and occupied Moesia, the Triballi and the *Dardani living in the Triballian territory*, until their defeat by the Romans. It was not until they attacked a Roman ally, the Dentheleti, that the Romans decided on military intervention. According to Fanula Papazoglu (1969, 142–143), the area around the Južna Morava and the lower course of the river Nišava should be considered as the Triballian land inhabited by the Dardani.

¹² Cass. Dio LI 23, 2.

¹³ Mirković 1968, 22.

¹⁴ Some authors suggest that the legions stationed in the north of Macedonia at the beginning of the Principate were under the command of one legatus *Augusti pro praetore*, cf. Patsch, *Beiträge* V, 1, 86; Mirković 1968, 23 ff; Syme 1971, 60, n. 72.

Dardania.¹⁵ The movement of legions may have followed the crushing of a Thracian revolt in 11 B.C., and it certainly took place before a Dalmatian–Pannonian uprising in A.D. 6–9, at the outbreak of which Caecina Severus came to the aid of the Romans besieged in *Sirmium*.¹⁶ As to the location of the first Roman military camps in the province of Moesia, of legions *III Scythica* and *V Macedonica*, opinions diverge.¹⁷ It is quite reasonable to assume that such camps must have been at strategically important points, such as *Naissus*¹⁸ or *Scupi*,¹⁹ from where the conquered peoples, Dardani, Moesi and Scordisci, could be controlled. However, the first military inscriptions from the territory of Moesia Superior, if we disregard the earliest ones from the *Limes*, date from the mature Flavian age and mostly come from the sites connecting *Naissus* with the Danubian basin (*Timacum Minus*,²⁰ *Aquae/Prahovo*,²¹ *Taliata*²²).

The province of Moesia Superior, which included, as already mentioned, the area of Dardania, existed for a relatively short time, from A.D. 86 to 272, and had a specific history and specific military and administrative structure.²³ Namely, the circumstances in Moesia Superior depended to a large extent on its ethnic diversity, its geographic position along the main road connecting Italy with the East, and also on its diverse terrain and unusual shape (it stretched from the Danube far to the south), but mostly on its rich and varied mineral resources.

According to the notes of the Roman second-century legislator Saturninus, Upper Moesia was thought to be a land rich in ores,²⁴ in much the same way as Africa *proconsularis* was called the granary.²⁵ According

¹⁵ Cass. Dio LIV, 20, 3.

¹⁶ Cass. Dio LV, 29, 3.

¹⁷ For the transfer and accommodation of the first Roman legions in the territory of Dardania, and for the oldest military inscriptions, see Petrović 1979, 30–31 (with the earlier bibliography). As regards the stay of legion *III Scythica* in Moesia (Dardania) and its transfer to Germania, see Dušanić 1978b, 470 ff.

¹⁸ TIR, K-34, Naissus, 89; Petrović 1979, 37–51.

¹⁹ TIR, K-34, Naissus, 112; Dragojević-Josifovska 1982, 20–40.

²⁰ TIR, K-34, Naissus, 125; Petrović 1995, 37–50.

²¹ TIR, L-34, Aquincum 94.

²² TIR, L-34, Aquincum 109; Vučković-Todorović 1969, 125–134; Popović 1982, 265–282.

²³ Dušanić 2000, 343.

²⁴ Dušanić 2003, 255, n. 44.

²⁵ Dig. 48.19.16. 9–10 (Saturninus): *evenit, ut eadem scelera in quibusdam provinciis gravius plectantur, ut in Africa messium incensores, in Mysia (!) vitium, ubi metalla sunt,*

to Slobodan Dušanić,²⁶ apart from military (legionary) and municipal territories and private estates, Upper Moesia was divided into four major units named after the local tribes: the Dardani (Dardania) in the entire south of the province,²⁷ and the areas of Tricornienses (Tricornenses), Pincenses (Pincenses) and Moesi in the north.²⁸ Each of the four subdivisions combined two types of territories: those rich in ores belonged to the imperial treasury, *fiscus*, and the rest to tribal settlements, *civitates peregrinae*. The fact that the *civitates peregrinae* and fiscal estates (or at least the mines) bore the same names is explained by the fiscal domains being named after the tribal communities from which they had been seized. On the other hand, those who belonged to *civitates peregrinae* doubtlessly had the obligation of labour on the estates, especially in the mines. The unity of peregrine and fiscal organizations was ensured by military administration. It is of interest to point to the role of the army in servicing the *res metallica*, which basically was dual. It primarily protected the mines, but it also took part in ore processing and was involved in administration. The mines needed protection due to an increasing threat not only to the ore pits but also to the roads used for transporting precious loads, especially after A.D. 250. Military presence in the territory of Dardania, such as cohorts I *Aurelia Dardanorum* (based at *Naissus*) and II *Aurelia Dardanorum*,²⁹ as local militias, was necessary because of the danger of raiders – *latrones Dardaniae*, robbing caravans and merchants, and raiding estates in the vicinity of fortified stations.³⁰ Information on *latrones* can be found in the biography of Marcus Aurelius.³¹

In this paper Dardania will not be looked at as a Late Roman province, a result of Aurelianus' reforms. The Dardania to which this paper refers is the area that constituted a composite fiscal domain (analogous to an agricultural *tractus* divided into *regiones*) within the province of Upper Moesia. In Moesia Superior, the division of fiscal domains which included

adulteratoris monetae. For more detail about Saturninus' notes, especially concerning coin minting in mining districts, cf. Dušanić 1995, 135-136.

²⁶ Dušanić 2000, 344.

²⁷ According to Pliny and Ptolemy, Dardania occupied the entire south of the province of Upper Moesia, Plin. *Nat.* III 149, Ptol. III, 9, 2; III, 9, 4.

²⁸ On the division of Moesia Superior into four major entities, see Dušanić 2000, 344. According to Dušanić 2003, 256, the territory of Moesia Superior was divided into two large zones: *Dardania* in the south, and the area named *Ripa Danuvii* in the north of the province.

²⁹ On two cohorts *Aureliae Dardanorum*, see Dušanić 1978a, 237-247; Petrović 1979, 29-33.

³⁰ On *latrones Dardaniae*, see Mócsy 1968.

³¹ SHA, *vita Marci*, 21, 7: *latrones etiam Dalmatiae atque Dardaniae milites fecit*.

mines was identical to the organization of the military, *portoria* and *civitates peregrinae* in the second and early third centuries, until the major upheavals that shook the Empire between 250 and 300.³² A mining area (*tractus*), such as Dardania, was governed by a procurator, the *procurator metallorum*. Generally, the imperial mines in Dardania all belonged to the *fiscus*, and thus were governed indirectly by the *comes metallorum per Illyricum*, who in turn were under the *comes sacrarum largitionum*, judging by the information from the *Notitia Dignitatum*.³³

Administration of fiscal territories such as Dardania required a certain form of centralization, which also involved *portorium*.³⁴ Thus Dardania may well have constituted an administrative entity, but not a separate province under the Principate. Special type of administrative centre was at *Ulpiana*,³⁵ and the area of Dardania consisted of several centres united into a few areas, *civitates Dardanae*.³⁶ There were at least five subdivisions, in close connection with the economic interests of the *fiscus*, and above all with the mines constituting the *Metalli Dardanici* complex. Their centres were: 1) Sočanica (Municipium Dardanorum);³⁷ 2) Ulpiana; 3) in the vicinity of the village

³² Dušanić 1980, 25-26.

³³ Not. Dig. Or. XIII 11.

³⁴ Dušanić 1977a, 70, n. 97.

³⁵ TIR, K-34, Naissus, 129; Čerškov 1969, Parović-Pešikan 1982; Fidanovski 1998, 258-349. *Res publica Ulp(iana)* appears as the dedicant of inscriptions on three monuments found in the area of Remesiana, cf. Petrović 1979, 101-103, n. 69, 70, 71. It is generally thought that this was the town of *Ulpiana* in present-day Kosovo (Mommsen, *CIL*, III, 368; Patsch 1898, 287 ff; Vulić 1961, 29). It is a fact that *Ulpiana* set up these monuments in *Remesiana* with the approval from the provincial governor, which is explained in the scholarly literature in various ways. Mommsen believed that the monuments had been simply transferred from *Ulpiana* to *Remesiana*. The large distance between the two places makes such an assumption unacceptable. Starting from these inscriptions, Patsch concluded that the *concilium* of the province could have been held in *Remesiana* and that these monuments had been set up at the time of the conference of the towns of *Moesia Superior*. N. Vulić believed that the presence of these dedications in *Remesiana* could be explained by the town's border position, and he linked their erection with the passing through of Septimius Severus and Caracalla. The envoys of Upper Moesian towns, *Ulpiana* included, arrived in *Remesiana* to greet the Emperors when they entered the province. S. Dušanić proposes an interesting and acceptable thesis pointing to the fact that *Ulpiana* and *Remesiana* were mining centres and that they most probably were administrative and territorial communities of the same fiscal domain. Such an explanation sheds light on the reasons for *res publica Ulpiana* to set up an official inscription in *Remesiana* with the provincial governor's approval (Dušanić 1977a, 91; 1977b, 172; 2000, 345, n. 19).

³⁶ Dušanić 2000, 345, n. 18.

³⁷ TIR, K-34, Naissus, 89; Čerškov 1965, Čerškov 1969.

of Lopate (Lamud(um)?),³⁸ Konjuh (Vizi(anum)?),³⁹ or Kratovo (Kratiskara?);⁴⁰ 4) Bela Palanka (Remesiana);⁴¹ and 5) Ravna (Timacum Minus?).⁴² With regard to that, judging by the geological constants and the available data on *vici metallorum*, on several toponyms *Ad Fines*, or customs stations dependent on the mining territory, the Dardanian mines may be classified into the following districts: I. Ibar (Sočanica); II. Janjevo (Ulpiana); III. Kumanovo (Lopate);⁴³ IV. Bela Palanka (Remesiana); V. Ravna (Timacum Minus?). The administrative position of district VI, which is probably the area: *east Kopaonik–Kuršumlija*⁴⁴–*Veliki Jastrebac–Lece*,⁴⁵ remains rather unclear.⁴⁶

The extent of Upper Moesian Dardania is for the most part known, and it coincided with the southern parts of the province of Moesia Superior. Therefore, according to Fanula Papazoglu,⁴⁷ it was an area with its western boundaries west of the present-day line Djakovica–Peć–Novi-Pazar–Ivanjica–Čačak, and probably identical to the border of the Roman province.⁴⁸ In the southwest of Dardania was the tri-border of the provinces Moesia,

³⁸ TIR, K-34, Naissus, 80.

³⁹ TIR, K-34, Naissus, 72-73.

⁴⁰ It is uncertain whether the areas of Kratovo and Zletovo should be assigned to Dardania or to the province of Upper Moesia. According to Dušanić 1980, 27, n. 135, Kratovo mining region formed part of Thrace rather than Dardania, but the other hypothesis cannot be completely ignored, cf. Patsch 1937, 1, 227; Keramitčiev 1973, 147-154. The inscriptions from Kratovo–Zletovo region (Keramitčiev, 1966) were mostly in the Latin language, Dragojević-Josifovska 1982, 41, n. 6. From the area of Kratovo originates a female statue made of volcanic rock, presumably Libera. On the classification of the find and on the connection of the cult of Libera with mineral resources, see Pilipović 2005.

⁴¹ TIR, K-34, Naissus, 108; Petrović 1979, 51-57; Petrović 2004b, 277-284.

⁴² Dušanić 2003, 257, 258.

⁴³ In the place of Lopate there was a temple dedicated to Jupiter Dolichenus, whose religious function may be viewed in the context of the mining pantheon, cf. Dragojević-Josifovska 1982, n. 208. On the connection of Dolichenus' cult with mining, see Dušanić 1999, 134; Petrović 2004a, 217-224.

⁴⁴ TIR, K-34, Naissus, 77.

⁴⁵ TIR, K-34, Naissus, 78.

⁴⁶ Dušanić 2003, 259.

⁴⁷ On the boundaries of Dardania within Upper Moesia, see Papazoglu 1969, 143-161.

⁴⁸ According to epigraphic testimonies (Vulić 1931, no. 321 *VII Claudia*, no. 325 *IV Flavia*: from the place Dobrušta or Dobrudža) and geomorphology, the border between Upper Moesian Dardania and Dalmatia in the territory of present-day Metohija was identical to the natural and modern border of Serbia on one side, and Albania and Montenegro on the other, cf. Papazoglu 1969, 150.

Dalmatia and Macedonia, which seems to have been identical to the pre-Roman Macedonian–Dardani–Illyrian tri-border. According to Ptolemy,⁴⁹ this tri-border was Mount *Scardus*, identified as the present-day mountain range of Šar with Korab and other highlands connected to it in the direction of Debar⁵⁰ and Kičevo. The southern Dardanian borders seem to have followed the border between the Roman provinces of Moesia Superior and Macedonia, which was also the border between Greek- and Latin-speaking areas. They were, thus, the areas between Mount Šar and further on, along the border of Moesia Superior, to Bylazora,⁵¹ an ancient town to the north of present-day Veles. The eastern borders of Dardania should be looked for east of the line Kumanovo–Vranje–Bela Palanka, that is in the vicinity of antique *Remesiana*, on the river Nišava, the limit of the Latin-speaking zone in Roman times. The Dardani, unlike their pre-Roman neighbours, preserved autochthonous traditions and remained non-Hellenized. With the Roman conquest, they adopted the Latin language.⁵² The northern borders of Dardania are very difficult to identify but it is believed, based on the view of Fanula Papazoglu, that it was the area encompassed by the river Zapadna (West) Morava and the limits of the antique *Naissus* area, east of the river Velika Morava. As a contribution to this issue we should also mention Ptolemy's information on *Naissus* as one of the four towns of Dardania.⁵³ In identifying the area of *Naissus* in Dardania the epigraphic evidence is also important, notably the text *Naisso Dardaniae*⁵⁴ from the Early Empire period, found in Rome, which supports Ptolemy's testimony. As for the limits of the *Naissus* area in the north, it is also important that Marcus Aurelius, at the time of the wars with the Marcomanni, established cohort *II Aurelia Dardanorum*, based in *Naissus*. According to the epigraphic evidence, this cohort also stayed in forts *Praesidium Pompei*⁵⁵ (near Aleksinac) and *Timacum Minus* (Ravna), near the river Timok.

That the territory of Dardania could have extended even further north of the Zapadna Morava and antique *Naissus* is indicated by several

⁴⁹ Ptol. II, 16, 1; III 9, 1.

⁵⁰ TIR, K-34, Naissus, 40.

⁵¹ TIR, K-34, Naissus, 32.

⁵² The eastern border of Dardania most probably lay after the station *mutatio Latina* (TIR, K-34, Naissus, 77-78), on the Roman road *Viminacium–Naissus–Serdica–Constantinopolis* (Itinerarium Hierosolymitanum 565.1-566.8), the first station east of *Remesiana*. *Mutatio Latina* was the last place where, at least according to toponymy, Latin was in use, unlike the Greek-speaking regions further east, cf. Petrović 2005, 67.

⁵³ Ptol. III 9, 4.

⁵⁴ *CIL* VI, 32937.

⁵⁵ TIR, K-34, Naissus, 103; Petrović 1976 and 1979, 25.

interesting facts. Namely, as is known, Pliny states that the rivers *Margus* (Morava), *Timachus* (Timok) and gold-bearing *Pingus* (Pek) flow from Dardania.⁵⁶ Furthermore, an epigraphic piece of information, which according to the interpretation by Slobodan Dušanić refers to *Dea Dardania*, originates from a place farther to the north, Kamenica between Kragujevac and Gornji Milanovac.⁵⁷

In parallel with the establishment of their rule in the newly-conquered territories, the Romans devoted themselves to incorporating these areas, through careful and cautious planning, into the economic system of the Empire. The Dardanian society of the time had several strata: the landed aristocracy, independent or semi-dependent farmers and cattle-breeders, miners, traders and craftsmen. Settlements that may be interpreted as urban were very rare, and functioned as the seats of the local aristocracy, traders and craftsmen. They were built on hilltops and enclosed with earthen walls, so in times of war they served also as safe havens or *refugia* for the inhabitants of nearby villages.⁵⁸ The surviving toponymy of Roman Dardania testifies to the antiquity of the settlements in Dardanian areas. In addition to verified Greek and Latin toponyms, the names of the largest number of settlements draw their roots from the pre-Roman inhabitants of Dardania. As we move from the east towards the west, the widespread toponymy of Thracian origin is gradually replaced by the toponymy of Dardanian and Illyrian origin in the far west. Some names, such as those of the towns *Naisus* and *Scupi*, preserved their Celtic roots.⁵⁹ Based on this brief onomastic observation, the existence of many settlements may be assumed even prior to the Roman conquest.

Gradual Romanization, involving the planned settlement of Roman citizens, resulted in the formation of urban centres with limited self-government in certain areas of Dardania. After the Roman conquest, due to military, economic and administrative reasons, the original pre-Roman *refugia*

⁵⁶ Plin. *Nat.* III, 149: *Flumina clara e Dardanis Margus, Pingus, Timachus*; Papazoglu 1969, 203.

⁵⁷ Mirković and Dušanić 1976, n. 167. However, even if this inscription was dedicated to Dardania, it does not necessarily mean that Kamenica near Kragujevac was in Dardania. Dardanian settlers in *Apulum* in Dacia dedicated two reliefs to the same goddess, personification of Dardania, cf. *CIL* III, 995, 7853.

⁵⁸ They were Iron Age defensive hillfort settlements. Built on hilltops, they provided control of the surrounding area. For the archaeologically attested remains of pre-Roman Dardanian settlements and fortifications, such as the hillforts at Belačevac, Gornje Gadimlje, Hisar, Kuline, Samodreža (Teneš Do) in the west of Roman Dardania, see Tasić, 1998, 147-225.

⁵⁹ Papazoglu 1969, 189-201.

and *vici* grew into urban centres of larger areas, such as *Scupi* and *Naissus*. The inhabitants of towns were more exposed to the process of Romanization than the rural population, as a rule more conservative and reluctant to adopt a new culture. The newly-formed urban centres were sources from which Roman influence and culture spread among the local population; moreover, they were also the military, economic, administrative and religious centres of entire regions.

The reasons for an early Romanization of the Dardanian areas lie above all in the Roman Empire's increasing needs for ores containing silver, gold, zinc, copper and lead, necessary for maintaining the empire's monetary stability. Therefore, the areas rich in ores, such as the slopes of Stara Planina, Svrlijig and Kopaonik, were organized into mining regions and imperial domains. Then the centres like *Municipium Dardanorum* at the confluence of the Sočanička and Ibar rivers, and *Ulpiana* in the vicinity of Gračanica, appeared. The rise of settlements was caused by the presence of other natural resources as well, such as the fertile valleys of the Nišava and Morava rivers (*Margus*), or the wealth of thermal springs suitable to become spa centres (Niška Banja, Mediana,⁶⁰ Kuršumlijska Banja⁶¹). However, the largest number of settlements was established along the roads, both main and local.

The roads recorded in Roman itineraries⁶² (Viminacium–Naissus–Serdica–Constantinopolis; Naissus–Ratiaria; Naissus–Lissus; Naissus–Scupi) were built very early, perhaps as early as the first decades of the first century A.D. However, it is quite probable that the Roman roads followed the course of earlier, pre-Roman, roads, and that in that sense the Roman conquest of the Dardani areas brought no discontinuity.⁶³ Early consolidation of the road network in Roman times is explained by their great strategic importance. The oldest Roman roads connected *Stobi*⁶⁴ with *Scupi* in the south of Dardania, and then with the Morava river valley and northwards to the Danube, where the army was transferred. Innumerable legions travelled

⁶⁰ TIR, K-34, Naissus, 84, 85; Petrović 1994.

⁶¹ TIR, K-34, Naissus, 77.

⁶² The term *itinerarium* is derived from the Latin word *iter* (route) and denotes a route map with descriptions of Roman communication lines. Itineraries indicated settlements (stations) and the intervening distances. For the territory of Roman Dardania the following itineraries are of importance: *Itinerarium Hierosolymitanum*, 565.1–566.8; *Itinerarium Antonini*, 134–135.4; *Tabula Peutingeriana*, segm. VI and *Ravennatis anonymi cosmographia* (Anonymi Ravennatis) IV, 7.

⁶³ Pre-Roman Dardania maintained intense contacts with the Greek colonies on the Adriatic coast (Apollonia, Dyrrhachium) along the Drim river valley, and in the east, with Macedonia, along the Vardar and Strumica river valleys, cf. Tasić 1998, 214.

⁶⁴ TIR, K-34, Naissus, 119–120.

these roads at the time the Romans were consolidating their rule in the central Balkans, and at the time they were firming up the Empire's borders on the Danube. The great antiquity of Dardanian roads is also supported by the absence from the itineraries of some important towns, such as *Municipium Dardanorum*⁶⁵ and *Ulpiana* in west Dardania. It is obvious that these towns, being primarily economic centres, grew after the main communication lines had been constructed. Namely, upon Dardania's incorporation into the Empire, there followed a fast development of various economic activities, above all the intense exploitation of mineral raw materials. In the vicinity of the already known or newly-established mining areas new urban centres were built, so that the communications lines constructed in the early first century and during the second and third centuries gained great economic significance, though originally intended for military purposes. Since certain regions rich in natural resources were often far away from the originally built communication lines, very soon an entire network of local roads developed for the purpose of transporting ores and other raw materials.

Although the Romans regularly maintained the roads, it seems quite reasonable to assume that in particular heavy loads were transported in other, cheaper ways. In addition to land modes of transport we should take into account here also the possibility of fluvial transportation, or, more probably, a combination of road and river transport. For highly practical reasons transportation by waterways would have been used whenever possible, especially since it is known that in antiquity, due to a more humid climate and dense forests, many rivers, even smaller ones, were navigable. According to Strabo, the river Drim was navigable from its mouth upstream to Dardania,⁶⁶ and the river Nišava was also navigable in one section, according to the inscription of a recruit of the river *classis* of legion *VII Claudia* from *Naisus*.⁶⁷ Goods could easily have been transported by waterways to the nearest sea ports, where they would be reloaded to larger vessels to be distributed to distant parts of the Empire. This can be supported by the find of a set of lead ingots from *Caesarea* in modern Israel.⁶⁸ Namely, during the archaeological investigation in 1993 of the vestiges of a Roman merchant ship, which obviously had sunk just off the port, lead ingots were discovered, two of which still bore clearly visible stamped inscriptions. One inscription refers to Emperor Domitian with the name *Ger(manicus)*, which clearly suggests a

⁶⁵ Fidanovski 1998, 258-349.

⁶⁶ Strab. VII, 5, 7.

⁶⁷ A soldier of legion *VII Claudia* served as *Disce(n)s epibeta* in the river *classis*, according to the inscription from the fortress of Niš, cf. Petrović 1979, 31.

⁶⁸ S. Dušanić, *Dardanian Lead Ingots at Caesarea Palestinae*, forthcoming.

date between A.D. 83, when Domitian gained that name owing to his military victories in Germania, and A.D. 93, the last year of his reign. The other stamped inscription, of interest to our issue, reads: *Met(alli) Dard(anici)*, indicating the Dardanian origin of the precious shipment.

Unfortunately, the traces of Roman roads in the area of Dardania are ill-preserved in our times. The reason for that lies in the fact that they were for the most part overlaid by later, medieval and modern roads, and also that the very configuration of the terrain has been unfavourable for the preservation of visible traces.⁶⁹ Such a poor state of preservation should also be attributed to continuous devastation by local populations, given that similar fate also befell other structures of Roman date in towns and villages.

* * *

It seems important to reiterate the key ideas stemming from our considerations of this complex theme, attempting to outline some important moments in the history of pre-Roman Dardania, as well as to show all the complexity, specific position and particular structure of Roman Dardania under the provincial organization of the Empire. By shedding light on the issue of delineating the extent of Roman Dardania within the province of Upper Moesia and pointing to certain epigraphic data and written sources, it has been shown that Dardania's boundaries may be moved further north of the river Zapadna Morava, the area of antique *Naissus* and *Timacum Minus*. When the Romans appeared on the historical stage of Dardania, they did not interfere much into the stratified and stable social structure and hierarchy of the newly-conquered areas.⁷⁰ Attracted by the mineral resources of Dardania and seeking to expand the borders of the Empire to the Danube, the Romans first constructed main roads, recorded by the itineraries, in continuity with the courses of pre-Roman communications. However, the fact that, in contrast with *Scupi* and *Naissus*, some important towns, such as *Ulpiana* and *Municipium Dardanorum*, do not occur in the itineraries, suggests the antiquity of Dardanian settlements and communications. By simple deduction, the following phases in the development of Dardanian settlements and communication lines may be outlined: **I. Pre-Roman phase** – characterized by *vici* and rare urban settlements in the form of *refugia*, as seats of the local aristocracy, trade and crafts. The road network was determined by the natural features of the terrain and the human need for movement and trade. These communication lines were travelled by armies, but they also carried influences of more advanced Greek and Macedonian

⁶⁹ Čerškov 1969, 43-49.

⁷⁰ Fidanovski 1998, 288.

cultures; **II. Early Roman phase** – marked by the rise of the first urban centres of larger areas. Communication lines mostly followed the well-proven courses of pre-Roman roads, and such roads were used mostly by armies and logistic support to the troops on the *Limes* (first century A.D.); and **III. Developed Roman phase** – from as early as the second and third centuries A.D., when the development of settlements was significantly influenced by the exploitation of mineral and other resources of Dardania. The main roads in Dardania assumed a predominantly commercial and economic character. Due to abundant mineral resources and intensive exploitation of the imperial mines, the roads carried rich loads of metals towards other parts of the state. Such loads attracted robbers, *latrones*, making military presence in the stations along the roads necessary, even after the “firm” border of the *Limes* was established.

In these last considerations it is also important to bring attention to the point that, regardless of the well-organized protection and maintenance of the road network, it is hardly imaginable that heavy loads (ores) could have been transported solely by land. It appears logical to assume, especially in the light of the facts mentioned, that waterways were partly used for transporting goods towards the nearest Adriatic and Aegean seaports. Hopefully the assumption proposed here will find further scholarly corroboration in the times to come.

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UDC 911.6:94](36/37Dardania)

Abbreviations

Sources

Iust.	<i>Iuniani Iustini Epitoma historiarum Philippicarum</i>
Diodor.	<i>Diodorus Siculus</i>
Fest.	<i>Festi breviarium rerum gestarum populi Romani</i>
Caes.	<i>Bell. civ. C. Iuli Caesaris Commentariorum de bello civili</i>
Cass. Dio	<i>Cassi Dionis Historiae Romanae epitome</i>
Not. Dig.	<i>Notitia Dignitatum</i>
Plin. <i>Nat.</i>	<i>Naturalis historia</i>
Ptol. <i>Geogr.</i>	<i>Ptolemaei geographia</i>
Strab.	<i>Strabonis geographia</i>
Liv.	<i>Titi Livii ab urbe condita</i>

Literature

ANRW	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt</i> , Berlin–New York
CIL	<i>Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum</i>
Patsch, <i>Beiträge</i>	C. Patsch, <i>Beiträge zur Völkerkunde von Südosteuropa, V, 1: Aus 500 Jahres vorrömischer und römischer Geschichte Südosteuropas bis zur Festsetzung der Römer in Transdanubien</i> . Vienna 1932

SHA	<i>Scriptores Historiae Augustae</i>
TIR, K-34, Naissus	<i>Tabula Imperii Romani, Naissus–Dyrrachion–Scupi–Serdica–Thessalonice</i> . Ljubljana 1968
TIR, L-34, Aquincum	<i>Tabula Imperii Romani, Aquincum–Sarmizegetusa–Sirmium</i> . Budapest 1968
ŽA	<i>Živa antika</i> . Skopje

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
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Map of Upper Moesian Dardania

Sanja Pilipović

Heroic Themes of the Trojan Cycle in Roman Funerary Art Example of a Relief from Pincum

The relief of Achilles and Hector from Veliko Gradište (Pincum), in the area of the Upper Moesian Limes, today in the National Museum in Belgrade, has not so far been analyzed in the scholarly literature. The relief draws most of its significance from the theme, infrequently shown in the funerary stelae of the Balkan and other provinces of the Empire. Although the relief has been preserved only as a fragment, it is obvious that the monument was elaborate in terms of iconography and a piece of fine craftsmanship. This is a sufficient reason to present the relief and make an attempt to place it in a relevant context. It also seems essential to take a look at other reliefs with heroic themes from the Trojan Cycle found not only in Upper Moesia, but also in other provinces of the Empire. Furthermore, it appears important to examine the inscription discovered along with this relief, and to investigate the possibility of their being fragments of a single funerary monument.

Before we proceed to their analysis, both the Pincum relief and the concurrently discovered inscription will be presented in a catalogue form:

- Relief: Relief on a damaged fragment of white coarse-grained marble.
Dimensions: Length 80 cm; medium width 60 cm; thickness 5–9.5 cm.
Discovery site: Estate of Kosta Marković, Veliko Gradište (Pincum).¹
Date: Beginning of 2nd century.
Today: For a long time property of Kosta Marković, who made a gift of both the relief and the inscription to the Archaeological Society; it was kept in Weiffert Collection; today in the National Museum, Belgrade, Inv. no. 2991/III.
Description: Relief on the fragment of a marble slab, placed in a square field, is damaged on three sides. Above the relief the remnant of a flat field with the base of a semi-column is observable. Most probably it was the inscription field flanked by semi-columns. The lower part of

¹ Valtrović 1886, 69; Kanitz 1892, 24. However, in his first reference to this monument F. Kanitz (1861, 11, Pl. 3/4) cites the name of Stojan Marjanović.

the slab is narrower and its roughly dressed surface suggests that it was in the ground.

The left side shows a crenellated round tower of dressed stone blocks with a gate in its lower left part. To the right of the tower is the *biga* in which Achilles stands, and to which Hector's legs are bound. Hector's naked body lies lifeless on the ground, with his hair ruffled, his right arm close to the body, and the left above the head. Achilles is armoured and has a helmet with a plume of feathers, his left foot is on the *biga*, and the right one rests on Hector's belly. He holds the reins of his horse and a round shield in his left hand, and the right one is raised to the side, but the relief being damaged, it is impossible to say whether he is holding something in it. At the time Kalinka and Swoboda saw the relief the object was recognizably a whip. Below the shield, horses' tails are recognizable.

Letters *B* and *T* can be seen on the top left side above the tower, and on the top right side, above the horses' heads, are the letters *K*, *C*, and *M*. Cyrillic letters were most probably inscribed at a later date.

Inscription:

The inscribed fragment was discovered along with the relief on the estate of Kosta Marković at Veliko Gradište (Pincum). It now is lost, and all that is known about it is based on older documents. Valtrović claimed that the inscription fragment, as well as the relief fragment, had entered the National Museum in Belgrade from Weiffert Collection, but there is no information in the Museum's records suggesting that this fragment has ever been the property of the Museum.² As for the material of the inscribed fragment, according to M. Valtrović both the inscription and the relief were cut in *white coarse-grained marble*. Based on the description, it is known that the slab with the inscription was irregular in shape, dented on all four sides and, based on the preserved part of the semi-column on the lower left side, probably flanked by semi-columns. Valtrović supplies the following dimensions of the fragment: length 70 cm, medium width 67 cm, thickness 4 cm.

Inscription

text:³

] | [- - - -] XXX Fl(avio, -ae?) Iucu[n(do, -dae?)] |
 [- - - -] r et Aeli (i) ann(or)um |
 [- - - -] s et Lucundus | [- - - -] s et Gaia her(edes) |⁵
 [- - - -] Gaianus fil(ius) | [- - - -] c
 h(ic) s(itus) e(st).

² My gratitude to the curators of the National Museum in Belgrade Veselinka Ninković, for assistance in my search for data related to this inscription fragment, and Deana Ratković, for providing the photograph of the relief.

³ I owe a debt of gratitude to Snežana Ferjančić, Department of History, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, for her help in reading this inscription. It is necessary to note that the reading of this inscription cannot be completely reliable due to its fragmentary character.

Bibliography: *CIL* III, 8098 (-6298); Kanitz 1861, 11, T. 3/4; Valtrović 1886, 69-70; Kalinka, Swoboda 1890, 42, no. 24; Kanitz 1892, 23-24; Vulić, Ladek, Premerstein 1903, 45; Vulić 1909, 114-115.

Achilles, the great hero of the Trojan War, was one of the most important figures in Roman funerary art. Achilles' cycle comprised, among others, the following compositions: immersing of child Achilles in the Styx, Achilles' education with Cheiron, his being found on Skyros among Lycomedes' daughters, killing of Penthesileia, his encounter with Priam.⁴ The representation of Achilles dragging Hector's body is just one of the scenes making up the vast Achilles' cycle, but also the crucial moment of the Trojan Cycle, depicted in more detail on sarcophagi than on funerary stelae. Sarcophagi usually showed the cycle, or a larger number of scenes with the mythological theme.⁵

The artistic representations of the myth of Achilles and Hector on funerary stelae show little difference. Achilles usually stands in a *biga*, trailing the victim on the ground behind him.⁶ Iconographic differences are usually a matter of detail: the *biga* may move in different directions, the horses may be in gallop or standing still. The basic scene – Achilles standing in the *biga* and dragging Hector's body – could be enriched with the walls of Troy in the background, or a figure of Achilles' fellow warrior Patroclus, of Andromache and Victory, and at times Priam and Hecuba, or Athena.⁷ Compared to the basic type, the relief from Pincum is enriched with a round tower on the left. This iconographic detail makes it obvious that the Pincum relief

⁴ Sichtermann, Koch 1975, 15-17; cf. Toynbee 1977, 348-352, 407; LIMC I, s.v. Achilleus, no. 607-640.

⁵ This myth is depicted on numerous Attica sarcophagi. The fragment of a sarcophagus from Dalmatia, from an unknown site, bears scenes of this myth in an unusual, right to left, sequence. The front side probably bore Achilles and Hector, on the left was the scene of Hermes and Priam pleading for Hector's body, and on the right the warrior halting Achilles' *biga* (Cambi 1988, 31-33, cat. no. 8); also, other sarcophagi are characterized by complex iconographies varying only in the number and selection of scenes. Usually the right side of the composition shows Priam kneeling and pleading with Achilles for his son's body; behind him are servants untying the horses of Achilles' *biga* to which Hector's body is bound, Automedon as the charioteer, and at the end there is the wagon with Priam's ransom; Automedon, most probably under Achilles' orders, dragged the body of Hector around Patroclus' grave; and finally, the unbinding of Hector's body to give it his father (LIMC I, s.v. Achilleus, no. 618-630).

⁶ Toynbee 1977, 408-409.

⁷ LIMC I, s.v. Achilleus, no. 607-640.

draws on Homer's verses about Achilles dragging Hector's body three times around the walls of Troy.⁸

The composition of Achilles dragging Hector's body and, consequently, the relief from Pinum, may express its symbolic meaning at several different levels. On the first level, Achilles, the epic hero of the Trojan Cycle, embodies *Virtus* in the most explicit manner.⁹ Besides Meleager, Bellerophon, Heracles, and other epic heroes, Achilles was certainly one of the most popular mythological characters shown in funerary art. All these themes, regardless of their eclecticism, symbolized the union of the deceased with the divine world, and showed that mortals could earn eternal life by their virtues, especially heroic virtues.¹⁰

Scholars are in agreement that Achilles, as a symbol of *Virtus*, was raised to immortality by virtue of his conscious decision.¹¹ According to Homer, Achilles was given to choose between a long and peaceful life and heroic glory.¹² By deciding to kill Hector, he chose to die at a young age and win heroic glory.¹³ In that context, the composition of Achilles dragging Hector's body and the scene of finding Achilles on Skyros stand apart from Achilles' cycle. The decision reached on Skyros begins to be brought to fulfilment at the moment of Achilles' killing Hector, and that is why these two

⁸ According to Homer, Achilles went round the city walls three times, dragging Hector's body bound with the belt given to Hector by Ajax (*Il.* XXII), and after that, overwhelmed by grief, Achilles would rise at dawn and drag Hector's body around Patroclus' grave (*Il.* XXIV).

⁹ Studying *virtus* as a theme in funerary art, R. Turcan (1978, 1730) suggests its varied expressions. Thus, the myth about Meleager expresses symbolism through the *virtus*-death relation; myths about Phaedra and Hippolytos, Stheneboea and Bellerophon, Ariadne and Theseus, are expressive of the love-*virtus* relation; while the scenes showing Achilles on Skyros, Heracles or the Amazons exemplify *virtus*.

¹⁰ Schefold 1961, 183; Toynbee 1977, 407.

¹¹ Cumont 1942, 22; Schefold 1961, 183.

¹² *Il.* XVIII, 88-99, 114-116, 329-335, 409-410, 420-422; XIX, 410-416.

¹³ Achilles learnt from his mother that he would die if he killed Hector out of love for Patroclus, but also that, if he did not, he would live to a ripe old age in his homeland. Thetis knew that Achilles would not return from the battle, because destiny meant for him to make the decision he made, so she hid him on Skyros, where Achilles' reached his decision. The importance of this decision is stressed by the fact that, by Thetis' orders, Achilles was followed everywhere by the servant Mnemon who was supposed to keep reminding him that should he ever kill a son of Apollo's, he would die at Apollo's hands. Ancient writers say that Achilles killed Mnemon because he failed to remind him of Thetis' words in good time, and also claim that he argued with Agamemnon three times, blaming him for calling him to war only subsequently (Plut. *Qu. Gr.* 28; Apd. *Ep.* III, 31; Proclus, *Chrest.* 1).

compositions may be seen as the decision and its practical realization, which is shown in the relief from Pincum. Accordingly, the reason for this theme, and the one from Pincum, to be chosen for the decoration of funerary monuments should be sought in the idea of *Imitatio Achillis*. The deceased earns union of his soul with the divine world by his virtue, especially his valour.¹⁴ Studying the funerary context of Greek myths, Olszewski emphasizes the importance of this theme from the Trojan Cycle.¹⁵ Relying on the work by a famous soothsayer of the Antonine period, Artemidorus Daldianus, he sees the myths of Hector's death and funeral, and of Achilles' foretold death, as symbolizing the separation of the soul from the body and its union with the divine world.¹⁶ According to him, Hector's tragic death also demonstrates the importance of retrieving his remains to be buried in accordance with the established ritual.

Besides being a heroic scene from the Trojan cycle, the Pincum relief may be seen in the following way as well. In its essence, the scene of Achilles trailing Hector's body is the realization of his choice, namely that heroic death and eternal bliss should be preferred over a long and peaceful life in this world. The motive behind this choice, according to Plato, is Achilles' love for Patroclus.¹⁷ Plato believes that Achilles followed Patroclus, as Alcestis followed Admetus, yearning for immortality. Thus understood, Achilles dragging Hector's body becomes an expression of love rewarded by the gods. This act is, however, the expression of both love and valour. Out of love for Patroclus, Achilles chooses not only to die for him, but to die for him who is already dead. In classical texts the relationship between Achilles and Patroclus was described in different ways. According to some writers, it was more than just friendship, in fact, they are seen as lovers.¹⁸ It was even believed that they remained together even after death, on the island of Leuke at the mouth of the Danube.¹⁹ Plato refers to this honour paid to Achilles by the gods when speaking of love and says that Achilles' reward

¹⁴ Schefold 1961, 183.

¹⁵ Olszewski 2001, 157 ff.

¹⁶ Artemidorus Daldianus, *Oneirocritica*; cf. Olszewski 2001, 157 ff and the diagram on p. 158.

¹⁷ Plat. *Symp.* 179c-180c, 208 d; cf. Turcan 1999, 46.

¹⁸ Aeschyl. fr. 65-67; Plat. *Symp.* 179e; Apd. *Bibl.* III, 13, 8.

¹⁹ Paus. III, 19, 13; Antilochus was, next to Patroclus, Achilles' best friend and he was the one entrusted with breaking the news of Patroclus' death to Achilles (Apd. *Bibl.* III, 10, 8; Hyg. *Fab.* 81, 97); speaking about the myth of Achilles, O. Frejdenberg 1987, 274-276, mentions also the light symbolism described in the *Iliad* (Achilles' armour, forged by fiery deities, radiates fiery light around his head, bright gold cloud blazing. Also, when the body of the dead Patroclus is laid out, the Sun, against his will, under

is greater than Alcestis', for she was brought back to life, while he was sent to the Blessed Isles.²⁰ He also links this idea with the different roles they played in their relationship, emphasizing that the role of the lover, in this case Achilles, is more important than the role of the beloved. That is why this heroic theme of the Trojan Cycle may be also understood as an indirect expression of love. However, the reasons for Achilles' heroic adventure apart, this theme from the Trojan Cycle fully expresses this funerary symbolism as the most illustrious example of *virtus*, becoming a paradigm of the soul's journey after death and its union with the divine world earned by the heroic virtues shown.

After considering basic iconographic and symbolic characteristics of the relief from Pincum, it is important to look at the existing artistic analogies or other instances of this theme in funerary art. Achilles and Hector were not often represented in the funerary stelae, and not only in the area of Upper Moesia where this relief, as far as is known, is the unique example. Therefore, the closest analogies for the relief from Pincum are found in the funerary art of Noricum and Pannonia: a relief from Virunum²¹ in Noricum, and two images from Intercisa (Dunapentile) in Pannonia.²² Since it makes only three known reliefs with the representation of Achilles dragging Hector's body, they will be given more attention.

The relief from Virunum was reused for the façade of the *Maria Saal* Church in Klagenfurt, Austria.²³ It is placed in a square field topped with a Noric-Pannonian volute. The action unfolds from right to left. Achilles, naked, with a cape over his shoulder and a spear in his right hand, is standing in a *biga*. Above the *biga* is the flying figure of Victoria, with a palm branch in her left hand and a triumphal wreath of the immortals, *corona triumphalis*, in her right. Hector's naked body lies lifelessly on the ground with his left arm above his head. Achilles' body is turned to the left, and his head in the other direction. He is looking at his fellow warrior, a naked figure with a cape over the shoulder standing on a rock above Hector's body at the far right end of the composition. This fellow warrior of Achilles', most probably Patroclus, holds a large shield in his left hand, while his right hand is damaged and it cannot be seen whether he used to hold any object.

Hera's orders, must dive into the torrents of the Oceanus and set (*Il.* XVIII, 205-209; XIX 373-377, 379-382).

²⁰ Plat. *Symp.* 180d.

²¹ Ferri 1933, 98, fig. 81.

²² One relief is simpler, and the other a more elaborate composition, Toynbee 1977, 350, i, ii.

²³ Toynbee 1977, 350-351, iii; cf. Alföldy, 1974, T. 31; Ferri, 1933, 98, fig. 31.

One of the reliefs from Intercisa shows Achilles standing in the *biga*, fully equipped for war,²⁴ armoured and helmeted, with an oval shield on his left arm, extended to the right. In the raised right hand he is holding a stone to throw it at Hector, whose body, bound to the chariot, is lying on the ground behind him. This relief is the closest analogy to the relief from Pincum, but it does not show the tower depicted in the Upper Moesian example. The other relief from Intercisa also shows Achilles standing in a *biga*, armoured and helmeted.²⁵ The walls of Troy, similar to those from the Pincum relief, also appear here above Hector's body. At the left end of the relief is Andromache, holding her hair with both hands.

It is also important to point to the existence of other themes from the Trojan Cycle in the funerary art of not only Upper Moesia but also of other provinces of the Empire. Priam's pleading with Achilles for the body of his son Hector was another rarely depicted scene in funerary art. One such relief, originating from Danubian Serbia is discussed by A. Jovanović with reference to the issue of its authenticity.²⁶ If it were indeed an authentic relief, then it would be geographically the closest representation of the Trojan Cycle theme. Priam is shown kneeling and kissing the outstretched hand of Achilles. Achilles is at table and interrupts his meal, and beside the table there are two heroes, most likely Automedon, Achilles' charioteer, and Alcimius from the *Iliad*. Priam's fellow warriors are behind him, at the far left end of the composition. Below the relief is the inscription *LEG. VII CL.*²⁷

In addition to one relief from distant Gaul, Priam and Achilles are only shown in two reliefs, both from Pannonia.²⁸ One is kept in a museum in Vienna, while the other, geographically much closer, comes from Aquincum. The relief from Aquincum shows Priam with a Phrygian cap kneeling before Achilles. Behind Achilles is most probably Athena, while the right side of the relief is damaged.

²⁴ Toynbee 1977, 350, i; Móscy 1974, T. 33b; Erdélyi 1974, fig. 186.

²⁵ Toynbee 1977, 350, ii; Erdélyi 1974, fig. 187.

²⁶ Jovanović 2002, 89–92.

²⁷ A. Jovanović (2002, 91), in his analysis of the relief of Priam's pleading with Achilles, suggests that the idea of *Imitatio Achillis* may be applied also to one of the imperators or triumphators in the East, or rather in the Lower Danubian region, island of Leuke, Achilles' abode after death. The chosen theme from the Trojan War would be a metaphor for the victory over the enemy, but also for the hard-won Greek accord. Of a large number of possibilities Jovanović decides on Gallienus (*Vita Gall.* 13, 9), suggesting that the monument celebrates his campaigns in Achilles' wake, his military triumphs in the Lower Danubian areas.

²⁸ Toynbee 1977, 351; cf. Móscy 1974, T. 33a.

The socle of the funerary stela of Gaius Lucanius from Celeia bears another scene from the Trojan Cycle, quite unique in funerary art – Menelaus saving Patroclus' body.²⁹

To the reliefs with scenes from the Trojan War may be added the one on the funerary stela of Gaius Cornelius Rufus from Viminacium. It depicts the solemn theme of Helen and Menelaus meeting before the walls of Troy.³⁰ On the left side of this relief are the walls of Troy. Above them are the fragments of three horse heads, one above the other. Before the walls are Helen, in a long gown, and Menelaus, clad as a Roman centurion with a *gorgoneion* on his chest. They stretch their right arms towards each other. Menelaus' head is almost completely destroyed. On the left side of the composition, behind Menelaus, only the legs and part of the cape of his fellow warrior are still discernible.

Helen and Menelaus are also shown in a relief from Aquincum, Pannonia, and in two reliefs from Noricum, one from Oswaldgraben, the other from Šempeter, Celeia.³¹ In the relief from Aquincum, Menelaus raises the sword at Helen, and next to them stands Eros on an altar. Similar iconography is repeated in the relief from Oswaldgraben, while on the relief from Šempeter, in addition to this mythological couple, there are also a fellow warrior of Menelaus' and a female figure, most probably Aphrodite.

These reliefs depicting themes from the Trojan Cycle show that such instances are not numerous and, also, that there is not much iconographic variation. In that respect, the Pincum relief of Achilles and Hector fully corresponds to these most significant pieces of Roman funerary art.

Careful analysis of the preserved fragment of the relief from Pincum and its comparison with other Upper Moesian monuments may prove useful in reconstructing the original appearance of the funerary monument the relief formed part of. The relief showing Achilles dragging Hector's body was most probably placed on the socle, given that the marble part below the relief is coarser, lacks finish and is narrower, which indicates that it was buried in the ground. The preserved base of a semi-column above the relief indicates that the inscription field was flanked by semi-columns. In order to attempt a reconstruction of what the upper part of this funerary monument was like, it is necessary to take a look at all the other Upper Moesian monuments whose socles bore relief compositions surmounted by the inscription field flanked by semi-columns.

Studying the typology of Upper Moesian funerary monuments, or their architectural order, V. Kondić failed to notice any special expression

²⁹ Toynbee 1977, 396; cf. Schober 1923, 40-41, fig. 33.

³⁰ Mirković 1986, 110-111, no. 73.

³¹ Toynbee 1977, 364-365, ii, iii, iv.

peculiar to them.³² Those with the simplest scheme, a gable, an inscription field and a socle, are present, as well as those of a more elaborate form with the inter-field added, sometimes even with the main field decorated in relief.³³ Examining the typology of the stelae from this province as well as their relief decoration, the relief from Pincum may only be compared to the most representative funerary monuments from Viminacium.³⁴ The funerary stelae from Viminacium preserved in their original form, with compositions in relief and the inscription field flanked by semi-columns above (*IMS* II, 73; *IMS* II, 92; *IMS* II 110; *IMS* II 167), are very helpful in creating a more complete picture of the relief fragment from Pincum. The socles of these monuments bear the following figural scenes: augurs, hunting horsemen, rape of Europa, and dolphins with a trident.³⁵ On these monuments, the inscription field is surmounted by a square field decorated in relief, or a gable with triangular fields outside the tympanum, while one of the monuments is damaged, and it cannot be identified what was shown in the field above the inscription.³⁶ Although it is impossible to know whether the upper part of the Pincum monument had a gable or a central relief, this obviously was an architecturally elaborate monument.³⁷

³² Kondić 1965, 191.

³³ In the typology of stelae from south-eastern Lower Pannonia, V. Dautova Ruševljan shows that stelae with socles belong to the most developed architectural type of stelae. Publishing the funerary monuments from that region, she cites a single stela decorated with a mythological composition (1983, 35 ff, 62 ff, no. 91 and schematic presentation on p. 66). The stela comes from Bassiana and dates from the turn of the 1st and 2nd centuries. Its socle shows the scene of Clytemnestra's death and Agamemnon's grave. Scenes with mythological narratives were more characteristic of the provinces Upper Pannonia and Noricum (Schober 1923).

³⁴ Kondić 1965; all volumes of the *IMS* edition.

³⁵ Two monuments with their socles bearing the motif of cantharos with vine or a relief which is not clearly legible today, which also have the inscription field flanked by semi-columns above, are not mentioned here. One of these two monuments has a richly decorated gable above the inscription, while the upper part of the other has not survived (Mirković 1986, no. 202 and no. 77).

³⁶ The stela with augurs on the socle, above the inscription field bears the frieze with wild animals on the run, and above it the relief of Helen and Menelaus (no. 73); the stela with the horsemen hunting on its socle does not have a preserved part above the inscription field (no. 92), while above the inscription field of the stela with the rape of Europa there is a relief of the rape of Persephone on the socle (no. 110), and, finally, above the inscription field of the stela with dolphins and a trident on the socle, there is a richly decorated upper part with the Triton and a doe in the gable, and lions in triangular fields surrounding it (no. 167) (Mirković 1986).

³⁷ Comparison with the mentioned funerary monuments from Viminacium, especially with those showing the Rape of Europa or the augurs on the socle, may indicate that

In its monumental character and dimensions, the relief of Achilles and Hector from Pincum is similar to those showing the Rape of Persephone on the stela of *M. Valerius Speratus*, Helen and Menelaus on the stela of *C. Cornelius Rufus*, or the relief with Heracles and Alcestis, now built into the fortress of Smederevo.³⁸ Regarding its placement on the stela, the closest analogies for the relief from Pincum can be found in those shown on the socles of luxury funerary monuments from Viminacium, in the relief with the augurs or the Rape of Europa.³⁹ In spite of these analogies, the relief from Pincum still falls among monuments with heroic themes from more distant provinces of the Empire, Pannonia and Noricum.

Minor iconographic differences in the iconography of these pieces with the themes from the Trojan Cycle, which are not so numerous, show that the carver who cut the Pincum relief most probably had before him a patternbook from Italy or some other artistic centre in the western provinces of the Empire, whence the influences reached this part of the Danubian areas of Upper Moesia anyway. According to V. Kondić, the relief from Pincum, as well as the relief of Heracles and Alcestis, or the reliefs on the sides of the sarcophagi showing Iphigenia on Tauris, should not be considered as imports, but as obviously made here with the use of patternbooks.⁴⁰

The relief with Achilles and Hector from Pincum is in a rather poor state of preservation, and its exact date can hardly be established. Its deciphering is made additionally difficult as the relief has lost its original three-dimensionality; however, the richness of detail and the skilful organization of the elaborate composition are still observable. All this supports the assumption that this relief, or the monument, should be dated to the first half of second century, which is the date of most of the monuments with this thematic repertoire.

the funerary monument from Pincum had a composition in relief above the inscription field. This assumption may be supported by the fact that there were workshops in Viminacium where such luxurious monuments were made. It is important to note that these luxurious monuments have a characteristic frieze with wild animals on the run, placed between the inscription field and the central relief above. Thus such a frieze was beneath the Rape of Persephone on the stela of *M. Valerius Speratus*, beneath Helen and Menelaus on the stela of *C. Cornelius Rufus*, and beneath Heracles and Alcestis on the stela built into the Smederevo fortress, of which only the upper part has survived (Mirković 1986, no. 110 and no. 73; Ladek, Premerstein, Vulić 1901, 124, figure 4; cf. *LIMC* I, s.v. Alkestis, no. 27).

³⁸ Mirković 1986, nos. 110 and 73; Ladek, Premerstein, Vulić 1901, 124, fig. 4; *LIMC* I, s.v. Alkestis, no. 27.

³⁹ Mirković 1986, nos. 73 and 110.

⁴⁰ Kondić 1965, 282.

The relief of Achilles and Hector from Pincum was discovered along with an inscription, preserved only fragmentarily and lost today.⁴¹ The authors who originally published these fragments did not state explicitly that these had formed part of the same monument; nonetheless, they were always referred to together.⁴²

In order to understand whether they are the fragments of one sepulchral whole, it is important to point out the following facts. Firstly, both fragments were made of the same material.⁴³ In addition, the preserved base of the left semi-column in the inscription field surmounting the relief indicates that the inscription was flanked by semi-columns, or that the fragment of the inscription was flanked by semi-columns, which is also mentioned in the literature.⁴⁴ And finally, even the dimensions of the fragments may suggest that they once formed part of one whole. The thickness of the inscribed fragment was 4 cm, and of the relief between 5 and 7 cm. The inscription, dented on all four sides, was 70 cm wide, and the relief, damaged only on one side, is 80 cm wide. Unfortunately, the search through the National Museum's documentation has so far failed to confirm that the inscription from Pincum used to be kept in the Museum, as stated by earlier researchers. Although the two pieces are very likely to be fragments of one funerary monument, it will not be possible to say anything more until additional information is found in the Museum documentation.

Even if the inscription were to be taken to have been an integral part of the monument, not much could be learnt about the dedicants of the funerary monument from Pincum. As the inscription, due to its fragmentary preservation, is, and was even at the time of its first publication, very difficult to read, it is not quite clear to whom the monument was dedicated. Probably three persons, Iucundus, Gaia and Gaianus (the son?), had the monument erected for one, or rather two persons, of which one was Flavius Iucundus, while the name of the other is impossible to reconstruct. What can be seen from this inscription is that those were gentile names *Flavius* and *Aelius*. M. Mirković, in her research into the origin of the inhabitants of Pincum, mentions this very inscription, or its published fragment, as a confirmation of the existence of the names *Flavius* and *Aelius* in those areas.⁴⁵ *Aelii* might have been original inhabitants, acquiring Roman citizenship

⁴¹ Valtrović 1886, 69-70.

⁴² *CIL* III, 8098 (=6298); Valtrović 1886, 69-70; Kalinka, Swoboda 1890, 42, no. 24; Kanitz 1892, 23-24; Vulić, Ladek, Premerstein 1903, 45; Vulić 1909, 114-115.

⁴³ Valtrović 1886, 69-70.

⁴⁴ Valtrović 1886, 69-70; Vulić 1909, 114-115, no. 11.

⁴⁵ In addition to these *gentilitia*, imperial gentile name *Aurelius* was also present in Pincum. Flavius and Aurelius also appear in a bronze plaque, today lost, once probably

under Hadrian, at the time the mines were opened. Settlement of veterans in the vicinity of less important military camps, like the one in Pincum, began relatively early, which is supported by evidence on these settlements from the first half of the second century and later.⁴⁶ From all this, the inscription may be dated to the period of Hadrian's rule or the period after it, and the very formula *hic situs est* confirms the date of the end of the first and beginning of the second century.⁴⁷

Bearing in mind that the relief from Pincum is a representation of heroic drama from the Trojan Cycle, it may be assumed that the choice of theme was consistent with the military profession of the deceased. It is not quite certain which units were stationed at Pincum during the Early Empire. A large number of stamped bricks have been discovered at this site to date.⁴⁸ M. Mirković believes that most were made in Viminacium and that some were manufactured at Pincum.⁴⁹ The largest number of all stamped bricks refers to legion VII *Claudia*, while those stamped with *leg IIII* probably refer to IV *Flavia*, several units of which may have stayed for a short while at the confluence of the Pek.⁵⁰ In addition to them, the area has yielded two more inscriptions referring to VII *Claudia*. One mentions a former soldier of this legion.⁵¹ The other does not explicitly mention this legion, but M. Mirković believes that it also refers to a person serving in this legion.⁵² All of the inscriptions mention the troops of Pincum and indicate that there, as also believed by M. Mirković, VII *Claudia* was stationed.⁵³ In light of these facts, the dedicant of this funerary monument should be seen as related to this legion, moreover as a person affluent enough to afford such a luxurious monument.⁵⁴

part of the military diploma, *Jahreshefte* 6, Beibl. 12, no. 14; cf. Vulić, Ladek, Premereštein 1903, 45; Mirković 1968, 103, n. 46.

⁴⁶ Mirković 1968, 118, n. 7, and 120, n. 33.

⁴⁷ On the formula *hic situs est* on Upper Moesian monuments, see Petrović 1979, 80–82.

⁴⁸ M. Mirković (1968, 102, no. 1–5) mentions the inscriptions on these bricks.

⁴⁹ *CIL* III, 6328; *Jahreshefte* 6, Beibl. 56, no. 83: *Pinco*; *Jahreshefte* 6, Beibl. 56, no. 84: *Cast(ra) Pinc(ensia)*; cf. Mirković 1968, 140, n. 42; Mirković 2003b, 49.

⁵⁰ Mirković 1968, 102.

⁵¹ *ILJug* 2, 481: *Iovi vexillario leg(ionis) VII*.

⁵² *CIL* III, 14503, 1: *Iov(i) opt(imo) m(aximo) Dulceno ex vot(o) Ael(ius) Silvanus het (=et) Leonides leg(ionis) sig(nifer) EN MIR... (=Jahreshefte 4, Beibl. 77, no. 1, N. Vulić completed the last line: [*b*]ene mer(enti), cf. Mirković, 1968, 102, n. 42).*

⁵³ Mirković 1968, 102, 120, n. 33.

⁵⁴ Town administrators, decurions, also set up the monument with the relief of augurs on the socle, and Helen and Menelaus in the central relief, and the monument with

The described qualities of the relief of Achilles and Hector from Pincum, and therefore the funerary monument itself, raise many issues concerning this, obviously as yet unexplored, antique settlement. Who were its inhabitants, who could afford such monuments, was this marble monument perhaps an exception? Since the first research of this archaeological site in Veliko Gradište and the time when F. Kanitz visited it, all that remained of the fort was one wall towards the Danube, still visible in some places.⁵⁵ Scholars have identified Pincum, the Roman and Early Byzantium fort (45.5 by 45.5 m), with the antique station on the road near the Danube. It was probably a major settlement, centre of the mining district in the Pek valley.⁵⁶

Given that the site that has not been investigated, the archaeological finds recorded to date will be listed here. The mentioned brick inscriptions come from Pincum,⁵⁷ as well as the two already mentioned inscriptions referring to *legio VII Claudia*, which were dedicated to Jupiter, one by a former soldier and the other, above a fragmentarily preserved sculptural representation, by Aelius Silvanus.⁵⁸ One more inscription on the fragment of a marble slab should be mentioned here, dedicated to the Spirits of the Departed, *Dis Manibus*,⁵⁹ and two inscriptions, dedicated to the Spirits of the Departed in the Underworld, *Dis Infernis*, engraved on bronze votive plaques, once probably attached to urns or sarcophagi.⁶⁰ The dedicants of these votive tablets were town administrators, *quinquennalis* and *decurio*, in a town whose name was abbreviated to *M* or *AL* and which can hardly be identified.⁶¹

the reliefs of the Rape of Europa on the socle and Rape of Persephone in the central field (Mirković 1986, no. 73 and no. 110). For the dedicant of Jason's sarcophagus, of high military ranking, and analysis of the iconography of this sarcophagus, see Pilipović 2004, 65-78; cf. Kanitz 1985, 182.

⁵⁵ Mirković 1968, 102; cf. Kanitz 1892, 23.

⁵⁶ Dušanić 1977, 76; Dušanić 1995, 138 ff; P. Petrović 1991, 210-211, in his analysis of the existence of the port and Roman fleet, *Classis Flavia Moesica* on the Danube, touches on the issue of the port in this area as well, and mentions Ostrovo near Veliko Gradište, where faint Roman traces have been registered.

⁵⁷ Mirković 1968, 102, no. 1-5.

⁵⁸ For the first inscription, see *ILJug* 2, 481; for the second inscription, cf. *CIL* III, 14503, 1; Mirković 1968, 102, n. 42; on the sculptural representation, see Vulić, Ladek, Premerstein 1903, 45.

⁵⁹ Vulić 1933, no. 39.

⁶⁰ Mirković 2003, 97-98, no. 1 and no. 2.

⁶¹ Mirković 2003, 97-98, nos. 1 and 2, assumes that the name *Flaviana* refers to the area where Viminacium and Margum were situated, similarly to the name *Aeliana* for the mining area along the Pek river.

Numerous sculptural works from Pincum were not recorded and, as far as is known, they in fact were individual, most often accidental, finds. One of the earliest references was made by F. Kanitz in 1892. He mentions bronzes such as a small statue of Mercury, child Bacchus, Zeus and a conventionally crafted Nike, which appeared in *Trausche Sammlung* collection in Vienna, via Belgrade and Budapest.⁶² Such is Athena's bronze head,⁶³ the mentioned funerary monument with the inscription, above which was the fragmentary marble base of a sculpture,⁶⁴ and a funerary monument, today known only from older literature, with an inscription which was not preserved, above which was the bust of a woman with a child and a strap with herbal ornament beneath the relief.⁶⁵ A die for striking the obverse of Hadrian's denarius or aureus,⁶⁶ and a golden ring whose loop is formed by two naked female figures holding in their raised hands a plate inlaid with a white opal cameo with Medusa's head.⁶⁷ There are also several graves.⁶⁸ In addition to several ceramic and glass vessels, two metal daggers were also found,⁶⁹ and two metal buckles used for fastening the wooden sheaths for the sword whose fragment was also found, as well as a golden earring. M. Cunjak, based on the results of small-scale rescue excavations, simply reports a necropolis with cremation burials to the northwest of Pincum, and another one with inhumation burials to the southwest of the fort.⁷⁰ The mentioned pieces, in fact rare archaeological finds, support the belief that this is a site that has not been sufficiently investigated. Transcending in its significance the provincial boundaries, the monument discussed in this paper corroborates this belief.

⁶² Kanitz 1892, 24.

⁶³ The height of this bronze fragment was 4 cm, Vulić 1933, 21, no. 41.

⁶⁴ The dimensions of this small marble base were 58 x 12 x 5 cm, and the height of the sculptural representation itself was 29 cm (Vulić, Ladek, Premerstein 1903, 45, with a drawing).

⁶⁵ Vulić, Ladek, Premerstein 1903, 45.

⁶⁶ Popović 1988, 150, type A, no. 2 (with earlier bibliography); Dušanić 1995, 138, fig. 6.

⁶⁷ Popović 1992, 36, no. 60.

⁶⁸ M. Cunjak 1985, 57-58 mentions the results of archaeological research conducted after accidental findings during construction work at Veliko Gradište in 1985.

⁶⁹ A. Jovanović 2000, 79-82, in his analysis of these daggers, suggests that the two are complementary and identifies them as *sica*, a well-known weapon of Thracian or Dacian origin. Through careful analysis the author arrives at the conclusion that this is the grave of a (former) soldier of IIII *Flavia* or VII *Claudia*, and dates it to the first half of the 2nd century.

⁷⁰ Cunjak 1985, 58.

In conclusion, it may be said that the fragmented relief from Pincum with the scene of Achilles dragging Hector's body belonged to a funerary stela of the architectural type, and to a group of not very numerous monuments with heroic themes from the Trojan Cycle. The idea to depict the heroic theme with Achilles and Hector on the marble relief from Pincum, and the emphasis on the idea that only *virtus* can earn eternal life may be indicative of the deceased person's military profession. Since legion VII *Claudia* was stationed at Pincum, he may have belonged to one of its units. The inscription discovered along with this relief fragment probably belonged to the same sepulchral whole. Although its reading is made difficult by its fragmentary state of preservation, it suggests Romanized inhabitants whose gentile names were *Flavius* and *Aelius*. The funerary monument may be dated to the beginning of the second century, which is the date of its closest analogies found in luxurious funerary monuments from Viminacium or other provinces of the Empire such as Pannonia and Noricum.

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Abbreviations

Sources

Apd. <i>Bibl.</i>	Apollodori, <i>Bibliotheca</i>
Apd. <i>Ep.</i>	Apollodori, <i>Epitome</i>
Artem.	Artemidorus Daldianus, <i>Oneirocritica</i>
<i>Il.</i>	Homeri, <i>Ilias</i>
Hyg. <i>Fab.</i>	Hygini, <i>Fabulae</i>
Plat. <i>Symp.</i>	Platon, <i>Symposium</i>
Plut. <i>Qu. Gr.</i>	Plutarchus, <i>Quaestiones Graecae</i>
Proclos, <i>Chrest.</i>	Proclos, <i>Chrestomathia</i>

Literature

<i>AE</i>	<i>L'anée épigraphique</i> , Paris.
<i>AEM</i>	<i>Archäologisch-epigraphische Mitteilungen aus Österreich</i> , Vienna.
<i>ANRW</i>	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt</i> , Berlin–New York.
<i>GSAD</i>	<i>Glasnik Srpskog arheološkog društva</i> , Belgrade.
<i>GDKS</i>	<i>Glasnik društva konzervatora Srbije</i> , Belgrade.
<i>ILJug</i>	A. et J. Šašel, <i>Inscriptiones Latinae quae in Iugoslavia inter annos MCMXL et inter annos MCMLX et inter annos CMLX et MCMLXX et inter annos MCMII et MCMXL repertae et editae sunt</i> , Ljubljana 1963, 1978, 1986.
<i>IMS</i>	<i>Inscriptions de la Mésie Supérieure</i> I, II, III/2, IV, VI, Belgrade 1976–95.
<i>Jahreshefte</i>	Jahreshefte des österreichischen archäologischen Institutes in Wien, Vienna.

<i>LIMC</i>	<i>Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae</i> I–VIII, Zurich, Munich, 1981–97; VIII, Zurich–Düsseldorf, 1997.
<i>RA</i>	<i>Revue archéologique</i> , Paris.
<i>Spomenik</i>	<i>Spomenik SKA</i> . Serbian Royal Academy, Belgrade.

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Fig. 1 Achilles and Hector, marble relief found at Veliko Gradište (Pincum), 2nd century A.D. National Museum, Belgrade (photo National Museum, Belgrade)




Fig. 2 Drawing of the relief of Achilles and Hector found at Veliko Gradište (Pincum) (after Kanitz 1861, Pl. 3/4)



Fig. 3 Achilles and Hector, marble relief found at Intercisa. Museum of Budapest (photo Móscy 1974, fig. 33b)




Fig. 4 Achilles and Hector, marble relief found at Intercisa. Museum of Budapest (photo Erdélyi, fig. 187)



Fig. 5 Achilles and Hector, marble relief from Virunum, built into the Maria Saal Church, Klagenfurt (photo Ferii 1933, 98, fig. 81)



Fig. 6 Priam and Achilles, marble relief from Acquincum. Museum of Budapest (photo Móscy 1974, fig. 33a)



Fig. 7 Helen and Menelaus, relief on the marble stela of C. Cornelius Rufus from Viminacium. National Museum, Požarevac (photo I. Stanić)




Fig. 8 Helen and Menelaus, relief from Acquincum. Museum of Budapest (photo Erdélyi 1974, fig. 192)

Tanja Petrović

Such Were the Times
**Serbian Peasant Women Born in the 1920s and 1930s and the
Stories of Their Lives**

1. Life story as a source of information on history, culture and identity

The analysis presented in this paper is based on eight life stories told by women born in Serbia in the 1920s and 1930s.¹ Most of the stories were recorded by students of the Faculty of Philology, Belgrade, between 1997 and 2000, and some were recorded by Sofija Rakić-Miloradović and Biljana Sikimić.² All interviewees were female and significantly younger than their interviewees. The stories were collected primarily for the purpose of linguistic (dialectological) research: the question *Tell me about your life* or *Tell me what life was like when you were young* gives the interviewees the possibility of telling a coherent story which is neither led nor often interrupted by the interviewer's questions, whereby linguistic interference between the collocutors is reduced to a minimum, as required for the material being used in dialectological studies.

The material obtained in this way can be a valuable source of two kinds of information. Namely, it provides information about how the people interviewed lived several decades ago, how they experienced important changes in their personal lives as well as important historical moments such as wars, major political changes, etc. On the other hand, this material

¹ Z. M. (1915), Čepure (near Paraćin); V. J. (1928), Mirilovac (near Paraćin); D. P. (1931), Venčane (Šumadija, central Serbia); J. C. (1927), Kladovo (eastern Serbia); R. Ž. (1934), Majur (near Jagodina); J. Đ. (1924), Guberevci (near Guča, western Serbia); R. M. (1926), Bagrdan (near Jagodina); B. S. (1935), Banatska Palanka (southern Banat, Vojvodina, close to the Romanian border).

² I am grateful to Radoje Simić (Faculty of Philology, University of Belgrade), Sofija Rakić-Miloradović (Institute for the Serbian Language), and Biljana Sikimić (Institute for Balkan Studies), who were so kind as to make materials from their archives available for my research.

constitutes a linguistic unit, a performance of the *self* in discourse through which an interviewee presents herself to an interviewer. Discursive interactions between the two may be seen as manifestations of processes of cultural identity formation.³ Similarly to this view, Linde stresses that “life stories express our sense of self: who we are and how we got that way. They are also one very important means by which we communicate this sense of self to the others”.⁴

All the women interviewed are of similar age and the same social group (to which the majority of the female population of their age in the areas they come from belongs) – all of them come from rural parts of Serbia, have lived in peasant families, all have spent their lives in villages, and all are illiterate. The analysis will focus on the period when they were young, when they got married and moved from their father’s to the family of their father-in-law. This means that the portion of their life stories describing this period in their lives concerns the 1940s and 1950s. In her extensive and detailed study published in 1966,⁵ Vera St. Erlich analyzed approximately the same period (the survey was conducted in 1937–41), concentrating on the issues of authority, conflict, rank and position in the family, as well as on the process of transformation of all family relations. The fact that Erlich’s work refers to the same period and deals with the same phenomena of family life makes it possible for her results, acquired mainly by the questionnaire method, to be compared with this material, obtained by the oral history method, which offers personal accounts.

1.1. *Communicative situation*

In this article I present the way the interviewed women see what their position in the family was 50 years ago. The process of remembering is always highly dependent on the present moment, at which the act of remembering takes place. The present moment gives shape to people’s memories, and enables them to position themselves in the existing social reality, and to negotiate and justify their statuses and roles. Only in connecting the past with the present, in positioning ‘then’ in relation to ‘now’, can the full meaning of memories reveal itself. Narration, as a form of remembering, is a way in which people assign meaning to their memories. “Narrative is among the

³ Cf. *Relationality: Discursive Constructions of Asian Pacific American Identities*, eds. A. Lo and A. Reyes, *Pragmatics* 14/2-3 (2004), and therein B. Urciuoli, “The Discursive Emergence of the Cultural Actor”, 257-261.

⁴ C. Linde, *Life Stories. The Creation of Coherence* (Oxford University Press, 1993), 3.

⁵ V. St. Erlich, *Family in Transition: A Study of 300 Yugoslav Families* (Princeton University Press, 1966).

most important social resources for creating and maintaining personal identity.”⁶ As Kathleen Stewart argues, “to narrate is to place oneself in an event and a scene – to make an interpretative space – and to relate something to someone: to make an interpretative space that is relational and in which meanings have direct social referents”.⁷

Speaking about their own past and the time of their youth, the interviewed women were aware of the changes that have occurred in family structure and values in the meantime. One also has to bear in mind the fact that they told their stories to young women coming from a completely different family and social background; this fact certainly affected the form, concept and contents of their life stories – as stressed by Niedermüller, “the verbalized life history ... is not an autonomous text, constructed only in the function of the life course of the speaker but much rather the immanent product of the linguistic interaction, the psychological, sociological situation between the researcher and the ‘native’.”⁸ As during the interviews the interviewees were not “led” by specific questions, they were free to make their own concept of the story they were telling⁹ – to stress what they considered to be important, to make comments, evaluations and comparisons; as a result, the collected material shows which verbal strategies women used in presenting themselves. Life history is always “the print of the interaction

⁶ Linde, *Life Stories*, 98.

⁷ K. Stewart, “Nostalgia. A Polemic”, *Cultural Anthropology* 3(3) (1988), 227.

⁸ P. Niedermüller, “From the Stories of Life to the Life History: Historic Context, Social Processes and the Biographical Method”, in *Life History as Cultural Construction/Performance*, eds., T. Hofer and P. Niedermüller (Budapest, 1988), 458-459.

⁹ H. Bausinger, “Constructions of Life” in *Life History as Cultural Construction* (p. 485), mentions the German material collected by using the same method: in the late 1950s the Tübingen Institute took part in an extended project of collecting, documenting and classifying dialectological material, which involved a large number of interviewees. The research was concerned with language rather than with the topics interviewees spoke about, but the easiest way to obtain the material needed was to ask them to speak about their lives. As Bausinger stresses, topics such as birth, baptism, marriage or death were rarely brought up. People preferred to speak about moving to or visiting other towns and cities, or about extreme experiences such as war. By contrast, all life stories analyzed in this paper contain passages about childhood, marrying into another family, giving birth to and rearing the children. Explanation for this difference may be found in the fact that the living and social space of the interviewed women was extremely limited – most had no encounters with other people or places apart from their village. Of course, those who, for instance, had experiences such as meeting Bulgarian or German soldiers during WWII did mention them in their life stories.

between concrete, personal experiences and the individual understanding of reality".¹⁰

Narratives produced in the particular communicative situation are dialogic in nature. Dialogism, a concept developed by Bakhtin [Voloshinov],¹¹ has been fruitfully integrated into the theoretical frame of anthropological linguistics.¹² The dialogic nature of autobiographic narratives reaches beyond mere dialogical interactions between interviewer and interviewee (as we have already pointed out, these interactions were relatively rare, since the interviewers seldom interrupted the interviewees' narratives): it is also *inherently dialogical*, both with respect to the opposition *then* vs. *now* and to the opposing value systems prevailing in the two temporal frames. This dialogism is the reason why the autobiographical discourse analyzed here typically consists of statements describing events followed by personal comments; as a rule, these comments refer to differences between "their" (interviewees') and present times. The following quotation represents the typical pattern of narrating in these autobiographies:

<event> *There were three brothers and three sisters in my family. When I was old enough to take care of the cows, my father decided to marry me to a boy I had never met.*

<comment> *I did not love him, but I had to give in – life was different then, my dear, you had to listen to your parents back then. It was not as it is now – it was impossible to marry whom you wanted. There was no love then. (J. C.)*

¹⁰ Niedermüller, "From Stories of Life to Life History", 456.

¹¹ Cf. M. M. Bakhtin's works: *Problems of the Poetics of Dostoyevsky* [in Russian] (Moscow, 1963); *The Dialogic Imagination*, ed. M. Holquist, trans. C. Emerson & M. Holquist (University of Texas Press, 1981); *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, eds. C. Emerson & M. Holquist, trans. V. McGee (University of Texas Press, 1986).

¹² Cf. L. Tsitsipis, *A Linguistic Anthropology of Praxis and Language Shift: Arvanitika (Albanian) and Greek in Contact* (Oxford University Press, 1998); R. Bauman, "Contextualization, Tradition and the Dialogue of Genres: Icelandic Legends of the Kraftaskáld" in A. Duranti and C. Goodwin, eds., *Rethinking Context. Language as an Interactive Phenomenon* (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 125-145; R. Bauman and C. L. Briggs, "Poetics and Performance as Critical Perspectives on Language and Social Life", *Annual Review of Anthropology* 19 (1990), 59-88; C. L. Briggs, *Learning how to ask: a sociolinguistic appraisal of the role of the interview in social science research* (Cambridge University Press, 1986); B. Mannheim and D. Tedlock, eds., *The Dialogic Emergence of Culture* (University of Illinois Press, 1995).

2. Position of the young woman (daughter/daughter-in-law) in the Serbian patriarchal family

In the analysis, I focus on two phenomena quite uncommon in current everyday experience but, by contrast, common in the interviewees' youth: marriage against their will and the bride's subordinated position in the family of her father-in-law. The life history approach gives an opportunity to get a picture of traditional patriarchal life in Serbia as seen from the perspective of young women involved in it, and filtered through a period of five decades marked by a significant change of values and family circumstances.

2.1. Marriage against women's will

Balkan family structure is based on two main principles – the principle of seniority and a male-dominated system of regulations.¹³ In such a society the worst position in the hierarchy is that of a young woman. Some of the interviewees explain that they even feared their younger brothers. Generally, they explain their position as part of the then existing rules, so they not only considered it acceptable, but normal. In fact, they saw it as the only possibility in such a value system and the prevailing social order. But, at the same time they are aware that the people they are talking to have completely different value systems, so that a difference between “their time” and “this time” is often stressed:

When I was young, life was not like it is today. There were no cafes, no promenade, and my parents were so strict that I did not dare even talk with boys, never mind considering going to cafes and promenade. (R. M.)

Times have changed. It was completely different when I was young, unlike youngsters marrying whom they want now. (J. C.)

Subordination of young women was most obvious when decisions about their marriage were made. They usually had no influence on the choice of a husband. “To belong” to one's own times, which means to behave according to the rules created by the community, was the only way to remain an accepted member of the community. So these women saw their acceptance of prescribed roles and obedience as the only choice they had:

My mother told me: My child, you have to get married, war is beginning, a girl is worthless after a war, nobody will respect you. So I got married. (D. P.)

¹³ M. Mitterauer, “A Patriarchal Culture? Functions and Forms of Family in the Balkans”, *Beitraege zur historischen Sozialkunde*, sp. issue (Vienna, 1999), 17.

For a woman, being an exception from the existing socio-cultural model would have had much worse consequences than remaining in a subordinated position as a married woman:¹⁴

It was shameful back then to leave one's husband and marry another man. Women were supposed to put up with everything, and nobody asked how they felt. Then it was rare for a woman to leave her husband, because nobody would have respected her. (J. C.)

Their fear of remaining unmarried was stronger than their intimate disagreement with the family's choice of a husband:

I got afraid I would remain unmarried at the age of 22. In the past girls did not go to school and they married earlier – at the age of 18, 17, even as early as 16. (Z. M.)

Even when the interviewees speak of other women who married against their family's (father's) will, they only explain the possibility of such behaviour by "changing times":

Only my youngest sister married against our father's will. She married whom she wanted, she did not want to be unhappy like her elder sisters who had married unwillingly. She suffered a lot, but she made it. But by then a new time had already begun, and everybody was looking for love. When I was getting married, it was completely different. (J. C.)

However, when the interviewed women talk about their non-voluntary marriages, a kind of conflict between their personal and social identities becomes observable:¹⁵ belonging to a certain social structure, they accept it and consider themselves part of it. But personally, they disagree with their position as imposed by rural patriarchal society and see it as a very bad and humiliating state:

It was impossible to marry whom you wanted, they bargained over you as if you had been a cow. I kept thinking, God, do not let me have female children. I like girls, but they suffer too much in life. (Z. M.)

Times were different then. I like the way it is now. (J. C.)

¹⁴ C. D. Worobec, *Peasant Russia, Family and Community in the Post-Emancipation Period* (Northern Illinois University Press, 1995), 183, stresses that it was a serious crime for a Russian peasant women to default on her obligations to her husband; the author explains such an attitude mainly by economic reasons, in terms of "interdependent labour relationship of spouses".

¹⁵ M. Elchinova, "Autobiographical Story as Self-Presentation" [in Bulgarian], *Balgarski folklor* 6 (1994), 24-25, emphasizes the existence of the two types of identity: "Social identity is the individual's awareness of belonging to a certain social group, with emotional and valuable significance for the group members, while individual identity consists of a person's intimate images of themselves."

2.1.1. *Rethinking the past*

Bausinger says “the innate contradiction of autobiography is that something unfinished has to be presented as if it were round and done and closed”.¹⁶ Similarly, Linde stresses that “the nature of the process of narration contributes to the creation of ... reflexivity, because one can never immediately speak the present in the present. This necessarily creates a distinction between the narrator and the protagonist of the narrative, and interposes a distance between them. Consequently, the narrator can observe, reflect, adjust the amount of distance, and correct what is being created.”¹⁷

Reflexivity is also a characteristic of the analyzed life stories, which frequently contain statements that recapitulate the women’s lives. However, despite the fact they consider their non-voluntary marriages as a bad and humiliating thing, while recapitulating their lives the interviewed women always speak about it in a good manner:

There were 14 persons including me in the household I came into when I got married. Somehow I have spent my life there and, you see, I was happy with my husband. We have spent 22 years together. (Z. M.)

I have danced and sung a lot in my lifetime, and I am not sorry at all that I got old. (Z. M.)

I was very unhappy, but I had to agree and to marry the husband my father chose for me. We had children later, and we have loved each other because of the children. I got ill when I was still young, but I managed to educate my children and to raise them properly. They have the children of their own now. So, that was my life; it was brutal in a way, but it has come out well. Somehow, one comes to love one’s husband later. (J. C.)

We have been married for 50 years, my husband was often away, he worked a lot, he spent 26 months in the army. We had three male children, one of them died, so we have two sons and five grandchildren now. That is the way we are living now. (J. Đ.)

2.2. *Father and father-in-law*

For the interviewed women, their father was an absolute authority. They stress his despotic, authoritative role in the family:

My father was very strict with me, he did not allow me to go anywhere. (J. Đ.)

¹⁶ Bausinger, “Constructions of Life”, 481.

¹⁷ Linde, *Life Stories*, 105.

My father was very tough, I was not even allowed to speak [with men]. (R. M.)

My father would take me to a dance, but he would also take a stick along. And when I danced with somebody, he would stand right next to me. If he disliked the person I was dancing with, he would beat me with his stick. (J. D.)

Once married and in a new family, “the position of young women derived from the position of the daughter-in-law in home of father-in-law and mother-in-law”. As Vera Erlich describes, the relation between bride and husband’s parents is more important than her relation to her husband – she primarily becomes a *snaba* (daughter-in-law), not a wife, so “as a rule marriage meant entering a home not of a husband, but of a husband’s parents”.¹⁸

Erlich notices “certain customs regarding the seniors which reflect the humility of the young wife (and to some extent every wife)”,¹⁹ and mentions the custom for a married woman to kiss the hand of men (first of all her father-in-law’s), to wash the feet of her father-in-law, and the custom of standing at meals. In the analyzed life stories, the first two of these customs are often mentioned:

I lived with my father-in-law for 16 years. I washed his feet, I cut his nails, I washed his hair, I did his laundry. He loved me as if I had been his daughter. (J. C.)

I washed my father-in-law’s feet for five years. Before going to bed, I would go to him to say “good night” and kiss his hand. Then in the morning I would go to say “good morning” and kiss his hand again. He was lying in his bed and I had to kiss his hand. But, what could I do, such were the times. (R. Z.)

Such an obligation of young women’s towards the father-in-law was institutionalized in a patriarchal community. Even though quite “extreme” from today’s point of view, it was considered normal and the women often talk about it. A bride had similar obligations towards her mother-in-law, but taking care of her intimate affairs was tabooed and only one of the interviewed women was ready to talk about it:

When my mother-in-law had a period, I had to wash her bloody shirts. She did not wear underwear, only a long shirt. And I had to wash it when I came to their house as a bride. (B. S.)

¹⁸ Erlich, *Family in Transition*, 228.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 229.

3. *Father-in-law–daughter-in-law alliance*

The analyzed narratives reveal some issues concerning the family structure and value system in the Serbian patriarchal community. The life story method gives an opportunity to look at the position of a young woman within that community from her own perspective; this method sheds a somewhat different light on this issue from the questionnaire method. So Vera St. Erlich in her study explains the custom for a bride to kiss the hand of her father-in-law and to wash his feet as a manifestation of the woman's extremely subordinated position and humiliation. However, the way the interviewed women talk about these customs in their autobiographies shows another dimension of the daughter-in-law/father-in-law relationship whose main characteristics are mutual respect and mutual confidence rather than humiliation and subordination. While fear is the basic feeling characterizing the passages about their fathers, when speaking about their fathers-in-law the women's emphasis is on cooperation and confidence:

When I got married, I asked my father-in-law to buy a cow which I would take care of. And we lived off that cow. (J. C.)

I asked my father-in-law: Do you agree that we can work in the field with our own cattle? And he agreed. And I began to work the land the way I had learnt in my father's house. At the end of the year my father-in-law was very pleased with me and my work. (R. M.)

These women are always very proud of the fact that their fathers-in-law were fond of them:

When my husband and his brother decided to live apart, my father-in-law decided to stay with us. I was very happy with his decision: it showed that I was a good daughter-in-law. I always cooked the food that my father-in-law liked. (Z. M.)

My life with my husband's parents was nice; we had lived together with my husband's brothers' families for ten years, and then we separated. My father-in-law and mother-in-law went on living with us. My father-in-law used to say: one does not choose a son, but a daughter-in-law. One should choose a daughter-in-law who will take care of her husband's parents when they get old. (V. J.)

Vera Erlich stresses that the groom's parents were absolute authorities in the household into which the bride came. But, why is such an unexpectedly important role given to their fathers-in-law by the women themselves in their life stories? In the segment of their life stories describing the bride's life in the new family, the father-in-law takes up much more space and importance than the groom himself. This may be explained by the fact that grooms were very often much younger than their brides. The analyzed autobiographies give evidence for this:

After the Second World War my father decided to marry me to a boy from the same village. But almost all boys of my age had left or died during the war, and the village was small, so there were only very young boys left. They wanted to marry and get brides from good families. But they were so young, short and immature, I disliked them very much. (V. J.)

My grandfather told me that he had been very young when he married my grandmother; my grandmother was beautiful and he was so young and short that he used to sit on a pillow to look taller. So, my grandfather thought I should marry a young boy as well. (M. R.)

It seems, however, that this phenomenon is not the main reason for the interviewed to attach so much importance to their fathers-in-law; more important is the fact that the father-in-law was the highest authority and decision-making person in the patriarchal family. By contrast, the young bride who had just come to his house was the person in the worst position, with no influence in the family. Dominant communicative functions of life histories being “self-presentation and self-expression”,²⁰ an emphasis on this kind of alliance between the most authoritative and least authoritative members of the family serves these functions too. While men had a relatively broad field of social activities in the patriarchal village community, women’s space was very limited – it covered the house and pasture.²¹ The communication which women could establish was also limited, to their children, other women and junior community members. So their communication and cooperation with the father-in-law as the highest family authority would significantly improve their position and make their role in the family more important. As their obligations towards their mothers-in-law imposed by patriarchal roles were obviously considered too humiliating for a young bride, the women do not talk about them in their life stories: being a woman too, the mother-in-law was not a high enough authority, and so an emphasis on her relation to the daughter-in-law would not add any symbolic value to the interviewee’s self-presentation.

Speaking about women’s taking typically men’s obligations such as taking care of the cattle and agriculture is one of very common verbal strategies they use to enlarge the symbolic space that belongs to them. Eckert stresses that women, “deprived of power ... can only gain compliance through the indirect use of man’s power, or through the development of per-

²⁰ Elchinova, “Autobiographical Story”, 17.

²¹ For more on these spatial distributions of gender roles in traditional societies, cf. T. Petrović, “‘Struggling for Space’. Self-presentation in Autobiographies of Women in Serbia Born in 1920s and 1930s” in *She in the Balkans*, eds. E. Tacheva and I. Nedin (Blagoevgrad, 2000).

sonal influence. Men's power can be used indirectly by winning men's cooperation through social manipulation or by borrowing men's status through the display and exploitation of connections with men."²² Ardner introduced the terms *dominant* and *dumb* in order to describe the unequal positions of men and women in society:²³ men, being dominant, had the opportunity to form and express their significance in society, while women, belonging to the group of the dumb, had no such possibility. Because of that they were forced either to transform their own significance expressing it through the dominant group's code, or not to talk about it at all.

The women's oft-stressed view that they were their father-in-law's favourite daughter-in-law shows another verbal strategy they used in order to improve their position and expand their significance in the family. Presenting themselves as persons who perfectly fulfilled the role they were given by the patriarchal society was a way to express their individuality, and to position "me" as the focus of narration, which is necessary and natural for an autobiographical discourse. That is why these women always stress that their fathers-in-law liked them better because they were hard-working and dutiful. There are many passages in the analyzed oral histories where women describe how they were eager to accomplish the prescribed tasks:

When my man returns home, if I haven't done something the way it should be done, I would start crying at once. He would say, "Do not cry for that, woman". But I felt bad for not having done it before he came. I wanted to have everything done before he came back home, so that he could say, "Well done, woman!" (J. Đ.)

I had to manage to get everything done. I would not let anyone say I was late, I do not know what I would do in that case, I would die of humiliation. I always got everything done on time, even though I had no watch. I could tell the time by looking at the sun. (Z. M.)

Analyzing the position of Russian peasant women, Worobec observes that they, "despite their position of second-class citizens, supported, or at least accommodated themselves to patriarchy", and explains this accommodation "by the nature of patriarchy itself, which was careful to give women some rewards, power, and safeguards. Russian peasants honoured women as mothers and diligent persons".²⁴ Accordingly, Serbian peasant women also sought to conform as closely as possible to the highest values existing in the patriarchal community.

²² Quoted in Linde, *Life Stories*, 104.

²³ Quoted in P. Vodenicharov and K. Popova, "So, I was not the last one...', Individuality and men's identity in biographical interviews of two Mohammedan Bulgarians from Smolian region" [in Bulgarian], *Balkanistic Forum* 1 (1994), 72.

²⁴ Worobec, *Peasant Russia*, 175-216.

4. *Life histories and research on the Balkan patriarchal family*

Phenomena characteristic of the Serbian patriarchal society such as non-voluntary marriage and the subordinate position of the bride in her new family reveal different meanings if, apart from ethnographic and historical data, the participants' experiences and perceptions are taken into consideration. The methodological approach of historical anthropology tends to bridge this gap between structure and experience, trying to view "people, and families, not only as subjects of social change, but also as agents of change".²⁵ The question as to "how people perceived social structures and what kind of strategies they formulated as a result of their perceptions in order to achieve their individual and collective goals"²⁶ appears to be essential and unavoidable. New dimensions of family relations in Serbian village communities in the mid-twentieth century, and the social and individual meanings of these relations derived from women's life histories are another proof of how important it is that "the history from below" should be taken into consideration.

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²⁵ U. Brunnbauer, "New Directions in Balkan Family Studies: Between Numbers and Biographies", *Talking History*, ed. D. Koleva (Sofia: LIK, 2000), 23-24. Brunnbauer gives an overview of methodological approaches to the study of South-East-European family structure.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

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Iskra Likomanova

“People in My Life” (Picture of Socialization)

Nine life histories of elderly women (over 70 years of age) from several small Bulgarian towns are analyzed here. The stories were recorded according to a definite methodology and subordinated to a definite goal: to outline the narrators' social spheres. The narrative structure of the stories is described and analyzed as well.¹ The stories are predominantly monologues, but they are supplemented by way of clarifying questions asked by the researcher following the interviewees' monologues.² The stories take up about an hour each.

Here the content structure of life histories is being analyzed, based on the designations (nouns, adjectives and pronouns) used for persons from the narrator's environment.

1. Methodology of research. The analysis combines the statistical and qualitative methods. The number of designations for a person is studied statistically. For example, for her *father* a female narrator may use the following designations: *my father*, *he*, or just *the verb inflexion* (the so-called zero marker), which is typical of the Bulgarian language. The naming of one and the same person in the story is studied also in terms of his/her designations in relation to other people in the story, e.g. *my father-in-law* = *my husband's father*, or *my brother-in-law* = *my husband's brother*. So depending on the plot of the story one and the same person may be designated in the following ways: *my son*, *my daughter-in-law's husband*, *my grand daughter's*

¹ I. Likomanova, “How do we retell our life-story (Typology of autobiographical story)”, *Communicating experience*, Proceedings from IX International Oral History Conference (Gothenburg, 1996), 815-820.

² For more, see I. Likomanova, “Life-History's Discourse” in *Organization in discourse*, eds. B. Warvik, S.K. Tanskanen and R. Hitumen, *Anglicana Turkuensia* 14 (Turku, 1995), 353-360; Eadem, “Life History discourse (between monologue and dialogue)”, *Proceedings of Evaluation of Biographies* (Klagenfurt, 1997).

father, my other daughter-in-law's husband's brother, their son-in-law (in relation to relatives by marriage), *their brother* (in relation to other children) and so on. The terminology designating the persons in a large patriarchal family in terms of family relations is very widely used in the contemporary Bulgarian language.

2. Digressions from the topic – about grammatical characteristics of the Bulgarian language. The extremely rich kinship terminology in the Bulgarian language gives immense opportunities for such type of studies. The long-lasting agricultural and patriarchal way of life has developed a rich system of kinship terms to describe various relations within a large family living around the same courtyard if not under the same roof. In such a family, the sister of the father, for example, is designated differently from the sister of the mother, the same goes for their spouses, and in different regions of the country, in different dialects, the designations may be similar, but more often than not they are different. Different is also the mode of address for relatives belonging to a different generation for whom there are specific designating common nouns instead of proper ones.

Something more interesting: kinship terms in Bulgarian reflect a more obsolete stage in the evolution of language because the typical category of modern Bulgarian definiteness-indefiniteness is not applied always or in all kinship terms. Here the differences are distributed along the line of the opposition *female/male* and along the line *closer/more distant* in relation to the narrator's generation. For example:

- | | |
|-------------|--|
| Bulg. | ženà mi vs. mǎžà mi [-def:+def]
my wife vs. my husband; |
| Bulg. | dǎšterja mi vs. sinà mi [-def:+def]
my daughter vs. my son; |
| as well as: | Bulg. zet mi vs. plemennika mi [-def:+def]
my son-in-law vs. my nephew; |
| Bulg. | brat mi vs. vnuka mi [-def:+def]
my brother vs. my grandson |

Based on these oppositions, I considered their use in the life history important; moreover they were manifested quite distinctly.

2.1. Life history as a rule is chronological – the narrated events in the life of the narrators begin with their birth, possible education, job, setting up their own family, building a home, raising the children, and then follow the events in which the narrator is a participant in the life of her children or grandchildren: death, school, weddings etc.

From the general scheme of the story it can be assumed that the basic social spheres are chronologically determined and conditioned by the narrator's life cycles. It turned out, though, that the extent of the inclusion of other persons taking part in their lives is different in the individual

story of every particular narrator. That is why the parallel social spheres are outlined according to their *thematic* boundaries. A topic of the story, as part of it, may be present as a fragment – a continuous narrative, but also as the background to other events – sub-topics. As we have observed in another study, the general topic of the story is more or less the same, but intensity (richness in detail) is different in different fragments – life events. Some of the events can be referred to considerably more often than others, some may be more recurrent than others, and some can be completely evaded, although we know that they are present in the life of the narrator (for instance, one of them mentioned neither her husband nor their wedding until I asked a direct question, knowing she had children; another told me about her parents and about her new house, but her children were not present in her story).³ The same holds true for the persons in the narrator's life, and this finds direct expression in the introduction of and/or reference to them in the story. Detailed description covers both closely related people and more distant relatives – along the line of kinship ties and social characteristics (job, place of residence, age – the same or close to that of the narrator).

The frequency with which persons are referred to within the framework of topic fragments is also looked at in terms of social groups according to sex.

2.2. The person presented with his/her features and commented on will be described in maximum detail. However, this does not hold true for the everyday circle (father, mother, husband and children), who are frequently mentioned for objective considerations and rarely commented.

That is why we shall distinguish here between the *objective* criteria for socialization (one's own family, school) and the *subjective* ones (work, school, more distant relatives, neighbours).

2.3. Any person in his/her turn can be introduced not only in the monologue portion of the life history but in the dialogue portion as well. This also changes their participation in the general scheme of socialization – their appearance in the story is provoked by the researcher rather than occurring in the natural flow of narration.

3. Basic topics of life histories. The most frequent topics in the recorded one-hour life histories of nine female narrators are their **childhood**, their own **family**, their own **house**, **work**, to some extent their education (theirs and their children's). Other periods or topics of human life (*youth, children, diseases*) are somewhat interwoven with the four basic topics.

The topics can be statistically divided into two groups according to the presence of other persons in the life of the narrator: a considerably

³ For more, see I. Likomanova and T. Kmetova, "Gaps in women's discourse", *Abstracts for XI Balkan Congress* (Athens, 1994).

larger number of persons, referred to in different ways, appear in the topic fragments of *childhood* (107) and *family* (105) as compared to the other two fragments, *house* (41) and *work* (39). *Education* occurs as a separate subtopic, but only in some of the stories with the presence of three persons in it. This coincides, to some extent, with the continuance of topics in the story.

3.1. Childhood. This is the most densely “populated” period in the life of the interviewees, and also socially the most intense period, with the most numerous interpersonal relations. One hundred and seven different persons from the life of the narrator are mentioned in it. These are predominantly members of the narrator’s nuclear and extended family and can be subdivided here according to both sex and generation group.

3.1.1. If the interviewee’s generation is taken as zero [0], we can include her brothers and sisters into it, notwithstanding their age differences, which may be considerable. Then her parents and her cousins’ parents will belong to generation [-1], and their parents to generation [-2]. In generation [+1], when mentioned, their children are included in an anticipatory way.

3.1.2. The persons from this period will be divided into persons of male and female sex. Their proportion in the topic fragment in all cases totals 52 : 55 to a slight advantage of female persons. This advantage is easily explained: children are surrounded by mothers, grandmothers, sisters, often aunts, wives of fathers’ brothers, and the reference to them is uniformly distributed among all persons of female sex as follows: *majka* (mother) – 24 times, *baba* (grandmother) – 5 times, *lelja* (aunt) and *strinka* (wife of father’s brother) – 14 times, *sestri* (sisters) – 11 times. At the same time, of all males, the *baštata* (father), mentioned 33 times in total, is the person most frequently referred to, while *bratja* (brothers) in the family are mentioned 8 times as well as others. On the whole, men are fewer in the story, but the first man in the life of the child is very actively present in the life history and is present much more than any woman.

It is observable that in this fragment of the story persons from the interviewee’s closest family and generational environment are present. This is her first family, and if I have chosen here to label this fragment as childhood, it is not only to distinguish it from the next topic in the story but also because the life history of the interviewed was initiated by my question: *Tell me about your childhood.*

3.2. The family of the interviewed. The women I have interviewed are about 70 years old. They set up their families 50 or 60 years ago, before the Second World War. The principle that governed in that period is formulated by one of them: *One gets married easily before 20, but later, no* (Granny Dana). The interviewees have been living mostly in small towns and villages (up to 20,000 inhabitants). These settlements, however, were even smaller at the time (not more than five or six thousand) and all the inhabitants knew each

other. Future spouses were chosen chiefly from among the neighbours, very often with the mediation of relatives and without previously knowing each other. One of them remembers how tenacious she was in her choice and her criteria for her future husband: *If he is rich, I don't want him, but if he's poor, I'll take him* (Granny Tina). Generally, the maxim "Poverty is no sin" functioned quite clearly in that period. Asked what their life was like, one of the women told me: *Our life was nice, because we were poor.*

In the family fragment, apart from the expected persons from the first fragment of the story, there also appear persons from the husband's family as well as the husband himself. Of 105 persons present within the topic *family*, the *husband* is mentioned 40 times; *his parents* and *brothers* or *sisters* – 5 times; his relatives: *etorva* (his brother's wife) and *zalva* (his sister) – 5 times; and her own parents – 9 times (they are already pushed into the background); her own *brothers* and *sisters* – 10 times (more than in the first period or topic, *childhood*); her own *relatives* of generation [-1] (taken as a whole – *vujni* [her mother's brothers], *lelji* [aunts], *strinki* [wives of her father's brothers] and *ćičo* [uncles]) – 12 times; her relatives of generation [-2] are still present: *baba* (grandmother), *djado* (grandfather) – 8 times; her *children*, and others, for example the *craftsmen* taking part in the construction of a shared house and so on. As regards the male/female opposition, persons of the two sexes occur in virtually equal proportions. But it should be taken into account that outside this opposition remain the children when they are not specified in greater detail (son or daughter; I would cite an informant who turned to her son at the birth of his first child with the following words: *Don't be mad, never mind it's a girl, God bless her*), the husband's parents when they are designated with the collective noun *svatovete* (in-laws), as well as her own parents if also named collectively as *my parents*, and only few times the women referred to their own families using the generalizing Bulgarian pronoun *nie* (we).

3.3. The house. Here different persons, mostly from the closest family circle, appear 41 times (*husband* – 9 times; *his parents* – 3 times; narrator's *own parents: mother* – 5 times; *grandmother* – 2 times; or *brothers* and *sisters* – 5 times; *children* – 11 times), but also *workers*, *nephews* and *nieces* – 6 times. The peculiarity in this fragment of the story is that there is virtually no sex-based differentiation among the persons introduced in the story, there is a balance between the persons of male and female sex: in these fragments the father is completely omitted, but there appear workers, most often helping in the construction of the family house. On the other hand, women of all generations are present, as they were at the beginning, within the topic *childhood*. Stress is laid on the new home and here the recurrence is noticeable of statements such as *Every woman is happy to get a house of her own* (Granny Nitcha); *My-my, I was so happy to live in my own house*

(Granny Dana); or *It was such a joy when we built the house* (Granny Kata). One of the few emotionally positively charged elements of the whole story is the one connected with memories of the new home.

3.4. Work. One of the interviewed said: *Nobody worked back then, we all were only farming*. The topic *work* runs through all other topics because children were engaged in agricultural work from an early age and very often these are the informants' only childhood memories – grazing goats and sheep, working on the master's fields. Agricultural work, however, is not considered as “real” work: *Women then took care of their children, the house and the cattle* (Granny Veta). In this topic mainly persons from the previous fragments are reintroduced and their total number is 39. In this topic fragment, however, mostly figure male persons, the only woman mentioned in several stories in this context being the *mother*. The other persons are: *father* – 6 times; *parents* – 3 times; there are also references to male/female *colleagues* – 8 times; the *master* – 7 times and *his sons* – 2 times; her *brothers* – 2 times; *bosses* – 6 times; *craftsmen* – 4 times; the *salesman* to whom the youngest daughter is sent for shopping, and others. Work still pervades the thoughts and dreams of the interviewed elderly women. One of them admitted to me: *When I wake up at night, I always make plans about what I should do, and always a week ahead*, and she is a 77-year-old widow, her children live far away and she is completely alone.

4. The next typological feature of the life histories is the presence of definite, designated persons. Again reference to the closest persons has been analyzed, but this time not just within the defined topic fragments but throughout the life history. I have chosen to analyze the persons appearing more than once in the life history.

4.1. Persons from the kinship circle in the story. Since all the interviewees are female, they represent the women's picture of their world: in it the *husband* is the person most frequently referred to: he appears 65 times, referred to by his *name*, by a *noun* – *husband, man*, and by a *pronoun* – *he, him*, as well as by kinship terms in relation to other persons in the story: *my mother-in-law's son*, chiefly in the context ‘and she told him: *My son...*’ If we rank them in order of frequency, the narrator's *father* takes the second place with 49 times, and her *mother* comes quite close with 35 times. Statistically, between them are the narrator's *children* – they are mentioned 40 times. The children are not presented here separately because the parents themselves refer to them by the collective noun – *the children*. Moreover, the families of that generation, which is the generation of our grandmothers, as a rule were not only numerous, but also had a lot of children. That is why here I describe them in one group – *children: sons + daughters*.

There follow the narrator's *brothers* – 28 times, *sisters* – 16 times, then come her *uncles* – 15 times (they often help in the construction of the

house, they have been worked with since childhood – something typical of a big patriarchal family). Other persons are mentioned considerably less frequently, but still those referred to are from the kinship circle: *svėkør* (father-in-law) – 9 times; *husbands' brothers* – 10 times; *strina* (wife of the father's brother) – 9 times; *lejja* (aunt) – 6 times; *granddaughter* – 5 times; *grandmother* – 4 times; *svėkørva* (mother-in-law) – 3 times; *vujna* (wife of the mother's brother) – 3 times; *cousins* – 3 times. Other close relatives are mentioned only once.

4.1.1. As this survey does not have as its aim to show the mere frequency of references in the story, comparison with the frequency dictionary of Bulgarian colloquial speech is appropriate. There the first noun from the kinship vocabulary is *majka* (mother) – it holds the 92nd place, but if combined with *mama* (mummy), which holds place no. 208, it gets a higher ranking position. There follow: *child* – place 103; *man* – 146; and *son* – 158. If we combine *father* + *daddy*, the 'male parent' gets place no. 161, followed by *sister*, *brother*, *svėkørva* (mother-in-law), *grandfather*, *baby*, *vujčo* (mother's brother), *snaha* (daughter-in-law), *uncle*, *cousin*, *daughter*, *svėkør* (father-in-law) and so on.

In another recurrence survey of the speech of educated Bulgarians almost all of the lexemes mentioned so far are absent except *mother*, *mummy* and *parent*.

4.2. Persons from other social spheres in the story. These are predominantly members of informal groups in the village or town: – *boys* – 8 times; *girls* – 5 times; *lads* – 2 times; *male/female friends*, *neighbours* – 3 times.

These also are different professional circles with which the narrator has communicated in different periods of her life, on different occasions and in a variety of situations presented in the story: *colleagues*, *craftsmen*, *teachers* – 5 times; *doctors* – 4 times; the *master* – 4 times; the *police* – 7 times; the *salesman* – 2 times, *workers* – 3 times; *other women* – 2 times.

5. Conclusions. On the basis of the survey thus conducted (recording and analysis), I propose the terms *life presence* vs. *narrative presence* of a person in a given life history.

Only narrative presence has been described above, the one which is subjective to the narrator and reflects her memories and point of view.

We know from the contents of the life histories that the life (objective) presence of a number of persons has been different from the picture presented. Thus, for instance, the mother is present in the life of a child much more actively and with much more time, especially in the child's early years. Child's memories, however, begin at a later age, when in fact the father's impact on the child is stronger, when the child begins to acquire

independence through his/her initiation into labour, a process occurring at a considerably earlier age than today.

In the *family* topic, the narrative presence of a very broad family circle is disproportionate to the incidental participation of children, who appeared quite often after a question by the interviewer.

By way of a working conclusion, it should be noted that the dialogue approach in an interview did not prove appropriate for this type of statistical-qualitative surveys of socialization. More than once the narrator gave an unexpected reply to a purposive question. This type of deviations should be the subject of another research.

In the topics *childhood* and *family* the distribution of male and female roles on the whole coincides with the usual pattern and here the interviews have produced a fairly accurate picture. The same may be said for the topic *work* (Bulg. *rabota*), where the presence of designated male persons is dominant.

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Patterns of Martyrial Sanctity in the Royal Ideology of Medieval Serbia Continuity and Change

A broad research field such as that offered by the issue of royal sanctity may be approached in a number of ways.¹ Without losing sight of different aspects of royal cults and their place in medieval piety, we have chosen to focus on the political role of a particular cult, that of the royal martyr. The holy king cult to which, in a broader sense, that of *regnans*-martyr also belongs, proves to be a European-wide phenomenon. Reflecting both ideological continuity and change, it varies revealingly with the epoch and cultural environment of the protagonists involved.

Seeking to define the type with more precision, modern scholarship has looked at the personalities of rulers, the *realia* associated with their reigns, and the very acts of martyrdom.² Hagiographic portrayal of a ruler and of the style of his rule is based on standardized imagery, that is, on the principles of ideal kingship found in Christian moralizing literature such as Pseudo-Cyprian's treatise and mirrors of kings, a type of writing increasingly popular from the ninth century on. This literature took shape under the powerful influence of the monastic ideal, which profoundly marks the typical portrait of a holy king. Almost as a rule, the hero of a hagiographic narrative is characterized by traditional *virtutes*: noble descent and strict Christian upbringing, a proclivity for asceticism, Davidic *humilitas*, generosity towards the poor, protection for the weak and the sick, the gift of

¹ The phenomenon of royal saints has been much written about. G. Klaniczay, *Holy Rulers and Blessed Princesses. Dynastic Cults in Medieval Central Europe* (Cambridge, 2000), offers a very good and detailed overview of the ample relevant literature on the subject.

² For the martyred ruler type, see a very good study by N. Ingham, "The Sovereign as Martyr, East and West", *Slavic and East European Journal* 17, no.1 (1973), 1-17. On this ruler type in detail, R. Folz, "Les saints rois du Moyen Âge en Occident (VI^e-XIII^e siècles)", *Subsidia Hagiographica* 68 (Brussels: Société des Bollandistes, 1984), 23-67, and his "Les saintes reines du Moyen Âge en Occident (VI^e-XIII^e siècles)", *Subsidia Hagiographica* 76 (Brussels: Société des Bollandistes, 1992).

teaching showing the true path to salvation, temperance in every way, and exceptional *pietas*. It is this piety that leads the ruler to choose the monastic way of life or practise ascetic discipline. A distinctive group of royal martyrs are those who suffered *pro patria et gente propria*.³ Notwithstanding this early and very old function of kingship, which finds expression in early ruler cults, the royal martyr primarily is a favourite with the Church and his devotion is expressed in erecting churches, giving donations to monasteries and protecting the clergy. His concern for justice ensures perfect peace, harmony and quietness, the ideals of God's kingdom on earth. Since such conduct confers certain clerical functions upon his kingship, early types of holy kings may be rightly classified as conform to the *rex-sacerdos* pattern.

A feature common to all the cited ruler cults is recognizable in hagiographies where the *passio* of a new martyr as a rule is shaped on the model of Christ's passion. In that sense, somewhat later types of royal martyrs such as the passion-sufferers Boris and Gleb basically fit into the same hagiographic pattern despite their different dates of origin.⁴ By the end of the eleventh century the cults of holy rulers had consolidated in Europe as a legitimate form of religious support to kingly authority.⁵ Of particular interest in studying the holy rulers' cults is to observe the phenomenon of linking up saintly cults with authority and society.⁶ A close link established between sainthood, authority and noble blood becomes a commonplace in all hagiographies.

In that respect, especially important for the development of the holy king concept with the Serbs appears to be the early period of Serbian sovereignty, initially in Zeta, and subsequently in Raška under Stefan Nemanja and his descendants. We shall try to show that Serbian societies, their many distinct features notwithstanding, sought to build the cults of their own holy kings in much the same way as most of Europe. The eleventh

³ On this ideal ruler type, see E. H. Kantorowicz, "Mourir pour la patrie (Pro patria mori) dans la pensée politique médiévale", in *Mourir pour la patrie et autres textes* (Paris: PUF, 1984), 105-141.

⁴ J.-P. Arrignon, "L'Inhumation des princes et des saints de la Rus' de Kiev", in *Le sacré et son inscription dans l'espace à Byzance et en Occident. Études comparées*, ed. Michel Kaplan (Paris, 2001), 5-11. Cf. also G. Lenhoff, *The Martyred Princes Boris and Gleb: A Socio-Cultural Study of the Cult and the Texts*, UCLA Slavic Studies 19 (Columbus, Ohio: Slavic Publishers, 1989), 32-33, with earlier literature.

⁵ F. Graus, "La sanctification du souverain dans l'Europe centrale des X^e et XI^e siècles" in *Hagiographie, cultures et sociétés IV^e-XII^e siècles*, Actes du Colloque organisé à Nanterre et à Paris 2-5 mai 1979 (Paris, 1981), 561-572.

⁶ P. Brown, "Chorotope: Theodore of Sykeon and his sacred landscape", in *Hierotopy. The Creation of Sacred Spaces in Byzantium and Medieval Russia*, ed. A. Lidov (Moscow, 2006), 117-124.

century proves to be “formative” in that respect. It was then that the earliest cult of a holy ruler was shaped, that of Jovan Vladimir of Zeta. Despite a significant ideological gap between the need of the emerging European nations to ensure their place in sacred history by elevating a national ruler to the rank of saint and the situation in Constantinople, certain traditions, central to understanding the ways in which the holy king cult was designed and put into practice with the Serbs, were under a tremendous influence of the ideologically prestigious empire on the Bosphorus.

It cannot be a coincidence, then, that it is in the eleventh century that new patterns of the ruler’s image rise to prominence. As shown by well-studied Byzantine examples, the link between the cult of saints and authority becomes obvious, and publicly proclaimed in contemporary hagiography.⁷ We can observe holy men’s increasing repute and importance, their way up on the social ladder, the influence they begin to exert in the field of active politics.⁸ Holy men act as spiritual fathers of the leading figures of the secular hierarchy, and their prophetic visions and advice have an effect on the actions of the political elite. The popularity of a monastic vocation in the Eastern Christian world leads to the monastic ideal being embraced by representatives of the highest political circles as early as the tenth century, and it even leaves its mark on the development of the emperor cult.⁹

The said model undoubtedly influenced the cult of emperor Nikephoros II Phokas (963–969), increasingly popular in the Slavic world from the thirteenth century.¹⁰ Owing mostly to the widely-read “Eulogy on emperor Nikephoros II Phokas and his spouse Theophano”,¹¹ the emperor’s cult becomes the preferred prototype of the ruler-monk. Contemporary western Lives of martyred rulers meeting their end while praying, at the church door, or performing ascetical practices as emperor Phokas did by sleeping

⁷ For Byzantine examples, see the exceptionally useful volume *The Byzantine Saint: University of Birmingham Fourteenth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies*, ed. S. Hackel (Birmingham, 1981), and therein, esp. E. Patlagean, “Sainteté et Pouvoir”, 95–97; and R. Morris, “The Political Saint of the Eleventh Century”, 43–50. The elevation to sanctity of highest-ranking members of the secular and church hierarchies in Byzantium is observable in the thirteenth century as well; see, in the same volume, R. Macrides, “Saints and Sainthood in the Early Palaiologan Period”, 67–87.

⁸ On the concept of the holy man, see A. Cameron, “On defining the holy men” in *The Cult of Saints in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Essays on the Contribution of Peter Brown*, eds. J. Howard-Johnson and P. A. Hayward (Oxford, 1999), 27–43.

⁹ As shown by the research of P. Magdalino, “The Byzantine Holy Man in the Twelfth Century”, in *Byzantine Saint*, 51–66.

¹⁰ Patlagean, “Sainteté et Pouvoir”, 99.

¹¹ A critical edition of the text of the Eulogy, E. Turdeanu, *Le dit de l'empereur Nicéphore II Phocas et de son épouse Théophano* (Thessaloniki, 1976).

on jagged stones, as a rule contrast the hero of the Life with his murderer who profits from the crime and takes power. A well-liked *topos* in such texts is the murderer's repentance and his assumption of the leading role in the ensuing process of canonization. In the abovementioned Byzantine text, the pattern is applicable to John Tzimiskes, who subsequently also receives a cult, cultivated especially on Mount Athos along with that of Nikephoros Phokas. In the eleventh century Phokas receives an office, read on 11 December, the day of his death, honouring him as a martyr, an ascetic, and the bringer of victory spreading the glory of the Romaion arms. Relevant to the shaping of the emperor's cultic image was the fact that the monk Athanasios acted as his spiritual father. An emphasis on this new spiritual lineage and the ascetical tradition embraced by Phokas accommodate the celebration of the emperor's sanctity to the frame of current piety and popularity of the cult of ascetics and martyrs.¹² Subsequent Serbian hagiography and especially the fashioning of the popular ruler-monk pattern undoubtedly drew upon the related literary genre cultivated in the Byzantine cultural orbit. It cannot be an accident that the popularity of the *Eulogy* and *Office* to the emperor, composed at the Great Lavra and honouring him as an ascetically inclined ruler close to the Athonite monastic circles, coincides with the growing popularity of royal monkhood which from the time of Manuel Komnenos becomes an accepted model in Nemanjić Serbia.¹³

During the eleventh century, cults of royal martyrs arise across the Slavic world, receiving a most enthusiastic response connected with the spread of the martyrial and monastic ideals in Byzantium.¹⁴ Careful comparative analysis of the eleventh-century royal martyrs' cults reveals significant similarities in the manner of shaping the contemporary cults of

¹² Imperial sanctity and its connection with the assassination of emperors has been discussed by E. Patlagean, "Le Basileus Assassiné et la sainteté imperiale", in *Media in Francia. Recueil de mélanges offert à Karl Ferdinand Werner* (Paris: Institut Historique Allemand, 1989), 345-359; P. Schreiner, "Aspekte der politischen Heiligenverehrung in Byzanz" in *Politik und Heiligenverehrung im Hochmittelalter*, ed. J. Peterson (Sigmaringen, 1994), 365-383.

¹³ P. Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos (1143-1180)* (Cambridge, 1993), chap. "The emperor and his image", 413-488. On the application of the said model in medieval Serbia, cf. S. Marjanović-Dušanić, *Vladarska ideologija Nemanjića* (L'idéologie monarchique de la dynastie des Némanides) (Belgrade, 1997), 274-286, and by the same author, "L'idéologie monarchique dans les chartes de la dynastie des Némanides (1167-1371). Etude diplomatique", *Archiv für Diplomatik, Schriftgeschichte, Siegel- und Wappenkunde* 26 (2006), 149-158.

¹⁴ Patlagean, "Basileus Assassiné", 348-349, 372.

St Vaclav, Sts Boris and Gleb, and St Jovan Vladimir, *knez* of Zeta.¹⁵ The cult of St Jovan Vladimir is the earliest royal saint's cult with the Serbs, and it is rightfully set apart from the ideologically consistent whole encompassing the subsequent cults of the Nemanjić rulers. The *Life* of Jovan Vladimir written shortly after his heinous murder in 1016 is now lost. The surviving version, known as the "Legend of Jovan and Kosara", is incorporated into the twelfth-century Latin chronicle *The Annals of a Priest of Dioclea*.¹⁶ The writer of Vladimir's original *Life*, or the anonymous priest of Bar who composed the chronicle, offers a standard description of the saint's image conforming to the example set by Christ in all of its major points. Although the act of ultimate sacrifice is the main requirement for martyrdom, the Lives of royal martyrs as a rule "introduce" the reader, or the listener, to their prospective sanctity. The *Life* of Jovan Vladimir also makes use of well-proven mechanisms based on recognizable *topoi*. They begin by describing the hero as a child "endowed with all manner of skills and holiness",¹⁷ on whom miraculous signs are manifested. The king is described as a "holy man"¹⁸ and, as such, he refuses to confront the enemy directly, but "withdraws humbly" to the hill of Oblik before Samuil's attack. Even then, besieged on Oblik, the king begins to work miracles (the miracle with a snake). This type of miracles, "performed during lifetime", falls among the expected *topoi* when it comes to the "holy man's" attributes;¹⁹ obviously familiar with the rules of the genre, the writer knowingly builds up the image of a future martyr. Possibly as a result of subsequent interpolations into the original text of the *Life*, there are surrounding this miracle references to contemporary legends about how Vladimir saved his people with his prayer which God heard and granted.²⁰ As there is no martyrdom without sacrifice, and no

¹⁵ On the evolution of the cult of St Vaclav, most exhaustively, F. Graus, *Lebendige Vergangenheit. Überlieferung im Mittelalter und in den Vorstellungen vom Mittelalter* (Cologne, 1975), 159-181.

¹⁶ *Ljetopis popa Dukljanina*, in *Stara srpska književnost u 24 knjige* [Old Serbian Literature in 24 Volumes], ed. S. Mijušković (Belgrade, 1988).

¹⁷ "The child Vladimir, having ascended to the throne, was growing up endowed with all manner of skills and holiness", *ibid.*, 125.

¹⁸ "The king, who was a holy man, humbly withdrew with his men and ascended to the hill named Oblik", *ibid.*, 125.

¹⁹ For a detailed account of the power of working miracles during lifetime as an important attribute of "holy men", see P. Brown, "The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity", in *Society and the Holy in Late Antiquity*, (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1982), 103-152.

²⁰ Legend has it that even at the time the chronicle was written "indeed, even today, if a man or an animal gets bitten by a snake on that hill, both the man and the animal come

sacrifice without betrayal, following this biblical pattern, the traitor was found in the figure of the local lord who denounced Vladimir to the tsar; he is explicitly described as being “like the traitor Judas”. Bidding farewell to his people, the king proclaims himself a good shepherd giving up his soul for his flock. “So my brethren, I would rather give my soul for you all and willingly let my body be mutilated or killed than let you be imperilled by famine or sword.”²¹ Quite in the spirit of contemporary Lives of martyred rulers, emphasis is not only on making a sacrifice for the people, but also on willingly accepting the sacrifice and consciously choosing the death of a martyr. But Vladimir was not to suffer death immediately; he was shackled and thrown into the imperial dungeon. Even in those conditions, he exercises the exemplary Christian virtues, fasting and praying day and night. Unsurprisingly, a divine messenger appears to him. God’s angel announces the course of future events and their fortunate outcome, namely that he is to earn the Kingdom of God and be rewarded with the unwithering wreath of eternal life.

In the cultic veneration of the royal saints of the martyr type, the dramatic climax of the hagiographic narrative is their passive acceptance of a violent death.²² The underlying idea of this hagiographic pattern is the saint’s identification with Christ or the repetition of the sacrifice of Christ, and an identical *imitatio* consistently recurs in the accounts of their style of ruling and catalogue of virtues. Not at all infrequently, even the list of posthumous miracles includes some that in fact are recognizable New Testament motifs.²³

The scheme of the hagiographic narrative about St Jovan Vladimir shows much resemblance to the contemporary biographies of martyr-saints.²⁴ At emotional level, the reader’s compassion elicited by Gleb’s words, “This is not a murder, this is the felling of a young forest,” finds its counterpart in the romantic background against which unfolds the love story of prince Vladimir and his rescuer princess Kosara. The description of their marital love is carefully devised: “And thus king Vladimir lived with his wife Kosara in absolute holiness and chastity, loving and serving God

out alive and unharmed. On that hill, ever since the day the blessed Vladimir prayed till this day, snakes seem to be venomless”, *Ljetopis*, 125.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 126.

²² Klaniczay, *Holy Rulers*, 62-113.

²³ S. Marjanović-Dušanić, “Dynastie et sainteté à l’époque de la famille des Lazarević: exemples anciens et nouveaux modèles”, *Recueil des travaux de l’Institut d’études byzantines* XLIII (2006), 77-83.

²⁴ N. W. Ingham, “The Sovereign as Martyr”, *Slavic and East European Journal* 17, no. 1 (1973), 1-17; Arrignon, “L’Inhumation des princes”, 5-11.

day and night.” The king’s virtuousness, a common motif in the accounts of a prospective saint’s reign, also reveals itself in his perfect rule over his people, consistent with David’s psalm about the fear of God as the beginning of all wisdom. This is not only the wisdom of a monk, but indeed of a statesman. In the twelfth century, when the *Annals of a Priest of Dioclea* was composed, the image of a martyr-ruler gradually becomes accommodated to the then popular chivalrous ideal.²⁵ In the text itself this process is observable in the description of the late ruler as an avenger garbed in knightly armour. Instead of a knight, it is God’s angel that delivers coup de grace to the enemy, whereby the saint’s murderous image becomes sublimated, which is a well-known hagiographic motif. Typical of the eleventh century in all of its details, and comparable with similar cults from the Slavic world, the cult of this royal saint undergoes a change in the twelfth century as regards the image of the exemplary ruler. The martyrial cults of holy kings emerge in medieval Serbia only in the fifteenth century, under the influence of completely different motives. They become fitted into a changed cultic framework and bear little resemblance to the eleventh-century cults of martyrs.

The cults of national royal saints associate domestic dynasties with the Old Testament-based traditions of God-chosenness, which play a central role in the processes of securing political legitimation for ruling houses.²⁶ At the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, we can see both the national and universal relics being used for raising an awareness of chosenness, observable in expanding the sacred realm as the fatherland’s prayerful shield. In that sense, all-Christian relics, especially those of Constantinopolitan provenance, become integrated into domestic traditions.²⁷ Such processes are widely observable in the Byzantine commonwealth: in shaping the concept of the capital city;²⁸ in the cults of patron saints adopted;²⁹ in a changed piety the public display of which is very well documented in texts created for the

²⁵ G. Klaniczay, “L’image chevaleresque du saint roi au XII^e siècle” in *La Royauté sacrée dans le monde Chrétien*, eds. A. Boureau and C.-S. Ingerflom (Paris, 1992), 53–61.

²⁶ For the Serbian example, see Marjanović-Dušanić, *L’Idéologie*, 60 and *passim*.

²⁷ Marjanović-Dušanić, “Dynastie et sainteté”, 90–92.

²⁸ On the shaping of the concept of the capital city, see B. Kühnel, “The Use and Abuse of Jerusalem” in *The Real and Ideal Jerusalem in Jewish, Christian and Islamic Art*, sp. issue of *Jewish Art* 23 (1997/8); J. Erdeljan, “Belgrade as New Jerusalem”, *Recueil des travaux de l’Institut d’Etudes byzantines* 43 (2006), 97–110.

²⁹ D. Popović, “Mošti svetog Luke – srpska epizoda” (The Relics of St Luke – the Serbian Episode), in Eadem, *Pod okriljem svetosti (Under the Auspices of Sanctity)* (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2006), 287–291.

purposes of ephemeral spectacles;³⁰ and especially in an insistence on the concept of a polysemic *translatio* recognizable as central both in the political and in the religious shaping of a new world. This concept of “translation”, variedly viewed, and distributed over a vast area from Venice to Moscow, is expressed in the translation of both the sacral essence and of its various manifestations. It is observable in the widespread practice of translating relics – ranging from the relics of patron saints of cities to *palladia* of states, and from constructing new capital cities to translating the idea of a New Jerusalem³¹ and a New Constantinople,³² proper to the Slavic inheritors of Romaion Orthodoxy.³³

It is against this historical background that in the Serbian society of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries new cults of royal saints emerge and become included into martyrologies as the then prevailing literary genre. The most interesting issue here is the manner of creating the holy kings’ *memoria* in conformity with the notion of cult proper to the late medieval sensibility.³⁴ Expressive of the interests of the environment that is creating the cult, the carefully constructed *memoria* reflects most of all a coupling of the highest church hierarchy and political authority. In the case of a particularly popular cult of a martyr saint, prince Lazar

³⁰ A good example is the so-called Smederevo office to the translation of the relics of St Luke (Ms no 165, Library of the Patriarchate, Belgrade) first published by Ilarion Ruvarac in 1868, the latest edition edited by T. Subotin-Golubović, “Sveti apostol Luka, poslednji zaštitnik srpske zemlje” in *Čudo u slovenskim kulturama*, ed. D. Ajdačić (Novi Sad, 2000), 167-179, with earlier literature; cf. Eadem, “Smederevska služba prenosu moštiju svetog apostola Luke” in *Srpska književnost u doba Despotovine* (Despotovac, 1998), 133-156. Cf. also the office to St Theophano (published by K. Ivanovna in *Arheografski prilozi* 10/11 (1988/9)), 83-106; cf. Đ. Trifunović, *Ogledi i prevodi XIV-XVII vek* (Belgrade, 1995), 37.

³¹ Claims to the role of a New Jerusalem were laid, apart from Moscow, by Tirnovo and Preslav or Prague and Aachen. On Kiev seen as the second Jerusalem, see the interesting recent study by V. Richka, *Kiiv – Drugi Yerusalim* (Kiev, 2005), 95-96.

³² B. Flusin, “Construire une nouvelle Jérusalem: Constantinople et les reliques” in *L’Orient dans l’histoire religieuse de l’Europe. L’invention des origines*, eds. M. Amir Moezzi and J. Schneid (Brussels, 2000), 51, 53, 57, 68.

³³ Telling are the well-studied examples of the *translatio Hierosolymi* idea related to Tirnovo and Moscow, two capitals shaped on the model of Constantinople. Cf. V. Tapkova-Zaimova, “Tarnovo mezhdu Erusalim, Rim i Tsarigrad” (Ideyata na prestolen grad), *Tarnovska knizhovna shkola* 4 (1985), 249-261; I. Bozhilov, *Sedem etyuda po srednovekovna istoriya* (Sofia, 1995), 201-203; cf. also above n. 5.

³⁴ A. Vauchez, “Saints admirables et saints imitables: les fonctions de l’hagiographie ont-elles changé aux derniers siècles du moyen âge?” in *Les fonctions des saints dans le monde occidental (III^e-XIII^e s.)*, Actes du colloque organisé par l’Ecole française de Rome avec le concours de l’Université de Rome “La Sapienza” (Rome, 1991), 161-172.

– celebrated sufferer of the Battle of Kosovo – the *memoria* draws upon two crucial points: the violent death of the hero murdered after the battle, and the halo of martyrdom acquired by a death suffered in defence of the fatherland against the infidel; both elements derive from the practice of emulating Christ, so important in founding a saintly cult. Another significant phase in the veneration of saints involves manifestations of miracle. A change, both in structure and in manners of expanding the area envisaged for miracles, is observable in a changed model of sanctity. An integral and essential component of the medieval mentality is the fundamental belief in the omnipresence of the supernatural and its continual intervention in the world of the living.³⁵ Thus miracles are the most important manifestation whereby a close connection between the earthly and the heavenly comes to be defined.³⁶ Devotional compositions written for the intended founding of his cult associate his posthumous *miracula* with instances of healing, and with his role as his successors' intercessor before the heavenly assembly of martyr saints coming to aid and ensuring victory in the field of battle.³⁷ The prince's hagiographers and writers of offices insist on the martyr's crown that his death, and especially his decapitation, earned him. His powers as a saint are expected in prayers.

Setting up the new saint's *memoriae* also involves creating an appropriate sacral space essential to the cult. Not only a matter of a space in the church, it is a three-layer phenomenon comprising a particular way of marking the place of death, a carefully designed funerary whole centred on the original grave, the translation and deposition of the body in another grave, and, finally, the composition of eulogies outlining the main features or type of the sanctity in the making. This drift away from the previous martyr-ruler patterns in Serbian tradition has its reasons, and is basically a result of the establishment of a new pattern. The new cult does not fall within the familial or dynastic type of sanctity, because it is not intended as a source of a new holy dynasty. What Lazar acquires through his martyrdom is personal sanctity. It is to do with the legitimation of his successors and their consolidation in power. Prince Lazar's grave, in his foundation at

³⁵ P. Brown, *Authority and the Sacred. Aspects of the Christianisation of the Roman World* (Cambridge, 1995).

³⁶ A. Vauchez, "Structures et extension du champ miraculeux" in *La sainteté en Occident aux derniers siècles du Moyen Âge* (Rome: Ecole française de Rome, 1981), 519.

³⁷ Relevant sources for this issue have been published in Vol. 3 of *Stara srpska književnost* [Old Serbian Literature] (Novi Sad–Belgrade, 1970): Povesno slovo o knezu Lazaru (p. 118); Pohvala knezu Lazaru od monahinje Jefimije (p. 126).

Ravanica, thus becomes a “holy place”, a sacral space of the highest order where an unrepeatable act of martyrdom is commemorated.³⁸

The new holy ruler type takes on a well-defined martyrial character. Into that mould, shaped for the cult of prince Lazar, is fitted the newly-established cult of Stefan of Dečani (*Stefan Dečanski*), initiated by the monastic community of Dečani and its hegumen Gregory Tsamblak. Tsamblak wrote the king’s Life after 1402, the year he had arrived in despot Stefan’s Serbia from Moldavia and become hegumen of the monastery of Dečani (until 1414, when he was appointed metropolitan of Kiev).³⁹ Given that by the time Tsamblak accessed to the hegumen’s throne the relics of Stefan of Dečani deposited in his foundation had become the centre of a cult for which the existing “dynastic” Life from Danilo’s Collection was not fully appropriate, Gregory wrote the necessary liturgical compositions, above all a new Life and an office eulogizing a martyr ruler. Students of Old Serbian literature have long ago observed the unity, in terms of literary fashioning and internal cohesion, of the Kosovo writings and the contemporary compositions written for the purpose of two new cults, those of the holy prince Lazar and the holy king Stefan of Dečani. The view that it is the same martyriological inspiration of Serbian post-Kosovo literature resulting in the historical and spiritual motivation for the simultaneous cultivation of both cults⁴⁰ should be fitted into the bigger picture of current “historiographic” trends, into the time of the first genealogies, precursors of historical genealogies,⁴¹ or the first Serbian annals – *skazaniyes* – distinguished by their chronographic style.⁴²

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries the cult of royal martyrs in medieval Serbia assumes features found in the hagiography of the Slavic world. While arising under the influence of similar developments in Byzantine hagiography, they form part of broader processes of forming sacral kingship, which in the underlying ruler cult requires the ruler’s

³⁸ On the prince’s tomb at the monastery of Ravanica, see D. Popović, *Srpski vladarski grob u srednjem veku* (The Royal Tomb in Medieval Serbia) (Belgrade, 1992), 121-127.

³⁹ D. Bogdanović, *Istorija stare srpske književnosti* [A History of Old Serbian Literature] (Belgrade, 1980), 205.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 207.

⁴¹ The short text of the first Serbian genealogy appeared in the last quarter of the fourteenth century, between 1374 and 1377. Devoted to the ancestral trees of the Serbian rulers, it seems to have been written for the purpose of legitimizing king Tvrtko’s claims to the legacy of the Serbian kings.

⁴² Earliest Serbian annals appear in the mid-fourteenth century as Serbian versions of the then translated Byzantine chronicles. On the genre, see Bogdanović, *Istorija*, 210-211.

identification with Christ on several levels, including the level of martyrdom and sacrifice bringing about collective salvation. During the late medieval period, under the impact of historical circumstances turning Serbia into a shield against the infidel, this ideal gradually undergoes transformation into an elaborate programme of the sainted martyr king, whose most important function other than healing is to assure his successors victory in battle. The ideal of the martyr ruler thus conforms to the chivalrous inspiration of ideal kingship in general, but shows distinguishing features connected with the emergence in Serbia of new historiographic genres – genealogies and annals as specific historical chronicles of the early modern age.

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**Mont Athos, les princes roumains, Jean Castriot
et la Tour albanaise (*Arbanaški pirg*) dépendance de Chilandar**

Après que le monde byzantin des Balkans eût été submergé par le ras de marée ottoman, les institutions héritées de Rome et de Byzance ne purent se maintenir que dans un cadre ecclésiastique. En tant qu'une des plus prestigieuses communautés du monachisme chrétien, le Mont-Athos avait toujours bénéficié des largesses des basileis, des rois et des princes pieux et soucieux, tout pouvoir séculier ayant une part d'équivoque et d'arbitraire, de voir leur légitimité cautionnée par l'Église.

La continuité dans la perpétuation de la tradition de *ktitor* n'est d'ailleurs pas seulement une question d'ordre juridique. Ce n'est que dans l'esprit de la pratique liturgique que l'on peut considérer cette continuité à laquelle les moines athonites, et notamment ceux de Chilandar, le monastère serbe, attachaient une importance et une fidélité toute religieuse.

La logique de continuité qui inspire les références aux *ktitors* est respectée systématiquement dans tous les actes princiers des Archives de Chilandar. Les institutions monastiques fondées par la dynastie némanide supposent une référence quasi systématique aux premiers *ktitors*, les moines Siméon (ex grand-joupan de Serbie, Stefan-Nemanja, 1165–1196) et Sava (futur premier archevêque de l'Église de Serbie, 1220–1233), et quelquefois aux derniers représentants de la dynastie des Branković. Dans les chartes des princes de Valachie émises en faveur de Chilandar, les références à Mara et à sa sœur, « la Cantacuzène », y ont notamment pour fonction de signifier la transmission du protectorat sur le monastère.

C'est parce que ces ermitages que sont la Tour albanaise et l'église de Saint-Elie¹ n'ont pas été fondés par les dynastes que nous venons de citer,

¹ Il s'agit peut-être de l'église qui aurait appartenu au métoque de Zygou, dédié à Saint Elie, en bordure de la Mégalè Bigla, qui fait la limite occidentale du Mont Athos, propriété foncière appartenant à Chilandar depuis sa fondation par Siméon et Sava en 1198 (confirmé par la chrysobulle d'Andronic II Paléologue, en 1299), voir M. Živojinović, V.

que les références que nous trouvons dans les actes qui leur sont dédiés, sont de portée plus générale : « les bienheureux tsars et princes d'antan », sans que les noms des fondateurs soient mentionnés, à l'exception de l'acte de Neagoe Basarab (1512-1521),² se référant à Vlad le Moine (1481, 1482-1495) et à Radul le Grand (1494-1508). Ce qui ne peut que confirmer le fait que les relations de Chilandar et de ses dépendances, la Tour albanaise en l'occurrence, remontent à l'époque de Vlad le Moine. Si en effet Basarab le Jeune (1477-1481) avait été le ktitor de la Tour albanaise en son temps, il aurait été mentionné nommément en tant que tel, et non pas seulement en tant que père du donateur.

La densité de la documentation des Archives de Chilandar, notamment celle qui concerne essentiellement des princes de Valachie, soulève la question de la motivation de ces princes par rapport à cette pratique caritative et liturgique à l'échelle de presque deux siècles. Au-delà de tout critère quantitatif, le contenu sémantique de ces documents nous met sur la trace de cet attachement princier exemplaire à la laure athonite de Chilandar. La fréquence de l'évocation des saints princes fondateurs, la volonté de s'inscrire dans la droite ligne de leur succession,³ y compris dans le domaine de la pratique liturgique,⁴ le fait que deux des dépendances bénéficiant de l'allocation ont également été fondées par les princes, Jean Castriote d'Albanie, pour la Tour albanaise, et Sava Nemanjić, pour l'ermitage de Karyès, plaident fortement en faveur d'une motivation d'un ordre politico-religieux. Dans

Kravari, Ch. Giros, *Actes de Chilandar I. Des origines à 1319* (Paris, 1998), 57, acte n° 17 (pp. 167-171) ; M. Živojinović, « Le monastère de Chilandar et ses métoques dans la région de l'Athos », *Zbornik radova Vizantološkog instituta* 26 (1987), 62.

² Marié à Milica-Despina, fille du despote Jean Branković, Neagoe Basarab eut pour premier saint patron Saint Sava, ce dont témoigne l'icône de ce saint, ayant fait partie d'objets personnels de ce prince, trouvé dans le skété d'Ostrovul Kalimanestilor, voir S. Anuiki, « Sveti Sava u poveljama rumunskih vojvoda » [**Saint Sava dans les chartes des voïvodes roumains**] in *Sveti Sava. Spomenica povodom osamstogodišnjice rođenja 1177-1977* (Belgrade, 1977), 361-362 ; S. Bazilescu, « Relatiile lui Neagoe Basarab cu lumea ortodoxa din afara granitelor Tarii Romanesti » [Les relations de Neagoe Basarab avec le monde orthodoxe hors de la Valachie], *Mitropolia Olteniei* XXIII, n° 9-10 (1971), 679.

³ B. Joudiou, « La signification de l'élection du prince régnant dans les provinces roumaines de Valachie et de Moldavie (XV^e-XVII^e siècles) in *Inchinare lui Petre S. Nasturel la 80 de ani* (Braila, 2003), 285-298, et aussi « Le règne d'Etienne le Grand et la succession : une perspective idéologique » in *Stefan cel Mare si Sfânt. Atlet al Credintei cristine* (Sfanta manastire Putna, 2004), 415-428.

⁴ B. Bojović, « Chilandar et les Pays roumains. Continuité liturgique et institutionnelle dans les actes princiers (XV^e-XVII^e siècles) » in *Recueil de travaux en l'honneur de Petre S. Nasturel*, 141-149.

le contexte politique, culturel et idéologique de l'époque, pouvait-il en être autrement ?

Après la disparition des derniers États balkaniques et de leur seigneurie devant la conquête ottomane, les monastères du Mont Athos se voient privés de leurs protecteurs traditionnels. Ce rôle sera désormais assumé par les princes des pays valaques, la Moldavie et la Valachie. En tant que vassaux de la Porte ottomane les princes roumains étaient les seuls à pouvoir assurer la tâche de *muteveli*, en tant que protecteurs et *ktitors* des grandes communautés hagiogites jadis choyées par les empereurs byzantins, ainsi que par les autres souverains des pays balkaniques. D'autant que ces institutions caritatives sous forme de *ktitorats* eurent une fonction éminemment politico-religieuse en terme de légitimation de pouvoir princier. En contrepartie de l'aide qu'elle recevait sous forme foncière ou financière et de la protection dont elle bénéficiait, la communauté monastique devait assurer un service religieux, *ad vitam aeternam*, de prières pour la santé du prince et de sa famille, ainsi que pour le repos de son âme lorsqu'il ne serait plus de ce monde. Afin que cette contrepartie liturgique pût se prolonger par delà des générations, le prince se devait d'assurer la pérennité de ses dons de la part de ses héritiers et autres successeurs sur le trône. C'est ainsi que prirent forme ces institutions caritatives sur la longue durée. Les princes roumains assurèrent en l'occurrence leur protectorat sur les monastères du Mont Athos entre le XV^e et le XVII^e siècle, période critique qui vit la disparition des États balkaniques et l'apparition de la Russie en tant que protectrice des églises et monastères des Balkans.

Fondation dynastique serbe depuis la fin du XII^e siècle, le monastère de Chilandar devait ainsi bénéficier d'une aide et d'une protection particulièrement attentive des princes roumains, notamment ceux de Valachie, depuis la fin du XV^e, jusqu'à la deuxième moitié du XVII^e siècle. Dispensée essentiellement sous forme d'allocation financière, le monastère de Chilandar devait ainsi avoir les faveurs des princes de Valachie à raison d'une allocation annuelle égale ou supérieure à celle des plus grands monastères du Mont Athos. C'est du moins ce qui ressort de la documentation disponible.

Les grands monastères athonites, tels que Chilandar (qui jouissait du troisième ou quatrième rang dans la hiérarchie athonite), avaient de nombreuses dépendances sous formes de cellules, *skites* et autres ermitages arbitrant des communautés monacales plus ou moins importantes. Certaines de ces communautés acquièrent, elles aussi, le privilège d'une aide princière directe. Parmi celles dépendant de Chilandar, ce fut le cas de l'ermitage de Saint Sava à Karyès, siège du Protaton, et donc en ce sens capitale de la Sainte Montagne. Même s'il ne devait pas abriter un grand nombre de

moines, le prestige de cet ermitage serbe de Karyès, fondé par Saint Sava, qui fut prince avant de s'y faire moine, devait justifier ce privilège princier.

*Jean Castriot et la Tour albanaise (Arbanaški pîrg, tr. Arnvud birgzi)*⁵

L'autre dépendance de Chilandar jouissant une faveur similaire était l'ermitage intitulé la Tour albanaise (*Arbanaški pîrg*). D'après la documentation disponible, l'allocation annuelle de ce *skite* est accordée à partir de 1512 pour continuer à être versée jusqu'au moins en 1544.

Quant à l'origine du patronage roumain sur ce lieu de prière et de recueillement, le premier donateur valaque aurait pu être Basarab Tepelus (1477-1481).

Le montant de l'allocation fut de 1.000 aspres, en plus de 100 aspres pour les frais de voyage des moines qui vinrent chercher ces subsides à Targovište en août 1512. En 1525 le montant fut élevé à 1.200, en plus de 1.000 aspres en faveur de l'higoumène Macaire,⁶ responsable de la dite communauté. Trois ans plus tard, en 1528, l'allocation est chiffrée à 3.000, en plus de 300 aspres, par le prince Radu de la Afumati (1522-1529). Le même montant est confirmé par le prince Radu Paisie aux termes de sa charte délivrée le 9 février 1544 toujours à Targovište.⁷

Il semble que les faveurs des princes de Valachie se soient appliquées plus longtemps à la Tour albanaise qu'à l'ermitage de Karyès qui reçoit son allocation entre 1528 et 1536 seulement, pour autant qu'il soit possible d'en juger d'après la documentation connue à ce jour. Il est vrai que la somme versée à l'ermitage de Karyès est légèrement plus élevée en 1528, 3.500 aspres en tout, ce qui ne peut remettre en cause la position privilégiée de la Tour albanaise en comparaison d'une institution aussi prestigieuse que celle de Karyès. Parmi les dépendances de Chilandar, seul le kyr Kosma (demeurant auprès de l'église de Saint Elie au Mont Athos), personnage illustre très en faveur des princes Radu le Grand et Vlad le Jeune, avait perçu une allocation plus importante, 2.000 aspres en 1501 et pas moins de 5.000 aspres en 1510.

Située à quelques kilomètres de distance de Chilandar, en direction du sud-ouest, cet ermitage se trouve sur une hauteur avec vue sur le pe-

⁵ V. Petković, « 'Arbanaški pîrg' u Hilandar », *Arhiv za arbanašku starinu, jezik i etnologiju* I/1-2 (1923), 197-199 ; A. Fotić, *Sveta Gora i Hilandar u Osmanskom carstvu (XV-XVII vek)* (Belgrade, 2000), 247-248.

⁶ Higoumène de Chilandar (1525-1526 et 1533).

⁷ B. Bojović, « La légitimation du pouvoir princier et le patronage roumain sur le Mont Athos » in *Arta istoriei-Istoria artei. Academicianul Razvan Theodorescu la 65 de ani* (Bucarest, 2004), 37-48, et aussi « Chilandar et les Pays roumains », 146-147.

tit port du monastère. À l'origine du nom donné à cet ermitage dédié à Saint Georges, se trouve une donation de Jean Castriot (1407–1437), dont le fils Georges allait devenir Skenderbeg. En 1426, il avait fait don en faveur de Chilandar de deux villages, Radostušë (Rostušë) et Trebište (près de la rivière Radika, au nord-est de Debar), avec une église dédiée à la sainte Mère de Dieu, à Rostuša. C'est en 1428 que le seigneur albanais fit acquisition d'un viager sur ce skite pour 80 florins, y compris quatre *adelphata*.⁸ Le contrat d'acquisition fut conclu avec « l'hiéromoine Athanase », qui était l'higoumène de Chilandar en ce temps.⁹ Cet achat de droit viager est fait au nom de Jean Castriot et de ses quatre fils : Staniša, Repoš, Constantin et Georges. Un deuxième acte relatif au même achat de viager fut délivré vers 1430, avec les noms des trois fils de Jean Castriot, à l'exclusion de celui de Staniša qui s'était converti à l'islam vers 1428.¹⁰ L'un de ces fils, Repoš, l'aîné, mort en 1431, fut inhumé dans l'exonarthex de la grande église de Chilandar.¹¹ Il est possible qu'il ait été moine (ou plutôt sur le point de prononcer ses vœux), à la fin de sa vie. Si Repoš termina sa vie à Chilandar, vraisemblablement en tant que laïc, ce que le droit viager d'*adelfaton* permettait, en effet, son père Jean Castriot semble bien avoir achevé sa vie à la Tour albanaise ou à Chilandar, en tant que moine.¹²

C'est, en effet, dans l'*exonarthex* de l'église de Chilandar, sur le mur septentrional, qu'on a pu trouver l'inscription en vieux serbe : « Престави се раб божији Репош, дукс илирскии, 6939 » (Ci-gît le serviteur de Dieu Repoš, duc d'Illyrie, 6939 [=1431]). De même que dans un manuscrit, ayant appartenu jadis à Chilandar, conservé au Musée Rumjancovski à Moscou, on peut lire : « Сего 2 маја престаџи се Кастриот, мнишки же Иоаким

⁸ S. Novaković, *Zakonski spomenici* (Belgrade, 1912), 467–468 ; B. Korablev, « Actes de l'Athos V. Actes slaves de Chilandar », *Vizantiskii Vremennik* 19 (1915), n°82, I. 27 ; V. Mošin, « Akti bratskog sabora iz Hilandara », *Godišnjak Filozofskog fakulteta u Skoplju* 4 (1939–1949), n°7, pp. 33, 197–199. Ce terme (ἀδελφάτων) désigne une rente viagère, pour une ou plusieurs personnes, concédé notamment à ceux qui faisaient un don foncier, ou pécuniaire, au monastère. Confrontés la montée des dangers liés à la conquête ottomane, bien des familles princières et seigneuriales devaient ainsi recourir à l'acquisition de ce droit viager destiné à leur assurer une retraite sécurisée à l'écart des tumultes temporels.

⁹ V. Mošin, M. Purković, *Hilandarski igumani srednjeg veka* (Belgrade, 1999), 99, 114.

¹⁰ M. Živojinović, « Adelfati u Vizantiji i srednjovekovnoj Srbiji », *Zbornik radova Vizantološkog instituta* 11 (1968), 248, n. 38.

¹¹ M. Spremić, *Despot Djurdadj Branković i njegovo doba* (Belgrade, 1994), 286.

¹² R. Grujić, « Svetogorski azili za srpske vladaoce i vlastelu posle Kosovske bitke », *Glasnik Skopskog naučnog društva* 11 (1937), 81–82 ; Petković, « 'Arbanaški pirg' u Hilandaru », 197.

монах » (Ce 2 mai passa à trépas Castriot, dans les ordres, dit Joakime le moine).¹³

Quoi qu'il en soit, il apparaît que le grand seigneur albanais avait entretenu des liens étroits avec l'illustre lauréate serbe du Mont Athos, d'où le nom Tour albanaise donné désormais à l'ermitage qu'il avait racheté à vie, en faveur de son fils Repos et probablement de lui-même, afin qu'il pût s'y retirer, à l'image des princes et autres grands seigneurs qui avaient choisi la réclusion monastique dans la Sainte Montagne. Le fait est que l'acquisition d'un viager sous cette forme d'adelphata comprenait aussi le droit à un service religieux en faveur des souscripteurs de cet engagement. Ce qui expliquerait la mémoire séculaire des seigneurs albanais sous forme de nom donné à l'ermitage, la Tour albanaise.

Aux cotés de celui de Saint Georges, le vocable de Saint Nicolas¹⁴ apparaît sur le document de 1525. Il est possible qu'une autre chapelle y ait été construite par le donateur princier valaque, ce qui expliquerait le fait qu'il se désigne dans l'acte donateur en tant que « nouveau *ktitor*, protecteur et rénovateur » de l'ermitage.

Dans un *vaqifname* de 1569, en lieu et place du *pirg* on ne trouve plus qu'un vignoble. Aurait-il pu déjà se trouver en ruines ? Quoi qu'il en soit, au XVIII^e siècle on retrouve l'ermitage (Арванѣшки пиргъ) sur une lithographie de Chilandar avec ses dépendances, exécuté à Moscou en 1575. La Tour albanaise y est représentée avec son église, sa tour fortifiée, ses bâtiments adjacents et l'enceinte qui les entourait.¹⁵

En 1671 et 1672 un certain pope Petronije, *hadži* et membre du conseil des anciens de Chilandar, est moine résidant dans la Tour albanaise, à laquelle il fit don d'un livre, tout en payant la réparation d'un autre volume. Il avait fait un don en 1643 déjà pour la réfection de l'ermitage voisin de Sainte Trinité, de même qu'il fut à l'origine de la construction du *paraklision* de Saint Nicolas à Chilandar.¹⁶

¹³ Grujić, « Svetogorski azili », 81-82.

¹⁴ Dédié à ce saint, Saint-Nicolas était aussi un métoque de Chilandar situé dans la région de Méléai, à proximité du monastère, appartenant (de même que celui de Saint-Georges) à Chilandar depuis sa fondation par Siméon et Sava en 1198, cf. Živojinović, « Le monastère de Chilandar », 44-45. Ce qui correspond à la zone où se situe la Tour albanaise.

¹⁵ D. Davidov, « Manastir Hilandar na bakrorezima XVIII veka », *Hilandarski zbornik* 2 (1971), 155-158; S. Nenadović, « Hilandarski skit Svete Trojice na Spasovoj vodi », *Hilandarski zbornik* 2 (1971), 109.

¹⁶ O. Tomić, « Hilandarski skit Svete Trojice na Spasovoj vodi », *Hilandarski zbornik* 9 (1997), 182, n. 65-68.

L'ermitage d'origine médiévale, désigné dans les sources par « Tour albanaise » est actuellement en état de ruines. Elles ont été identifiés, étudiés et décrits par l'architecte S. Nenadović.¹⁷

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¹⁷ S. Nenadović, « Hilandar na grafičkim prikazima XVIII i XIX stoleća », *Zbornik zaštite spomenika kulture XVI* (1965), 105-106; la représentation graphique de l'ermitage est reproduite, en agrandi, dans Nenadović, « Hilandarski skit Svete Trojice », 109, p. tb. 7. Voir aussi, M. Živojinović, *Svetogorske kelije i pirgovi u srednjem veku* (Belgrade, 1972), 106-107.

Mirjana Tatić-Djurić

La Theotokos ΛΥΧΝΙΑ dans l'art et l'hymnologie

Dans la nef centrale du narthex de l'église de Vulcano dans le Péloponnèse se trouve une curieuse représentation de la Vierge, possédant l'épithète bien rare de Λυχνία (fig. 1).¹ Cette fresque datée de 1608 est l'œuvre de Démétrios et Georges Moschoi de Nauplie.² Elle possède un unique schéma iconographique appartenant au contexte thématique plus large, faisant part de la composition « Les prophètes t'ont annoncée » (fig. 2).³

Notre Vierge est représentée en orante avec le Christ orant, insérée dans la triple sphère et parsemée de sept cierges. Ici, au lieu du prêtre Zacarias avec le candélabre à sept branches préfigurant la Vierge, on posa sur la poitrine de la Vierge elle-même un candélabre portant le Christ Sauveur qui est la lumière des lumières.⁴ Elle ressemble à un flambeau inextinguible comme la qualifie St Cyrille d'Alexandrie lors de la clôture du concile d'Ephèse : « Salut, Marie Mère du Dieu, Trésors de l'univers, flambeau inextinguible, couronne de virginité, sceptre de l'Orthodoxie, temple indissoluble, tabernacle de celui que le monde ne peut contenir... »⁵

Tout autour, d'autres médaillons pareils au nôtre illustrent avec les symboles prophétiques la venue du Logos dans le monde, par la Vierge. Ce luminisme poétique est aussi en contexte d'une figure d'Odigitria appartenant à l'Acathiste, portant dans la main un cierge et signé φωτοδόχον

¹ S. Eustratiadis, *Ἡ Θεοτόκος ἐν τῇ ὑμνογραφίᾳ* (Chennevière-sur-Marne, 1930), 42-43.

² K. Kalokyris, *Βυζαντινὰ ἑκκλησιαί τῆς Ἱ. Μητροπόλεως Μεσσηνίας* (Thessalonique, 1973), 129.

³ *Ibid.*, 146.

⁴ *Ibid.*, fig. 97.

⁵ D. B. Capelle, « Typologie Mariale chez les pères et dans la liturgie », *Questions liturgiques et paroissiales* 35, 3 (mai-juin 1954), 120, n°195.

λαμπάδα.⁶ Cette composition dénommée "Ανωθεν οἱ προφηταὶ⁷ à Vulcano est encadrée des deux côtés par l'illustration de l'hymne Acatliste.

Le symbole vétérotestamentaire de la Vierge Candélabre à sept branches est emprunté au mobilier du temple hébraïque placé dans le département d'agia. Le symbole n'est pas étudié séparément, comme c'est le cas avec le sujet du tabernacle,⁸ du buisson ardent,⁹ du lit de Salomon, de la toison de Gédéon, de la porte d'Ezéchiél et de la sainte Montagne.¹⁰ D'autre part, dans l'étude d'ensemble sur le thème « Les prophètes t'ont annoncée »¹¹ où l'on énumère le cycle complet, on donne peu de place à la Theotokos, symbole du candélabre, dont Jésus lui-même proclame : « Il fallait que s'accomplisse tout ce qui est écrit de moi dans la loi de Moïse, dans les prophètes et dans les psaumes. »¹²

C'est St. Jean Damascène dans ses homélies sur la Nativité et la Dormition¹³ qui nous énumère les symboles vétérotestamentaires que de bonne heure les pères de l'église ont considéré comme figure préfigurant la Theo-

⁶ Kalokyris, *Βυζαντινὰ ἑκκλησιαίαι*, pl. 105 A.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pl. 96; *Μηναῖα* (Venise, 1895), 60 : "Ανωθεν χορός προφητικός.

⁸ N. Beljaev, « Le Tabernacle du témoignage' dans la peinture balkanique du XIV^e siècle », dans *L'Art byzantin chez les Slaves. Les Balkans* I/2 (Paris, 1930), 315 sq ; M. Gligorijević-Maksimović, « Skinija u Dečanima, poreklo i razvoj ikonografske teme », dans *Dečani et l'Art byzantin au milieu du XIV^e siècle* (Belgrade, 1989), 319-336, fig. 1-8.

⁹ L. Voroncev, « Икона Богоматери 'Купина Неопалима' », *Ж.М.Н.П.* 352 (1904), 62-88; E. Harris, « Mary in the Burning Bush », *Journal of Warburg Institute* I (London, 1937), 284; E. Vetter, « Maria in brennenden Dornbuch », *Das Münster* 10 (1957), 237.

¹⁰ S. Der Nersessian, « Le lit de Salomon », *Recueil des travaux de l'Institut d'études byzantines* VIII (Belgrade, 1963), 77-82; J. Radovanović, « Gedeonovo runo u srpskom srednjovekovnom slikarstvu », dans *Ikonografska istraživanja srpskog slikarstva XIII i XIV veka* (Belgrade, 1988), 83-88; G. Babić, « L'Image symbolique de la Porte fermée à Saint Clément d'Ochrid », *Synthronon* (Paris, 1968); S. Radojčić, « Epizoda o Bogorodici-Gori u Teodosijevom 'Životu sv. Save' i njena veza sa slikarstvom XIII i XIV veka », dans *Tekstovi i freske* (Novi Sad, 1965), 116-127.

¹¹ D. Mouriki, « Αἱ βιβλικαὶ προεικονίσεις τῆς Παναγίας εἰς τὸν τροῦλλον τῆς Περιβλέπτου τοῦ Μυστρᾶ », *Ἀρχαιολογικὸν Δελτίον* 25, 1 (1970; Athènes, 1971), 232, fig. 83; D. Panić et G. Babić, *Bogorodica Ljeviška* (Belgrade, 1975), 77; G. Babić, « Ikonografski program živopisa u pripratama crkava kralja Milutina », dans *Vizantijska umetnost početkom XIV veka* (Belgrade, 1978), 119; V. Milanović, « Proroci su te nagovestili' u Peći », dans *L'Archévêque Danilo II et son époque* (Belgrade, 1991), 411; S. der Nersessian, « Program and Iconography of the Frescoes of the Parecclesion », dans *The Kariye Djami*, vol. 4 (Princeton, 1975), 315.

¹² Luc 24, 44.

¹³ St Jean Damascène, Homélies sur la Nativité, *S.Ch.* 80 (Paris, 1963), 103.

tokos, « car elle est le trône royal près duquel se tiennent les anges, contemplant le maître et le créateur qui est L'ancien des Jours » (Dan. 7, 9), puis « l'arche t'a préfigurée, elle qui sauva le germe de la seconde création, car tu enfantas le Christ, Salut du monde, qui a submergé le péché. D'avance, c'est toi que le buisson a dépeint, que les tables de Dieu ont dessinée, que l'arche de la loi a raconté. C'est toi, qui est l'urne d'or, le candélabre de la table, le rameau d'Aron avaient fleuris (Hébr. 9, 4), ils t'ont manifestement préfigurée. De toi en effet est né Celui qui est la flamme de la divinité et la définition et l'expression du Père. La manne délicieuse et céleste, le nom innomé qui est au dessus de tout nom. La lumière inaccessible (1 Tim. 16) et éternelle dont nul être humain n'a approché, ni vu, dont la gloire de la Royauté est sans fin. Elle est le pain de la vie venu du Ciel, le fruit récolté sans travail, de toi qui est sortie corporellement...»

L'annonce du Messie par les prophètes déjà parue dans les actes du conseil d'Ephèse¹⁴ à l'époque macédonienne de Byzance devient le programme normal du décor des tambours des églises.¹⁵ Au temps des Comnènes sur les icônes portatives les prophètes sont groupés autour du cadre de la Vierge à l'Enfant.¹⁶ Cette pratique continue sous les Paléologues dans la peinture murale et sur les icônes.¹⁷ Elle est considérée comme « Temple saint de la Divine Lumière » à Peć et à Ljeviška de Prizren.¹⁸ Une pareille composition se trouve souvent dans le narthex d'une église dédiée à la Vierge, dans le médaillon de la coupole, et après, dans le sanctuaire, sur l'arc couronnant par la Vierge Platytera la conque de l'abside.¹⁹

¹⁴ J. D. Mansi, *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima Collectio* (Paris–Leipzig, 1901), col. 116 c.

¹⁵ Lj. Popović dans *Cyrrillomethodianum VIII-IX* (Thessalonique, 1984/5), 131–134. Dans l'Orologe slave il y a un beau texte à la fin de l'orthros: « Plod utrobe tvoje Prečista proroka i zakona je ispunjenje. Zato tebe Bogorodicu u poznanju slaveći pobožno veličamo. Raduj se Djevo proroka propoved kojom zasja Emanuil. » *Časoslov* (Kragujevac, 1986), 208.

¹⁶ Voir l'icône du Sinaï, K. et M. Sotiriou, *Εἰκόνας τῆς μονῆς Σινᾶ* I (Athènes, 1956), fig. 73–75, et de l'Ermitage (n° 1–301, XII–XIII s.), *Афонские Древности Государственный Эрмитаж*. Catalogue (Saint-Petersbourg, 1992), 48, pl. III.

¹⁷ Milanović, « 'Proroci su te nagovestili' », 412; D. and T. Talbot Rice, *Icons. The Natasha Allen Collection* (Dublin, 1968), 13–18; Mouriki, « Αἱ βιβλικά προεικονίσεις », 223, fig. 91.

¹⁸ *Pečka Patrijaršija* (Belgrade, 1990), 135, fig. 80; Babić, *Bogorodica Ljeviška*, 138–139, et fig. 30.

¹⁹ P. A. Underwood, *The Kariye Djami* (New York, 1966), vol. I, 55–56, vol. II, fig. 81–82; Mouriki, « Αἱ βιβλικά προεικονίσεις », 217–251, fig. 72–93; Milanović, « 'Proroci su te nagovestili' », 413.

A l'époque post-byzantine, sous l'influence de la liturgie, on représente la Vierge, trône de sagesse, entourée des prophètes avec les symboles et les textes préfigurant la Vierge comme instrument de l'incarnation.²⁰ Tel sont: la belle icône de l'Académie de Florence,²¹ la fresque se trouvant en Alagonie dans la conque de l'autel, datée de 1501,²² une icône de Bistrica de la région Vilcea en Roumanie de 1517,²³ puis une icône se trouvant à Priština (Kosovo).²⁴ Dans le musée historique de Crète on conserve une icône du XVI^e siècle avec le motif composé dans l'arbre de Jessé, parsemé de 12 prophètes autour de la Vierge à l'Enfant.²⁵ Un pareil schéma démontre la fresque athonite de 1615 à Dionysiou dont l'auteur est Makarié l'hagiographe.²⁶ Au XVII^e siècle notre composition est bien à la mode, à ne citer comme exemples: la belle icône de Patmos²⁷ (fig. 3) et l'icône du peintre Antoine, datée de 1641 dans une collection suisse.²⁸

Sur deux épigonatia, l'un daté en 1681 du musée Benaki, la figure de la Vierge est entourée de 12 prophètes et le texte d'un tropaire qu'on chante encore au Mont Athos, à l'occasion des fêtes de la Vierge, mais il n'est pas présent dans les livres liturgiques. Par contre, dans les recueils musicaux, les *pandekta*, on le trouve dans un manuscrit du XIV^e siècle sous le nom de Jean Koukouzelis²⁹ et de Jean Kladas.

Une icône du musée Benaki datée du milieu du XVII^e siècle, œuvre de Luka Mauriki, est inspirée par le tropaire Ἄνωθεν οἱ προφηῆται qui est chanté avant le liturgie pendant que le prêtre se prépare à servir la sainte messe. La dernière strophe du tropaire est dédiée à la Vierge comme trône

²⁰ L. Boyer, *Le trône de la sagesse, essais sur la signification du culte marial* (Paris, 1957), 195-228.

²¹ V. N. Lazarev, *Storia della pittura bizantina* (Turin, 1967), fig. 575.

²² Kalokyris, *Βυζαντινὰ ἑκκλησιάαι*, 182.

²³ *Ikonen aus Rumänien* (Düsseldorf, 1971), n° 2.

²⁴ Babić, « L'Image symbolique », 150.

²⁵ S. Alexiou, *Ὁδηγός Ἱστορ. Μουσείου Κρήτης* (Héraklion, 1953), fig. Γ.

²⁶ K. Kalokyris, *Ἀθῶς. Θέματα ἀρχαιολογίας καὶ τέχνης* (Athènes, 1963), 157, fig. A.

²⁷ K. Kalokyris, *Ἡ Θεοτόκος εἰς τῆς εἰκονογραφίαν Ἀνατολῆς καὶ Δύσεως* (Thessalonique, 1972), 193, fig. 272.

²⁸ *Les icônes dans les collections suisses* (Genève, 1968), Musée Rath, n° 67.

²⁹ E. Vei-Chatzidaki, *Μουσεῖον Μπενάκη. Ἐκκλησιαστικά Κεντήματα* (Athènes, 1953), 23, 24, fig. 13, 1-3; Mouriki, « Αἱ βιβλικά προεικονίσεις », 241; Milanović, « Προρόκι su te nagovestili' », 414; S. Eustratiadis, « Ἰωάννης Κουκουζέλης ὁ μαῖστωρ καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῆς ἀκμῆς αὐτοῦ », *E.E.B.S.* 14 (Athènes, 1938), 10 sq; sur les compositeurs Kladas et Koukouzelis, voir A. Jakovljević dans *Κληρονομία XIV/2* (Thessalonique, 1982), 357, et le même auteur dans *Hilandarski zbornik* (Belgrade, 1986), 158-159.

du basileus,³⁰ ce qui a pu inspirer les artistes de représenter la Vierge trônant presque régulièrement dans la peinture post-byzantine. Le nombre des prophètes varie, quoi que le manuel de peinture en prescrit douze.³¹

Parmi les monuments illustrant notre sujet qui abondent sous la domination ottomane, nous ne citons que les icônes de St Nicolas de Braşov,³² celle de Zane au Sinai,³³ une fresque de George Mitrofanović à Morača³⁴ et l'icône du XVIII^e siècle au Musée Rath.³⁵

Dans la plus haute rangée d'iconostase avec les figures des prophètes, il y a la Mère du Dieu comme l'accomplissement de l'annonce prophétique qu'on voit à Krušedol en Serbie.³⁶

La préfiguration de la Vierge comme candélabre à sept branches est à l'issue d'une longue tradition, qu'on voit sur le mur occidental à Dura,³⁷ puis dans le manuscrit de Cosmas Indicopleustès sur l'autel du tabernacle qui annonce l'apparition du Logos dans le temps.³⁸ Ce candélabre se trouve dans le premier département du temple dénommé «Saint». Là il symbolise par le numéro sept les phénomènes temporels selon les commentaires de Théodore de Mopsuestia. Il apparaît aussi illustrant les homélies de Grégoire de Nazianze dans le manuscrit Paris gr. Coislin 239, fol. 30^r.³⁹

³⁰ A. Xyngopoulos, *Μουσείον Μπενάκη. Κατάλογος τῶν εἰκόνων* (Athènes, 1936), n° 13, n°34, p. 50 le tropaire: Ἄνωθεν οἱ προφηῆται σέ προκατηγγείλαν, στάμνον, ράβδον, πλάκα, κιβωτόν, λυχνίαν, τράπεζαν, ὄρος, ἀλατόμητον, χρυσοῦν θυμιατήριον καὶ σκηνῆς, πύλην ἀδιόδοετον, παλάτιον καὶ κλίμακα καὶ θρόνον τοῦ βασιλέως.

³¹ Dionysios de Fournà, *Ἑρμηνεία τῆς ζωγραφικῆς τέχνης*, éd. Papadopoulos Kerameus (Petroupolis, 1909), 146.

³² *Istoria artelor plastice in Romania*, vol. I (Bucarest, 1968), 435.

³³ *Sinai Treasures of the Monastery of Saint Catherine*, éd. Konst. Manafis (Athènes, 1990), 22, fig. 97.

³⁴ S. Petković, *Morača* (Belgrade, 1986), fig. 49.

³⁵ La Vierge trônant ayant sous ses pieds l'arbre de Jessé dont les médaillons avec les prophètes : *Les icônes dans les collections suisses*, n°132, avec le tropaire: Ἄνωθεν οἱ προφηῆται...

³⁶ V. J. Djurić, *Ikone iz Jugoslavije* (Belgrade, 1961), 110, n°55, Pl. LXXVI.

³⁷ C. H. Kraeling, « The excavations at Dura-Europos », *The Synagogue VIII*, 1 (New Haven, 1956), Pl. XXIV, LXXVI-LXXVIII.

³⁸ W. Wolska, « La Topographie Chrétienne de Cosmas Indicopleustès », dans *Théologie et Sciences du VI^e siècle* (Paris, 1962), 39-47.

³⁹ Sur la symbolique du Tabernacle, *Studi et Testi* 141 (1948), 25-27; et 145 (1949), 327-329. Sur Homélie 4 de Grégoire de Nazianze, voir : G. Galavaris, *The Illustrations of the Liturgical Homilies of Gregory Nazianzenus* (Princeton, New York 1969), 247, Pl. XXXVII, 204.

Dans le Psautier Lectionnaire du Pantocrator (61, fol. 165^r) le candélabre présente l'Agia auprès du psaume 115 (4-8).⁴⁰ Un manuscrit de Cosmas Indicopleustès provenant de la Ste Trinité de Pljevlja illuminé en 1649 par le zographe Andreja Raičević a aussi la représentation du candélabre à sept branches (fol. 201).⁴¹

La Vierge préfigurée en candélabre dans *Skinia* (épître de Paul aux Hébreux 9, 2) et d'après l'exégèse de Philo d'Alexandrie *Περὶ ἱεροῦ* est le symbole de l'église terrestre, illuminant les ténèbres par son fils divin.⁴²

L'aspect christologique de la préfiguration du temple domine jusqu'au VII^e siècle quand la Vierge à l'Enfant la substituent. L'exemple le plus fascinant se trouve dans le *Physiologue* de Smyrne (fol. 164) représentant le Trône avec la Vierge à l'Enfant sur le sommet du candélabre à sept branches brillantes. L'inscription qui suit cette miniature ne laisse aucune place au doute sur le sens de l'image : ἡ ἑπτάκαυλος Λυχνία (fig. 4).⁴³

Le candélabre vétérotestamentaire dénommé « menora » est mentionné dans l'Exode (25, 31-40). Il est fait tout en or, il a sept branches décorées de pommes, d'amandes et de fleurs, et il est illuminé par sept bougies.

C'est l'Apocalypse qui met près du trône du Seigneur, comme sept esprits de Dieu.⁴⁴ « Et au milieu des sept chandeliers quelqu'un qui ressemblait à un fils d'Homme ... sa tête et ses cheveux étaient comme la laine blanche, comme la neige; ses yeux étaient comme une flamme », c'est la vision de l'Ancien des Jours (fig. 5).⁴⁵

C'est le candélabre en or qui, d'après l'interprétation de St Clément d'Alexandrie, figure les sept astres et les sept églises.⁴⁶

Le fondement biblique du candélabre à sept branches se trouve dans le texte de prophète Zacharie : il y a un chandelier tout en or surmonté d'un

⁴⁰ S. Dufrenne, *L'illustration des psautiers grecs du Moyen âge, I : Pantocrator 61*, Paris gr. 20, *Brit. Mus.* 40731 (Paris, 1966), Pl. 26.

⁴¹ S. Petković, *Manastir Sv. Trojice kod Pljevalja* (Belgrade, 1974), 89-94, fol. 201^v.

⁴² *Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt*, V, ed. minor (Berlin, 1906), 14. A la Vierge Perivleptos d'Ochrid, à Gračanica, Dečani, Peć, aux Apôtres à Thessalonique et à Lesnovo, partout on voit le tondo avec la Vierge appliqué au tabernacle. Gligorijević-Maksimović, « Skinija u Dečanima », Pl. 4/2, 5-8.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 335; J. Strzygowski, « Der Bilderkreis des griechischen Physiologus », *Byzantinischen Archiv* 2 (Leipzig, 1899), 57, Pl. XXVIII/1.

⁴⁴ Apoc. 4, 5.

⁴⁵ Apoc. 1, 13-14. Sur l'Ancien des Jours: Iezekiel, métropolitain de Thessalitos, Ὁ παλαιὸς τῶν ἡμερῶν (Athènes, 1940), 31; J. Radovanović, « Ikonografija fresaka protezisa crkve sv. Apostola u Peći », dans *Ikonografska istraživanja*, 2-6.

⁴⁶ Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata*, lib. V, cap. VI, éd. Stählin (Berlin, 1960), 32-35.

vase et portant sept lampes avec sept conduits pour les lampes qui sont au sommet du chandelier...⁴⁷ Plus loin l'ange explique à Zacharie que « ces sept sont les yeux de l'Éternel qui parcourent toute la terre ». ⁴⁸ D'après le Manuel de Dionysiou on représente le prophète Zacharie indiquant le candélabre à sept branches, portant le rouleau avec le texte : ἐγὼ λυχνίαν ἐπτάφωτόν σε εἶδον φῶς τὸ νοητὸν ἀστράψασαν κόσμῳ.⁴⁹

Les fêtes mariales concernant l'incarnation du Christ sont commentées par les symboles prophétiques, proclamant la Vierge comme temple saint de Dieu.⁵⁰ Telle est l'icône crétoise faite en 1636 (fig. 6), conservée dans l'école des Beaux Arts à Athènes.⁵¹ Sur cette icône, le prophète Zacharie porte le candélabre et un rouleau sur lequel se trouvent les paroles suivantes : ἐώρακα καὶ ἶδὸν χρυσοῦ ἢ λυχνία καὶ τὸ λαμπάδιον ἐπάνω αὐτῆς (Zach. 4, 2).

La poésie liturgique est presque inépuisable sur le sujet de la Theotokos Lychnia. Par un choix assez restreint je vais tâcher de tracer une esquisse de son portrait vu les hymnographes byzantins, présents dans les Méennes, Triodion, Pentikostarion, Théotokarion et Oktoichos en autant que l'Orologion.

Ainsi, elle est le candélabre lumineux de l'illustre souveraine avec plus d'éclat que le soleil,⁵² tout brillant d'or par le Soleil de la gloire⁵³ lumineuse,⁵⁴ très chaste, resplendissante,⁵⁵ par sept lumières⁵⁶ dont parle le prophète;⁵⁷

⁴⁷ Zach. 4, 2-3.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 4, 10.

⁴⁹ *Ἑρμηνεία*, 146, 282.

⁵⁰ E. Mercenier, *La prière des églises de rite byzantin* II, 1 (Chevetogne, 1953), 182. Même dans la Dormition à St Nagoričino (XIV^e s.), il y a cet accent sur l'incarnation par la présence des prophètes dans la scène de la Mort de la Vierge, inspirée par les homélies de Jean Damascène sur l'Annonciation et la Dormition. S. Radojčić, *Uzori i dela starih srpskih umetnika* (Belgrade, 1975), 186-187; B. Todić, *Staro Nagoričino* (Belgrade, 1993), 105, fig. 26.

⁵¹ N. Panselinou, « Κρητική εικόνα του 1636 έργο του Πεθύμνιου ζωγράφου Γεωργίλα Μαρούλη », *Ευφρόσυνοι*, Αφιέρματα στον Μανόλη Χατζηδάκη (Athènes, 1992), 478, fig. ΚΘ, 248.

⁵² Men. 15 jan. vêpres, p.139 b : Λύχνε πάμψτε ήλιακῶν λαμπήνιον λαμπροτέρα δέσποινα ; de même *Triodion de carême* (Jordanville, 1956), 32.

⁵³ S. Eustratiadis, *Θεοτοκάριον* (Chennevière-sur-Marne, 1931), 18.

⁵⁴ *Μηναῖα τοῦ ὄλου ένιαυτοῦ* II (Rome, 1988), 253.

⁵⁵ *Πεντηκοστάριον* (Rome, 1883), 350.

⁵⁶ Eustratiadis, *Θεοτοκάριον*, 286.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 211 ; *Εὐχολόγιον τό μέγα* (Venise, 1862), 204. La même expression chez le poète Theophanes et chez Damaskinos, 221, 114.

candélabre brillant⁵⁸ tout en or;⁵⁹ ce candélabre, qui annonce la triple lumière,⁶⁰ polylumineuse des charismes de Dieu,⁶¹ de la lumière immatérielle avec l'allure mystique,⁶² la lumière de la nuée qui engendre la gloire de Dieu.⁶³ Elle la table divine qui éclaire tout,⁶⁴ le candélabre inextinguible de la chambre nuptiale,⁶⁵ le candélabre d'or, la châsse portant lumière,⁶⁶ le chariot resplendissant du soleil imperceptible.⁶⁷

La plus vénérée par la chasteté qui resplendit plus que soleil, assise sur le trône solaire distillant,⁶⁸ comme la voit le poète Ephrem le Syrien dans sa troisième oraison à la Deipara.⁶⁹ Dans une autre oraison dédiée à la Vierge, ce même poète interprétant le nom Béate Marie, comme « Illuminée car cette lumière vient du Fils de Dieu et éclaire les croyants jusqu'au bout de la terre par la sainte Trinité ».⁷⁰

Le poète Romanos le Mélode l'appelle φωτεινή Μαρία (Marie Lumineuse).⁷¹ C'est aussi St Jérôme dans son exégèse des noms hébraïques (Exod. 2, 15) qui l'explique comme Maria Illuminatrix.⁷²

Pour le prétendu l'auteur de l'Acathiste de la Vierge, le patriarche Serge, elle est l'aube mystique de la journée, le candélabre inextinguible qui nous aveugle.⁷³ C'est Andrée de Crète qui dans son canon sur la Nativité

⁵⁸ *Μηναῖα* V (Venise, 1895), 205.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, IX, 38.

⁶⁰ *Νέα Σιών* 28 (1933), 215.

⁶¹ *Μηναῖα* II (Venise, 1895), 138 ; Eustratiadis, *Θεοτοκάριον*, 106.

⁶² Eustratiadis, *Θεοτοκάριον*, 244 ; *PG* 105, col. 1208.

⁶³ *Časoslov* (Belgrade, 1967), 264 ; *Μηναῖα* IV (Rome, 1888–91), 249 ; *Παρακλητική ητοι Ὁκτώηχος ἡ μεγάλη* (Rome, 1885), 181.

⁶⁴ Nikodemos Naxios, *Θεοτοκάριον* (Venise, 1883), 78.

⁶⁵ *Τριώδιον κατανυκτικόν* (Rome, 1879), 328 ; *PG* 105, col. 1368 ; A. Mai, *Spicilegium Romanum* IV (Rome, 1839–44), 143.

⁶⁶ Eustratiadis, *Θεοτοκάριον*, 146.

⁶⁷ A. Salzer, *Die Sinnbilder und Beiworte Mariens in der deutschen Literatur und lateinischen Hymnepsodie des Mittelalters* (Darmstadt, 1967), 396.

⁶⁸ *Εὐχολόγιον τὸ μέγα* (Venise, 1862), 859 ; *Ἀνθολόγιον* I (Rome, 1738), 169 : 5 dec. ode 9.

⁶⁹ Salzer, *Sinnbilder*, 396.

⁷⁰ Ephraim, *De Laudibus Deiparae*, 2, 192 b ; Salzer, *Sinnbilder*, 434.

⁷¹ J. B. Pitra, *Analecta Spicilegio Solesmensi parata* I (Paris, 1876), 225, 13.

⁷² Salzer, *Die Sinnbilder*, 435 : In Math. 2, 65 : Mariam plerique aestimant interpretari illuminant me isti illuminatrix ; de même dans *Fragmenta graeca nom. Hebr.* IV, 2, 127 : Μαριαμ φωτιζομένη ἢ φωτίζουσα θύτούς.

⁷³ Pitra, *Analecta*, 254, 10.

appelle Marie la porte de l'inaccessible lumière,⁷⁴ allusion à la porte fermée d'Ézéchiél.

Georges le Thaumaturge dans sa deuxième homélie sur l'Annonciation la proclame la source de la lumière et à cause de son émanation on interprète ce phénomène comme le plus brillant de sa Virginité.⁷⁵

Elle est vraiment le Candélabre sérénissime, contenant la lumière de Dieu,⁷⁶ comportant le feu divin, lumineux, contenant le flambeau divin⁷⁷ avec la lumière immatérielle.⁷⁸ C'est le candélabre réceptible de la lumière de la divinité⁷⁹ contenant le flambeau mystique et divin qui illumine tout souffle, comme un signal dans la nuit.⁸⁰ Elle est le candélabre du Plus Haut, d'allure lumineuse toute dorée,⁸¹ très brillante de la lumière immatérielle dans laquelle est le Christ,⁸² avec le feu supersubstantiel et indicible.⁸³

D'après Joseph, le métropolite de Thessalonique (762–832) et frère de Théodore Studite, c'est le feu de la divinité qui s'est domicilié en elle, illuminant avec son aube ceux qui dépérissent dans la nuit.⁸⁴ Tout brillant d'or capable de jeter l'Éclat de la lumière, bien sacré dans tout l'espace.⁸⁵ C'est le candélabre à sept branches avec la lumière charismatique comme dit le prophète de ce candélabre vénérable,⁸⁶ brillant de la lumière consacré, flamboyant de lumière d'or de Dieu.⁸⁷ Car, ce candélabre brille de la triple

⁷⁴ PG 97, col. 1321.

⁷⁵ Salzer, *Die Sinnbilder*, 434.

⁷⁶ Eustratiadis, *Ἡ Θεοτόκος*, 44 : 21 nov. canon ode tropaire 1 ; 20 jan. canon 2, ode 4, theotokion.

⁷⁷ Eustratiadis, *Ἡ Θεοτόκος*, 44.

⁷⁸ *Euchologion*, 76, 229.

⁷⁹ Chanté dans l'ikos de Proeortia pour la fête d'Annonciation.

⁸⁰ Canon de condoléance de St Anna, ode 8, tropaire 2.

⁸¹ Θηκαρα, 216, 217.

⁸² Le 24 avril, canon 1, ode 7 de David le moine de Laure; *Euchologion*, 228, 56 ; Eustratiadis, *Ἡ Θεοτόκος*, 44.

⁸³ Θηκαρα, 168, 30.

⁸⁴ *Triodion*, ode 8, jeudi matin.

⁸⁵ *Euchologion*, 44, 189 ; et 183, 246.

⁸⁶ Θηκαρᾶς μοναχὸς Ἰωάννης ; Eustratiadis, *Ἡ Θεοτόκος*, 43, 44 ; Theophanes, 130, 65 ; Damaskinos, Λόγος εἰς Εὐαγγελισμὸν, 100 ; Joseph hymnographe, nov. canon 4, ode 5.

⁸⁷ Trois auteurs du IX^e siècle, le patriarche Photios, Mitrophane, métropolite de Smyrne, et Théophane Graptos, moine de la Laure de St Sabas de Jérusalem, chantent sur la Theotokos λυχνία, comme aussi Théodore Studite (759–826), qui a fait le canon sur 1 Dimanche de l'Orthodoxie.

lumière⁸⁸ des trois soleils très saints, qui a acquis la lumière avant les siècles émanant du Père.⁸⁹

C'est bien la *λυχνία φωτεινόμορφος*⁹⁰ portant la lumière de toute éternité,⁹¹ feu de lumière illuminant tout.⁹² Brillant d'un éclair merveilleux qui fait obscurcir le monde.⁹³ C'est le polycandyle brillant et illuminant des affligés dans la nuit,⁹⁴ étincelant aux croyants les charismes divins.⁹⁵

Aussi, c'est un candélabre de la lumière raisonnable,⁹⁶ intelligible comme a prédit le prophète. Elle tenant la lampe de Dieu,⁹⁷ *νοερά καὶ ἐπτάφωτος* comme chante le Klimis Mélodos,⁹⁸ ou bien « la lumière éternelle » comme on lit dans l'*Euchologion*,⁹⁹ qui est consacré tout « en or »,¹⁰⁰ avec la lumière inextinguible.¹⁰¹ Portant avec ses sept branches le feu de la connaissance de Dieu,¹⁰² brillant à ceux qui périssent dans les ténèbres¹⁰³ divinement, car ce candélabre porte le reflet de la gloire de Dieu.¹⁰⁴

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⁸⁸ Eustratiadis, *Ἡ Θεοτόκος*, 44.

⁸⁹ *Κανὼν φίλικος ὠδ. η' Ἰωσήφ. Θεοτοκίον.*

⁹⁰ *Παρακλ.*, ἦ, α'.

⁹¹ *Euchologion*, 149, 96.

⁹² Ignatios, 47, 140 ; Eustratiadis, *Ἡ Θεοτόκος*, 43.

⁹³ *Παρακλ.*, mardi, theotokion de Joseph, du même vendredi canon 9.

⁹⁴ Eustratiadis, *Ἡ Θεοτόκος*, 43.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 43, 44 : *Μανουήλ ὁ μέγας ρήτωρ.*

⁹⁶ *Euchologion*, 43, 165.

⁹⁷ Eustratiadis, *Ἡ Θεοτόκος*, 43.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, Κλήμης ὁ μελωδός, Ἰωάννης Θηκαρᾶς, 65, 127.

⁹⁹ *Euchologion*, 274, 30.

¹⁰⁰ Eustratiadis, *Ἡ Θεοτόκος*, 43.

¹⁰¹ *Euchologion*, 108, 239.

¹⁰² *Canon de Basil le Grand*, ode 4, *Euchologion* ; theotokion de Joséph : canon de Jacques.

¹⁰³ *Παρακλ.*, 3^e η, le matin, canon ode 4 de Joseph.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, ode 6 théotokion de Joseph; théotokion de Theophanis, samedi, *Παρακλ.*, Β', ode 7; *Euchologion*, 4, 161.



Fig. 1 Vulcano, Messénie, fresque Theotokos Lychnia




Fig. 2 Vulcano, aperçu générale



Fig. 3 Patmos, « Les prophètes t'ont annoncée... », icône VII^e siècle




Fig. 4 Miniature de Cosmas Indicopleustès et Physiologue Theotokos signée λυχνία XI^e siècle

Fig. 5 Baltimore Walters
Cod. 355 fol.2^v, Walters
Art Gallery, datée 1415
Les sept cierges



Fig. 6 Icône crétoise datée
1636. Athènes, Ecole des
Beaux Arts
Les fêtes mariales
concernant l'incarnation
du Christ symbole
prophétique



Ljubinka Trgovčević

The Enlightenment and the Beginnings of Modern Serbian Culture

The age of Enlightenment found Serbs divided between two vast empires – Ottoman and Habsburg. At the end of the eighteenth century approximately the same number of Serbs, 600,000, lived in each of the two states. Namely, always opting for the Christian side, several hundred thousand Serbs had moved in mass migrations to Austria and Hungary in the wake of Turkish-Austrian wars at the end of the seventeenth and during the eighteenth century. Neither the Serbs nor other Christians in the Pashalik of Belgrade were in a position to develop national culture. There were hardly any literate persons, with the exception of few priests, themselves literate at a pretty basic level. Medieval churches were abandoned or derelict, and the construction of new ones was prohibited. There were no schools or cultural establishments, and it was only after 1830, following the First and Second Serbian Uprisings, that the Ottoman authorities allowed restoration or construction of churches and opening of vernacular schools. In brief, until the beginning of the nineteenth century the Serbs in the Pashalik of Belgrade remained largely illiterate and on the margin of European cultural development, maintaining oral literature and customs as their only cultural tradition.

By that time the centre of Serbian culture had moved to Southern Hungary, where Serbs, as imperial soldiers, mainly frontier guards, lived through a difficult period of adjusting to a different culture and foreign civilization. They differed from other citizens in being Orthodox Christian and in using Cyrillic script. The ideas of the Enlightenment that spread across the Habsburg Empire helped the Serbs to obtain some measure of religious and school autonomy from 1779. In the reign of Maria Theresa and Joseph II they succeeded in organizing their primary education and established a high school of their own, at first in Sremski Karlovci (Karlowitz) in 1791, then also in Novi Sad in 1810, as well as a teachers training school in Serb-inhabited Szentendre near Buda. In 1770 they were granted

a 20-year licence for a Serbian printing shop. It operated from that year in Vienna, and it was there that the first Serbian paper began to be printed in 1792. The Serbs enjoyed religious autonomy through the Metropolitanate of Karlovci. However, since they had no religious books of their own, they had to use Russian ones. As a result, the Serbian cultural elite adopted the Russian recension of Old Church Slavonic as their own.

It was in such a state of cultural backwardness that Serbs entered the age of Enlightenment. Their struggle for religious and school autonomy coincided with the development of the Habsburg Enlightenment, and they became acquainted with the original French ideas in a roundabout way, as they reached them already modified in Pest and Vienna. Direct contacts with French civilization were scarce, although the French language was spreading in Serbian high society in the Habsburg Monarchy. Personal contacts were rare and mainly limited to French immigrants from Lotharingia and Luxembourg who settled in Bačka and the Banat (today's Vojvodina, northern Serbia) between 1769 and 1771, and to French prisoners of war. During the French Revolution, many Serbs in the Austrian army sent to Belgium to suppress the revolt expressed their sympathies for this popular uprising with the words that they "cherish the French principles of liberty".¹ Closer contacts with French culture were hampered by Austrian censorship under Maria Theresa, prohibiting all anti-Catholic books. A *Catalog librorum prohibitorum* (1765) listed books by Rousseau and Voltaire, and from 1793 included all books expressing positive opinions about the French Revolution. The order of 1801 prohibiting "the works detrimental to religion, ethics and state" was also addressed to the Serb Metropolitan of Karlovci Djordje Stratimirović. In spite of the prohibition, these books by Enlightenment authors found their way to private libraries of many Serbian intellectuals. We know that Voltaire's works could be found in Zemun, the last Habsburg town on the border with Ottoman Serbia, and they even feature in the catalogue of the first Serbian bookstore started by Emanuel Janković. Sava Tekelija, a Serbian benefactor, wealthy feudalist and art patron residing in Budapest, had the complete works of Rousseau, Voltaire and the French encyclopaedists, and such books were not uncommon in the libraries of other Serbs such as the Russian general of Serbian descent Simeon Zorić, the bishop of Temesvar Petar Petrović and so on. Marmontel's *Bélisaire* was the first French novel translated into Serbian and published by Pavle Julinac in 1776/7.²

¹ M. Kostić, "Nekoliko idejnih odraza francuske revolucije u našem društvu krajem 18. i početkom 19. veka", *Zbornik Matice srpske* 3 (1953), 1.

² For more, see N. Gavrilović, "Littérature pédagogique française chez les Serbes à l'époque des Lumières" in *Les relations entre la France et les pays yougoslaves du dix-huitième au*

The French philosophers were rarely translated, and if they were, it was often from German translations. In the early nineteenth century they were only known to Serbian readers from translated excerpts of their works. One of the first translators of Rousseau's *Social Contract* was Stevan Živković, who studied, among other things, French literature in Vienna, and in 1805 joined the Serbian insurgents. Only later did some of their works become available as separate editions. Voltaire's novel *Zadig* (1826) and his tragedy *Zaira* (1843) were among his first books that were published.³ Rousseau's *Émile* was integrally translated from the original in 1864, but remained unpublished; the integral text was first published in Pančevo in 1872, but as a translation from German, while the *Social Contract* was translated and published integrally in 1892.⁴ Although translated relatively rarely, the French philosophers were often quoted and considerably written about. A thought of Voltaire's was chosen for the motto of the first French grammar in the Serbian language (written and published by Joakim Vujić in Buda in 1805), while Božidar Petranović, an outstanding Serbian author and journalist of the first half of the century, wrote a very interesting article on Rousseau, Voltaire and Bell in *Srpske novine* (Serbian Newspaper) in 1838.

As a result of their needs as a people deprived of their religious and national rights and quite poorly educated, the Serbs opted for the ideas of the Enlightenment. They embraced it in its Austrian form – Josephinism – as a movement prone to enable their development because, besides schools, the Tolerance Patent of 1781 proclaimed all religions equal. Through Josephinism they were also introduced to other ideas of the European Enlightenment. Initially, they accepted them selectively, choosing ideas which supported their national and cultural development. Therefore they first embraced Voltaire's stands on the protection of persecuted persons from his *Treatise on Tolerance*. From Rousseau's *Social Contract* they took sections about political institutions. Research shows that Sava Tekelija was the first Serb to discuss the French philosophers; he had all their books in his library and, in his doctoral thesis *De causa et fine civitatis* (1784), described Rous-

vingtième siècle (Ljubljana, 1987), 12-25; S. Kostić, "Kulturorientierung und Volksschule der Serben in der Donaumonarchie zur Zeit der Kaiserin Maria Theresia" in *Österreich im Europa der Aufklärung*, vol. II (Vienna, 1985), 847-866; D. Medaković, "Das historische Bewusstsein bei den Serben zur Zeit der Kaiserin Maria Theresia" in *Österreich im Europa der Aufklärung*, vol. II (Vienna, 1985), 867-882; M. Pavlović, *U dvostrukom ogledalu. Francusko-srpske kulturne i književne veze* (Belgrade, 1996); M. Kostić, *Prve pojave francuske kulture u srpskom društvu* (Sremski Karlovci, 1929)

³ M. Kostić, "Volter kod Srba", *Glas SAN CCXL* (Belgrade: SAN, Odeljenje literature i jezika 5, 1960), 65.

⁴ See Lj. Monev, *Žan-Žak Ruso kod Srba* (Belgrade, 1990).

seau as the greatest philosopher of the time. He embraced their views of natural life, criticized despotism and wondered how a free people could possibly submit to the authority of one man... Under the influence of these ideas, the Serbs assembled in 1790 for an ecclesiastical and national diet at Temesvar (present-day Timisoara, Romania) demanded their privileges and the right to have representatives in the Hungarian Diet, but their request was declined because “they do not have political existence as a people [and] because they are foreigners in Hungary”.⁵ At the same assembly, Jakov Sečanac protested against the privileges enjoyed by the nobility, and at his proposal a commission was appointed with the task of finding “possible ways to live in liberty”.⁶ The ideas about liberty, expounded in the *Social Contract* and given further impetus by the French Revolution, were also advocated by the Serb Ignjat Martinović, who became the leader of Hungarian Jacobins. In his *Oratio pro Leopoldo II* he is explicit that only the authority that follows from a social contract should be recognized, while seeing the aristocracy as the enemy of mankind, because they prevent people from becoming educated. In another of his works, *Catechism of People and Citizens*, he argues that citizens tend to oppose any repression and that sovereignty resides with the people. These ideas led to his execution in 1794, together with other 40 Jacobins. Inclined to the same ideas was also Božidar Grujović (Teodor Filipović), doctor of law and professor at Harkov University in Russia, who came to Serbia in 1805, during the First Serbian Uprising, and wrote *Slovo* (Speech) in the spirit of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen*. His guiding idea was the rule of the people, sovereignty and individual liberties. His paraphrase of Rousseau – better not to live than to live in slavery, is followed by the stand that common will rather than the will of one man should be the foundation of law. He thought that freedom is where laws are well worked out and where those in power abide by them. His stand on lawfulness is best expressed by a comparison between state and individual – law is for a state what food, air and housing is for a man. Maintaining that every citizen’s personal happiness and well-being depended on laws, he rejected any self-will and advocated a legislation that would ensure the natural right to equality and freedom, which was inspired by the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen*.⁷

The French philosophers’ tendency to rely on knowledge and science for liberating the minds and reducing the impact of the church was not

⁵ Quoted from Kostić, “Nekoliko idejnih odraza”, 3.

⁶ D. J. Popović, *Srbi u Vojvodini* (Novi Sad, 1966), 25.

⁷ G. Vukadinović, “Shvatanje prirodnog prava Božidara Grujovića” [B. Grujović’s notion of natural law] in *Pola veka nauke i tehnike u obnovljenoj Srbiji 1804–1854* (Kragujevac, 1996), 79–83.

welcomed among all Serbs. Namely, at the time the church was the most important custodian of national consciousness, as evidenced by the statement that “the words church, school and literature ... stand for the salvation of the soul and people in this world and the next”.⁸ Circles close to the church tended to keep education attached to it as a guarantee that religion, language and Cyrillic script should be preserved. On the opposite side were rationalists, who advocated modern education as necessary for the Serbs to become integrated into modern social processes. In their view, language was a more important marker of national identity. The enlightened stream gradually prevailed over the conservative, mostly owing to Dositej Obradović. When during the First Serbian Uprising he was entrusted with the task to engage in virtually nonexistent education and schooling in Serbia, he demanded that schools be opened in every municipal community, and when he was appointed minister of education in 1811, education was formally separated from the church and became a responsibility of the state.

Jovan Muškatirović (1743–1809), the first Serbian lawyer, better known as a writer, not quite original but important as a promoter of an education for the people, had a prominent place in the struggle against traditionalism and superstition. In 1786 he published a treatise *Kratkoe razmišljenje o prazdnici* (A Short Deliberation on Holidays), advocating a reduction in the number of religious holidays, an increase in the number of working days and, hence, an improvement of the economic power of the nation. Namely, at the beginning of the eighteenth century the Serbs in Serbia observed 170 religious holidays, while those living in the Habsburg Monarchy had, in addition, to celebrate all Catholic and public holidays. This seriously affected productivity, particularly in agriculture. Although Serbs tended to perceive some of these ideas as an attack on the Orthodox Church, the ideas of Enlightenment made it easier for the number of holidays to be reduced. He also wrote about health hazards of excessive fasting (at the time, fasting was prescribed for 200 days a year) and, inspired by the physiocratic theories, about the need to boost agricultural production. Another significant Serbian educator, Zaharije Orfelin, saw his mission not only in literature but also in the promotion of the education of the people. In *Iskusni podrumar* (Experienced Wine Producer) he wrote about vine growing, and in his paper *Zrcalo nauke* (Mirror of Science) discussed the issue of economic development. One of the greatest educators of the period was Uroš Milanković (1800–1849), a rationalist and mercantilist, who advocated a state-controlled economy as a way of safeguarding independence. His principal stand was that there could be no freedom without economic

⁸ Quoted in S. Gavrilović, “Srbi u Habsburškoj monarhiji od kraja XVIII do sredine XIX veka” in *Istorija srpskog naroda*, vol. V-2 (Belgrade: SKZ, 1981), 40.

independence, and in his book *Naše vreme* (Our Time, 1847) he advocated agricultural development based on the use of modern technology and the imperative of industrial development, which required an educated people.

Serbian educators' notion of education was a broad one, and they, much like the encyclopaedists, were creative in several fields of culture or science. Living under foreign rule, they did lag behind Europe, but within these few decades they wrote some books of paramount importance for the development of national culture. Jovan Rajić authored the first history of the Serbian people – *Istorija razni slovenskih narodov naipače Bolgar, Horvatov i Serbov* (History of Various Slavic Peoples, Notably Bulgarians, Croats and Serbs) – published in Vienna in 1794, as well as the first law textbook for the Lyceum of Belgrade *The Theoretical Foundations of Rhetoric: Elementary Principles*, where, quite in the spirit of the Enlightenment, he stresses that it is the duty of the state to reduce poverty, to provide employment for every citizen, and to prevent the accumulation of wealth in the hands of few. It is interesting that he proposes public works – construction of roads, canals, drainage of swamps, etc. – as one of the possible ways a state may undertake to increase employment.⁹ Atanasije Stojković, with Ph.D. from Göttingen University, is not only the author of the first novel in Serbian literature, but also of *Fisika* (Physics), the first book in Serbian offering a systematic presentation of natural sciences. Adjusting his style to the level of his readers' education, he makes use of interesting stories to explain natural phenomena. Although the first Serbian laws were based on Austrian modifications of French laws, direct French influences may be detected as well. Thus, the first Serbian expert in civil law Jovan Hadžić accepted Montesquieu's stand that the lawmaker must take into account the place and time to which a law applies. Therefore, the Serbian Civil Code (1844) introduced elements of Serbian common law rather than provisions contained in similar laws in Europe. The first textbook on natural law, written by the professor of the Belgrade Lyceum Jovan Sterija Popović, better known and still highly respected as a playwright, is also full of Enlightenment ideas. "His understanding of the freedom of thought, his view on the limits of state power, the responsibility of employees, the right of defence, international relations, parental power..." is notable.¹⁰

Radicalism towards the church and tradition among the early Serbian followers of the Enlightenment subsided after the death of Joseph II and writers restricted themselves to offering lessons and moral advice.

⁹ L. Pejić, *Jugoslavenski merkantilisti* (Belgrade, 1988), 237-238.

¹⁰ Quoted from M. Karanovich, *The Development of Education in Serbia and Emergence of its Intelligentsia (1838-1858)* (Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, 1995), 122.

Literary authors were mostly influenced by two Rousseau's works – *The New Heloise* and *Émile*, the former as a story about human rights, passion and emotions, and the latter as a model for modern education. Both works had an exceptional response in Europe, and among the Serbs as well. Instead of Julie and Saint-Preux, Atanasije Stojković writes in 1801 *Aristid i Natalija* (Aristide and Natalie), the first original novel in Serbian literature, quite in the spirit of late eighteenth-century ideas. It is a sentimental love story, but full of moral lessons, attractive descriptions of nature and idyllic pictures of rural life. Milovan Vidaković modelled his three-volume book *Ljubomir u Jelisijumu* (Ljubomir in Elysium) after *Émile*, but the events take place in a medieval setting, with his heroes being first educated in Greece before coming to Serbia. In the second and third volumes of the novel the author was inspired by some parts of Rousseau's *Social Contract*, notably those explicating the necessity of laws in society. This is the gist of advice a student gives to the medieval Serbian emperor Dušan in an imaginary conversation, in which the principle of equality before the law is requested for the nobility and the common people alike.¹¹ Both authors place the action of their books in Elysium – the same setting as the one chosen by Rousseau.

Joakim Vujić, founder of the first theatre in Serbia, in his plays written in the first years of the nineteenth century, e.g. *Fernando and Jarika*, uses an Enlightenment stereotype contrasting the purity and naturalness of savages with the corruptness of city people. Although most of his plays were a far cry from authentic creations, they had significant impact on the audience in their time.

Secularization made itself felt in eighteenth-century art. Portraits of saints and rulers assumed new, laicized forms. The major role in this was played by the *Stemmatography* (1741) of Hristofor Žefarović, where the medieval Serbian rulers are depicted as citizens after the current European fashion. The book emerged for political reasons – to demonstrate the antiquity of Serbian tradition to the court in Vienna. Besides artistic, its other and very important role was in awakening Serbian national consciousness.

Dositej Obradović is a paradigm of the Serbian Enlightenment. His work is a symbiosis of literature and philosophy, and his goal to teach the Serbian people to think freely and to adopt the results of contemporary science. Anticlericalism and antitraditionalism, ethic and scientific lessons characterize his works. Although borrowed from the cultural tradition of the Enlightenment, his ideas also contained Serbian cultural traditions. His life was similar to the lives of his ideal models, Rousseau and Voltaire. He came the way from a monk to the first Serbian minister of culture, he toured almost all of Europe, from the Black Sea and the island of Chios to London

¹¹ Monev, *Žan-Žak Ruso kod Srba*, 82.

and Leipzig, he lived poorly but also received honours. His *Autobiography* is a typical pedagogic novel of the age of Enlightenment in that it describes the futility of his years spent in a monastery and the benefits of his commitment to science. Although below the French models in quality, it was with this first Serbian educator that modern Serbian culture and its integration into the European cultural space began.

Although the Serbs did not draw on the sources of the Enlightenment directly, they did not remain altogether outside this European movement. Sometimes they took from it what they needed for their specific national development, and sometimes simply borrowed topics epigonically, following the Enlightenment models and their Austrian supporters. This is particularly noticeable in literature, with themes often copied from other literatures, which is typical of an emerging culture such as Serbian was at the time. Perhaps the most striking among many examples was the acceptance of Rousseau's view of the relationship between natural and urban man and his sympathy for the former. However, this concept could hardly be of relevance in Serbia, where the urban population accounted for only a few percents until the mid-nineteenth century. On the other hand, it should be noted that some of the ideas of this period helped the Serbs to recognize their own distinctive features and essential values as a nation, which in turn helped them to hold down the foreign spiritual legacy and to found a modern culture on their own values, suppressed by the centuries of foreign rule.

In its early years the Enlightenment produced manifold effects on the Serbs both in the Habsburg Empire and in the Principality of Serbia. First, its emphasis on the value of knowledge and science raised the awareness of the importance of education and contributed to its development. At the same time, religious tolerance and anticlericalism placed Orthodox Serbs side by side with representatives of other nations and religions and helped them to liberate themselves from the strong traditionalist impact of their church. Both education and a new awareness of their own rights strengthened national consciousness, eventually leading to the creation of a nation state and modern national culture. The period of Enlightenment also helped in moving the Serbian cultural centres from the north, where they had been dislocated in previous centuries, back to the south.

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The Establishment of Serbian Local Government in the Counties of Niš, Vranje, Toplica and Pirot Subsequent to the Serbo-Turkish Wars of 1876–1878

As a result of the wars of liberation against the Ottoman Empire in 1876–78 and decisions of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Serbia acquired independence, her territory considerably expanded¹ and the population increased by 299.640.² The major towns of the newly-liberated areas were Niš, Pirot, Vranje, Leskovac, Prokuplje and Kuršumlija. The so-called *New Areas* (Nove oblasti)³ were given their final legal shape under a special law, in the form of the counties of: Niš, Vranje, Pirot and Toplica.⁴ The process of establishing state administration and local government as well as incorporating the newly-liberated areas into the legal system of pre-war Serbia took five years (1877–82). It was a complex process, ridden with many difficulties. The intention was to bring stability to a backward feudal region marked by a volatile political situation, specific population distribution, high population density, intense migratory movements, ethnic and religious tensions, and a very low level of economic development. On the other hand, Serbia had to fulfil all the obligations stipulated by the Treaty of Berlin. Thus, establishing

¹ Before the wars, the Principality of Serbia enjoyed autonomy under Ottoman suzerainty and consisted of the Pashalik of Belgrade and the areas it had acquired by the Sultan's decree (hatti-sherif) of 1833: Ključ, Krajina, Crna Reka, Gurgusovac, Banja, Svrlijig, Aleksinac, Ražanj, Paraćin, Kruševac, Jadar, Radjevina, a smaller portion of the region known as Stari Vlah, and the Nahiye of Novi Pazar.

²M. Dj. Milićević, *Kraljevina Srbija – Novi krajevi, 1884* [Kingdom of Serbia–New Areas, 1884] (Belgrade, 1973), xvi.

³ The *New Areas* were incorporated into Serbia after the wars of liberation against the Ottoman Empire and the Congress of Berlin, and the term came into official usage immediately after liberation in December 1877 and January 1878. Milićević, *Kraljevina Srbija*, xv; National Assembly Sessional Records 1878–1907.

⁴ In Serbia, counties (*okrug*) were the largest units of local self-government, followed by districts (*srez*) as medium-sized and municipalities (*opština*) as the smallest.

state administration and local government in the newly-liberated areas was a three-fold process which included: 1) the legal organization of new local institutions; 2) the regulation of agrarian relations; and 3) the colonization of the liberated areas.⁵ This paper is devoted to the first part.

1. The legal organization of new local institutions

The Second Serbo-Turkish war broke out on 1 January 1877 and resulted in significant successes within several weeks.⁶ The Serbian army liberated large areas in the Južna (South) Morava and Nišava river valleys, virtually the whole region of south-eastern Serbia. By the time a peace treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Empire was signed at San Stefano, the provisional Serbian authorities controlled the following towns and villages: Niš, Prokuplje, Kuršumlija, Leskovac, Vlasotince, Bela Palanka, Pirot, Kula, Gramada, Belogradčik, Caribrod (modern-day Dimitrovgrad), Ginci, Dragoman, Slivnica, Breznik, Trn, Radomir, Klisura, Bosiljgrad, Vranje, Trgovište, Bujanovac, Preševo, Gnjilane, Kamenica, Novo Brdo, as well as the areas of the monasteries of Gračanica (in Kosovo) and Prohor Pčinjski (in Pčinja). The Serbian army had also penetrated close to Priština, Kumanovo and Kriva Palanka, and, apparently, volunteer units fighting under its command even entered Kustendil (medieval Velbuzd).⁷

According to the decisions of the Great Powers at the Congress of Berlin, a portion of the territory the Serbian Army had seized were assigned to the Principality of Bulgaria (Kula, Gramada, Belogradčik, Caribrod, Ginci, Dragoman, Slivnica, Breznik, Trn, Radomir and Bosiljgrad with its environs), and a portion was restored to the Ottoman Empire (Priština, Kumanovo, Kriva Palanka, Gnjilane, Lab District with Podujevo, and the Bujanovac-Preševo area with Upper Pčinja). At the same time, Serbian rule

⁵ For more on the resettlement of Albanians from these areas to Kosovo and the influx of Kosovo Serbs into these areas, see D. T. Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles* (Belgrade: Plato, 1992), esp. 111-112.

⁶ Russia started a war against the Ottoman Empire in April 1877, and emerged victorious in January 1878. The two sides negotiated, to the exclusion of other participants in the war, a new political situation in the Balkans, and on 3 March 1878 the Treaty of San Stefano was signed. The Ottomans had to accept the creation of an autonomous Bulgarian principality controlled by Russia, in fact a Greater Bulgaria as an instrument of Russia's dominance in the Balkans. The provisions of the Treaty, however, were significantly modified by the Treaty of Berlin of 13 July 1878, which did recognize an autonomous but much smaller Bulgaria within the Ottoman Empire.

⁷ A town in the southwest of modern Bulgaria; V. Stojančević, "Jugoistočna Srbija u vreme oslobođenja 1877-78" [Southeast Serbia at the Time of Liberation], *Leskovački zbornik XV* (1975), 71.

began to be established in the internationally recognized areas. First of all, many experienced officials serving in pre-war Serbia were sent to the newly-liberated areas with the powers of county prefects. They exercised their authority in the provisionally constituted territorial units. They were followed by other officials (magistrates, notaries, local treasury officers etc.) to assist in establishing the new local government in accordance with Serbia's state policy.⁸

A project for establishing local government in the areas to be liberated had been made in late 1875, simultaneously with Serbia's war plan (but it could not be carried out because Serbia suffered defeat in her first war against the Ottoman Empire in 1876). This may be inferred from a military report on Serbia's armament dated 1875,⁹ which also contained instructions for provisional institutions and officials and fixed the boundaries between the military powers of the *Supreme Administration*, and the civil powers of the *Auxiliary Administration*.¹⁰

The main role in establishing civil government was assigned to Serbia's Minister of Education and Religious Affairs Alimpije Vasiljević.¹¹ As the government's representative in the Supreme Army Command, he was authorized to issue a range of legislations necessary for establishing the first domestic local institutions in the liberated areas. Vasiljević was assisted by highest-ranking representatives of the military power, such as the head of the General Staff and the commander of the division responsible for the ongoing military operations. Serbia started implementing its war plan related to civil-military separation as early as December 1877. With the war still underway, however, the main duty of civil authorities was to collect clothes and food for the army.¹²

⁸ R. Guzina, *Opština u Srbiji 1839-1918* [The Municipality in Serbia 1839-1918] (Belgrade, 1976), 235.

⁹ V. Nikolić-Stojančević, *Leskovac i oslobođeni predeli Srbije 1877-78* [Leskovac and the liberated areas of Serbia 1877-78] (Leskovac, 1975), 26.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Alimpije Vasiljević (1831-1911), a Serbian politician, member of the Liberal Party, writer and professor of philosophy at the Great School in Belgrade (his most significant work was *The History of Education in Serbia*); he served several terms as Minister of Education and Religious Affairs (including the period of the Serbo-Turkish wars 1876-78), and was appointed Serbian diplomatic envoy to Russia twice.

¹² A letter by the Chief of the General Staff to the Minister of the Interior of 11 December 1877 shows the most important reasons for civil-military separation, cf. Guzina, *Opština*, 237; Nikolić-Stojančević, *Leskovac*, 58-59.

According to the research done by Slobodanka Stojičić,¹³ the process of establishing domestic civil government in the *New Areas* and incorporating them into the legal system of pre-war Serbia passed through two phases: 1) the establishment of provisional local institutions, and 2) the establishment of permanent local institutions on the model of those that already existing in the Principality of Serbia. The first phase lasted one year: from the arrival of the first officials in December 1877 until 17 December 1878, when the *Law on the Division of the Annexed Area into Counties and Districts* was passed, whereby the structure of local institutions of the new administrative units was finally established. The second phase began with the enactment of this law and lasted until 30 March 1881, when the *Law on the Enactment of the Police Profession Law in the Liberated and Annexed Areas* was brought into force as the final act in the process of incorporating the liberated areas into the legal system of pre-war Serbia. This was a painstaking task, because it involved removing, or at least modifying, the effects of Ottoman rule such as an outdated social system, underdeveloped economy, rudimentary state institutions, weak public finances, and feudal property relations.

a) First period: The provisional organization of local government

Alimpije Vasiljević signed the first instructions for the provisional organization of local government on 23 December 1877, titled *Rules for All Officials in the Seized Serbian Areas*.¹⁴ The *Rules* predominantly regulated the *conduct* of all officials who had begun to work in the new Serbian areas. They reminded the officials of the significance of their role in establishing the principles of law and order. The officials were expected to perform their duties in such a way that the people could feel *all the benefits of a brotherly government*, although they were warned not to turn into *leniency*.¹⁵ One of the interim instructions for the newly-established institutions was to settle all disputes *orally and promptly*, and to be of assistance to the Serbian army and the population in the *New Areas*.¹⁶

The *Rules* also regulated new local, district and municipal, government bodies in the liberated areas. The new districts were administered by

¹³ S. Stojičić, *Novi krajevi Srbije 1878–1883* [Serbia's New Areas 1878–83] (Leskovac, 1975).

¹⁴ *Pravila* [hereafter: *Rules*] in *Zbornik zakona i uredaba izdanih u Knjažestvu Srbiji XXXII* [Collection of Laws and Regulations Issued in the Principality of Serbia; hereafter: *Laws*] (Belgrade, 1878), 239–241.

¹⁵ *Rules*, 239.

¹⁶ *Rules*, 239.

a body of three members: *one for the Police, one for the Judiciary and one for Finances*. The Chief of Police was in charge of maintaining law and order, the Chief of Judiciary of judicial proceedings, and the Chief of Finance took care of the public revenue for the unit under his jurisdiction.¹⁷

The officials initially dispatched by the Serbian government to administer the new districts became the heads of local administration.¹⁸ They acted as a link with the government's member in the Supreme Army Command, and answered to him.¹⁹ According to S. Stojičić, these officials can neither be considered real district prefects, nor can their local administration be identified with real district prefectures, and for two reasons: 1) the territorial extent of the new districts corresponded more to pre-war Serbia's counties, and 2) the newly-established district administrations differed both in structure and in powers from the district prefectures of pre-war Serbia (collective bodies, Chief of Justice, collective governing in the sphere of police, judicial and financial matters). Therefore, the district administration should be viewed as a particular form of civil government, which was necessary under transitional conditions in the *New Areas*.²⁰

District administrations had several concerns. The *first concern* was to make a record of all municipalities, to specify the district's inner structure, and to establish municipal administrations.²¹

As can be seen from the *Rules*, the organization of municipal government was another task assigned to the central government's officials, to be carried out in the following way: the officials were to consult with distinguished local citizens on the appointment of members to municipal councils; the mayors were to be chosen from select persons of *confidence and energy willing and capable to perform their duties to the satisfaction of all*. Finally, every municipality was to elect a municipal council of five to fifteen members in accordance with its size, and to hire several salaried clerks.²²

And yet, the central government's officials often left local institutions as they had been under Ottoman rule. This is obvious from a report by Alimpije Vasiljević, revealing that the Serbian government found it suitable to preserve the existing institutions because the people had been accustomed

¹⁷ *Rules*, 240.

¹⁸ Stojičić, *Novi krajevi Srbije*, 41; *Rules*, 239.

¹⁹ *Rules*, 239.

²⁰ Stojičić, *Novi krajevi*, 41.

²¹ *Rules*, 241.

²² *Rules*, 240-241.

to them. In that way the local population was likely to accept their new administration more easily.²³

In the process of municipal reorganization, the most significant task of district administrations was to group villages into municipalities and to carry out a property enumeration. Several important factors played a part in the process, such as the natural boundaries of a municipality, communal orientation points (schools, churches, wells, watermills etc.) and the occupations of the population (farming, cattle-breeding, crafts). Nevertheless, the procedure could not be uniform for all the liberated areas, as different situations in different areas needed to be taken into account. Therefore, the newly-established authorities had to rely on the advice and opinion of local household heads.²⁴ It was even more difficult to carry out the enumeration of property was more difficult, and it required military support and assistance. The civil authorities were too weak to prevent the widespread looting of the abandoned Turkish property and frequent raids of armed Muslim Albanians into the liberated areas.

The implementation of the instructions contained in the *Rules* and the experience gained from it led to the first law regulating the legal status of municipalities and municipal authorities, passed by the National Assembly on 3 January 1878 – the *Provisional Law on the Liberated Areas Organization*.²⁵ This law defined the legal status of counties, districts and municipalities in all the liberated territory, as well as the responsibilities and procedures for their administrations. Although it made no change to the existing subdivisions, it left room for the district administrations to institute changes *if necessary and in consultation with the distinguished household heads*, but only before the process of reorganization was finalized. After that, any change to the structure and name of a municipality required approval from the Minister of the Interior.²⁶

Under the *Provisional Law* territorial subdivisions became typical policing subdivisions with some judicial powers. To judge from its provisions, it in fact was the *Law on County Prefecture System and County Prefect Office* of 1839 extended to the annexed areas under a *lex specialis*. According to its Article 53, every county had its organs of government,²⁷ such as the county prefect, the county treasury officer and the county judge.

²³ Guzina, *Opština*, 239.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Provisional Law in Laws*, 251–257.

²⁶ *Provisional Law*, Art. 1, 2 and 3, p. 251.

²⁷ *Provisional Law*, Art. 53, p. 261.

As the head of a county, the county prefect exercised police and some judicial powers (minor civil and criminal cases) in the area under his jurisdiction, assisted by the necessary number of personnel. He was appointed by the Prince at the proposal of the Minister of the Interior. He attended all county affairs through district and municipal administrations, which he had the power to replace. In case a county did not have its military commander, the county prefect fulfilled those duties as well.

The county treasury officer was in charge of economic and financial affairs. He was appointed by the Prince at the proposal of the Minister of Finance. Judicial power was embodied in the high judge appointed by the Prince at the proposal of the Minister of Justice. He exercised judicial authority in accordance with his legal powers.²⁸

According to Article 51 of the *Provisional Law*, every county was subdivided into districts,²⁹ and every district had its government bodies, headed by the district prefect and the district judge. The district prefect exercised police and some judicial powers (minor civil and criminal cases) in the area under his jurisdiction. He was appointed by the Prince at the proposal of the Minister of the Interior. He attended district affairs through municipal administrations, which he had the power to replace; in case the district had no military commander, the district prefect fulfilled his duties as well. Every district had a district judge appointed by the Prince at the proposal of the Minister of Justice, and he exercised judicial authority in accordance with his legal powers.³⁰

Under Article 22 of the *Provisional Law*, districts were subdivided into municipalities, which in turn were classified by size into three groups: small municipalities with up to 200 taxpayers, medium-sized municipalities with more than 200 taxpayers, and large municipalities with more than 500 taxpayers.³¹ Every municipality had its organs of government embodied in the mayor office. At the second session of the National Assembly in 1879, a member of the Serbian Parliament (Ćirko Andrejić) described the procedure for the appointment of municipal mayors in the *New Areas*: "At the outbreak of the second war [second Serbo-Turkish war], I was authorized by the commander to choose men in my district who would work properly. And I did, I chose several mayors and they still are mayors, and no one is unhappy with them."³²

²⁸ *Provisional Law*, Art. 55-57 and 62, pp. 261-263.

²⁹ *Provisional Law*, Art. 51, p. 261.

³⁰ *Provisional Law*, Art. 25-29, 33, 34 and 36, pp. 255-257.

³¹ *Provisional Law*, Art. 18, p. 254.

³² *Stenografske beleške o sednicama Narodne skupštine za 1879-90* [National Assembly Sessional Records for 1879-90], 1063-1064.

A municipal mayor was assisted by one or two assistants and several clerks, as well as by the necessary number of policemen. None of these offices or posts was elective. The mayor was appointed by the district prefecture *from among the distinguished household heads in a municipality*. Like county and district prefects in their jurisdictions, he exercised policing and minor judicial powers in his municipality, and fulfilled the duties of a military commander if there was not one. As the bearer of administrative powers, the municipal mayor was obliged to *deal with all affairs of state as required from a municipality*. As a judicial authority, the municipal mayor judged civil cases of no more than 50 dinars and minor criminal cases where the punishment was limited to 5 days in prison or a 50-dinar fine. However, not even these minor cases were under the exclusive jurisdiction of municipal courts; they could be committed to district courts. Appeals against the municipal court decisions could be lodged with district courts, and the last level was the so-called grand judge whose decision was binding.³³

It is important to note that all judges (municipal mayors, district judges and grand judges) tried cases not according to a written law, but in all *conscience, belief and knowledge of justice and tradition*.³⁴ They were advised on the local legal customs by councils consisting of local community members. Such a procedure was practical, because trials were quick, although it was more primitive than collegial judging in accordance with written law.³⁵

Every municipality had a council consisting of five, ten or fifteen members, in proportion to its size. This council was an advisory body, convened and presided over by the mayor; it discussed a range of issues of importance for the municipality.³⁶

The administrative functioning of municipal (district and county) government was overseen by the Minister of the Interior. As for different *professional responsibilities*, they were under the control of the corresponding ministers. However, during the war all bodies were also subject to the military authorities.³⁷

The relationship between the *Provisional Law* and the 1866 *Law on Municipalities and Municipal Government* (passed under Prince Mihailo),³⁸ i.e. *Alterations and Amendments* made to this Law in 1875, was regulated un-

³³ *Provisional Law*, Art. 4-8, 11, 13, 37 and 66, pp. 251-253, 258, 264.

³⁴ Slobodan Jovanović, *Vlada Milana Obrenovića II* [The Reign of Milan Obrenović] (Belgrade, 1991), 13.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Provisional Law*, Art. 18 and 19, p. 254.

³⁷ *Provisional Law*, Art. 71 and 73, p. 265.

³⁸ Prince Mihailo Obrenović (1823-68), son of Prince Miloš Obrenović, ruled 1840-42 and 1860-68. His rule may be described as *enlightened autocracy*.

der Article 87 of the *Provisional Law*: if there were no provisions for a concrete case in the *Provisional Law*, nor a local custom to abide by, the 1875 Serbian Law could be implemented in order to bridge such legal lacunae.³⁹

As can be seen, the *Provisional Law* envisaged the subsidiary use of a Serbian positive law, thereby paving the way for the incorporation of the *New Areas* into the legal system of pre-war Serbia. The same Law also ensured some essential values of civil society, such as the principle of equality before the law and religious freedom. All citizens of the liberated areas were made equal with the citizens of Serbia not only in rights but also in obligations (e.g. military service, taxation).⁴⁰

It is interesting to note that shortly after its enactment the *Provisional Law* was criticized in the magazine *Straža* (Sentry) in the article authored by "A Socialist Propagator".⁴¹ The anonymous writer claims that the principle of local self-government and prompt trial is at odds with the subordinate position of municipal institutions to bureaucracy and police, and instead demands political freedoms and the introduction of a true principle of local government.

Counties and districts were established under the *Law on Provisional Administrative Organization of the Liberated Areas* of 14 May 1878.⁴² All the liberated territory was divided into six counties (Niš, Kuršumljija, Leskovac, Vranje, Pirot and Kula) with 21 districts.⁴³ Each county and district was allocated the necessary number of policemen, financial and judicial officers, in order to alleviate the lack of skilled staff in the freshly-established local administration.⁴⁴ At the same time, the administrative, judicial and financial professions were completely separated, which was the last step in establish-

³⁹ *Provisional Law*, Art. 87, p. 268.

⁴⁰ *Provisional Law*, Art. 75-77, 80 and 81, pp. 266-267.

⁴¹ *Straža* was a socialist-coloured magazine for science, literature and social issues, published in Novi Sad (then in Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, today the capital of Vojvodina, Serbia) from September 1878 to March 1879. Its editor was Lazar Paču, subsequently a minister in several Serbian cabinets 1903-14. The likely author of this article was Pera Todorović (a friend and co-worker of Svetozar Marković's and a founding member of the People's Radical Party 1881), because he was responsible for political articles as a member of the editorial board of the magazine. *Straža*, Nov-Dec. 1878, 427-430.

⁴² *Law on Provisional Administrative Organization* in *Laws*, 308-315.

⁴³ Under Art. 2 of the Law, the County of Niš included the districts of: Niš, Koprivnica and Bela Palanka; 2. the County of Kuršumljija: Prokuplje, Kuršumljija, Ibar and Vučitrn; 3. the County of Leskovac: Veternik, Vlasina and Pusta Reka; 4. the County of Vranje: Vlasina, Poljana, Morava and Pčinja; 5. the County of Pirot: Visoki, Breznica, Nišava, Trn and Lužnica; and 6. the County of Kula included the districts of: Kula and Novo Selo.

⁴⁴ *Law on Provisional Administrative Organization*, Art. 3, pp. 310-311.

ing a provisional domestic government in a situation when the borders between the new Balkan states had not been drawn yet. Serbian government extended to all the areas taken by the Serbian army, overcoming, more or less successfully, many ethnic and religious barriers in the process. For example, there were many difficulties in the borderland between Serbia and Bulgaria (especially in the Šop region),⁴⁵ due to an unconsolidated ethnic awareness of the local people influenced both by the Serbian and Bulgarian national propagandas.

The *kojabashi* (non-Muslim community leader) of the Ottoman *Kaza* of Trn, Arandjel Stanojević, had a very important role in the establishing of Serbian civil government in the liberated Znepolje,⁴⁶ where he was first appointed president of the local court, and then head of the district of Trn. Under the *Provisional Law* of 3 January and the *Law on Provisional Administrative Organization* of 14 May 1878, Trn became the administrative seat of Znepolje, i.e. of the District of Trn included in the newly-formed County of Pirot.⁴⁷ Professor Panta Srećković⁴⁸ became the first prefect of the County of Pirot, and Arandjel Stanojević was appointed prefect of the District of Trn. Stanojević persistently campaigned for international recognition of the sovereignty of the Principality of Serbia over all areas taken

⁴⁵ The Šop area (*Šopluk* or *Šopsko*) is a mountainous area on the modern-day border between Serbia, Bulgaria and Macedonia, the boundaries of which are quite vague. The term Šop has always denoted the common people, highlanders. Cf. *Skrivene manjine na Balkanu (Hidden Minorities in the Balkans)*, ed. Biljana Sikimić (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2004) and therein the articles by P. Hristov, 67-83, and S. Zlatanović, 83-95.

⁴⁶ A Serbian popular leader and representative before the Ottoman authorities, Arandjel Stanojević was considered one of the most distinguished figures from Niš to Sofia, and from Pirot to Kustendil. Moreover, as a cattle trader, he was one of the richest locals. He was originally from Klisura, a highland settlement on the boundary between Znepolje and Vidin (today in Bulgaria). He was respected by the Turks as well. Stanojević spoke Turkish, French and Greek. After the arrival of the Serbian army he assumed an active role in establishing Serbian rule in the sanjaks of Niš and Sofia. See V. Stojančević, "Kodžabaša trnske kaze Arandjel Stanojević i srpsko-bugarski spor oko Trna i Znepolja 1878-1879", *Istorijski časopis* XXV, 195-196.

⁴⁷ National feelings of the local population of Znepolje were a highly important matter for the Serbian government and its claims on the liberated areas. Based on field reports, the Serbian government was quite confident that the people of Trn, Klisura and 80 other villages of Znepolje thought of themselves as Serbs, cf. Stojančević, "Kodžabaša", 199-200.

⁴⁸ Panta Srećković (1834-1903), professor of history at the Great School in Belgrade and politician. His historical writing on Serbia's past lacked the necessary criticism.

by the Serbian army on the border with Bulgaria.⁴⁹ He also energetically struggled against the propaganda of the Bulgarian Committee from Sofia, against the Exarchate bishops – especially bishop Eustathius (appointed by the Exarchate,⁵⁰ on the eve of the war against the Ottoman Empire, as head of the Eparchy of Nišava), and the Russian envoy to Sofia Alabin, who demanded that the Serbian authorities leave the former sanjaks of Niš and Sofia in order that these could be annexed to Bulgaria in compliance with the Treaty of San Stefano.⁵¹ Bulgarians were aware that Stanojević was distinguished in the local community, and that the annexation of the Kaza of Trn and Znepolje to Bulgaria was difficult without Stanojević on their side. Thus, Stanojević was offered to become a deputy of the Bulgarian Constitutional Assembly which was to establish the first domestic government⁵² after the departure of Russians from Bulgaria.⁵³ He declined the offer.⁵⁴ When the Congress of the Great Powers in Berlin was over on 13

⁴⁹ Arandjel Stanojević was the representative of the Kaza of Trn in a deputation to St. Petersburg in April 1878 to petition the Russian emperor for the right of the people of Pirot, Trn, Vranje and the neighbouring areas of *Old Serbia* to be *Old-Serbs* and, consequently, to remain in Serbia, cf. Stojančević, “Kodžabaša”, 203; B. Lilić, *Istorija Piroti i okoline* (1878–1918), vol. II, 246.

⁵⁰ From the abolishment of the Patriarchate of Peć in 1766 and the Archbishopric of Ohrid in 1767, all Bulgarian and Serbian bishoprics came under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which replaced almost all Slav bishops with ethnic Greeks. This was opposed by all Orthodox Slavs, Serbian and Bulgarian, who strove to emancipate their respective churches from the Greek Patriarchate. Backed by Russia, Bulgarians succeeded in establishing their autonomous church organization, and on 28 February 1870, by the Sultan’s decree, the Bulgarian Exarchate was established; its jurisdiction also extended to many Serb-inhabited areas, including the counties of Niš, Pirot and Vranje. In the areas under the Exarchate’s jurisdiction, Greek bishops and teachers were replaced with Bulgarian.

⁵¹ There was a significant gap between Pirot’s urban population and its rural surroundings. Many members of the Pirot elite, known as *čorbadžije* (chorbaji), accepted both the Exarchate and the Bulgarian idea, and were unwilling to break up their business relations with the markets of northern Bulgaria, Thrace and Constantinople. The rural population of the Pirot area, by contrast, accepted hardly any change in their life, upheld their customs and tradition, and supported the unification of Pirot with Serbia. The Exarchate sought to exploit this gap, especially under the mutaserif of Pirot Jordanča-Pasha Bakalov, cf. Lilić, *Istorija Piroti*, 247.

⁵² Stojančević, “Kodžabaša”, 209–210.

⁵³ Stationed in Bulgaria during the war, Russian army officers and soldiers behaved as a “domestic element”.

⁵⁴ Stanojević was warned that he would be tried by the “people’s court” if he did not declare himself a Bulgarian, which really meant that the Bulgarian Committee would have him executed. See Stojančević, “Kodžabaša”, 211.

July 1878, the borders between the independent Principality of Serbia and the autonomous Principality of Bulgaria were finally defined. The District of Trn and Znepolje became part of Bulgaria, and Stanojević moved to Serbia. In the Pirot region, he is still remembered as a man who made personal sacrifices for his homeland.⁵⁵

b) Second period: The permanent organization of local government

As a result of the Berlin Treaty, new states emerged in the Balkans. Serbia had to cede a large portion of the liberated territory to Bulgaria or to restore it to the Ottoman Empire. Both the military and civil authorities of the Principality of Serbia withdrew from the ceded and restored territories. Alos, a good part of the local population withdrew with them, unwilling to acknowledge the new borders. Serbia retained the largest part of the former Sanjak of Niš, while the smaller part and the whole Sanjak of Sofia were annexed to the autonomous Principality of Bulgaria. The Sanjak of Priština was restored to the Ottomans.

From that moment, the process of establishing permanent institutions of local government in the *New Areas* began. The Serbian government focused all its efforts on the constitutional and overall legal unification of post-Berlin Serbia.

Even before Serbia's legislature made the new areas administratively and legally equal with pre-war Serbia, the Serbian government had decreed their political unification by extending voting rights to the new citizens of Serbia, who voted in the parliamentary elections of 28 October 1878. The government's position was that the *New Areas* had not been conquered but liberated and that, consequently, they should enjoy all constitutional and political rights as from day one.⁵⁶ The Opposition suspected the government of having been guided by party political motives. Indeed, in the politically uneducated *New Areas*, where the fear of authorities was still strong, a chance for the government's candidates to win elections was greater than in pre-war Serbia. The Prime Minister, Jovan Ristić,⁵⁷ could rely on his party's

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 209–216.

⁵⁶ Jovanović, *Vlada Milana Obrenovića II*, 14.

⁵⁷ Jovan Ristić (1831–1899) was one of the most important Serbian politicians of the nineteenth century, a historian, diplomat and statesman, the unquestionable leader of the Liberal Party. He was a member of the Regency for underage Prince Milan Obrenović 1869–72, and underage King Alexander Obrenović 1889–93. He successfully completed long negotiations on the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from Serbia under Prince Mihailo Obrenović (1840–42, 1860–68; King 1882–89) and worked on the 1869 Regency Constitution. He was the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time

candidates in the *New Areas*, who firmly supported his government after the elections.

Political unification was followed by administrative and judicial unification. On 17 December 1878 the National Assembly passed the *Law on the Division of the Annexed Areas into Counties and Districts*.⁵⁸ Under this Law, the annexed areas were divided into four counties (Niš, Vranje, Pirot and Toplica) and 15 districts.⁵⁹ In addition, several important provisions of the *Provisional Law* of 3 January 1878 were revoked (Articles 22, 23, 51 and 52), mostly those regulating the grouping of municipalities into districts and districts into counties and the seats of districts and counties. This question was settled by a decree Prince Milan Obrenović issued on 6 February 1879, finally defining the boundaries of districts and counties, and the seats of local administration, listing all the villages included in their inner structure (1001 villages in 15 districts).⁶⁰ In that way, the unification that was de facto carried out even before the state borders in the Balkans were finally drawn, got its legal framework resulting in the administrative unification of the whole of the Principality of Serbia.

Under the *Law on Legal Proceedings in the Annexed Areas* of 31 December 1878⁶¹ judicial unification was carried out. The Serbian laws concerning the judiciary, civil and criminal law (material and procedural) were extended to the *New Areas*.⁶² The only exceptions were the legislation on immovable property and the *Law on Lawyers*. The first exception resulted from Serbia's international obligations as stipulated by the Berlin Treaty, and the second one had its domestic reasons. Domestic legislation on the immovable property was not extended to the *New Areas* because the Great Powers at the Congress of Berlin had met some demands of the Porte and the Ottoman landowners. The limitations imposed on Serbia concerned the

of the Berlin Congress, and the international recognition of Serbia was for the most part his doing. His historical writings include: *Foreign Relations of Serbia 1848-72* and *Serbian Diplomacy the Serbian Wars of Liberation and Independence 1875-78*.

⁵⁸ *Law on the Division of the Annexed Areas into Counties and Districts* in *Laws XXXIV* (1879), 32-34.

⁵⁹ Art. 1 of the *Law on the Division of the Annexed Areas*: 1. Niš County with Niš as its county town included four districts: of Niš, Zaplanje, Leskovac and Vlasotince; 2. Pirot County with Pirot as its county town also had four districts: of Nišava, Visoki, Bela Palanka and Lužnica; 3. Vranje County with Vranje as its county seat had three counties: of Pčinja, Poljanica and Masurica; and 4. Toplica County with Prokuplje as its provisional seat had four counties: of Dobrica, Prokuplje, Kosanica and Jablanica, 196-209.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 196-197.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 71-77.

⁶² *Law on Legal Proceedings*, Art. 3 and 4, pp. 71-74.

obligation to award compensation to the holders of former spahiliks in the liberated areas. Therefore, the issue was solved by a special law in compliance with Serbia's international obligations assumed by the ratification of the Berlin Treaty. The *Law on Lawyers* was not extended to the *New Areas* because the Serbian government assumed that the ill-informed population of the liberated areas might fall prey to unscrupulous lawyers.⁶³

3. Conclusion

The incorporation of the newly-annexed areas into the legal system of post-war Serbia was carried out fully in the administrative and judicial spheres, civil (except the question of land ownership) and criminal law. The process was rounded off with the passing of the *Law on the Enactment of the Police Profession Law in the Liberated and Annexed Areas* on 30 March 1881.⁶⁴ Under this Law the legislations of the Principality of Serbia concerning the organization of local government and its powers were extended to the *New Areas*. Most of its provisions regulated the extension to the liberated areas of all legislations on municipalities, districts and counties and their organization and functioning.⁶⁵ It is important to note that the 1875 *Law on Municipalities* was extended to the *New Areas* under this Law. The legal unification of Serbia, which had begun with the Second Serbo-Turkish War in 1877 and lasted until the passing of this Law under the Progressivist government in 1881, was thus completed.

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⁶³ Serbia extended the *Law on Lawyers* to her *New Areas* in 1881, together with other legislations that had not been in force in the liberated areas before that year.

⁶⁴ *Laws*, 526.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

Milan St. Protić

Sources of the Ideology of the Serbian Radical Movement
1881–1903

From a historical perspective, every political movement has two essential aspects: its theory and its practice. The theoretical aspect includes ideology, understood as a set of ideas which define the movement's political and philosophical stand on various issues. Practical aspects refer to its existence and actions in the actual historical context, a specific time and place. It is this dual nature of political movements that give them their complex historical character. The two aspects are often so intertwined that it is impossible to divide and analyze them separately. In other instances, they seem so contradictory to each other that it is virtually impossible to determine their common denominator and establish relations between the theory and practice of a single political movement.

The sources of the ideology of Serbian Radicalism¹ were twofold: imported and original. The imported (or foreign) influences on the Radical movement came in three major waves. The first wave came from European (especially Russian) socialist, anarchist, and populist traditions, mainly influencing the group round Svetozar Marković, and covering the period of Radicalism in Serbia known as rudimentary Radicalism. The second wave resulted from the influence of the French Radical movement, which had strong impact on Serbian Radicals regarding both their political programme and their organization.² The third wave of influence came from the British parliamentary and constitutional theory which, by the late 1880s, had been fully accepted by the Radicals in Serbia. The ideas that the Radicals drew

¹ For more detail, see Milan St. Protić, *Radikali u Srbiji 1881–1903* (Radicals in Serbia 1881–1903) (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1990).

² Cf. also D. T. Bataković, "Francuski uticaji u Srbiji 1935–1914. Četiri generacije Parižlija", *Zbornik za istoriju Matice srpske* 56 (1997), 73–95, and his "L'influence française sur la formation de la démocratie parlementaire en Serbie", *Revue d'Europe centrale* VII/no. 1 (1999; Strasbourg 2000), 17–44.

from European political experience needed to be transformed, changed, and adapted to suit the specific Serbian political environment. The internal (or domestic) sources of Radicalism were the specific political circumstances of Serbian society. Within a general historical framework, political expressions emerging from the ruler on the one hand and from political parties on the other fundamentally influenced and modified the Radical ideology. Finally, it is necessary to draw some general conclusions regarding the sources of Serbian Radical ideology, which includes a classification of particular influences and the degree of their impact on Serbian Radicalism.

Chronologically, the earliest was the influence of European socialist ideas and therefore it will be discussed first.

I

The influence of European socialism reached the Radical movement in its earliest phase of development, during a period when future Radical founders and leaders were associated with the group of Svetozar Marković.³ During the late 1860s the Swiss city of Zurich attracted many young, politically conscious students from all over Europe. Undoubtedly the most significant of them was Mikhail Bakunin, a Russian émigré and the leading figure of the anarchist movement.⁴ He played a central role among the student youth in Zurich, and organized many clandestine and semi-clandestine political groups and meetings. His reputation of the leader of the most radical wing of the Socialist International secured him the position of the central figure in the leftist movement not only in Switzerland, but in all of Europe. Bakunin's teaching included a social revolution carried out by violent means, the destruction of the state organization, and the establishment of free associations of individuals based on their free will. His personal commitment was based on his long years in Tsarist Russian prisons, which had a powerful impact on the young intellectuals in Zurich.⁵

In the late 1860s a small group of Serbian students arrived in Zurich as Serbian government grant holders sent abroad to obtain higher education. In 1868, Svetozar Marković came to Zurich from St. Petersburg, where he had already begun his political career as a follower of Russian socialists,

³ For more detail, see Jovan Skerlić, *Svetozar Marković, njegov život, rad i ideje* (Belgrade, 1922); Sofija Škorić, "The Populism of Nikola Pašić: The Zurich Period", *East European Quarterly* XIV, no. 4 (Winter 1980), 469-485.

⁴ Velizar Ninčić, *Pera Todorović* (Belgrade, 1956), 31-32.

⁵ Drag. Cilić, "Pera Todorović", Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (hereafter ASANU) no. 10634, p. 3; see also Ninčić, *Pera Todorović*, 32-35.

such as Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyubov and Lavrov.⁶ Together with the other Serbian students he organized an informal, distinctly socialist-anarchist political group known as the “Zurich group”. All of its members were future Radicals: Nikola Pašić, Pera Velimirović, Raša Milošević, Pera Todorović and Jovan Žujović.⁷ By the early 1869, they had decided to organize a political movement, and to name it the Radical Party.⁸ In February the same year Svetozar Marković, Nikola Pašić, Pera Velimirović and Djura Ljočić agreed to elaborate the political programme of their political organization in the making, but the attempt failed due to the fact that Svetozar Marković had to return to Serbia. He had been denied government grant on account of his subversive political activities.⁹

Although their first attempt to organize a political party failed, the young Serbian students returned to Serbia full of enthusiasm for socialist ideas. The works of Russian populists and Western socialists, which they brought to their native country, became major expressions of their political beliefs.

Upon their return to Serbia (1870–71), the members of Svetozar Marković’s group started a number of socialist newspapers – *Radenik* (Worker), *Javnost* (The Public), *Oslobodjenje* (Liberation), *Rad* (Work) – and continued political activities along socialist lines. Until the death of its leader Svetozar Marković in 1875, the movement gradually moved from pure socialism to Radical democracy,¹⁰ because of the peculiarities of Serbian society. With the vast majority of peasant population and virtually no working class, the ideas of socialism simply could not be applied in their original form. Thus, faced with Serbian socio-political realities, the socialist group of Svetozar Marković focused on democratic political reforms instead of social change.

Even so, some purely socialist elements can be found in the Radical movement even in its much later years. In a personal letter to a friend, a member of the Radical Party wrote in 1883: “I’d break the neck of anyone

⁶ See Slobodan Jovanović, *Svetozar Marković* (Belgrade, 1920), 8–12; also, Woodford McClellan, *Svetozar Markovic and the Origins of Balkan Socialism* (Princeton, 1964), 241–242.

⁷ S. Marković to Belimarković, 11 May 1869, in *Odabrani spisi* [Selected Writings] (Belgrade–Novi Sad, 1969).

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Svetozar Marković, “Srpske obmane”, *Zastava*, Novi Sad, 1869.

¹⁰ Cilić, “Pera Todorović”, 3; see also Slobodan Jovanović, *Političke i pravne rasprave*, 2 vols. (Belgrade, 1932), vol. I, 223; and Skerlić, *Svetozar Marković*, 95.

who says I'm not a socialist. I am as proud of that name as I am proud of the name of an active Radical."¹¹

A report from Smederevo dated the same year mentions a group of workers among local Radicals "which has socialist colours and numbers some 70 members".¹² A secret report to King Milan Obrenović, also of 1883, mentions a Toma Milošević, a member of the Radical Party from eastern Serbia (Vražogrnci), who pursued his studies in Zurich and now overtly "declares himself a nihilist".¹³

From 8 July 1883, Pera Todorović, a founding member of the Radical Party and its major ideologue in its formative period, subscribed to the French revolutionary newspapers of socialist-radical orientation *La Bataille*, *Le Proletaire* and *L'Intrensigeant*.¹⁴

Following the formation of the Radical Party in 1881 and the publication of its political programme, a group of Svetozar Marković's orthodox followers who maintained a pure socialist position formed a small political group led by Mita Cenić. They confronted the Radicals, accusing them of betraying Marković's original ideas and abandoning the socialist cause in general.¹⁵

In defining the position of the Radical Party in relation to socialism, Lazar Paču published in 1881 in *Samouprava* a series of articles under the title "The Middle Class Society and Its Political Parties",¹⁶ in which he made a threefold classification of political movements:

A group that wants to take society back to feudalism [reactionary or aristocratic parties]. A group called "money aristocracy", which teaches that human society reached its apex at a certain moment in the past and cannot develop any further without destroying its own fruits of culture and civilization. A third group argues for a new economic programme: the programme of social and economic reform.¹⁷

Continuing this line of thinking, Paču suggests that the socialist teaching may take two possible directions: towards theoretical socialism and towards applied socialism. By applied socialism Paču meant the practical political organization of the working classes. He simply concludes that the

¹¹ Archives of Serbia, Belgrade (hereafter AS), Milutin Garašanin Fund, B6, no. 750.

¹² AS, no. 667, 30 August 1883, Smederevo.

¹³ AS, Dobra Ružić Fund, PO-27/183, 6 June 1883, Požarevac.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 8 July 1883.

¹⁵ For more detail, see Latinka Perović, *Srpski socijalisti XIX veka* (Belgrade, 1985).

¹⁶ Lazar Paču, "Gradjansko društvo i njegove političke stranke", *Samouprava*, 5 May to 16 June 1881.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

Radical Party has adopted the concept of applied socialism.¹⁸ The Radicals obviously moved away from the original socialist ideology, but remained sympathetic to the ideas which had inspired them in their early days.

Elements of socialist influences on the Serbian Radical movement are observable throughout the period until the Timok Rebellion. Articles dealing with contemporary developments in European socialist circles regularly appeared in the official Radical newspaper. In 1881, *Samoupravva* publishes a series of articles on Chernyshevsky.¹⁹ In 1882, the Radical paper devotes a long column to Louis Blanc, stating that Blanc was among the most prominent leaders of the 1848 Revolution in France, and describing his idea to establish a ministry of progress as a masterpiece of his political career. *Samoupravva* concludes that “he will be remembered by the generations to come”.²⁰ In 1883, the newspaper notes the death of Karl Marx, and dedicates a praising article to the founder of scientific socialism:

The importance of his work is as relevant today as ever. But the future alone will be able to show the enormous impact of this talented and energetic man... Let the memory of this diligent man, who for more than forty years worked tirelessly for the development of social duties and the liberation of entire mankind, remain deep in every human heart.²¹

Probably the most illustrative example of socialist influences on the Radical movement is the fact that while searching homes of local Radicals (leaders of the Timok Rebellion), the police found the Communist Manifesto of 1848 by Marx and Engels, the Programme of German Social Democracy (1869), works of Babeuf (1789), and writings of the domestic revolutionary Vasa Pelagić.²² Elements of socialist ideologies in the Radical movement were, however, more theoretical than practical. From the very beginning, the Radicals abandoned the economic teaching of Svetozar Marković, basically the most socialist part of his doctrine. They entered full-heartedly into the political battle, concentrating all their forces on political reforms along the lines of constitutionalism and democracy. The elements of socialism shown here suggest that the attitude of Serbian Radicalism towards socialist ideas was merely academic. The sole element of socialism that the Radicals retained was their militancy.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Samoupravva*, 12 February 1881.

²⁰ *Samoupravva*, 1 Decemeber 1882.

²¹ *Samoupravva*, 15 and 22 March 1883.

²² *Timočka buna*, ed. Milen Nikolić (Belgrade, 1954–55), 372–385.

The Radicals often insisted on their faithfulness to their socialist roots. They liked to be regarded as an offspring of the great European socialist family. They expressed strong feelings about all movements and ideas coming from the left. But, the realities of the Serbian rudimentary, mostly peasant, society, with other social classes only emerging, forced them to direct their actions and their ideas towards practical problems – and towards attacking real obstacles on Serbia's road to political emancipation.

* * *

The influence of the French Radical movement was much more significant than the impact of European socialism. Two different views have developed in recent Yugoslav historiography regarding the issue of the major foreign influence on the Serbian Radical movement. One argues that the major impact came from the Russian populist tradition.²³ This argument is based on two assumptions. First, Russian society as it was in the second half of the nineteenth century resembled to a large extent the Serbian society of the same period. The vast majority of the population were uneducated peasants. Consequently, the idea of “going to the people”, the ultimate slogan of the Russian populist movement, held much appeal to the Serbian Radicals. Second, the political methods used by the Radicals were very similar to those used by Russian populists: the educational mission among the peasantry, accompanied by the use of simplicity and demagoguery.²⁴

The view that the French Radical tradition had the most crucial impact on the formation of Radicalism in Serbia deserves greater attention.²⁵ It is virtually impossible to establish the exact ways in which French ideas came to Serbia. The only fact that seems unquestionable is that most Radical leaders could read and speak French, and that most of them visited France in the 1870s.²⁶ Some, but not many, made their studies in Paris and later came to be known as “Parisian doctors”.²⁷ According to the Radical newspapers, it appears that by the 1880s they received French political press on a regular basis, including Clemenceau's *La Justice*.²⁸

If the notion of a predominant populist influence has some merit as an instrument of social development and general political inspiration, the hypothesis about French Radicalism as the major source of Serbian

²³ See Latinka Perović, *Pera Todorović* (Belgrade, 1983).

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 162-167.

²⁵ Slobodan Jovanović, Jovan Skerlić, Živan Živanović.

²⁶ See Ninčić, *Pera Todorović*, 58-62.

²⁷ Slobodan Jovanović, *Vlada Milana Obrenovića*, 3. vols (Belgrade, 1934), III, 282-283.

²⁸ Cf. *Samouprava*, June and July 1883.

Radical ideology is more convincing – particularly regarding their political programmes and organization.

The relationship between Serbian and French Radicalisms is central to the analysis of both movements. The first written programme of the Radical Party in Serbia dates from January 1881. The programme was originally published in the first issue of *Samouprava*, immediately following the formation of the Radical Party.²⁹ In the introduction, the Radicals stressed two crucial political objectives:

... in domestic affairs – national prosperity and freedom, and in foreign affairs – State independence, liberation and unification of all parts of Serbdom.³⁰

The programme was divided in eight sections, each defining the Party's position on a major issue. Much like the French Radicals, they suggested constitutional reform in the following directions: the National Assembly as the supreme legislative body was to be completely elective; the elections were to be directly accompanied by universal male suffrage. The Grand National Assembly was designed to convene periodically, and to be solely responsible for constitutional change, and the State Council was to be abolished. Serbian Radicals also proposed the administrative division of the country into regions and communes which were to be organized on the basis of local self-government. In the judicial system, the Radicals established elective judges for all civil cases and juries for all criminal cases. Absolutely the same terminology was used in discussing the question of State finances; "the establishment of a direct, progressive tax system based on property and income". The Serbian Radicals also suggested a reorganization of the National Bank along the lines of a central credit institution for agriculture, trade, and industry. Exactly like the French, the Radicals in Serbia insisted on free and compulsory primary education, and the replacement of the standing army with a popular one. They demanded the absolute freedom of the press, association and public assembly, the application of the principle of local self-government, and the guarantee of personal and material security.³¹

The Radical group in Serbia developed a political programme with essentially identical political demands ten years earlier, in 1871.³² This earliest Radical political platform contained eighteen important points: the

²⁹ "Naš program" [Our Programme], *Samouprava* 1, 8 January 1881.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² "Programme of the Radical group", 2 August 1871, AS, Dobra Ružić Fund, VI, PO-27/209.

communal and regional autonomy and self-government, absolute freedom of the press, association, public assembly and political action, judicial independence, reforms of the State administration based on the principle of local self-government, the establishment of regional banks for peasant and craftsmen loans and town banks for merchants and industrialists, the abolition of guilds, the cancellation of railroad construction, the founding of agricultural and craft schools, reform of the educational system, the abolition of gendarmerie as unnecessary due to the introduction of self-government, the abolition of dispository funds, complete control of the budget by the National Assembly, and the demand for constitutional change.³³

Similarities between the Serbian Radical programme of 1881 and the electoral programmes of Georges Clemenceau and Camille Pelletan of that same year are quite obvious. The fundamental issues pointed out in all three documents appear identical, not only in ideas they expressed, but in terminology as well. Serbian Radicalism, like French, insisted on constitutional reform, which in both cases included a single-chamber National Assembly elected by universal male suffrage. Following their French comrades, the Serbian Radicals singled out the principle of self-government as the central mode of territorial organization and instrument of democratic process. They both insisted on tax reform and on the introduction of direct tax system on capital and income. The idea of the formation of a popular army instead of professional military corps characterized both ideologies. Finally, Serbian Radicals, like the French, stubbornly repeated their demand for civil liberties. Their ideas of the educational system were identical: both argued in favour of free and compulsory primary education.

Differences between the ideologies of the two Radical movements came mainly from their different political and socio-economic contexts. French Radicals were strongly anticlerical due to the leading role of the Catholic Church in French politics, social life, culture and education. By contrast, the clergy of the Serbian Orthodox Church was neither powerful nor enjoyed a particularly advantageous position in the social hierarchy. This was particularly true of the lower clergy, which largely shared the social status of the peasantry, but acted as parish intelligentsia, and became affiliated with the Radical movement.³⁴ The higher-ranking clergy in Serbia, however, situated in the capital and several larger towns, never really accepted Radicalism. Part of the State establishment, the leadership of the Serbian Orthodox Church opted for the Liberal Party.³⁵

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ AS, Andra Nikolić Fund, B18, no. 10.

³⁵ Jovan Avakumović, "Memoirs", no. 9287/III, ASANU.

As had been stated earlier, the French Radical movement grew out of the Republican bloc, and always remained the champion of the Republican cause. This came as a result of specific historical circumstances in France, where the conflict between the Monarchy and the Republic marked the entire nineteenth century. In Serbia, the Republican issue was never seriously considered. Although the group around Svetozar Marković had developed a theoretical concept of republicanism, the idea was soon abandoned by the Radicals although there were several staunch republicans in their ranks.³⁶ Serbia's socio-political realities, with the ruler assuming the pivotal role not only in politics but, more importantly, in the minds of the population, the Republic could never be acceptable. So instead, the Serbian Radicals became strongly anti-dynastic, endlessly fighting to undercut the ruler's power. It means that the Radical anti-dynastic orientation became a substitute for Republicanism. The French representative in Belgrade noticed their anti-dynastic attitude and underlined it in several reports: "L'opposition radicale en Serbie est loin d'être une opposition dynastique."³⁷ And again in 1888:

Sans doute, parmi les cinq cents radicaux, que les électeurs ont envoyé siéger à la Grande Skoupchtina, plus d'un est parti de son village avec des dispositions franchement anti-dynastiques.³⁸

The French Radical movement favoured an anti-colonial foreign policy and the policy of peacemaking. Following a devastating defeat in the Franco-Prussian war (1870–71), and the unstable political situation in their country, the French Radicals argued for internal political reforms and opposed colonialism. The Serbian Radical movement was of purely national motivation, advocating the liberation and unification of all Serbdom. It was the result of historical processes of national emancipation and state building. As a centripetal force, the Serbian state attracted all as yet unliberated parts of the nation. The Radicals were compelled to join in the great national cause.

Serbian Radicals were only influenced by the political aspect of programmes of French Radicalism. They found Serbia a fertile soil for the implementation of French Radical ideas. The socio-economic aspect of the French Radical programmes, however, was incompatible with the Serbian socio-economic specifics and hence unacceptable to Serbian Radicalism. In a developed industrial country such as France, with a developed working class, the demands for a working-hours limit, workers' insurance, and

³⁶ Jovan Žujović and Dragiša Stanojević, later also Jaša Prodanović.

³⁷ Archives du Ministère des affaires étrangères, Paris, Correspondance politique-Serbie (AMAE, CP), 1882–83, 8 May 1883.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 1887–88, 25 December 1888.

the prohibition of child labour were logical steps in the process of improving working conditions. France was no exception in Europe in this respect. Almost all industrial European countries introduced social legislation in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. In a predominantly rural Serbian society, with little industry and no organized working class, the socio-economic segment of the French Radical programmes was inapplicable. Thus, it is quite clear that the ideological impact of the French Radical movement on Serbian Radicalism acquired the central place among the external (or foreign) sources of the Serbian Radical doctrine.

* * *

The influence of British constitutional and parliamentary theory and practice was a third major external source of Serbian Radicalism. This particular influence was the last to reach the Radical movement in Serbia, after 1883. The Radical constitutional proposal of 1883 was still heavily influenced by "Markovićism". It espoused the system of Convent, which meant the supreme authority of the National Assembly, and essentially established a republic with a monarch as its head.³⁹ British constitutional patterns were finding their way into the ideas of the Radical Party throughout the 1880. It was not until after the final text of the 1888 Constitution had been completed that the Radicals definitely accepted the concept of democratic, parliamentary monarchy.⁴⁰

A general notion of the British understanding of governmental organization reached Serbia in the late 1850s. Young members of the Liberal movement, who had for the most part received higher education in Europe, were the first to point out the importance of the English constitutional tradition: "We need to learn from England – mother of freedom and of the world's constitutional tradition," wrote Stojan Bošković.⁴¹ In 1876 John Stuart Mill's classical book *On Representative Government* was translated by Vladimir Jovanović, a Liberal. The Radical intellectuals, however, came in contact with the British concept in a roundabout way. The works which had been published on the Continent but followed in the footsteps of the British political doctrine became their first sources. In 1880, Kosta Taušanović translated Hover's book *Switzerland, Her Constitution, Government and Self-Government*.⁴² At about the same time, Djordje Simić, a more mod-

³⁹ Jovanović, *Rasprave*, vol. I, 43.

⁴⁰ Milivoje Popović, *Poreklo i postanak ustava od 1888*. (Belgrade, 1939), 109.

⁴¹ *Serbia* 1870.

⁴² Jovanović, *Vlada Milana Obrenovića*, 332-340; see also Raša Milošević, *Timočka buna 1883. godine* (Belgrade, 1923), 252-256.

erate Radical, translated Benjamin Constant's *The Political Principles and On Ministerial Responsibility*.⁴³ In 1884, Stojan Protić, the leading Radical political writer at the time, translated the most liberal constitutions of the period: Swiss, Belgian and American.⁴⁴ They were all published in *Odjek*. In his personal papers dealing with questions of parliamentary theory, Andra Nikolić, a long-time member of the Radical Main Committee, frequently referred to the British political example.⁴⁵

A more coherent political concept was developed by a younger Radical intellectual Milovan Dj. Milovanović. He was educated at the University of Paris where he obtained the doctorate in law. By the age of twenty-six he had become a professor at the School of Law in Belgrade.⁴⁶

His acceptance speech at the University entitled *On the Parliamentary Government*⁴⁷ was the most advanced treatment of the British parliamentary concept in Serbia at the time. Milovanović also acted as a preparatory secretary to the Constitutional Committee in 1888.⁴⁸ The final version of this document largely reflected his constitutional ideas.

British theoretical influences came from the writings of the leading political writers as well: Maine, Freeman, Boutmy, Guiest, and especially Bagehot.⁴⁹ Following their teachers, the Serbian Radicals espoused the concept of an ideal political system where the people would rule by themselves directly. The complexities of modern societies, however, made such a simple political system impossible to implement. Therefore, they suggested the people should rule through a collective representative body by transferring their sovereign rights to their elected representatives in the Parliament. They conclude that as a result of the fact that the people's interests are varied and often opposing, the Parliament consists of various political groups. The largest group represents the majority of the people, and therefore receives the mandate to form the government. The cabinet, which stands on the top of the State administration, is entirely dependent on the Assembly majority:⁵⁰ "The government is born, lives and dies together with the Assembly

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ AS, Andra Nikolić Fund, no. 10.

⁴⁶ For more detail, see Dimitrije Djordjević, *Milovan Dj. Milovanović* (Belgrade, 1962).

⁴⁷ Jovanović, *Vlada Milana Obrenovića*, 381.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Milovan Dj. Milovanović, "O parlamentarnoj vladi", *Otadžbina* XIX (May-June, 1888), 166.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 165.

Majority.”⁵¹ According to the British concept, the Radicals in Serbia accepted the system of political parties and of party government: the party which wins the majority in the Parliament forms the cabinet:⁵²

The essence of a parliamentary system lies in the cabinet’s dependence on and responsibility to the Assembly.⁵³

Foreign sources of the Radical political ideology were indeed three-fold. They originated from three different European political doctrines, but each left its mark on the formation of the Serbian Radical ideology. Their impacts differ both in intensity and in scope, thus making the Radical ideology essentially an eclectic political doctrine.

2

From an internal perspective, the ideology of the Serbian Radical movement was influenced by the specifics of the Serbian political circumstances. As had been noted earlier, by the early 1880s the Serbian political scene had witnessed a polarization. On one side was the Prince (King from 1882), and on the other three major political parties. Their competition for power influenced their ideologies, and their understanding of politics influenced their political attitudes.

The position of Serbian rulers became dominant under Karadjordje Petrović, the leader of the First Serbian Insurrection against the Ottomans in 1804. His successor, Miloš Obrenović, led the Second Serbian Insurrection (1815) and became the hereditary prince of Serbia (1830). Milan Obrenović, proclaimed king in 1882,⁵⁴ was a strong and authoritarian ruler opposed to any attempt of democratic change in Serbia. On the occasion of the promulgation of the liberal 1888 Constitution, he said to an intimate friend:

Everybody cried and shouted for a new constitution. So I accepted it. I wanted to make nonsense of the issue and thus prove that this constitution is not for Serbia.⁵⁵

Before his arrival in Serbia in 1868, Milan Obrenović lived abroad, where he received a sophisticated education in most prominent centres of

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² Stojan Protić, “Ustavna vlada i njena odgovornost”, *Samouprava*, January 1888.

⁵³ AS, Andra Nikolić Fund, no. 10.

⁵⁴ See Jovanović, *Vlada Milana Obrenovića*, vol. I; see also Živan Živanović, *Politička istorija Srbije*, vols. II and III (Belgrade, 1923–25).

⁵⁵ Stojan Novaković, *Dvadeset godina ustavne borbe u Srbiji 1883–1903* (Belgrade, 1912), 30.

Europe.⁵⁶ He spoke French and German better than his mother tongue.⁵⁷ Young and restless, with all virtues and vices of a royalty, he conducted a lifestyle according to European *bon vivant* standards. He was as alien to Serbian society as Serbian society was alien to him. King Milan Obrenović's policy was marked by two major features: he ran domestic affairs by himself, using political parties and politicians only as his own aids on the basis of their loyalty to him personally; his foreign policy was hostile to Russia, due to her betrayal of the Serbian national cause when in 1878 she signed the pro-Bulgarian San Stefano Treaty with the Ottomans.⁵⁸ Therefore Milan Obrenović turned to Austria-Hungary for protection and alliance, signing a secret convention of mutual friendship in 1881.⁵⁹ His statesmanship was often dominated by his personal interests, and his political moves influenced by his emotional motives. A report from the Čačak area, central Serbia, dated 1888, best illustrates to what extent King Milan was alien to the Serbian population. A certain Toma Vilotijević claimed publicly that "the King is German, he is going to Germanize all of us and we'll have to eat cats".⁶⁰ By the same token, King Milan did not think highly of his people in general. Shortly before his abdication in 1889, he confided in a close friend:

After twenty years of my rule in Serbia I have come to believe that our people is unable to grasp the meaning of the national idea and favours partisan interests over the interests of the country.⁶¹

Two mainstays of the ruler's power in Serbia were the Army and the Capital.⁶² King Milan Obrenović instituted a standing army and a professional core of officers.⁶³ Insomuch as this innovation fostered the state-building process, the entire military structure was completely loyal to him personally, and ready to protect the Crown and the existing regime. The other stronghold of the King's authority was the Capital. At the time, Belgrade was virtually the only town in Serbia that bore a resemblance to European cities.⁶⁴ The State administration, the military headquarters, and the Court

⁵⁶ Jovanović, *Vlada Milana Obrenovića*, vol. I, 24-27.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Jovanović, *Vlada Milana Obrenovića*, vol. II, 67.

⁵⁹ Jovanović, *Vlada Milana Obrenovića*, vol. III, 79.

⁶⁰ AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 1214, Belgrade, 6 December 1888.

⁶¹ AS, Vladan Djordjević Fund, no. 40; Vladan Djordjević, "Uspomene Vladana Djordjevića", *Vreme*, 5 December 1925.

⁶² Dragutin Ilić, *Zajčarska buna* (Belgrade, 1909), 25.

⁶³ See Živanović, *Politička istorija*, vol. III, 171-173.

⁶⁴ See Dimitrije Djordjević, "Srbija i srpsko društvo 1880-ih godina", *Istorijski časopis XXIX-XXX* (1982-83), 413-426.

were all in Belgrade, not to mention the bulk of the Serbian intelligentsia and a growing middle class. The King threw parties, organized receptions and balls, and on the whole played the role of the Capital's central figure.⁶⁵ It was a social environment in which he felt both comfortable and powerful.

From the very beginnings of the Radical movement, there developed an animosity between the Radicals and the Crown. Reasons for this confrontation were logical: the King was an authoritarian person who understood his royal powers as unlimited and would not accept any challenges to his authority. The Radical movement, eager to come to power, propagated constitutionalism, democracy, and self-government – demands aimed at limiting the King's authority. Andra Nikolić wrote on the subject:

The almighty power of a ruler always ends in disaster; Nicholas I, Austria 1859 and 1866, France 1870–71, King Milan in Serbia. It is not good for affairs of State when the ruler is too influential. Even if not an irresponsible one, he is unable to control everything by himself and therefore the outcome is always bad...⁶⁶

Escalating between 1881 and 1883, this conflict culminated in the 1883 Timok Rebellion. Although the rebels never admitted overtly that the revolt had been directed against the ruler personally, the rebellion essentially was an anti-dynastic revolution. The driving force behind the revolt, a prominent Radical leader from Knjaževac, Aca Stanojević, was described as “the Commander of the Knjaževac Army in Action against the Abuser of the Constitution and of the People's Rights”,⁶⁷ which is a clear reference to the King. On the eve of the revolt, in September 1883, a Radical representative in the National Assembly, Ljubinko Milinković, reportedly said: “It is easier for me to overthrow the King than to remove a village *kmet* [local official].”⁶⁸ Another report of the same year stated that the Radical Party organized a coup against King Milan.⁶⁹ Pera Todorović, a co-founder of the Radical Party who had abandoned the movement in 1886 and became the port-parole of the King, addressed this letter to the Serbian monarch:

In the hands of Djaja, Kosta [Taušanović] and Stojan [Protić], the Radical Party is a permanent threat to the country, and if there is no other way, the patriotic duty would dictate to the ruler and the government to fight that Party to the bitter end, to the final annihila-

⁶⁵ See Živanović, *Politička istorija*, vol. III, 201–205.

⁶⁶ AS, Andra Nikolić Fund, no. 10.

⁶⁷ Ilić, *Zaječarska buna*, 39.

⁶⁸ AS, Dobra Ružić Fund, PO-27/183, 10 September 1883.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 27 August 1883.

tion of one side. At this point there can be no truce, there can be no excuse – it is a life-and-death fight.⁷⁰

The King himself never fully trusted the Radicals, nor did he ever see them as a genuine ideological movement. In his view, they were a horde of anti-dynastic elements ready to overthrow him. He fought them once in 1883, but his struggle with them continued until his death in 1901:

The Radicals in Serbia are not a political party ready to fight for certain principles applicable in state institutions, but rather an anti-dynastic party working systematically from its inception towards overthrowing our dynasty.⁷¹

There were two attempts on King Milan's life during his thirty-year presence in Serbian politics. The first occurred in 1882 and the second in 1889. He utilized both attempts as a pretext to crush down the leadership of the Radical Party. The first attempted assassination was perpetrated by Jelena-Ilka Marković, the sister-in-law of Svetozar Marković, whose husband, a Radical sympathizer, had been executed for alleged high treason.⁷² She died in prison under unclarified circumstances. She was very close to most of the Radical leaders in Belgrade, especially to Rasa Milošević,⁷³ and it seems likely that at least a few of them had been aware of her intention. The King, however, was convinced that the assassination had been fully organized by the Radicals.⁷⁴ The second attempt on ex-King Milan's life was made in 1899. This event had a twofold importance as regards the relations between the Radicals and King Milan: first, it proved the profound animosity between the two; second, it indicated the intention of the ex-King to destroy the leadership of the Radical Party, even after nearly twenty years of their presence in Serbian politics. This assertion is supported by a letter of ex-King Milan to his son Alexander dated 1898 in which he advised his son that the Radicals had been the chief enemies of the Obrenović dynasty and that they should be "destroyed and annihilated".⁷⁵ According to the same source, the ex-King ordered that a secret agency be formed, headed by Court Marshal Mihailo Rašić, in order to follow closely the actions and moves of the prominent Radicals.⁷⁶ Open confrontation between the King and the Radicals fundamentally marked the policy of the Radicals. Their

⁷⁰ AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 1064.

⁷¹ AS, Vladan Djordjević Fund, no. 27, 1899.

⁷² See Jovanović, *Vlada Milana Obrenovića*, vol. I, 210-215.

⁷³ Milošević, *Timočka buna*, 51-58.

⁷⁴ AS, Vladan Djordjević Fund, no. 27.

⁷⁵ ASANU, no. 11657/1.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

opposition to the King inspired their demands for constitutional and democratic reforms – their understanding of democracy compelled them to oppose the King.

* * *

Relations among three political parties constitute the second internal factor in the formation of the Radical political ideology. At this point it should be noted that neither the Progressivist nor the Liberal parties had directed their political actions towards the masses. The Progressivist Party, which came up with a programme of moderate reform in the 1870s, sought to effect the change through the collaboration with the King. Their understanding of statehood was based on the premise that it was the intellectuals headed by the Crown that should lead the State and shape its policies. This aspect of the Progressivist ideology had been noticed by the French representative in Belgrade and described in several reports:

A Belgrade, les progressistes sont détestés par la population qui est libérale ou radicale. On ne leurs pardonne pas de s'être faits les instruments de la politique Autrichienne du Roi Milan.⁷⁷

In another of his reports to Paris, the French representative was even more outspoken:

Le parti progressiste qui n'a jamais eu de racines profondes dans le pays, que le Roi a crée en quelques fortes pour appliquer sa politique personnelle, est en pleine décomposition.⁷⁸

In his report dated March 1888, the Frenchman gave his final assessment of the Progressivist Party in Serbia:

C'est toute une génération politique qui disparaît de la scène: génération de petits bourgeois hônnetts, mais étroits et entêtés, qu'on pourrait appeler les doctrinaires de la Serbie. ayant emprunté à l'Europe quelques idées constitutionnelles, conservant de l'Orient l'esprit stationnaire...⁷⁹

The Liberal Party, which grew out of the romantic national ferment of the 1850s, and which saw internal progress in terms of national liberation, was also essentially an elitist organization. The leaders of this group were in power throughout the 1870s and already had significant political experience, tradition and self-confidence. The Liberals did not deem it necessary to gain massive support from the population. In their view, largely shared by

⁷⁷ AMAE, CP-Serbie, 1889, 28 May 1889.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 27 Jan. 1889.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 1887–88, 10 March 1888.

the Progressivists, the Serbian peasant was uneducated and primitive, and was not to be allowed to act as a politically relevant factor.

Both political organizations, therefore, resembled political clubs rather than true political movements with mass followings. Their strength derived either from the King's authority or from their intellectual prominence and political experience. Both were small in numbers and were never able to win the majority of the electorate, partly because they never took elections as a decisive criterion in competition for power, and partly because they were not deeply rooted in the Serbian population.

In contrast, the Radicals concentrated all their power and ability on winning over the peasantry. Their political strategy was entirely based on introducing the people to politics and making them a significant political factor. From the very beginning, the Radicals sought to ensure the broadest possible support from the countryside. The power of their movement came from two sources: the village and the numbers. Some figures may serve to support this assertion. In November 1887, the Radicals won 81 seats in the Assembly, the Liberals 61, and the Progressivists none.⁸⁰ In March 1888, of 156 members of the National Assembly 133 were Radicals.⁸¹ In the elections held in 1889, the Radicals received 158,856 votes and the Liberals only 21,829.⁸² In the 1890 elections, the Radicals won 152,935 votes, the Liberals 23,548, and the Progressivists only 8,895 votes,⁸³ which means that the Radicals won over 80 percent of the electorate. The Radical official newspapers were distributed all over the country. A number of reports from the interior of the country stated that no other political journals were available there.⁸⁴ The Progressivist official organ ironically commented on the Radical vast membership:

Radical Party is still powerful, and the power may not be that of intelligence but at least it is the power of numbers...⁸⁵

This "power of numbers" obviously was not convincing enough in the Serbian political circumstances for the Radicals to come to power. As a result, they resorted to making agreements with rival political camps. Their competition with Progressivists and Liberals worked in both directions: it oriented the Radical movement towards the electorate, towards peasantry, and towards the countryside; the drive to come to power motivated their

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 11 November 1887.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 10 March 1888.

⁸² Slobodan Jovanović, *Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića* (Belgrade, 1934–35), vol. I, 191.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ AS, Milutin Garašanin Fund, no. 199, Vranje, 3 November 1881.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 1058.

collaboration and coalition tactics. Both processes marked the Radical ideology. One coloured it with simplicity and demagoguery, but also with a straightforwardness and clarity of ideas. The other led to its flexibility and pragmatism.

To sum up, the ideology of Serbian Radicalism was essentially a combination of various influences. Its sources were manifold and came both from without and from within. In a purely political sense, French Radicalism was the most significant single impact. A comparison of the French and Serbian political programmes convincingly supports this assessment. Inspiration for the movement came from socialists. The British constitutional concept also played a significant role. From the viewpoint of internal political relations, the Radical doctrine was shaped under the impact of confrontation and collaboration with other actors on the Serbian political scene.

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**Nikola Pašić, les radicaux et la « Main noire »
Les défis à la démocratie parlementaire serbe
1903–1917**

La démocratie serbe : deux interprétations

La question de savoir si la démocratie parlementaire a réellement fonctionné en Serbie dans la période 1903–1914 est encore et toujours l'objet de controverses car les interprétations actuelles naviguent entre deux points de vue contradictoires. L'un, part du fait, relativement exact, qu'il s'agit là de « l'âge d'or de l'histoire serbe », d'une période lors de laquelle, en peu de temps, d'importantes épreuves, sur le plan intérieur comme extérieur, survinrent et furent, en général, surmontées de façon satisfaisante (la guerre douanière avec l'Autriche-Hongrie 1906–11) et même triomphante (les deux guerres balkaniques 1912–13). « L'ère de Périclès pour la Serbie », comme Milan Grol, ancien membre du parti radical indépendant, a dénommé cette période par contraste avec le développement ultérieur du pays et de la nation, est apparue, aussi bien aux yeux de ses contemporains qu'à ceux des chercheurs, comme un idéal inégal, marqué par une série de succès sur le champ politique et militaire mais aussi sur le plan culturel et économique.¹

De nombreuses raisons justifient ce sentiment. Grâce aux nouvelles libertés politiques et à l'idéologie nationale, la culture et la science serbes, libérées de leurs chaînes connurent un essor important qui alla au-delà de toutes les expériences politiques précédentes. La Serbie, avec son régime démocratique et ses aspirations nationales clairement exprimées, devint relativement rapidement, surtout après 1903, un véritable Piémont des Balkans sur lequel comptaient – aussi bien comme modèle politique que pôle d'un rassemblement plus large – non seulement l'élite éclairée et la jeunesse des Slaves du Sud d'Autriche-Hongrie, mais aussi les cercles libéraux bul-

¹ M. Grol, *Iz predratne Srbije* [De Serbie d'avant-guerre] (Belgrade, 1938). Ce texte, plus court qu'ici fut publié en serbe dans les actes du colloque tenue à l'Académie serbe des Sciences et des Arts : *Nikola Pašić, Život i delo* (Belgrade, 1998), 309–329.

gares, slovaques et tchèques gagnés par la vague du néo-slavisme, tous très enthousiastes en l'avenir. Les résultats des guerres balkaniques et de la Première Guerre mondiale très favorables à la Royaume de Serbie entérinèrent, *a posteriori*, le fonctionnement de la démocratie parlementaire et des institutions politiques serbes.²

D'un autre côté, d'autres interprétations s'appuient sur le fait que, dans sa période de pleine démocratie parlementaire, la Serbie fut secouée par une série de crises successives qui mirent sérieusement en question sa capacité à conduire de façon souveraine, par le biais de représentants librement élus, les affaires de l'Etat. Dans la société marquée par la démocratie rurale avec près de 90% de la population de paysans, l'absence d'une couche sociale moyenne développée réduisait le cercle des personnes prenant les décisions politiques les plus importantes à la Cour, aux chefs des partis politiques (parmi lesquels se détachait la figure de Nikola Pašić) et aux sommets de l'armée. Un tel rapport des forces laissait le champ libre à l'activité « d'acteurs [politiques] non responsables » ou « facteurs irresponsables et extra-constitutionnels » qui pouvaient, en dehors d'Assemblée nationale et en dépit des procédures instituées par la Constitution, influencer de façon décisive sur la résolution des questions importantes de politique étrangère – il s'agit, essentiellement, des officiers appartenant au cercle des conjurés qui réalisèrent le coup d'Etat de 29 mai [le 11 juin n.s.] 1903, en assassinant le dernier roi de la maison des Obrenović, le roi Alexandre et sa reine Draga.³

Dans cette perspective, l'attentat de Sarajevo en 1914 est interprété comme étant la conséquence directe de l'instabilité politique régnant en Serbie dont témoigne la dangereuse activité de l'organisation militaire et conspiratrice « l'Union ou la mort » [*Ujedinjenje ili Smrt*], après 1911, plus connue sous le nom populaire de « la Main noire » [*Crna ruka*], regroupant les anciennes conjurés de 1903, en majorité les officiers de l'armée serbe. Le fait que le chef de cette organisation, le lieutenant colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević Apis – l'un des jeunes conspirateurs de 1903, également chef des services secrets de l'armée (1913-15) – était impliqué dans l'organisation

² Cf. C. Sforza, *Pachtch et l'union des Yougoslaves* (Paris, 1938) ; M. Popović, *Borba za parlamentarni režim u Srbiji* [La lutte pour le régime parlementaire en Serbie] (Belgrade, 1938) ; Ž. Mitrović, *Srpske političke stranke* [Les partis politiques serbes] (Belgrade, 1939) ; S. Jovanović, « Nicholas Pašić. After Ten Years », *Slavonic Review* XV (1936), 368-376; la seule biographie disponible en anglais : A. N. Dragnich, *Serbia, Nikola Pašić and Yugoslavia* (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974).

³ Cf. D. T. Bataković, *Yougoslavie. Nations, religions idéologies* (Lausanne, 1994), 91-93 ; D. T. Batakovic, ed., *Histoire du peuple serbe* (Lausanne, 2005), 189-199.

de l'attentat qui servit de prétexte à la Première Guerre mondiale a renforcé la légitimité de cette interprétation.⁴

Entre ces deux points de vue, très éloignés l'un de l'autre, il faut chercher un équilibre pour se forger une juste image de cette période en prenant en compte tous les éléments des réalités complexes de « l'âge d'or de l'histoire serbe ». Dans cette tentative, la question des rapports entre Nikola Pašić, figure porteuse de la démocratie serbe depuis 1881, et l'organisation la « Main noire » qui généra tout un spectre d'opinions rejetant la démocratie – depuis des idées militaristes jusqu'à l'autoritarisme en matière de pouvoir d'Etat et de politique nationale – s'impose comme l'une des questions-clés de l'histoire de la Serbie avant la Première Guerre.

⁴ Cf. la littérature plus ancienne qui insiste sur la responsabilité serbe dans l'éclatement de la Première Guerre mondiale : M. Boghitchévitch, *Le procès de Salonique, juin 1917* (Paris, 1927) ; id., *Le colonel Dragoutine Dimitriévitch Apis* (Paris, 1928) ; A. Szanto, *Apis, der Führer des 'Schwarzen Hand'. Ein Beitrag zum Kriegsschuldproblem* (Berlin O.J. 1928) ; S. Pribitchévitch, *La dictature du roi Alexandre* (Paris, 1933) ; H. Uebersberger, *Österreich zwischen Russland und Serbien. Zur Sudslawischen Frage und der Entstehung des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Cologne–Graz, 1958) ; J. Remak, *Sarajevo. The Story of a Political Murder* (London, 1959). Voir aussi, une analyse française très équilibré par A. Mousset, *Un drame historique. L'attentat de Sarajevo* (Paris, 1930), avec une vaste documentation du premier ordre. Le plus récente analyse française dans J.-J. Becker, *L'Année 14* (Paris, 2004), 35-70. Néanmoins, il existe également une vaste littérature qui, écrite à l'époque de la reconstitution du procès de Salonique (2-13 juin 1953) sous le régime communiste, s'employait à disqualifier la dynastie des Karadjordjević, récemment renversée, ainsi que le régime du Royaume de Yougoslavie, afin de renforcer le régime communiste auquel participaient quelques personnes du cercle de l'ex « Main noire ». Cf. B. Nešković, *Istina o Solunskom procesu* [La vérité sur le procès de Salonique] (Belgrade, 1953). Cf. la recherche extensive dans D. MacKenzie, *The « Black Hand » on Trial. Salonika 1917*, East European Monographs (Boulder & New York, 1995). Les travaux du neveu d'Apis, Milan Ž. Živanović qui rassemble de nombreux matériaux sur la « Main noire », sont, dans une certaine mesure, par inclination familiale, de la même veine : *Solunski proces 1917. godine. Prilog za proučavanje političke istorije Srbije od 1903. do 1918. godine* [Le procès de Salonique de 1917. Contribution à l'étude de l'histoire politique de la Serbie de 1903 à 1918] (Belgrade, 1955). L'ouvrage, sa thèse du doctorat, a été réédité par l'auteur sous le titre *Pukovnik Apis* [Le colonel Apis] (Belgrade, 1955). Les points de vue révisionnistes plus récents dont le but est de rejeter sur la Serbie la responsabilité de la première guerre mondiale sont bien illustrés par F. Würtl, *Die Spur führt nach Belgrad* (Vienne, 1975). Le travail le plus complet sur le rôle de l'armée dans la vie politique de la Serbie avant 1914 est celui de V.J. Vučković, « Unutrašnje krize Srbije i Prvi svetski rat » [Les crises internes de la Serbie et la Première Guerre mondiale], *Istorijski časopis XIV-XV* (1963-65), 173-229. La biographie la plus récente : D. MacKenzie, *Apis. The Congenial Conspirator. The Life of Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic*, East European Monographs (Boulder & New York, 1989). Cf. aussi D. T. Bataković « La Main Noire (1911-1917) : l'armée serbe entre démocratie et autoritarisme », *Revue d'histoire diplomatique* 2 (Paris, 1998), 95-144.

L'armée serbe dans le rôle de classe moyenne

Un appareil étatique et des partis politiques développés et modernes se créèrent et se développèrent en Serbie sensiblement avant l'armée professionnelle. Celle-ci, formée seulement en 1883, était considérablement plus jeune que la société serbe et donc clairement en retard dans la définition de son rôle dans cette société.

Depuis la fin du XIX^e siècle, après une réorganisation fondamentale sous le commandement de l'ancien roi Milan Obrenović (1897–1900), équipée d'armes modernes et bien rémunérée, l'armée devint non seulement le gardien du régime et de la maison régnante, mais également une institution composée d'hommes instruits par excellence, qui ouvrait la voie à la promotion sociale des fils pauvres des campagnes et petits bourgs.⁵ Aussi l'opinion

⁵ Selon les souvenirs d'un colonel de cavalerie, « le nombre d'élèves boursiers admis à l'école de l'académie militaire de Niš après la guerre contre les Bulgares (1885) crût d'année en année, de sorte qu'en 1893 on accueillait en première année 26 classes de plus de 80 collégiens. Les trois classes suivantes étaient un peu moins nombreuses; quand le roi Milan devint commandant de l'armée d'active le nombre de collégiens se montait à 100, il se montait les années suivantes à 200. Avec le départ du roi Milan, le nombre tomba à 100, et les années suivantes il tomba même à 50. Lors de l'arrivée du gouvernement radical en 1903, le nombre de boursiers admis tomba à 30 puis passa en dessous et cette situation dura jusqu'aux guerres balkaniques (1912–13). Ainsi quand, à la fin de l'année 1897, le roi Milan prit la tête de l'armée, il trouva une base pour développer complètement nos forces armées. Il faut reconnaître que le roi Milan fit beaucoup pour le développement de notre armée et lui donna sa forme définitive, en même temps, il lui assura le nombre nécessaire de cadres éduqués. C'est avec cette armée que par la suite nous sommes entrés en guerre contre les Turcs en 1912. » (D. Mičić, colonel de cavalerie à la retraite, « Srpski oficiri, njihova uloga i značaj u političkom životu Srbije do ujedinjenja » [Les officiers serbes, leur rôle et leur signification dans la vie politique de la Serbie jusqu'à l'unification], Zagreb 1939, reg. 16, K. 26, f. 1, D. 1-907, Arhiv Vojnoistorijskog instituta [Archives de l'Institut d'histoire militaire]), 7. Un autre officier rend hommage au roi Milan pour avoir transformé les bataillons réguliers en régiments réguliers et avoir ainsi quadrupler le nombre d'unités, nommant aux postes de commandement de jeunes sous-lieutenants frais émoulus de l'académie militaire : « En même temps, il réduisit le cursus de l'académie militaire et augmenta le nombre d'élèves boursiers de plusieurs centaines en quatre ans (1898–1901), l'académie militaire fournit près de 500 officiers (classes 28–32) et deux classes en sortirent la même année (en 1899). » En réduisant le nombre de lycées par deux, le ministre de l'éducation, Andra Djordjević orienta de fait les élèves les plus pauvres vers l'école militaire. « De cette façon, l'académie militaire pendant un certain temps absorba toute la jeunesse intellectuelle de la Serbie » qui, à l'académie, pouvait « donner libre cours à ses idées démocratiques et socialistes et à un nationalisme révolutionnaire [...]. Les éditeurs belgradois, pendant ces 10–15 ans, avaient comme meilleurs acheteurs et plus fidèles clients les officiers, même pour les ouvrages de belles lettres, la philosophie et les textes politico-économiques, ainsi que pour d'autres sujets scientifiques et sociaux. » (Č. Popović, « La préparation du 29 mai

selon laquelle « l'entrée à l'académie militaire d'un plus grand nombre de jeunes issus de larges couches populaires introduisit [...] un esprit neuf dans le corps des officiers »⁶ est tout à fait fondée. Depuis le coup d'Etat de 1903, l'armée en Serbie jouait un rôle très important dans la vie politique, remplissant dans un pays essentiellement agraire un vide important dû à une stratification sociale insuffisante. En l'absence d'une classe sociale bourgeoise développée – le porteur classique des valeurs incarnées dans la démocratie parlementaire – l'armée remplissait la fonction de classe moyenne.

Le sentiment d'être les porteurs d'une mission nationale – sentiment d'un devoir implicite qui apparut dans une bonne partie des sommets militaires après le régicide de 1903 – contrastait avec le climat politique général régnant dans le pays. Les politiciens et les hommes d'Etat, parmi lesquels dominait la figure emblématique de Nikola Pašić, savaient bien que la lutte diplomatique et partisane sous-entendait patience et compromis, ascensions et chutes, respect de l'opinion des autres et prise en compte des réalités internationales. Pašić lui-même était la victime des différents défis politiques, oscillant dans sa carrière politique entre exil, prison, oubli et le retour triomphal dans le pouvoir. Les hommes politiques serbes étaient aussi conscients de la versatilité du corps électoral et des caprices du souverain, phénomènes courants sous les derniers Obrenović, Milan et Alexandre, et ils étaient prêts à différents compromis pour obtenir la faveur de l'opinion publique, la confiance des électeurs et celle de la Couronne qui incarnait la souveraineté de l'Etat. En politique étrangère, l'élite politique de la Serbie, selon les modestes forces du pays, ses limitations économiques et sa position fragile entre les grandes puissances très présentes dans les Balkans, travaillait, avec une prudence compréhensible, à réaliser, en plusieurs étapes, les grands objectifs nationaux et politiques fixés dans les programmes des partis.

A la différence de la classe politique, une partie de l'armée, sans expérience préalable en politique, mais avec la confiance en soi de la jeunesse, des idées nouvelles et un pouvoir politique qu'elle venait de découvrir, se mit à se considérer comme le seul véritable interprète des intérêts nationaux de la Serbie et des Serbes de façon générale. C'était notamment le cas de cette partie du corps des officiers réunie autour des conjurés de 1903 qui voulaient poursuivre l'œuvre d'indépendance nationale commencée avec l'assassinat du roi Alexandre Obrenović en 1903. Les officiers conjurés, ainsi que leurs partisans, n'éprouaient pas de dilemmes à définir les priori-

1903. La 'révolutionnarisation' de l'armée serbe sous Milan Obrenović », *Nova Evropa*, vol. V, n° 12, 11 juin 1927, 411-412). Voir également D. Vuksanović-Anić, *Stvaranje moderne srpske vojske* [La création de l'armée serbe moderne] (Belgrade, 1993), 119-123.

⁶ Mičić, « Srpski oficiri », 7.

tés nationales car ils n'avaient ni précurseurs ni expérience antérieure en la matière. Le rôle que joua l'armée, en particulier cette clique d'officiers, dans la période 1903–1917, témoigne de la fragilité des institutions de la jeune démocratie serbe.

Quand il s'agit de choisir la forme que prendrait le régime, en 1903, l'armée insista résolument non seulement pour que fût choisi son candidat au trône – le prince Pierre Karadjordjević – mais aussi pour qu'on préservât la monarchie contre laquelle s'était rapidement mobilisée une partie de la jeunesse universitaire ainsi qu'une partie des chefs des radicaux indépendants réunis autour du journal *Dnevni list* (Le Quotidien). Les conjurés répondirent aux revendications des étudiants par un sévère avertissement leur défendant désormais de se rassembler et les menaçant de réagir par des mesures militaires à toute tentative d'agitation en faveur de la république.⁷ Il n'en reste pas moins que le putsch militaire de 1903, à la différence des entreprises similaires lancées en Europe à la même époque, ne se termina pas par une forme de dictature militaire mais par le retour des valeurs qui, sous forme des intérêts bien compris de la nation, s'incarnent dans le parlementarisme et les libertés politiques. Reste la question, jusqu'à présent sans réponse complète, du degré d'influence exercée par les personnalités politiques civiles sur la formation finale des objectifs politiques de la conjuration.⁸

Par ailleurs, l'armée elle-même était si divisée sur la question de son rôle en politique que la militarisation de la société était impossible. Une partie importante des officiers, restée en dehors du complot, était disposée à se voir, dans le cadre sévèrement circonscrit par les lois, comme une force militaire qui reconnaît les institutions politiques et est sous le contrôle des autorités civiles, agit exclusivement en conformité avec la Constitution. Les divisions que l'engagement politique des conjurés suscita dans l'armée (notamment de la part des officiers non-conjurés – dit les « *contras* » – stationnés dans la garnison de Niš en 1903 et les sous-officiers et réservistes de la garnison de Kragujevac en 1906) étaient profondes, mais, du fait du rapport de forces dans la société, elles furent dépassées sans que soient adoptées des solutions qui auraient conduit au militarisme. Les ambitions politiques du corps des officiers se limitèrent à quelques dizaines d'officiers qui avaient participé à l'assassinat du roi et à leurs quelques partisans et amis.

Le cercle des conjurés, sur lequel le roi Pierre I^{er} Karadjordjević s'appuya dès le début de son règne parce que c'est lui qui l'avait fait monter sur le trône serbe, tenta, en dépit de la disposition d'esprit dans laquelle se trouvait le corps des officiers dans son ensemble, de perturber le régime

⁷ Antonije Antić, « Notes » [*Beleške*], vol. 2, p. 54 (manuscrit en possession privée).

⁸ Voir l'analyse détaillée de D. Vasić, *Devetstotreća* [L'année 1903] (Belgrade, 1925).

parlementaire tout juste établi et d'influer, par le biais de la camarilla de la Cour renforcée par les officiers au service de celle-ci, sur des décisions politiques de la plus grande importance pour le pays.⁹ Pierre I^{er} ne pouvait que s'appuyer sur les conjurés non seulement parce qu'il était officier de formation et en avait l'état d'esprit, mais également parce qu'il n'y avait pas dans le pays d'autre force politique sur laquelle, incertain de sa position et de l'avenir de la dynastie, il aurait pu se reposer en toute confiance.¹⁰

Nikola Pašić et les conjurés de 1903

Les conjurés militaires de 1903 étant issus en majorité de familles d'orientation libérale, l'armée, après l'instauration du régime parlementaire, n'intervint pas directement dans la vie des partis. Attendant le développement des événements, elle n'influa pas sur l'organisation et le déroulement des élections libres de 1903, élections lors desquelles les vieux radicaux de Nikola Pašić obtinrent une majorité relative (75 sièges sur 160).¹¹ Les chefs de la conjuration furent profondément désappointés par les résultats des élections des premières années de régime parlementaire, montrant ainsi combien leurs analyses politiques de l'état d'esprit du peuple étaient naïves et combien ils avaient sous-estimé la force du seul parti qui possédait un réseau puissant de comités locaux parfaitement organisés. De plus, la capacité des vieux radicaux, en particulier de Stojan Protić, à préparer la machine élective – avec la collaboration efficace des autorités locales dont la nomination ne devait rien au hasard puisque le but était que ces autorités locales influencent le résultat final des élections – on comprend alors que les conjurés, novices dans les manipulations partisans, aient eu le sentiment que le régime parlementaire sous la férule des radicaux n'était qu'une illusion de ce que la démocratie devait être selon eux.

⁹ D. Djordjević, « The Role of the Military in the Balkans in the Nineteenth Century », in *Der Berliner Kongress von 1878*, eds. R. Melville und H.-J. Schroeder (Wiesbaden, 1982), 317-347.

¹⁰ D. R. Živojinović, *Kralj Petar Karadjordjević. U otadžbini 1903-1914. godine* [Le roi Pierre Karadjordjević, au pays, de 1903 à 1914] (Belgrade, 1990), vol. 2, 199-205.

¹¹ Aux élections de 1903 les vieux radicaux de Nikola Pašić obtinrent 95.883 voix et les radicaux indépendants 88.650 (soit 66 sièges). Les libéraux-populistes (les anciens libéraux rebaptisés populistes, les plus proches des conjurés), obtinrent 17 sièges avec 47.298 voix, les progressistes et les socialistes obtinrent chacun un siège de député. La Constitution de 1903 et la loi sur les élections favorisaient le parti le plus puissant. Les données sur les résultats des élections ne concordent pas et donnent plus ou moins de mandats à l'un ou l'autre des partis radicaux du fait des députés « mobiles » qui passaient facilement d'un camp radical à l'autre suivant les problèmes abordés.

L'attitude de l'armée envers les radicaux était également, selon un réflexe hérité de l'époque des derniers Obrenović, marquée par une défiance du fait que les partis envisageaient de réduire l'armée aux compagnies régulières peu nombreuses et de transposer le centre de gravité de l'organisation militaire sur l'armée de conscription. Le général Sava Grujić, représentant de l'aile modérée des vieux radicaux et dont le fils, officier également, était l'un des participants à la conjuration, parvint sans doute pendant quelque temps à contenir leurs doutes. Cependant, les vieux radicaux, après 1903, ne modifièrent pas leur programme de 1881 (republié en 1889 et 1892) qui proclamait clairement que « l'armée régulière est considérée uniquement comme une école pour l'armée de conscription et, de ce fait, on ne maintiendra l'armée régulière que pour instruire et organiser efficacement et correctement l'armée du peuple ».¹²

Ceci explique le témoignage d'un officier qui, selon ses propres dires, était resté en dehors des coteries et, pour qui, les radicaux ne purent cacher « leur vieille antipathie à l'encontre des officiers et de l'armée, surtout quand il fut question des dépenses concernant son armement et sa préparation. C'est pourquoi les officiers dans l'armée serbe à sympathiser avec les [vieux] radicaux étaient rares et, quand c'était le cas, ils ne valaient en général rien comme officiers ».¹³

Après le coup d'Etat de 1903, Nikola Pašić fut pendant un certain temps éloigné de la direction du parti, essentiellement à la demande des radicaux indépendants avec lesquels les vieux radicaux espéraient s'unifier à nouveau dans un parti commun, ce qui réussit sur une courte période.¹⁴ Pašić assura son retour à la barre du parti en menant une habile agitation dans les comités locaux des vieux radicaux où sa légende fonctionnait encore parfaitement. En tant que chef de parti et président du gouvernement (1904–1905, 1906–1908, 1909–1911, 1912–1918), Pašić avait appris à connaître la mentalité et les aspirations politiques des officiers conjurés les plus âgés,

¹² V. Krestić et R. Ljušić, *Programi i statuti srpskih političkih stranaka do 1918. godine* [Les programmes et les statuts des partis politiques avant 1918] (Belgrade, 1991), 102–103.

¹³ Mičić, « Srpski oficiri », 38.

¹⁴ L'unification des deux fractions radicales en un seul parti fut proclamée solennellement le 15 (28) octobre 1903, elle fut couronnée par la création d'un cabinet de coalition sous la présidence du général Sava Grujić. Ce qui nébranla pas un certain nombre d'indépendants qui refusaient d'accepter l'union des deux fractions, ces indépendants qui conservèrent l'appellation d'indépendants jusqu'au 12 (25) octobre 1904, date à laquelle l'accord de l'année précédente fut résilié, ce qui signifia la division définitive en deux partis concurrents. L'une des principales raisons de la scission finale fut le retour triomphal de Nikola Pašić sur la scène politique, d'abord comme ministre des affaires étrangères au début 1904, puis en novembre de la même année par le fait qu'il reçut mandat pour constituer un cabinet entièrement composé de vieux radicaux.

avant qu'un groupe de plus jeunes ne formât, en mai 1911, l'organisation secrète sous le nom « L'unification ou la mort » (dite la « Main noire »).

Selon des témoignages, certes sujets à caution (comme les mémoires du prince Georges Karadjordjević), Pašić dès 1903 (plus vraisemblablement en 1904) exigea du souverain que les officiers qui avaient participé au complot fussent éloignés non seulement de la Cour mais aussi de la capitale serbe.¹⁵ Pragmatique à un point que ses opposants interprétaient comme une absence de tout principe moral, Pašić, cependant, ne se gêna pas de faire des alliances momentanées, collaborer temporairement avec les cercles militaires influents comme quand il fallut éloigner de la Cour la camarilla pro-autrichienne constituée par les secrétaires et les parents du roi (Živojin Baludžić, Jaša Nenadović). Maître ès manoeuvres en coulisses, Pašić dès 1904, par une série de manoeuvres synchronisées, brisa le front commun formé par la camarilla de la Cour, l'armée et l'opposition à son gouvernement. Il se rallia l'armée dont le ministre, le général Radomir Putnik, était proche des conjurés, par une augmentation surprise et exceptionnelle du budget militaire. Pour en finir avec Živojin Baludžić, le secrétaire du roi, Pašić conclut un accord avec les conjurés (les colonels Alexandre Mašin et Damjan Popović, l'ex ministre Djordje Genčić) en reconnaissant le coup d'Etat de 1903, allant ainsi à l'encontre des demandes pour que les conjurés fussent traduits devant un tribunal pour avoir assassiné le roi Alexandre Obrenović.¹⁶

Ayant éloigné de la Cour les secrétaires du roi, Pašić dans la phase suivante parvint à détacher du souverain les officiers conjurés les plus âgés en agissant sur deux plans séparés mais parallèles sur les points d'achoppement entre les priorités intérieures et extérieures du pays. Dans l'arène politique intérieure, Pašić utilisa habilement la campagne de l'opposition qui, en particulier au cours de l'année 1905, accusa le groupe des conjurés en uniforme et en civil – « les acteurs non responsables » – de tenter de renverser le gouvernement par une voie anticonstitutionnelle pour soumettre la nation à leur volonté. Pašić, alors, au nom du gouvernement, lut à l'Assemblée nationale une déclaration qui proclamait la démocratie parlementaire comme étant le seul principe légitime de conduite des affaires de l'Etat.

Le problème des conjurés affecta constamment le gouvernement parlementaire, d'autant qu'une partie très influente de l'opposition, incarnée par les jeunes radicaux indépendants, était prête, dans son conflit avec ses anciens camarades réunis autour de Pašić, à se servir de l'influence des conjurés à la Cour pour tenter ainsi de supplanter ses principaux concurrents politiques. L'accord temporaire que passa Pašić avec les conjurés en 1904–1905

¹⁵ Dj. Karadjordjević, *Istina o mome životu* [La vérité sur ma vie] (Belgrade, 1969), 196–204.

¹⁶ *Samouprava* (L'Autogestion), Belgrade, 17 (30) janvier 1905.

était une trêve tactique nécessaire, dont le but était d'empêcher la création d'un front commun de l'opposition et de l'armée contre les vieux radicaux.¹⁷ Pašić justifia son alliance proclamée officiellement avec les conjurés par le fait que traduire en justice les conjurés de 1903 signifierait condamner la Serbie.¹⁸

Pour régler leur compte aux officiers conjurés les plus âgés qui montraient une hostilité toujours plus ouverte envers les vieux radicaux, Pašić tenta de susciter une scission : il s'assura le soutien d'un des officiers les plus en vue de cette clique – le colonel Petar Mišić qui, par la suite, une fois à la retraite, adhéra au parti des vieux radicaux. Cependant, l'attitude de la majeure partie du corps des officiers envers les vieux radicaux était tout sauf amicale, selon une tradition qui avait débutée avec les premiers programmes du parti qui visaient à limiter les moyens alloués à l'armée.

En politique extérieure, Pašić attendit le moment favorable pour lier la mise à la retraite des officiers conjurés les plus en vue exclusivement avec l'importante question de la reprise des relations avec la Grande Bretagne et non avec l'opinion qu'il avait d'eux sur le plan politique. La question des conjurés redevint aiguë lors des vifs conflits autour du lancement d'un emprunt pour l'armement en 1905.¹⁹ Les journaux serbes rivalisèrent de virulence, dénonçant les manoeuvres en coulisses pour choisir le type de canons et leurs producteurs. Le journal d'opposition *Štampa* (La Presse), subventionné par Vienne, suscita un nouvel émoi de l'opinion publique en écrivant que les officiers conjurés siégeaient en permanence, se préparant à de nouvelles actions politiques.

Les libéraux, à l'automne 1905, demandèrent publiquement la mise à l'écart définitive de la clique d'officiers non seulement de la vie politique mais également de l'armée au nom de la normalisation des relations au sein de celle-ci et la reprise des relations diplomatiques avec la Grande Bretagne, tandis que les progressistes, pour les mêmes raisons, réclamèrent des mesures

¹⁷ D. Djordjević, *Carinski rat između Austro-Ugarske i Srbije 1906–1911* [La guerre douanière entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie, 1906–1911] (Belgrade, 1962), 71–73.

¹⁸ Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (M.A.E.), Paris, Nouvelle série, Serbie, vol. 4, n° 27, Belgrade, Note du 19 février 1905.

¹⁹ L'achat des canons servit de prétexte direct au règlement de comptes avec la camarilla : pour des raisons politiques, le roi et le gouvernement radical avaient l'intention de commander leur artillerie lourde en France, auprès de la maison Schneider-Creusot, tandis que Balugdžić et Jakov Nenadović optaient pour l'achat de canons Skoda autrichiens. Une troisième compagnie, l'allemand Krupp, était en lice, mais sans grand espoir de conquérir le marché serbe. Pour s'assurer que la préférence serait accordée aux canons français, les radicaux renoncèrent aux essais comparatifs qui s'étaient d'emblée montrés défavorables, sur des points techniques, aux armes françaises. Djordjević, *Carinski rat*, 38–39.

plus dures : leur condamnation pénale.²⁰ Pour Nikola Pašić, prêt à de nombreux compromis pour parvenir à un but qu'il considérait comme justifié, la mise à la retraite des conjurés devait atteindre trois objectifs importants 1°) réduire à néant l'influence des conjurés sur le souverain, 2°) satisfaire les revendications de la Grande Bretagne par un compromis qui ne nuirait pas à l'image de la Serbie et 3°) permettre d'indemniser les officiers en les mettant à la retraite afin qu'ils ne devinssent pas des ennemis durables des vieux radicaux. Lors du troisième anniversaire du coup d'État de 1903, en 1906, les principaux conjurés de la vieille génération furent mis à la retraite, la camarilla militaire éloignée de la Cour et l'armée, elle-même, ramenée définitivement dans le cadre constitutionnel. Pašić tenta même, sans beaucoup de succès, de réconcilier les leaders du cercle des conjurés avec les officiers éminents qui, à l'instar du colonel Živojin Mišić (le futur général et le maréchal serbe durant la Grande Guerre), condamnaient le coup d'État et étaient en disgrâce auprès des sommets de l'armée qui dirigeaient les affaires militaires de la Serbie.

La mise à la retraite de six des principaux conjurés de 1903 parmi les officiers ne résolut pas définitivement la question des relations avec l'armée. Les relations épineuses avec les sommets militaires influents persistent cependant et restèrent un problème du fait du mécontentement – à peine réfréné – des officiers conjurés et de leurs partisans à l'égard de Pašić et du cabinet des vieux radicaux. D'un autre côté, la question de l'influence politique de certains cercles militaires resta constamment ouverte. La presse et une campagne opiniâtre de l'opposition (les libéraux populistes et les progressistes) considéraient que la question des conjurés ne pouvait se clore par leur éloignement de l'armée mais devait l'être par une condamnation pénale pour violation du serment d'officiers au dernier des Obrenović.

²⁰ Vojislav Veljković, l'un des leaders des libéraux lançait en octobre 1905 l'avertissement suivant : « Enfin Messieurs, il y a encore la question de la morale dans l'armée. Nous avons dû la soulever parce que nous ne considérons pas les phénomènes d'indiscipline dans l'armée comme des phénomènes banals analogues à ceux qu'on trouve dans d'autres États. Chez nous, cette question est beaucoup plus sérieuse et complexe parce que, parallèlement à l'indiscipline, apparaissent chez certaines personnes des velléités politiques, et derrière elles se cachent certains spéculateurs politiques qui, avec la plus grande malveillance et la plus grande avidité, observent ces phénomènes, les suivent et tentent de les exploiter selon leurs tendances et aspirations politiques. » *Srpska zastava* [Le Drapeau serbe], 16-19 octobre 1905. Le chef des libéraux populiste Stojan Ribarac formula également sur le même ton une interpellation à l'Assemblée le 31 octobre. Les discussions portant sur les « acteurs non responsables » et le rôle de l'armée se poursuivirent, non sans une certaine virulence, lors du premier et unique gouvernement composé uniquement de radicaux indépendants (1905-1906). Voir *Stenografske beleške Narodne Skupštine, saziv za 1905. godinu* [Les comptes-rendus sténographiques de l'Assemblée nationale, session de 1905] (Belgrade, 1906), 135-197.

Grâce à un officier fanatique, le capitaine Milan Novaković, qui, bien qu'il eut été condamné pour avoir participé au contre-complot de Niš en 1903, à sa sortie de prison en 1905, souleva à nouveau, cette fois avec l'aide de civils, la question de la condamnation pénale des régicides et ce par l'intermédiaire de « La société pour une solution légale de la question des conjurés ». Novaković lança la revue *Za otadžbinu* (Pour la patrie) dans laquelle il condamnait impitoyablement les chefs du complot, les rendant responsables de « la grève diplomatique » des représentants des grandes puissances dans les premières années du règne du roi Petar ainsi que du long ajournement de la reprise de relations diplomatiques complètes avec la Grande Bretagne.

L'armée considéra les textes de la revue de Novaković comme l'une des causes de la tentative de contre-complot réalisée par des sous-officiers et officiers-réservistes de la garnison de Kragujevac (en mars 1906); à sa demande, la revue fut interdite.²¹ Comme Novaković, obstiné, continuait à écrire des pamphlets soutenant désormais les officiers et sous-officiers réservistes condamnés (« L'affaire de la revue *Pour la patrie* »), il fut d'abord arrêté, puis relâché il édita à nouveau sa revue. Quand il se remit, de façon encore plus virulente, non seulement à attaquer les conjurés et leurs défenseurs à l'état-major général mais également à les accuser au nom du gouvernement, du maire de Belgrade, du chef de la police, Novaković fut à nouveau incarcéré et, en septembre 1907, avec son parent Maksim Novaković (officier de gendarmerie), il fut tué dans des circonstances douteuses alors qu'il tentait de s'évader de prison. Du fait que c'était un cabinet formé par Pašić qui était au pouvoir et que le ministre de l'intérieur était Nastas Petrović, l'opposition, lors d'un débat animé à l'Assemblée nationale, exigea la destitution du ministre et la démission du gouvernement tout entier, mais Pašić qui disposait avec la majorité nécessaire, supporta toutes les attaques, jugeant opportun de ne pas en référer ni aux puissants sommets de l'armée (les généraux Radomir Putnik, Stepa Stepanović, Mihailo Živković, le colonel Ilija Gojković) ni au roi Pierre lui même.²²

Lors des débats parlementaires, l'opposition tenta obstinément de profiter de l'armistice temporaire entre Pašić et les sommets de l'armée

²¹ En novembre 1907, le tribunal militaire condamna quatre officiers et 27 officiers réservistes à des peines allant de vingt ans de réclusion (pour le sergent-major Sreten Sredojević, le meneur) à quelques années ou mois de réclusion pour participation au contre-complot de Kragujevac. Voir W. S. Vucinich, *Serbia between East and West. The Events of 1903-1908* (Stanford, 1954), 99-102. La question de la responsabilité de l'assassinat des deux Novaković, anciens officiers, fut soulevée, à nouveau sans succès, au début de l'année 1910 : *Narodna Skupština. XVI redovni sastanak 29. oktobra 1910* [Assemblée Nationale, XVI^e session ordinaire, 29 octobre 1910] (Belgrade, 1910), 5.

²² *Ibid.*

pour lancer des attaques argumentées. Le rapporteur de la minorité, D. M. Joksimović, attaqua ainsi, en mars 1908, le général Putnik, ministre des armées qui, bien qu'à la retraite, défendait à l'Assemblée nationale le budget militaire. Accusant Putnik de protéger ses amis, le rapporteur de la minorité souligna que ce dernier « ne pouvait se trouver à l'Assemblée qu'en tant qu'émissaire de M. le Ministre [...] et non en tant que ministre des armées. Pourtant, M. Putnik veut jouer le rôle de ministre. Je constate que ce phénomène dans notre vie parlementaire est caractéristique du gouvernement dirigé par M. Pašić ». L'opposition reprochait à Putnik d'avoir, à l'occasion d'un rassemblement lors duquel s'exprimèrent Ljubomir Stojanović pour les radicaux indépendants et Vojislav Veljković pour le libéraux, amené à Belgrade des troupes militaires supplémentaires pour maintenir l'ordre et la paix. Ce fait, interprété comme un soutien de l'armée au gouvernement Pašić, poussa l'opposition à aborder de façon critique le débat sur l'approbation du budget de l'armée serbe.²³

La « Main noire » et les vieux radicaux : l'aggravation du conflit

L'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzégovine en 1908 ouvrit la question serbe et donna lieu à une nouvelle polarisation des cercles militaires. La majeure partie des conjurés s'était déjà rassemblée autour d'un chef incontesté, le commandant Dragutin T. Dimitrijević Apis, qui avait une influence considérable à la Cour, à la fois en tant que suivant et ami des fils du roi, en particulier du prince George qui abdiqua rapidement, puis ensuite du nouveau héritier du trône, le Prince Alexandre.²⁴ Rassemblant autour lui la jeune génération des conjurés, Apis participa activement au travail des comités qui préparaient et surveillaient l'action de guérilla serbe (*četnička akcija*) en Macédoine slave. Comme la plupart de ses partisans, Apis acceptait difficilement le fait que l'on gaspilla l'énergie politique du pays dans des débats

²³ Il fut souligné à l'Assemblée que : « pour la première fois après le 29 mai, il se trouva un ministre des armées qui s'était mis au service de la politique du régime en place, celui de Nikola Pašić. Avant le 29 mai, cela pouvait se comprendre, après cette date non. Monsieur le ministre des armées est, quoiqu'il en soit, obligé de donner à l'Assemblée une explication et les raisons pour lesquelles il fut conduit à faire marcher l'armée sur Belgrade. Les événements après le meeting ont montré à quel point les estimations de M. le ministre étaient injustifiées, à quel point il était peu fondé de faire traverser tout le pays par l'armée pour un seul meeting. » (*Rad Narodne Skupštine sazvane u drugi redovan saziv za 1907. godinu. Stenografske beleške* [Travaux de l'Assemblée nationale convoquée en deuxième session ordinaire en 1907. Comptes-rendus sténographiques], vol. IV, Belgrade 1908, 130).

²⁴ Voir D. MacKenzie, *Apis. The Congenial Conspirator. The Life of Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević*, pour la littérature plus ancienne.

politiques vifs suscités par les rivalités partisans, tandis qu'aux frontières sud de la Serbie avait lieu une lutte sans merci pour défendre les habitants locaux contre les rebelles albanais, les komitadjis bulgares et les gendarmes turcs. Cette disproportion dans les affaires touchant à l'unification nationale, particulièrement marquée après que Belgrade ait dû en mars 1909 reconnaître l'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, agit sur les cercles d'officiers découragés qui suivaient avec une grande résignation les luttes des partis qui, à leur avis, épuisaient les énergies politiques du pays sans toutefois tenir suffisamment compte des intérêts nationaux globaux.

D'après les mémoires d'un conjuré de 1903, Antonije Antić, Apis, « se mêlant de politique intérieure, se heurtait de plus en plus aux [vieux] radicaux dans son travail pour la cause nationale. Ces conflits de plus en plus fréquents conduisirent à une haine effroyable entre Apis et les radicaux [...]. Apis tenta de renverser les radicaux au pouvoir. Ses tentatives ne furent pas couronnées de succès. Il sentit que seul il était faible et se mit à chercher des alliés. Il pensait pouvoir influencer, par l'intermédiaire de Jakov [Jaša] Nenadović et d'autres personnes puissantes, sur le roi Pierre pour écarter les radicaux du pouvoir. Le roi Pierre, parce qu'il était le souverain d'une monarchie parlementaire et également parce qu'il redoutait quelque peu les radicaux, ne se montrait pas disposé à donner le pouvoir à un autre parti de l'opposition – ni même de confier à l'opposition l'organisation d'élections. Cela conduisit Apis au désespoir – il considérait que le long gouvernement radical était dommageable aux intérêts du pays. »²⁵ Antonije Antić raconte ensuite le contenu d'une conversation avec Apis en 1910 lors de laquelle le chef des plus jeunes conjurés lui avait exposé son intention de provoquer un changement sur le trône. « Vois-tu, dit-il, les radicaux mèneront le pays à sa perte et le roi Pierre n'a pas la force de les destituer [...] le seul salut est que le roi Pierre abdique en faveur d'Alexandre [...]; à dix officiers, nous entrerons au Palais et nous l'y contraindrons. » Antić considérait un tel plan comme dangereux mais il proposa, au cas où on se lancerait dans une telle entreprise, de chercher l'accord « et l'appui d'un des partis d'opposition, par exemple les radicaux indépendants ». Apis renonça à cette idée mais, comme en témoigne Antić, « après quelque temps », il entra en étroit contact avec les radicaux indépendants, avec Milorad Drašković et le libéraux populistes de Stojan Ribarac avec lesquels il eut des entrevues.²⁶

Tandis que les vieux radicaux s'efforçaient d'adapter la politique nationale aux réalités de la politique extérieure, un groupe de jeunes officiers conjurés de 1903, ayant déjà une expérience du travail hors des frontières en Macédoine, fonda, en mai 1911, aidé par les civils, une organisation secrète

²⁵ Antić, « Notes ».

²⁶ *Ibid.*

« L'unification ou la mort », connue du public sous le nom de la « Main noire ». Déçus par les institutions démocratiques de la monarchie parlementaire – des institutions qu'ils considéraient comme menaçant gravement la résolution de la question de l'unification serbe – rassemblés autour de la revue *Pijemont* (Piémont), ils forgèrent une idéologie où se mêlaient des idées militaristes et une conception autoritaire de nationalisme.²⁷

Une analyse des textes de la revue *Pijemont*, en particulier de l'éditorial et des articles de la une, révèle une hostilité ouverte envers les institutions de la démocratie parlementaire. Dès le premier numéro du 3 septembre 1911, tous les partis étaient accusés « d'immoralité, d'inculture et de manque de patriotisme ». Le seul remède selon le *Pijemont* était d'introduire un « centralisme » qui tout d'abord éclairerait le peuple et le rendrait apte à prendre en toute indépendance une décision politique.²⁸ Un peu plus tard, le *Pije-*

²⁷ L'un des membres actifs de la « Main noire », le colonel Čedomir Popović, n'établissait pas de lien direct entre la formation de l'organisation et le mécontentement envers la politique intérieure mais une corrélation directe entre la création de l'organisation et le travail pour la cause nationale. « La fin de la crise de l'annexion fit que le sentiment belliqueux qui était apparu dans les masses populaires disparaissait. Commença la stagnation de la cause nationale. Le gouvernement avait cessé toute action en Macédoine, il avait déclaré publiquement (certes sous la pression des circonstances) son désintérêt pour la Bosnie. La Défense nationale [*Narodna Odbrana*] avait renoncé à son rôle révolutionnaire [...]. De partout en dehors des frontières de la Serbie parvenaient des plaintes désespérées de nos amis et de ceux qui oeuvraient pour la cause nationale; cette inactivité était fatale, il était nécessaire de faire quelque chose car, dans le cas contraire, le découragement se serait emparé des masses, ce qui aurait eu des conséquences incommensurables [...]. Il suffisait de relancer la question. Alors est née l'organisation 'L'unification ou la mort'. » (Č. Popović, « L'organisation 'L'unification ou la mort' (la 'Main noire'). Les causes et la façon dont elle est née, [Organizacija "Ujedinjenje ili smrt" ("Crna ruka")], *Nova Evropa*, vol. XV, n° 12, le 11 juin 1927, 402).

²⁸ Un écrit postérieur de Božić Simić donne un bon aperçu des vues générales des membres de la « Main noire » quant à la démocratie parlementaire : « Après le 29 mai, à l'exception du gouvernement de Ljubomir Stojanović (radicaux indépendants 1905), issu des élections, aucun gouvernement n'a mis en œuvre de véritables élections libres. A partir de là, presque tous les ministres et les hommes politiques se sont efforcés, faisant passer cela avant les soucis et les affaires de l'État, de faire entrer le plus grand nombre possible des leurs au Conseil d'État, à la Cour d'appel et à la Cour de cassation, de leur fournir des postes de greffiers et fonctionnaires, maires, gendarmes et gardiens des bois et forêts, tous postes d'importance pour obtenir une majorité électorale. Si au moins dans ce processus de parlementarisation de l'administration, on avait tenu plus ou moins compte de la formation et de la probité de ces fonctionnaires partisans, même si ce phénomène n'est guère sympathique, mais ce ne fut pas le cas... Ainsi, dans notre pays, plus encore que dans d'autres États démocratiques, l'armée, outre sa tâche principale qui est 'de défendre le pays d'un ennemi extérieur', a reçu de la Constitution un autre devoir qui est de 'protéger l'ordre et la légalité dans le pays' [...]. Si les leaders des partis des

mont accusa le gouvernement des vieux radicaux d'avoir trahi les idéaux des conjurés de 1903 et affirma que le pays devait se régénérer avec une idéologie nouvelle, indubitablement autoritaire. « L'assassinat de personnalités ne change pas le régime et encore moins la justice sociale. La meilleure preuve en est le 29 mai [1903] quand, dans notre pays, le souverain et la souveraine, leurs ministres, ont été tués, quand de nombreux changements sont intervenus non seulement dans les personnes mais aussi dans les lois – mais nous constatons que ces assassinats n'ont pas modifié notre vie sociale [...]. Ceux qui veulent améliorer la vie du peuple serbe et de la Serbie n'ont à leur disposition qu'un seul moyen, la régénération de notre race dégénérée et un nouveau mode d'éducation et d'instruction de notre jeunesse. »²⁹

Après la mort soudaine du premier ministre Milovan Milovanović en 1912, Pašić présida à nouveau le gouvernement. Le chef des vieux radicaux devint alors la cible principale de toutes les attaques des membres de la « Main noire ». Tous les mémoires disponibles écrits par des membres du cercle de la « Main noire » montrent une nette hostilité envers les opinions politiques et les méthodes de travail de Nikola Pašić qui, avec Stojan Protić, devint la métaphore de tous les fourvoiements de la démocratie parlementaire, stigmatisés dans le Pijemont. L'écart entre les besoins militaires immédiats, les idéaux nationaux et le faible équipement militaire de l'armée renforçait les tensions suscitées par le refus des vieux radicaux d'augmenter le budget militaire autant que l'exigeait le commandement militaire qui pensait à la mission nationale de la Serbie. Une série de malentendus eut pour conséquence d'ulcérer les cercles militaires, ce qui se termina par la démission des ministres des armées depuis Ilija Gojković (1911) jusqu'à Miloš Božanović (1912), tous deux sympathisants de la « Main noire » et partageant ses idées sur les objectifs nationaux et la place de l'armée au sein de l'Etat. Ces démissions démonstratives conjuguées au sentiment qu'avait l'armée d'être injustement oubliée (à un moment où, à l'Assemblée nationale, les vieux radicaux étaient la cible des attaques des indépendants pour cause de corruption et de « bancocratie ») renforçèrent encore le mécontentement de larges cercles militaires envers la politique de Pašić et de

vieux radicaux et des radicaux indépendants avaient été, par principe, des démocrates et des partisans du parlementarisme, les conjurés n'auraient eu aucune influence. Ou ne l'auraient eue qu'au ministère des armées. » (Marco, « L'armée serbe avant et après le 29 mai 1903. L'influence des conjurés sur la politique de la Serbie d'avant-guerre », *Novi Evropa*, vol. XI, n° 1, 11 juillet 1927, 10-13).

²⁹ Dans *Pijemont*, 31 octobre (12 novembre) 1911.

Protić, les rapprochant ainsi des positions de la « Main noire » sur la politique du gouvernement.³⁰

Avec quelques centaines de membres, en majorité originaires de Serbie, et pour la plupart jeunes officiers, l'organisation « L'unification ou la mort » était une variante balkanique des organisations d'officiers conjurés organisées selon les principes de fonctionnement des loges maçonniques. La « Main noire » était très proche par ses méthodes et ses buts de l'organisation des Jeunes Turcs qui, en 1908, fit un putsch dans l'Empire ottoman. C'est le journaliste Ljuba Jovanović-Čupa, qui mourut d'ailleurs peu après la fondation de l'organisation lors de la première guerre balkanique, qui élaborait le cérémonial d'admission dans l'organisation, ainsi que ses « statuts ».

Selon le programme de l'organisation, la démocratie parlementaire était l'une des sources du mal qui intoxiquait le peuple serbe. Le premier numéro du *Pijemont* déclarait : « la direction étatique de la Serbie n'est pas bonne. La popularité des principaux représentants de l'Etat, des souverains, du gouvernement, de l'Assemblée nationale, a diminué [...]. Peu d'entre eux remplissent leurs devoirs. Il faut commencer par cultiver un culte de l'Etat. Sans un tel culte, la Serbie ne peut avoir le sentiment d'être un Etat... De façon générale, tant que le peuple ne sera pas instruit, il faudra en tout préférer le centralisme à la décentralisation, au nom de l'Etat. » En même temps, on rappelait que « le parlementarisme n'est pas le dernier cri de la sagesse politique. Il a été démontré que les masses populaires, même dans un tel régime, ne sont ni la source ni le destinataire du pouvoir. La démagogie a compromis et fait un mauvais usage des libertés politiques. Lui permettre de continuer signifie préparer une réaction politique car le désordre, le relâchement et l'insécurité ne peuvent être considérés comme des signes de liberté et de démocratie. Il faut dans la question des libertés civiles trouver une moyenne qui répondra au degré atteint par notre culture et civilisation ; seulement alors ce sera la fin des soubresauts politiques. »³¹

³⁰ Après la Grande Guerre, le fils du général Ilija Gojković exposa une opinion nettement plus radicale envers Pašić, affirmant que « depuis la révolte radicale de Timok [*Timočka buna*] en 1883, Nikola Pašić et les autres chefs radicaux s'étaient mis à haïr l'armée car ils savaient et percevaient que l'armée régulière ne permettrait pas qu'on fasse de la Serbie un laboratoire sociologique pour expérimenter le programme du parti. Pašić en particulier haïssait de façon sectaire l'armée – peut-être de façon justifiée selon son point de vue partisan; pour Pašić, le parti passa toujours et continua à passer avant l'Etat. » (V. I. Gojković, « Radikali i vojska » [Les radicaux et l'armée], *Nova Evropa*, vol. XVIII, n° 10-11, Zagreb 1928, 324).

³¹ *Pijemont*, Belgrade, le 21 août (3 septembre n.s.) 1911. Cité également par V. Dedijer, *Sarajevo 1914* (Belgrade, 1966), 633-634. La version française, plus courte, est disponible sous le titre suivant : V. Dedijer, *La route de Sarajevo* (Paris, 1969).

Du fait de l'indiscrétion d'un fonctionnaire de l'Etat, l'existence de l'organisation, ne resta pas secrète et, selon certains indices, le gouvernement lui-même, mais non le héritier du trône Alexandre qui avait apporté une importante contribution au lancement de la revue *Pijemont*, avait été informé de la création de l'organisation.³² Les nouveaux membres étaient recrutés quasi-publiquement au sein de l'armée, et étaient admis dans leurs rangs, à titre individuel, certain nombre des Croates et des Slovènes d'orientation yougoslave.³³ Dirigée par le charismatique officier Dragutin T. Dimitrijević Apis, chef des services de renseignements de l'Etat major, la « Main noire » introduisit progressivement des hommes à elle dans nombre d'organisations importantes, y compris dans la « Défense nationale ».

L'influence de la « Main noire » crût particulièrement après les guerres balkaniques (1912–1913) où ses membres, s'étant illustrés par leurs hauts faits héroïques sur le front, acquirent un prestige considérable au sein du corps des officiers.³⁴ A la veille de la seconde guerre balkanique contre la Bulgarie en 1913 pour les frontières entre les deux Etats en Macédoine slave, le *Pijemont* menaça ouvertement le gouvernement déclarant que celui-ci devrait être jugé pour trahison s'il cédaient une partie du territoire contesté à la Bulgarie.

En 1914, le conflit entre les membres de la « Main noire » et le gouvernement de Pašić autour de la question de savoir qui des autorités mili-

³² Antonije Antić (« Notes », 71) de sa part affirme que les plus hauts responsables politiques avaient été informés de la formation de l'organisation secrète, que « le roi Pierre, l'héritier du trône Alexandre, Nikola Pašić, St. Protić ainsi que Milovan Milovanović ont été informés confidentiellement de la fondation du *Piémont* ainsi que de celle de l'organisation ». Cette donnée n'est pas confirmée dans les autres sources et témoignages, à l'exception d'Alexandre et de Milovan Milovanović.

³³ Cf. O. Tartalja, *Veleizdajnik* [Traître à la patrie] (Split–Zagreb, 1928), 32.

³⁴ Lors de la première guerre balkanique, des membres les plus éminents de la « Main noire » périrent, à savoir les colonels de régiments Aleksandar Glišić, Ilija Radivojević, Radivoje Andjelković, le commandant Milan Vasić, commandant de bataillon dans le 5^{ème} régiment et secrétaire de la « Défense nationale », tandis que, près de Krivolak (en Macédoine slave), mourut du choléra le civil fondateur de la « Main noire », le journaliste et directeur du *Piémont*, Ljubomir Jovanović-Čupa (D. Semiz, « Majevci » [Les hommes de mai], *Nova Evropa*, vol. XVI, n° 7, 11 octobre 1927, 221). D'après le témoignage de A. Antić, la conduite des membres de la « Main noire » lors des guerres balkaniques dissipa tous les doutes en l'armée, et les éloges ne manquèrent pas. Ainsi Jovan Skerlić, le fameux critique littéraire et l'un des dirigeants des radicaux indépendants, félicita Antić par ces mots : « Vous nous avez tous fait honneur [...]. Je craignais que l'un d'entre vous ne soit un lâche à la guerre – mais, grâce à Dieu, vous avez tous été des héros. » De même, le général Stepa Stepanović félicita Milan Gr. Milovanović et Apis « nous, nous sommes bien comportés pendant la guerre – sous-entendu sa génération – mais vous avez été meilleurs et je vous tire mon chapeau » (Antić, « Notes », 74).

taires et civiles en Macédoine devaient avoir la prééminence, montra que les membres de la « Main noire », soutenus tactiquement par l'opposition (en particulier par les radicaux indépendants) nourrissaient des « aspirations prétoriennes », contraires à l'organisation démocratique du pays. Cette crise révéla toute l'ampleur du conflit qui couvait depuis longtemps entre Pašić et la « Main noire ». Ce conflit se termina par une crise constitutionnelle, par la dissolution de l'Assemblée nationale suivie d'élections, à la veille de l'attentat de Sarajevo, ainsi que, le 24 juin 1914, par l'abdication du roi Pierre, impuissant à défendre les intérêts de l'armée à laquelle il devait son trône et qui, sous la pression conjointe de Pašić, de la diplomatie russe et de l'héritier du trône, remit son mandat de souverain à son plus jeune fils, Alexandre.³⁵

Dans cette crise, vraisemblablement à l'instigation de Pašić, l'envoyé de la Russie impériale Nikolai Hartwig qui, dans les années marquées par les guerres balkaniques, s'était imposé comme une sorte de « vice-roi », un arbitre dans la politique intérieure et extérieure de la Serbie, joua un rôle-clé. Son loyalisme à la partie serbe lors des guerres balkaniques l'avait pourvu d'une auréole de grand ami des Serbes. Agissant souvent hors des instructions de Saint-Petersbourg, Hartwig présentait régulièrement ses idées au gouvernement serbe et à la Cour comme l'opinion officielle russe. Dans le conflit autour de la prééminence des autorités civiles ou militaires, il se rangea du côté de Pašić qui, pour Saint-Petersbourg, était une personnalité-clé digne de confiance pour, ensuite, rallier à Pašić le jeune héritier du trône désireux de s'emparer le plus rapidement possible de la fonction de roi.³⁶

³⁵ D. T. Bataković, « Sukob vojnih i civilnih vlasti u Srbiji u proleće 1914. godine » [Le conflit des autorités civiles et militaires au printemps 1914], *Istorijski časopis XXIX-XXX* (1982-83), 477-492. Selon le témoignage de A. Antić, Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis s'allia à l'opposition contre Pašić parce qu'il n'avait pas réussi à faire marcher les troupes de Skopje, sous le commandement de ces amis de la « Main noire » sur Belgrade pour renverser le gouvernement Pašić.

³⁶ Les membres de la « Main noire » déniaient à Pašić toute capacité étatique, ramenant son travail à d'étroites manipulations partisans qui faisaient grand tort aux affaires de l'Etat et de la nation. Comparant Hartwig et Pašić et les plaçant aux antipodes, Božin Simić écrivait que « Nikola Pašić n'était pas de ces hommes d'Etat qui résolvent les questions importantes de l'Etat à temps – il ne courrait jamais au devant des événements pour les diriger dans la direction souhaitée, si cela était possible, ou pour 'prendre le taureau par les cornes', comme le faisait Hartwig dans son domaine d'action. Pašić, aussi bien en politique intérieure qu'extérieure, illustrait ce qui s'appelle en français 'le laisser-aller', car il laissait traîner toutes les questions difficiles tant que les événements n'imposaient pas d'eux-mêmes des solutions. La grande capacité de Pašić était tout à fait ailleurs. En tant qu'organisateur et chef d'un parti politique, il était extraordinairement capable, à cet égard il n'a pas de rival dans notre pays même si on remonte d'un siècle [...] l'histoire politique montre que les grands hommes d'Etat ne valent rien comme

Lors de cette crise, les membres de la « Main noire », grâce à des hommes de confiance appartenant à la « Défense nationale » et se trouvant dans la région autour d'Užice (en Serbie de l'ouest), le long de la rivière Drina, firent passer la frontière à plusieurs jeunes bosniaques qu'ils avaient préalablement munis de pistolets et de bombes. Pašić fut averti quelques jours plus tard par les autorités civiles du passage illégal des jeunes dont les intentions restaient inconnues (1-2 juin 1914). Dès le 15 juin, il exigea du ministre des armées « d'empêcher toute action similaire car c'est très dangereux pour nous ». ³⁷ Lors d'une réunion du gouvernement, à la mi-juin 1914, Pašić fit part de cette question aux membres de son cabinet. Il fut alors décidé de prévenir à l'avenir toute affaire analogue en renforçant la surveillance des frontières. Il fut aussitôt donné ordre aux autorités civiles de mener une enquête sur le passage illégal d'armes et de personnes en Bosnie. En même temps, Pašić, se doutant que derrière de telles actions se tenaient la « Main noire », ordonna dès le 24 juin une enquête sur les garde-frontières et le lieutenant-colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević Apis, chef du service de renseignements de l'Etat major. ³⁸

Le conflit dans l'ombre de la Grande Guerre

Le déclenchement de la guerre empêcha le dénouement final. Le conflit entre autorités civiles et militaires en Serbie, réduit à une rivalité entre le gouvernement de Pašić et la « Main noire », couvait encore au moment où la grande guerre éclata. Au tout début de la guerre, à un chef social-démocrate qui protestait affirmant que le gouvernement tolérait « des organisations secrètes qui avaient conduit à la guerre », Pašić répondit qu'elles existaient en effet, mais que, jusqu'alors, elles n'étaient pas très dangereuses et que quand elles le deviendraient réellement, le gouvernement prendrait les mesures nécessaires. ³⁹

hommes de parti et que réciproquement les géniaux hommes de parti ne sont pas de bons hommes d'Etat. Le cas de Nikola Pašić confirme ce fait historique. Pour mener un travail positif en politique intérieure et extérieure, Pašić a toujours eu besoin de gens capables qui le conduisaient par la main, dans les moments les plus cruciaux, ce furent pour la politique étrangère Nikola Hartwig, et pour la politique intérieure Lazar Paču; dès que ces deux personnages disparurent, Pašić était un homme mort, avant sa mort, dans son pays comme à l'extérieur » (Marco, « Nikola Hartwig et la Serbie. A l'occasion d'une discussion sur la guerre mondiale », *Nova Evropa*, n°6, 26 juin 1933, 244-245).

³⁷ Dj. Stanković, *Nikola Pašić, saveznici i stvaranje Jugoslavije* [Nikola Pašić, les Alliés et la création de la Yougoslavie] (Belgrade, 1983), 17.

³⁸ Dedijer, *Sarajevo 1914*, 663.

³⁹ D. Lapčević, « Nikola Pašić », *Politika*, n° 6693, 11 décembre 1926.

La formation d'un gouvernement de coalition à la fin de l'année 1914 révéla l'ampleur de la puissance de la « Main noire », les chefs des radicaux indépendants n'ayant accepté de participer à un tel cabinet qu'après avoir consulté Apis. A la demande de l'héritier du trône Alexandre, Apis fut écarté du haut commandement et envoyé dans les troupes d'Užice, puis celles de Timok (de Serbie de l'est) avec lesquelles il traversa l'Albanie. Il semblerait que Pašić, lui-même en disgrâce auprès de l'héritier du trône, ait tenté d'aplanir le conflit avec les chefs de la « Main noire ». D'après le témoignage de Antonije Antić, le premier ministre Pašić, par l'intermédiaire d'un des rares vieux radicaux qui avait été mis au fait du complot de 1903, le député de Smederevo, Živojin Tajsic, tenta de fixer une entrevue avec les membres de la « Main noire » pour faire la paix avec eux. Mais, avant la rencontre, pour des raisons techniques (Apis, Milan Gr. Milovanović et A. Antić étaient dans différentes garnisons lointaines), la réunion n'eut pas lieu. Le rendez-vous, reporté à une date plus favorable, n'eut pas lieu du fait de l'offensive germano-autrichienne à l'automne 1915, suivit par les Bulgares aboutant avec la défaite serbe et la retraite pénible à travers l'Albanie en Corfou et plus tard vers le Salonique.⁴⁰

Le conflit avec la « Main noire » reprit de l'acuité après la défaite de la Serbie en 1915, quand les membres de cette organisation, avec l'approbation de l'armée, accusèrent publiquement Pašić et l'héritier du trône Alexandre d'avoir mal géré les affaires civiles et militaires de l'Etat ainsi que d'avoir contribué de façon décisive à la déroute rapide et totale du pays. Dès le mois de décembre 1915, au cours même de la retraite militaire, l'héritier du trône Alexandre fit un pas significatif qui annonçait son intention de mettre de l'ordre dans l'armée et de se subordonner ses commandants parmi lesquels l'influence de la « Main noire » était extraordinairement forte : il destitua de leurs fonctions le *voïvode* (le maréchal) Radomir Putnik, chef du haut commandement et principal protecteur de la « Main noire », ainsi que le colonel Radivoje Bojović, ministre des armées, pour nommer à leur place des hommes qui avaient sa confiance le général Petar Bojović et le colonel Božidar Terzić. De même, un certain nombre d'officiers, d'anciens conjurés de 1903, qui à la veille de la Grande Guerre pour s'opposer à leurs camarades de la « Main noire » avaient formé à la Cour, autour de l'héritier du trône Alexandre, une coterie militaire rivale dénommée la « Main blanche » furent nommés à des postes importants.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Antić, « Notes », 85.

⁴¹ Selon les mémoires de D. Mičić (« Srpski oficiri », 58), « Putnik fut transporté, gravement malade, sur les bras des soldats à travers l'Albanie. En ces temps extrêmement difficiles, tout bon Serbe trouvait un responsable à la catastrophe et, de la façon la plus normale, le nommait et le maudissait. Il va de soi que les officiers, notamment ceux de la

L'antagonisme entre, d'une part, le gouvernement et l'héritier du trône Alexandre et, d'autre part, la « Main noire » se renforça, les uns et les autres faisant preuve de méfiance mutuelle et les membres de la « Main noire » proférant de plus en plus haut des menaces à l'égard des premiers. Après que l'armée serbe ait traversé l'Albanie, alors qu'ils se trouvaient sur le front de Salonique, ils menacèrent publiquement de ne laisser rentrer en Serbie libérée, sous « une haie de sabres », uniquement ceux qui l'auraient mérité et donc ni l'héritier du trône Alexandre ni Pašić. L'influence des membres de la « Main noire » dans les unités de volontaires formées en Russie et dans les autres était telle que, si les circonstances s'y prêtaient, cette organisation pouvait faire un coup d'Etat militaire.⁴²

Pašić, qui pourtant avait de mauvaises relations avec l'héritier du trône et n'était pas prêt à faire des concessions à un jeune souverain désireux d'avoir le dernier mot, jugea rapidement qu'il était temps d'aplanir ses relations avec Alexandre, vu le danger qui les menaçait tous deux. En septembre 1916, le prince-héritier Alexandre posa un ultimatum au gouvernement de Pašić exigeant que celui-ci préparât un projet de loi sur la création de tribunaux extraordinaires pour officiers afin de régler son compte à la « Main noire » pour avoir organisé un attentat sur sa personne à Ostrovo (Arnissa).⁴³

Le conflit se termina par un procès fabriqué autour d'un attentat présumé sur la personne de l'héritier du trône Alexandre.⁴⁴ Il ne fut possible de

'Main noire', rendaient responsables de tout Pašić et les radicaux, tandis que ces derniers rejetaient la faute sur Putnik et sa maladie ainsi que sur l'ensemble de l'Etat major au sein duquel, à de rares exceptions, les membres de la 'Main noire' prédominaient. Ainsi, les radicaux utilisèrent la maladie de Putnik et obtinrent le consentement de l'héritier du trône pour remplacer l'ensemble du haut commandement dès qu'ils parvinrent à Scutari après avoir traversé l'Albanie. Cela eut deux conséquences. Premièrement, la 'Main noire' perdit son dernier point d'appui sérieux, et deuxièmement, la destitution indiqua publiquement qui était responsable de notre faillite. »

⁴² L'héritier du trône, Alexandre, craignait un coup d'Etat militaire qui, réalisé avec l'aide des troupes de Russie, aurait instauré une sorte de république sud-américaine sous dictature militaire. Cf. D. T. Bataković, « Nouvelles sources narratives sur le procès de Salonique » in *Srbija 1917. godine* [*La Serbie en 1917*], Recueil de travaux de l'Institut d'histoire, vol. 6 (Belgrade, 1988), 169.

⁴³ Cf. D. T. Bataković, « The Salonica Trial 1917 : Black Hand vs. Democracy (The Serbian Army from Internal Strife to Military Success) », in *The Salonica Theatre of Operations and the Outcome of the Great War* (Thessaloniki, 2005), 273-293.

⁴⁴ Selon le témoignage d'Antonije Antić (« Notes », 95), Apis n'avait pas l'intention de tenter quoi que ce soit contre l'héritier du trône et Pašić avant de rentrer dans le pays. Apis commenta les récriminations du général Damnjan Popović qui n'avait pas obtenu le commandement d'une armée par les mots suivants : « Si tu l'avais entendu. Il voulait que nous fassions une révolution parce qu'il n'a pas reçu le commandement d'une armée.

liquider l'organisation qu'après que le vieux roi Pierre ait donné son accord à ce que les chefs de la « Main noire » fussent traduits devant un tribunal à Salonique en 1917.⁴⁵ Le plus fameux chef militaire serbe, le voïvode Putnik, considéré à raison comme le principal protecteur des membres de la « Main noire », parti, après avoir été destitué, se soigner en France où il mourut rapidement. Pašić qui, avec le gouvernement, se trouvait à Corfou, n'était pas prêt à sacrifier à l'aventurisme trouble de certains officiers le parlementarisme difficilement instauré en exil alors que le pays était occupé. Ces officiers, bien qu'ils aient prouvé qu'ils étaient des patriotes courageux, pouvaient sérieusement aggraver la position du gouvernement et de l'armée en exil déjà sérieusement ébranlée sur le plan international, en menaçant les dirigeants serbes et en planifiant une série d'attentats contre les têtes couronnées des Etats ennemis.⁴⁶

Craignant des troubles plus sérieux dans l'armée qu'attendait la lourde tâche de libérer le pays, Pašić hésita sur la façon de punir les officiers soupçonnés d'avoir l'intention de réaliser un coup d'Etat, intention incompatible avec le rôle d'une armée dans un Etat parlementaire et, de surcroît, dans les conditions difficiles de l'exil. Cependant, l'enquête ne donna pas de preuves tangibles de l'attentat contre l'héritier du trône. Le gouvernement de Pašić fut jusqu'à la fin de 1914 un gouvernement de coalition, des ministres radicaux indépendants qui passaient pour être des amis des chefs de la « Main noire » avaient des postes importants en son sein. Tout d'abord, Pašić, dans un accord avec Ljubomir Jovanović, ministre de l'intérieur, proposa d'éviter un scandale de grande ampleur et de résoudre la question par des mesures administratives – allant de la mise à la retraite à la révocation de l'armée. Quand, sous la pression de l'héritier du trône, il dut accepter un procès, Pašić réfléchit au nombre de personnes qu'il fallait traduire devant le

Non mais! Ecoute, nous ne pouvons rien faire pour l'instant et il ne faut pas, efforçons-nous seulement de toutes nos forces de rentrer au plus vite au pays – et là, nous verrons [...]. Jamais il n'a fait la moindre allusion à un quelconque renversement de l'héritier du trône”.

⁴⁵ Au cours du procès, le vieux roi exprima la crainte que « le gouvernement n'hésite et ne renonce aux mesures législatives prises et condamna par des mots cinglants toute éventuelle faiblesse ». A la demande d'Apis de mettre un terme à « cette affaire », il ne répondit pas, et questionné sur les demandes de grâce des condamnés, il répondit brièvement : « Tuez-les! ». D. R. Živojinović, *Kralj Petar Karadjordjević. Rat i poslednje godine 1914-1921*, vol. III [Le roi Pierre I Karadjordjević. La guerre et les dernières années 1914-1921] (Belgrade, 1994), 253-255.

⁴⁶ Les membres de la « Main noire », toujours loyaux to Apis, avaient l'intention de commettre un attentat sur la personne du roi de Grèce Constantin, du roi de Bulgarie Ferdinand et du kaiser allemand Guillaume II. Cf. Nešković, *Istina o Solunskom procesu*,

tribunal, acceptant, finalement, que seuls les « meneurs de la danse » fussent impliqués, arguant que, à son avis, il y avait un certain nombre d'officiers loyaux à la dynastie dans les rangs des partisans et des membres de la « Main noire ». ⁴⁷

Un procès monté pour sauver le régime

Pašić ne s'opposa pas à ce que les membres de la « Main noire » fussent jugés dans un procès monté de toutes pièces à Salonique, craignant que, dans des conditions d'instabilité, la « Main noire » ne se transformât en une junte militaire, et supposant également que ce groupe était impliqué dans l'organisation de l'attentat de Sarajevo. ⁴⁸ De ce fait, l'alliance tactique initiale entre Pašić et l'héritier du trône contre les putschistes potentiels qui menaçaient le régime parlementaire se renforça. En liquidant par un procès l'organisation « L'unification ou la mort », Pašić ne consolida pas seulement sa propre position. Après que les ministres radicaux indépendants Ljubomir Davidović et Milorad Drašković (puis le représentant des progressistes, par ailleurs opposé aux conjurés dans le gouvernement de coalition) eurent démissionné en signe de protestation contre « l'assassinat judiciaire » des conjurés, Nikola Pašić reçut en juin 1917 mandat pour former un cabinet uniquement composé de vieux radicaux. ⁴⁹ Parallèlement, il défendit le principe selon lequel les affaires de l'Etat, dans une monarchie parlementaire, ne

⁴⁷ Živojinović, *Kralj Petar Karadjordjević*, vol. III, 249.

⁴⁸ D'après Antić (« Notes », 80), Apis, lors d'une conversation peu après l'attentat contre l'archiduc François-Ferdinand, lui expliqua sa participation à celui-ci de la façon suivante : « Je craignais que les Autrichiens, à l'occasion de manoeuvres en Bosnie, ne nous attaquent et ne nous écrasent. Comme tu le sais, nos troupes sont en Macédoine et avec deux corps d'armée les Autrichiens auraient pu facilement nous écraser. Quand ces jeunes gens ('les jeunes Bosniaques') sont apparus – c'est-à-dire quand Rade Malobabić m'a informé qu'il y avait des hommes prêts à tuer François-Ferdinand – j'ai pensé 'qu'ils essaient! Ils ne réussiront certainement pas, mais au moins ils lui feront peur!' Il se tiendra sans doute le raisonnement suivant : si des Serbes tirent sur moi en Bosnie, que feraient-ils si j'allais en Serbie? Mais vois-tu, je me suis trompé – ils l'ont tué, par Dieu. » D'après le témoignage d'Antić sur le projet d'attaque de la Serbie par les armées austro-hongroises, Apis informé par son émissaire en Bosnie, Rade Malobabić (qui, toujours selon Antić, avait été recommandé lui aussi par Srdjan Budisavljević, le chef de la coalition croato-serbe à Zagreb), communiqua la nouvelle à Putnik, mais celui-ci ne retransmit pas l'information à Pašić. A cette occasion, Apis accabla Pašić d'épithètes injurieuses. Pašić lui-même, si on lit attentivement ses notes confidentielles et même ses déclarations publiques sur le procès de Salonique, estimait que Malobabić était un agent double, un espion de l'Autriche-Hongrie, infiltré en Serbie. Voir Nešković, *Istina o Solunskom procesu*, 235 (communication officielle du gouvernement de Pašić).

⁴⁹ Živanović, *Solunski proces*, 522.

pouvaient être conduites que par des acteurs dont les pouvoirs sont délimités par la Constitution.

Ce point de vue Pašić défendit dans une conversation privée avec un officier qui appartenait à l'organisation conjurée. Il souligna que l'organisation étatique de la Serbie n'était pas conciliable avec la volonté des officiers d'influer sur le cours de la politique de l'Etat. Selon la même source Pašić fit valoir que : « Nous sommes un pays parlementaire. On sait comment la politique se mène. Le pays est dirigé par le roi, le gouvernement et l'Assemblée. Quiconque veut influencer sur le cours de la politique de l'Etat doit être un citoyen, doit fréquenter des meetings, écrire dans les journaux, entrer à l'Assemblée nationale et dans les autres organes représentatifs; il aura d'autant plus d'influence qu'il aura des capacités et du savoir. On ne peut permettre que les officiers en capote exercent leur emprise sur la politique. Cela n'est permis nulle part au monde. L'armée repose sur l'obéissance. Le plus jeune doit obéir au plus âgé, un point c'est tout. Ils voulaient faire pression sur la politique. [...] Quand ils n'ont pas pu parvenir à ce qu'ils voulaient, alors ils ont dit : 'Allez! Eliminons ceux sur lesquels nous ne pouvons pas influencer, et remplaçons-les par d'autres sur lesquels nous pourrions exercer notre influence afin que la politique soit celle que nous voulons'. »⁵⁰

Bien que la procédure judiciaire qui établit la culpabilité des membres de la « Main noire » dans le prétendu attentat contre Alexandre, les dépositions peu fiables des témoins, les abus du tribunal et les pressions aient été à de nombreuses reprises stigmatisés comme révélateur du bas niveau de loyauté de Pašić envers les institutions de l'Etat parlementaire et l'Etat de droit, si l'on tient compte de toutes les circonstances entourant le procès, les positions de Pašić deviennent plus compréhensibles. En effet, dans ces conditions, il s'agissait d'une démarche nécessaire pour défendre non seulement les intérêts du parlementarisme mais également les intérêts les plus élevés de l'Etat et de la nation. Dans une circulaire confidentielle adressée, au cours du procès, aux envoyés à l'étranger, Pašić formula les principes sur lesquels il faisait reposer la responsabilité des membres de la « Main noire » et, donc, la dissolution systématique de l'organisation : « Des mesures judiciaires sont prises à l'encontre de ceux pour lesquels l'instruction a trouvé des preuves de ce qu'ils ont, par des moyens condamnables, travaillé non au programme d'unification nationale auquel ils ont prêté serment lors de leur admission dans l'organisation mais à un autre : la préparation d'un coup d'Etat. L'atmosphère politique sera assainie et l'ordre public assuré contre les surprises, premièrement, quand un verdict aura été prononcé à l'encontre des putschistes, puis, deuxièmement, quand l'organisation secrète aura été

⁵⁰ Živanović, *Solunski proces*, 602-603.

démantelée et relevés de leur serment d'allégeance envers elle ceux qui en étaient membres mais n'ont pas participé aux actions putschistes ». ⁵¹

Pour justifier la décision du tribunal militaire de Salonique auprès des Alliés, Pašić lia délibérément dans une déclaration officielle le procès de la « Main noire » et les rumeurs insistantes selon lesquelles ils étaient prêts à conclure une paix séparée avec l'Autriche-Hongrie – rumeurs qui, dans ces circonstances, étaient les bienvenues – et il souligna : « Dieu, à cette occasion, a sauvé la Serbie. Il est évident, même pour les esprits les plus faibles, que si les conjurés avaient réussi à tuer les détenteurs du pouvoir étatique et les acteurs d'une politique qui s'appuie sur les puissances coalisées, ça aurait été la ruine de la Serbie. Dans ce cas, les conjurés n'auraient pas eu d'autre choix que de se battre contre les armées alliées sur notre front ou de se rendre à l'ennemi. Il n'y avait pas d'autre issue et il ne pouvait y en avoir d'autre. » ⁵² Un rapport secret adressé aux envoyés diplomatiques à l'étranger concluait de la même façon : « [...] on voit clairement que le mal est entré si profondément avec l'organisation secrète qu'il est plus que temps de se mettre en travers de son chemin », justifiant la décision du tribunal par le fait que les conjurés « ont attenté à la vie de l'héritier du trône et ont réussi à mettre en question l'existence même de la Serbie et des Serbes. Dieu, lui-même, a sauvé la Serbie du danger né en son sein. » ⁵³

Sans tenir compte du fait qu'il était facile d'établir qu'il n'y avait pas eu réellement d'attentat, le jugement de Pašić atteste de la gravité du danger que pouvait présenter, dans certaines conditions, le travail de l'organisation des conjurés. Son refus d'accorder la grâce aux trois hommes directement impliqués dans la préparation de l'attentat de Sarajevo (le colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević Apis, le commandant Ljubomir Vulović, agent Rade Malobabić) témoigne de sa volonté de barrer, une fois pour toute, la route au danger d'une activité antidémocratique des cercles conjurés. Leur participation à l'attentat de Sarajevo, attentat commis au moment le moins favorable pour la Serbie, qui ne s'était pas encore rétablie des guerres balkaniques, montrait qu'on pouvait attendre d'eux d'autres entreprises du même genre, aux conséquences également imprévisibles.

Si, de surcroît, on tient compte du fait que, quasiment au même moment, il y eut des procès dans les hauts cercles militaires et les noyaux conspirateurs au sein d'autres armées européennes, française, russe, etc., alors on saisit une nouvelle dimension de l'ensemble complexe des relations entre le gouvernement et l'armée en Serbie : l'aggravation d'un conflit entre autori-

⁵¹ Voir Nešković, *Istina o Solunskom procesu*, 228.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 238.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 241.

tés civiles et militaires lors d'une guerre longue, épuisante et véritablement « grande » par ses nombreuses conséquences.

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La France et le programme yougoslave du gouvernement serbe

En novembre 1914, Auguste Boppe, envoyé français en Serbie, prend connaissance du programme yougoslave du gouvernement serbe, plus précisément de son volet territorial (qui prévoit l'incorporation des régions occidentales et septentrionales de l'espace yougoslave allant du Banat à l'Est jusqu'à la Carinthie à l'Ouest dans le futur état des Slaves du Sud). Il juge les revendications territoriales serbes surprenantes vu que, à l'époque, l'État serbe est en train de lutter pour sa survie. Il reste néanmoins persuadé qu'en cas d'une éventuelle victoire de l'Entente, les Serbes n'hésiteraient pas à présenter sous cette forme leurs exigences territoriales lors du futur congrès de la paix.¹ La création possible d'un État des Slaves de Sud devient ainsi l'élément clé des relations franco-serbes lors de toute la durée de la guerre. En conséquence il est d'une importance primordiale de connaître et préciser l'attitude française envers le projet yougoslave du gouvernement serbe : autrement dit, peut-on voir en la France la véritable créatrice et protectrice de l'État yougoslave.

Nombreux sont les partisans de cette thèse : la France détient la responsabilité exclusive non seulement pour la création, mais aussi pour la délimitation de ses frontières et l'organisation interne du Royaume SHS.² En Italie la diplomatie, mais aussi l'opinion publique en général, voient en la France la force obscure qui a permis, pour ainsi dire, la mutilation de la victoire italienne en créant la Yougoslavie sur les rives orientales du *mare nostrum* italien. De l'autre côté de l'Adriatique, l'historiographie récente es-

¹ Boppe à Delcasse, Nich, 22.11.1914, AMAE, Guerre, Autriche, vol. 159.

² Dans l'historiographie récente, l'article de Jacques Bariéty, « La France et la naissance du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes 1914-1919 », *Revue d'Europe Centrale* II/1 (Strasbourg 1994), est une exception, car il démontre que le gouvernement français accordait un intérêt assez limité à la naissance du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, laquelle d'ailleurs c'est faite sans l'aide française.

time que l'hégémonie serbe en Yougoslavie ne pouvait être mise en place, sans l'aide décisive (tant diplomatique que militaire) de la France.³

Qu'en est-il exactement ? Que pouvaient être les raisons d'un intérêt supposé aussi vif et un engagement aussi important de la France dans une partie de l'Europe si éloignée de ses zones d'intérêts traditionnelles. Nous nous proposons d'étudier l'engagement français dans les affaires yougoslaves en essayant d'apporter des réponses à trois importantes questions. Tout d'abord : quand et comment la France s'est-elle décidée à soutenir le programme yougoslave et en conséquence de favoriser la dissolution de l'Autriche-Hongrie ? Ensuite, la France considérait-elle opportun de choisir entre l'alliance avec l'Italie ou le soutien aux Serbes et Yougoslaves ? Enfin, la naissance du Royaume des Serbes Croates et Slovènes, était-elle un projet français ?

1. Autriche-Hongrie ou la Yougoslavie

La France s'est intéressée d'avantage à la Serbie à cause de son alliance avec la Russie. Il doit être précisé que son influence politique dans le pays était due d'abord à cette alliance. Quant à l'importance du marché serbe pour l'économie française, elle était quasiment inexistante. A titre d'exemple : en 1911 le commerce global (exportation et importation) entre la France et la Serbie s'élevait à 5,3 millions, tandis que le commerce avec les voisins de cette dernière était bien plus important. Les chiffres respectifs étant : pour la Bulgarie, 25,6, la Grèce 44,6, la Turquie 183 et la Roumanie 185,7 millions de francs.⁴ La présence de capitaux français était certes plus significative, mais ils étaient placés à 95% dans les fonds d'État serbe.⁵ Ainsi se révèle le caractère politique des emprunts que le gouvernement serbe a fait sur le marché parisien avec le soutien des gouvernements français et russe, et dont les fonds étaient principalement destinés à l'achat d'armements en France.

Pourquoi donc, et surtout à quel moment, pendant le conflit mondial, le gouvernement français s'est-il décidé à soutenir le programme yougoslave (qui impliquait la dissolution de l'Autriche-Hongrie) ? Comment la France s'est-elle décidée à privilégier la création d'un État nouveau à la place

³ Le livre de Jasna Adler, *L'union forcée. La Croatie et la création de l'Etat yougoslave* (Chêne et Bourg : Georg, 1997), est le dernier exemple en date de ce courant historiographique qui voit dans le soutien que la France a accordé à la Serbie l'origine pour la création d'un état dont la caractéristique principale était la prétendue hégémonie serbe sur toutes les autres nations yougoslaves.

⁴ Maurice Bompard à Ribot, Paris, 21.9.1917, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, Yougoslavie, vol. 121.

⁵ *Ibid.*

de la Double Monarchie ? Cette double monarchie était en effet, depuis le changement des alliances au XVIII^{ème} siècle, un élément important de la pensée géostratégique française. Sur le plan économique, il ne faut pas oublier que les investissements français n'y étaient inférieurs qu'aux engagements français en Russie.⁶

C'est précisément à cause de l'allié russe que la diplomatie française, pour la première fois, se voit amenée à concevoir un possible démantèlement de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Le 6 janvier 1915, Théophile Delcassé, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, envoie à l'ambassadeur français à Petrograd, Maurice Paléologue, les instructions suivantes: « Je vous recommande instamment de ne pas prononcer un mot qui puisse faire supposer au Gouvernement russe que le Gouvernement de la République pourrait peser sur la Russie pour modérer ses prétentions sur l'Autriche ». ⁷ A l'origine de cette étonnante déclaration se trouvaient : la déclaration des buts de guerre du Ministre russe des Affaires étrangères Sazonov, ses 13 points de septembre 1914, et plus précisément encore la conversation entre le Tzar Nicolas II et Paléologue du 21 novembre 1914. ⁸ Dans ses 13 points, Sazonov ne prévoyait pas la dissolution de la Double Monarchie, mais seulement sa réduction, après que des concessions territoriales auraient été accordées à la Serbie, à la Roumanie et à la Russie elle-même. La Double Monarchie se verrait alors transformée en une Monarchie tripartite, constituée des royaumes de Hongrie, de Bohême et d'Autriche (possessions héréditaires des Habsbourg). ⁹ Mais lors de son entretien avec le tzar, Paléologue comprend que la Russie souhaite aussi l'indépendance de la Bohême, de la Moravie et de la Carin-

⁶ Kalervo Hovi, *Cordon sanitaire or barrière à l'est ? The Emergence of the New French Eastern European Alliance Policy 1917-1919* (Turku, 1975), 40.

⁷ Contenu dans la lettre de Maurice Paléologue à Raymond Poincaré, Petrograd, 16.3.1915, Bibliothèque de l'Institut de France, Papiers Stephen Pichon, MS, vol. 4397.

⁸ William Renzi, « **Who composed 'Sazonov's thirteen points'? A Re-Examination of Russia's War Aims ?** », *American Historical Review* CXXXIII/2 (1983), 247-357, soutient que le programme de Sazonov n'était qu'une invention de Paléologue. Il croit aussi que Sazonov avait, par la suite, désavoué son souverain. Selon Renzi, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères britannique Edward Grey, à qui Delcassé avait communiqué le contenu de conversation entre Nicholas II à Paléologue, proposait le 25 novembre 1914 à Sazonov que les alliés se limitent aux déclarations du 5 septembre 1914 (refus de la paix séparée), tout en cherchant à préserver leur alliance pour l'après-guerre. En acceptant la proposition britannique, selon Renzi, Sazonov a complètement invalidé les propositions de son tzar. Or, Renzi n'explique pas le télégramme de Delcassé à Paléologue du 6 janvier 1915, même s'il cite la correspondance Poincaré-Paléologue. Nous nous croyons donc en mesure de conclure que, même si l'origine des buts de guerre russes peut être douteux, la réaction française ne l'est pas, et c'est elle qui nous intéresse ici.

⁹ Leo Valiani, *The End of Austria-Hungary* (London, 1973), 83.

thie, donc la dissolution de l'Autriche-Hongrie et la création d'une série d'Etats slaves sous domination russe.¹⁰ En l'absence d'instructions précises de Paris, et pressé de donner une réponse aux déclarations russe, Paléologue croit, en janvier 1915 lors de sa réponse à Sazonov, utile de répéter un axiome de la politique étrangère de la France: « Tant qu'il existerait une Italie, nous serions intéressées au maintien de l'Autriche ». ¹¹ Cette réponse lui vaut la réprimande citée, car la France, à ce moment, estime que le maintien de l'alliance russe est d'une importance cruciale, et est prête à concéder les concessions demandées. Comme il s'avérera par la suite, le véritable objectif russe n'est en fait pas la dissolution de la Double Monarchie mais la main mise sur Constantinople et les détroits : c'est pourquoi, dès mars 1915 le gouvernement français y acquiesce.¹²

Il s'agissait d'une concession particulière, et non d'incorporation de la dissolution de l'Autriche-Hongrie dans les buts de guerre français. Cela est démontré par la déclaration du gouvernement Viviani du 22 décembre 1914. A la Chambre, le président du Conseil déclare que les buts de guerre de la France se limitent à la restitution des provinces qui lui furent ravies, la restauration de la Belgique, et à l'exigence que le militarisme prussien soit brisé.¹³ La dissolution de l'Autriche-Hongrie n'était donc pas un objectif du gouvernement français. Mais son territoire servait comme une sorte de gage pour consolider les alliances existantes, comme on a pu le constater dans le cas de la Russie, ou pour s'attirer les bonnes grâces de nouveaux alliés. Ainsi, lors du traité de Londres en avril 1915, les Alliés promettent à l'Italie (en plus du Trentin et du Sud Tyrol) : Trieste, Gorizia, l'Istrie, la Dalmatie avec les îles, entre Zadar et le Cap Planka au sud de Šibenik et le port de Valonna sur la côte albanaise.¹⁴ Presque parallèlement ont lieu des pourparlers avec le gouvernement bulgare, auquel des avantages territoriaux devraient être procurés par la cession de la partie orientale de la Macédoine devenue serbe après la deuxième guerre balkanique.¹⁵

¹⁰ Lettre de Maurice Paléologue à Raymond Poincaré, Petrograd, 16.4.1915, Bibliothèque de l'Institut de France, Papiers Stephen Pichon, MS, vol. 4397.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² David Stevenson, *French War Aims against Germany 1914-1919* (Oxford University Press, 1982), 26, 27.

¹³ Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *La Grande Guerre des Français 1914-1918* (Perrin, 1998²), 279.

¹⁴ David Stevenson, *The First World War and International Politics* (Oxford University Press, 1988), 51-53.

¹⁵ Lucca Riccardi, *Aleati non amici. Le relazioni politiche tra Italia et l'Intesa durante la prima guerra mondiale* (Morcelliana, 1992), 110.

Au vu des sacrifices demandés aux Serbes, directement et indirectement, afin d'attirer l'Italie et la Bulgarie dans le camp allié, il leur était promis un grand dédommagement territorial aux dépens de la Double Monarchie. Les trois puissances de l'Entente proposent au gouvernement serbe (note formelle du 15 août 1915) au titre de compensation pour la perte de la Macédoine, les territoires suivants: la Bosnie et Herzégovine, le Srem jusqu'à la ligne Drava–Danube y compris la ville de Zemun et la région de Bačka, la côte dalmate à partir du Cap Planka (fin de la zone promise aux Italiens) jusqu'à la frontière monténégrine avec toutes les îles voisines. Au cas où, à la fin de la guerre, l'avenir de la Slavonie dépendrait des alliés, ils la promettent également à la Serbie.¹⁶ Si l'on tient compte des promesses faites à la Roumanie l'année suivante au traité de Bucarest (17 octobre 1916), dont notamment le Banat et la Transylvanie, et les visées russes sur la Galicie, on est obligé de conclure que le dépouillement prévu de la Double Monarchie était considérable.¹⁷ Mais pour autant sa dissolution n'était pas souhaitée, comme en témoigne la déclaration des buts de guerre français du gouvernement Briand tels qu'énoncés le 3 novembre 1915, se terminant par ces mots assez vagues: « Quant à nous, nous sommes décidés d'aller jusqu'au but; nos ennemis n'ont pas à escompter de notre part ni lassitude, ni défaillance... Nous avons la volonté de vaincre et nous vaincrons ».¹⁸

Après que le président Wilson eut, le 18 décembre 1916, demandé que les belligérants déclarent leurs buts de guerre, le gouvernement Briand, de même que tous les gouvernements alliés, sont obligés de préciser l'analyse des leurs objectifs. Néanmoins, la réponse alliée du 12 janvier 1917 reste tout aussi vague, car elle stipule d'abord l'évacuation des territoires occupés, y compris donc la Serbie et le Monténégro, en ajoutant que la libération des minorités nationales fait partie des buts de guerre alliés. Aucune obligation explicite envers les nationalités de l'Autriche-Hongrie n'est précisée.¹⁹

Les buts de guerre français paraissent non seulement assez vagues, mais parfois, ils semblent même contradictoires. C'est ainsi que dans la déclaration précitée de janvier 1917, les alliés se prononcent pour création d'un État polonais. Or, le mois suivant Gaston Doumergue (ancien président du Conseil et à l'époque Ministre des Colonies lors de l'ultime tentative française de sauver l'alliance russe), promet, au nom du gouvernement Briand, de laisser la Russie régler comme elle l'entend les questions relatives à

¹⁶ Note remise par les représentants français, anglais et russes au gouvernement serbe le 15.8.1915, AMAE, Papiers d'agents, Archives privées, Fontenay, 347, vol. 103.

¹⁷ Stevenson, *First World War*, 63.

¹⁸ George Bonnefous, *Histoire politique de la Troisième République*, tome II : *La Grande Guerre* (PUF, 1967²), 97.

¹⁹ Duroselle, *La Grande Guerre*, 282.

sa frontière occidentale, ce qui signifiait de laisser les Polonais sous l'emprise russe.²⁰ L'abdication du tzar quelques jours plus tard rendait cette promesse caduque. Toutes ces tractations démontrent que le marchandage à propos des territoires de la Double Monarchie suit les impératifs de la guerre, mais que l'axiome de la pensée géostratégique française, c'est-à-dire l'existence de la Double Monarchie en tant que telle, n'est pas remis en question.

La situation militaire pendant l'année 1917 amène le gouvernement français à réviser ses objectifs à la baisse : l'échec de l'offensive Nivelle et la fatigue des troupes françaises, la catastrophe italienne à Caporetto, mais surtout les révolutions en Russie poussent la France à la modération et à accorder une certaine importance aux initiatives pacifistes du nouvel empereur autrichien Charles I. Lors des pourparlers entre Charles et son beau frère Sixte de Bourbon, le gouvernement Briand insiste, parmi les conditions pour une paix séparée avec l'Autriche-Hongrie, sur la restauration de la Serbie et sur son accès à la mer.²¹ Dans ce moment délicat, le programme yougoslave n'était même pas à l'ordre du jour : on essaie plutôt d'affaiblir l'Allemagne par une paix séparée. Toutes ces négociations (Armand-Revetere, Briand-Lacken, Smuts-Mendsdorf) échouent car alors que les alliés veulent une paix séparée avec la Double Monarchie, la diplomatie autrichienne recherche une paix générale.

Le changement de la politique française et alliée envers la Double Monarchie intervient seulement en avril 1918, et cela pour diverses raisons. D'abord, comme on l'a vu, il s'est avéré impossible de détacher la Double Monarchie de son alliance avec l'Allemagne par une paix séparée. En plus, la Double Monarchie avait signé des traités de paix avec la Russie et la Roumanie, et en escomptait les bénéfices qui en découlaient. Mais surtout pour la première fois, des troupes autrichiennes font leur apparition sur le front français lors des offensives Luddendorf à partir de mars 1918. Pour toutes ces raisons la politique visant à affaiblir l'Allemagne en détachant d'elle la Double Monarchie se voit modifier, et on envisage pour la première fois la dissolution de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En France la démonstration de cette nouvelle politique se voit illustrée par la fameuse polémique entre le comte Czernin et Clemenceau. Le Ministre de Affaires Étrangères de la Double Monarchie accusait imprudemment Clemenceau d'avoir cherché à conclure une paix séparée. En guise de réponse le président du Conseil publie tout d'abord la lettre d'un agent austro-hongrois sollicitant les propositions françaises en vue d'une paix séparée. Ensuite, il rend publique la lettre de

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 287.

²¹ Woll Dieter Bihl, « La Mission de médiation des princes Sixte et Xavier de Bourbon-Parma en faveur de la paix », *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains* XLIII/170 (1993), 33, 37.

l'empereur Charles à son beau-frère Sixte de Bourbon-Parme de mai 1917. Le dernier Habsbourg, dans sa missive, tentait d'instaurer un climat favorable dans les pourparlers en soutenant les prétentions françaises sur l'Alsace et la Lorraine.²² De cette façon la rupture entre les Alliés et la Double Monarchie était consommée, tandis que l'empereur, fort compromis aux yeux de son allié allemand, devait accepter toute une série d'accords liant définitivement le destin de son Empire à celui de l'Allemagne. Clemenceau, quant à lui, déclare le 20 avril à Beneš que pour lui l'affaire tchécoslovaque était réglée et qu'il est prêt à reconnaître le Conseil national Tchèque comme organisme de gouvernement, et de lui accorder les prérogatives gouvernementales.²³ Début Mai 1918 Clemenceau et Pichon informent la commission parlementaire sur l'affaire Czernin que la France doit maintenant inéluctablement soutenir les demandes d'autodétermination des nationalités de l'Autriche-Hongrie.²⁴

Le sort de la Double Monarchie se voyait tranché dès lors qu'il devenait clair qu'elle restait liée à l'Allemagne : la décision de soutenir les nationalités qui y vivaient était prise, non seulement parce que leur cause était jugée juste, mais parce que dans un moment crucial de la guerre on cherchait par tous les moyens de trouver de nouvelles troupes. Le rôle de la Légion tchèque en Russie après l'armistice de Brest-Litovsk démontre bien l'importance que l'enrôlement des bataillons de prisonniers tchèques, polonais ou yougoslaves pourraient avoir pour les Alliés.²⁵ En même temps, les Alliés espèrent que la nouvelle politique envers les nationalités opprimées pourrait démoraliser les unités tchèques, slovaques, et yougoslaves combattant encore sous le drapeau des Habsbourgs. Force est de constater que le programme yougoslave de gouvernement serbe n'a nullement influencé la décision alliée d'apporter son soutien aux nationalités vivant dans la Monarchie des Habsbourgs.

2. *La question de la Yougoslavie dans l'ombre italienne*

Depuis la conclusion du traité de Londres, la question yougoslave était conditionnée non seulement par la survie de la Double-Monarchie, mais aussi par les aspirations italiennes en Adriatique et dans les Balkans. Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères italiens, Sydney Sonnino, défendait les clauses du traité de Londres comme raison principale de l'entrée en guerre de l'Italie.

²² J.-B. Duroselle, *Clemenceau* (Fayard, 1988), 703-705.

²³ *Ibid.*, 813.

²⁴ Stevenson, *First World War*, 217.

²⁵ Stevenson, *French War Aims*, 107.

Dans cette perspective son attitude envers le problème yougoslave revêt une importance primordiale. Sonnino était partisan d'une expansion italienne sur les rives orientales de l'Adriatique. Mais pour autant il n'était pas favorable à la dissolution de la Double Monarchie. Il croyait qu'il aurait été bien plus avantageux pour l'Italie d'avoir comme voisin une Autriche-Hongrie affaiblie, qu'une Yougoslavie jeune et vigoureuse, capable de lui disputer la primauté dans l'Adriatique. L'objectif véritable de sa politique était de remplacer l'influence politique et économique autrichienne dans les Balkans par l'influence italienne.²⁶ Malgré ses visées expansionnistes, Sonnino était perçu comme le meilleur garant de l'alliance de l'Italie avec l'Entente. Cela donnait à sa politique et ses aspirations une importance largement plus significative au programme yougoslave du gouvernement serbe.

D'autre part, avec la création du Comité Yougoslave en mai 1915 par les hommes politiques originaires des provinces yougoslaves de l'Autriche-Hongrie, la diplomatie française se rend compte des divergences au sein même du camp yougoslave au sens large du mot. Entre le gouvernement serbe de Nikola Pašić et le Conseil Yougoslave de Ante Trumbić, existent des dissensions sur le caractère et l'organisation du futur état commun. Pašić, suivant les concepts qui se sont avérés valables dans l'histoire serbe préconise la création d'un état unique sous la couronne de Karadjordjević.²⁷ De son côté Trumbić, par sa longue expérience dans les tractations entre les diverses nations au sein de la Monarchie des Habsbourgs, penchait pour une fédération. Mais les deux parties se mettent d'accord, lors de la Conférence de Corfou en 1917, de lutter pour la création d'un état des Slaves du Sud, sous l'égide des Karadjordjević, dont l'organisation interne serait décidée après la guerre. Il faut souligner qu'à l'époque les deux hommes d'État sont d'accord pour dire qu'il n'existe qu'un seul peuple yougoslave avec trois noms désignant trois tribus, Serbes, Croates, et Slovènes. Ni les différentes expériences historiques, ni les différences de religion ou de langue ne les amène à conclure qu'il pourrait s'agir de nations différentes.²⁸

Cependant leur entente ne résiste pas à l'épreuve du temps. Après les victoires alliées en été 1918, Trumbić souhaite que le Comité Yougoslave soit reconnu, à l'instar du Conseil national Tchécoslovaque, comme ayant le statut de gouvernement, et la nation yougoslave (reconnue dans la Double Monarchie) comme une nation alliée et belligérante. Certes, le gouvernement Pašić s'oppose à ce qu'on reconnaisse les Yougoslaves, mais c'est le veto italien qui s'avérera décisif.

²⁶ James H. Burgwyn, « Sonnino at the Paris Peace Conference », *Storia delle relazioni internazionali* VII/2 (1991), 244-245.

²⁷ Djordje Stanković, *Nikola Pašić i jugoslovensko pitanje I* (Belgrade, 1985), 202-235.

²⁸ Valiani, *End of Austria-Hungary*, 196.

Même si la diplomatie française déplore la mésentente entre les parties engagées, elle ne peut s'immiscer car sa position officielle reste inchangée. La ligne directrice reste le respect du traité de Londres tant que l'Italie elle-même ne demande pas sa modification. D'autre part, malgré les sympathies maintes fois manifestées pour les Yougoslaves, l'interlocuteur privilégié pour le gouvernement français reste Pašić, dans sa capacité de président du Conseil du gouvernement allié, dont la loyauté à la cause alliée a fait ses preuves lors de quatre années d'une guerre particulièrement éprouvante pour les Serbes.

Pourtant le gouvernement français ne soutient pas inconditionnellement la vision serbe de la future Yougoslavie. Certes en février 1918 le gouvernement français, par la voix de son Ministre des Affaires Étrangères Stéphane Pichon, est prêt à empêcher la réunion d'une assemblée des Yougoslaves en provenance de la Double Monarchie sur le sol français. Or, il le fait car : « une telle agitation nuirait à la fois à nos relations avec l'Italie et à la cause serbe ».²⁹ Des deux raisons évoquées, évidemment c'est l'alliance avec l'Italie qui est la principale, même si en mars 1918 il semblerait que les relations entre les Italiens et les Yougoslaves puissent s'améliorer. Les représentants du ministère de propagande italien et les membres du Comité Yougoslave arrivent le 7 mars 1918 à Londres à un accord. Les deux parties acceptent que la Dalmatie soit partagée selon le principe des nationalités. Les Italiens acceptent l'unité et l'indépendance de la Yougoslavie, tandis que les Yougoslaves consentent à l'union de l'Italie avec les provinces italiennes de la Double Monarchie.³⁰ Le Congrès des nationalités opprimées, en avril 1918 à Rome s'ouvre donc sous les meilleurs auspices.

La diplomatie française se félicite de l'atmosphère générale d'entente qui règne, pendant le congrès, entre toutes les parties intéressées. Le changement de la politique italienne s'explique par la condition difficile de son armée après la défaite de Caporetto, qui la pousse à modérer ses aspirations territoriales et à améliorer ses relations avec les Yougoslaves. Néanmoins, baron Sonnino reste intransigeant et refuse de permettre que le Congrès se prononce pour l'indépendance des nations opprimées de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Il déclare à l'Ambassadeur français à Rome, Camille Barrère, que cela signifierait l'abandon du traité de Londres.³¹ Ainsi le décalage entre la politique officieuse, menée par le Ministère de la propagande italien, et

²⁹ Pichon à Fontenay, Paris, 20.2.1918, AMAE, Guerre 1914-1918, Balkans, Serbie, vol. 388.

³⁰ Kenneth Clader, *Britain and the Origins of the New Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 1976), 180.

³¹ Barrère à Pichon, Rome, 17.4.1918, n°818, AMAE, Guerre 1914-1918, Autriche, vol. 161.

celle officielle du baron Sonnino, apparaît au grand jour. Le vrai objectif du congrès de Rome, pour le gouvernement italien, n'est pas l'accord avec les nationalités de la Double Monarchie, mais la volonté de donner une impression d'entente avec elles visant à diminuer la volonté de combattre de leur co-nationaux sur le front italien.

Sur le plan intérieur yougoslave, la diplomatie française suivait avec inquiétude le conflit opposant le gouvernement Pašić d'un côté, et Trumbić et les Yougoslaves de l'autre, sans pour autant prendre parti. Trumbić soupçonnait Pašić d'être d'abord intéressé par l'union des Serbes.³² De son côté Pašić redoutait que les aspirations territoriales de Trumbić et des Yougoslaves sur Trieste et l'Istrie, rendraient impossible un accord avec les Italiens.³³ Le sort de l'Adriatique du Nord était au coeur des accusations portées contre Pašić. Les amis de Trumbić le soupçonnaient d'avoir conclu un accord avec le baron Sonnino lors de leurs entretiens en 1917, en sacrifiant les intérêts yougoslaves au profit de ceux strictement serbes. En effet, lors de leur rencontre du 10 septembre 1917 à Rome, Pašić propose à Sonnino de céder à l'Italie la ville de Trieste, la partie occidentale de l'Istrie avec Pola, les îles de Mali Lošinj et Vis, et le port de Vallonna en Albanie. Une solution presque identique sera proposée par le président américain lors du Congrès de la paix. Or, Sonnino considère que les concessions proposées sont loin d'être suffisantes, car avec l'intégration du Monténégro, le contrôle sur le mont Lovćen et les Bouches de Kotor, les Yougoslaves présentent, à son avis, une menace pour la sécurité de l'Italie. D'autre part, il considère impossible le marchandage sur le sort de l'Istrie, région selon lui italienne en tout cas. De manière générale, le Ministre italien croyait qu'après la Déclaration de Corfou, prévoyant la création d'un État commun des Slaves du Sud, aucun accord n'était plus possible. Selon ce dernier il fallait que, au préalable, les Serbes reconnaissent la validité du pacte de Londres, revenant ainsi aux engagements pris à Corfou.³⁴ Ignorant l'issue des pourparlers Pašić-Sonnino, Trumbić et les Yougoslaves avertissent à plusieurs reprises le Quai d'Orsay de l'existence possible d'un accord entre l'Italie et la Serbie, ce que à deux reprises en novembre 1918 Barrère dément formellement.³⁵

³² Barrère à Pichon, Rome, 10.5.1918, Annexe, note de Charles Loiseau, AMAE, Guerre 1914-1918, Balkans, Serbie, vol. 389.

³³ Fontenay à Pichon, Corfou, 9.5.1918, n°81, AMAE, Guerre, 1914-1918, Balkans, Serbie, vol. 389.

³⁴ Pietro Pastorelli, *Sonnino, Diario* III (Laterza, 1972), 190-193.

³⁵ Barrère à Pichon, Rome, 1.11.1918, n°2742, AMAE, Série A-Paix 1914-1920, Travaux préparatoires à la Conférence de la paix, Politique de la Yougoslavie et de Monténégro, 149.

Dans ce débat entre Serbes et Yougoslaves, l'envoyé français auprès du gouvernement serbe, le Vicomte de Fontenay, tenait des propos un peu particuliers par rapport à la position officielle de son gouvernement. Avant tout, il voyait dans l'union des Serbes et des Yougoslaves un moyen de faire barrage à l'influence allemande dans les Balkans. C'était le critère, pour lui, de juger les avantages pour la France des différents modes d'union des Yougoslaves. C'est ainsi qu'il s'oppose ouvertement à toute solution « trialiste » au sein de la Double Monarchie, car selon lui elle soumettrait aussi les Serbes à l'influence du germanisme au lieu d'en épargner les Yougoslaves. Par contre, il est convaincu qu'une Yougoslavie indépendante et forte ne pourrait être qu'une : « digue puissante et résistante contre toute poussée germanique vers l'Est et vers l'Adriatique ».³⁶ La thèse de Fontenay, à part son caractère anti-allemand, devait fournir l'argumentation nécessaire pour convaincre l'Italie de modifier son attitude anti-yougoslave. Ensuite, le cas échéant, elle devait valoriser l'importance de ce futur État par rapport à l'alliance italienne. Cependant, la diplomatie française n'était pas prête à accepter une modification dans ses alliances, d'abord à cause des obligations prises envers son alliée, mais surtout vu que l'importance de l'effort militaire italien serait largement supérieur à celui de la Serbie.

Le problème majeur pour les Serbes et les Yougoslaves restait donc, encore et toujours, l'opposition italienne. Le gouvernement italien était à l'origine de la vague déclaration du Conseil suprême des Alliés du 3 juin 1918. A cette occasion les Alliés avaient exprimé seulement leur sympathie pour la volonté des Yougoslaves et Tchécoslovaques de réaliser leurs aspirations nationales. Étant donné que les formules adoptées étaient incomplètes à cause de la position italienne, le gouvernement français avait l'intention « d'accentuer les démonstrations qui lui paraissent indispensables pour encourager les Tchèques et les Yougoslaves à prendre à l'intérieur de la Monarchie austro-hongroise une attitude permanente de révolte ».³⁷ Ce sont les Tchécoslovaques qui profitaient surtout de cette résolution française, car le 29 juin 1918, dans une lettre de Pichon à Benès, le gouvernement de la République avait reconnu le Conseil National Tchécoslovaque comme représentant officiel de cette nation et comme base de son futur gouvernement.³⁸

La reconnaissance officielle et publique de la nation Tchécoslovaque en sa qualité d'allié intervient pendant l'été 1918, provoquant ainsi les de-

³⁶ Fontenay à Picon, Corfou, 16.5.1918, n°85, AMAE, Guerre, 1914-1918, Balkans, Serbie, vol. 389.

³⁷ Pichon à Barrère, Paris, 6.6.1918, n°1427, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, Autriche, vol. 57.

³⁸ Hovi, *Cordon sanitaire*, 130.

mandes des Yougoslaves et Serbes pour une même démarche en leur faveur. La manière dans laquelle leurs demandes sont présentées était en soi l'obstacle majeur. Le Comité yougoslave et le gouvernement Pašić ont, après les victoires alliées sur le front occidental, chacun de son côté soumis leur demande, cherchant de se présenter indépendamment les uns des autres, comme étant les seuls représentants des Yougoslaves vivant dans la Double Monarchie.

Le président du Conseil Serbe déclara à Fontenay qu'il avait l'intention de charger ses Ministres à Paris et à Londres de demander aux gouvernements alliés de faire une déclaration en faveur de la Yougoslavie, analogue à celle qu'ils avaient faite pour reconnaître la nation Tchécoslovaque. Pašić surtout insistait que les alliés reconnaissent la Serbie comme le représentant officiel de la Yougoslavie, car selon lui, la Serbie devrait être le pivot autour duquel se grouperont les éléments yougoslaves. Pour soutenir sa demande, Pašić fournit à Fontenay toute une argumentation dont l'objectif était de démontrer que la Yougoslavie formée autour de la Serbie resterait fidèle à l'Entente autant que l'était la Serbie pendant la guerre. Par contre si les Alliés reconnaissent le Comité Yougoslave comme représentant de la nation Yougoslave soumise aux Habsbourgs, ils risquent de voir naître deux états des Slaves de Sud, dont l'occidental resterait sûrement sous l'influence des Habsbourg et du germanisme.³⁹ Même s'il demande la reconnaissance de la Serbie comme pivot du futur État, Pašić prévoyait de consulter les principaux intéressés, à savoir les Serbes, les Croates et les Slovènes, lorsqu'ils seraient libérés, afin qu'ils puissent exprimer leur volonté de s'unir ou non avec la Serbie. Il aurait été nécessaire aussi de connaître l'issue du conflit territorial avec l'Italie.⁴⁰ En revanche, Trumbić souhaitait une reconnaissance immédiate du Comité de Londres comme seul représentant des Yougoslaves vivant encore dans la Double Monarchie.⁴¹

Cette cacophonie yougoslave incite la diplomatie française à demander l'avis du Foreign Office avant de donner une réponse à Pašić.⁴² L'ambassadeur français à Londres, Paul Cambon, s'entretient à ce sujet avec Lord Robert Cecil, Secrétaire Adjoint du Foreign Office, qui estimait d'abord qu'aucune décision à propos de la Yougoslavie ne pouvait être prise

³⁹ Fontenay à Pichon, Evian, 26.8.1918 et 27.8.1918, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, Autriche, vol. 50.

⁴⁰ Fontenay à Pichon, Evian, 4.9.1918, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, Autriche, vol. 50.

⁴¹ Note de commissaire divisionnaire d'Annemasse sur le séjour de Pašić à Evian, Annemasse, 9.9.1918, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, Autriche, vol. 50.

⁴² Pichon à Paul Cambon, Paris, 3.9.1918, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, Autriche, vol. 50.

sans un accord préalable avec l'Italie. De plus, il soulignait les différences entre le Comité Yougoslave et le Comité Tchèque, car le soutien pour le Comité yougoslave n'était pas unanime, et ses troupes étaient quasiment inexistantes. En conséquence Cecil conseillait une extrême prudence avant de donner des espoirs à Trumbić pour la reconnaissance de son Comité.⁴³

L'avis du gouvernement britannique était conforme aux vues du Quai d'Orsay. Dans sa réponse à Pašić, Pichon insistait sur le fait que tant qu'il n'existait pas un accord entre le gouvernement serbe et le Comité yougoslave, toute déclaration alliée les obligerait nécessairement de faire un choix entre les deux parties intéressées et ainsi de susciter les divisions avec des conséquences néfastes. Pichon assura Pašić que la France n'accorderait pas la reconnaissance du Comité yougoslave, afin d'éviter de provoquer le mécontentement de la Serbie. En revanche, il estimait que la France ne pouvait pas non plus accorder son soutien officiel à une Yougoslavie formée autour de la Serbie, car cela donnerait l'occasion aux Autrichiens de faire une propagande en faveur de la fédéralisation de l'empire, et de ce fait d'empêcher la naissance de la Yougoslavie. En conséquence, la France se refusait de choisir entre les deux groupes des Yougoslaves, pour ne pas s'aliéner l'un ou l'autre. En même temps le gouvernement de la République ne pouvait pas non plus négliger l'opposition italienne et provoquer l'opinion publique en Italie par une déclaration en faveur des Yougoslaves. La condition pour une telle déclaration restait, pour Pichon, surtout l'unité de vues entre les Yougoslaves eux-mêmes et l'entente entre eux et le gouvernement italien. Pichon considérait le gouvernement américain comme très bien placé pour jouer le rôle d'arbitre dans le contentieux italo-yougoslave. En même temps il soulignait que cette attitude du gouvernement français ne mettait pas en doute ses sympathies envers les Yougoslaves ni son souhait de voir une Yougoslavie unifiée constituant une barrière aux avancées du germanisme, mais la prudence était nécessaire pour ne pas provoquer des dissensions au sein des Alliés. En même temps Pašić était informé que lors de la Conférence des Alliés à Londres il avait été convenu qu'il n'y aurait pas de discussions politiques sur les frontières entre l'Italie et la Yougoslavie, et que l'initiative des alliés envers la Yougoslavie appartenait à l'Italie.⁴⁴

L'hypothèque italienne pesait de tout son poids sur la question yougoslave, malgré la déclaration italienne du 14 septembre 1918, par laquelle le gouvernement italien acceptait en principe l'existence d'un État yougoslave sous condition qu'il ne contrevienne pas aux articles du traité de Lon-

⁴³ Cambon à Pichon, Londres, 9.9.1918, n°628, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, vol. 50.

⁴⁴ Pichon à de Fontenay, Paris, 10.9.1918, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, Yougoslavie, vol. 31.

dres.⁴⁵ Dans cette perspective la visite de Pašić à Paris du 20 septembre 1918 ne donna pas les résultats escomptés. Lors de son entrevue avec Pašić, Pichon refusa même de commenter ses demandes pour la reconnaissance des Yougoslaves.⁴⁶ Le Président de la République, Raymond Poincaré conseille d'abord à Fontenay lors d'une audience privée, puis à Pašić, qu'on prenne d'abord des mesures provisoires n'engageant pas l'avenir de futur état Yougoslave, car il croyait qu'avant l'union définitive il serait nécessaire de consulter les populations en organisant un plébiscite. Le président du Conseil, George Clemenceau, quant à lui, pensait que l'union yougoslave se ferait seulement avec le temps.⁴⁷

Fontenay se voyait forcé de conclure que les dirigeants français n'avaient pas de solution pour le dilemme ; une Serbie agrandie ou un État yougoslave.⁴⁸ L'importance que le gouvernement italien accordait au traité de Londres et les dissensions au sein des Yougoslaves les empêchaient de faire une démarche diplomatique en faveur des Yougoslaves.⁴⁹ Pour les hommes d'état français l'union des Serbes et Yougoslaves restait une lointaine possibilité, et entre-temps ils voulaient surtout s'assurer du soutien serbe à la prochaine offensive alliée sur le front de Salonique.⁵⁰

3. *La France et la naissance du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes*

Les offensives alliées sur le front occidental et sur celui de Salonique de septembre 1918 obligent les pouvoirs Centraux à demander la cessation des hostilités. L'imminente défaite de la Double Monarchie permet l'articulation de la volonté politique des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes de se séparer de la Double Monarchie. En octobre 1918, ils créent une représentation politique, Narodno veće SHS, qui demande l'union de tous les Yougoslaves partout où ils vivent. Leur position s'est radicalisée lorsqu'ils apprennent que le président Wilson estime que le choix de leur destin leur appartient désormais. Ainsi, le 29 octobre 1918, le Narodno veće SHS rompt offici-

⁴⁵ Note de MAE, Paris, 14.9.1918, AMAE, Série A-Paix 1914-1920, Travaux préparatoires à la Conférence de la paix, Politique de la Yougoslavie et de Monténégro, 2.

⁴⁶ Compte rendu de Fontenay de la conversation entre Pašić et Pichon, AMAE, Papier d'Agents, Archive Privées, Fontenay, 347, vol. 103.

⁴⁷ Fontenay compte rendu des conversations de Pašić avec Poincaré et Clemenceau, Paris, 21.9.1918, AMAE, Papier d'Agents, Archive Privées, Fontenay, 347, vol. 103.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, remarque de Fontenay.

⁴⁹ Pichon à Barrère, Paris, 30.9.1918, n°2654, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, Autriche, vol. 51.

⁵⁰ Note de Pichon sur l'entretien avec Milenko Vesnić, l'envoyé serbe à Paris, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, Autriche, vol. 50.

ellement tous les liens avec la Double Monarchie. Le Narodno veće SHS s'autoproclame en État SHS dans les limites des frontières des provinces yougoslaves de la Double Monarchie le 31 octobre 1918, et le même jour il prend le contrôle de la marine autrichienne.⁵¹

Les développements politique à l'intérieur de la Double Monarchie et l'avancée de l'Armée Serbe en Macédoine et en Serbie ont considérablement influencé les positions des deux courants qui se disputaient le droit d'unir les Slaves de Sud. La création d'une représentation des Slaves du Sud en Autriche-Hongrie oblige Pašić à modifier sa position et à accorder une place égale à leurs représentants dans la création de l'État commun. Les réactions des hommes d'état français et britanniques lors de sa visite à Londres début octobre, ont convaincu Pašić que sa conception de la Yougoslavie fondée sur le socle serbe n'est pas acceptée dans les capitales alliées. Désormais il soutient que le meilleur fondement pour un état des Slaves de Sud est la déclaration de Corfou. La position privilégiée du gouvernement serbe comme acteur reconnu de la vie internationale et belligérant de la première heure, s'estompait ainsi au profit de l'union fondée sur l'accord des deux parties égales, le Comité Yougoslave et le gouvernement serbe. A la demande de Pašić, les ministres serbes demandent que les alliés fassent une déclaration reconnaissant les Serbes et les Yougoslaves comme nations alliées, et favorisant leur union dans un État libre et démocratique.⁵² Pichon n'était pas prêt à aller au-delà des déclarations précédentes, car il craignait qu'une déclaration favorisant l'union des Yougoslaves d'Autriche avec la Serbie risquerait de créer « un malentendu de nature à indisposer une grande partie des Yougoslaves qui craignent, de la part du gouvernement serbe, une tentative pour s'annexer les autres populations slaves du Sud, sans se préoccuper de différences de religion et de culture ». ⁵³ Le gouvernement italien était évidemment d'accord avec Pichon qu'il ne fallait faire aucune déclaration en faveur des Yougoslaves.⁵⁴

Le gouvernement italien sera désormais un adversaire bien plus redoutable pour Trumbić (même si sa position se voyait considérablement renforcée grâce au soutien de ses collègues à Zagreb), que n'étaient jadis Pašić et le gouvernement serbe. L'offensive de l'armée italienne sur le front autrich-

⁵¹ Bogdan Krizman, *Raspad Austro-Ugarske i stvaranje jugoslavenske države* (Zagreb 1977), 67-121.

⁵² Pichon à Barrère, Paris, 13.10.1918, n°2950, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, Autriche, vol. 51; Stanković, *Nikola Pašić*, 266.

⁵³ Pichon à Barrère, Paris, 13.10.1918, n°2950, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, Autriche, vol. 51.

⁵⁴ Barrère à Pichon, Rome, 15.10.1918, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, Autriche, vol. 51.

ien était conçue comme la réalisation des aspirations territoriales italiennes, et ainsi la course pour les territoires sur la rive gauche de l'Adriatique était ouverte. L'objectif principal de Trumbić dorénavant sera de défendre les intérêts du nouvel État des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes (dans le cadre de la Double Monarchie) face aux prétentions italiennes, lors des pourparlers sur l'armistice avec l'Autriche-Hongrie. Pour qu'il soit en mesure de le faire, il demande que les alliés reconnaissent les Slaves du Sud de la Monarchie des Habsbourg comme nation alliée, et le Comité yougoslave comme son représentant en pays alliés.⁵⁵

Pašić, quant à lui, s'est décidé à aller plus loin en cherchant à donner à sa démarche un aspect plus yougoslave et moins exclusivement serbe. Lors du remaniement du cabinet serbe, et à l'initiative de l'opposition serbe, il a accepté de prendre trois représentants des Yougoslaves de la Double Monarchie, un Slovène, un Croate et un Serbe, dans le gouvernement serbe.⁵⁶ Son objectif était de neutraliser l'action des Yougoslaves et notamment Trumbić, puisqu'il a exprimé le souhait que le gouvernement français conseille à ce dernier d'accepter l'invitation de participer au gouvernement de concentration nationale.⁵⁷

L'éclatement évident de la Double Monarchie et la création imminente du nouvel état regroupant tout ou partie des Slaves de Sud, incitent la diplomatie et les hommes d'état français à imaginer sa place dans l'Europe et son importance pour la France. Ces considérations géostratégiques ne se traduisent pas dans une politique officielle française, qui restait toujours prudente tout en respectant les obligations prises envers l'Italie. Ainsi le gouvernement français ne voulait pas s'immiscer dans la politique interne yougoslave, et en conséquence il se refusait à donner des conseils à Trumbić pour qu'il entre dans le nouveau gouvernement Serbe.⁵⁸ Le gouvernement français n'était pas prêt non plus à accepter les demandes réitérées de Trumbić lors de ses rencontres avec Jules Laroche (sous-chef de la Direction de l'Europe au Quai d'Orsay) le 30 octobre, et le 31 octobre avec Philippe Berthelot (adjoint du Directeur de la Direction politique et Commerciale). Trumbić demandait que la diplomatie française choisisse entre les obligations prises envers l'Italie, qui prévoyaient l'occupation italienne de tous les territoires prévus par le traité de Londres, et la reconnaissance du nouvel état SHS composé des anciennes provinces yougoslaves de la Double

⁵⁵ Trumbić à Pichon, Londres, 28.10.1918, AMAE, Série A-Paix, Travaux préparatoires à la Conférence de la paix, Politique de la Yougoslavie et Monténégro, vol. 295, 5.

⁵⁶ Stanković, *Nikola Pašić*, 269.

⁵⁷ Fontenay à Pichon, Paris, 21.10.1918 et 22.10.1918, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, Yougoslavie, vol. 31.

⁵⁸ Berthelot à Fontenay, Paris, 28.10.1918, AMAE, Série Z, Yougoslavie, vol. 31.

Monarchie. Pour Laroche et Berthelot le dilemme n'existait pas. La France se devait de respecter sa parole, et les négociations sur l'armistice, commencées le 29 octobre, se déroulent sans la participation des Yougoslaves. De plus, le gouvernement français considérait qu'une entente entre Serbes et Yougoslaves était nécessaire avant qu'une déclaration en leur faveur puisse être envisagée.⁵⁹ Ni Laroche ni Berthelot n'ignoraient l'existence du contentieux divisant les Yougoslaves, mais ils ne souhaitent pas avoir à jouer le rôle d'arbitres. Ils avaient beaucoup d'estime pour Pašić vu sa fidélité à la cause alliée, mais pour autant ils n'envisageaient point de soutenir sa conception de l'union Yougoslave. Berthelot s'empresse d'assurer Trumbić que le gouvernement français, de la manière la plus formelle, avait l'intention de laisser toute latitude aux peuples yougoslaves pour organiser leur indépendance. Le gouvernement français ne voulait absolument pas se prêter aux vues particulières de la Serbie, et le moment venu, il était décidé d'assurer la liberté nécessaire aux Yougoslaves pour qu'ils puissent se prononcer sur leur sort. A propos du contentieux territorial avec l'Italie, Berthelot conseille clairement à Trumbić de solliciter l'aide du gouvernement américain, qui lui n'avait pris aucun engagement envers l'Italie.⁶⁰

Pour la diplomatie française il était évident que le veto italien était la raison principale qui l'empêchait de reconnaître officiellement le nouvel État. L'importance accordée à l'alliance avec l'Italie était confirmée lors du Conseil Allié (29 octobre – 3 novembre 1918) sur les conditions d'armistice. Clemenceau était d'accord que l'armistice avec l'Autriche-Hongrie prévoyait l'occupation italienne de tous les territoires qui lui avaient été accordés par le traité de Londres.⁶¹ Lors des discussions sur le sort de la marine autrichienne, le Président du Conseil va même plus loin. Il promet formellement à Orlando que le gouvernement de la République ne reconnaîtra aucun Comité Yougoslave (en conséquence pas le nouvel État SHS) avant l'exécution des conditions de l'armistice. En contrepartie le premier ministre italien promet d'envoyer la flotte autrichienne sous drapeau blanc à Corfou pour y être mise à quai.⁶²

⁵⁹ Note de MAE sur les conversations de Laroche avec Trumbić, Paris, 28.10.1918, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, Autriche, vol. 51.

⁶⁰ Note sur les conversations entre Berthelot et Trumbić, Paris, 31.10.1918, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, Autriche, vol. 51.

⁶¹ Conversations entre Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando et Maréchal Foch au domicile parisien du Colonel House, Paris, 31.10.1918, AMAE, Série Y, Internationale 1918-1940, vol. 15.

⁶² Clemenceau à Orlando, Paris, 6.11.1918, AMAE, Série A-Paix 1914-1920, Travaux préparatoires à la Conférence de la paix, Politique de la Yougoslavie et Monténégro, vol. 296, 94.

C'est la mise en application de l'armistice avec l'Autriche-Hongrie, et non la question yougoslave, qui est à l'origine du différend franco-italien apparu en novembre 1918. La marine italienne s'empare de la flotte autrichienne, laquelle était depuis le 31 octobre aux mains des représentants de Narodno veće SHS, et refuse d'honorer l'accord Clemenceau-Orlando de l'envoyer à Corfou. Une fois arrivée à Pola et dans les autres ports autrichiens, la marine italienne prend le contrôle de la flotte autrichienne, en expliquant que l'accord est valable seulement pour la période avant la mise en application de l'armistice.⁶³ Qui plus est, les amiraux italiens cherchent à exclure les navires français du nord de l'Adriatique, près de la base navale autrichienne de Pola.⁶⁴ L'attitude de la marine italienne oblige le président du Conseil italien à faire des excuses formelles au gouvernement français, mais pour autant la question de la flotte autrichienne n'était pas réglée.⁶⁵ Dans le différend qui oppose par la suite les deux gouvernements, il n'a jamais été question que la France renonce aux obligations prises et elle se sert de la reconnaissance des Yougoslaves comme une menace (ce que Orlando redoutait) pour faire plier le gouvernement italien. Une des raisons était les aspirations territoriales des yougoslaves sur Trieste et l'Istrie, car selon l'avis de l'ambassadeur Barrère, si la France les soutenait, elle risquait de se brouiller définitivement avec l'Italie.⁶⁶ Le gouvernement français se borne à souligner que l'accord entre les deux présidents du conseil est intervenu après que les termes de l'armistice avec l'Autriche-Hongrie avaient été établis, et que de ce fait il devrait avoir la préséance.⁶⁷ La solution de la question épineuse était finalement remise à une commission d'amiraux alliés siégeant à Venise.⁶⁸

⁶³ Sonnino à Orlando, Rome, 8.11.1918, *Documenti Diplomatici italiani* (DDI), série VI, 1918-1922, vol. I, doc. 51, pp. 25, 26.

⁶⁴ Pichon à Barrère, Paris, 11.11.1918, n° 3769, AMAE, Série A-Paix 1914-1920, Travaux préparatoires à la Conférence de la paix, Politique de la Yougoslavie et Monténégro, vol. 296, 114.

⁶⁵ Orlando à Bonin Longare, Rome, 13.11.1918, DDI, série VI, 1918-1922, vol. I, doc. 133, 69.

⁶⁶ Barrère à Pichon, Rome, 9.11.1918, n° 2689, AMAE, Série A-Paix 1914-1920, Travaux préparatoires à la Conférence de la paix, Politique de la Yougoslavie et Monténégro, vol. 296, 108.

⁶⁷ Le compte rendu de l'entretien entre Pichon et Bonin Longare, dans : Bonin Longare à Sonnino, Paris, 11.11.1918, DDI, série VI, 1918-1922, vol. I, doc. 101, p. 53, 54.

⁶⁸ Barrère à Pichon, Rome, 12.11.1918, n° 2714, AMAE, Série A-Paix 1914-1920, Travaux préparatoires à la Conférence de la paix, Politique de la Yougoslavie et Monténégro, vol. 296, 145.

Un autre aspect de la mise en application de l'armistice avec l'Autriche-Hongrie était la raison de l'engagement français dans les rapports entre les Italiens et le Narodno veće de Zagreb et le gouvernement serbe. Dans les clauses militaires de l'armistice il était stipulé que les alliés peuvent occuper tous les territoires jusqu'à la ligne délimitant les territoires accordés à l'Italie par le traité de Londres, mais aussi tous les autres territoires si nécessaire au maintien de l'ordre.⁶⁹ Profitant de cette possibilité, les troupes italiennes avancent largement au-delà de la ligne établie par l'armistice, et devant la ville de Ljubljana elles se trouvent face aux volontaires et prisonniers serbes mobilisés par le Narodno veće pour leur barrer la route.⁷⁰ En plus, le prince Alexandre en sa capacité de commandant suprême de l'armée serbe demande l'intervention du Maréchal Foch pour arrêter l'avance de l'armée italienne, et il fait même savoir au gouvernement français qu'il est prêt à aider militairement le Narodno veće si une telle demande lui est soumise.⁷¹ Le risque de conflit armé entre les troupes serbes et l'armée italienne incite le gouvernement français à proposer une solution pour cette situation fâcheuse, conséquence, selon le Quai d'Orsay, des ambitions démesurées des Italiens. Ils « sembl[e]nt traiter les Yougoslaves en pays conquis et ennemi ». ⁷² Ainsi le 16 novembre Pichon propose que les troupes alliées d'occupation dans les anciennes provinces yougoslaves de la Double Monarchie soient en principe mixtes (français, anglais, serbe, italien et américain). Il était stipulé que seulement dans les territoires prévus par le traité de Londres, le commandement serait italien et qu'il n'y aurait pas de troupes serbes. Dans tous les autres territoires, les troupes d'occupation des territoires yougoslaves seront formées de contingents alliés sous le commandement de général Franchet d'Esperey.⁷³ La proposition française est acceptée par le président du Conseil italien, sous condition que les troupes alliées soit prélevées parmi celles qui sont déjà sur place (l'armée d'Italie ou l'armée d'Orient, écartant ainsi l'arrivée des troupes américaines), et que le commandement italien ait

⁶⁹ Conditions d'un armistice avec l'Autriche-Hongrie, Versailles, 31.10.1918, AMAE, Série Y, Internationale 1918-1940, vol. 15, 35.

⁷⁰ Franchet d'Esperey à Maréchal Foch, Salonique, 15.11.1918, n°702 et 703, AMAE, Série A-Paix 1914-1920, Travaux préparatoires à la Conférence de la paix, Politique de la Yougoslavie et Monténégro, vol. 296, 150.

⁷¹ Franchet d'Esperey à Maréchal Foch, Salonique, 15.11.1918, n°705, AMAE, Série A-Paix 1914-1920, Travaux préparatoires à la Conférence de la paix, Politique de la Yougoslavie et Monténégro, vol. 296, 153.

⁷² Pichon à Barrère, Paris, 16.11.1918, AMAE, Série A-Paix 1914-1920, Travaux préparatoires à la Conférence de la paix, Politique de la Yougoslavie et Monténégro, vol. 296, 154-155.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

la direction de ses occupations mixtes.⁷⁴ L'armée italienne accepte difficilement la solution proposée par le Quai d'Orsay. Par exemple, il faut lui faire comprendre que les forces d'occupation alliées au Monténégro doivent être mixtes, et que l'armée serbe peut en faire partie. Même cette solution est difficile à appliquer car, par exemple, les troupes italiennes s'emparent de la ville de Fiume, même si ce n'était pas prévu par le traité de Londres. Enfin, le baron Sonnino accepte que dans les territoires prévus par le traité de Londres le commandement des troupes d'occupation sera italien, et qu'en-dehors de ce cas les troupes seront sous le commandement de Franchet d'Espèrey comme commandant des troupes alliées d'Orient.⁷⁵

Ce différend sur les zones d'occupation provoque une certaine tension entre Rome et Paris. Mais dans les deux cas concernés, la flotte autrichienne et la délimitation des zones d'occupation, l'action du gouvernement français n'est jamais dictée par le souhait de faciliter l'union yougoslave. Le sort de la flotte autrichienne intéressait vivement la marine française, et le contentieux italo-yougoslave risquait de dégénérer en conflit armé entre deux nations alliées, ce que le gouvernement français voulait éviter à tout prix. Même si la presse italienne voyait en France l'obstacle majeur à la réalisation de la victoire italienne, la diplomatie française n'avait nullement l'intention de renier les obligations prises envers l'Italie. Le respect du traité de Londres restait tout au long l'axiome de la politique française, même si les aspirations territoriales italiennes sont considérées comme exagérées et sans fondement car elles englobent la Dalmatie où les Italiens ne sont que 10% de la population.⁷⁶ La seule issue possible à cette situation difficile, la diplomatie française le voyait dans la médiation du gouvernement américain qui n'avait pas d'obligations envers l'Italie.⁷⁷ D'autre part la question posée par le spécialiste pour les questions yougoslaves, Charles Loiseau à savoir : – Est-ce que la France resterait absente des anciens territoires de

⁷⁴ Barrère à Pichon, Rome, 18.11.1918, n° 2785, AMAE, Série A-Paix 1914-1920, Travaux préparatoires à la Conférence de la paix, Politique de la Yougoslavie et Monténégro, vol. 296, 158.

⁷⁵ Barrère à Pichon, Rome, 20.11.1918, n° 2804, AMAE, Série A-Paix 1914-1920, Travaux préparatoires à la Conférence de la paix, Politique de la Yougoslavie et Monténégro, vol. 296, 165.

⁷⁶ Note sur la question yougoslave, Paris, 1.11.1918, AMAE, Série A-Paix 1914-1920, Travaux préparatoires à la Conférence de la paix, Politique de la Yougoslavie et Monténégro, vol. 296, 62-65.

⁷⁷ Note sur la question yougoslave, Paris, 5.11.1918, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, Autriche, vol. 51.

la Monarchie des Habsbourg, tandis que l'Italie était en train de se poser comme gendarme dans la région – restait sans réponse.⁷⁸

Officiellement la France, liée par le traité de Londres, veillait seulement à la bonne application des termes de l'armistice. Officieusement, les diplomates français réfléchissaient sur le rôle du futur état yougoslave en Europe. Déjà en septembre 1918 Pichon le concevait comme une barrière à l'avancée du germanisme.⁷⁹ Paul Cambon estime le 10 octobre que la France a intérêt à voir naître un état aussi fort que possible à l'Est de l'Adriatique pour faire le contrepoids à une Italie agrandie. Il considère aussi que l'union de la Serbie, la Croatie, la Slavonie et la Bosnie et Herzégovine sera préférable à leur existence indépendante car leurs possibles différends risqueraient de plonger l'Europe dans de nouveaux conflits.⁸⁰ Fontenay, à la fin d'octobre, considère que seule une Yougoslavie fondée sur le pacte de Corfou sera suffisamment forte pour avoir un rôle pacificateur dans les Balkans, et en même temps être un maillon essentiel de cette chaîne d'états de la Baltique à l'Adriatique qui forment une barrière de revers contre l'Allemagne.⁸¹ La position française, résumée par Robert de Caix, publiciste français rattaché au Quai d'Orsay, préconise que la diplomatie française reste à l'écart du conflit italo-yougoslave dans l'Adriatique, car elle est dans l'impossibilité d'agir vu les clauses du traité de Londres. Selon lui, toute victoire italienne dans ce conflit ne peut être que de courte durée car l'Italie n'a pas les moyens d'intégrer les régions slaves. Qui plus est, de cette façon, elle ne pourrait que provoquer un contentieux lourd et durable avec ses voisins orientaux.⁸²

En conséquence le gouvernement français laisse toute liberté aux Serbes et Yougoslaves d'effectuer leur union comme ils le souhaitent, ce qu'ils essaient de faire lors de la Conférence de Genève (du 6 au 9 novembre) à laquelle participent Pašić et l'opposition serbe d'un côté, Trumbić et Antun Korošec en sa capacité de président de Narodno veće SHS de

⁷⁸ Loiseau à Jacqui de Margérie, Rome, 10.11.1918, AMAE, Série A-Paix 1914-1920, Travaux préparatoires à la Conférence de la paix, Politique de la Yougoslavie et Monténégro, vol. 296, 110, 111.

⁷⁹ Pichon à Fontenay, Paris, 10.9.1918, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, Yougoslavie, vol. 31.

⁸⁰ Cambon à Pichon, Londres, 10.10.1918, n°744, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, Autriche, vol. 51.

⁸¹ Fontenay à Pichon, Paris, 24.10.1918, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, Autriche, vol. 51.

⁸² Note de Robert de Caix, Paris, 3.11.1918, AMAE, Série A-Paix 1914-1920, Travaux préparatoires à la Conférence de la paix, Politique de la Yougoslavie et Monténégro, vol. 296, 76-77.

l'autre. La coalition ad hoc composée de l'opposition serbe, de Trumbić et de Korošec appuie l'idée de Conférence pour une Yougoslavie confédérale.⁸³ En conséquence le gouvernement serbe reconnaît le Narodno veće comme gouvernement légal dans les provinces yougoslaves de la Double Monarchie, vu qu'il est censé devenir son partenaire dans la future confédération yougoslave. Par la même occasion Pašić reconnaît le Comité de Londres comme représentant légitime de Narodno veće à l'étranger en demandant aux Alliés de le faire à leur tour.⁸⁴ De cette façon le gouvernement serbe s'engage formellement à défendre toutes les aspirations territoriales des Yougoslaves face à l'Italie. Quant au gouvernement français, il est dûment informé de la teneur des négociations de Genève ainsi que de leur issue, sans qu'il fasse de commentaires. La question qui se pose alors est de savoir qui est en mesure de défendre le mieux les aspirations territoriales des Yougoslaves, qui d'ailleurs incluait Trieste et la vallée d'Isonzo : le directoire ainsi créé d'un état non reconnu, ou le gouvernement serbe. En plus il fallait tenir compte de la réaction du prince serbe et de son armée. Le prince Alexandre s'oppose fermement aux décisions prises à Genève, car il n'y était pas question de la Monarchie yougoslave.⁸⁵ Par ailleurs, dès le 3 novembre les troupes serbes commencent à franchir les frontières autrichiennes sous l'ordre de général Franchet d'Esperey selon les termes de l'armistice décidée lors des négociations alliées à Paris.

A cause du veto italien le Narodno veće SHS n'a jamais eu un statut officiel, et il devenait de plus en plus clair que le seul moyen pour les Yougoslaves de l'Autriche-Hongrie de faire valoir leurs droits était par l'entremise du gouvernement serbe. L'union se fait donc sur le terrain dans des négociations entre représentants de Narodno veće et le prince Alexandre lui-même. L'union est proclamée le 1 décembre sans que les questions d'organisation interne du futur Etat soient abordées. En même temps, le tout nouveau Royaume SHS reprend toutes les revendications territoriales de Narodno veće. Comme le nouveau Royaume n'est pas reconnu, c'est toujours le gouvernement serbe qui tente de maîtriser l'expansionnisme italien.

De cette manière l'union des Yougoslaves s'opère sans aucune aide de la part du gouvernement français. Les conditions de l'union ont été dé-

⁸³ Dutasta à Pichon, Berne, 9.11.1918, n°1876, AMAE, Série A-Paix 1914-1920, Travaux préparatoires à la Conférence de la paix, Politique de la Yougoslavie et Monténégro, vol. 296, 106.

⁸⁴ Vesnić à Pichon, Paris, 9.11.1918, AMAE, Série A-Paix 1914-1920, Travaux préparatoires à la Conférence de la paix, Politique de la Yougoslavie et Monténégro, vol. 296, 109.

⁸⁵ Fontenay à Pichon, Paris, 14.11.1918, AMAE, Série Z, Europe 1918-1940, Yougoslavie, vol. 31.

terminées par le conflit territorial avec l'Italie. C'est la peur face à l'avancée italienne qui pousse les représentants de Narodno veće à accepter une union inconditionnelle avec la Serbie, au lieu d'insister sur une formule fédérale du genre de celle proposée à Genève. D'autre part, le gouvernement français a scrupuleusement, même à contre cœur, respecté ses obligations envers l'Italie. Il a dû s'opposer à son allié, pour faire respecter les termes de l'armistice autrichien. Les relations avec l'Italie ont quand même pâti de cette réaction française, car la lecture du traité de Londres était fondamentalement différente des deux côtés des Alpes. Pas dans les termes, mais dans l'esprit du traité de Londres, les Italiens y voyaient une garantie pour leur prédominance sur l'Adriatique et dans les Balkans. Or, il s'est avéré que l'influence française y était toujours présente, à cause de la présence de l'armée d'Orient.

La disparition de l'Autriche-Hongrie a ouvert tous les appétits. D'un côté pour la réalisation de l'objectif maximal des Yougoslaves, un État de Vardar à Isonzo, centralisé ou fédéral selon les goûts. De l'autre pour la domination italienne sur les Balkans, basée sur les territoires accordés par le traité de Londres et sur une série d'états sous son influence par exemple, la Croatie et le Monténégro. La France comme première puissance continentale devait apporter son soutien à chacun de ces projets pour qu'ils puissent se réaliser, ce qu'elle a refusé de faire. Par ce fait elle est devenue la cible de critiques virulentes venant des deux côtés de l'Adriatique. La France se trouvait victime de son succès, car l'impression générale était qu'après la victoire de ses armées, elle avait des moyens de réaliser les aspirations des deux nationalismes, italien et yougoslave. Sa volonté de les modérer lui a valu que les Yougoslaves se sont tournés vers les États-Unis du président Wilson, et que l'opinion publique italienne ait désigné le France comme principal responsable de la mutilation de sa victoire.

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Nation-building under the Austro-Hungarian Sceptre Croato-Serb Antagonism and Cooperation

In the nineteenth century many European nations became politically conscious of their “nationhood”, which became one of the factors in the crumbling of the two great empires in Central-East Europe – the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empire – at the beginning of the next century. Historians have termed this issue the Eastern Question, a question of filling up the vacuum created by the gradual erosion of Ottoman rule in Eastern Europe.¹ The Eastern Question involved not only a repositioning of the Balkan states (especially Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania) but also of Russia and the Habsburg Empire, leading to Great Power rivalries and resulting in the First World War.

The peoples of future Yugoslavia, most notably Croats and Serbs, matured as nations during this period. They strived for greater independence not only by resisting foreign rule but also by means of diplomacy and cooperation with nations who shared their aspirations either out of idealism or out of interest. The Great Powers, however, chiefly decided their fate. The year 1878 provides the most vivid example, when the borders of the South-Slav peoples shifted drastically two times in four months as a consequence of diverging interests of the Great Powers.²

¹ See John Marriott, *The Eastern Question* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917); M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774–1923* (New York: Macmillan, 1966).

² In March 1878, Russia, having defeated the Ottomans, attempted to resolve the Eastern Question to her advantage by the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano (3 March 1878). The agreement with the Ottomans provided Russia with overwhelming influence in the Balkans, including the much-desired outlet to the warm seas via a Greater Bulgaria, de facto a Russian protectorate that included the regions of Macedonia, Western Thrace, a portion of Albania, and a district of Serbia. Russia also awarded full recognition to Serbia, erstwhile an autonomous principality within the Ottoman Empire (reduced in the East by the Treaty of San Stefano to the advantage of Bulgaria) and Montenegro (almost tripled in size). In July 1878, the Congress of Berlin, attended by Germany,

Development of Serb national movement until 1914

Modern Serbian history³ dates back to 1804, when the First Serbian Insurrection against the Ottomans began, born out of the desire for national emancipation.⁴ This was the first national uprising against the Ottomans among the peoples of Southeast Europe, followed by the Greek Revolution of 1821. Moreover, amongst the conquered Slavs of future Yugoslavia, only Serbs succeeded in creating an independent state in 1878.⁵ Montenegro, which had never been completely subjugated by the Ottomans, was also recognized then.⁶ At the same time, these two states did not encompass all

Austria-Hungary, Russia, Britain, France, Italy and Turkey, revised the Treaty of San Stefano, exploiting the fact that Russia, although victorious against the Ottomans, was exhausted by the war and at the verge of bankruptcy. Bulgaria, which to this day celebrates the day the Treaty of San Stefano was signed as its national day, was reduced, most of its extended territory having been restored to the Ottomans. The Congress of Berlin did recognize an independent Serbia and an independent Montenegro, within borders that suited the Great Powers, which were then impersonated by the Concert of Europe. It also granted Austria-Hungary the right to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina and to control the allegedly independent Montenegrin port of Bar [Treaty between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and Turkey, 13 July 1878, 153 CTS 171-191].

³ The history of Serb statehood is very rich, with the first Serbian dynasty established in the eighth century. It is not recounted here for the reason of brevity. For more information, see *Histoire du Peuple Serbe*, ed. Dušan T. Bataković (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 2005).

⁴ The First Serbian Uprising has also been called a "Serbian national revolution". Brutally crushed by the Ottomans in 1813, it sparked the Second Serbian Uprising in 1815, which led to Serbia's semi-independence from the Ottomans in 1817, formalized in 1829 by the Peace of Adrianople and hatti-sherifs in 1829, 1830 and 1833. Pressured by Russia, the Sultan then granted Serbia the right to internal autonomy and its governor a hereditary title of a prince, but continued to oblige Serbia to pledge a fixed yearly tribute to the Porte. Prior to the uprisings, the rights of the vassal Serbia were regulated by various decrees. See Wayne Vucinich, ed., *The First Serbian Uprising 1804-1813* (Boulder, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Leopold von Ranke, *History of Servia and the Servian Revolution* (London: Benn, 1848). Please also note that "the Serbian elite raised the issue of national rights and territorial autonomy as early as 1790, at the ecclesiastical-national diet held in Temesvar (present-day Romania) and attended by 75 representatives of the aristocracy, high clergy and officer corps." Dušan T. Bataković, "A Balkan-Style French Revolution? The 1804 Serbian Uprising in European Perspective", *Balcanica XXXVI* (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2006), 113-129.

⁵ Treaty of Berlin, 13 July 1878, 153 CTS 171-191 (Article XXXIV).

⁶ *Ibid.* (Article XXVI).

the territories where Serbs lived. Until 1912, more than a half of the Serb population lived under Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian rule.⁷

Despite the current revisionist claims by those favouring a non-Serb Montenegrin identity, it is a historical fact that the aspirations of the Montenegrins in the late nineteenth century mirrored those of Serbs as a whole – unification and independence of Serb-inhabited lands. The greatest Montenegrin poet Prince-bishop Petar Petrović Njegoš was a leading Serb national figure in the nineteenth century, instrumental in codifying the Kosovo myth as the central theme of the Serbian national movement.⁸ The Petrović Njegoš dynasty, which ruled Montenegro, even made a brief attempt to assume the role of the Serb leader and unifier, but Montenegro's small size and weak economy eventually led to the recognition of the primacy of the Karadjordjević dynasty ruling out of Belgrade. Montenegrins had Serbian identity but they at once were proud of their state, especially in the area around Cetinje, the capital of the Kingdom of Montenegro. A sense of distinct statehood was strong enough to breed strong autonomist sentiments in a portion of Montenegro's population following the 1918 unification with Serbia and the imminent disappearance of a Montenegrin state.⁹

In the nineteenth century, the Serbian national identity had fully developed. The Serbs were aware of their long history and tradition, great medieval civilization and cultural unity, regardless of the fact that they lived under different imperial administrations. Three elements, interwoven with the legacy of the medieval Serb Nemanjić dynasty, were imperative in the forging of Serb national identity and its preservation during long periods

⁷ Slavenko Terzić, "The Right to Self-Determination and the Serbian Question" in *The Serbian Question in the Balkans: Geographical and Historical Aspects*, ed. Bratislav Atanacković (Belgrade: Faculty of Geography, University of Belgrade, 1995), 40. See also Dimitrije Djordjević, *Les révolutions nationales des peuples balkaniques* (Belgrade: Institut d'Histoire, 1965).

⁸ See below.

⁹ See John D. Treadway, *The Falcon and the Eagle, Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908–1914* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1983), 16–18, 201, 210. The 1914 edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica describes Montenegrins as belonging to the "Serb race". Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, Prince Kropotkin, C. Mijatovich and J. D. Borchier, *A Short History of Russia and the Balkan States*; reproduced from the 11th edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (London: The Encyclopaedia Britannica Company, 1914), 121, 126. According to Stevan K. Pawlovitch, *A History of the Balkans 1804–1945* (London and New York: Longman, 1999), 108, Montenegrin "rulers considered themselves Serb, were generally supportive of a 'Serb' cause and willing to cooperate with Serbia, but nevertheless gave priority to their own territorial objectives".

of foreign domination – the Serbian Orthodox Church, the symbolism of Kosovo, and the Serbian language.

The identification of the Serbian Orthodox Church with the Serbian nation is deeply rooted in national consciousness. The medieval rulers of the Serbs were closely identified with the Serbian Church and its struggle for autonomy. Following the Byzantine tradition, members of the Serb Nemanjić dynasty founded monasteries, some became monks and achieved sainthood, and in 1219 the pious St. Sava, son of Stefan Nemanja, became the first archbishop of an autocephalous Serbian church, freed from the jurisdiction of the Greek-led Archbishopric of Ohrid. The Church's independence was extinguished soon after 1459, when the Ottomans conquered Serbia. The Serbian (Christian Orthodox) Church, under the name of the Patriarchate of Peć, re-emerged a century later (1557), after an intervention by the influential Ottoman vizier of Serbian origin Sokollu Mehmed Pasha (Sokolović) who extended its jurisdiction, bringing almost the entire Serbian nation under its wing.¹⁰ The church was essential to Serbian identity as the only surviving Serbian institution during the long period of foreign rule and thus a form of a surrogate Serb state. Christian Orthodoxy has been one of the main Serbian traits, though there has been an important Catholic Serb minority, mainly in Dalmatia.¹¹ In addition, many Christian Serbs converted to Islam under the Ottomans, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Oral folk traditions constituted another element nurturing Serbian national culture and a reassurance that the nation would rise against its oppressors. A national hero of epic songs, legendary Marko Kraljević, is “an embodiment of all that the Serbs wanted to believe of themselves – his heroism, his gentleness, his respect for the religious and social customs of his people, his ‘machismo’, even his cruelty, but above all his fierce opposition to the Turks and his intense national pride”.¹² The real Marko Kraljević died fighting as an Ottoman vassal.

While Serb epic poetry also appealed to other Slav peoples of the Balkans, the Kosovo legends kept the spark of Serbian national conscious-

¹⁰ Naturally, Sokolović was Muslim, but three of the first four patriarchs of the re-established Serbian Orthodox Church – Patriarchate of Peć, in Kosovo and Metohia, came from his family (the first patriarch was his brother, the Serb Orthodox monk Makarije Sokolović). See Fred Singleton, *A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 44; Djoko Slijepčević, *Istorija srpske pravoslavne crkve* [History of the Serbian Orthodox Church] (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1991), vol. 1, 306, 318–319.

¹¹ See below.

¹² Singleton, *Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples*, 45.

ness alive for centuries, which burst into flame with Karadjordje's¹³ revolt against the Ottoman Turks in 1804. **Legends of the Battle of Kosovo (15/28 June 1389) dominated Serbian literature and art before the twentieth century.** Historians observe that neither Serbs nor Turks won the battle, while both the Serbian ruler and the Ottoman Sultan were killed in its course. However, the Ottoman conquest of Serbia followed,¹⁴ indicating that this battle represented a long-term loss for the Serbs. The Serbs have nonetheless celebrated the Battle of Kosovo as a symbol of their resistance to foreign occupation, of national unity and ultimate sacrifice for homeland (Serbdom) and Heavenly Kingdom.¹⁵ Prior to Ottoman occupation, the Serbs had reached their zenith under Dušan the Great (1331–55), who was crowned “Emperor of the Serbs, Greeks and Bulgars”.¹⁶

The most ardent collector of Serb oral tradition was Vuk Karadžić (1787–1864), reflecting the ideas of European early Romanticism. Notably, he was also the reformer and founder of the modern Serbian language, building on the work of other Serb linguists and philosophers, Sava Mrkalj (1783–1833), Luka Milovanov (1784–1828) and Dositej Obradović (1742–1811), the latter being a representative of European rationalism. Karadžić

¹³ Djordje Petrović known as Karadjordje was the leader of the First Serbian Insurrection and the founder of the Serb Karadjordjević dynasty. For more, see Zeljan E. Suster, *Historical Dictionary of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, European Historical Dictionaries No. 29 (Lanham, MD/London: Scarecrow Press, 1999), 154.

¹⁴ Serbia lost independence only in 1459, but the Battle of Kosovo was perceived as crucial to the establishment of the 500 years of Ottoman domination over Serbia. It should be stressed that, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the capital city of the Serbian Kingdom and the seat of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarch were, respectively, Prizren and Peć, two cities in the modern-day territory of Kosovo and Metohia.

¹⁵ The Battle of Kosovo took place on St. Vitus' Day (*Vidovdan*). The day of the Kosovo anniversary was chosen by the heir apparent to the Habsburg throne for a state visit to the occupied Sarajevo in 1914, when he was assassinated by a local Serb activist, Gavrilo Princip, marking the beginning of the First World War. June 28th was also chosen by the ruler of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as the day on which to promulgate the Vidovdan Constitution in 1921. Aware of this symbolism, Stalin chose this date to announce the expulsion of the Yugoslav Communist Party from the Cominform in 1948. The anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo has been honoured by other nations as well. In June 1918, five months before the end of the First World War, the United States recognized it as a day of special commemoration in honour of Serbia and all other oppressed peoples fighting in the Great War. Prior to that, in 1916, a nationwide tribute to Serbia was arranged in Britain to celebrate the anniversary of Kosovo. For more information on these celebrations, see Thomas A. Emmert, “The Kosovo Legacy” in *Kosovo*, ed. Basil W.R. Jenkins (Alhambra, CA: The Kosovo Charity Fund, 1992), 55–57.

¹⁶ Quoted in Frits W. Hondius, *The Yugoslav Community of Nations* (Hague: Mouton, 1968), 20.

solidified Serbian culture, spreading and popularizing national awakening. He also extended the definition of Serbdom to embrace all who spoke this language, which, according to him, was a Serbian national heritage.¹⁷ This idea reappeared in the formation of the first Yugoslavia, but failed in practice because a common language was not sufficient to unite Serbs, Croats and Muslims in one nation. Moreover, the majority of Croats had strongly rejected Karadžić's linguistic theory of national identity, perceiving Karadžić as a Serb nationalist.

In 1844, an unofficial plan of Serbian foreign policy was forged, inspired by a leading Polish émigré in France Count Adam Jerzy Czartoryski and his Balkan agent Frantisek Zach who wrote the first draft of this document. Ilija Garašanin (1812–74), Serbian statesman and politician then serving as Minister of the Interior, personally endorsed Zach's somewhat revised plan in a then secret¹⁸ document known as *Načertanije* ("Draft"). Like many of his contemporaries, Garašanin accepted that Serbia's national mission was to complete the task of national and social liberation initiated by the Serbian insurrections of 1804 and 1815. The frontiers of the state needed to be extended to encompass all areas where Serbs lived according to the most famous paragraph of *Načertanije*:

The significance and the foundation of Serbian politics is that it not be limited to its present borders, but that it seeks to embrace all Serb peoples surrounding it.¹⁹

Following Karadžić's lead, Garašanin defined the Serb national boundaries as linguistic and cultural rather than exclusively ethnic or religious. However, the *Načertanije* also advocated historical borders, especially towards the South.

Načertanije was a national programme created after the famous national programmes in Europe demanding national liberation and union in nation-states, pursuant to similar processes in Germany or Italy. In fact, that

¹⁷ Mihailo Crnobrnja, *The Yugoslav Drama* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), 37.

¹⁸ The Serbian public was not aware of the existence of the document until 1888 and of its contents until the beginning of the twentieth century. See Radoš Ljušić, "Ilija Garašanin o srpskoj državnosti" [Ilija Garašanin on Serb Statehood] in *Garašanin: susreti i vidjenja 2001* [Garašanin: meetings and perceptions 2001], eds. Zoran Konstantinović and Slobodan Pavićević (Kragujevac: Jefimija, 2002), 99.

¹⁹ "Načertanije Ilije Garašanina", reprinted in Belgrade 1991, 15 (translation mine). English copy produced in Paul N. Hehn, "The Origins of Modern Pan-Serbism – the 1844 Nacertanije of Ilija Garasanin: An Analysis and Translation", *East European Quarterly* IX, No. 2 (Summer 1975).

same year the project of a Greater Greece – *Megali Idea* – was published.²⁰ Both the Serbian and Greek national programmes were based on the principle of inalienable historic right, in agreement with the national ideologies in Europe at the time. Serbian political parties followed this ideology within and without the principedoms, kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, which is comparable to the implementation of “internal” and “external” right to self-determination. The most influential Serbian party, the National Radical Party, in its 1881 programme thus declared the following two goals for future state organization: “internally people’s prosperity and freedom, and externally state independence and freedom and unification of the remaining parts of Serbdom.”²¹

Later historiography, mainly of Croat origin, has wrongly accused Garašanin of extreme Serb nationalism.²² And yet, the reading of the original text suggests a different conclusion. The section titled “The Policy of Servia towards Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Northern Albania” states that “one of the main points which should be set forth is the principle of full freedom of religion established by law”, and that “every effort should be made to protect the Bosnians and other Slavs and to render them every means of assistance”. *Načertanije* further declares:

It would be advisable to print a short and general history of Bosnia, in which the names of several men of the Mohammedan faith and their renowned deeds would be included. It is recommended that this history be written in the spirit of the Slavic people.

Garašanin was a pragmatic statesman who realized that “only through alliance with other neighbouring peoples can she [Serbia] solve her future problems”.²³ While Garašanin certainly envisioned a Serb-led kingdom, at the same time this was to be a democratic South-Slav union. According to Slobodan Jovanović, Garašanin was one of the first statesmen to conceptualize the idea “Balkans to the Balkan peoples”.²⁴

In practice, union of free Serbs with the Serbs under foreign rule remained the Serbs’ ultimate goal. Whether this union would be achieved independently or in union with other Slav peoples was yet to be determined. Garašanin was aware that the implementation of his political programme

²⁰ Milan St. Protić, *Uspon i pad srpske ideje* [The Rise and Fall of the Serbian Idea] (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1994), 68.

²¹ *Samouprava* (Self-government), no. 1, 8 January 1881 [translation mine].

²² See, for instance, Mirko Valentić, “Konceptija Garašaninovog ‘Načertanija’ (1844)”, *Historijski pregled* VII (Zagreb, 1961).

²³ *Načertanije*, Appendix.

²⁴ Slobodan Jovanović, *Političke i pravne rasprave* I–III [Political and legal treatises] (1st ed. 1908; Belgrade: BIGZ, 1990), 352.

would not begin immediately but that it provided an important strategic vision.

Four years after the *Načertanije* was written, the Slavs (mainly Serbs) living in the Habsburg province of South Hungary (Voivodina)²⁵ allied themselves with Vienna not simply to counteract the Hungarian revolutionaries, but primarily to protect their rights from the Hungarian denial of Serb identity. Their struggle was aided by the Kingdom of Serbia in an action organized by Garašanin, as well as by Serbs from other parts of the Habsburg Empire. However, the Voivodina Serbs, to their disappointment, were not granted territorial autonomy by Vienna in return, but just another imperial patent reconfirming their previous privileges.²⁶

The “Duchy of Serbia and Temes Banat” established on 18 November 1849 was not a separate federal unit as such but a separate administrative district with church and school autonomy. Under Hungarian pressure even this status was abolished on 27 December 1860, with Voivodina becoming fully incorporated into Hungary. In 1868, the Hungarian authorities renewed the church and school autonomy for Voivodina Serbs, but limited in scope, only to abolish it once again in 1912. The extensive limitation of privileges, beginning with the act of 1860, stimulated political organization of the Voivodina Serbs, who gradually became the leaders of Serb political action in the Habsburg Empire.

²⁵ Voivodina (Voyvodina, Vojvodina) is the Serbian word for duchy. The province’s original historic name is the Duchy of Serbia, shortened to Serbian Voivodina and then just Voivodina upon its incorporation into Serbia when the attribute “Serbian” was no longer necessary.

²⁶ The Serbs moved from southern Serbia (mainly Kosovo) to Voivodina in great numbers in 1690 to escape Ottoman retaliation, whose army they had fought together with the Austrians. The migration to Voivodina was initiated by an Invitational manifest (so-called *Leterae invitatorie*) issued by the Habsburg Emperor Leopold I to all Balkan Christians on 6 April 1690. Special privileges were granted to Serbs in Voivodina by Leopold I on 21 August 1690, 11 December 1690, 20 August 1691 and 4 March 1695, and reconfirmed by the decrees of 1698 and 1699, as well as with each change of the ruler (Joseph I on 7 August 1706, Charles VI on 10 April 1715 and Maria Theresa on 24 April 1743). These privileges, allowing for church and school autonomy (including free election of church patriarch and military ruler – duke), exemption from 10% tax imposed by the Catholic Church, and guarantees of personal and property rights, were limited in times of peace (under pressure from the Catholic Church and Hungarian authorities) and extended in times of crisis since the Voivodina Serbs rendered military services to the Austrian rulers. For more information, see Vasilije Dj. Krestić, *Gradja o Srbima u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji (1848–1914)* [Documents on Serbs in Croatia and Slavonia (1848–1914)] (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1995), 88–112.

Serbia liberated its Southern territory (Old Serbia and Slavic Macedonia)²⁷ from the Ottoman Turks in the First Balkan War (1912–13), but then fought a second Balkan war to determine her borders in relation to other Balkan states, primarily Bulgaria, which resulted in the Treaty of Bucharest of 10 August 1913.²⁸ During that period the Serbian government made no overt attempts to undermine Austro-Hungarian rule, aware that Serbia was not strong enough to fight the Empire on her own. However, the relations with Austria-Hungary became increasingly strained, especially after 1908 when the Dual Monarchy annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose relative majority population at that time was Serb.²⁹ Perceiving the Serbs as the greatest threat to the Empire's integrity³⁰ and an obstacle to its expansion to the East (*Drang nach Osten*), the Habsburgs used the assassination of the archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo as a pretext for the punitive war against Serbia.

According to Jovanović, in Serbia at the turn of the twentieth century “the strongest idea-force was nationalism”, which he identifies as a positive force contributing to Serbia's state building:

The people needed an independent state in order to liberate themselves from the Turks; the dynasty needed a strong state power for its security; the parties needed a constitutional and parliamentary state system in order to govern. Feeding itself on the components of nationalism, dynastism, partyism, the state idea grew stronger.³¹

²⁷ Old Serbia is a geographic region that was the core of medieval Serbia, including Raška, Kosovo and Metohia, as well as the northwest of today's Slavic Macedonia, including the towns of Skoplje, Veles and Tetovo.

²⁸ Treaty of Bucharest, 10 August 1913, 218 CTS 322–337.

²⁹ See Dimitrije Djordjevic, “The Serbs as an Integrating and Disintegrating Factor”, *Austrian History Yearbook* 3, No. 2 (1967), 48–82, 72–74.

³⁰ Samuel R. Williamson, Jr, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War* (London: Macmillan, 1991), 103.

³¹ Jovanović, *Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovića*, 374. Note: The Obrenović dynasty ruled in 1815–42 and 1858–1903, and the Karadjordjević dynasty in 1842–58 and 1903–45. The two rival dynasties were both native, Serb. Prince Miloš Obrenović organized the 1817 assassination of Karadjordje. An arbitrary ruler, Miloš was forced to abdicate in 1839. He was succeeded by two of his sons, Milan (who ruled only a few weeks) and Michael, who ruled for three years. In 1842 Karadjordje's son Alexander (1806–85) acceded to the throne, but was deposed in 1858, when the Obrenović dynasty was reinstalled and Prince Miloš came to the throne for the second time. Prince Michael Obrenović (1825–68), the youngest son of Miloš, engineered the total Ottoman withdrawal from Serbia in 1867. However, after his assassination in 1868, his first cousin Milan (1854–1901) was elected Prince of Serbia (King from 1882) and ruled until 1889 when he abdicated in favour of his son Alexander, the last ruler of the Obrenović dynasty (1881–1903).

As a result, the early twentieth century saw Serbia as a relatively modern and functional parliamentary monarchy. The 1903 Constitution (the revised 1888 one) reinaugurated a democratic regime, with strong guarantees for political and human rights, building upon the 1838 Constitution, which enforced a separation of executive and judicial powers, the 1869 Constitution, which strengthened the role of the National Assembly, and the 1888 Constitution, which granted the National Assembly complete control over the budget, establishing a parliamentary regime.³² Public administration reform and a professional civil service were important building blocks of a modern Serb state, with many civil servants coming from the ranks of Austro-Hungarian Serbs. By the First World War, almost universal male suffrage had existed for at least a generation in Serbia (from the 1888 Constitution) and social rights equalled if not exceeded those of West-European states; working time was limited and workers enjoyed the right to strike.

As observed by John Allcock, “measured by the standard of the existence of representative institutions alone, Serbia should be considered the most ‘advanced’ of all the South Slav lands”.³³ This is not to say that Serbia lacked non-democratic elements. Notably, in 1903 a secret society largely composed of military officers murdered the autocratic King Alexander Obrenović and Queen Draga, considering the couple to be a political embarrassment to Serbia and an obstacle to her democratization. Still, the subsequent Serb ruler, King Peter I Karadjordjević, was a true constitutional monarch, who had in his youth translated John Stuart Mill’s essay *On Liberty* into Serbian.³⁴ In the nineteenth century Serbia created a modern army and a civilian bureaucracy, making a unique achievement in what was to become Yugoslavia, that of building the framework for a modern state.³⁵

Development of Croat national movement and Croato-Serb relations until 1914

As in the case of the Serbs, language and literature became the building blocks of Croat national consciousness in the nineteenth century. Ljudevit

³² See Jovanović, *Političke i pravne rasprave*, 20-35.

³³ John B. Allcock, *Explaining Yugoslavia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 263.

³⁴ Grandson of Karadjordje Petrović, the leader of the First Serbian Insurrection against the Ottomans, King Peter I was a modest person and a patriot, Serb and European, having fought in the French army against the Germans and wounded in 1870, as well as taking part in the 1876 Serb uprising against the Ottomans in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

³⁵ See John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a country* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 46-55.

Gaj (1809–72) led this language reform, modifying the Latin alphabet to partially conform to the rule “one sound–one letter”, established for the Cyrillic alphabet by Vuk Karadžić. Gaj also adopted the shtokavian dialect of the Serbian language as the Croat literary dialect.³⁶ His reform was an essential part of the so-called Illyrian movement, resisting the attempts from Budapest to Magyarize the Croats and entertaining the idea of a common “Illyrian” (that is, South Slav) state. Serbs, including Garašanin, mistrusted Ljudevit Gaj and therefore questioned the authenticity of the Illyrian movement, having discovered that Gaj also acted as a spy for the Viennese authorities.³⁷

In contrast to Slovene and Serb nationalism, which mainly relate to people, Croat nationalism principally relates to territory, a policy which has over time become the root of competing claims between the two nations that inhabit present-day Croatia – the Croats and the Serbs:

While Serbian nationalism was fashioned so as to appeal to the minds and hearts of all Serbian people, regardless of where they lived, Croatian nationalism, largely legalistic, was predicated on territorial claims, without taking account of who lived in these territories.³⁸

Historically, “Croatia” has been an amorphous geographic concept, significantly changing in size and ownership of sovereignty. It existed as a small independent state in the Middle Ages,³⁹ but it was absorbed by the Hungarian Kingdom following the death of the last Croatian king in a battle against Hungarians in 1097. Croatia became one of many provinces, administratively linked with the province of Slavonia, most of which forms part of present-day Croatia. A third formerly Habsburg province which also forms part of present-day Croatia, but which, historically, has been more autonomous than the original province of Croatia or the province of Slavonia, is Dalmatia. Austrians ruled Dalmatia, while Hungary administered Croatia and Slavonia in the Empire. Finally, the fourth region incorporated

³⁶ For more, see Suster, *Historical Dictionary of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, 118–119.

³⁷ See Vasilije Dj. Krestić, *Znameniti Srbi o Hrvatima* [Eminent Serbs on Croats] (Novi Sad: Prometej, 1999), 18–19.

³⁸ Žarko Bilbija, “The Serbs and Yugoslavia” in *The Serbs and their National Interest*, eds. Norma von Ragenfeld-Feldman and Dusan T. Batakovic (San Francisco: Serbian Unity Congress, 1997), 96–97. Note: Bosnia and Herzegovina is another territory of competing claims between Croats and Serbs but this important issue will not be discussed here due to the limited space.

³⁹ Medieval Croatia reached its peak in the reign of Tomislav (910–928), who proclaimed himself king in 924.

into today's Croatia is *Krajina* or the Military Frontier, ruled by the Austrians until 1881 when it was placed under Hungarian auspices.⁴⁰

Dalmatia certainly enjoyed the largest degree of autonomy in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It entered the Habsburg monarchy much later than the other South-Slav provinces, as a result of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, when it was taken from Napoleonic France. Indeed, Dalmatia retained a distinctive character during most of its history, not unified with the other Austro-Hungarian provinces inhabited by South-Slavs until the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes more than a hundred years after the Habsburg conquest (1918). According to Allcock: "Although Croats had tended to include Dalmatia within their understanding of the historical 'Croat lands', these had long been Venetian possessions." Moreover, the Ragusan Republic (Dubrovnik) had retained relative independence until 1808. By the Treaty of Campo Formio (1797), Venice ceded Dalmatia to Austria and, following the intervening Napoleonic period, Austrian control was reasserted in 1815.⁴¹

In 1874 Dalmatia's population was mostly made up of Croats and Serbs, with a small Italian minority, which nevertheless had significant cultural influence.⁴² The exact proportions of Serbs and Croats cannot be precisely determined. Historians at the time made estimates based on language and religion, and while language was considered to be one and the same, Serb Catholics were also a large group in Dalmatia.⁴³ Serbs lived mostly in the south of Dalmatia, in the Bay of Kotor (Cattaro) and in Dubrovnik. They were also to be found in the towns of Zadar and Šibenik and in the

⁴⁰ The peninsula of Istria is sometimes studied as a separate, fifth region although most historians tend to group Istria with Dalmatia.

⁴¹ Allcock, *Explaining Yugoslavia*, 255.

⁴² According to one historian, Rade Petrović, *Nacionalno pitanje u Dalmaciji u XIX stoljeću* [National question in Dalmatia in the 19th Century] (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, and Zagreb: Prosvjeta, 1982), 17-18, "89 percent of the population of Dalmatia spoke only Serbo-Croatian in 1874; about 8 percent spoke both Serbo-Croatian and Italian; 3 percent spoke only Italian", quoted in Nicholas J. Miller, *Between Nation and State* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 29. For more, see Vasilije Krestić, *History of the Serbs in Croatia and Slavonia 1848-1914*, transl. Margot and Boško Milosavljević (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1997).

⁴³ For more information on Roman Catholic Serbs, see Lazo M. Kostić, *Katolički Srbi* [Catholic Serbs] (Toronto: St. Sava Serb Cultural Club, 1963) and Ivan Stojanović, *Povjest Dubrovačke Republike* [The History of the Republic of Dubrovnik], orig. written in German by Ivan Hristijan v. Engel (Dubrovnik: Srpske Dubrovačke Štamparije A. Pasarića, 1903).

hinterland of northern Dalmatia.⁴⁴ The Serb presence in Dalmatia and its hinterland is centuries old. In addition to some older historical documents, living witnesses to Serb presence are the Serbian Orthodox monasteries of Krupa and Krka (both dated to the fourteenth century). A brief account of economic, cultural, scientific and political influence of the Dubrovnik Serbs is an illustrative example of the significant Serb presence in southern Dalmatia:

For many centuries Dubrovnik traded with its Orthodox hinterland and received immigrants therefrom. The most renowned inhabitants of Dubrovnik, Ivan Gundulić, poet (1583–1638) and Rudjer Bošković, scientist and philosopher (1713–1787), famous in European circles, were of Serbian origin ... In 1890, the Serbian Party won the municipal election in Dubrovnik. They got votes of the Orthodox Serbs and of the Catholic Serbs as well. In Ston, on the Pelješac peninsula, St. Sava founded an eparchy in 1219.⁴⁵

Three nations therefore claimed this region – Serbs, Croats and Italians. Yet it should be noted that prior to and under Habsburg rule, many Dalmatians identified themselves simply as Dalmatians or Slavs, rather than Serbs, Croats or Italians.⁴⁶

*Krajina*⁴⁷ is the region established by Vienna in the 1520s as a military frontier zone between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires, on empty land bordering the provinces of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia to the west and Bosnia-Herzegovina to the east. The people who came to inhabit this region, predominantly Serb,⁴⁸ fought for the Habsburgs against the Ottomans. In return, they enjoyed a large degree of autonomy that included independent schooling and an autonomous church. Slavo-Serbian (the lan-

⁴⁴ Serbs began to settle in the coastal city of Rijeka only after the Second World War, following the expulsion of most of its Italian inhabitants by the Yugoslav Communist authorities.

⁴⁵ Jovan Ilić, “The Serbs in the Former SR Croatia” in *The Serbian Question in the Balkans*, 317.

⁴⁶ As late as 1860, a Dalmatian politician reported no more than seven pro-Slavic politicians in Dalmatia, further noting that several of these declared themselves as Slavo-Dalmatians, also considering Dalmatians to be a separate ethnic group. For more, see Josip Vrandečić, “Nacionalne ideologije u Dalmaciji u 19. stoljeću” [National ideologies in Dalmatia in the 19th century] in *Dijalog povjesničara-istoričara* [Dialogue of historians 4], eds. Dušan Gamsler, Igor Graovac and Olivera Milosavljević (Zagreb: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2001).

⁴⁷ Military Border or Frontier in English; Militärgrenze in German.

⁴⁸ For one of the earliest autochthonous demographic accounts of Krajina, see Spiridon Jović, *Etnografska slika Slavonske vojne granice* [Ethnographic Picture of the Military Border in Slavonia] (1st ed. 1835; Belgrade: Čigoja štampa, 2004), esp. 43–48.

guage that pre-dates the current version of the Serbian language) was used as a language of instruction, and Serb Orthodox clergy oversaw schools in Krajina. It was the *Statuta Valachorum*,⁴⁹ a decree issued by Emperor Ferdinand II in 1630, that placed Krajina under the direct rule of Vienna, removing the jurisdiction of the Croatian Diet and effectively creating a separate region at the expense of the Croatia-Slavonia province. Internal organization of the Krajina was based on local autonomy, with courts for each of three captaincies, elected for year-long terms by the elders of each district. This civil government and courts were in charge of all civil penalties, with military courts limited to corporal punishment, and that only for the military. The Statute also elaborated military requirements: a minimum of six thousand soldiers was to gather within three hours of any alarm. The Krajina inhabitants were exempt from various land and protection taxes imposed on others.⁵⁰

Upon the creation of Krajina, Croatian noblemen demanded that their levy power be extended to this area. In the eighteenth century, the Croatian representatives in the Hungarian Diet even demanded “the enactment of laws and regulations which would make life impossible for the Serbian people and for the Orthodox Church”⁵¹ such as those preventing the organization of Serbian high schools, the building of Serb Orthodox churches, and so on. However, Vienna rejected these demands, needing the Krajina manpower to fight the Ottoman onslaught. In turn, the inhabitants of Krajina were extremely loyal to the Habsburgs, regarding them as the guarantors of their privileged status. According to Gunther Rothenberg:

At the time when serfdom and subservience to feudal lords were still the general rule, [they] regarded themselves as free tenants of the emperor who were far superior to ordinary peasants.⁵²

⁴⁹ The legislation had the same name and purpose as the so-called Vlach law of 1467–8, under which the Ottomans granted privileges to Serbs in vassal Serbia. However the Austro-Hungarian law granted more extensive rights, at once creating an autonomous region and an effective military system defending their Empire. The integral text of the *Statuta Valachorum*, proclaimed on 5 October 1630, is reproduced in Latin, Serbian and English in Dinko Davidov, *Srpske privilegije* [Serbian Privileges], (Novi Sad, Belgrade: Matica srpska, Institute for Balkan Studies, Svetovi, 1994), 145–147.

⁵⁰ Miller, *Between Nation and State*, 10–11.

⁵¹ Edmond Paris, *Genocide in Satellite Croatia. A Record of Racial and Religious Prosecutions and Massacres* (Chicago: American Institute for Balkan Affairs, 1961), 11.

⁵² Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Military Border in Croatia, 1740–1881* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 9.

However, the Austrians tended to overlook local derogations to privileges at a time of a low war danger. The Catholic Church used this to forcefully convert the residents of the Military Frontier:

As long as the service of the Orthodox Grenzer were needed, their religion was respected; but when the need had passed the throne did nothing to restrain the efforts of the Catholic hierarchy, which, with the zealous collaboration of the military, attempted forcibly to convert the Orthodox or at least to coerce them to accept the Uniate rites.⁵³

Despite the forced conversions, and the taxing demands of the Croat noblemen, the Serbs and the Croats generally lived peacefully in Krajina, where Serbs were a majority.⁵⁴ The Krajina Serbs also had good relations with other Habsburg provinces where Croats formed the majority – Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia. Serious scholars have therefore refuted the postulated “age-old antagonisms” between Serbs and Croats.⁵⁵

The Croats of *Croatia-Slavonia* enjoyed a limited political autonomy from the Habsburgs from their official incorporation into the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1102. However, many present-day Croat historians find the position of Croatia’s subservience to Hungary in the Habsburg Empire (later Austria-Hungary) impossible to accept, because it testifies to the loss of Croatian statehood in the Middle Ages. Contrary to the established scholarly evidence, they tend to describe the Croat position within the Dual Monarchy as a voluntary sharing of power and a personal union between Croatia and Hungary: “In the early Middle-Ages Croatia entered into something of a commonwealth with Hungary.”⁵⁶

Some Croat historians go beyond this explanation and depict Croatia as one of the three states constituting the Habsburg Empire which, accord-

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 29. Please note that Grenzer is the German term for the Krajina inhabitants.

⁵⁴ See Drago Roksandić, *Srbi u Hrvatskoj* [Serbs in Croatia] (Zagreb: Vjesnik, 1991), 55–70.

⁵⁵ See, e.g., Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 30.

⁵⁶ Stephen Gazi, *A History of Croatia* (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1993), ix. A document titled *Pacta Conventa*, not preserved but supposedly signed in 1102, was claimed by leading Croatian historians to be a contract stipulating personal union of Hungary and Croatia. However, even if its authenticity were accepted, it still would not represent anything more than a contract between the feudal ruler of Croatia, Hungarian King Koloman, and his Croatian vassals, i.e. it would not be perceived as an interstate agreement in the domain of international law. Marko Kostrenčić, s. v. “Pacta conventa”, *Enciklopedija Jugoslavije* (Zagreb, 1955), 404; Nada Kalić, “Pacta conventa ili tobožnji ugovor između plemstva dvanaestoro plemena i kralja Kolomana 1102. godine” [*Pacta conventa* or the alleged contract between twelve tribes and king Koloman of 1102], *Historijski pregled* 2 (1960).

ing to them, was only nominally a “Dual” monarchy.⁵⁷ Historical legalism based on the continuity of the Croat state⁵⁸ is characteristic of Croatian historiography,⁵⁹ and it follows in many aspects, and is a reaction to, similar Hungarian designs. Croatian historical legalism was rejected by the Hungarian and other historians such as Hondius who viewed it as “a complex and national malaise [of the Croats].”⁶⁰ Nevertheless it is important to emphasize the firm belief of most Croats in its factuality since nationhood tends to be based on belief rather than reality.⁶¹ The belief in the idea that Croatian statehood had never been extinguished contributed to the emergence of modern Croat national consciousness in the nineteenth century, with a goal of reunification of the alleged Triune Kingdom of the Middle Ages (Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia).

An undisputable fact is that Habsburg rule was less oppressive than Ottoman, sharing Roman Catholic religion and cultural views with the Croats who retained the institutions of a parliament and a governor (*ban*), who was nevertheless chosen by Vienna or Budapest, which also had full control of the provinces’ finances.⁶² Nonetheless, according to Singleton, dominant Croat families did not display any strong national feelings, Croat or Hungarian:

They were more concerned with the consolidation of their estates and with the expansion of their personal power. Two of the leading families, the Zrinski and the Frankopan, held land in both Croatia-

⁵⁷ See, e.g., Milan Vladislavjević, *Hrvatska autonomija pod Austro-Ugarskom* [Croatian autonomy under Austria-Hungary] (Belgrade: Politika AD, 1939).

⁵⁸ See also Emilio Pallua, “A Survey of the Constitutional History of the Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia”, *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 24 (1990), 129-154.

⁵⁹ Croato-American historians Charles and Barbara Jelavich share the Croat viewpoint that Croatia and Hungary “remained as separate kingdoms united through the crown”. Rather than having been conquered, Croats had, in this view, “elected the ruler of Hungary as their monarch” in 1102, and, by the same reasoning, in 1527 “after the defeat of Hungary by the Turks, Croatia elected the Habsburg emperor as her king”. See Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920* (1st edition 1986; Seattle, London: University of Washington Press, 1993), 247.

⁶⁰ Hondius, *Yugoslav Community of Nations*, 20

⁶¹ See Benedict R. OG. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983); Maria N. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

⁶² Charles Jelavich, “The Croatian Problem in the Habsburg Empire in the Nineteenth Century”, *Austrian History Yearbook* 3, No. 2 (1967), 100.

Slavonia region and Hungary and moved freely between their lands.⁶³

However, an era of centralization and Magyarization ensuing in the late nineteenth century placed Croatia-Slavonia under the direct rule of Budapest:

The railways were being constructed as an integral part of the Hungarian railway system. Also, Hungarian flags, emblems, coats of arms, and inscriptions were being erected everywhere.⁶⁴

Croat nationalists from Croatia and Slavonia developed an increasing animosity towards the Hungarians, whom they then viewed as oppressors, while others remained loyal to Budapest.

It was not until the nineteenth century that the provinces of Croatia and Slavonia had a first governor of Croatian origin, Josip Jelačić, previously a mid-ranking Austrian military officer. Jelačić entertained a good relationship with the Habsburg Serbs. He referred to the “Croat and Serbian People” in his proclamations, and declared on 7 September 1848: “Religious differences make no barriers between brothers in social or public life. We proclaim full equality [between Croats and Serbs].”⁶⁵

When the Hungarians began to demand greater rights from the Austrian Habsburgs, the Croats and the Serbs in the Empire, led by Ban Jelačić, fought fervently on the Austrian side. Croats, who were under Hungarian rule in the Empire, resisted Magyarization and hoped to obtain greater rights from the Austrian emperor. The Krajina Serbs supported the Croats not only because of Jelačić’s fair treatment of Serbs and Croats, but also because the Hungarians had begun encroaching on the Austrian rule in Krajina. Finally, the Hungarians had directed their Magyarization policy not just against Croats but also against Serbs and other ethnic groups in the provinces under their rule. A key factor in forging a Croato-Serb military coalition against the Hungarians was the uprising of the Voivodina Serbs (then a part of Southern Hungary) against the Hungarian authorities during the 1848–49 revolution.⁶⁶ The Krajina Serbs demanded that Jelačić provide military aid for their brethren. The Serb Patriarch Josif Rajačić, who had consecrated Jelačić as a ban, seconded this demand.⁶⁷ Although the Croat-

⁶³ Singleton, *Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples*, 55–56.

⁶⁴ Aleksa Djilas, *The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919–1953* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 31.

⁶⁵ Branko Vincic, “History of Serbs in Croatia”, *Krajina: Tragedy of a People* (Hamilton, ON: Canadian-Serbian Council, 1998), 41.

⁶⁶ See above.

⁶⁷ Rothenberg, *Military Border*, 151.

Serb army then delivered a serious blow to the Hungarian forces, they lost the battle. The Hungarian revolution was quelled by Russian troops who aided the Austrian crown, bound by the Holy Alliance.⁶⁸

The good relations between the Serbs and the Croats in the Habsburg Empire were further strengthened in 1867, when the Croatian Diet declared that the Serbian and Croatian nations and their languages were equal.⁶⁹ However, this decision was not always respected. Notably the first Croat teachers' general assembly in 1871 concluded that teaching was to be in Croatian only.⁷⁰ Perhaps this change in attitude came as a result of the 1868 Croato-Hungarian agreement (*Nagodba*).⁷¹ The agreement dealing with Croato-Hungarian relations was a consequence of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, which had turned the Habsburg Monarchy into a Dual Monarchy, now placing the province of Croatia-Slavonia completely in the sphere of Hungary.

The Croato-Hungarian agreement delineated Croatian autonomy within Hungary with Croatian as the official language. Yet it stressed in the first article that Hungary and the provinces of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia formed "one and the same political community",⁷² with Budapest retaining control over the choice of governor, finances and the most important port, Fiume (Rijeka). While Croats placed their hopes in this agreement, perceiving it as a document apt to strengthen their rights within the Empire, Hungarians considered it a first step in Croatia's transformation

⁶⁸ Article II of the Holy Alliance Treaty, signed on 26 September 1815 by the sovereigns of Austria, Prussia and Russia, stipulated that "the sole principle of force, whether between the said Governments or between their Subjects, shall be that of doing each other reciprocal service, and of testifying by unalterable good will the mutual affection with which they ought to be animated, to consider themselves all as members of one and the same Christian nation." Edward Cecil Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty* (London, 1875) (accessed 10 February 2005); available from <http://www.napoleonseries.org/reference/diplomatic/alliance.cfm>

⁶⁹ *Saborski spisi sabora kraljevinah Dalmacije, Hrvatske i Slavonije od godine 1865–1867* [Parliamentary Acts of the Parliament of the Kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia 1865–1867] (Zagreb, 1900), 308.

⁷⁰ Decision quoted in Vasilije Dj. Krestić, *Iz istorije Srba i srpsko-hrvatskih odnosa* [From the History of Serbs and Serb-Croat Relations] (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1994), 210–211.

⁷¹ Integral text of the political compromise between Croatia and Hungary of 18 November 1868 reproduced in François Rodolphe, *Les Constitutions Modernes—Recueil des constitutions en vigueur dans les divers Etats d'Europe, d'Amérique et du monde civilisé* (Paris: Challamel, 1910), Vol. I, 505, and in Snezana Trifunovska, *Yugoslavia through Documents from its Creation to its Dissolution* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), 50–58.

⁷² *Ibid.* (translation mine). Original text: "La Hongrie et la Croatie, Slavonie et Dalmatie forment une seule et même communauté politique..."

into an integral part of Hungary. Hungarian and other foreign historians, including those writing in that period,⁷³ constantly emphasized the limits to Croatia's autonomy within Hungary, while Croatian historians tended to exaggerate its scope.⁷⁴ Notably, just as Hungarians wanted to render Croats a Hungarian "political nation", Croats preferred to view the Serbs as 'political Croats', a view that Serbs fiercely rejected.⁷⁵ This issue formed the core of Croato-Serb antagonism, which developed as Croatian nationalism ripened in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Consequently, Croatia's frustrations regarding its position in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were not soothed with the *Nagodba*. Thirteen years later (1881), the Habsburgs dissolved the Krajina province under great pressure from Hungary, incorporating it into Croatia-Slavonia. From that point, after the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878 diminished the importance of Krajina's role in the defence of the Empire's eastern borders, the Serbs become an important factor in the Croato-Hungarian conflict:

With the new lands, Croatia added 61 percent more territory and 663,000 more people, of which 55 percent were Serbs. This simple transfer of land and people from one jurisdiction to another upset the equilibrium of Croatian politics by inserting a non-Croatian element into what had been a largely Croatian land. By 1910, Orthodox Serbs made up approximately 25 percent of Croatia [-Slavonia-]'s population.⁷⁶

While the majority of the Serbs living in the Austro-Hungarian Empire were peasants, some were also bankers and wealthy landowners. In 1897, Serbian farmers' collectives began to be formed in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, providing small-scale aid in the form of seeds, feed, educational materials, and classes to Serbian peasants. Linking all the collectives was the Serbian Bank and the influential Serbian Economic Society with its newspaper, *Privrednik* (The Tradesman), seated in Zagreb. Started in 1888,

⁷³ See, e.g., *Hungary of Today*, ed. Percy Alden (London: Fawside House, 1909), 394.

⁷⁴ See, e.g., Gazi, *History of Croatia*, ix.

⁷⁵ See Tihomir Cipek, "Oblikovanje hrvatskoga nacionalnog identiteta. Primordijalni identitetski kod u ranoj hrvatskoj političkoj misli" [Shaping of Croatian national identity. Primordial identity code in early Croatian political thought] in *Dijalog povjesničar-istoričara*; Mirjana Gross and Agneza Szabo, *Prema hrvatskome građanskom društvu. Društveni razvoj u civilnoj Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji šezdesetih i sedamdesetih godina 19. stoljeća* (Zagreb, 1992), 129-157.

⁷⁶ Miller, *Between Nation and State*, 18. Importantly, Serbs constituted absolute majority in more than a dozen towns and a relative majority in many more. See "Popis žitelja od 31. prosinca 1910. u Kraljevinama Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji" [Census of 31 December 1910 in the Kingdoms of Croatia and Slavonia] in *Publikacije Kr. zemaljskog statističkog ureda u Zagrebu* LXIII (Zagreb, 1914), 50-51.

it was devoted to economic education and general advancement of Serbs who dominated Croatia's economy until 1914.⁷⁷

The *Matica Srpska*, Serbian scholarly and cultural organization, was founded in Budapest in 1826, but subsequently transferred to Novi Sad (Voivodina), the hub of Serb publishing activities. However, while promoting Serb interests, the Serb banks, cultural institutions and party organizations, according to Miller, also "served to segregate Serbs from their neighbours and inculcate an insular sense of community".⁷⁸

Anxious about the termination of Krajina in 1881, the Serbs received reassurances from Emperor Francis Joseph that "all measures have been taken to place [the inhabitants of Krajina] on equal status with all other inhabitants of [Habsburg] lands of the Hungarian crown".⁷⁹ In return for the preservation of their previous privileges, the Serbs opted for loyalty to the Hungarian governor of Croatia-Slavonia, Count Charles Khuen-Hédervary (1882-1903). Khuen-Hédervary began a divide-and-rule policy in the region by granting greater privileges to the Serbs. In directly placing the Hungarian government rather than the Croatian Diet in the service of Serbian interests, Khuen-Hédervary drew Serbs into the Hungarian, rather than Croatian, administrative context. In 1887 and 1888, the Parliament passed two laws, one legalizing the use of the Serbian language and Cyrillic alphabet, and the other assuring the existence of Serbian Orthodox schools in the districts where Serbs were a majority.⁸⁰ Many Serbs were dissatisfied with the scope of these laws, which they believed to be less generous than the privileges granted to Serbs in 1868, emphasizing religious and cultural rather than national rights.⁸¹ The 1887/8 legislation was imprecise and it did not apply to the entire territory of the Serb-inhabited provinces. For instance, the 1887 "Law regulating the activities of the Eastern Greek Church and the use of Cyrillic" stipulated that the Cyrillic alphabet could be used in court proceedings "there where Serbs live in greater numbers".⁸²

Count Khuen-Hédervary's actions generated a strong Croatian opposition. He was portrayed as a tyrant in Croatian historiography, although

⁷⁷ All these organizations were founded by members of the Serbian Independent Party.

⁷⁸ Miller, *Between Nation and State*, 24.

⁷⁹ Document quoted in Rothenberg, *Military Border*, 192.

⁸⁰ Miller, *Between Nation and State*, 37.

⁸¹ See Žarko Miladinović, *Tumač povlastica, zakona, uredba i drugih naredjenja srpske narodne crkvene autonomije u Ugarskoj, Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji* [Interpretation of privileges, laws, decrees and other orders of the Serb national church autonomy in Hungary, Croatia and Slavonia] (Novi Sad, 1897), 100-101.

⁸² Article 3, Law regulating the activities of the Eastern Greek Church and the use of Cyrillic, passed on 14 May 1887, produced in Krestić, *Gradja*, 89.

“during the entire twenty years of his rule exactly one man was shot”.⁸³ The Croatian nationalism that developed very timidly in resistance to Hungarian rule, aiming at the unification of Croatia, Slavonia, the Military Frontier (Krajina), Dalmatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina into a single state according to a national programme drafted by Janko Drašković in 1832,⁸⁴ was rapidly enhanced by Khuen-Hedervary’s actions – and directed against the Serbs who agreed to the ban’s concessions hopeful to preserve their own culture represented by the Christian Orthodox faith and Cyrillic alphabet. According to Miller:

Serbs’ behaviour in Croatia was rooted in their fear of losing their collective identity. They were conscious of their history and proud that they had maintained their identity through centuries of Ottoman and Habsburg administration. ... [They] could do nothing but accept Khuen-Hedervary’s patronage, given the attitude of the most popular Croatian political parties and their leaders.⁸⁵

Croatian politics became one of resisting the granting of any recognition to Serbian institutions and cultural peculiarity without previous acceptance by Serbs of the concept that the only “political nation” in Croatia was the Croatian.⁸⁶ This politics was emanated by the extreme nationalist Ante Starčević (1823–96) and the Croatian Party of Rights.

Starčević, like many other Croat intellectuals, believed that Croatian statehood had never been extinguished, that the “Croatian state” had merely been ruled by foreigners. According to him, this state encompassed all the Illyrian provinces of the Roman Empire, and was inhabited exclusively by Croats. Starčević not only denied any claim to Serbian nationhood, but even argued that members of the medieval Serbian Nemanjić dynasty had been the “purest-blooded Croats”.⁸⁷

Starčević turned fiercely anti-Serb after failing to obtain professorship at the University of Belgrade and from then on regarded Serbs as a political preference, an inferior race amidst the Croats that either was to abandon its national consciousness and become Croat or to be exterminated. Not only did Starčević launch the slogan “The Serbs are a breed fit only for the slaughter house”,⁸⁸ but he also claimed Slovenes as ethnic Croats. He aspired towards a Greater Croatia that would encompass Slovenia, the

⁸³ Hondius, *Yugoslav Community of Nations*, 71.

⁸⁴ See Gazi, *History of Croatia*, 179.

⁸⁵ Miller, *Between Nation and State*, 42.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Dennison Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974* (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1977), 13.

⁸⁸ Paris, *Genocide*, 11.

provinces of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and Krajina, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina. In brief, Starčević was “the progenitor of extreme Croatian nationalism, which sought to suppress and perhaps even to exterminate all those who had a different national consciousness”.⁸⁹ Despite overwhelming historical evidence to the contrary, however, modern Croat historians have identified Starčević as one of Croatian most eminent liberals, enlightened by the ideals of the French Revolution and committed to democracy and the rule of law.⁹⁰

Another ideology that emanated from Croatian resistance to Magyarization was the Croat version of Yugoslavism, which foresaw union of South Slavs into one, highly federalized, region based on the alleged historical rights. The goal was not independence but autonomy in the form of a separate federal unit dominated by Croats. The champion of this ideology was Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer, who had also briefly contemplated unification of the South-Slav lands of the Dual Monarchy with Serbia in the mid-1860s.

Serb politics in the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century was divided between those supporting cooperation with the Croats (the Independents), and those who supported some cooperation but insisted on forming an entity separate from the Croats in the future and joining with the Kingdom of Serbia (the Radicals).

The Independent Serbian Party (later the Serbian National Independent Party) was founded in August 1881 as the first Serbian opposition party in Croatia, demanding Serbian church and school autonomy, budgetary support for Serbian institutions in Croatia, equality of the Cyrillic with the Latin alphabet, the right to fly the Serbian flag, and a revision of the agreement with Hungary.⁹¹ The party's leader, Svetozar Pribičević, was the most active and influential Serb politician in Croatia from late 1902. Born in Kostajnica in Krajina, he was brought up in such a way as “to have deep devotion toward the Serbian national idea and fully uncritical love towards Serbia, Montenegro and Russia”.⁹² His party advocated a broader version of Serbdom seeing Serbs as part of a larger, Serbo-Croatian nation.

A more vocal party, the *Serbian National Radical Party*, came into force in 1887. It was not active in the entire province of Croatia-Slavonia, which then included Krajina, but based its political activity on the privileges

⁸⁹ Djilas, *Contested Country*, 106-107.

⁹⁰ See Pavo Barišić, “Ante Starčević (1823-1896)” in *Liberalna misao u Hrvatskoj* [Liberal Idea in Croatia], eds. Andrea Feldman, Vladimir Stipetić and Franjo Zenko (Zagreb: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2000), 105-120.

⁹¹ Miller, *Between Nation and State*, 38.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 47.

granted to Serbs by the earlier Habsburg monarchs. The party goal was to extend the Serbian church and school autonomy to the political realm, building a basis for Serb territorial autonomy. According to the Radicals' Autonomy Programme of 1897, Serbs should seek "the right of autonomy not only in the church/school and property/financial [fields] but also in the political arena".⁹³ The Radicals based their claims on the set of privileges granted by Habsburg Emperor Leopold I in 1690, refusing the changes introduced by the subsequent Croato-Hungarian agreement. According to Miller, the *Serbian Radical Party*, led by Jaša Tomić, "represented a tried and true version of Serbianness: that the Serbian community was [Christian] Orthodox, isolated, threatened with assimilation, and needful of vigilance".⁹⁴ This vigilance developed in response to Magyarization and the Croats' increasing denial of Serbian identity

In September 1902, *Srbobran* (Serb-Defender), newspaper published by the *Independent Serbian Party*, reprinted an article titled "Serbs and Croats" from *Srpski književni glasnik* (Serbian Literary Herald), the leading literary journal in the Kingdom of Serbia. This article by a young Serb student from Bosnia argued that the Serbs, having a stronger culture, would eventually culturally absorb the Croats. It caused a great uproar among the Croats, who protested in Zagreb, looting and destroying many Serbian banks and businesses.⁹⁵ The extent of the violence shocked the Serbs across the Empire.⁹⁶

Three years after this incident, however, a small group of enlightened Serbs and Croats formed an official political coalition, realizing that Magyarization threatened them both and that the Viennese authorities did not support a further federalization of the Empire. Thus, at the turn of the century, a policy of Croato-Serb cooperation prevailed, born out of the 1897 unification of the Croat and Serb youth organizations into the United Croatian and Serbian Youth. The youth leaders later formed parties that entered into a Serbo-Croatian government coalition, reflecting Pribičević's belief that "the Serbo-Croatian conflict cannot be considered a national question, because Serbs and Croats are not two different nations but parts of one and the same nation".⁹⁷

⁹³ Quoted in Miller, *Between Nation and State*, 40.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 51.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 52-54.

⁹⁶ See correspondence of Serb notables describing the 1902 riots, reproduced in Krestić, *Gradja*, 333-337.

⁹⁷ Svetozar Pribičević, "Misao vodilja Srba i Hrvata" [Guiding Idea of Serbs and Croats] in Jovan Banjanin et al., *Narodna misao* (Zagreb: Dionička tiskara, 1897), 50.

One of the goals of the Croato-Serb coalition was unification of Dalmatia with Croatia-Slavonia, with the purpose of strengthening the struggle against the Austro-Hungarian dominance. Concerned about the previous nationalist Croatian policy, the Serbs joined the Coalition under one important condition, contained in the Zadar Resolution:

Concerning the demands of our Croat brothers for the reincorporation of Dalmatia into Croatia and Slavonia ... the Serbian parties are prepared to [support this] if the Croatian side ... bindingly recognizes the equality of the Serbian nation with the Croatian.⁹⁸

On 14 November 1905, the parliamentary club of the Croatian Party and the club of the Serbian National Party signed a declaration in the Dalmatian parliament to that effect, stating that “the Croats and Serbs are one people, equal to one another”. The two parliamentary clubs further agreed to interchangeably use Serbian and Croatian language and flags, to allow for Serbian culture and history to be aptly represented in education and for judicial use of Cyrillic script when cases are filed in that script.⁹⁹ This agreement was a cornerstone of a coalition that was announced a month later, becoming a significant factor in Croatia-Slavonia after the elections of May 1906.

In 1909 Ban Rauch of Croatia-Slavonia attempted to dismantle the Croato-Serbian political coalition by trying fifty-three Serbs (mostly supporters of the Serbian Independent Party) for high treason, for encouraging Serbian nationalism aiming to destroy the Empire. It was evident that this trial was purely political, and Rauch failed to dismantle the Coalition. At the same time the trial demonstrated the existence of a strong Serbian national consciousness in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, even if it could not prove its subversive nature.

Aleksa Djilas explains how the Croatian-Serbian Coalition successfully joined the Croatian and the Serbian interests:

The Yugoslavism of the Croatian-Serbian Coalition was made possible by its emphasis on liberal-democratic political institutions and on the universal right of nations to self-determination. Arguments for political legitimacy had moved away from the irreconcilable Croatian and Serbian national ideologies based on historical

⁹⁸ *Stenografski zapisnici sabora Kraljevine Hrvatske, Slavonije i Dalmacije (1901–1906)* [Minutes of the Parliament of the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia] (Zagreb: Tisak kraljevske zemaljske tiskare, 1903), v. 5, pt. 2, 966, quoted in Miller, *Between Nation and State*, 83.

⁹⁹ Minutes of the meeting in Zadar held on 14 November 1905, printed as a document “Sporazum sa Hrvatima” [Agreement with the Croats] by the Serb Dubrovnik printing house, kept in the Archives of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Dr F. Nikić Fund, no. 14.528; reproduced in Krestić, *Gradja*, 422–424.

memories. The Coalition opposed the participation of clergy in political affairs and held that religious beliefs and values were the private concern of the individual. This separation of the churches from politics helped to remove an important obstacle to Croatian and Serbian cooperation and unity.¹⁰⁰

Nevertheless, the Serbian Radicals rapidly abandoned the Coalition, claiming that Serbian interests could not be forwarded in conjunction with the interests of the Croats in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and that Serbs should strive for autonomy from both the Habsburgs and the Croats.

Even the Serbian Independents had important disagreements with the Croatian political parties. One of these involved a strong opposition to the annexation of Bosnia. Although the Independents considered that Bosnia should become part of the Kingdom of Serbia, they were only able to protest against the Austro-Hungarian annexation indirectly, objecting that it “was carried out against the precedent of the Berlin agreement ... [and that] the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina were not consulted”.¹⁰¹

Although party politics and parliamentary action significantly matured in the nineteenth-century provinces of Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia, Allcock concludes that, “as in Slovenia, the political class ... was extremely small”. The difference was that some Croat nobility survived, and that “Croats had not been marginalized within the urban middle strata to the same extent as had the Slovenes”.¹⁰² Yet, the electorate amounted to less than two percent of the population, 50–60% of which were state officials. The new electoral law of 1910 increased the number of eligible voters to only eight percent.¹⁰³ Seton-Watson also observed a lack of democracy in Croatia of that period (Croatia-Slavonia province): Public voting and tax qualification which was extremely high for so poor a country, made ‘freedom of election’ in Croatia a mere farce.¹⁰⁴

The Austro-Hungarian Croats and Serbs entered the twentieth century with their respective national consciousness fully awakened, but with different and evermore opposing national goals. A comprehensive but highly uncritical *Croatian History*, originally published in five volumes between 1899 and 1911, thus speaks about the Croatian struggle for nationhood and “reunification of Croatian lands”, ignoring Serbian interests and even their

¹⁰⁰ Djilas, *Contested Country*, 34–35.

¹⁰¹ Miller, *Between Nation and State*, 124.

¹⁰² Allcock, *Explaining Yugoslavia*, 255.

¹⁰³ Charles Jelavich, “The Croatian Problem in the Habsburg Empire in the Nineteenth Century”, *Austrian History Yearbook* 3, No. 2 (1967), 99.

¹⁰⁴ R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question* (London, 1911), 104–105.

presence,¹⁰⁵ while Serbs fail to understand the Croat attachment to what they perceive to be their “historical state rights”. The ensuing world wars and civil wars brought the Croato-Serb conflict to the fore, with both the first and the second Yugoslavia failing to accommodate the two nations’ opposing aspirations.¹⁰⁶

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¹⁰⁵ Vjekoslav Klaić, *Povijest Hrvata* [Croatian History] I–V, 2nd ed. (Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Matice Hrvatske, 1975).

¹⁰⁶ For more, see Ana S. Trbovich, *A Legal Geography of Yugoslavia’s Disintegration* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

Alexis Troude

Les relations franco-serbes au sein de l'Armée d'Orient 1915-1918

La Serbie en 1914 : un allié récent mais solide de la France

1. La Serbie dans le jeu des puissances

1.1. Liens politiques, culturels et militaires France/Serbie (1900-1914)

Les liens entre la France et la Serbie étaient à la fois très solides et ténus depuis le retour de la dynastie des Karadjordjević en Serbie en 1903,¹ mais ils dénotaient en même temps une profonde méconnaissance des Serbes et de la Serbie par les Français avant la Première Guerre mondiale.

Le publiciste Pierre de Lanux a bien décrit en 1916 la totale méconnaissance des caractères ethniques de chaque peuple balkanique par les Français lorsque le conflit mondial commença. Ainsi, les Serbes étaient pris pour des « montagnards » et des « orientaux au caractère indolent et fuyant » ; l'envoyé français en poste à Belgrade entre 1907 et 1914 évoquera même leur « somnolence coutumière ». ² Par ailleurs, la presse française avait l'habitude de parler des Serbes, mais seulement en les présentant sous une seule facette et de manière parfois dédaigneuse. Selon des journaux comme le *Temps* ou l'*Illustration*, c'étaient des « éleveurs de porcs » aux mœurs orientales et violentes. On les confondait souvent avec les Bulgares et le coup d'Etat sanglant de 1903, où le dernier descendant de la dynastie Obrenović fut assassiné, était resté dans les mémoires.

Dans ces journaux à grand tirage, on estimait peu la stratégie et l'organisation militaire des Serbes, mais on s'intéressait surtout à leur goût pour le chant et les poèmes épiques. Les Français, à la veille du conflit, avaient en fait peur des velléités combatives des Serbes : lorsqu'Henri Barby,

¹ Georges Castellan, *Histoire des Balkans* (Paris : Fayard, 1991), 326-331.

² Service Historique de la Marine, Château de Vincennes -SHM, SS Z 35, dossier H3-Affaires serbes.

journaliste à l'*Aurore*, raconta les victoires serbes contre les Ottomans en 1913, les lecteurs réagirent en pensant que cela risquait d'entraîner la France dans une nouvelle guerre.³ Les dirigeants eux, par contre, étaient très bien informés des réalités locales. L'envoyé français à Belgrade, déjà déséquilibré et malade, Robert Descos, avait déjà dit dans sa note du 10 septembre 1912, adressée à son Ministre, que « la défiance du Bulgare domine toujours en Serbie » ; le 4 février 1913, il opposait ainsi « le Serbe, infiniment plus cultivé, mais plus mou que son voisin de l'Est » au Bulgare « âpre et violent, arbitraire et dominateur ». Déjà, l'envoyé français à Belgrade remarquait les prétentions territoriales des Bulgares sur Kumanovo et Skoplje, et la volonté des Serbes d'avoir un « débouché sur la mer Egée » depuis que la Bosnie-Herzégovine annexée par l'Autriche en 1908 leur avait barré la route de l'Adriatique.⁴

Dans ce contexte, la France officielle se rapprocha de la Serbie, Piémont des Slaves de Sud. Le roi Pierre I^{er} Karadjordjević, arrivé sur le trône en 1903, avait mené une politique ouvertement favorable à la France, ce qui changea complètement la politique française dans les années entre 1900 et 1910. Ayant fréquenté l'école militaire de Saint-Cyr à la fin des années 1860, puis participé à la guerre contre la Prusse aux côtés de la France, Pierre I^{er} de Serbie était un monarque sur lequel la France pouvait s'appuyer.⁵

Bien avant ce rapprochement diplomatique franco-serbe, la culture française s'était implantée dans la principauté de Serbie au XIX^e siècle. Déjà en 1838, les Français avaient aidé le prince Miloš Obrenović à établir une Constitution et la langue française était enseignée dans le Lycée dès 1838 et à l'Université de Belgrade depuis sa création comme la Grande Ecole en 1863. Mais le contact le plus important avec le milieu culturel français fut l'envoi de jeunes boursiers serbes en France à partir du milieu du XIX^e siècle. Cela avait le double avantage de les arracher à l'influence germanique de Vuk Karadžić à Nikola Pašić, les figures éminentes de la Serbie avaient fait leurs études dans le monde almanophone (l'Autriche-Hongrie, l'Allemagne, et la Suisse), et de constituer un corps de diplomates et de fonctionnaires fidèles à la France. Ce qu'on a appelé les « Parisiens » eurent pour nom Jovan Marinović, Filip Hristić, ou Milan Janković. En 1889, sur 33 boursiers envoyés à l'étranger, 14 le furent à Paris. A partir du milieu du XIX^e siècle, ils formaient une élite intellectuelle francophile qui allait influencer sur le rapprochement entre la Serbie et la France. La conséquence en fut la présence d'hommes d'Etat proches de la France : en poste durant la

³ Henry Barby, *Les victoires serbes* (Paris : Belfond, 1913).

⁴ Télégrammes de la Légation française de Belgrade, in Mihailo Pavlović, *Témoignages français sur les Serbes et la Serbie* (Belgrade : Narodna knjiga, 1988) 67-85.

⁵ Dušan T. Bataković, *Histoire du peuple serbe* (Paris : L'Age d'Homme, 2005), 185-188.

Première Guerre mondiale, le Ministre des Finances Momčilo Ninčić et les ambassadeurs à Londres et à Paris avaient fait leurs études à Paris.⁶

La colonie française à Belgrade n'était pas nombreuse au XIX^e siècle, mais certains de ses membres avaient laissé des traces dans la vie publique de la Serbie ; le capitaine Magnant avait essayé de rétablir, après la paix de Paris, le transport fluvial sur la Save et le Danube et, en le reliant à la ligne Marseille–Galatz, de faire sortir le commerce serbe de sa dépendance vis-à-vis de l'Autriche. Mais c'est surtout le capitaine de génie Hippolyte Mondain qui retiendra notre attention. Il fut envoyé dans une première mission à Belgrade pendant la guerre de Crimée (1853–56) puis, en 1861, il était nommé Ministre de la Guerre par le gouvernement serbe.⁷ En l'espace de quelques années, il dressa un plan d'ensemble des routes et défenses de la Serbie, refit le programme de l'école d'artillerie et forma un certain nombre de cadres militaires. Surtout, Mondain créa une milice nationale serbe. En bon connaisseur des Balkans, il avait constaté dans les années 1880 que « les manœuvres s'exécutent avec un entrain et un ensemble qu'on serait loin d'espérer de troupes irrégulières » ; « le peuple serbe possède un goût inné pour les armes et des qualités nécessaires pour faire un peuple guerrier ».⁸

1.2. *La Serbie comme clé stratégique des Balkans*

La Serbie représentait en 1914 un allié important du dispositif diplomatique français. Comme le dit en 1916 l'historien Victor Bérard, la Serbie constituait, dans les Balkans, l'« élément principal de notre politique face à l'expansionnisme germanique ». Or cette position clé dans le dispositif allié provoqua des appréhensions au sein du commandement français notamment, par les officiers du 3^e bureau : ainsi le 7 octobre 1915 était souligné ce qui fut appelé le « plan allemand », c'est-à-dire « réaliser au travers du territoire serbe la continuité des échanges et des territoires autrichien, bulgare et turc ».⁹ En effet, les Allemands contrôlaient en 1914, la Serbie mise à part, à la fois l'axe Vienne–Sofia–Istanbul par l'Orient-Express et la route de

⁶ Vojislav Pavlović, « L'influence culturelle de la France en Serbie à l'époque des Constitutionnalistes » in *Rapports franco-yougoslaves* (Belgrade : Institut d'Histoire, 1990), 103–111.

⁷ Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, Château de Vincennes -SHAT, 7 N 1573, Dossier « Attachés militaires-Missions en Serbie ».

⁸ Draga Vuksanović-Anić, « Les missions militaires françaises en Serbie de 1853 à 1886 et la question de la milice nationale » in *Rapports franco-yougoslaves* (Belgrade : Institut d'Histoire, 1990), 120–130.

⁹ SHAT, 16 N 3056, GQG Armées de l'Est, 3^e bureau (1915–16), pièce n°2, 7 octobre 1915.

l'Orient par le Berlin–Bagdad–Bahn. Des rapports du 2^o bureau sur les Balkans ressortait en 1915 le souci principal de la France : empêcher les Allemands d'aller plus en avant dans leur contrôle des richesses du Moyen-Orient, « terre de convoitises économiques et de rêves d'influence mondiale » pour l'Allemagne.¹⁰ Pétrole de mer Caspienne, mines de fer et de charbon d'Irak ainsi que richesses agricoles de Turquie étaient pointées du doigt par le 2^o bureau.¹¹ Or les deux axes Budapest–Salonique et Vienne–Istanbul traversaient la Serbie. Depuis la crise de l'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzégovine par les Autrichiens en 1908, la France craignait un contournement de la Serbie par l'ouest et le sud (alliés albanais), ce qui aurait amené un affaiblissement de ses positions dans la région.

Deuxième souci de la diplomatie française en 1914, comme le dit une note du 2^o bureau du 7 octobre 1915, « la Quadruple Entente sait en effet à peu près maintenant quels sont ses adversaires dans les Balkans, mais elle ne sait pas quels sont ses amis ». La Roumanie était dirigée par un « Hohenzollern qui a signé des traités avec tout le monde », car son but était de « ne marcher qu'au dernier moment et avec le vainqueur ». Or au moment de la débâcle serbe d'octobre 1915, il fut fait mention à plusieurs reprises de l'intérêt crucial de la Roumanie pour la réussite du front de Salonique : par ce pays se ferait la jonction entre le front de Salonique et la Galicie où l'allié russe était en train de se battre ardemment. En Grèce, le roi Constantin était pro-allemand, et le Premier ministre Venizelos pouvait tout juste accorder quelques gardes pour le camp fortifié qui se construisait à Salonique à partir de novembre 1915. Le 3^o bureau remarqua que les soldats grecs maintiendraient longtemps vis-à-vis des Français une « attitude douteuse »¹² et alla même jusqu'à craindre que « l'hostilité de la Grèce, qui a déjà hypothéqué toutes nos opérations dans les Balkans, ne les fasse pas définitivement échouer ».¹³

Dernier facteur géopolitique était le rôle des autres grandes puissances. Les responsables politiques britanniques, relayés par les officiers de l'armée royale, freinaient les initiatives de la France. Lord Kitchener, Ministre de la Guerre, avait évoqué en novembre 1915 l'éventualité de faire retirer les troupes britanniques ; lorsque le général Sarrail prit le comman-

¹⁰ SHAT, 16 N 3058, GQG Armées de l'Est, 3^o bureau (1916–17), pièce n^o 7, 6 novembre 1916.

¹¹ SHAT, 16 N 3056, GQG Armées de l'Est, 3^o bureau (1915–16), note n^o 10, 27 octobre 1915.

¹² SHAT, 16 N 3060, GQG Armées de l'Est, 3^o bureau (1917–18), dossier n^o 2, pièce n^o 64, 11 novembre 1917.

¹³ SHAT, 16 N 3058, GQG Armées de l'Est, 3^o bureau (1916–17), pièce n^o 7, 6 novembre 1916.

dement en chef de l'Armée d'Orient en novembre 1916, les Britanniques maintinrent leur autonomie et, en pleine bataille de Monastir, refusèrent de renvoyer des renforts. En fait, l'Armée d'Orient abandonna à partir de 1917 la zone d'influence du Vardar et de Salonique aux Italiens. Ceux-ci renforcèrent également leur présence chez leur protégé albanais : l'armée italienne pénétra ainsi en 1917 à El-Basan « sans les Français et sans Essad Pacha ». ¹⁴ Selon les accords de Londres d'août 1915, l'Italie devait récupérer la Dalmatie et l'Istrie dans l'Adriatique (l'objectif étant de faire barrage aux prétentions serbes sur l'Adriatique). ¹⁵

Enfin, il nous faut mentionner une implantation économique française en Serbie débutée au tournant du siècle et qui s'accéléra à l'approche du conflit mondial. La « Un groupe des banques françaises menés par la Banque Ottomane, avait investi 60 millions de francs dès 1902 en Serbie et encore 95 millions quatre années plus tard dans l'équipement militaire serbe. » ¹⁶ La France avait des participations dans les mines de charbon de Bor et Negotin, en Serbie orientale, mais aussi dans les mines de fer de Trepča et de cuivre de Leskovac en Vieille-Serbie; Manufrance avait fourni dans les années 1910 l'armée serbe en fusils-mitrailleurs et en canons de 75. ¹⁷ Enfin, le réseau ferré serbe était largement la réalisation de constructeurs français : l'axe Belgrade–Salonique par Skoplje [Uskub] en Macédoine venait juste d'être terminé lorsque la guerre débuta, et on travaillait sur le projet Belgrade–Sarajevo. ¹⁸

2. *L'armée française en 1915 : soutien et rapprochement avec la Serbie*

En 1914, la vaillance des Serbes contre les Puissances centrales commençait à être connue en France et provoqua des vocations. Les correspondants du « Petit Journal », de l'« Illustration » et du « Parisien » rapportaient quotidiennement les faits et gestes de l'épopée serbe. Les Serbes avaient repoussé les Austro-Hongrois sur la Kolubara en août 1914, face à un ennemi six fois supérieur en nombre, et repris Belgrade. Or quelques volontaires français s'étaient déjà fait remarquer pour la défense de Belgrade.

¹⁴ SHAT, 16 N 3058, GQG Armées de l'Est, 3^e bureau (1916–17), pièce n° 21.

¹⁵ Frédéric Le Moal, « Le poids des ambitions adriatiques de l'Italie sur les opérations militaires dans les Balkans 1914–18 », *Cahiers du CEHD* 22 (2004), 45–63.

¹⁶ Grégoire Jakšić, « Les relations franco-serbes aux XIX^e–XX^e siècles », in *Actes du Colloque des Langues Orientales* (Avril 1980).

¹⁷ Antoine Lambour, « Politique des fournitures d'armes de la France en Europe centrale en 1900–1914 » (Paris, 1971).

¹⁸ Entretien avec Ljiljana Mirković, Directrice des Archives de Serbie, Belgrade, avril 1990. *Sur les infrastructures et les intérêts français dans les mines.*

2. 1. Janvier–novembre 1915 : missions médicale et aérienne françaises

Pendant les combats que les Serbes menèrent seuls contre les Allemands et les Austro-Hongrois, deux missions militaires françaises allaient en 1915 venir aider l'armée serbe. Déjà Belgrade était défendue par trois canons de 140 et quelques dizaines de militaires français -la mission D-, et la frégate du lieutenant Picot défendait l'embouchure de la Save et du Danube.¹⁹ Pas moins de 1200 tirailleurs marins, aviateurs, artilleurs ou télégraphistes allaient ainsi, avant la formation de l'Armée d'Orient, rentrer en contact avec la population et l'armée serbe.²⁰

D'avril à août 1915, une mission formée de plus de 100 médecins officia à Belgrade, avec comme tâche principale de lutter contre les épidémies qui commençaient à se propager. L'épidémie de typhus faisait rage et en mars 1915, déjà 125 médecins serbes sur 300 étaient décédés. Etablie dans les hôpitaux de Niš et de Belgrade, et assistée d'infirmières britanniques, la mission française réussira en quelques mois à faire passer de 35 à 4 % le taux de mortalité typhique. Des tournées de vaccination, des comités d'hygiène avec création de dispensaires, mais aussi un effort d'information, avec causeries, soupes populaires et actions explicatives dans les écoles de village, amenèrent ce résultat formidable.²¹

En janvier 1915, arriva à Niš une mission militaire formée de 80 soldats, 8 officiers aviateurs et 8 avions, sous le commandement du major Vitraud. Ses objectifs consistaient à bombarder les positions ennemies, défendre le territoire serbe et enfin surveiller les mouvements allemands et austro-hongrois, notamment en Syrmie et au Banat. Les avions de type Farman avaient beaucoup soutenu l'armée serbe même si les Allemands en abattirent deux. L'escadrille française fut d'abord déplacée dans le village de Ralja, dans les environs de Belgrade, puis à Kraljevo. Les six derniers avions

¹⁹ SHM, SS Z 35, dossier H3-Affaires serbes, Note du lieutenant Picot (attaché militaire), 15 février 1916 ; SHM, SS Z 35, dossier H3-Affaires serbes, Note d'Auguste Boppe (Ambassadeur de France), 23 février 1916.

²⁰ Vladimir Stojančević, « Les Français en Serbie en 1915 » in *Rapports franco-yougoslaves* (Belgrade : Institut d'Histoire, 1990), 174-181.

²¹ « Mission militaire médicale française en Serbie », *Revue franco-macédonienne* 2 (Mai 1916). Cette revue avait été publiée d'avril 1915 à décembre 1917 à Salonique, non loin des zones occupées par l'Armée d'Orient. Regroupant des articles d'officiers et de sous-officiers de l'Armée d'Orient, la *Revue franco-macédonienne* cherchait à illustrer le travail humanitaire et les œuvres sociales de cette armée (écoles, hôpitaux, etc.), mais aussi à accoutumer les soldats de l'Armée d'Orient à cette terre de Macédoine en vue d'une installation à plus long terme.

français ramenèrent en novembre 1915 des enfants et des femmes serbes en France.²²

Les Belgradois se sentirent véritablement protégés par cette aide maritime, terrestre et aérienne française et déjà en 1915 naquit une amitié entre soldats français et civils serbes. L'envoyé de France à Belgrade, Auguste Boppe, constatait le 23 février 1915 : « la mission D a été très appréciée en Serbie »²³ et « l'excellente organisation des missions françaises produit une impression profonde ; le contraste avec les missions d'artillerie russe et britannique est sensible ». Le major commandant la mission médicale française soulignait aussi les liens qui se nouèrent entre Français et Serbes au tout début du conflit. « Accueilli cordialement dans tous les milieux serbes, c'est surtout au contact du paysan, véritable force de la Serbie, que le médecin serbe put pénétrer et comprendre les qualités foncières de la race. Altruisme, amour du sol natal, culte fervent de la patrie, souci de l'honneur, telles sont les vertus capitales du Serbe ; et ceci suffit pour expliquer l'attrance faite d'affinités électives qu'exerce sur nous cette race qu'une fraternité de cœur et non un vil calcul d'intérêt pousse vers la France et que nous devons, dans ces cruelles épreuves, aimer et assister fraternellement ».²⁴

2.2. Octobre–décembre 1915 : le sauvetage à Durazzo et la retraite de Corfou

Après l'échec des Dardanelles à l'été 1915, une partie du corps expéditionnaire franco-britannique fut ramenée dans le port grec de Salonique. Le haut commandement français comptait sur la combativité des Serbes pour qu'ils retiennent assez longtemps les Austro-allemands le temps de préparer le contact avec l'armée russe en Galicie. Mais le 5 octobre 1915, soit le jour même du débarquement de la 156^e division d'infanterie à Salonique, les Bulgares ajoutaient deux armées à la IX^e armée allemande et à la III^e armée austro-hongroise ; le 9 octobre, les Austro-Hongrois prenaient Belgrade et avant même que la mission Bailloud n'ait franchi la vallée du Vardar, les Bulgares occupaient Skoplje. Dans sa note du 11 novembre 1915, le 3^e bureau constata : « l'armée serbe n'a pas présenté la force de résistance dont nous la croyons capable ». ²⁵ Mais en aucun cas « il ne faut abandonner

²² Alphonse Muzet, *Le monde balkanique* (Paris : Flammarion, 1917), chapitre « La défense de Belgrade ».

²³ SHM, SS Z 35, dossier H3-Affaires serbes, Note d'Auguste Boppe (Ambassadeur de France), 23 février 1916.

²⁴ Médecin-major J-C, « La mission médicale française en Serbie », *Revue franco-macédonienne* 2 (Mai 1916).

²⁵ SHAT, 16 N 3056, GQG Armées de l'Est, 3^e bureau (1915-16), note n^o 19, 11 novembre 1915.

l'armée serbe », ²⁶ ne serait-ce que pour des raisons morales ; mais aussi « afin d'éviter que l'Allemagne ne mette la main sur Salonique ». ²⁷

Le 25 novembre 1915 fut donné l'ordre historique de retraite de l'armée serbe par le roi Pierre I^{er}, qui refusait la capitulation. Commença alors un épisode tragique qui se terminera seulement le 15 janvier 1916 : la traversée de l'armée et de la cour royale serbes à travers les montagnes d'Albanie. Assaillie par le froid et les maladies, un tiers de l'armée serbe périt. Alors que la mission navale française affirmait dès le 25 octobre qu'« il est indispensable pour l'armée serbe qu'elle puisse continuer à subsister », ²⁸ les Italiens se plaignaient dès le 1^{er} décembre d'être les seuls à prendre des risques. Le 20 décembre, alors que les premiers soldats serbes en hâillons rejoignaient les ports de Valona et Durazzo, le lieutenant Gauchet se plaignit du frein à l'aide émis par les Italiens et prévint : « Les Serbes vont mourir de faim ». ²⁹ Le lieutenant-colonel Broussaud signalait « l'épuisement physique et moral complet » et des « coups de fusils des comitadjis albanais » ; il évoqua aussi la mort de jeunes recrues par centaines le long des routes. ³⁰ Or ce fut l'armée française qui, sur 120 000 soldats serbes arrivés à pied sur la côte albanaise, en récupéra 90 000 pour les transférer sur l'île grecque de Corfou.

Entre le 15 janvier et le 20 février 1916 furent ainsi évacués à Corfou plus de 135 000 soldats serbes. Lorsqu'ils débarquèrent sur l'île grecque, on pouvait lire dans le carnet de route du 6^e chasseurs alpins que « l'état d'épuisement des malheureux soldats serbes est extrême : il en mourait 40 par jour ». ³¹ A Corfou, les médecins allaient entièrement rétablir cette armée en guenilles et les instructeurs la remettre sur pieds : deux hôpitaux militaires furent dès lors installés et fin mars plus aucune épidémie n'était à l'œuvre. Les Serbes étaient pour la première fois en contact avec des unités constituées de Français ordinaires – pas des aviateurs comme en 1915 – et qui n'avaient pas été préparés à cette aventure. Svetozar Aleksić, paysan du

²⁶ SHAT, 16 N 3056, GQG Armées de l'Est, 3^e bureau (1915-16), note n^o 20, 11 novembre 1915.

²⁷ SHAT, 16 N 3056, GQG Armées de l'Est, 3^e bureau (1915-16), note n^o 3, 12 octobre 1915.

²⁸ SHM, SS Z 35, dossier H3-Affaires serbes, Télégramme du Commandant Laurens, 25 octobre 1915.

²⁹ SHM, SS Z 35, dossier H3-Affaires serbes, Note du Lieutenant Gauchet, 20 décembre 1915.

³⁰ SHM, SS Z 35, dossier H3-Affaires serbes, Note du Lieutenant-colonel Broussaud, 22 décembre 1916.

³¹ SHAT, 16 N 3057, GQG Armées de l'Est, 3^e bureau (1916-17), note n^o 14, 5 février 1916.

centre de Serbie, fut réjoui d'avoir été, durant le transport de Corfou, rasé, lavé et habillé comme de neuf. « Qu'ils [les Français] bénissent leur mère patrie, la France. Ils nous ont alors sauvé la vie. »³² La même reconnaissance se retrouve dans la lettre du Ministre serbe de la guerre au général Mondésir, responsable de l'évacuation de Corfou. Le 24 avril 1916, il affirmait que « les chasseurs, pendant leur séjour à Corfou, ont gagné les cœurs des soldats et de leurs chefs par leur dévouement inlassable envers leurs camarades serbes ».³³ Ce dévouement explique que « les Français portaient à leurs camarades serbes leurs équipements et leur donnaient la plus grande partie de leur pain ».³⁴ De plus, les Français si proches et attentionnés avaient créé des liens indéfectibles. Le prince Alexandre dit en avril 1916 à Auguste Boppe : « Les Serbes savent aujourd'hui ce qu'est la France. Jusqu'ici, ils ne connaissaient que la Russie. Or nul part ils n'ont vu les Russes, partout ils ont trouvé des Français : à Salonique pour leur tendre la main, en Albanie pour les accueillir, à Corfou pour les sauver. »³⁵

L'Armée d'Orient 1916–1917 : échanges et conflits

1. Les enjeux militaires du Front de Salonique

1.1. Un camp retranché loin du front de l'Ouest

Le 5 octobre 1915, la 156^e DI britannique, directement arrivée des Dardanelles, débarquait dans le port de Salonique. A la fin du mois arrivèrent du front occidental pour les épauler la 57^e DI et la 122^e DI françaises. Parties vers le nord à Veles rejoindre l'armée serbe, elles furent stoppées par les troupes bulgares entrées en guerre le 5 octobre. En réponse, une aide militaire française assez importante fut acheminée dans la région : à Durazzo, 1700 wagons de farine de blé, à Corfou, 75 000 fusils et 18 batteries de 75, enfin à Salonique, 24 canons de 155 et 3 batteries de 65.³⁶ Mais très vite les Français durent se replier sur Salonique et y construire un fort retranché, entouré par des massifs avoisinant les 2500 mètres d'altitude. Avec les Britanniques, l'Armée Française d'Orient allait tracer une ligne de fortification

³² Témoignage de Svetozar Aleksić, in D. Paunić et M. Djordjević, *Tri sile pritisle Srbijicu* [Trois puissances ont encerclé la petite Serbie] (Belgrade, 1988), 8-12.

³³ Milan Živanović, « Sur l'évacuation de l'armée serbe de l'Albanie et sa réorganisation à Corfou (1915–1916) d'après les documents français », *Revue historique* XIV-XV (Belgrade : Institut d'Histoire, 1966), 2.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

³⁶ SHM, SS Z 35, Dossier H3 : « ravitaillement armée serbe ».

allant du village de Serres au nord-est de Salonique jusqu'au lac de Prespa sur la frontière albanaise.

A partir d'avril 1916, l'Armée Française d'Orient formée des Britanniques et des Français accueillit l'armée serbe, placée au cœur du dispositif. Le front restait relativement stable, hormis des percées comme celle de Monastir en novembre 1916 et de Pogradec fin 1917. Pourtant, quatre nouvelles divisions furent envoyées en décembre 1916, mais des désaccords entre le général Sarrail, commandant de ce qui devient l'Armée d'Orient fin 1916, et le général Milne, commandant les troupes britanniques, empêchèrent de relayer les ordres et expliquèrent les échecs, notamment dans le secteur de Florina. Alors que l'armée serbe était placée sous le commandement direct de Sarrail, les Britanniques s'abstenaient à partir de l'hiver 1916 de participer aux opérations : l'attaque déclenchée en mai 1917 dans le secteur de Doïran fut un échec, par mauvaise synchronisation des attaques et dispersion des moyens.³⁷

L'autre raison des échecs réside dans la conception même du front de Salonique. Jusqu'en 1918, ce front était considéré comme un appui aux Russes qui combattaient en Galicie. Le gouvernement français attendait l'entrée en guerre de la Roumanie, à laquelle elle proposa même des territoires de Transylvanie et du Banat. Mais l'entrée dans l'Entente de la Roumanie en août 1916 ne fit qu'éloigner tout espoir d'une prochaine jonction des fronts de Salonique et de Galicie. En effet, dès septembre 1916, les Roumains étaient défaits et occupés par les Austro-Allemands.³⁸

1.2. *Mésententes et incompréhensions entre Serbes et Français*

Au début de l'année 1917, la démoralisation gagna les troupes et les premières divisions se firent jour au sein de l'Armée d'Orient. Tout d'abord, les officiers serbes, déçus par les atermoiements du Haut commandement à l'automne et l'hiver 1916, semblaient remettre en cause la stratégie militaire des généraux français. Dans son rapport de février 1918, l'officier de liaison Strauss remarquait une « subordination mal définie » des officiers serbes face au Haut commandement. Strauss critiquait aussi l'esprit mercantile des Serbes, qui ne pensaient qu'à « faire du commerce et traiter ».³⁹ En fait, ce qui gênait le commandement français, c'était la faiblesse momentanée des

³⁷ Lieutenant-colonel Gérard Fassy, « Le commandement unique aux armées alliées d'Orient », *Revue historique des armées* n° 226 (2002), 47-58.

³⁸ Charles Pingaud, *Histoire diplomatique de la France pendant la Grande Guerre*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1921).

³⁹ SHAT, 16 N 3060, GQG Armées de l'Est, 3^e bureau (1917-18), dossier 2, note n° 49, 24 février 1918.

troupes serbes, alors qu'au début du conflit la France fondait toute son action dans les Balkans sur cette armée. Dans un rapport du 9 septembre 1917, le 2^o bureau affirmait que l'armée serbe « ne présente plus qu'une valeur défensive restreinte » et que « son concours aux opérations de l'Armée d'Orient est devenu faible au début de l'année 1917 ». ⁴⁰ Il faut savoir que la Serbie s'était battue pendant un an contre un ennemi – l'Autriche-Hongrie – 8 fois supérieur en nombre ; en second lieu, comme il était dit dans le rapport du 9 septembre 1917, cette armée fournit « un effort considérable » à l'automne 1916, ce qui avait « porté un coup sérieux à sa valeur militaire ». ⁴¹ Enfin, des divisions importantes entre le gouvernement serbe et certains exilés politiques commençaient à apparaître sur l'après-guerre.

Au sein même de l'armée française existait un bataillon « bosniaque », qui très vite posera problème à la hiérarchie militaire. Constitué en mai 1916, ce bataillon comptait des Monténégrins et des Serbes d'Herzégovine, qui s'étaient battus jusque là avec l'armée serbe ou bien s'étaient engagés dans l'armée du roi Nicolas du Monténégro. Ces deux armées ayant été vaincues en 1915, 1700 hommes seront incorporés pendant six mois dans l'Armée Française d'Orient. ⁴² Très vite des cas d'indiscipline ou d'insubordination apparurent, conduisant à la dissolution du bataillon par Sarrail en 1916. ⁴³

2. Découvertes réciproques

2.1. Fraternité d'armes et reconnaissance des Serbes

Au début du front de Salonique, soldats serbes et français se jaugeaient car la vision de l'autre était difficile : les Etats-majors n'avaient pas préparé leurs soldats à une cohabitation et aucune explication des cultures autochtones n'avait été faite auprès des poilus d'Orient. Radenko Ivić, arrivant à Salonique en avril 1916, expliquait ainsi sa peur des Français. « Nous avons été mis en garde à vue et le bateau qui nous accueillait était empli d'hommes en armes qui nous défiguraient ; le bateau était inondé de lumière venant de grands projecteurs ». Mihajlo Milojević se souvient aussi quel accueil il a reçu à Bizerte au printemps 1916 : « Les Français nous attendaient sur

⁴⁰ SHAT, 16 N 3060, GQG Armées de l'Est, 3^o bureau (1917-18), dossier 1, note n^o 7, 6 septembre 1917.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Lieutenant Michaël Bourlet, « Les Slaves du Sud dans l'armée française pendant la Première Guerre mondiale », *Revue historique des armées* n^o 226 (La France et les Balkans, 2002), 59-70.

⁴³ SHAT, 6 N 236, note n^o 225 de la 113^o brigade, 30 novembre 1916.

des chevaux, le revolver au ceinturon, la carabine au flanc et le sabre à la main ». ⁴⁴

Or les Français expliquaient leur attitude suspicieuse, voire craintive : « Nous avons entendu parler de vous [les Serbes] comme de sauvages qui veulent fuir. Mais quand vous avez montré que personne n'essayait de fuir, notre peur a disparu. » ⁴⁵ Cette incrédulité et cette peur du côté français provenaient d'une méconnaissance totale des peuples balkaniques par le poilu d'Orient à son arrivée en Macédoine. Le lieutenant Maurice Tetenor, dans son journal de guerre, expliquait bien le long temps d'acclimatation pour ces soldats brutalement jetés dans une guerre qui se déroulait loin de leur patrie. Arrivé le 26 septembre 1915 sur le front de Salonique et placé dans le secteur de Kereves, Tetenor reconnût d'abord avoir peu de contacts avec la population locale. Ainsi le 8 octobre 1915 : « Nous partons au camp installé à 4 km. La pluie tombe à torrents, nous traversons la ville arme sur l'épaule. La population nous regarde ; les soldats et les officiers grecs nous dévisagent. » Le lieutenant savait que l'armée française allait devoir se battre aux côtés de l'armée serbe, mais il ne la connaissait pas encore. Ainsi toujours le 8 octobre, Tetenor écrivait : « La 176^e était partie à 11 heures pour embarquer à destination de la Serbie. Arrivés à la gare, contre-ordre ; il ne peut partir pour raison diplomatique. Le train venu de Serbie repart vide... Quelle est notre situation ici ? » Sa mission était donc peu claire : aider des Serbes qu'il n'avait pas encore vus. Or même lorsqu'il dut les accueillir, Tetenor avait peur de ne pas les reconnaître. Le 19 octobre, parti avec un peloton occuper le village de Gradec incendié par les Bulgares, le lieutenant dira : « Devant nous des Serbes qui paraît-il vont se replier cette nuit. Comment les reconnaitrons-nous ? » Malheureusement, le lieutenant Tetenor mourait trois jours après dans une embuscade, sans avoir connu les soldats serbes. ⁴⁶

Mais la proximité des garnisons – les Serbes furent placés au centre du dispositif de l'Armée d'Orient – et surtout la fraternité d'armes à partir de la percée du Kaïmaktchalan [*Kajmakčalan*] en septembre 1916 allaient vite aider à se connaître et s'apprécier. Un rapport établi par l'officier de liaison à Corfou en mars 1917 semble indiquer que les soldats français s'entendaient bien avec ceux des autres nationalités. Notamment, les liens

⁴⁴ Témoignage de Mihajlo Milojević, in Paunić, Djordjević, *Tri sile*, 78-82.

⁴⁵ SHAT, 16 N 3060, GQG Armées de l'Est, 3^e bureau (1917-18), dossier 1, note n^o 6, 5 septembre 1917.

⁴⁶ Recueil de lettres du lieutenant Maurice Tetenor, de la 176^e DIC, publié par le « Courrier du Président » n^o 4 de l'« Association des Poilus d'Orient et Anciens combattants », Paris, septembre 2001.

entretenus avec les Serbes étaient « très cordiaux et suivis ». ⁴⁷ Un an plus tard, l'officier de liaison Strauss auprès de l'armée serbe, confirmait le sentiment d'un fort rapprochement des poilus d'Orient avec leurs homologues serbes. Il dit ainsi : « Parfaitement accueillis en France et à Bizerte, lors des séjours de convalescence qu'ils y ont fait, les soldats serbes ont pour la France un sentiment marqué de reconnaissance. » ⁴⁸ Ce sentiment des officiers de liaison français est corroboré par les remarques et écrits d'après-guerre des intéressés, les soldats serbes. Ranko Aleksandrović raconte son voyage de Valona à Corfou : « Les Français nous ont accueillis comme des frères ; ce sont des mères pour nous, je ne sais comment décrire combien ils nous ont sauvé à Corfou. » ⁴⁹ Radojica Petrović accomplit un parcours impressionnant pour rejoindre le front. Il est parti de Londres, puis a embarqué à Toulon pour Bizerte en juin 1917 avant de se retrouver sur le front de Salonique à l'été 1917. Le plus important pour lui était que les Français aient montré tout de suite un fort sentiment de solidarité : « Je remercie les Français de nous avoir fourni des bouées pour le sauvetage à Bizerte, avant même de nous donner des vêtements. » ⁵⁰ Mais c'est Danilo Kuzmić qui le mieux parviendra à décrire le sentiment d'amitié qui naquit à Salonique entre Serbes et Français. À son arrivée à Salonique, il nota que « les Français étaient joyeux de nous voir et nous joyeux d'être revenus ». ⁵¹

Soutien des intellectuels à la cause serbe

En fait, les slavisants de renom multiplièrent les conférences et ainsi faire connaître les peuples balkaniques. L'historien Ernest Denis publia son livre célèbre sur la Serbie en 1915 et Victor Bérard en 1916. Eux-mêmes peu au fait des particularités balkaniques au début de leur carrière, ces deux historiens réagirent à l'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzégovine par les Autrichiens en 1908 et commencèrent à partir de cette année une réflexion sur le rôle de la Serbie. Et puis les journalistes spécialisés allaient mieux faire connaître les réalités serbes. Henri Barby, correspondant de guerre au *Journal*, écrivit en 1915 une série d'articles sur les batailles menées à Kumanovo et à Bregalnitza pendant les guerres balkaniques. Charles Diehl, dans son ouvrage de

⁴⁷ SHAT, 17 N 725, dossier n°2, doc. n° 1103.

⁴⁸ SHAT, 16 N 3060, GQG Armées de l'Est, 3° bureau (1917-18), dossier n°2, pièce n°49, 24 février 1918.

⁴⁹ Témoignage de Ranko Aleksandrović, in Paunić, Djordjević, *Tri sile*, 32-35.

⁵⁰ Témoignage de Radojica Petrović, *ibid.*, 45-48.

⁵¹ Témoignage de Danilo Kuzmić, *ibid.*, 64-67.

vulgarisation « L'Héroïque Serbie » qui parut en février 1915, relatait les victoires serbes à Tser et Kolubara.⁵²

Auguste Albert était mitrailleur sur le front de Salonique. Il reviendra en Yougoslavie après la guerre où il se maria ; il s'installa ensuite à Skoplje où il créa une usine d'huile avec son beau-père. Auguste Albert était étonné par l'amour du Serbe pour sa terre. Lorsqu'il se battait contre les Bulgares, le Serbe criait : « C'est ma terre, ne l'oublie pas. » Puis Auguste Albert ajoutait : « Dans l'offensive attendue depuis longtemps [la percée du front] j'ai été frappé par des choses étonnantes. J'ai remarqué comment le soldat serbe s'agenouille sur son sol natal et l'embrasse. Ses yeux sont pleins de larmes et je l'entends dire : ' ma terre '. »⁵³ Il faut savoir que les Bulgares avaient occupé de 1915 à 1918 tout le sud-est de la Serbie : leurs revendications portaient sur la Macédoine serbe et les districts de Pirot, Leskovac et Vranje.

Les conférences en Sorbonne par de grands slavistes devenaient plus fréquentes en 1916. Emile Haumant et Victor Bérard, qui avaient créé le « Comité franco-serbe », y développaient leurs idées généreuses sur la Serbie. En Sorbonne se tinrent aussi des manifestations réunissant universitaires, hommes de lettres et responsables politiques. L'historien Ernest Denis prononcera, rien qu'en 1916, pas moins de trois conférences sur les Serbes et la Yougoslavie :⁵⁴ le 27 janvier 1916, le président de la République, Raymond Poincaré, y assista. Le 8 février 1917, l'« Effort serbe » fut organisé par le comité l'« Effort de la France et ses alliés » : cette initiative permit d'envoyer plus de 67 000 vêtements aux sinistrés en 1916. Enfin le gouvernement organisa, le 25 mars 1915 et le 28 juin 1916, des « Journées franco-serbes » dans toutes les écoles pour faire connaître notre allié lointain.⁵⁵

Dans le prolongement de cette action, un élan de solidarité se manifestait en faveur des enfants touchés par la guerre. Plus de 1900 enfants serbes avaient ainsi trouvé refuge pendant la guerre en France. La retraite d'Albanie et l'occupation de la Serbie fin 1915 avaient beaucoup ému la population et ce furent des associations, comme celle des « Orphelins de guerre », qui les premières accueillirent ces enfants démunis. On les retrouva ensuite au lycée de Bastia, à Saint-Etienne comme à Viriville, donc dans

⁵² Mihailo Pavlović, *Témoignages français sur les Serbes et la Serbie 1912-1918* (Belgrade : Narodna knjiga, 1988).

⁵³ Témoignage d'Auguste Albert, in Antonije Djurić, *Ovako je bilo : Solunci govore* [C'était comme ça à Salonique – témoignages d'Anciens combattants] (Belgrade, 1986).

⁵⁴ Ernest Denis, « La Serbie héroïque », *Foi et vie*, Cahier B, 16 janvier 1916. Voir aussi son ouvrage majeur sur la question serbe, *La Grande Serbie* (Paris, 1915).

⁵⁵ Grégoire Jakšić, *Livre sur la France* (Belgrade, 1940). Consulter aussi aux Archives de Serbie (Belgrade), les pièces de l'Exposition « Français et Yougoslaves 1838-1988 » organisée à Belgrade en 1988.

toutes les régions de France. La solidarité nationale fonctionna à plein régime pour aider ces civils serbes : 1,5 millions de francs d'aide furent votés à l'été 1916 au Parlement et des fonds « serbes » allaient même être créés dans quelques villes. Enfin, plus de mille étudiants vinrent se former dans les universités françaises ; dans les années vingt, cinquante viendront chaque année.⁵⁶

1918–20 : Libération de la Serbie et action politique de la France

1. *La percée du front de Salonique en septembre 1918*

1.1. *La victoire décisive : accord parfait franco-serbe*

En septembre 1918, les colonnes du Général Tranié et du Maréchal Franchet d'Esperey perçaient le front de Salonique dans le massif de la Moglena et, en l'espace de trois semaines, libéraient la Macédoine et la Serbie centrale. Le général allemand Mackensen déclarait lors de cet événement : « Nous avons perdu la guerre à Salonique. »

Ces opérations militaires menées ensemble finirent de souder les liens entre Serbes et poilus d'Orient et de nouer une amitié indéfectible. Paul Roi, élève-officier dans l'artillerie, évoquait l'habitude des combats qui avait fini de rapprocher les deux armées. « La joie des Français et des Serbes dès le moment où les canons tonnent. Ces canons ont comme redonné espoir aux soldats serbes dans la pensée du retour proche dans leur patrie. Nous, Français, avons une patrie. Tous les soldats français étaient conscients de cette situation ; de là leur volonté de se battre épaule contre épaule pour la liberté de la terre serbe. »⁵⁷ Georges Schweitzer, officier artillier à Monastir [Bitolj] en 1916 puis à la Moglena en septembre 1918, racontait l'abnégation des soldats serbes pendant la bataille. Blessé et perdu dans une tranchée dans le massif de la Moglena, Schweitzer fut sauvé d'une mort assurée par plusieurs Serbes venu le soigner dans la tranchée. « D'un coup, j'ai compris que j'étais entouré d'amis, de gens fantastiques, des soldats serbes qui sont maintenant là, à côté de moi. » Les Bulgares continuèrent à s'approcher en lançant des grenades, mais sa peur avait disparu. « Mes blessures sont soignées, le sang ne coule plus mais ce qui est le plus important : je ne suis plus seul. C'est maintenant la lutte pour moi : quand un soldat serbe se relève et lance une bombe, il le fait pour moi, il défend ma vie ! »⁵⁸ Georges Schweitzer, dans une hallucination extatique, éprouvait toute sa reconnaissance à l'esprit de

⁵⁶ Maurice Torau-Bayle, « Réorganisation de l'armée serbe et trahison de la Grèce » in *Salonique, Monastir et Athènes* (Paris : Chiron, 1920).

⁵⁷ Paul Roi, in Djurić, *Ovako je bilo*.

⁵⁸ Georges Schweitzer, *ibid.*

sacrifice et de corps des soldats serbes accourus pour le sauver. A ce moment-là de la guerre, la solidité des liens entre Serbes et Français expliquait en partie la victoire obtenue par Franchet d'Esperey.

La confiance fut telle à la fin de la guerre entre soldats serbes et français qu'on décéla de véritables scènes de liesse et des fêtes mémorables dans les bivouacs de l'Armée d'Orient. Albert Chantel, officier de liaison à la Moglena en septembre 1918, racontait la joie des Serbes à la vue de troupes françaises. Un officier serbe passant à côté de lui avec son escouade au retour d'une mission de surveillance s'écria : « Ce sont des Français, des Français – *Francuzi* ! » Et les soldats serbes se mirent à danser et à chanter. « Ses soldats, heureux, riaient comme s'ils allaient à une fête. »

1.2. *Accueil chaleureux de l'Armée d'Orient en Serbie*

Lors de leur remontée à travers les vallées du Vardar et de la Morava, des scènes de liesse populaire accompagnèrent l'Armée d'Orient. Les civils serbes, qui avaient appris les hauts faits militaires de cette armée, furent reconnaissants de leur avoir rendu leur famille et libéré leurs territoires.

Le général Tranié, qui libéra Skopje en Macédoine puis Djakovica et Mitrovica au Kosovo-Métochie, nous a laissé des témoignages saisissants de l'amour d'un peuple pour son libérateur. A Kuršumlija, sur la route qui menait de Mitrovica à Niš, « les gens sont habillés pauvrement, les enfants presque nus, mais la population nous offre ce qu'elle a, les maisons sont largement ouvertes aux Français ». ⁵⁹ Partout sur la route menant à Niš, des scènes d'accolade, des offrandes de pain, de vin et de fromage, toujours données de bon cœur par un peuple pourtant touché par la disette. Arrivés à Niš, la seconde ville serbe, les soldats de l'Armée d'Orient furent accueillis avec tous les honneurs : les plus vieux ne laissaient pas le général Tranié remonter à cheval et l'embrassaient comme s'il était leur fils. Puis en remontant la vallée de la Morava, des actes symboliques très forts, qui allaient sceller l'amitié franco-serbe, émaillaient le chemin. A Aleksinac, le général Tranié fut enthousiasmé par l'accueil qui lui fut réservé : « De jeunes filles chantent la Marseillaise et m'entraînent dans la ronde dansée par tout le village. » ⁶⁰ Plus loin, à Ćuprija, le maire de la ville fit un discours en français et les soldats serbes offrirent en guise de cadeau à l'Armée d'Orient des foulards ; à Svilajnac, des demoiselles offrirent au général Tranié un drapeau brodé de lettres d'or par leurs mères où il fut écrit en lettres cyrilliques : « Aux libérateurs de la Serbie, les demoiselles de Resava ! » ⁶¹

⁵⁹ Général Tranié, in Antonije Djurić, *Solunci govore* [Les soldats de Salonique parlent] (Belgrade, 1978), 58.

⁶⁰ Général Tranié, *ibid.*, 64.

⁶¹ Général Tranié, *ibid.*, 65.

2. *Implantation française 1919–1920*

2.1. *Projet d'implantation durable en Macédoine*

Le dépouillement de la « *Revue Franco-Macédonienne* », journal des officiers de l'Armée d'Orient qui a publié plus de 15 numéros mensuels entre septembre 1916 et fin 1917, nous permet d'attester la volonté de certains milieux française de s'établir durablement dans la région une fois la guerre terminée. Par exemple, autour de Korytza (Korçë) en Albanie actuelle a été établie pendant plusieurs mois une République avec écoles, routes et droit français. En mars 1917, un article souligna ainsi l'importance de l'influence culturelle pour les responsables français. Domaine placé au-dessus de l'économie, dans lequel la France était considérée plus forte que les autres, la culture représentait « un produit (sic) où la concurrence nous sera la moins dangereuse »⁶². C'est dans cet état d'esprit que fut construite par l'armée française l'école de Lembet en Macédoine. Accueillant 220 élèves, tous civils, sur une population de 4500 âmes, l'école française de Lembet dispensait des cours d'histoire et de géographie en langue grecque, mais les mathématiques et les « leçons de choses » se faisaient dans la langue de Voltaire. L'auteur de l'article écrit en mai 1917 dans la « *Revue Franco-Macédonienne* » émettait l'espoir que cette école « restera après la guerre comme un modèle de la culture française en Macédoine ».⁶³ Cette action se poursuivit après l'armistice : dans un compte-rendu envoyé au Quartier général le 10 février 1919, l'officier de liaison déclara qu'il « faudrait envoyer des publications de France car il n'est pas encore parvenu ni livres ni journaux français durant cette guerre ».⁶⁴ Or dès octobre 1918, le gouvernement serbe lui-même avait demandé la création d'un journal en français à Skopje.

Mais c'est surtout au niveau des infrastructures économiques que va porter à la fin de la guerre l'effort de la France. En 1917, le gouvernement français dépêcha en Macédoine hydrologues, géographes, historiens et linguistes. Dans un premier temps, ils allaient mettre en plan toute la région contrôlée par l'Armée d'Orient : la cartographie complète du pays réalisée par l'Armée d'Orient remplaça la « carte autrichienne incomplète et inexacte ».⁶⁵ Ensuite, un réseau de routes quadrilla la Macédoine : une voie Kastoria–Salonique comprenant de nombreux ponts sur la Moglenitsa, et une route Florina–Veles, donc vers la Serbie, furent construites. Enfin, les ressources du sol et du sous-sol furent exploitées. L'Armée d'Orient assécha les marais autour de Kastoria et Verria pour en faire des cultures maraîchères.

⁶² « La culture française en Macédoine », *Revue Franco-Macédonienne* 8 (Mars 1917).

⁶³ « L'école française de Lembet », *Revue Franco-Macédonienne* 9 (Mai 1917).

⁶⁴ SHAT, 20 N 522, dossier n°8, note du 10 février 1919.

⁶⁵ Jacques Ancel, *Travaux et jours de l'Armée d'Orient* (Paris : Brossard, 1921), 78–79.

Des mines de charbon (Komotini) et des gisements de fer (Kavala) approvisionnèrent les industries de Salonique.⁶⁶

Mais le plus étonnant fut le projet d'installer dans la région des combattants nord-africains après la guerre. Un article de décembre 1917 de la « Revue Franco-Macédonienne » nous éclaire ainsi sur les espoirs caressés par les officiers de l'Armée d'Orient. La similitude entre l'Afrique du nord et la Macédoine était décrite dans ses aspects géographiques et sociaux, incitant le soldat à émigrer dans cette région balkanique. « Des rues étroites, pavées à l'arabe, bordées de petites maisons » donnent l'occasion à l'auteur de souligner que Macédoniens et Africains possédaient « les mêmes coutumes, les mêmes caractères et les mêmes mœurs ». D'ailleurs, la Macédoine « semble être résignée depuis des siècles à vivre sous le protectorat (sic) d'un autre pays plus grand » et les Macédoniens montraient de « petites ambitions de cultivateur et d'épicier ». L'Africain pouvait donc s'y installer sans y être dépaysé, d'autant plus que le vide que représentait « le nombre trop restreint de nos compatriotes » devait être comblé.⁶⁷

2.2 *Politique active de la France*

L'Armée d'Orient n'arrêta pas de combattre en octobre 1918 avec la capitulation de la Bulgarie. En effet, alors que le général Tranié poursuivait son avancée à l'ouest, l'autre partie des armées françaises s'installa à Constanța, avec pour mission de bloquer le nouvel ennemi, le bolchevique. Jusqu'en 1921 stationneront des soldats français dans l'embouchure du Danube, mais avec beaucoup d'atermoiements devant un ennemi souvent invisible, ce qui entraînera des formes de lassitude.

Le plus important pour notre sujet réside dans le fait que cette situation idéale sur le Danube va amener la France à jouer un grand rôle dans la construction du « Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes ». Les frontières de cet Etat créé en décembre 1918 étaient souhaitées par des géographes français, comme Ernest Denis. Des juristes français furent très vite après la guerre envoyés dans ce nouvel Etat, ce qui explique que le système politique y ressemblait fortement. En effet, dans l'Etat des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, une Assemblée nationale de 315 députés élus pour quatre ans au suffrage universel direct et à la représentation proportionnelle fut formée dès 1919. L'administration fut aussi fortement imprégnée des valeurs françaises. Enfin, un système départemental avec 33 unités dirigées par des préfets fut installé, ce qui remplaçait les anciennes régions historiques.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ « La politique française en Orient », *Revue Franco-Macédonienne* 12 (Décembre 1917).

Dans le domaine économique aussi, la politique de la France se fit sentir dès l'après-guerre. En Serbie, Lafarge exploita les mines de cuivre de Bor et le gisement de charbon de Rudnik ; en Bosnie, des entreprises françaises prenaient possession des mines de fer de Zenica et de charbon à Banjaluka ; enfin en Macédoine, le gisement de Prilep intéressa les Français. Sur les pas de l'Armée d'Orient, pour mieux desservir ces mines au départ, furent construites des routes qui allaient devenir des axes importants. Ainsi les voies Bor–Negotin et Kratovo–Vranje furent construites au début des années vingt. A la même époque, la voie ferrée Belgrade–Sarajevo était terminée par des compagnies françaises.

Conclusion

La Première Guerre mondiale a permis à la France d'approfondir son implantation dans les Balkans. Sur les plans économique, politique et culturel, le travail entamé par l'Armée Française d'Orient puis l'Armée d'Orient pendant la guerre a permis à la France de se présenter comme puissance de premier plan dans les Balkans dans les années 1920. Grâce au soutien indéfectible à ses alliés serbe, grec et roumain, la France put remplacer les Puissances centrales dans les Balkans.

Cette politique d'intérêt créera les conditions favorables pour l'émergence d'une amitié indéfectible entre les peuples serbe et français. Encore dans les années 1932, un train entier de journalistes spécialistes mais aussi de simples citoyens fit le trajet Paris–Belgrade pour témoigner de l'attache profonde qui liait ces deux peuples. A Belgrade, l'association franco-serbe érigea un monument où il était écrit « Nous aimons la France comme elle nous a aimé » et en France beaucoup de nos villes se paraient de rues en référence à des personnalités ou des lieux de Serbie. Mais l'assassinat en 1934 du roi Alexandre Karadjordjević et du Président du Conseil Louis Barthou à Marseilles, et l'arrivée du communisme en 1945 en Yougoslavie amenuiseront cette flamme. Pourtant, le Général de Gaulle évoquera toujours la Serbie au lieu de parler de la Yougoslavie et encore dans les années 1980, une troupe de théâtre serbe itinérante, remontant le trajet de la colonne de Tranié, était partout accueillie comme aux plus beaux jours de la libération de 1918.⁶⁸

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⁶⁸ Voir aussi les recueils de témoignages suivants: A. Boppe, *A la suite du gouvernement serbe* (Brossard, 1919); Fappa, *Souvenirs d'un officier de liaison* (Flammarion, 1921); Jouin-François, *Uskub, c'est loin* (Lavauzelle, 1976); R. Labry, *Avec le retrait de l'Armée serbe* (Paris, 1918); M. Sarraïl, *Mon commandement en Orient (1916–18)* (Paris, 1920).

Traian Sandu

Les relations roumano-serbes et la question du Banat durant la Première Guerre mondiale

La convergence d'intérêts entre la Serbie et la Roumanie lors de l'éclatement de la Première Guerre mondiale procédait bien entendu des revendications officielles des deux États à l'encontre de territoires de l'Empire austro-hongrois. Mais leur situation diplomatique était fort différente : la Roumanie était liée aux Centraux par le traité défensif de 1883, régulièrement renouvelé; la Serbie se trouvait clairement dans le camp de l'Entente, sous la protection politique de la Russie et sous l'influence économique de la France. Les obligations de la Roumanie envers l'Entente ne possédaient donc pas la même force que celles de sa voisine : elle était donc aussi – comme l'Italie – plus difficile et plus intéressante à courtiser en vue de la détacher de la Triplice.

Or les prétentions des deux États se rencontrèrent lorsqu'il s'agit d'attribuer la province historique du Banat, qui forme un quadrilatère de 30 000 km² entre les vallées du Mures au nord – où le Banat se trouve au contact de la Transylvanie, également convoitée par la Roumanie – de la Tisza à l'ouest et du Danube au sud, ainsi que par les monts du Banat à l'est.¹ Dans les trois « comitats » composant la région, le Krasso montagneux à l'est, la plaine du Temes – avec la ville de Timisoara (Temesvar en hongrois) et le grand complexe métallurgique de Resita – au centre et la plaine du Torontal à l'ouest, les Serbes ne possédaient la majorité sur les Roumains que dans le Torontal.²

Sur le plan stratégique, le Banat formait une sorte de coin hongrois introduit entre Serbie et Roumanie sur l'axe danubien, ce qui permettait aux

¹ Voir Jean Nouzille, *La Transylvanie, terre de contacts et de conflits*, Revue d'Europe centrale (Strasbourg, 1993), 15.

² Jovan Cvijić *et al.*, *La Question du Banat, de la Batchka et de la Baranya. Le Banat* (Paris, 1919), 13.

Centraux de menacer tous les Balkans, et notamment de peser sur la décision de la Bulgarie.

Parmi les arguments dont les propagandes des deux compétiteurs inondèrent les capitales alliées,³ il faut chercher une synthèse plus apaisée chez le géographe Emmanuel de Martonne, dont le rapport sur le Banat pour le Comité d'études du Quai d'Orsay en vue des discussions de la Conférence de la Paix fut remis le 3 février 1919.⁴ En faveur des Serbes, il relève l'ancienneté de leur peuplement et de leur civilisation, la nécessité pour eux de couvrir leur capitale – trop exposée sur le Danube – ainsi que la complémentarité entre la production agricole de la plaine banataise et celle des régions montagneuses de la Serbie pauvres en grandes plaines céréalières, ce qui n'était pas le cas pour la Roumanie. Pour les Roumains, de Martonne invoque la nécessité d'une frontière stratégique – sur le Danube et sur la Tisza – en continuité avec la Transylvanie, mais évoque aussi leurs arguments de l'antiquité du peuplement, de leur majorité démographique relative – 37% contre 24% d'Allemands, 18% de Serbes et 15% de Magyars – et de la confluence du Mures et de la Tisza – ce qui fournissait un axe commercial complet pour le drainage des produits transylvains et banatais vers la voie danubienne, ainsi que la maîtrise stratégique d'un possible axe de pénétration est-ouest. En fait, en 1914, le Banat n'était lié économiquement à aucun des deux réclamants, puisqu'il représentait surtout le grenier de Budapest.

Mais en réalité, l'évolution des chances d'attribution du Banat à l'un ou à l'autre des deux alliés dépendit étroitement de leurs avatars militaires respectifs durant le conflit ; ceux-ci fournissent la trame des relations roumano-serbes et du sort mouvant de la province dans les buts de guerre des compétiteurs et de leurs puissants protecteurs.

Au début des hostilités, les deux camps avaient pour la Roumanie un intérêt dû à sa neutralité, à ses ressources en hommes, en céréales et en pétrole; avant tout, sa position stratégique lui permettait soit de participer à l'isolement de la Serbie et surtout, depuis la fermeture des Détroits par les Ottomans le 1er novembre 1914, de la Russie – avec l'aide éventuelle de la Bulgarie, de la Turquie et de la Grèce – soit de s'intégrer au système balkanique embryonnaire de l'Entente pour ravitailler la Russie et pour couper les communications entre les Centraux et les Ottomans, avec l'aide de la

³ On peut commodément en consulter un échantillon représentatif dans trois volumes de mélanges de la bibliothèque du Ministère des Affaires étrangères intitulés : *Rôle diplomatique de la Roumanie, 1913-1919, Problèmes roumains, 1915-1919* et *Annexions roumaines, 1915-1919*.

⁴ Le passage suivant est inspiré de Jacques Bariety, « Le Comité d'études du Quai d'Orsay et les frontières de la Grande Roumanie, 1918-1919 », à paraître dans *La Revue roumaine d'études internationales* (manuscrit aimablement communiqué par l'auteur).

Serbie, de la Bulgarie et de la Grèce. L'opinion étant toutefois favorable à la neutralité – acquise après le Conseil de la Couronne du 3 août 1914 – les principaux belligérants engagèrent, en vue de l'obtenir l'alliance roumaine, une course diplomatique qui consistait en une surenchère de promesses territoriales aux dépens de l'autre camp.

C'est ainsi que le Banat de Temesvar devint l'enjeu d'une compétition entre l'allié serbe et l'allié potentiel roumain. La puissance de l'Entente la plus directement intéressée à l'entrée de la Roumanie dans le combat était la Russie, mais le client serbe avait déjà émis des prétentions sur le Banat occidental, en échange de concessions qu'il ferait à la Bulgarie en Macédoine, afin de l'attirer également du côté des Alliés.⁵ La Roumanie, qui s'était engagée dans une neutralité bienveillante envers l'Entente par un échange de lettres avec la Russie le premier octobre 1914 – par lequel la Russie lui promettait la Transylvanie – avait engagé, à partir du 3 mai 1915, donc après les échecs alliés du début de l'année, des négociations avec la Russie pour entrer en guerre.⁶ Toutefois, le premier ministre, le national-libéral Ion Bratianu, avait d'abord présenté exclusivement au ministre de France les revendications territoriales complètes, car elles comprenaient le Banat et la Bucovine – cette dernière intéressant directement la Russie⁷ – sans oublier l'accès que la Russie demandait aux Détroits, ce qui pouvait se traduire par l'annexion de toute la côte occidentale de la Mer Noire, au détriment de la Roumanie dans la Dobroudja et de la Bulgarie. La Roumanie ne faisait ainsi qu'imiter l'Italie, qui avait également engagé des négociations avec l'Entente en mars-avril 1915 sur la base de la cession de la côte dalmate que convoitait la Serbie.

Après le traité de Londres du 26 avril 1915 avec l'Italie, les Alliés espèrent l'entrée imminente de la Roumanie dans le conflit ; ainsi, malgré une note indignée de Pašić du 4 mai, Delcassé pressa le 17 mai la Russie d'accepter les revendications territoriales roumaines et le 19 mai, une note de Petrograd reconnut les droits de la Roumanie sur la Bucovine du sud et sur la totalité du Banat, y compris sa partie occidentale, le Torontal.⁸ Les Serbes n'étaient pas au bout de leurs peines avec les promesses faites à la Bulgarie le 29 mai, et qui portaient sur la Macédoine du sud ; une nouvelle protestation de Pašić n'y fit rien. Les défaites des Russes en juin les incitèrent

⁵ Jasna Koulisher-Adler, *La Croatie et la création de l'Etat yougoslave* (Genève, 1994), 117. Voir aussi la note du premier octobre 1915 du Quai d'Orsay dans les Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères (plus loin : AMAE), série A, vol. 333, folio 1-3.

⁶ Voir, entre autres, Vasile Vesa, *Les Relations politiques roumano-françaises au début du XXe siècle (1900-1916)* (Bucarest, 1986), 115.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 123.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 129.

à faire de nouvelles concessions en Bucovine, mais l'ampleur des exigences roumaines dans le Banat méridional retarda la conclusion du traité, car cette fois l'ensemble des Alliés – notamment l'Angleterre – et même le chef de l'aile ententophile des conservateurs, Take Ionescu, s'élevèrent contre de telles prétentions à l'égard d'un allié, avec lequel on risquait de voir s'ouvrir un conflit frontalier.⁹

Mais l'urgence des besoins alliés les obligea à céder aux revendications roumaines, qui reçurent satisfaction lors de la rencontre entre Delcassé et Asquith à Calais, le 6 juillet 1915 : Sazonov accepta de sacrifier les intérêts de la Serbie dans le Banat, mais l'entrée en guerre de la Roumanie fut retardée par des considérations stratégiques de coordination des mouvements des armées alliées dans la zone et d'approvisionnement en matériel.¹⁰ Lorsque tous les doutes roumains furent levés, les Alliés envoyèrent une note le 4 août 1915 au président du Conseil serbe, Nikola Pašić, comprenant les abandons territoriaux que l'on attendait de son pays au bénéfice de la Roumanie et de la Bulgarie ; la France tenta d'obtenir son assentiment en suggérant verbalement une compensation en Croatie, mais Pašić refusa le 4 septembre les exigences roumaines, en invoquant les sacrifices qu'on lui demandait en Macédoine.¹¹ De toute façon, les succès des Centraux en août avaient stoppé les négociations avec les Roumains.

Ainsi, malgré les manifestations de sympathie répétée des milieux interventionnistes roumains envers les Serbes – que le ministre de France, Camille Blondel, encourageait fortement – la Roumanie s'en tint, après septembre 1915 et face aux succès des Centraux dans la zone, au refus du transit entre ces derniers et les Ottomans : lors de l'offensive bulgare contre la Serbie d'octobre à décembre, celle-ci « a, sans succès, cherché à obtenir l'appui de la Roumanie pour le respect du traité de Bucarest [de 1913] et la défense des intérêts communs aux deux peuples »,¹² qui était une des clauses de ce traité qui mettait fin à la deuxième guerre balkanique. En fait, la Roumanie tenta de dissuader Sofia d'intervenir, mais l'Autriche-Hongrie couvrait l'offensive bulgare et après l'échec d'une entente roumano-serbo-grecque, la défaite et le repli de l'armée serbe vers Corfou laissa la Roumanie isolée sur toutes ses frontières, à l'exception de celle de l'est.¹³ L'ouverture d'un front défensif timide à Salonique au même moment eut le don de maintenir la Grèce et la Roumanie dans une neutralité bienveillante, à défaut de les encourager à intervenir aux côtés de l'Entente.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 133.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 136.

¹¹ Voir note du Quai d'Orsay citée ci-dessus.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Vesa, *Relations politiques*, 150-154.

Avec la défaite et l'occupation de la Serbie prend fin la première phase des relations roumano-serbes ; durant la période suivante, les Alliés éprouvent un besoin plus pressant encore de s'adjoindre la Roumanie.

La seconde phase se déroule en fait en l'absence du partenaire serbe, totalement remplacé dans les discussions – notamment sur la configuration territoriale de la zone après la victoire – par de Grands Alliés toujours prêts à payer l'intervention roumaine de l'attribution, entre autres, du Banat. Les discussions reprirent en janvier 1916 ; même si la France se montrait par ailleurs soucieuse d'éviter une paix séparée entre la Serbie et l'Autriche, elle avait dorénavant d'autres compensations à offrir aux Serbes – comme le sauvetage de leur armée et la reconquête de la Serbie.¹⁴ Ces discussions étaient par ailleurs facilitées par la plus grande inclination de Briand à envisager un démantèlement de l'Autriche-Hongrie au moment de Verdun pour trouver des alliés.¹⁵

Mais la Roumanie demandait aussi le renforcement du front de Salonique pour remplacer la Serbie défaillante et l'ouverture d'un front russo-roumain dans la Dobroudja pour maintenir la Bulgarie, tandis que l'armée roumaine se serait emparée de la Transylvanie et du Banat. La conjoncture du début de l'été 1916 fut meilleure pour les Alliés avec le relâchement de la pression allemande à Verdun et avec le début de l'offensive Brussilov en juin à l'est. Mais la contrepartie pour la Roumanie était la possibilité d'une paix séparée de l'Autriche-Hongrie, donc la fin des espoirs d'annexion à son détriment. La France mit tout son poids dans la pression alliée sur la Roumanie, et Bratianu accepta d'intervenir, aux conditions évoquées.¹⁶ Les réticences russes à satisfaire les revendications roumaines après les succès de Brussilov, à laisser s'installer les arrières logistiques roumains en Bessarabie, à permettre à la Roumanie de ne déclarer la guerre que contre l'Autriche-Hongrie et à participer sur un pied d'égalité à la future conférence de la paix furent balayées par la pression française, qui détermina les Russes à accepter, le premier août 1916, l'entrée en ligne immédiate de la Roumanie; par la même occasion, Bratianu profitait de la sollicitude de la France pour lui faire jouer le rôle d'arbitre vis-à-vis des éventuelles tensions futures entre la Roumanie et son puissant protecteur oriental.¹⁷ La conclusion du traité politique et de son pendant militaire le 17 août 1916 à Bucarest concrétisa les promesses

¹⁴ Note de Briand du 22 décembre 1915, citée et commentée par Henri-Georges Soutou dans « Relations internationales, tentatives de paix et buts de guerre en 1916 », in Centre de Recherche de l'Historial de la Grande Guerre, *La Bataille de la Somme dans la Grande Guerre*, Actes du Colloque des 1^{er}, 2, 3, 4 juillet 1996, Péronne [2000].

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Vesa, *Relations politiques*, 190-195.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 195-214.

territoriales alliées, en échange d'une offensive roumaine en Transylvanie – à charge pour les Alliés d'immobiliser les Bulgares ; concernant le Banat, et afin de donner des garanties stratégiques et humanitaires aux Serbes, les dispositions suivantes étaient prévues à l'article quatre :

La Roumanie s'engage à ne pas élever de fortifications en face de Belgrade dans une zone à déterminer ultérieurement, et à ne tenir dans cette zone que des forces nécessaires au service de la police. Le Gouvernement royal roumain s'engage à indemniser les Serbes de la région du Banat qui, abandonnant leurs propriétés, voudraient émigrer dans l'espace de deux ans à partir de la conclusion de la paix.¹⁸

Mais ce traité ne fut jamais appliqué, puisque la Roumanie fut rapidement battue ; jusqu'à sa paix séparée avec les Centraux en mai 1918, le traité d'août 1916 sembla valoir ; en réalité, Serbes et Roumains s'efforcèrent de faire valoir leur point de vue, les premiers en intégrant leur armée de Corfou à l'Armée alliée d'Orient, les autres en accueillant la mission militaire du général Berthelot, destinée à réorganiser leur armée avant les opérations sur les cols des Carpathes de l'été 1917. La révolution russe d'octobre 1917 fut un coup dur pour Pašić, qui perdit son principal protecteur, mais aussi pour Bratianu qui, ne pouvant plus tenir le front des Carpates, signa l'armistice en décembre et démissionna.

Le troisième épisode des relations roumano-serbes et du développement de la question banataise prend place en France, après la rapide défaite de la Roumanie devant les Centraux et leurs alliés balkaniques. Les acteurs n'en sont plus, du côté roumain, les représentants officiels du gouvernement, obligés, après une tentative de résistance sous l'égide de la mission française du général Berthelot, de traiter avec l'ennemi à partir de décembre 1917 et de l'écroulement du front russe. L'homme fort de l'émigration roumaine est Take Ionescu, qui parvient à supplanter auprès des Alliés Bratianu, obligé de s'éclipser en Roumanie devant un personnel plus susceptible de traiter avec les Centraux, mais ayant refusé l'exil du pouvoir roumain, malgré la dureté du traité imposé par l'occupant en mai 1918.

Les projets de Take Ionescu se situent essentiellement à deux niveaux.¹⁹ Oeuvrant pour la réhabilitation de son pays auprès des dirigeants de l'Entente afin de regagner le statut d'allié perdu par la paix séparée, il fonde à Paris, en août, le Conseil national de l'unité roumaine. Sur le plan

¹⁸ Annexe A au « Mémoire présenté par la délégation roumaine : La Roumanie devant le Congrès de la Paix », AMAE, Recueil des Actes de la Conférence de la Paix, IV, C, 4, p. 436-437.

¹⁹ Une synthèse commode est l'ouvrage succinct – mais partiel – de Vasile Netea, *Take Ionescu* (Bucarest, 1971), 48-81 pour la période de la guerre.

international, il décide de s'entendre avec les autres exilés centre-européens afin de présenter un front uni lors de la conférence de paix à venir et de donner ainsi plus de poids à leurs revendications territoriales respectives – en évitant notamment de se diviser sur des questions litigieuses – ainsi que de créer une entente centre-européenne des vainqueurs qui prendrait le relais des empires multinationaux dont les Alliés commençaient à prévoir la dissolution à partir du printemps 1918. Le contexte était en effet favorable: après la polémique entre Clemenceau et Czernin d'avril, les espoirs d'une paix séparée autrichienne s'étaient effondrés, alors que le congrès des « nationalités opprimées » d'Autriche-Hongrie se tenait au même moment à Rome ; le 3 juin, les Alliés produisirent une déclaration favorable aux Polonais, aux Tchécoslovaques et aux Yougoslaves. Take Ionescu se mit donc en rapport avec les autres dirigeants centre-européens, et notamment serbes, afin de régler leurs contentieux éventuels :

dès l'automne de 1918, des pourparlers ont commencé entre Mm. Benès, Venizelos, Pachitch [Pašić] et moi, à Paris et à Londres. [...] En effet, il n'y a pas de voisinage sans friction. [...] Il existait jusqu'à tout dernièrement un cas unique : les Serbes et les Roumains. On sait comment dans les dernières années ce cas unique avait cessé. [...] Pour le moment, nous n'avions formulé qu'un désir : devant la future conférence de la paix, nous irions unis avec tous nos différends tranchés entre nous ou par des arbitrages choisis par nous, mais nous montrerions aux Puissances qui allaient décider de notre sort que nous étions assez mûrs pour ne pas avoir besoin d'elles quand il s'agissait de régler nos questions à nous.²⁰

C'est dans cette double perspective, à moyen terme – la conférence de la paix, et à plus long terme – l'organisation de l'Europe centrale après la guerre, qu'il faut replacer la tentative de Ionescu et de Pašić de régler le contentieux banatais. La conception d'une intégration balkanique n'était d'ailleurs pas non plus étrangère au dirigeant serbe, aux côtés du projet de Grande Serbie ou du programme yougoslave de regroupement des Slaves du sud.²¹ Enfin, la Roumanie se montrait d'autant plus encline à transiger qu'elle se trouvait, par sa paix séparée, en état d'infériorité diplomatique à l'égard de la Serbie.

Les rencontres les plus importantes pour la question du Banat eurent lieu à Paris, en présence du Grec Venizelos comme médiateur et

²⁰ Note de Take Ionescu sur « la Petite Entente » du 8 octobre 1921, Bibliothèque Nationale Roumaine, fond Saint-Georges, paquet XLII, dossier 3 (Take Ionescu, politique extérieure, 1920-1922), 22-25.

²¹ Voir Koulišcher-Adler, *Croatie et l'Etat yougoslave*, 112.

du Britannique Balfour comme témoin.²² Après de longues discussions, ils s'entendirent pour attribuer à la Roumanie la plus grande partie du Banat, y compris la rive sud du Mures jusqu'à sa confluence avec la Tisza, ainsi que l'importante voie nord-sud de Timisoara à Bazias, sur le Danube ; par contre, la préoccupation stratégique des Serbes fut également respectée, puisqu'ils obtinrent la rive gauche du Danube face à Belgrade, soit le Torontal.²³

Le seul problème, de taille il est vrai, était de savoir quelle était la légitimité de cet accord, dans la mesure où Ionescu représentait une institution certes reconnue par les Alliés en octobre, mais ignorée par le gouvernement roumain, y compris lorsque les ententistes pro-Bratianu revinrent au pouvoir à partir du 6 novembre 1918 et remirent en cause l'autorité, ainsi que l'action, de Take Ionescu. De façon à la fois significative et symbolique, le premier décembre 1918 vit à la fois la proclamation du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes – avec des prétentions sur le Torontal – et l'union de la Transylvanie et du Banat à la Roumanie lors de la réunion d'Alba-Iulia. La question du Banat fut donc rouverte durant la Conférence de Paris, d'autant que l'avance des troupes alliées lors de l'offensive de l'Armée d'Orient mit l'Armée serbe en possession d'une grande partie du Banat où s'installa aussi, il est vrai, un commandement français, qui pouvait faire pression en vue d'un règlement amiable entre les deux petits alliés – si tant fût que la Roumanie pût retrouver son statut d'allié.

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²² Ivo Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference. A Study in Frontiermaking* (Yale, 1963), 99-100; voir aussi les mémoires de Ion G. Duca (un libéral proche de Bratianu), vol. 4 : *Razboiu* [La guerre], Deuxième partie (1917-1919) (Bucarest, 1994), 219-222.

²³ Lederer, 99-100.

Saša Mišić

Serbo-Albanian Bank in Albania

1925–1927

The idea of setting up a bank with Yugoslav capital in Albania, which, being on the ground, would serve as a channel for economic and every other penetration into Albania, may be traced back to the aftermath of the First World War. The bank was an aspect of the Yugoslav (Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) government's policy on Albania aimed at establishing the closest possible "commercial, credit and transport relations with the neighbouring state of Albania, its northern part in particular".¹ Yet another motive was the Yugoslav government's aspiration to counteract Italy's growing economic influence in Albania.² Moreover, the undertaking should be analyzed also in light of the fact that in the first few years after the First World War there were no banks at all in Albania. Namely, before the war, there operated the Turkish *Ottoman Bank*, which opened its branch office in Scutari (Shkodër) in 1911.³ When Albania became independent in 1913, some banks from Austria-Hungary and Italy also showed interest. Groups of Austrian and Italian banks, led by *Wiener Bankverein* and *Banca Commerciale Italiana* respectively, tried to establish an Albanian National Bank, but with no success.⁴ During the war, only *Wiener Bankverein* operated in

¹ Miladin Milošević and Ljubodrag Dimić, "Međudržavni ugovori između Jugoslavije i Albanije 1919–1939" [Interstate agreements between Yugoslavia and Albania 1919–1939] in *Stanovištvo slovenskog porekla u Albaniji* [Population of Slavic Origin in Albania] (Cetinje, 1990); internet edition only consulted: <http://www.rastko.org.yu/rastko-al/zbornik1990/milosevic-ljdimic-ugovori.php>

² For the role of Italy in the financial life of Albania between the two world wars, see Alessandro Roselli, *Italy and Albania: Financial Relations in the Fascist Period* (London, 2006).

³ The Ottoman Bank's branch office in Scutari was closed in 1914; cf. The Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre at: www.obarsiv.com/english/history.html.

⁴ A. Mitrović, *Strane banke u Srbiji 1878–1914* [Foreign Banks in Serbia 1878–1914] (Belgrade, 2004), 57.

the territory of Albania.⁵ As its operation was terminated at the end of the war, the need arose to fill up the gap and establish a bank that would have a prevailing influence on the overall economic life in Albania.

It is in that context as well that the founding of the Cetinje-based *Serbo-Albanian Bank* (*Srpsko-arbanaška banka*) should be looked at. After having some difficulties with the shareholding *Yugoslav Mercantile Bank* (*Jugoslovenska merkantilna banka*), founded in Belgrade in 1919, sometime in late March 1922 two Zuber brothers, Lale and Nikola, set about to establish a new Cetinje-based shareholding company under the changed name *Serbo-Albanian Bank*.⁶ Among the reasons for this change of the Bank's name and seat was, as stated, the desire to develop "closer" relations with neighbouring Albania and therefore to suppress "foreign influence" in that country.⁷

The Bank was set up immediately after Yugoslav-Albanian diplomatic relations had finally been established in March 1922. The Founders' Assembly was held as early as April the same year, and the Bank was court-registered at Cetinje on 20 June 1922.⁸ It commenced its operation in September, following the Constituent Assembly of Shareholders. The initial capital of 10 million dinars was divided into 10 thousand shares, with 75% of the capital payable immediately. The largest portion was in the hands of the Zuber family of Cetinje. One of the main goals of the *Serbo-Albanian Bank* in its first year of operation was to open a branch office in Scutari, with the view to developing stronger economic relations with the neighbouring country and improving mutual trade, marked by a slowdown in the first years after the war.⁹ For the sake of achieving optimum results, the Yugoslav

⁵ Ž. Avramovski, "Italijanska ekonomska penetracija u Albaniji 1925-1939. godine" [Italian economic penetration of Albania 1925-1939] in *Istorija XX veka* (Belgrade, 1963), vol. V, 150.

⁶ Arhiv Srbije i Crne Gore, Ministarstvo trgovine i industrije Kraljevine Jugoslavije [Archive of Serbia and Montenegro, Ministry of Trade and Industry of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, hereafter: ASCG, 65], F. 1277, no 2261.

⁷ Državni arhiv Crne Gore, Fond Srpsko-albanska banka [State Archive of Montenegro, Fund of the Serbo-Albanian Bank, hereafter: DACG, SAB]. The records of this fund are unfiled. F. 6, copy of the Bank's letter to the National Bank of the Kingdom of SCS, 16 September 1923.

⁸ *Ibid.* F. 10, copy of the Bank's letter to the Adriatic-Danube Bank [*Jadransko-podunavska banka*] in Dubrovnik, July 1925.

⁹ ASCG, 65-1277-2261, report of the Managing Board of the Serbo-Albanian Bank for 1922.

government met the needs of the Bank and granted it the status of a royal privileged trading agency, with seats at Scutari and Durrës.¹⁰

However, between the end of 1922 and the end of 1924 the Bank did not operate in Albania. It did rent premises in Scutari, but it neither opened its counters nor its doors as it had to wait for the necessary licenses from the Albanian authorities.¹¹ Meanwhile, the Bank effected all payments for the account of the *Serbo-Albanian Bank* in Albania and all payments with that country through a certain Pashko Gurashi, an Albanian who ran an exchange office at Scutari and functioned as an “agent” of the Yugoslav bank.¹²

The Bank issue further worsened with the outbreak of the June Revolution in Albania in 1924. The government was ousted, its speaker Ahmed Bey Zogu¹³ fled the country and later sought refuge in Yugoslavia, and the Orthodox bishop Fan Noli became head of Albania. During Fan Noli's six-month rule, the Yugoslav government broke up diplomatic relations with Albania. They were re-established only after Zogu's Yugoslav-assisted return to power in December the same year. Good relations between the two countries established in early 1925 gave a fresh impetus to the activities focused on the *Serbo-Albanian Bank's* operation in Albania, an issue which undoubtedly had been negotiated between Yugoslav officials and Zogu during his stay in Belgrade in 1924.¹⁴ In parallel with the border demarcation

¹⁰ DACG, SAB (records unfiled), F. 3, letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of SCS, Pov. 3355, 21 December 1922. It was emphasized that the agency was not to receive state subsidy, cf. Milošević & Dimić, “Međudržavni ugovori”.

¹¹ DACG, SAB (records unfiled), F. 10. The Bank's balance sheet for 1924 contains an item relating to the rent of offices and another relating to the obtainment of a license in Tirana amounting to 100 thousand dinars.

¹² *Ibid.* Bishop of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Scutari Viktor Mihailović was financed through Gurashi.

¹³ Ahmed Bey Zogu was the most influential Albanian politician in the first decade after the First World War. In 1928 he became king under the name of Zog I and ruled Albania until the beginning of the Second World War. For more detail about his life, see J. Tomes, *King Zog of Albania: Self-made Monarch of Albania* (New York, 2004); B. J. Fischer, *King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania* (New York, 1984). For his relations with the Kingdom of Serbia, see D. T. Bataković, “Ahmed-beg Zogu i Srbija” [Ahmed-Bey Zogu and Serbia], in *Srbija 1916. godine* [Serbia in 1916] (Belgrade: Historical Institute, 1987), 165–177.

¹⁴ Arhiv Vojnoistorijskog instituta [Archives of the Military Historical Institute, hereafter: AVII], reg. 17, box 61 g, Elaborat “Albanija u periodu između dva rata” [Study Albania between the two wars], 39. The study was written in 1953 by an anonymous author obviously well versed in the problem of Yugoslav–Albanian relations of that period. According to him, it was agreed with Zogu that Albania should “allow that a bank could be established with Yugoslav capital in Scutari”.

negotiations, talks about establishing a bank with Yugoslav capital in Albania commenced as early as February 1925.

The action of opening a bank with Yugoslav capital in Albania was undertaken by the *Serbo-Albanian Bank*, founded three years earlier with exactly that goal. As we have seen, the Bank was owned by the Zuber brothers of Cetinje. In the meantime, the Bank invested fully its capital of 10 million dinars. There are some grounds to assume that a half of the Bank's capital (5 million dinars) was provided by the Yugoslav government, i.e. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁵ What is certain, however, is that the Bank received the same amount as a loan from the *Privileged National Bank* of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

At the time the opening of a branch office in Scutari was in preparation, Nikola Zuber, a member of the National Radical Party from Montenegro, was the Party's candidate for Cetinje and Bar County on the parliamentary elections held in February 1925. The first candidate on the Radical list from Montenegro was Minister of Finance Milan Stojadinović, and Nikola Zuber was actively involved in his election campaign. The Zubers may have used their close relations with the minister to speed up the process of opening the branch office and ensure as favourable conditions for the Bank's operation in Albania as possible.¹⁶

The preparations for opening the branch office in Scutari were intensified in February 1925 when the Albanian authorities issued the necessary licences, which was reported to Belgrade by Ivo Vukotić, the Counsellor in Scutari.¹⁷ On 6 March everything was ready for the opening ceremony, and Lale Zuber's approval and the arrival of the delegation from Cetinje were waited for. Informed that the preparations for the start up of operations in Albania were completed, Lale Zuber, who was in Belgrade, gave his approval and, on 15 March, authorized Krsto Pejović, Bank Director, to open the branch office, stating that it was necessary to supply a full report to the Yugoslav *Privileged National Bank* and Ministry of Finance in order to obtain the necessary funds for opening the branch office. A few days later, unaware

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Šerbo Rastoder, *Političke borbe u Crnoj Gori 1918–1929* [Political Struggles in Montenegro 1918–1929] (Belgrade, 1996), 66. Milan Stojadinović was a representative of one of three Radical lists for Montenegro. Nikola Zuber was one of his closest collaborators in the election campaign led in Montenegro. Although the available archival material does not give a clear picture, it seems that the reasons for entrusting the Zubers with the task of establishing a bank in Albania may be found in their mutual connection.

¹⁷ DACG, SAB (records unfiled), F. 27, cable of Lale Zuber, Belgrade, 18 February 1925.

of the developments in Albania, Zuber demanded the “urgent” opening of the branch office. His comment “even if we don’t do anything” spoke for itself about the intention to finish the whole business as quickly as possible.¹⁸ The haste with which the last step in the process of establishing a bank in Albania was made becomes understandable if we know that it was in those days that news began to arrive from Albania about a “clash” between Great Britain and Italy over the founding of an *Albanian National Bank*.

Namely, in February 1925 Zogu negotiated both with British *Midland Bank* and with an Italian group of bankers headed by Professor Mario Alberti, Director of *Credito Italiano*. *Midland Bank* offered to establish a bank in Albania with a capital of 500,000 pounds, with Zogu receiving 100,000 pounds immediately to pay the army; the whole amount would have been guaranteed by Albanian customs duties and monopolies. In parallel, negotiations were conducted in Rome, with prominent Albanians, the Libohova brothers, acting as mediators, about establishing a bank with Italian capital. The winner was to be decided by the amount of bribe the competitors were willing to pay for this important concession.¹⁹

The Yugoslav government was actively involved in the competition for establishing the *Albanian National Bank*. Although preoccupied with internal problems associated with the February parliamentary elections, diplomacy attempted to build up its influence in Albania. On the news about the British offer, which caused huge excitement in the Yugoslav public, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Momčilo Ninčić proposed to Rome to establish jointly a bank of issue in Albania, and in late February, General Alessandro Bodrero, Italian diplomat seated in Belgrade, received an offer from Belgrade for investing Italian capital in the *Serbo-Albanian Bank*.²⁰ This is supported by an interesting document of 5 February 1925, “Memorandum on Albania”, found in the archives of the *Serbo-Albanian Bank*.²¹ The document states that the *Serbo-Albanian Bank* is owned by “a prominent Montenegrin” and proposes that, for the sake of peaceful economic penetration of both Italy and Yugoslavia in Albania, this Bank be given the role of the central

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, cable of Lala Zuber, Belgrade, 20 March 1925.

¹⁹ Fischer, *King Zog*, 89.

²⁰ General Bodrero, Italian diplomatic representative in Belgrade, to Mussolini, 2 March 1925, *Documenti diplomatici Italiani* (hereafter: DDI), ser. VII, vol. III, doc. 741. Bodrero refers to his previous cable of 24 February, which has not been included in the published collection of documents. See note 2 with document 741; P. Pastorelli, *Italia e Albania 1924–1927* (Florence, 1967), 140.

²¹ DACG, SAB (records unfiled), F. 20. Except for the date, there is nothing to indicate the maker of this document and its purpose. Analysis of the context shows that the author is likely to have been someone from the Bank’s management.

bank of Albania.²² Stating that the Bank's capital is 10 million dinars and the reserve fund one million, the Memorandum proposes an increase of the capital of the Bank to 50 millions and a distribution of the capital where Italy should invest one half, while the other half should be divided between the Yugoslav government and the owners of the *Serbo-Albanian Bank*. As far as the Bank's management is concerned, the Memorandum stipulated that the Managing Board be composed of Yugoslav, Italian and Albanian representatives – Italy and Yugoslavia having four representatives each, and Albania, one.²³ The headquarters of the Bank should be in Scutari, although “some other Albanian city” is not ruled out, while branch offices should be opened not only in Albania, but also in Yugoslavia and Italy. The Memorandum, in fact, anticipates the transformation of the *Serbo-Albanian Bank* into the *Albanian National Bank* authorized to issue banknotes, i.e. the bank of issue.

The Memorandum emphasizes yet another and very important role of the Bank. It should be the regulator of the entire financial life of Albania, meaning that no banking concessions could be approved without its knowledge.²⁴ To gain control over all financial concessions in an undeveloped country such as Albania was meant to control its entire economic life and the strategy of its development. Aware of the extreme importance of the stated proposal, the Memorandum envisages a separate agreement between Belgrade and Rome concerning this matter. The role of the Bank in the whole project was that of a “guarantor of the economic life of Albania”.²⁵

In mid March, when it became clear that Yugoslavia was going to get its bank in Albania, the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs Ninčić reaffirmed to the Italian diplomat Bodrero the need for the two countries' joint economic action in Albania,²⁶ with the founding of a bank of issue as the first step. Ninčić offered the cooperation to Italy, explaining it by Yugoslavia's inability to establish such a bank on her own and by her desire to prevent other “great powers” – first of all Great Britain – from doing business

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.* This Memorandum casts a new light on the intentions of the founders of the Bank's Scutari branch office. Contrary to the opinion that it was established as a response of the Yugoslav party to Italy's action in order “to compete” against Italian influence, as proposed by Ž. Avramovski (“Italijanska ekonomska penetracija”, 153), it seems that the Bank was meant to play a central role in the economic life, and so its establishment ran in parallel with the establishment of the *Albanian National Bank*.

²⁶ DDI, ser. VII, vol. III, doc. 764. Also quoted in Avramovski, “Italijanska ekonomska penetracija”, 151.

in Albania.²⁷ And then information leaked out that an agreement on establishing another bank in Albania had been concluded, this time as a result of the Albanian Minister of Finance Myfit Libohova's successful mission to Rome.²⁸ Indeed, already on 19 March, the Protocol on the Establishment of the *Albanian National Bank* was signed by the state of Albania and the group led by the Italian Mario Alberti, only two days after the branch office of the *Serbo-Albanian Bank* in Scutari had been opened.

The text of the Convention on the Establishment of the *Albanian National Bank* with accompanying documents was endorsed on 15 March 1925 and officially signed four days later.²⁹ The Convention stipulated the Bank's capital of 12.5 million gold francs, divided into 495 thousand common shares of 25 golden francs each, and 100 thousand founders' shares with a value of 1.25 francs per share.³⁰ It was stipulated that 49% of common shares be booked for Albanian citizens, and that the rest be distributed among the Kingdom of SCS (10%), *Basler Kommerzial Bank* (also 10%), *Banque Belge pour l'Etranger* (5%), and Italy, which, however, obtained the largest portion (26%) together with all founders' shares.³¹

The establishment of the *Albanian National Bank* came as a shock to the Yugoslav party which, as we have said, had different plans and considered the joint establishment of a bank of issue as an act of good will on the part of the Kingdom of SCS in accordance with the Yugoslav-Italian Pact of Friendship.³² Branko Lazarević, new diplomatic representative in Albania who had arrived in Tirana only a few of days before the Convention was made public, was livid and suggested that the Albanian government should request a participation of Yugoslav capital in order to ensure control over operations performed by the Italians.³³ Unlike the Yugoslav plan on parity representation between Italians and Yugoslavs in the management of the Bank, including one representative of Albania, as stipulated by the Memorandum and proposed to Bodrero by Ninčić, the Convention on the Establishment of the National Bank of Albania of 19 March 1925 stipulated that

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ The agreement was made public on 15 March 1925. ASCG, Fond Aleksandra Cincar Markovića [Fund of Aleksandar Cincar-Marković, hereinafter: 310], F. 1, Pov. no. 86, report of military representative Tanasije Dinić, Tirana, 17 March 1926.

²⁹ Avramovski, "Italijanska ekonomska penetracija", 151.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 152.

³¹ On the Albanian National Bank, see: Vidan O. Blagojević, "Albanska narodna banka" [Albanian National Bank], *Ekonomist* VI, No. 1, January 1926, 76–83.

³² DDI, ser. VII, vol. III, doc. 770; Avramovski, "Italijanska ekonomska penetracija", 151.

³³ *Ibid.*

the central management be composed of two representatives of Italy and Albania, and that the presidency and decisive vote belong to the representative of Italy.³⁴ In this new situation, the Yugoslav government hoped that, in spite of its small 10%-participation in the ownership of the capital, it would still be able to take over the Albanian share of 49%, thereby gaining control of the bank and rising above the role of a mere observer.³⁵ However, Rome was prepared for such a situation. Mussolini sent clear instructions regarding this matter to the Italian diplomatic representative. Of the 49% of shares originally intended for the Albanians, the Duce requested that 30% be offered to the Albanians residing in Italy, which meant they would fall under the sway of Italian capital. Moreover, the remaining 19% was purchased by an Italian financial group.³⁶ Thus, having purchased all shares owned by Albanian citizens, the Italian party outwitted the Yugoslavs and took over control of the Bank.

These developments, as it seems, meant that the *raison d'être* for the branch office of the *Serbo-Albanian Bank*, as stated in the abovementioned February Memorandum, ceased to exist. Although it lost the battle for the central bank, there were still hopes that it might maintain its role in Albania by ensuring that the “quota” Yugoslavia should have participated with in the capital of the *Albanian National Bank* included the Bank “with all its current assets and invested capital”.³⁷ As an alternative, “if this is not possible because other capitalists, founders of the *Albanian Bank of Issue*, disagree”, the *Serbo-Albanian Bank* proposed that “the amount our state shall participate with be registered through our Bank and that our Bank represent it in the management of the *Bank of Issue*”. Ninčić was called to protect endangered interests, reminded of the “political and economic importance” of the Bank’s penetration into Albania, and solicited to grant the request of the *Serbo-Albanian Bank*, “the first and only pioneer in Albania”.³⁸

In spite of everything, the *Serbo-Albanian Bank* continued to operate but with a significantly changed role. Soon upon its establishment, the branch office drew prominent members of the Serbian community from Scutari and several surrounding villages, representatives of the Yugoslav

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ ASCG, 310, F.1, Pov. no. 86, report of Tanasije Dinić, military representative, Tirana, 17 March 1926.

³⁶ Roselli, *Italy and Albania*, 34.

³⁷ ASCG, Ministarstvo inostranih poslova Kraljevine Jugoslavije, političko odeljenje [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Political Department, hereinafter: 334], F. 4, arch. unit 18, sheet 455, letter of the *Serbian-Albanian Bank* to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 April 1925.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

Consulate and Orthodox clergy. The Yugoslav Consulate opened its current account in the Bank, and Ivo Vukotić, the Counsellor, became a member of the Managing Board.³⁹ Representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Albania, headed by Bishop Victor Mihailović, and the clergy from the city and surrounding Serbian villages also became clients of the Bank.⁴⁰ Among its clients were some proven Albanian friends of the Kingdom of SCS, the most important being the “Tirana Bishop Visar” (Visarion Xhuvani, bishop of the Albanian Orthodox Church).⁴¹ The branch office also did business with the prominent pro-Yugoslav Albanian Ceno Bej Kryeziu, the prominent Mirdit trader Zef Ndozi (Noci?) and others. Trader Riza Bej Kopliku, an influential pro-Yugoslav Muslim from Scutari, also became a member of the Managing Board.⁴²

Upon the establishment of the branch office of the *Serbo-Albanian Bank*, a Privileged Trading Agency was opened under the same roof and firm, with “agents” in the Albanian cities of Durrës (Durazzo) and Sarandë (Santi Quaranta), and the goal to enhance trade between the Kingdom of SCS and Albania. To this effect, as of May 1925, the branch office launched a broad advertising campaign covering a number of domestic and foreign banks, all chambers of commerce, as well as companies which had already developed business relations with Albania. Yugoslav chambers of commerce and trade were consulted on the possible assortment of products to be imported into Albania, and particularly into Scutari. Given the impending trade agreement between the two countries, the chambers were also consulted on the range of products for which customs rates should be reduced, or duties completely abolished.⁴³ The branch office emphasized that its operations were focused on remaining competitive with Italian products on the Albanian market.⁴⁴ In order to increase Yugoslav imports into Albania, the Bank sought to establish business relations with firms engaged in the

³⁹ Besides Vukotić, other officers of the Consulate also had their accounts in the Bank.

⁴⁰ DACG, SAB (records unfiled), F. 18, balance sheets for 1925. There is an interesting letter (*ibid.* F. 21) of “parish priest Laza” in which he complains that he was unable to take his “advance salary” due to the lack of money. The letter is dated 12 June 1925.

⁴¹ Visarion had a current account in *napoleonadors* (Napoleon d’Or) for which the branch office received necessary written guarantees from the Consulate of the Kingdom of SCS in Scutari (*ibid.* F. 18, balance sheets for 1925).

⁴² The third member of the Managing Board was director of the branch office. Initially, that function was performed by a certain Galliani, but about the middle of 1925 he was replaced by Julije Anterić.

⁴³ DACG, SAB, F. 20, circular letter to Chambers of Crafts and Commerce in the Kingdom of SCS, 11 August 1925.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

manufacture and export of certain products. It was interested in timber, cement and foods such as sugar, flour, beer and corn. Firms that had already developed business relations with Albania were requested to entrust their agency operations to the Bank.⁴⁵ At the same time, the Bank required from Yugoslav diplomatic missions in Albania to supply statistical data on imports into and exports from Albania.⁴⁶ The response varied from outwardly to actually interested, the latter being those chambers of commerce and banks which had already developed relations with Albania. This is particularly true for Split Chamber of Commerce which, aware of the importance of a “commercial and economic action” in Albania, advised the Bank to enhance trade between the Kingdom of SCS and Albania through its actions. Underlining natural ties between Albania and Dalmatia, Split Chamber was interested in selling some particular products on the Albanian market, most of all cement.⁴⁷ The branch office of the *Serbo-Albanian Bank* in its turn gathered information about some Albanian businessmen for Yugoslav industrials.

Within months of the beginning of its operation, with the *Albanian National Bank* and the Durrës branch office of the Greek *Bank of Athens*, also opened in 1925, as competitors, the Scutari branch office of the *Serbo-Albanian Bank* faced problems. Since its scope of operation was quite limited, the branch office complained to the Cetinje headquarters about insufficient cash holdings, an amount not exceeding 500,000 dinars. In their words, this was not enough to start and develop any kind of business in Scutari.⁴⁸ After the initial speedy process, it became obvious that the branch office, losing

⁴⁵ In reply to this request, some firms asked for more detailed information, but there were also those which replied that they had already had their agents, i.e. that they did not intend to share warehouses with the Bank and put their staff under its control (letter of the cement factory Lavocat & Cia from Split of 3 September 1925 can serve as an example, *ibid.*).

⁴⁶ The reply of Brana Dimitrijević, head of the Yugoslav Mission in Valona, was negative as that kind of data was nonexistent in Albania in 1925 (*ibid.* 1 October 1925).

⁴⁷ Cement was among Yugoslav major exports to Albania. In 1914 the Chamber of Split exported cement worth one million dinars to Albania, but it was noted that this only accounted for about 0.5% of the total export to Albania, which amounted to 19 million dinars (Split Chamber to the Bank, *ibid.*).

⁴⁸ Interesting in this context is an observation of the journalist Milosav Jelić who visited Scutari in August 1925. Speaking about the look of the city, he observed: “There dominates a new firm of the Serbo-Albanian Bank. It looks good, but I would say that the business is not diversified enough. Anyway, it all depends on the size of capital.” M. Jelić, *Albanija, zapisi o ljudima i događajima* (Belgrade, 1933), 116. As an illustrative example of the weak position caused by lack of money, the branch office stated the fact that even the Yugoslav Consulate in Scutari was “forced to negotiate cheques in francs

in competition with the *Albanian National Bank*, was left without a clear strategy. As the original idea of becoming the central and only bank ended in failure, and the available amount of money could not satisfy the needs of business, the headquarters was expected to draw up guidelines on the branch office's further operations.⁴⁹

With the founding of the *Albanian National Bank*, on 2 September 1925, several banks, led by the *Beogradska zadruga* (Belgrade Credit Union), entered into the Yugoslav 10%-participation in its share capital.⁵⁰ Obviously at the request of the *Serbo-Albanian Bank*, Lale Zuber was appointed as representative of the Yugoslav party in its Managing Board.

The Bank survived in Albania, but continued to face the same problems throughout the following year. It completed the first operation period of 1926 with a minimum profit, almost entirely from exchange operations. In its report to the headquarters, it complained again about permanent lack of the cash holdings necessary for developing business operations in Albania.⁵¹ Its business interests in Albania, however, focused more and more on maintaining a steamship line on Lake Scutari and on obtaining mining concessions for copper in the region of Puka.

One of the Bank's goals, important at the moment of its founding, was to start a regular steamship line Rijeka–Vir–Plavnica–Scutari on Lake Scutari and the Bojana River. The Bank started a shipping company, *Jadransko-skadarska plovidba* (Adriatic-Scutari Shipping) and established the line, operating with state subsidies. However, not even this business ran smoothly. In March 1924, due to irregular payments of subsidies and competition with army steamships, the *Serbo-Albanian Bank* suspended the line. It was restarted only after a new agreement with the government was reached in autumn the same year.⁵² In early 1925, the problem of competition between the Bank and the Army was resolved. Namely, according to an agreement

and dollars elsewhere rather than with us". DACG, SAB (records unfiled), F. 20, Scutari branch office to the Cetinje headquarters, 24 August 1925.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ According to Roselli (*Italy and Albania*, 35), the Yugoslav party's share was 8.4%. Besides *Beogradska zadruga*, the consortium of Yugoslav banks included Zagreb-based *Srpska banka* (Serbian Bank), Belgrade-based *Jadransko-podunavska banka* (Adriatic-Danube Bank) and the Cetinje-based *Serbo-Albanian Bank*. Of the total number of 595,000 shareholders' votes, the Kingdom of SCS had 50,000. Blagojević, "Albanska narodna banka", 81–82.

⁵¹ DACG, SAB (records unfiled), F. 30, report of the Scutari branch office to the Headquarters at Cetinje about the business results for the first semester of 1926, undated. The branch office made a profit of only 35,181 dinars.

⁵² *Ibid.*

concluded with the Navy of the Kingdom of the SCS at the end of January, the *Serbo-Albanian Bank* was granted “to exploit” a certain number of military ships, while being obliged to transport troops and military supplies at reduced fares.⁵³ The Adriatic-Scutari Shipping ceased operating in 1928, when the Ministry of Transportation ordered a merger of shipping companies in Zeta District and transferred its fleet to *Boka*, a Kotor-based shipping company.⁵⁴

Once in Albania, the *Serbo-Albanian Bank* showed much interest in obtaining certain businesses, particularly concession for copper ore deposits in Puka, near Scutari in northern Albania.⁵⁵ As the ore deposits were on the Prizren–Scutari road, of a great military and strategic interest, the motives for obtaining this concession were not only economic but also political. Therefore, the Bank’s efforts were supported by the Yugoslav government.⁵⁶

In spring 1925, immediately upon the establishment of the Scutari branch office, the *Serbo-Albanian Bank*, backed by the state, set about obtaining this concession from the Albanian government. In early May, Nikola Zuber and two mining engineers, Malicki and Rusovjan, left Cetinje for Scutari in order to explore the deposits.⁵⁷ After the initial success, however, in the second half of 1925 a slowdown ensued, reflecting the strained relations between the two countries. It was only after the border was finally drawn at St. Naum and Vrmos, and negotiations resumed, that Puka resurfaced as an issue at the interstate level in the autumn of 1925. Based on Zogu’s repeated assurances to Lazarević to the effect that “we consider this matter done”, it seemed that the only thing left to be done was the ratification of the concession by the Albanian Parliament and Senate. On several occasions, Zogu assured Belgrade via the Yugoslav diplomatic representative that the issue of Puka was resolved and that the concession would be

⁵³ *Ibid.*, F. 36, copy of the contract between the commander of the Zeta Division Zone and the management of the Serbo-Albanian Bank for the transport of troops and military material on Lake Scutari. In early 1926 the Adriatic-Scutari Shipping started the steamship line Scutari–Oboti–Ulcinj–Bar.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, F. 39, report of the *Serbo-Albanian Bank* Managing Board, 24 June 1929. According to the Board, the Bank invested most of its capital into Boka Company.

⁵⁵ Copper exploration in the area of Puka had been started during the First World War, in 1916, by an Albanian, Lec Borici. ASCG, Ministarstvo inostranih poslova Kraljevine Jugoslavije, Konzularno-privredno odeljenje [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Consular-Commercial Department, hereinafter: ASCG, MIP KJ, KPO], records under filing, F. II 6, II 8, Pov. no 1139, report of the diplomatic representative Dj. Nastasijević, Tirana, 10 June 1930.

⁵⁶ Avramovski, “Italijanska ekonomska penetracija”, 168.

⁵⁷ DACG, SAB (records unfiled), F. 27, copy of cable of the *Serbo-Albanian Bank* to Lale Zuber in Belgrade, 4 May 1925.

granted to the Kingdom of SCS, but months passed and the matter remained at a standstill.⁵⁸ A part in the affair was played by the British, who acted in accordance with their interests, but also by the Italians, guided by the same aspects of the matter as Belgrade, its strategic and commercial importance. It was only after the Yugoslav party promised Ahmed Zogu 25% of the value of the concession, that the procedure was continued, and in spring 1926 the contract was ratified,⁵⁹ at first by the Albanian Parliament and, in late April, by Senate.

The *Serbo-Albanian Bank* as the holder of the concession was to set up a company for the exploitation of Puka within five months, as well as to offer 40% of the shares to Albanian citizens within two months of registration. In the event of insufficient interest, however, the concession holder was required to purchase the remaining shares. Exploration was due to begin three months from the date of the establishment of the company.⁶⁰ Under Concession Contract, the holder was to pay an annual sum of 1.5 golden francs per hectare for land lease costs. The Albanian government required certain privileges once excavation should begin, and that all employees be Albanian “except experts of whom there are none in Albania”.⁶¹

In spite all efforts to raise the start-up funds, the Zuber brothers failed. Namely, once the company Copper Mines Puka was established, sometime in mid August began the two-month period set for the registration of shares. Out of the planned capital of five million gold francs divided into 200,000 shares, at the end of the defined term 120,000 shares were registered, 79,900 of which were in the hands of the Zubers.⁶² Obviously, this was insufficient, as the Bank lost the concession it had obtained.⁶³

⁵⁸ ASCG, 334-4-18, sheet 580, Pov. no 258, cable of the diplomatic representative Lazarević to Belgrade, 17 February 1926. Lazarević was suspicious of Zogu's willingness to grant the Puka concession to Yugoslavia and explained the endlessly deferred ratification by the Albanian president's desire to arouse British and Italian interest in the concession.

⁵⁹ ASCG, 310, F.1, K. Pov. no 635, report of the military representative, Tirana, 19 February 1926.

⁶⁰ ASCG, MIP KJ, KPO (records under filing), F. II 6, II 8, Pov. no 1139, report of the representative Dj. Nastasijević, Tirana, 10 June 1930.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* The holder of the concession had to pay to the Albanian state a certain part of income, as well as to “allocate 10% of the excavated or processed ore to Albania at 10% reduction of the current price on the European market”.

⁶² DACG, SAB (records unfilled), F. 33, letter of the Scutari branch office to the *Serbo-Albanian Bank* at Cetinje, 15 October 1926.

⁶³ ASCG, MIP KJ, KPO (records under filing), F. II 6, II 8, Pov. no 1139, report of the diplomatic representative Dj. Nastasijević, Tirana, 10 June 1930. Reasons for the failure should be find also in the fact that the response of the Albanians was extremely low – in

Moreover, the Bank incurred significant financial losses.⁶⁴ The concession was returned to its original holder, Borici. In June 1927 it changed hands again as its owner became an Italian marquis, Gaetano di Suni. He succeeded in establishing a company for the exploration and exploitation of Puka, *Societa Italo-Schipetare per lo Sfruttamento di Minerio Puka*.⁶⁵ Political games surrounding the Puka copper deposits became even more evident once the mine began to work. The quality and quantity of the ore could not justify interest in the mine, with the inaccessibility of deposits requiring construction of a railway as an additional disadvantage.⁶⁶

Facing numerous problems in all fields of its operation in Albania, the Managing Board of the *Serbo-Albanian Bank* decided to close its branch office in Scutari at its meeting of 1 March 1927.⁶⁷ Undoubtedly, the decision was influenced by several reasons of economic and political nature, the most important being the Bank's business failures. Most of the blame was laid on its operations in Albania, where, according to the management's estimates, the Bank had incurred losses amounting to as much as 5,631,526.56 dinars. As a result, the Bank's capital dropped from ten to five million dinars.⁶⁸ The decision to close the branch office was influenced by the news that the *National Bank of Albania* was planning a branch office in Scutari, but also

the said period they registered only 10 shares (DACG, SAB, F. 33, letter of the Skhodra branch office to Cetinje, 15 October 1926).

⁶⁴ The Bank lost 35,000 gold francs (1750 "Napoleondor") deposited with the Albanian state as guarantee for the mine (ASCG, MIP KJ, KPO (records under filing), F. II 6, II 8, Pov. no 1139, report of the diplomatic representative Dj. Nastasijević, Tirana, 10 June 1930. In the first half of 1926, up to the moment the concession was obtained, the total debt for Puka was estimated at about 8,000 *napoleondors* (c. 1.6 million dinars at the time). DACG, SAB (records unfiled), F. 30, report of the Scutari branch office to the Cetinje headquarters on business results for the first period of operation of 1926, undated.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Avramovski, "Italijanska ekonomska penetracija", 168.

⁶⁷ DACG, SAB, (records unfiled), F. 34, copy of a letter of the *Serbo-Albanian Bank* headquarters to the Scutari branch office, 16 February 1927.

⁶⁸ ASCG, 65-1277-2261, report of Managing and Supervisory Boards of the Serbo-Albanian Bank, Cetinje, 29 December 1927. The consulted documents do not explain how such a huge loss was incurred. It may only be assumed that, except the losses generated by Puka, a portion of this amount might have had to do with the withdrawal of the alleged government share (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in the Bank. It is interesting that the Shareholders' Assembly of 12 June 1927 confirmed a loss of only 318,929.79 dinars (*ibid.*, operation and balance report of Managing Board of *Serbo-Albanian Bank* Cetinje for 1926). The text of the Pact in: Momir Stojković, *Balkanski ugovorni odnosi 1876-1996*, vol. II [Balkan Contractual Relations 1876-1996] (Belgrade, 1998).

by deteriorating Yugoslav-Albanian political relations in the wake of the Pact of Friendship and Security, known as the First Tirana Pact, which Italy and Albania signed on 26 November 1926. This deterioration culminated in the break-up of diplomatic relations in May 1927. The decision to close the branch office of the *Serbo-Albanian Bank* in Albania was carried out in the course of 1927.

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L'éphémère Eglise orthodoxe croate et son prolongement bosniaque

Parmi les étrangetés causées à partir de 1941 dans les Balkans occidentaux par le second conflit mondial et le remodelage de ce flanc méridional de l'Europe par l'Axe, et surtout l'Allemagne, il faut citer sur le plan ecclésiastique et politique, la curieuse et éphémère « Eglise orthodoxe croate ». Créée en 1942 par Ante Pavelić, le *Poglavnik* oustachi de « l'Etat indépendant de Croatie », vassal de l'Axe et premier bénéficiaire de l'invasion hitlérienne,¹ elle ne comptait qu'un seul évêque, l'ancien archevêque russe d'Ekaterinoslav, Mgr Hermogène (Malsinov) exilé en Serbie depuis la fin de la guerre civile en Russie, mais, à partir de l'été 1944, pourvu d'un suffragant nommé évêque de Sarajevo. Face au martyr qui frappait alors le peuple orthodoxe serbe massivement massacré par le régime fantoche de Zagreb, on a là un intéressant cas de collaboration ecclésiastique qui appelle quelques interrogations.

Certes, les époques tragiques de l'histoire de la chrétienté, lorsque bascule l'ordre traditionnel d'un monde ou d'un peuple, voient souvent surgir des évêques exceptionnels, guides de leur nation dans les tribulations, au cœur de la gestation d'une ère nouvelle. L'histoire serbe a ainsi vu S. Sabbas (Sv. Sava, archevêque de Serbie 1220–33) donner son âme orthodoxe au peuple serbe dont l'Etat se formait, puis S. Joannice (Joanikije) sacrer à Skoplje en 1346 l'empereur Douchan (Stefan Dušan), et enfin le patriarche Gabriel (Gavrilo Dožić) symboliser, en 1941, le refus par toute sa nation d'une humiliation honteuse. Pour les mêmes raisons, les Bulgares vénèrent la mémoire du patriarche de Trnovo S. Euthyme et les Russes celle des patriarches Philarète et S. Hermogène, gardiens de l'Orthodoxie au « Temps des Troubles », ou de S. Tykhon, à peine élu sur la cathèdre moscovite face à l'avènement du pouvoir athée.

¹ Sur la persécution des Serbes orthodoxes dans l'Etat nazi croate, voir: Dušan T. Bataković, « Le génocide dans l'Etat indépendant croate (1941–1945) », *Hérodote* 67 (Paris, 1992), 70–80.

Toutefois, le même phénomène a pu donner l'occasion à des aventuriers ou à des opportunistes ecclésiastiques, de jouer un rôle indu, qui s'est rapidement révélé nuisible à l'Eglise et à leur peuple.

Les Français ont pris l'habitude d'opposer, peut-être artificiellement, le véritable homme d'Etat qu'était le cardinal Mazarin à l'intrigant cardinal de Retz qui, en tant qu'évêque, méritait mieux que sa réputation. Les catholiques anglais célèbrent l'archevêque martyr Jean Fischer, canonisé par Paul VI, face au calvinisant Cranmer, que vénère au contraire, la Low Church.² En Russie, la multiplication des schismes après 1917 fut encouragée par le pouvoir soviétique qui utilisa tour à tour les métropolites Alexandre Vvédensky († 1946) pour créer « l'Eglise Vivante », Antonin Granovsky († 1927) pour « l'Eglise rénovée »³ et Serge Stragorodsky, parfait apparatchik synodal rallié en 1927 et créé premier patriarche soviétique en 1944 ;⁴ on se souvient encore, dans les mêmes circonstances, du passage aux Vieux-Croyants du primat des Edinovertsy,⁵ le prince – archevêque martyr André (Oukhtomsky) († 1937), et de la démarche identique, relatée par la poétesse Zénaïde Hippus,⁶ de l'archimandrite révolutionnaire Michel Kanadsky, devenu évêque vieux croyant et tué en 1916 par les ouvriers auxquels il prêchait son « christianisme du Golgotha ».

C'est sans doute dans un contexte proche et aussi brutal, celui d'un autre totalitarisme sanguinaire du XX^e siècle, que se situa en 1942-1945, l'archevêque Hermogène (Malsinov), fondateur sans troupeau d'une « Eglise orthodoxe croate » à l'intérieur de la « Grande Croatie » s'étendant de Zagreb à Sarajevo.

Peut-on expliquer son étrange et absurde collaboration avec les fascistes croates d'Ante Pavelitch ? L'anti-communisme devait les réunir puisque Mgr Hermogène avait connu la chute de l'Empire russe, l'échec du gouvernement provisoire et le triomphe des bolchéviks. La guerre civile l'avait contraint à l'exil et il s'était fixé comme d'autres prélats russes de l'émigration

² Cf. M. Davies, *La réforme liturgique anglicane* (Paris, 2002). Victor Hugo a fait de Cranmer un martyr.

³ Le métropolite Euloge (Guéorguievsky) († 1945), qui l'avait assez tôt connu, le caractérise ainsi dans ses mémoires, *Le chemin de ma vie* (Paris, 2005), 91-92 : « Il y avait dans cet homme quelque chose de fatidique, de démoniaque, de moralement maléfaisant. »

⁴ Cf. S. L. Firsov, *Le rôle du destin. S. S. le patriarche de Moscou et de toute la Russie Serge (Stragorodsky). La genèse du « sergianisme » dans la tradition ecclésiale du XX^e siècle* [en russe] (Saint-Pétersbourg, 2005).

⁵ Anciens vieux croyants ralliés à l'Eglise orthodoxe tout en conservant leurs particularismes liturgiques.

⁶ In *Journal sous la Terreur* (Paris, 2006), 110-112.

aux côtés du célèbre métropolite de Kiev Antoine (Khrapovitsky) († 1936)⁷ dans le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes (S.H.S.), où les avait accueillis à bras ouverts le nouveau roi Alexandre I^{er}. Avec son chaleureux soutien et celui, tout aussi amical et enthousiaste, de l'Eglise orthodoxe serbe, ces hiérarques pour la plupart de grande envergure théologique et spirituelle, établirent le Saint-Synode de leur Administration Ecclésiastique provisoire, devenue « l'Eglise russe hors frontières », à Sremski-Karlovci sur le Danube, au nord de Belgrade dans l'ancien palais des patriarches serbes de l'époque austro-hongroise. Malgré l'opposition croissante du métropolite Euloge cité supra et fixé à Paris, puis celle du métropolite Serge de Moscou, remplaçant du *Locum Tenens* du trône patriarcal, cette nouvelle institution ecclésiastique exerça une influence considérable sur la vaste diaspora russe établie en Europe, en Amérique et en Asie (Chine et Mandchourie). Liée étroitement aux Romanov, elle fut aussi un véritable obstacle pour la jeune Union Soviétique. En outre, par leur ascèse et leur science théologique, plusieurs membres du Synode de Karlovci, ainsi que de nombreux laïcs, moines et moniales russes qui les avaient suivis en Yougoslavie purent contribuer au renouvellement de l'Eglise serbe, affaiblie et appauvrie par le long joug ottoman ou habsbourgeois. L'archimandrite Justin Popovitch († 1979)⁸ fut sans doute à cet égard le plus brillant disciple serbe du métropolite primat Antoine ; de même, ce dernier avait envoyé enseigner au séminaire de Bitola le jeune hiéromoine Jean II Maximovitch, futur archevêque russe de Changhai, aujourd'hui canonisé et sur les reliques de qui le Patriarche Paul alla à San Francisco célébrer une parastase.⁹

Des liens russo-serbes aussi étroits auraient dû dissuader Mgr Hermogène de collaborer avec l'Etat oustachi en 1942. La serbophobie sanginaire de ses maîtres allait entièrement à l'encontre des principes du Synode auquel il appartenait et qui d'ailleurs le déposa. Les évêques russes réfugiés étaient sur le territoire canonique de l'Eglise serbe et n'avaient de juridiction que sur leurs propres fidèles russes. Ces derniers, outre les chapelles qu'ils avaient installées dans leurs écoles, lycées et hôpitaux, ne disposaient que d'une petite église à Belgrade, élevée par leurs soins derrière Saint-Marc et où repose encore leur héros, Wrangel, le dernier général de l'Armée Blanche. Le principe canonique selon lequel l'Eglise doit adopter les divisions administratives de l'Etat, quoique remontant à l'antiquité romaine, ne pouvait donc jouer. Mgr Hermogène ne pouvait jouir d'aucune juridiction

⁷ Cf. Archevêque Nikon (Rklistsky), *Biographie de S.B. Antoine, métropolite de Kiev et de Galicie* [en russe] (New York, 1954).

⁸ Cf. notre article « L'héritage spirituel de Père Justin », *Le Monde*, 23 mai 1979.

⁹ Cf. B. Le Caro, *Saint Jean de Changhaï* (Paris-Lausanne, 2006). Ouvrage remarquable, désormais de référence sur cet apôtre de la diaspora russe.

directe sur les populations orthodoxes locales, fussent-elles comprises en 1942–1945, dans les frontières exagérément étendues de « l'Etat indépendant de Croatie ». De plus, son initiative était d'autant plus malséante qu'elle usurpait le siège épiscopal de Zagreb, dont venait d'être martyrisé le titulaire légitime, assassiné par les oustachis en 1941, Mgr Dosithée (Dositej), aujourd'hui canonisé par l'Eglise orthodoxe serbe.

Cette entreprise s'acheva d'ailleurs dans le grotesque. En 1944, Mgr Hermogène, déjà âgé, voulut pourvoir à sa succession et étendre son influence en installant un autre évêque en Bosnie, sur le siège de Sarajevo. C'était d'autant plus mal venu que la situation militaire de l'Axe et de ses vassaux croates était de plus en plus compromise entre la poussée de l'Armée Rouge vers les Balkans, où elle entra en septembre à Bucarest et Sofia, et la puissance des forces du Maréchal Tito, dont l'état-major était précisément installé dans les montagnes de Bosnie.¹⁰ De plus, c'était à Sarajevo que sévissait le thuriféraire des Oustachis, l'archevêque catholique Jean Saritch, auteur d'une Ode au *Poglavnik*, et que se trouvaient les S.S. bosniaques musulmans de la division Handjar, parente de la division Skanderbeg des S.S. albanais.¹¹ Dans l'imaginaire occidental, et même français, ce n'était pas le grand évêque de Djakovo, Mgr Strossmayer († 1905), anti-ultramontain illustre,¹² qui était le symbole le plus parlant de la Bosnie, mais hélas, la vision orientaliste, nostalgique des Ottomans, illustrée par les écrits des consuls français de Travnik puis de Sarajevo, Chaumette – Desfossés sous Napoléon I^{er} et René Pelletier sous Pierre Laval en 1935.¹³

Pour ce sacre épiscopal, qui se déroula effectivement non pas d'ailleurs à Sarajevo mais à Zagreb, le 15 août 1944, Mgr Hermogène ne pouvait présenter qu'un candidat extrêmement douteux, l'aventurier ecclésiastique Spyridon Mifka.¹⁴ Il avait cependant besoin d'un co-consécrateur et celui-ci, en la personne du troisième dignitaire de l'Eglise orthodoxe roumaine, le

¹⁰ Cf. M. Djilas, *Une guerre dans la guerre* (Paris, 1985).

¹¹ Cf. L. Latruwe et G. Kostić, *La division Skanderbeg. Histoire des Waffen SS albanais* (Paris, 2003).

¹² Cf. sa correspondance avec le barnabite Cesare Tondini, et notre communication au colloque international de Belgrade, à l'Académie serbe, *Europe and the Serbs* (Belgrade, 1996), 341–350.

¹³ Etudié par Philippe Gelez lors du colloque franco-serbe de Paris des 20 et 21 octobre 2006, *L'écho des nationalismes yougoslaves dans l'œuvre de René Pelletier, consul de France à Sarajevo* (à paraître dans la revue *Etudes danubiennes* de Strasbourg). Cf. également R. West, *Agneau noir et faucon gris* (Paris–Lausanne, 2000), 237–351.

¹⁴ Cf. D. Slijepčević, *Histoire de l'Eglise orthodoxe serbe* [en serbe] (Munich, 1966), vol. II, 685. Nous remercions aussi vivement le Dr Kolanovitch, directeur des Archives de Croatie, pour les documents communiqués.

métropolitaine Bessarion (Puiu) de Tchernowitz, primat de Bucovine, puis de Transnistrie dans Odessa conquise, relevait brillamment de sa présence une cérémonie somme toute assez indigne et pitoyable.¹⁵ Ce n'était donc pas par hasard si y assistait l'attaché culturel roumain en poste à Zagreb, le futur écrivain et prêtre Virgil Gheorghiu.¹⁶ Mgr Bessarion était une haute figure de l'Orthodoxie roumaine : docteur en théologie de l'Université de Kiev en 1909, évêque d'Arges puis de Hotin, il avait été successivement métropolitaine des deux provinces roumaines les plus exposées au danger soviétique, la Bucovine, envahie par l'Armée Rouge en juin 1940, puis la Transnistrie, arrachée à l'URSS par le Maréchal Antonesco durant l'été 1941. A Zagreb, la veille du sacre, il donna une conférence de presse en présence du ministre Slavo Besarovitch et l'acheva en saluant « le guide suprême du peuple croate » ; son texte fut publié le mardi 15 août 1944 dans le quotidien *Nova Hrvatska*.¹⁷ Toutefois, l'offensive soviétique du 20 août empêche le prélat de rentrer en Roumanie. A la suite de la cessation des hostilités soviéto-roumaines annoncée le 23 par S.M. Michel I^{er} à la radio, Mgr Bessarion gagna l'Autriche où le successeur de Codreanu, Horia Sima, forma le 10 décembre 1944 un gouvernement légionnaire fidèle à l'Axe. Ensuite, en Italie et en Suisse, pendant qu'à Bucarest il était condamné à mort par le régime communiste (1946), il s'installa en France de 1949 à sa mort en 1964¹⁸ et en profita pour fonder à Paris la métropole orthodoxe roumaine d'Europe occidentale, entrée en communion en 1954 avec l'Église russe hors frontières, dont le centre n'était plus désormais à Karlovtsy mais à New York.

Ainsi, le sacre de Mgr Spyridon n'avait évidemment pas perpétué la fantomatique « Eglise orthodoxe croate », mais il avait indirectement servi à organiser durablement les exilés anti-communistes roumains d'Europe occidentale : « Dieu écrit droit avec des lignes courbes »... Quant à l'intention de Mgr Hermogène (Malsinov) de Zagreb, elle demeure d'autant plus difficile à cerner qu'il fut condamné et exécuté dès l'arrivée des partisans communistes. Avait-il voulu sauver du génocide des centaines de milliers de Serbes en les faisant passer pour croates ? En tout cas, il s'était fait de tragiques illusions sur la mentalité et les méthodes des chefs oustachis, la

¹⁵ Mgr Bessarion n'agit que par délégation du patriarche roumain Nicodème (en date du 4 août 1944), ensuite empoisonné par le régime communiste.

¹⁶ Archiprêtre Virgil Gheorghiu, *Mémoires. Le témoin de la 25^{ème} heure* (Paris, 1986). Ses sentiments pro-croates sont exposés p. 478.

¹⁷ Nous en avons publié la version française intégrale dans notre ouvrage *L'église orthodoxe roumaine de Paris* préfacé par Eugène Ionesco (Paris, 1994), 160-163 ; cf. également sur Mgr Bessarion les pp. 110-121.

¹⁸ Il est aujourd'hui inhumé au cimetière parisien du Montparnasse avec son suffragant, l'évêque Théophile (Ionesco) de Sèvres († 1975).

pérennité de leur « Etat indépendant » et la conscience nationale de leurs victimes serbes.

Le Grand Coudeé
Chantilly

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Milan Ristović

**L'insurrection de décembre à Athènes
Intervention britannique et réaction yougoslave
(décembre 1944 – janvier 1945)**

Une conjonction d'événements politiques importants pour le renforcement de la position des communistes yougoslaves vers la fin de 1944 et le commencement de 1945, contraints qu'ils étaient, par décision des Alliés, de coopérer avec des politiciens bourgeois (un gouvernement de coalition fut établi le 7 mars 1945), les dernières opérations pour la libération du pays (déclenchées pendant l'hiver sur le front sirmien), des relations tendues avec les alliés occidentaux, un différend avec le parti communiste grec (KKE) sur la question macédonienne, les projets de mise en place d'une « fédération » avec la Bulgarie pour « l'unification de la Macédoine » – voilà tous les facteurs qui ont entraîné l'extrême prudence et la passivité dont ont fait preuve les dirigeants communistes yougoslaves pendant le « deuxième round », cours, dramatique et sanglant, de la guerre civile en Grèce.¹

Les combats de rues (*Ta Dekemvriana*), qui commencèrent le 3 décembre 1944 à Athènes, ont marqué le début d'une nouvelle étape du conflit, qui aboutit finalement à la défaite de la gauche dans la « bataille d'Athènes » et à une trêve le 11 janvier 1945.² Cependant, ces conflits ont accentué le clivage entre les nouveaux régimes communistes dans les Balkans et le gouvernement grec, qui s'est aggravé pendant les années de la guerre civile en Grèce.

Au début du soulèvement de décembre 1944, les dirigeants du KKE demandèrent à leur représentant à Belgrade, Andreas Tzimas, de solliciter

¹ Heinz Richter, « The Battle of Athens and the Role of the British », in *From Resistance to Civil War*, ed. M. Marion Sarafis (Nottingham, 1980), 78.

² Haris Vlavianos, « The Greek Communist Party in Search of a Revolution », in *Resistance and Revolution in Mediterranean Europe 1939–1948*, ed. Tony Judt (Londres et New York, 1989), 189–192.

à nouveau une aide en armes, que Josip Broz-Tito refusa.³ Cette réponse ne correspondait pas à ce que la même instance avait dit à Tzimas et à St. Anastasiadis (également membre du Comité central du KKE) un mois auparavant, à savoir qu'en cas de conflit avec les Britanniques, une assistance serait apportée aux communistes grecs. En cette première occasion, ils avaient en outre été encouragés à ne pas accepter de désarmer les unités de l'ELAS.⁴ D. Partsalidis (membre du Bureau politique du KKE) prétendait au contraire que les partis communistes de Yougoslavie, d'Albanie et de Bulgarie admettaient qu'ils n'étaient pas en mesure d'apporter une assistance efficace aux communistes grecs dans leur lutte éventuelle contre les Britanniques.⁵

On a donné plus tard comme explication à ce changement de position des leaders partisans qu'une aide à la gauche grecque pourrait donner aux Britanniques une raison d'intervenir en Yougoslavie.⁶ La méfiance envers les Britanniques augmenta visiblement après que le corps expéditionnaire du général britannique Ronald Scobie se fut joint aux combats de rues dans Athènes. Selon le témoignage de Vladimir Dedijer, l'entrée des unités de Scobie dans la bataille pour Athènes causa une « espèce de panique » à Belgrade, parce qu'on croyait que la manœuvre britannique visait de la même façon l'Armée de libération nationale de Yougoslavie.⁷

Les dramatiques développements étaient suivis avec grande attention dans la capitale yougoslave, mais ne donnèrent pas lieu à des commentaires officiels au cours des premières semaines. Des informations plus ou moins neutres parurent dans la presse yougoslave aux premiers jours du conflit. Cependant, divers communiqués d'agences (de Londres et d'Athènes) et leur « conditionnement » de propagande montrent où allaient les sympathies des communistes yougoslaves.⁸

³ Evangelos Kofos, *The Impact of the Macedonian Question on Civil Conflict in Greece (1943-1949)* (Athènes, 1989), 17. Kofos dit qu'en novembre 1944, deux envoyés du KKE reçurent de Tito une réponse positive à la même question, mais « [...] quand la fusillade commença, cependant, Tito revint sur la promesse antérieure », *ibid.*, 40, note 48.

⁴ Lawrence Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949* (New York, 1982), 27.

⁵ Mat. Esche, *Die Kommunistische Partei Griechenlands 1941-1949. Ein Beitrag zur Politik der KKE vom Beginn der Resistance bis zum Ende des Bürgerkrieges* (Münich-Vienne, 1982), 174.

⁶ *Ibid.* De l'historien militaire yougoslave Vojmir Kljaković à l'historien grec Vassos Mathiopoulos.

⁷ Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito speaks. His Selfportrait and Struggle with Stalin* (Londres, 1953), 238.

⁸ « La police d'Athènes a tiré sur des patriotes grecs appartenant au groupe EAM », *Politika*, 4 décembre 1944; « Papandreou tire sur un peuple sans armes », *Politika*, 5

Sans faire directement allusion aux combats dans Athènes, une critique sévère de la politique des partis grecs de droite par Vladimir Dedijer (qui fut plus tard le biographe officiel de Tito) paru dans *Borba*, le journal du Parti communiste yougoslave. Il accusait les politiciens bourgeois grecs de vouloir « retirer à [notre] patrie la totalité de la Macédoine » et de « semer la discorde parce qu'ils demandent à l'Albanie l'Albanie tout entière, à la Bulgarie la Bulgarie tout entière, sauf Sofia et Vidin ». Pour lui, il y avait derrière tout cela Napoleon Zervas, alors que les déclarations d'autres politiciens d'Athènes suggéraient que le gouvernement de Georgios Papandreou était d'accord avec lui. Il terminait son commentaire en disant que « [notre] peuple se rend bien compte que Papandreou en Grèce n'a personne d'autre [de son côté] que les hordes de la cinquième colonne de Zervas et un prince de sang allemand ... La victoire de Papandreou est la victoire d'un maniaque qui souhaite des conflits dans les Balkans, qui veut 'la Grande Grèce' ».⁹

L'envoyé britannique à Belgrade, le général de brigade Fitzroy Maclean, avertit Tito le 7 décembre que la situation en Grèce était déjà assez mauvaise sans une interférence yougoslave.¹⁰ Inquiété par les déclarations publiques de certains chefs partisans sur l'unification de la Macédoine, Tito assura Maclean que toutes les demandes yougoslaves concernant cette région seraient présentées « à la Conférence de paix, pas avant ».¹¹ Tito dut démentir les rumeurs de mouvements d'une « brigade macédonienne » (partie du 15^{ème} corps d'armes) en direction de la Grèce. Le 12 décembre il donna ordre au quartier général de l'Armée nationale de libération et au Mouvement de résistance de Macédoine de « ne laisser en aucune façon cette unité traverser la frontière grecque », ce qui serait « un scandale international, compte tenu des circonstances ». Début janvier une révolte éclata (et fut immédiatement réprimée) dans le 15^{ème} corps de l'Armée nationale de libération de Yougoslavie à Skopje pour réclamer une campagne immédiate de « libération de Thessalonique ».

décembre 1944; « De nouveaux conflits sanglants ont éclaté hier entre le peuple et les autorités à Athènes et au Pirée », *Politika*, 5 décembre 1944. Le 6 décembre le *Politika* de Belgrade publia un petit « lexique » de courtes biographies des principaux hommes politiques grecs et des renseignements sur les partis politiques pour aider à comprendre une situation compliquée dans le pays voisin; « *Ko je ko i šta je šta u Grčkoj* » [Qui est qui et quoi est quoi en Grèce], *Politika*, 6 décembre 1944.

⁹ Vladimir Dedijer, « *Zločinački planovi neprijatelja na Balkanu* » [Les plans criminels des ennemis dans les Balkans], *Borba*, 11 décembre 1944. Ce commentaire réagissait à une carte publiée dans le magazine *Megali Idea. Organon alytolon Ellinon*, périodes B, ar. 6, 20 X 1944.

¹⁰ *Tito-Churchill, strogo tajno* [Tito-Churchill, Top Secret], ed. Dušan Biber (Zagreb, 1981), 392.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

Le 10 décembre Tito dit à Maclean qu'il espérait « que [nous serions] bientôt capables de trouver une solution pacifique, parce que ... la crise grecque provoque des inquiétudes dans ce pays [la Yougoslavie, note de l'auteur] ». Tito dit aussi que, d'après lui, Papandreou était le principal obstacle à une telle solution. Le général de brigade Maclean ne répondit pas et lui conseilla « de ne pas [se] mêler des affaires grecques ».¹²

Au lieu de critiquer directement l'intervention britannique dans les événements d'Athènes, la presse yougoslave parle des réactions défavorables survenues en Grande-Bretagne, surtout dans les rangs du Parti travailliste, de même que des critiques venant des États-Unis et d'autres pays alliés.¹³ Le langage utilisé dans la propagande de la radio yougoslave et les discours publics se fait par la suite plus direct et plus dur. Déjà à la mi-décembre ce changement incita les Britanniques à commencer à se demander si quelque chose de plus sérieux ne se cachait pas derrière cette attitude. Ils envoyèrent donc un avertissement à Tito sur « d'éventuelles conséquences graves en cas d'action précise ».¹⁴

Le différend en cours avec les Britanniques sur la participation aux opérations dans l'Adriatique acquit alors une signification différente pour les leaders partisans, ce que l'envoyé britannique à Belgrade reconnut.

Le refus des leaders partisans d'autoriser la construction d'une base aérienne à Zadar pour 21.000 soldats, l'interdiction d'ancrage à Split du destroyer *Delbi*, etc. prirent également un autre sens dans le contexte de la crise grecque.

Maclean expliqua dans un rapport au Foreign Office que « la position de partisans non identifiés » peut se comprendre plus facilement « à la lumière de notre intervention en Grèce », qui « pourrait vraiment faire croire que nous envisageons une action similaire dans ce pays ». Maclean en trouva maintes preuves dans les rapports des missions britanniques en divers endroits de Yougoslavie.¹⁵

¹² *Ibid.*, 398, 399.

¹³ Voir par exemple: « Le Parti travailliste profondément bouleversé », *Politika*, 7 décembre 1944; « Le Premier Ministre Churchill et le Ministre Eden répondent à une interpellation de M. Cox, membre du Parlement pour le Parti travailliste », *Politika*, 9 décembre 1944; « Les travaillistes demandent la cessation immédiate des hostilités », *Politika*, 12 décembre 1944; « Il doit y avoir une meilleure façon de résoudre la crise grecque... », *Politika*, 13 décembre 1944.

¹⁴ Wittner, *American Intervention*, 27.

¹⁵ *Tito-Churchill*, 399, 419; Elisabeth Parker, *Britanska politika na Balkanu u II svjetskom ratu* [Politique britannique dans les Balkans pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale] (Zagreb, 1978), 167-168.

Dès la fin de novembre 1944 Churchill était convaincu qu'il n'y avait aucun contact entre l'EAM et Moscou.¹⁶ Sir W. Mallet, l'ambassadeur britannique à Stockholm, informa le Foreign Office le 20 décembre que l'ambassadeur soviétique, Mme Kolontay, adoptait une « ligne fortement pro-Churchill ». Elle « [était] sûre que [nous faisons] de notre mieux dans une situation très compliquée [et faisait] remarquer que le gouvernement soviétique avait soigneusement évité de se mêler des discussions à propos de la Grèce. Il gardait un silence absolu ».¹⁷

Le Premier Ministre britannique dit au Cabinet que, à Yalta, « il n'y eut pas, de la part de Staline, de critique implicite de notre politique ... Staline avait respecté très scrupuleusement son acceptation [celle de Churchill] de notre position en Grèce. »¹⁸ Churchill témoigne dans ses mémoires de la passivité de Staline envers les événements de Grèce.¹⁹ Dans un message à Mackenzie King, Premier Ministre du Canada, Churchill mentionna le 15 janvier qu'il s'était assuré « l'accord verbal de Staline » pour que les troupes britanniques entrent en Grèce et « libèrent Athènes ». Il soulignait qu'il s'agissait là de « l'observation stricte de notre accord d'octobre » de sorte que, pendant les « longues semaines de combats avec les communistes dans les rues d'Athènes, aucune critique ne parut dans la *Pravda* ou dans les *Izvestia* ».²⁰

Cette attitude de l'Union soviétique a dû avoir une influence décisive sur la passivité des communistes des Balkans, à un moment où ils devaient renforcer leur position au pouvoir et « éliminer » les concurrents politiques locaux. Une intervention directe de Moscou – mais il n'y en eut pas – aurait permis à la gauche grecque de contrôler le gouvernement et aux Soviétiques d'avoir accès à l'Adriatique. Pour certains, cela aurait pu se faire en apportant une aide à la rébellion gauchiste armée en 1946, mais ne se produisit pas, parce qu'entre-temps « les limitations que Staline imposait à Tito, dans ses négociations sur Trieste et son soutien aux communistes grecs, avaient con-

¹⁶ Esche, *Kommunistische Partei*, 174.

¹⁷ Sir W. Mallet à Chr. Warner, 22 décembre 1944. PRO-FO 371-48319-Greece-British Policy, 1945, dossier 98-1-547.

¹⁸ Cité par Lloyd C. Gardner, *Spheres of Influence: The Partition of Europe, from Munich to Yalta* (Londres-Cambridge, 1993), 244.

¹⁹ Vinston Čerčil, *Drugi svetski rat VI, Trijumf i tragedija* [W. Churchill, Deuxième guerre mondiale, vol. VI, Triomphe et tragédie], 264, 266. Sur la passivité soviétique vis-à-vis des événements en Grèce à la veille de l'insurrection de décembre, voir Esche, *Kommunistische Partei*, 174, 186; J. Iatrides, *The Greek Communists « Second Round », 1944-1945* (Princeton, New Jersey), 221 sqq.

²⁰ Churchill, vol. VI, 276.

tribué à aigrir les relations avec la Yougoslavie ». Voilà ce qu'il en coûte de donner la priorité à une entente moribonde sur des gains géopolitiques.²¹

Petros Roussos, membre du Comité central du Parti communiste grec, alla à Moscou présenter une demande d'aide, mais les autorités soviétiques l'arrêtèrent le 18 décembre et le renvoyèrent en Grèce au bout de trois jours. L'historien américain Lawrence S. Wittner estime que c'est sans doute encouragé par le soutien de Tito que Roussos décida cette mission vouée à l'échec. En effet, Tito ne voulait pas continuer sa politique envers la Grèce « dans ces circonstances » seul et « sans l'appui des Soviétiques ». Il approuva aussi l'envoi d'une mission de l'EAM en France et en Grande-Bretagne via la Yougoslavie. Cependant, arrivée à Belgrade dans un contexte différent, elle ne fut pas reçue par Tito et n'obtint pas non plus d'assistance (des papiers yougoslaves pour continuer le voyage).²²

Georgi Dimitrov donna une réponse qui éclaire la position des partis communistes des Balkans et aida ainsi à éviter d'accorder une assistance aux rebelles d'Athènes. Le 15 décembre, il justifia cette attitude en disant que l'aide de la Yougoslavie et de la Bulgarie à l'ELAS, à ce moment-là, « n'aiderait pas beaucoup les camarades grecs », alors que d'un autre côté, cela se ferait « au détriment de la Yougoslavie et de la Bulgarie », ce qui devait « faire réfléchir nos amis grecs ». ²³ Selon une information de l'OSS (Bureau des services secrets américaine) du 13 janvier, le KKE reçut de Moscou un télégramme qui désapprouvait fermement « sa politique et son action ». ²⁴

La réponse donnée d'Athènes par Gheorgios Siantos (qui à l'époque remplaçait à la tête du parti communiste grec Nikos Zahariadis, toujours détenu dans un camp de concentration en Allemagne) était en contradiction avec son acceptation jusqu'alors inconditionnelle des directives de Moscou : « Nous continuons la lutte pour la liberté et l'indépendance de notre pays. » Cependant, il n'en informa pas le Bureau politique du KKE, qui avait parmi ses membres de fervents défenseurs d'un « compromis honnête » (D. Roussos et H. Hadzivasiliou), qui estimaient qu'il était temps de cesser le combat.²⁵

Siantos informait Belgrade et Sofia des combats à Athènes. De tous les rapports que Siantos envoya à Tito, seulement 6 dépêches, qui décrivent

²¹ Michael McGwire, « National Security and Soviet Foreign Policy » in *Origins of the Cold War. An International History*, éd. M. P. Leffler et D. S. Painter (Londres-New York, 1994), 74.

²² Wittner, *American Intervention*, 27, 28; Gardner, *Spheres of Influence*, 244.

²³ Esche, *Kommunistische Partei*, 188, 119.

²⁴ Wittner, *American Intervention*, 27.

²⁵ Esche, *Kommunistische Partei*, 190. Sur la question de la date de ce télégramme, *ibid.*

la situation dans la dernière semaine de décembre 1944, ont été conservées dans les archives yougoslaves. Le 19 décembre, il rapportait que, au cours de deux semaines de combats, l'ELAS d'Athènes avait perdu la moitié de ses soldats, mais qu'ils avaient été remplacés par des volontaires.²⁶ Le 23 décembre il rapportait que les combattants de l'ELAS avaient réussi à infliger de lourdes pertes aux parachutistes britanniques à Kifisia après 36 heures de combat. Il rapportait aussi qu'ils avait capturé « 600 soldats y compris du personnel des forces aériennes anglaises, un général de brigade, commandant les forces aériennes », ainsi que sept canons et des munitions d'infanterie, et détruit un avion et deux tanks.²⁷ Le 27 décembre il faisait un bref rapport sur le commencement des négociations avec Churchill et Eden sur la fin des combats et la participation de la gauche dans la répartition des pouvoirs et les conditions du désarmement. Siantos promit de revenir sur les résultats des négociations.²⁸

Dans une dépêche de fin décembre 1944, sans date, il rendit compte à Tito du déroulement des combats à Athènes, surtout ceux aux alentours du sanatorium de Soteria. Il souligna qu'il « [s'attendait] à un nouveau débarquement des Britanniques » et que « le peuple voulait des fusils et des munitions ».²⁹ Dans la dépêche suivante, également sans date, il parlait en termes généraux de la poursuite de la « bataille d'Athènes » et de la « lutte de tout un peuple en Grèce » contre l'intervention britannique qui soutenait des « fascistes, anciens alliés de l'Allemagne ». Il accusait les Britanniques de retarder les livraisons de nourriture à la population et la distribution de l'aide de la Croix-Rouge. La dépêche se termine par une affirmation auto-encourageante que « malgré un combat inégal notre position s'améliore ».³⁰

La dernière des dépêches adressées à Tito conservées (probablement de la première semaine de janvier 1945) parle de « la poursuite de l'avance de l'ELAS » contre les « Anglais et les fascistes ». En conclusion, il renouvelle la demande d'aide en munitions, surtout de « type italien », parce que les soldats de l'ELAS disposaient surtout d'armement saisi aux Italiens.³¹

Lorsque le dénouement, malheureux du point de vue de l'EAM et de l'ELAS, approcha, les événements d'Athènes furent couverts dans la presse yougoslave par des communiqués plus brefs. La fin des hostilités passa pr-

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 190.

²⁷ Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives nationales yougoslaves], SKJ, KMOV, Gr. IX, 15/1-67, 26/XII, Télégramme de Siantos du 23 décembre 1944.

²⁸ Esche, *Kommunistische Partei*, 119.

²⁹ AJ, SKJ, KMOV, Gr. IX, 20-III/1, CK ELAS (Siantos) à Josip Broz-Tito, sans date.

³⁰ *Ibid.* « *Boi v Atine...* » [Bataille d'Athènes], fin décembre 1944.

³¹ *Ibid.* « *ELAS prodolzhaet...* », sans date.

esque inaperçue, mentionnée seulement dans de courtes notes dans *Politika* les 10, 11, 12 et 13 janvier 1945.³² La signature de l'accord de paix de Varkiza fut traitée de la même façon.³³

Le 15 janvier Siantos fit savoir à Dimitrov que continuer un combat déséquilibré n'avait aucune chance de succès et que pour cette raison la direction de l'EAM/ELAS avait été forcée d'assumer une « cessation temporaire du feu afin de rechercher une solution politique. C'est pourquoi [nous avons] besoin d'une aide étrangère ».³⁴ La réponse de Staline fut cassante : « La situation internationale ne justifie pas l'envoi d'une aide militaire aux camarades grecs. » Il leur fut conseillé de se retirer et de « préserver leurs forces ».³⁵

Pendant que les représentants du gouvernement négociaient avec les chefs rebelles à Athènes, *Politika* publia un premier (et seul) long commentaire sur les événements de Grèce. L'auteur en était Vasa Čubrilović, professeur à l'université de Belgrade, connu avant la guerre pour ses prises de position politiques conservatrices, et à l'époque tout sauf proche idéologiquement des communistes. Čubrilović prétendait que les dirigeants britanniques « disent toujours qu'ils souhaitent sincèrement que les Grecs puissent choisir la forme de leur gouvernement », mais indiquent que la condition préalable à cela est « de donner le pouvoir en Grèce au 'gouvernement constitutionnel', d'assurer la liberté de vote à la population, de désarmer les unités des partisans ». Selon Čubrilović, cela signifiait que « le peuple grec [devait] rappeler le roi et son gouvernement avant les élections ... Le Mouvement de libération nationale [devait] démanteler son armée et devenir un parti politique ordinaire ». L'EAM ne le veut pas parce qu'elle sait bien « à quoi ces 'élections libres' ressembleraient si elles étaient conduites par lui [Papandreou] ». Il pensait que la question de la prise du pouvoir devait « être observée d'un autre point de vue, pas seulement constitutionnel. Si le pouvoir doit être remis à quelqu'un, il est juste qu'il soit remis à ceux qui y

³² « Prestale borbe u Atini » [Fin des combats à Athènes], *Politika*, 10 janvier 1945; « ELAS-ovi delegati kod Skobija » [Les délégués de l'ELAS chez Scoby], *Politika*, 11 janvier 1945; « Sporazum Skobija i ELAS-a » [Accord entre Scoby et l'ELAS], *Politika*, 12 janvier 1945; « ELAS ispunjava uslove primirja » [L'ELAS remplit les conditions de l'armistice], *Politika*, 13 janvier 1945.

³³ « Sinoć je u Varkizi potpisan sporazum » [Traité signé à Varkiza la nuit dernière], *Politika*, 14 février 1945.

³⁴ Dragan Kljakić, *Izgubljena pobeda generala Markosa* [La victoire perdue du général Markos] (Belgrade, 1987), 74. Georgi Dimitrov était chargé de liaison entre le Comité central du Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique et les partis communistes des Balkans.

³⁵ Kljakić, *Izgubljena pobeda*, 75.

ont le plus grand droit moral en raison de leur combat et de leurs pertes ». Ainsi « la seule règle simple dans ce cas est [...] : celui qui dirige le peuple en temps de guerre doit le diriger en temps de paix. »³⁶

Dans un autre éditorial consacré aux relations entre la Yougoslavie et ses voisins, publié le 4 janvier 1945, Moše Pijade, l'un des proches collaborateurs de Tito, parlait en termes généraux des « relations étroites » établies pendant la guerre entre les représentants des mouvements de libération de Grèce et de Yougoslavie, comme les « solides fondations » d'une future coopération. Il ne mentionna jamais les événements en cours à Athènes.³⁷

Vers la fin de janvier (le 29) Tito assura à nouveau Maclean qu'il n'avait pas l'intention d'annexer des territoires de Grèce ou de Bulgarie *avant* (c'est l'auteur qui souligne) la Conférence de paix, à laquelle il soumettrait « de la façon appropriée toutes les demandes que [la Yougoslavie] pourrait avoir à présenter ». Maclean croyait que ces questions avaient déjà été résolues avec Moscou et que Tito n'attendait donc que le moment propice et, dans l'intervalle, préparait le public aux changements proposés.³⁸

Le 12 février Maclean redit au Foreign Office qu'à son avis l'intervention britannique en Grèce « n'avait pas donné une idée juste des intentions opérationnelles des Britanniques en Yougoslavie ». Bien que les déclarations officielles aient été discrètes, il n'y a pas de doute que les sympathies des partisans, qui tendaient à comparer la situation en Grèce et en Yougoslavie, allaient entièrement à l'EAM et à l'ELAS.³⁹

La déclaration selon laquelle « pour Tito une capitulation rapide et inattendue de CPG/ELAS à Varkiza (le 12 février 1945) avait clairement ruiné ses plans pour une future Macédoine unifiée » peut être sérieusement mise en doute. De plus, l'assertion que, dans la circonstance, Josip Broz-Tito aurait pu ou aurait voulu sortir du cadre de la politique de Staline envers les communistes grecs n'est pas prouvée.⁴⁰

L'attitude des Britanniques quant à leur intérêt en Yougoslavie et leur intérêt en Grèce présentait des différences évidentes. En réponse à un mes-

³⁶ Dr Vasa Čubrilović, « Grčka kriza » [La crise grecque], *Politika*, 26 décembre 1944. Čubrilović était l'un des membres les plus jeunes de l'organisation de nationalistes yougoslaves « La Jeune Bosnie » qui assassina François Ferdinand à Sarajevo en 1914.

³⁷ Moše Pijade, « Jugoslavija i njeni susedi » [La Yougoslavie et ses voisins], *Politika*, 4 janvier 1945.

³⁸ *Tito-Churchill*, 440.

³⁹ *Tito-Churchill*, 456. Maclean informa Londres qu'au cours de la visite du maréchal Alexander à Belgrade vers la fin de février 1945, des rumeurs voulaient qu'il « venait en compagnie du général Scoby pour renverser Tito et assurer la régence lui-même », *ibid.*, 488.

⁴⁰ Kofos, *Impact of the Macedonian Question*, 17.

sage de Churchill, le ministre des Affaires étrangères britannique, Anthony Eden, affirmait le 18 mars que la politique de Londres envers la Yougoslavie était « réaliste et pas trop ambitieuse », reconnaissant le fait que la Yougoslavie n'a pas pour la Grande-Bretagne « le même intérêt stratégique à long terme que la Grèce ou ... l'Italie » et que « la Yougoslavie est en dehors, ou, plus précisément, en bordure de la zone de nos intérêts majeurs ». Eden estimait que la politique de son gouvernement en Yougoslavie était basée sur un accord 50-50 avec Moscou et proposa que la partie britannique fasse un effort particulier pour que la Yougoslavie soit une zone « neutre », ce qui pourrait aider de façon non négligeable à protéger « [sa] position en Grèce et, dans une moindre mesure, en Italie ». ⁴¹

Selon Eden, une bonne raison était aussi « le fait que la Yougoslavie [deviendrait] probablement le plus fort et le plus influent des États balkaniques ». Renoncer à « toute possibilité de conseiller ou de donner notre avis sur la conduite de la politique yougoslave » serait abandonner l'un des plus importants moyens d'influence sur l'ensemble des affaires balkaniques. ⁴²

Mais Churchill pensait que la cause britannique en *Titoland*, comme il appelait la Yougoslavie, avait déjà été perdue dans le jeu avec l'Union soviétique parce que le gouvernement yougoslave « se jeta cordialement dans les bras de la Russie », et il était donc enclin à condamner « tout sacrifice important que nous devrions faire pour avoir le droit de jouer un jeu perdant », parce qu'il « n'y a rien qui puisse enlever la Yougoslavie à l'étreinte russe. Sur ce champ de bataille la politique doit être de *se détacher*. En revanche, en Grèce, il faut *tenir bon* » (c'est l'auteur qui souligne). ⁴³

Cette formulation simple devait être la caractéristique de la politique britannique dans les Balkans dans les années à venir. Après l'abandon de positions aux États-Unis d'Amérique, elle resta la prémisses essentielle des relations avec la Yougoslavie et la Grèce.

Dans une analyse de l'Ambassade de Yougoslavie à Athènes de la situation en Grèce après Varkiza (juillet 1945), il est admis que l'intervention britannique et « les fautes des chefs de l'EAM aboutirent ... à la défaite du mouvement grec de libération nationale et à l'arrivée au pouvoir des réactionnaires grecs ». Les événements de la vie politique (remplacement du gouvernement de Papandreou, puis de celui de Plastiras, auquel succéda celui de l'amiral Voulgaris) dénotèrent une politique que l'on peut décrire

⁴¹ *Tito-Churchill*, 496.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 503, 504, dans une note personnelle à Sir Orme, 20 avril 1945.

comme annonçant « l'établissement d'une dictature monarchique et militaire ». ⁴⁴

Pour les membres les plus radicaux de l'ELAS et du KKE et surtout les combattants d'origine slavo-macédonienne, les conditions de l'accord de Varkiza en février 1945 étaient inacceptables, et ils émigrèrent vers les pays voisins, principalement la Yougoslavie. Selon des chiffres officiels yougoslaves quelque 25 à 30.000 citoyens grecs, des officiers et des soldats de l'ELAS avec leurs familles, trouvèrent refuge en Yougoslavie. En 1945, un groupe de ces immigrants organisa dans le village de Buljkes, en Voïvodine, Serbie du nord, une véritable « commune autonome grecque », de quelque 3 à 4.000 habitants. Ils fondèrent des écoles, un hôpital, mais aussi – après le commencement de la guerre civile en Grèce – une « académie militaire » pour officiers de l'Armée démocratique. ⁴⁵

Le commencement de la guerre civile en 1946 ouvrit également une nouvelle période, complexe, des relations entre la Grèce et la Yougoslavie, dans le contexte général d'une guerre froide chargée de conflits politiques et idéologiques, d'incidents de frontières, d'interférence dans les conflits internes, d'accusations devant les organisations internationales, etc. Cette situation évolua suivant les circonstances: le conflit Tito-Staline qui débuta pendant l'été de 1948, l'isolation de la Yougoslavie et l'amélioration des relations entre les pays occidentaux, le conflit entre l'PCY et le KKE, la fin de la guerre civile en Grèce. Les relations diplomatiques se normalisèrent au début de 1950 et en 1953-54 la Yougoslavie signa avec la Grèce et la Turquie le Pacte balkanique. ⁴⁶

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⁴⁴ SMIP, PA, Grèce, 1945, f 10, d 8, pov. 2667, 9 VII 1945. Rapport sur la situation politique en Grèce.

⁴⁵ Milan Ristović, « Eksperiment Buljkes: grčka republika u Jugoslaviji 1945-1949 » [L'expérience Buljkes: la République grecque en Yougoslavie 1945-1949], *Godišnjak za društvenu istoriju* IV,2-3 (1997), 179-181.

⁴⁶ John O. Iatrides, *Balkan Triangle. Birth and Decline of an Alliance Across Ideological Boundaries* (La Haye: Mouton 1968); Milan Ristović, « Jugoslawien und der Bürgerkrieg in Griechenland (1945-1950) », *Thetis, Mannheimer Beiträge zur Klassischen Archeologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns*, Bd. 4 (Mannheim, 1997), 290, 291.

Gordon N. Bardos

The Balkans' New Political Dynamics

Lost beneath the bloody headlines from Afghanistan, Darfur, Iraq and Lebanon is the fact that 2006 was the most important year for the Balkans since Slobodan Milošević's overthrow in 2000. In June 2006, Montenegro declared its independence, and the process to determine Kosovo's future status has entered its last stages. Together, these developments represent the final fall of Tito's Yugoslavia, a process which began back in 1991. Since July, parliamentary elections have been held in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. In November, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia were invited to join NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), and in Bosnia constitutional reform is also on the agenda.

All of these changes are taking place at a time when strategic uncertainty in southeastern Europe is increasing because Washington and Brussels are consumed by problems elsewhere and Russia is increasingly asserting its political and economic interests in the region. Balkan stability over the past seven years has rested on three pillars – a significant U.S. military presence, the foreseeable prospect of E.U. accession for the Balkan countries, and the fact that political elites in Belgrade, Banja Luka, Skopje, and Zagreb support the political and territorial status quo in the region. Two of these three pillars – the U.S. military presence and the foreseeable prospect of E.U. accession – are either being withdrawn, or pushed back to an increasingly distant future. The few remaining U.S. troops in Bosnia were pulled out in 2006, and a similar withdrawal is planned for Kosovo in the near future. Both moves reveal the mindset of bureaucratic planners who know the price of everything and the value of nothing. Meanwhile, the Europeans are suffering from too many of their own problems to guide the Balkan states successfully through the transition process, and are unable to provide firm assurances as to when the next round of enlargement that would include the Balkan states might take place. Hence, there is a significant danger that international policy toward the region could founder for the next couple of years.

The third pillar of Balkan stability – the *status quo* elites in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia – is somewhat wobbly as well. Political forces challenging the current status quo in the region, whether in the form of politicians in Sarajevo demanding a radical revision of the Dayton Peace Accords, or revanchists in the Serbian Radical Party who still dream of creating a “Greater Serbia,” or militant Albanian movements threatening to destabilize Macedonia, Montenegro, or southern Serbia, all to greater or lesser degrees are waiting on the sidelines to see how quickly changing facts on the ground may play to their advantage.

Additionally, an important new variable has been introduced into the Balkan strategic equation – the re-emergence of Russia as an important economic and political player in the region. In Montenegro, Russians have bought the republic’s largest industrial enterprise; in Bosnia, the largest oil refinery; in Macedonia, Lukoil is planning a major expansion of its operations; in Serbia, Russia is providing the capital to refurbish the hydro-electric plant at the Iron Gates of the Danube, Serbia’s main source of electricity; and in March, Russian President Vladimir Putin traveled to Greece to sign an agreement with his Bulgarian and Greek counterparts to build a new pipeline to carry Russian oil from the Black Sea to the Aegean.

Given all of these developments, the current political moment in the Balkans bears a disconcerting resemblance to the situation that obtained in 1991 when the Yugoslav crisis first began. Then, as now, rapidly changing political realities on the ground in southeastern Europe came at a moment when Washington and European capitals were distracted by problems elsewhere – the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and German reunification – and belated American and European reactions to the accelerating dynamic of disintegration and violence were unable to keep the lid on a rapidly changing situation.

To be sure, there is little danger that the large scale violence of the 1990s that ravaged Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo will again erupt in the western or southern Balkans. New security mechanisms and instruments – many developed specifically in response to the original outbreak of violence in the former Yugoslavia – are now in place, and there is much more recognition of the need for quick, preventive diplomacy in the early stages of a crisis than there was in the early 1990s.

Nevertheless, the problems facing the region should be neither underestimated nor dismissed, and after fifteen years of intensive international engagement in the region, there is no excuse for Washington and Brussels to be behind the curve. While Montenegrin independence and a resolution of Kosovo’s future status may clarify some things in southeastern Europe, they also open up a host of other issues – the futures of Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia itself, and how all of these increasingly small,

weak, economically impoverished states lacking internal political legitimacy will find the strength both to adopt political and economic reforms and to deal with powerful organized crime syndicates and the infiltration of Islamic militant groups.¹

Moreover, it is not at all clear that the new security structures in place will be strong enough to counteract the powerful forces now being unleashed in the region. Maintaining peace and stability and promoting economic and political reform in the Balkans while simultaneously redrawing borders and creating new states will not be easy to achieve, especially at a time when Washington's and Brussels' ability to control developments on the ground is decreasing in direct relationship to their drawdown in troops and financial aid, and the only carrot on offer is the increasingly distant prospect of E.U. accession.

For these reasons, many implicit assumptions about Balkan policy currently holding sway on both sides of the Atlantic are seriously flawed. In Washington, the prevailing sentiment is that we can grant Kosovo independence, revise Bosnia's constitutional structure, declare victory, and pull out of southeastern Europe. In Brussels, many quarters believe that southeastern Europe's E.U. integration aspirations can wait until the E.U. settles its own internal difficulties. But the new political dynamics of the region unleashed by the changes of the past year means that at this moment the Balkans cannot afford benign neglect. The International Commission on the Balkans warned in 2005 that we are as close to failure in southeastern Europe as we are to success.² The judgment still holds true, and while American policymakers may be able to tick off many of the items on their Balkan agenda in the coming months, what they want most – a *responsible* way to disengage from the Balkans – will remain unattainable.

The good news is that maintaining stability and promoting reform in the Balkans can be done for a fraction of the cost of the Afghan and Iraqi operations, and in a region where Americans are popular and everyone wants to join the European club. But stability and progress will not emerge by themselves, which is why understanding the new political dynamics unleashed by quickly changing facts on the ground in southeastern Europe is crucial. The nature of the questions hovering over the Balkans reveals the continued seriousness of the situation: What will happen in Bosnia if and when the Office of the High Representative (OHR) shuts down? Can

¹ On the problems facing Eastern Europe as a whole, see F. Stephen Larrabee, "Danger and Opportunity in Eastern Europe", *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 6 (November-December 2006), 117-131.

² "The Balkans in Europe's Future", Report of the International Commission on the Balkans (April 2005), 7.

Kosovo and Montenegro succeed as independent states? Will the Ohrid Accords (and, by extension, Macedonia itself) work? Will Serbia's post-Milosevic reform process continue? At this political juncture, in many ways the answers to these questions lie more in Washington and Brussels than in the region itself.

Montenegro – Independence without Exceptionalism?

For the past fifteen years, Montenegro has prided itself, with some justification, as being an exception to the general Balkan rule of ethnic heterogeneity leading to ethnic conflict. Paradoxically, however, the thesis of Montenegrin exceptionalism faces its greatest challenge now that Montenegro has become independent. Last May, Montenegrins approved an independence referendum by a 55-45 percent margin, but a glance behind the 45,000 vote difference suggests the future of Montenegrin politics will be anything but smooth. Voting was strictly along ethnic lines, with Albanians, Croats, Muslims (recognized as a distinct ethnic group in many parts of the Balkans) and ethnic Montenegrins voting overwhelmingly in favor of independence, while Montenegrin citizens identifying themselves as Serbs (over thirty percent of the population) voted just as strongly in favor of maintaining the state union with Serbia.

Independence, however, significantly changes the political game that all of these groups have been playing in recent years. Most of Montenegro's ethnic minorities have supported Montenegrin independence not out of any particular loyalty to the Montenegrin state itself, but primarily to break Montenegro's ties with Serbia. Now that that has been achieved, Montenegro's various ethnic groups have already begun to up the ante in Montenegrin politics by demanding more autonomy and greater collective group rights.³ And as repeatedly seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, such ethnically-based politics make it extremely difficult to achieve the consensus needed to adopt and implement political and economic reform.

Two recent events sharply bring into focus this lack of consensus in Montenegrin society. In September 2007, on the eve of parliamentary elections, Montenegrin security forces arrested over a dozen ethnic Albanians for planning an alleged terrorist plot. Two of those arrested were local municipal council members, showing the relatively shallow support even some Albanian government officials have for an independent Montenegrin state. On the other side of the political and ethnic spectrum, meanwhile, just a

³ For an analysis along these lines, see Misa Djurkovic, "Montenegro: Headed for New Divisions?" (Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Balkan Series 07/11, March 2007).

few days later, at the inaugural session of the Montenegrin parliament on October 2nd, Serb members of parliament refused to stand for the singing of the Montenegrin national anthem, yet another subtle indication of the weak foundations on which Montenegrin independence rests.

Montenegro, clearly, will face several years of difficult birth pains. Even apart from the most basic question of the new state's legitimacy in the eyes of many of its citizens, Montenegro faces enormous economic difficulties. Less than a fifth of the population is officially employed, governmental corruption is high even by regional standards, and there is a serious debate within the country over the wisdom of relying so heavily on Russian investment in the republic. Adding to all of this uncertainty is Djukanović's decision to step down as prime minister and retire from politics. To his credit, Djukanović achieved many things while he was in power. His decision to break with Milošević in 1997 was an important blow to Milošević's aura of omnipotence, and he kept his cool during NATO's air campaign against the then Yugoslavia in 1999. Crowning these achievements was his role in peacefully guiding a deeply divided state to independence.

But the price of many of these things has yet to be paid. Putting together a coalition of groups with convergent short-term tactical goals but contradictory long-term strategic goals can win an independence referendum, but it will not make for a stable state. Similarly, the social and economic costs of Djukanović's struggle to keep himself and his party in power, in terms of the significant criminalization of the Montenegrin state and society, is something that Montenegro will continue to pay for for many years to come.

Bosnia after the OHR

To Montenegro's north, the spillover effects of its independence referendum were immediately visible in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina. Eleven years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, in 2006 Bosnia had its most heated election campaign since the end of the country's civil war in 1995. Within days of the Montenegrin referendum, the prime minister of the Serbian entity in Bosnia, the Republika Srpska (or RS), Milorad Dodik, aired the possibility of the Bosnian Serbs holding their own referendum on independence if Muslim politicians in Sarajevo continued with their attacks on the legitimacy of the RS. Dodik's threats clearly struck a nerve among Bosnia's Serb population, as Dodik and his Independent Social Democratic Party scored a huge victory in Bosnia's October presidential and parliamentary elections, becoming by far the most important political force in the Serb half of Bosnia. Elections in the other half of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslim-Croat Federation produced minor political tremors of their own.

Haris Silajdžić, the Bosnian Muslim wartime prime minister, was elected to the tripartite state presidency after several years out of politics, while a Croat from Sarajevo, Željko Komšić, was elected as the Croat member of the presidency, apparently with the help of thousands of Muslim votes, and without the support of Bosnia's leading Croat political parties.

This new political constellation in Bosnia has emerged at an important crossroads for Bosnia's future development. Last April, constitutional reform proposals supported by Washington and Brussels and most political parties in Bosnia failed after Silajdžić and his party refused to endorse them, thereby sabotaging years of delicate political negotiations intended to provide a new, post-Dayton political framework for Bosnia.⁴ Political tensions in Bosnia are sure to increase over the next few years as Dodik and Silajdžić – two sharp-tongued, strong-willed individuals – fight over their contrasting visions of Bosnia's future. For the first time since the war, one of Bosnia's leading journalists, Senad Pećanin, has become concerned enough to say "I am afraid for the peace here."⁵

While a return to large-scale conflict in Bosnia is unlikely, there is clearly no consensus among the peoples of Bosnia as to how their state should be organized or governed. Eleven years into the Dayton Peace Process, however, many observers are questioning the intrusive role international actors are playing in Bosnia's domestic politics. The High Representative's current powers, which include the ability to impose legislation and remove publicly elected officials from office, has prevented Bosnians from taking responsibility for their own affairs, and the strong role of the High Representative or the American ambassador in Sarajevo has often convinced Bosnia's Croat, Muslim, and Serb political leaders that it is more important to gain the support of international officials than that of their fellow Bosnians. The perverse result has been the introduction of a negative dynamic into Bosnia's political life, preventing Bosnia's Croats, Muslims and Serbs from developing the habits of mutual trust, cooperation, and compromise needed for the country to progress on its own, and absolving Bosnia's politicians from responsibility for the country's future.

Eleven years after the end of the war, and after one of the most intensive and large-scale international engagements in history, making Bosnia-Herzegovina a viable state from this point on is going to depend upon the Bosnian peoples themselves. The best the international community can do

⁴ See the testimony by Daniel Server, "Balkans Progress: Who Stands in the Way?", before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Hearing on Human Rights, Democracy and Integration in South-Central Europe, June 15, 2006

⁵ Andrew Purvis, "Can Bosnia's Peace Survive?", *Time* (European Edition), 2 October 2006.

is provide a secure environment in which Bosnian politics can evolve and play out free from the threat of civil war, foreign military intervention, or threats to secede or partition the country. Apart from these ground rules, however, few people believe that continued international micromanagement can do much to promote further interethnic reconciliation in Bosnia. In the next phase of Bosnia's post-Dayton development, this will have to be up to Bosnia's politicians and peoples themselves.

Kosovo – Toward Independence?

Of all the problems facing southeastern Europe and the international community, the most difficult and potentially dangerous remains deciding Kosovo's future status. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, which formally regulated the end of the Kosovo war in 1999, left Kosovo legally a part of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but practically a United Nations/NATO protectorate. Driven by a belief that Kosovo's international-legal limbo status could not be prolonged indefinitely, but also by the fear that Albanian dissatisfaction with the status quo could result in an explosion of violent discontent directed against international personnel in Kosovo, negotiations over Kosovo's future status began last February. Predictably, however, they made practically no progress in bridging the gap between Belgrade and Priština, with the result being that the U.N. Security Council will have to impose a solution on the two parties. Most observers believe that the imposed solution will remove Kosovo from Belgrade's sovereignty and grant it some form of independence.

Whatever is done in Kosovo, however, is almost certain to have widespread ramifications. Russian president Vladimir Putin has publicly warned that whatever happens in Kosovo could serve as a precedent for similar unresolved territorial conflicts in the former Soviet Union, most especially in Georgia's breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and in Moldova's Transdnistria region, and Putin has specifically called for the application of "universal principles" to the Kosovo case. Many regional leaders, especially in Romania and Greece, have also raised concerns about plans to impose a solution that has not been agreed to by the two parties.

More immediately, however, whatever legal form Kosovo's future status takes, it will do little to resolve Kosovo's fundamental internal problems: extremely weak governmental capacity, a moribund economy with few serious opportunities for growth, pervasive corruption and organized crime, a fractionalized political system based on regional and clan loyalties, and an intolerant nationalist xenophobia against non-Albanian ethnic communities that has produced the worst human rights situation in Europe. In 2005, Kosovo registered negative economic growth, and a reduced international

presence in Kosovo will only worsen economic conditions. Moreover, with half of Kosovo's population under the age of 26 (and one third under the age of 17), the vast majority of whom account for the 50-60 percent of Kosovo's population that is officially unemployed, the potentially explosive social consequences of the situation are clear. Compounding all of these problems is the fact that Kosovo already has its own frozen conflict – the Serb enclave north of the Ibar river, anchored by the divided city of Mitrovica. Here, in territory adjoining Serbia proper, some 80,000 Serbs are practically more a part of Serbia than they are of Kosovo.

Clearly, a continued international (and particularly U.S.) presence will be needed in Kosovo for several more years. Whatever form Kosovo's future status ultimately takes, it remains to be seen whether it will in fact promote regional stability, or whether it will merely begin destabilizing neighboring states such as Macedonia, Montenegro, and southern Serbia. Extremists in Kosovo have already been implicated in fomenting violence in all of these areas, and without a strong U.S. presence, it is doubtful that a European force would have the credibility to reign in any potential extremist violence.

Macedonia after Kosovo

In many ways, the political logic of Balkan nationalism – succinctly summed up by Vladimir Gligorov in the saying “Why should I be a minority in your country when you can be a minority in mine?” – suggests that Macedonia will have the most difficult time dealing with the new strategic environment in the southern Balkans if and when Kosovo is granted independence. With three million Albanians living in an independent state to its west, and a further two million Albanians living in an independent state to its north, it is difficult to see why 500,000 Albanians in Macedonia will remain satisfied in a state in which they claim they are discriminated against and treated as second-class citizens. Moreover, there is no evidence of such a political situation succeeding in the Balkans at any time over the past several decades. The Bosnian experience shows how difficult it is to make a multi-ethnic state work even when the main ethnic groups speak a common language, and in Macedonia the ethnic divide is further deepened by the fact that state's main ethnic groups speak mutually unintelligible languages.⁶

Macedonia's parliamentary elections in July showed how fragile Macedonia remains five years after a civil war between Albanians and Macedonian Slavs was narrowly averted. When the right-of-center Internal

⁶ It should be noted, however, that many Albanians in Macedonia do speak Macedonian.

Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) chose to invite a smaller Albanian party to join its ruling coalition in place of the largest Albanian political party in Macedonia, Ali Ahmeti's Democratic Union of Albanians (DUI). Ahmeti's followers took to the streets, raising roadblocks in many parts of the country and boycotting parliament for two months. On the other side of the ethnic divide, in August the Macedonian government again arrested a Christian Orthodox cleric, Bishop Jovan Vraniševski, who has re-established ties with the Serbian Orthodox Church in Belgrade. Bishop Jovan, named a prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International, has been subject to various forms of intimidation and harassment over the past several years, including being charged with crimes as petty as performing a baptism in his apartment. As these events suggest, Macedonia's social and political cohesion remains weak, and without strong international support it is doubtful that Macedonia would have the internal strength to weather the changes facing southeastern Europe in the coming years.

Stabilizing Serbia

Any American policymaker who has bemoaned the fact that Washington is a one-crisis-at-a-time town should have some sympathy for the problems confronting Belgrade politicians. As a result of Montenegro's declaration of independence, Serbia has involuntarily become an independent country, a decision which grants Kosovo some form of independence will reduce its territory by a further fifteen percent, and the E.U. has suspended talks with Belgrade because of its failure to apprehend Hague indictee Ratko Mladić. And these are just the "big" problems; others, such as judicial and security sector reform, providing for the largest refugee population in Europe, or rebuilding an economy in which unemployment hovers at 30 percent and another decade will be needed for per capita GDP to reach 1989 levels also remain to be solved.

Given these realities, what is noteworthy is not that reform in post-Milošević Serbia has been slow, but that the post-Milošević reform effort is making any progress at all. In many ways, however, the coming years will be the most severe test of Serbia's nascent democratic institutions, which is why there is an urgent need to rethink current U.S. and E.U. policy towards the country.

For the past several years, much of Washington's and Brussels' relations with Serbia – such as negotiations with the E.U. over a Stabilization and Association Agreement, or Serbia's membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace – have been reduced to the fate of one man, former Bosnian Serb general Ratko Mladić, indicted for war crimes by the International

Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and widely believed to be the man most responsible for the Srebrenica massacres in July 1995 in which several thousand Bosnian Muslims were killed. But while the morality of insisting on Mladić's arrest and extradition is unassailable, the consequences of freezing Serbia's Euro-Atlantic integration efforts because of one individual have become detrimental to long-term stability in the Balkans. As one op-ed contributor in the *New York Times* asked, "How important is Mladić's arrest balanced against the integration of eight million people in a region that badly needs stability?"⁷

In similar instances, Washington and Brussels have both shown greater understanding for the wider strategic issues at stake. In October 2005, for instance, the European Union gave Croatia a green light to proceed with E.U. accession talks only days after ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte announced her disappointment with the Croatian government's lack of cooperation in the case of fugitive Hague indictee Ante Gotovina. Similarly, the ICTY is allowing another indicted war criminal, former Kosovo prime minister Ramush Haradinaj, to await trial from his home in Kosovo (despite the fact that Haradinaj has reportedly been intimidating and harassing potential witnesses against him) because of the belief that Haradinaj can reign in extremists in Kosovo.⁸ In both cases, larger strategic concerns have required that some unpleasant compromises be made between the just and the good. Washington, Brussels, and the ICTY now confront the same situation with regard to Mladić. Fortunately, Washington made a good move in this direction at NATO's November summit in Riga when it agreed to invite Serbia (along with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro) to join PfP. The E.U. now needs to show similar pragmatism in supporting democratic forces in Serbia by restarting accession talks with Serbia as soon as possible.

Serbia's neighbors certainly understand the importance of such pragmatism. As Kosovo Prime Minister Agim Ceku recently noted, "the international community needs to find a way to stimulate democratic Serbia while sidelining the radicals."⁹ Sidelining the "radicals" in this case most especially means that Washington should reconsider its policy of avoiding all dealings with the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), whose leader, Vojislav Šešelj, is currently on trial for war crimes in The Hague. The SRS is known for its extremist rhetoric and little else, but in a country with so many refu-

⁷ See Timothy William Waters, "Why Insist on the Surrender of Ratko Mladic?", *The New York Times*, 12 May 2006, p. A33.

⁸ See, for instance, Nicholas Wood, "Kosovo War-Crimes Trials Splits West and Prosecutors", *The New York Times*, 8 April 2007.

⁹ See Agim Ceku, "Succeeding in Kosovo", *The Washington Post*, 12 December 2006.

gees and a devastated economy they can count on the support of anywhere between 30-35 percent of the electorate, and there is a serious possibility that if Kosovo is granted independence its support could increase substantially. American officials refuse to deal with SRS officials, but this is a policy whose logic is becoming weaker and weaker. The SRS is not monolithic: it has extreme and moderate factions, and initiating even low level contacts with the party will move the moderates into a more responsible, mainstream direction and marginalize the extremists, which will be of considerable benefit to domestic Serbian politics. A more flexible U.S. policy can speed this process along, and the sooner this is done, the better.

Stabilizing Serbia – and, by extension, southeastern Europe as a whole – requires a new approach to dealing with Belgrade. Just like generals fighting the last war, however, far too many policymakers in Washington and some European capitals have yet to recognize that Slobodan Milošević is dead and the challenge for U.S. and E.U. policy when dealing with Belgrade today is different from that of the 1990s. Then, the task was containing a malevolent dictator; today, the challenge is to foster an international environment that will guarantee the success of the democratic transition in what is strategically the most important country in the Balkans. The assassination of former Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjić in March 2003 should be a tragic reminder of the difficulties and dangers post-Milošević political forces in Belgrade are facing. They need American and European understanding and support.

Historical Opportunities

Richard Holbrooke often points out that U.S. and E.U. engagement in the region is about more than altruism. Problems in southeastern Europe quickly become European problems, and European problems, sooner or later, create problems for American security interests. To take but one example: several of the September 11 hijackers had been trained or fought in Bosnia in the 1990s, and for this and many other reasons Washington has a strong interest in the region, and in seeing the Balkans transition and integration process through to a successful conclusion.

Doing so, however, will require devoting more attention to the region than either Washington or Brussels currently seem willing to do. One of Europe's most knowledgeable Balkan hands, Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt, has warned that if the E.U.'s doors are closed to the remaining Balkan states it would "take away the guiding beacon which has guided the reform policies of the region for the past few years. Instead of the magnet of European integration, we might well go back to seeing the policies of

the region driven by the fears and prejudices of nationalism.”¹⁰ Jacques Paul Klein, another old Balkan hand, puts the issue facing the EU in the following terms – either the E.U. accelerates the western Balkans’ accession to the union, or these countries enter the E.U. on their own – one person at a time. As former Macedonian prime minister Vlado Bučkovski has expressed the concerns of many Balkan political leaders, absent a clear timetable from the E.U. as to when the various countries of the Western Balkans may join, “it will be very difficult for us pro-Western and pro-European reformers to continue the political fight.”¹¹

At the moment, many regional leaders are closely watching to see how the E.U. deals with Croatia’s membership bid. Croatia is by most measures a more suitable candidate for E.U. membership than either Bulgaria or Romania, so the problem in integrating Croatia is more a matter of internal E.U. politics than of Croatia’s political or economic suitability. All of these things combined – accelerating Croatia’s E.U. accession timetable, stabilizing Serbia and providing support to its democratic forces, continuing to provide strong security guarantees to all the states in the region and giving them foreseeable prospects for joining the E.U. – will go a long way to ensuring that the transition process in the Balkans is successful.

While much can still go wrong in southeastern Europe, the current political moment also presents a very rare historical opportunity. For the first time in centuries, the region is not divided between rival empires or power blocs, and all the Balkan states share the same foreign and domestic policy goals – internally, political democratization and the creation of market economies, and externally, integration into NATO, the E.U. and other Euro-Atlantic institutions. Whether these efforts succeed or fail largely depends on decisions that will be made outside the region. What is clear, however, is that this is a rare political moment when historical change can be accomplished in the Balkans for a relatively modest price.

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¹⁰ See Carl Bildt, “On the Periphery of Europe”, *Internationale Politik*, Transatlantic Edition (Summer 2006), 27.

¹¹ Nicholas Wood, “Nationalism Still a Threat in Macedonia,” *The New York Times*, 4 July 2006.

ABSTRACTS

Vladimir P. Petrović

PRE-ROMAN AND ROMAN DARDANIA
HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This paper on Pre-Roman and Roman Dardania is an attempt to review, in a somewhat restricted article form, several important issues marking the development of the Dardanian areas in a period between the earliest references to the Dardani in written sources and their inclusion in the administrative structure of the Roman Empire. Historical developments preceding the Roman conquest of Dardania are analyzed, as well as its boundaries, and the character and administrative structure of the conquered territory. Changes that Dardanian society underwent are paid special attention, and phases in the development of urban centres and communications outlined.

Sanja Pilipović

HEROIC THEMES OF THE TROJAN CYCLE IN ROMAN FUNERARY ART
EXAMPLE OF A RELIEF FROM PINCUM

The fragment of a marble relief from Roman *Pincum* (modern-day Veliko Gradište, Serbia) showing Achilles and Hector inspires to explore the symbolic meaning of this mythological composition and to examine other reliefs depicting heroic themes of the Trojan Cycle in the funerary art not only of Upper Moesia but also of other provinces of the Empire, notably Noricum and Pannonia. Based on the available data, a reconstruction of the original appearance of the funerary monument with the relief of Achilles and Hector from Pincum is attempted, and the inscription discovered along with it analyzed. Also, the importance of Pincum itself is shown, an archaeological site in the Upper Moesian Limes area which remains insufficiently investigated.

Tanja Petrović

SUCH WERE THE TIMES

SERBIAN PEASANT WOMEN BORN IN THE 1920S AND 1930S AND THE STORIES OF THEIR LIVES

Eight life stories of peasant women from Serbia born in the 1920s and 1930s serve as a basis for analyzing two phenomena characteristic of the Serbian patriarchal family: marriage against the woman's will and her subordinate position in the family. The analysis points to the ways in which the women themselves perceive these phenomena and to verbal strategies they use in constructing their life stories.

Iskra Likomanova

"PEOPLE IN MY LIFE"

(PICTURE OF SOCIALIZATION)

In every life history the narrator introduces different personalities she has known, met, worked or lived with in a different/specific way. It is done in the context of frequent topics such as work, home, school etc. The paper introduces notions such as *narrative presence* (subjectivity) and *life presence* (objectivity); mentioned once and mentioned repeatedly; positive and negative emotional contexts for the personality presented etc. The analysis suggests a matrix of the narrator's internal and external socialization.

Smilja Marjanović-Dušanić

PATTERNS OF MARTYRIAL SANCTITY IN THE ROYAL IDEOLOGY OF MEDIEVAL SERBIA: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

Especially important for the development of the holy king concept with the Serbs appears to be the early period of Serbian sovereignty, initially in Zeta, and subsequently in Raška under Stefan Nemanja and his descendants. During the eleventh century, cults of royal martyrs arise across the Slavic world, receiving a most enthusiastic response connected with the spread of the martyrial and monastic ideals in Byzantium. The cult of St Vladimir is the earliest royal saint's cult with the Serbs, and it is rightfully set apart from the ideologically consistent whole encompassing the subsequent cults of the Nemanjić rulers. **The cult of this royal saint undergoes a change in the twelfth century as regards the image of the exemplary ruler.** The martyrial cults of holy kings emerge in medieval Serbia only in the fifteenth century, under the influence of completely different motives. **The cults of national royal saints associate domestic dynasties with the Old Testament-based traditions of God-chosenness, which play a central role in the processes of se-**

curing political legitimation for ruling houses. At the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, we can see both the national and universal relics being used for raising an awareness of chosenness, observable in expanding the sacred realm as the fatherland's prayerful shield. In that sense, all-Christian relics, especially those of Constantinopolitan provenance, become integrated into domestic traditions.

Boško Bojović

MOUNT ATHOS, WALLACHIAN PRINCES (VOYVODES),
JOHN KASTRIOTIS, AND THE ALBANIAN TOWER, A DEPENDENCY OF
HILANDAR

After the Ottoman conquest of the Balkan states, the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia, now the sultan's vassals, assumed responsibility for the Athonite monasteries. Reference in their donation charters to the founders of Hilandar Simeon Nemanja and St Sava ensured liturgical continuity, their names being added to a string of distinguished historical figures mentioned in prayers, which contributed to the legitimacy and prestige of their power. The absence of such names from the charters to the Albanian Tower, or the Church of St Elias, two dependencies of Hilandar, may be explained by the fact that their founders were not that famous. Securing refuge at the time of the Ottoman invasion, John Kastriotis donated two villages to Hilandar in 1426, and in 1430 made an arrangement (*adelphaton*) for lifetime use of the Tower on behalf of his four sons. One of them died on Mt Athos in 1431, and John himself, now monk Joachim, died in 1437. All the evidence testifies to close and long-lived connections between Albanian feudal lords and the Serbian imperial *laura*.

Mirjana Tatić-Djurić

THE VIRGIN LYXNIA IN ART AND HYMNOLOGY

In the composition "Prophets have announced you" in the narthex of the Volcano church in the Peloponnesus, two Moschos brothers painted the image of the *Virgin Lychnia* with a seven-branch candelabrum as one of her Old Testament prefigurations. A candlestick with seven branches of pure gold is referred to in Exodus 25 : 31-40; as a symbol of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit in the Book of Revelation 4 : 5; and with a glass and seven lamps in Zechariah 4 : 2-3. The seven-branched candelabrum has a long history in art and may be traced back to the wall-painting of Dura Europos or to an illumination in Cosmas Indicopleustes' *Christian Topography*. In liturgical poetry and hymnology, inexhaustible source for understanding the image of the Virgin as *Lychnia*, she is described as *Maria Illuminatrix*. Like

God's temple and God's lamp, the Virgin Lychnia symbolizes the light of the whole world spreading like the triple light of three holy suns and reflecting the glory of God before the creation of the world.

Ljubinka Trgovčević

THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN SERBIAN CULTURE

The Enlightenment, mostly in its Austrian form, influenced in many ways the Serbs both in the Habsburg Empire and in the Principality of Serbia, still under Ottoman suzerainty. First, its emphasis on the value of knowledge and science raised the awareness of the importance of education and contributed to its development. Religious tolerance and anticlericalism placed Orthodox Serbs side by side with representatives of other nations and religions and helped them to liberate themselves from the strong traditionalist impact of their church. Both education and a new awareness of their own rights strengthened national consciousness, eventually leading to the creation of a nation state and modern national culture.

Miroslav Svirčević

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SERBIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE COUNTIES OF NIŠ, VRANJE, TOPLICA AND PIROT SUBSEQUENT TO THE SERBO-TURKISH WARS OF 1876–1878

In the wake of the Serbo-Turkish wars of 1876–77 and the 1878 Congress of Berlin the process of establishing local government in the newly-liberated areas began. The process of incorporating the so-called *New Areas* into the legal system of pre-war Serbia took five years (1877–82) and went through four phases. The first phase began with the Second Serbo-Turkish war and lasted to the border demarcation between the principalities of Serbia and Bulgaria in 1878. It was marked by the establishment of provisional local authorities, carried out by the representative of the Serbian government in the Supreme Army Command. In the second phase permanent local institutions were established in the *New Areas* in order to harmonize their administrative and judicial structure with that of pre-war Serbia. In the third phase the agrarian reform was carried out in order to abolish feudal relations, while protecting the property rights of the former Muslim landowners in compliance with Article 39 of the Berlin Treaty. In the fourth phase the question of resettling the "New Serbian Areas" was being resolved after the significant population change brought about by the Second Serbo-Turkish War. The focus of the paper is on the first two phases.

Milan St. Protić**SOURCES OF THE IDEOLOGY OF THE SERBIAN RADICAL MOVEMENT
1881–1903**

The sources of the ideology of Serbian Radicalism were twofold: imported and domestic. The imported (or foreign) influences came in three major waves: 1) European (especially Russian) socialist, anarchist, and populist traditions, mainly influencing the group round Svetozar Marković and covering the period described as rudimentary Radicalism; 2) strong influence of the French Radical movement both in terms of political programme and organization; 3) British parliamentary and constitutional theory, fully accepted by the Radicals in Serbia by the late 1880s. The ideas drawn from European political experience needed to be transformed, changed, and adapted to suit the specific Serbian political environment. The internal (or domestic) sources of Radicalism were the specific political circumstances of Serbian society: political expressions emerging from the ruler, on the one hand, and from political parties, on the other, fundamentally influenced and modified the Radical ideology.

Dušan T. Bataković**NIKOLA PAŠIĆ, THE RADICALS AND THE “BLACK HAND”
CHALLENGES TO PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN SERBIA
1903–1917**

Given that the issue of the functioning of parliamentary democracy in Serbia 1903–1914 has not been thoroughly explored, an attempt is made to define the capacities of Serbia's parliamentary system confronted with military interferences in political processes. The paper looks at the conflict between the democratic forces, led by the Prime Minister Nikola Pašić and his Radicals, and a group of conspirators within the army, which in 1911 formed a clandestine society “Unification or Death” (Black Hand), led by D. Dimitrijević Apis. Political influence of the army significantly increased with the dynastic change effected in 1903. In a predominantly rural society (almost 90 percent of the population) the army took up the function of the middle class and its mission to expedite the process of national liberation. Due to unconstitutional and non-parliamentary actions of military circles, the period may be described as one of fragile but functional democracy. Seeking to suppress the army's praetorian aspirations, Pašić and the Radicals took various measures to force it into its constitutional role. Sharpened during the First World War, the conflict led in 1917 to a show trial known as the Salonica Trial. The leaders of the Black Hand were sentenced to death and executed. Similar trials stood by military conspiracies in other

European countries during the Great War show that democracy is always threatened in times of extreme crisis such as war. In that sense, Pašić may have deemed the extreme measures against the Black Hand necessary for the preservation of the democratic system established in 1903.

Vojislav Pavlović

FRANCE AND THE SERBIAN GOVERNMENT'S YUGOSLAV PROJECT

The French government and statesmen had never considered the creation of a unified South-Slav state as an objective of the Great War. Officially acquainted with the project through the Niš Declaration in December 1914, they remained silent on the issue, as it involved both the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy and, following the Treaty of London in May 1915, an open conflict with Italy. In neither case, then, did French diplomacy deem it useful to trigger such a shift in the balance of power in Europe just to grant the wishes of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Naturally, in the spring of 1918 the dismantlement of Austria-Hungary was envisaged, but with the view to weakening the adversary camp, while the destiny of the Yugoslav provinces remained undecided. Moreover, war imperatives required extreme caution in relation to Italian intransigency. The Italian veto weighed heavily on French politics, to the extent that even the actual realization of the Yugoslav project, proclamation of a unified state on 1 December 1918 in Belgrade, took place without a consent or implicit support on the part of the French government.

Ana S. Trbovich

NATION-BUILDING UNDER THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SCEPTRE CROATO-SERB ANTAGONISM AND COOPERATION

In the nineteenth century many European nations, including Serbs and Croats, became politically conscious of their "nationhood", which became a contributory factor in the crumbling of the two great empires in Central-East Europe – the Habsburg and the Ottoman – at the beginning of the following century. The Serbs had, since medieval times, an awareness of their long history and tradition, great medieval civilization and cultural unity, regardless of the fact that they lived under several different administrations. As in the case of Habsburg Serbs, language and literature became building blocks of Croat national consciousness in the nineteenth century. Unlike Serb nationalism centred on people, Croat nationalism was mainly territory-related. Since both Serbs and Croats inhabited the Austro-Hungarian provinces claimed by the Croats as their "historical right" (absorption in 1097 of the small medieval Croat state by the Hungarians is inter-

preted, by many Croat historians, as a voluntary act of union), the different conceptions of nationalism resulted in competing claims. Croatian politics became one of opposing any recognition of Serbian institutions and cultural characteristics without Serbs previously accepting the concept that the only 'political nation' in the Austro-Hungarian Province of Croatia was Croatian. Nonetheless, Croats compromised when in need of Serb assistance in opposing Hungarian domination. In turn, Serb politics was divided between those supporting cooperation with the Croats in order to achieve greater autonomy from the Hungarians in the Dual Monarchy, and those who supported some cooperation but insisted on forming an entity separate from the Croats in the future and joining with the Kingdom of Serbia, which regained its independence in 1878. The ensuing world and civil wars brought the Croato-Serb conflict to the fore, with the first and the second Yugoslavia failing to accommodate the two nations' opposing aspirations.

Alexis Troude

FRANCO-SERBIAN RELATIONS WITHIN THE ARMÉE D'ORIENT 1915-1918

The paper offers an atypical approach to the Franco-Serbian collaboration on the Salonica Front in that it seeks to view it from the perspective of participants rather than to base itself on reports submitted by the respective military commands. Interesting and frequently contradictory personal experiences drawn from the encounter of two culturally and geographically remote worlds reflect the daily life of French and Serbian soldiers. Observing Franco-Serbian relations at three parallel levels – everyday contacts on the front, support of French scholars and intellectuals to Serbia, and diplomatic relations between the two countries – the paper builds an argumentation for the process of establishing French influence in Serbia and the Balkans.

Traian Sandu

ROMANIAN-SERBIAN RELATIONS AND THE BANAT QUESTION DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Relations between Serbia and Romania throughout the war are viewed from the standpoint of the two countries' rivalling claims on the Banat and within the framework of power balance in the Allied camp with an emphasis on the position of the Romanian government and statesmen. Obviously, Romania's position was more favourable during the first two war years as the Allies sought to win her over for the Entente. Thus the Banat was included in compensations for her entering the war on the side of the Allies. Romania's defeat, however, produced a complete shift in the balance

of power, with Romania now in an unenviable position, especially following the breach of the Salonica Front in September 1918. From the Romanian perspective, the Banat's destiny also depended on divergent political positions on the domestic scene. The fate of the Banat was eventually decided by the advancing Serbian army which took the whole territory, though under French command. The final decision became a responsibility of the Paris Peace Conference.

Saša Mišić

SERBO-ALBANIAN BANK IN ALBANIA 1925–1927

The *Serbo-Albanian Bank* was founded at Cetinje in 1922, at the time Yugoslav-Albanian diplomatic relations were established, with the purpose of opening its branch offices in Albania in order to contribute to closer economic relations between the two neighbouring countries. The Bank was unable to achieve its goal in the first two years of operation, as it had not obtained the necessary licenses from the Albanian authorities. The branch office in Scutari was opened only in early 1925. Another topical issue at the time was the creation of the *Albanian National Bank* as the central monetary institution that would function as a regulator of the entire economic life of Albania. Supported by the Yugoslav state, the *Serbo-Albanian Bank* planned its transformation into an Albanian central bank, but without success. Namely, it was Italian capital that assumed a leading role in the *Albanian National Bank* founded in September 1925. In spite of this failure, the branch office of the *Serbo-Albanian Bank* commenced its operations in Albania. Under its roof, it set up the Privileged Trading Agency, and expressed interest in obtaining exploration and excavation concessions for the copper mine in the region of Puka in northern Albania. It was granted the concession by the Albanian government, but failed to set up a copper exploitation company. Facing numerous difficulties, the major of which was lack of the necessary cash for operation and significant business losses in Albania, the branch office was closed in 1927, pursuant to the decision of the Cetinje headquarters.

Jean-Paul Besse

THE EPHEMERAL CROATIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH AND ITS BOSNIAN EXTENSION

The so-called Croatian Orthodox Church was an ephemeral creation of the Ustachi regime founded in 1942 in Croatia. The analysis of its founder Malsinov, an archbishop of the Russian Orthodox Church in exile, doubtlessly reveals his anti-communist motives, which were also behind his co-

operation with the Romanian Orthodox Church through Metropolitan Bessarion. The two prelates ordained Spyridon Mifka as bishop of Sarajevo, an extension of the same Croatian Orthodox Church. The anti-communist aspect of this cooperation continued in exile following the establishment of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe. The climate and reasons that led Maslinov to become the head of this phantom institution, however, cannot be fully elucidated at present.

Milan Ristović

THE DECEMBER REVOLT IN ATHENS
BRITISH INTERVENTION AND YUGOSLAV REACTION
DECEMBER 1944 – JANUARY 1945

The revolt that members and supporters of the leftist movement EAM-ELAS staged in Athens in early December 1944 against the Greek royal and British forces ushered into the second “round” of the civil war in Greece. The developments in the neighbourhood draw much attention in Yugoslavia, where the war of liberation was in its final phases in parallel with the elimination of political rivals to the new government in which communists played a central role. This attention was not only a result of ideological solidarity, it also had to do with the “Macedonian Question”, i.e. the position of Slavic Macedonian minority in northern Greece, an issue that had aroused a debate between Greek and Yugoslav communists in 1944. Difficulties in relations between the Yugoslav partisan leadership and the British, pressure from London, the passivity of the Soviet Union as regards the developments in Athens, a stalemate on the Srem Front, fights with the remaining collaborationist forces, compelled Yugoslavia to take a reserved position and avoid direct involvement in Greece. Appeals of Greek communists for aid in military supplies, promised on the eve of the revolt, failed to provoke a tangible response of the Yugoslav leadership. Once the revolt was crushed by the British and a truce between the EAM-ELAS and the royal government signed, a wave of migration to Yugoslavia ensued of the borderland civilian Slavic Macedonian population but also of several thousand radical Greek leftists unwilling to accept the Varkiza agreement.

Gordon N. Bardos

THE BALKANS’ NEW POLITICAL DYNAMICS

The Balkans is currently going through its most profound period of change since Slobodan Milošević’s overthrow in October 2000. Montenegro has declared its independence from the state union of Serbia and Montenegro; the Kosovo future status talks are in their final stages and by all indications

will suggest some form of independence for the Serbian province; new governments are in place in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia; while the results of Serbia's January 2007 elections suggest that Serbian politics will be unstable for the foreseeable future. All of this is occurring at a time when two of the pillars promoting stability in the Balkans – a substantial U.S. military presence and the foreseeable prospect of EU accession for the countries of the region – are being withdrawn. Meanwhile, a new variable is being introduced into the strategic equation in the region – the return of Russia as a serious player. As a result of all of these new developments, without a more serious commitment to the region from both Washington and Brussels over the next few years, there is a serious likelihood that the democratic and economic transitions in the region will suffer serious setbacks or delays.

HISTOIRE DU PEUPLE SERBE, SOUS LA DIRECTION DE DUŠAN T. BATAKOVIĆ.
LAUSANNE : L'AGE D'HOMME, 2005. Pp. 386.

Présenté par Georges Castellan

Je voudrais tout d'abord souligner le soin qu'ont mis les éditeurs pour produire un livre dont la présentation extérieure est excellente et du meilleur effet. Qu'ils me permettent toutefois une remarque préliminaire : il est indiqué quatre auteurs sous la direction du Professeur Bataković, mais il n'est nulle part précisé la participation exacte de chacun d'eux : c'est regrettable, car le lecteur aime savoir à qui il doit les pages qu'il lit. Par contre, les très abondantes petites photographies illustrant les chapitres avec les portraits d'hommes politiques, d'évêques, d'écrivains et de savants font de ce récit un véritable dictionnaire des « grands hommes » de l'histoire serbe. Joint à de nombreux textes, de documents des différentes époques, on a ainsi une « somme » très riche du millénaire parcouru.

Devant une telle « richesse », il n'est pas question pour moi de suivre, siècle après siècle, l'aventure historique du peuple serbe. Je me contenterai donc de m'arrêter sur certains grands faits qui en ont marqué les étapes. J'en retiendrai quatre :

1. La question des origines du peuple et de l'État serbes
2. Le problème des territoires où les Serbes se sont établis
3. Le développement de l'idée yougoslave parmi les Serbes
4. Les conséquences possibles de « l'Histoire du peuple serbe », telle qu'elle est exposée dans cet livre.

1. La question des origines du peuple et de l'État serbes

Les origines sont clairement évoquées par les déplacements des peuples que les Grecs du VI^e siècle après J.-C. désignaient comme les Slaves. Parmi ces tribus en perpétuel mouvement pour la conquête de territoires, se trouvent les Serbes venus de la région de la Vistule et dont on rencontre des traces dans la toponymie des régions balkaniques jusqu'au nord du domaine des Grecs. Une note marginale précise l'origine du nom des Serbes – qui désigne un peuple dont les communautés allaient déboucher sur des entités étatiques. C'est ce qui se produisit au IX^e siècle. L'empereur de Byzance Constantin Porphyrogénète (912-959) indique comme faisant partie du « domaine serbe » les régions de Bosnie, d'Herzégovine, de la Dalmatie et la région côtière entre les bouches du Kotor et la rivière Bojana, désignée comme la Dioclée. Au nord, la Rascie (Raška) était la zone dans laquelle s'était établie la communauté serbe la plus stable. Est-ce dans cette région que l'on trouve la première dynastie serbe ? Ce n'est pas explicité dans l'Histoire citée qui fournit par contre un tableau précis de cette dynastie qui dura depuis le prince (*knez*) Višeslav (2^e moitié du VIII^e siècle) jusqu'à Časlav [Klonimirović], mort en 950 en luttant contre les Hongrois.

C'est à ce moment, en tout cas, que les Serbes furent christianisés. L'auteur du livre précise qu'il « n'existe pas de documents fiables au sujet de la conversion des Serbes au christianisme ». Et d'ajouter : « On sait seulement que ce processus s'est poursuivi durant plusieurs siècles. » Il énumère alors les conditions de la « christianisation » : d'abord l'établissement d'une organisation ecclésiastique sur l'ensemble du territoire des implantations serbes – puis le développement de l'alphabétisation, enfin l'apparition des premières communautés étatiques. Ces conditions furent réunies lorsque les apôtres Cyrille et Méthode et leurs disciples développèrent l'alphabet glagolitique et par-delà l'aventure de Bodin de Dioclée, les Nemanjić mirent sur pied la première construction étatique durable pour encadrer le peuple serbe. Ce fut l'action de Stefan Nemanjić, que l'on appela le « premier couronné » (en 1217). Son frère Sava, moine du Mont Athos, fut le créateur de l'Église serbe dont il devint le premier métropolite résidant au monastère de Žiža. Les Serbes disposèrent, à partir de là, d'une Église et d'une organisation étatique constituant au début du XIII^e siècle un élément fort des Balkans de cette époque. La période des origines se terminait là pour le peuple serbe.

En conclusion, ce problème difficile a été traité avec beaucoup de prudence par les auteurs qui s'appuyèrent sur des documents irréfutables conduisant à des positions solides. Il mérite donc l'adhésion des historiens.

2. Le problème des territoires sur lesquels se sont établis les Serbes

Le livre est intitulé *Histoire du peuple serbe* et tout naturellement traite des territoires occupés par ce peuple. La liste en est longue : on rencontre des Serbes au Monténégro, dans la république de Dubrovnik, en Croatie et en Slavonie, dans la Hongrie du Sud et dans la République de Venise. Tout cela est conforme à des situations

qui ont évolué au cours des siècles. Pour la Dalmatie vénitienne, on note la présence de nombreux réfugiés de l'Empire ottoman – les Morlaques – dont on dit très justement : « La majeure partie d'entre eux était constituée de Serbes orthodoxes, mais on y trouvait également des groupes de catholiques romains » (p. 132). Vient ensuite les trois guerres entre Venise et les Ottomans : la guerre de Candie (1645–1669), de Morée (1684–1699) et celle de 1714 à 1718. Dans ces guerres, on nous dit que des Serbes – les Uskoks et les haïdouks « se couvrirent de gloire » et qu'un groupe d'entre eux parvint même jusqu'à la Save.

« La guerre de Candie a forgé une nouvelle race de guerriers indomptables, robustes et ivres de vengeance », ayant acquis l'habitude des opérations militaires et des rapines, habitude qu'ils conservèrent en période de paix. Il n'est pas surprenant qu'une telle époque soit apparue comme une ère épique de l'histoire serbe. « Jamais, en effet, autant de chants épiques ne furent chantés et jamais ils n'eurent une influence aussi grande sur les générations à venir. Cette époque fit éclore des héros de grande renommée. » Tout cela est fort bien venu, mais on aurait aimé connaître les rapports entre ces soldats de l'Empereur Habsbourg ou de la République de Venise avec l'administration centrale de Vienne ou de Venise : fournissait-elle l'encadrement militaire, les armes ? Il y a là quelque ambiguïté pour ces Serbes combattants antiturcs.

Par contre, sous l'égide de la République vénitienne, on voit qu'ils étaient soumis à une pression ininterrompue afin qu'ils changent de religion. Et l'auteur de rappeler le grand rôle joué pour la « défense des activités culturelles et spirituelles serbes par les monastères de Krka, Krupa et Dragović ». Une phrase du livre pose un problème à ce sujet : « Le plus important de ces monastères était celui de Krka, dont l'origine remonte, selon la tradition

populaire, à Hélène, sœur de l'empereur Dušan, qui était mariée à un notable croate Šubić. Noyau de l'orthodoxie dans ces régions, ce monastère a représenté une cible fréquente pour les autorités catholiques ». Ce passage me semblerait demander explication : unissant un Croate à un centre de l'Église orthodoxe, à une époque – le XVII^e siècle – où l'Église de Rome vivait la période de la Contre-Réforme.

Ceci amène le lecteur à poser la question : à quelle époque fait-on remonter la « prise de conscience nationale » des Serbes ? Quel a été le rôle des « chansons populaires » faisant appel au tsar Dušan dans cette prise de conscience ? Il y a là pour l'histoire des Serbes un grand problème qui méritait d'être clairement abordé et explicité. Car comme les autres peuples des Balkans, les Croates, les Grecs, les Albanais, il est difficile d'accorder à chacun d'entre eux un « territoire » qui lui soit propre, jusqu'à la formation des États au début des XIX^e et XX^e siècles.

3. Le développement de « l'idée yougoslave » parmi les Serbes

Cette idée d'une Union des Slaves du Sud est clairement indiquée dans ses origines : elles sont croates. Elle est née en Croatie dans les années 1830, sous la forme du *mouvement illyrien*, avec l'écrivain Ljudevit Gaj comme leader. Celui-ci fit en 1846 et 1847 plusieurs voyages dans la Principauté de Serbie et collabora avec un mouvement serbe issu du *Načertanije* de Garašanin de 1844. Aux territoires serbes déjà cités dans le « projet », ceux qui, Serbes ou Croates, s'intitulaient « patriotes » ajoutaient volontiers le Srem, la Bačka, le Banat, soustraits aux Habsbourg par l'Union à la Serbie et au Monténégro. Les Révolutions de 1848–49 vinrent mettre un terme à ces projets, mais ils subsistaient et s'élargirent en s'appuyant sur la réforme linguistique de Karadžić, puisqu'il est écrit dans l'ouvrage : « le mouvement national croate répandit progressivement l'adjec-

tif croate » à presque tous les catholiques de dialecte štokavien (p. 269). Qu'il y ait eu des exagérations des disciples de Kvačernik, c'est certain, mais l'idée yougoslave était également propagée par l'évêque croate Strossmayer qui lui aussi avait des liaisons avec des cercles de Belgrade. Il n'en est pas ainsi exact d'écrire : « A la fin du XIX^e siècle, le mouvement *yougoslave* en Croatie et en Slavonie avait pour but ultime l'Union des Yougoslaves sous le sceptre de la dynastie des Habsbourg ». En effet, nul n'envisageait, à cette époque, l'effondrement de la Double Monarchie.

Au début du XX^e siècle, cette idée prit une forme nouvelle. Une intelligentsia libérale s'était formée tant à Belgrade qu'à Zagreb et s'inspirait des théories du mouvement panslave de Thomas Masaryk qui eut une grande influence dans les milieux intellectuels, surtout en Croatie et en Dalmatie. C'est parmi cette intelligentsia que naquit la théorie de l'unité des Serbes, des Croates et des Slovènes, considérés comme les trois entités d'un seul peuple *yougoslave*.

En Serbie, l'idée prit une forme particulière. A la fin du XIX^e siècle, l'élite culturelle serbe considérait que les Serbes et les Croates, peuples voisins, demeuraient cependant séparés par les traditions religieuses ; catholicisme romain et orthodoxie de Byzance. Ilija Garašanin avait bien déclaré que Serbes et Croates constituaient un seul peuple, le *peuple yougoslave*, mais divisé en trois communautés religieuses.

A la veille de la Première Guerre mondiale, Nikola Pašić, chef du gouvernement à Belgrade, prenait acte de ces liens tout en affirmant que seule « la Serbie pouvait supporter le poids de l'union » (p. 270). Ce fut également l'idée du roi Pierre I^{er} lors de son accession au trône en 1903. Notons aussi que jusqu'aux Guerres Balkaniques, l'idée de l'union s'étendait également aux Bulgares. En 1914, on peut dire que les concepts de la « Grande

Serbie » et de la « Yougoslavie » apparaissent synonymes pour les Serbes, mais qu'il existait des différences sensibles dans les conceptions de l'« Union ».

La Première Guerre mondiale vint bouleverser tous ces plans. Pašić estimait que la Serbie avait besoin d'être un « Grand État » et fin août 1914, le gouvernement de Belgrade forma une commission composée de savants avec pour tâche d'élaborer un programme d'Union Yougoslave. Le 7 décembre 1914, le gouvernement serbe publiait la « Déclaration de Niš » qui répondait au vœu d'Union. La politique officielle serbe mettait alors en tête de ses objectifs la création d'un « État commun des Slaves du Sud ». Mais l'ouvrage du Prof. Bataković note clairement: « L'idée yougoslave fut acceptée par la force des choses, non par conviction. Seuls quelques universitaires et intellectuels avaient développé le concept d'Union des Slaves du Sud et de leurs intérêts communs nationaux et étatiques et avaient sincèrement adhéré à une telle vision. La Déclaration de Niš, enveloppée dans les habits de l'union nationale des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, trouvait motivation dans les besoins immédiats de la Serbie, dont la survie était menacée par la guerre. » Cette constatation très nette explique les événements qui ont conduit à l'acte du 1er décembre 1918 : la proclamation à Belgrade dans la résidence du roi de l'Union des peuples Serbes, Croates, Slovènes, dans un nouvel État bientôt appelé *Yougoslavie*. En fait, le sort du peuple serbe dépendait depuis 1915 des Puissances de l'Entente. Pour leur plaire et faire face à une situation dramatique, le gouvernement serbe réfugié à Corfou et le Comité yougoslave de Ante Trumbić rassemblant les émigrés slaves d'Autriche-Hongrie se réunirent à Corfou et déclarèrent la volonté d'organiser un « État commun des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes » sous l'autorité d'un roi de la dynastie des Karageorgević. Ce fut la Déclaration de

Corfou du 20 juillet 1917, dont on souligne – à juste titre – le caractère « discutable » aussi bien du point de vue juridique que politique.

Mais par la suite, le gouvernement serbe fut entraîné dans des discussions fort complexes avec les Alliés: les Américains attendirent juin 1918 pour reconnaître les bases de l'accord de Corfou, la France mentionna pour la première fois le 19 juin 1918 un « État yougoslave », l'Angleterre la suivit le 28 juillet.

L'effondrement de l'Autriche-Hongrie apportait des complications supplémentaires que Pašić s'efforça de résoudre et qui conduisirent à l'acte – quelque peu clandestine – du 1^{er} décembre 1918 proclamant solennellement « l'Union du royaume de Serbie et des pays de l'État indépendant des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes en un Royaume Uni des Serbes, Croates, Slovènes ». L'idée *yougoslave* triomphait à ce moment.

L'ouvrage de Dušan T. Bataković rend compte de cet événement de façon claire et complète avec son lot d'imprévoyances et d'ambiguïtés. C'est une bonne analyse historique.

Je terminerai par une évocation rapide des

4. *Conséquences possibles du livre Histoire du peuple serbe dans la conjoncture actuelle*
Au lendemain de la mort de Tito figure dans le livre un chapitre intitulé « Vers la désintégration de la Yougoslavie ». Il ne comporte que cinq pages : c'est peu. Il est vrai que les auteurs y ont joint une « chronologie » de 1990 à 1992 fort complète. Personnellement, j'aurais préféré que cette *Histoire du peuple serbe* s'arrêtât à 1980, à la mort de Tito. La suite mériterait une grande étude. Mais sans doute est-il trop tôt pour la rédiger.

En conclusion, nous sommes en présence d'un livre solide, clair, qui donne un bon exposé de l'aventure historique du peuple serbe. Il sera, j'en suis persuadé, bien accueilli à Belgrade. Aura-t-il le

même succès à Zagreb, Banja Luka, Sarajevo, Tirana, Podgorica, Sofia et Athènes? C'est moins sur. Cet exposé de « l'Histoire du peuple serbe » risque de heurter des voisins dont l'Histoire fut différente, voire hostile. Et quelle sera leur attitude lors-

que la Serbie sera candidate à l'Europe ? C'est un problème auquel il faut réfléchir. Car par son ampleur et son importance, ce livre est un événement marquant de l'histoire contemporaine des Serbes.

BRANISLAV TODIĆ & MILKA ČANAK-MEDIĆ, *MANASTIR DEČANI* [MONASTERY OF DEČANI]. BELGRADE: MUSEUM AT PRIŠTINA, CENTRE FOR PROTECTION OF HERITAGE OF KOSOVO AND METOCHIA–MNEMOSYNE, SERBIAN ORTHODOX MONASTERY OF DEČANI, 2005. Pp. 535. ILLS. 432. PHOTO BRANISLAV STRUGAR.

Reviewed by Danica Popović

A little over a year after the monastery of Dečani had, quite belatedly, been added to the Unesco World Heritage list, a seminal monograph devoted to this Serbian holy shrine and magnificent work of medieval architecture and wall painting, by Branko Todić and Milka Čanak-Medić, was published. The book appeared in one of the most difficult periods in the monastery's 750-year-long history, the latest stage of which, much too often filled with dramatic events, has been befittingly termed the "Dečani Question" (D. T. Bataković, Belgrade, 1989; 2nd ed. 2007). In that way a bizarre continuity has been confirmed, and the fact has not passed unnoticed by the authors. Namely, through force of circumstance all the three scholarly monographs on Dečani conceived or published over the past century are associated with war times: the first, unrealized, was prepared during the Balkan Wars and WWI, while the second, penned by Vladimir R. Petković and Djurdje Bošković (*Manastir Dečani*, Belgrade 1941), was published in the early days of WWII. The latest was being written and prepared for publication against the background of the 1999 aggression of NATO powers and the 2004 outburst of Albanian violence against the Kosovo Serbs. As a result of these events, Dečani has become isolated from its mother country, in a hostile environment, and thus virtually inaccessible

to the faithful, to visitors and researchers. Telling in that sense is the fact that the publisher, the Priština Museum, functions as an institution in exile, struggling in gruelling conditions to preserve the Serbian cultural heritage in Kosovo and Metochia.

It seems difficult to think of a sharper contrast than that between the sad developments marking our times and those when Dečani was built. The first half of the 14th century was a flourishing time for the Serbian state to which the Nemanjić, "offspring from a holy root", ensured the aura of holiness. It was a time of all manner of accomplishments: military victories, territorial and economic expansion, remarkable upsurges of thought and spirit, outstanding literary and artistic achievements. Seen in that light, the foundation of king Stefan Uroš III (1322–31) is a true representative of its epoch. Following the tradition of Nemanjić *ktetorship* established by Studenica, Dečani not only encompassed all the previous achievements – the organization of monastic life, the cult of the holy founder, architecture, wall painting – but even surpassed them in format, richness and monumentality. Incalculable in itself, the value of Dečani becomes even greater considering the destruction suffered by its equally magnificent predecessors and successors such as king Milutin's Banjska and king Dušan's

Holy Archangels near Prizren. The endowment of king Stefan of Dečani assembled all the best, the most cherished and the most beautiful the Nemanjić had to offer to the Saviour for the salvation of the soul and eternal remembrance, but also for the glory of dynasty and “fatherland”. Construction of Dečani was one of those truly outstanding undertakings through which the Serbs, led by their elite, were seeking to achieve the status of a New Israel, ensuring their legitimate and deserved place in the existing order of nations.

Writing a monograph on a historic and artistic monument of that rank must be an ultimate professional challenge. The book by B. Todić and M. Čanak-Medić faces the challenge in an apt manner. Their study itself is an outstanding piece of work or, more precisely, it is the first modern synthetic study on the monastery’s history, art and treasures. It is written by experienced researchers and experts in not only medieval Serbian but also Byzantine art and architecture. As they themselves stress, they found support in the long and fruitful history of previous research, which has offered some valuable results in more recent times. Essential among them are *Dečanska riznica* by Mirjana Šakota [*The Treasury of Dečani*, Belgrade, 1984], *Dečani i vizantijska umetnost [Dečani and Byzantine art]* by V. J. Djurić (ed.) [Belgrade, 1989] and an extensive collection of works by the late Gordana Babić and her students *Zidno slikarstvo manastira Dečana. Gradnja i studije [The Wall-painting of Dečani. Documents and Studies]*, ed. V. J. Djurić, [Belgrade, 1995]. On the other hand, central to the conception and contents of the book was fieldwork research carried out by the authors themselves. M. Čanak-Medić had for almost a decade directed architectural investigation and restoration of the monastic complex and its church, while B. Todić had for many years studied its frescoes and other antiq-

uities. Finally, as it is always the case with masterpieces, every generation of scholars is left enough room for fresh perspectives and interpretations.

Setting about the task, the writers of this book were led by the intention to present the monastery of Dečani comprehensively, from its founding till this day. This means that the study encompassed its history, architecture, sculptural decoration and all the antiquities and treasures accumulated over the centuries. The focus of attention, a conceptual pivot of a sort, was the cult of the founder, the holy king Stefan of Dečani.

The very conception of the book rests on certain principles, some of which deserve special emphasis, for example the decision to present the long and often turbulent history of Dečani in its full continuity, that is, from its founding till this day. The results of this demanding approach are vital to a true understanding of Dečani’s purpose and role. Dečani is not just a representative “monument of culture” from a remote past and, as such, primarily an object of technical protection and scholarly attention. Originally intended as a House of God, Dečani has never ceased being a living organism with a liturgical function and social mission. Likewise, it was and still is the scene of significant, often dramatic, historical events. Another aspect, fully consistent with the views of modern scholarship, concerns the structure of the book, most of all the authors’ decision not to “isolate” the monastery’s treasury into a separate chapter. On the contrary, instead of being dislocated into an artificial, “museological” frame, the monastery’s illustrious valuables – icons, books, church vessels and vestments – including the greatest of all, the holy king’s relics, are viewed in a much more realistic and historically more credible context. One need not emphasize that such a manner of viewing past realities is one of the foremost tasks of a

methodologically well-founded historical science.

The important individual contributions making up the book should also be underlined, at least briefly. M. Čanak-Medić is responsible for the chapter on the original monastic compound, the architecture and sculpture of the monastery church. She views the monastic settlement as a spatial and architectural whole suited to the needs of communal life and guided by the idea of a higher order to which the monastic life is to be accommodated. Her presentation of its components, such as the monastery's fortifications, gateway tower and refectory, is documented with exquisite reconstructions. The focus of her attention, and with good reason, is the monastery church. In her recognizable manner, which means with exceptional thoroughness and credibility, with ample technical documentation, she discusses all the elements of the church – its ground-plan and structural system, the space and its decorative treatment, the shaping of its exterior, liturgical organization. Confirming the widespread recognition of Studenica as a prototype for the overall design of Dečani, an expression of commitment to hallowed models and everlasting values, she puts forward a number of fresh observations, especially concerning the origin of the architectural design. She traces it back to the east Mediterranean, most of all to Kotor cathedral, St Tryphon's, and to churches of Dubrovnik, but also farther afield, to the Venetian area, Tuscany and Umbria. Recapitulating the results of previous research, she demonstrates that the sculptural decoration of Dečani, an amazing combination of biblical scenes, real and imaginary plants and animals, and ornaments, is late Romanesque, but at the same time in full conformity with the spiritual ambience of an Orthodox church. So were its messages: all created beings, in their multiplicity and diversity, are a mirror of this world filled with the

struggle between virtue and sin. Similarly to psalms, they glorify God and at the same part partake in the artistic beauty of the church. Owing to M. Čanak-Medić, we now have a much deeper understanding of the roles played by the originator of the building and sculptural programme of Dečani – archbishop Danilo II, and the master builder – Fra Vita, who had the skill and the gift to confer a remarkable and beautiful form onto an exceptionally complex theological content.

B. Todić, in addition to the task of reviving more than seven and a half centuries of the monastery's life, wrote the pages devoted to the church frescoes. The magnitude of the challenge may be surmised from the fact that some ten years of frescoing resulted in about one thousand scenes and individual saintly figures combined into some twenty hagiographic and liturgical cycles. All the paintings were consistently arranged according to a carefully designed programme, which, as the author puts it, was a work of art in itself. While taking into account, scrupulously and deferentially, all the previous results in presenting and interpreting the painting of Dečani, B. Todić has chosen a fresh and different approach. Instead of approaching the frescoes from the angle of iconography and the cycles depicted, he has opted for a solution at once more useful and more sophisticated, closer to the medieval outlook of the world and the true significance of fresco ensembles. He interprets the painting of Dečani as a consistent programme of superior intellectual format which in a theologically well-versed way expounds salvation history in all of its stages: from the image of God, the Pantocrator, the story of creation and the original sin, the announcement of Christ's redemptory work – through his incarnation, miracles, teachings and passion, to the founding, consolidation and expansion of the New Testament church, to the Second Coming of Christ and

the final salvation of humanity. In other words, the painting of Dečani is interpreted as an expression of the notion that a church with its painted decoration is an image of the Kingdom of God and that it depicts it in the same essential way as the liturgy that takes place in it. Within that general order feature the Serbs as members of the community of the elect. The believer who entered the church would meet a series of historical figures – first the *ktetors*, St Stefan of Dečani and his heir, at first king then emperor, Dušan, whose initiatives powerfully influenced some elements of the painted programme. Serbian church leaders found their place among them, including the deserving hegumen of Dečani. The basic message communicated to the faithful was the one about the Nemanjić dynasty's sainted forebears and God-chosenness.

In studying this monumental fresco programme, unique not only in Serbian but also in Byzantine art, B. Todić puts forward many fresh and interesting observations which we believe will inspire an exchange of ideas in the scholarly community. For example, an essential feature of the Dečani painting such as its firm reliance on the text is interpreted differently from his predecessors – not in terms of the illustrative or didactic role of images, which characterized Roman Catholic art, but in terms of its liturgical meaning and its accommodation to different functions of different portions of the church. A convincing example in that sense is his analysis of the scenes from the cycle of the Acts of Apostles. A praiseworthy novelty is also his well-documented observation that in the process of frescoing these different portions certain cycles were disbanded and certain themes brought closer together and merged, assuming specific and additional meanings, which is recognized as yet another peculiarity of the Dečani painted programme.

With iconography at the centre of scholarly attention, the painters of Dečani and their style have been a neglected topic, but owing to B. Todić this lacuna is finally filled up. The work of many fresco painters engaged at Dečani is subjected to meticulous consideration and highly competent evaluation. Unlike earlier wholesale and not exactly flattering evaluations, we now have a coherent analysis, based on ample knowledge and experience, of the styles, preferences and handwritings of the Dečani painters, whose individual contributions are precisely determined for the first time. Therefore, the new and nuanced assessment of the Dečani painting proposed by B. Todić may be said to rest on very reliable foundations. Some of the painters, such as those executing the Ecumenical councils, were not up to their task, some may be considered mediocre, such as the authors of the Creation, of part of the cycle of St Nicholas, Christ's miracles and teachings, and some, such as those who frescoed the sanctuary and side chapels, showed much greater skills. A distinctive personal handwriting characterizes the painters of the Calendar and Acatist, while the painters of the cycle of St Demetrios, lower registers of the Acts of Apostles, Old Testament scenes and especially the Last Judgment are recognized as best. Common to them all was a penchant for the classicist art of the early decades of the 14th century. Finally, one should mention the author's well-substantiated rejection of their western origin and the cautiously assumed Thessalonican background.

A separate and praiseworthy quality of this book is its ample illustrative material conceived as a document running parallel with the text as its functional supplement rather than as a mere "decoration". It includes technical drawings, made according to highest standards and with the aid of state-of-the-art digital technology, such as those showing the arrangement of

frescoes. Supreme quality also characterizes the photographs of a master of the art, Branislav Strugar, which effectively bolster the new assessment of Dečani's artistic achievements. The documentary value of the illustrations is but one of their dimensions. They contribute just as much to the visual identity and beauty of

the book, for the design of which is responsible Mirjana Pištalo-Gligorijević. The book was designed as a luxury item, not only to be read with interest but also leafed with pleasure. Such a work is what the church that had even in medieval times been said to "surpass any thought by beauty" deserves.

NEW JERUSALEMS. THE TRANSLATION OF SACRED SPACES IN CHRISTIAN CULTURE.
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE HELD AT THE NEW JERUSALEM MONASTERY AND THE
TRET'YAKOV GALLERY, MOSCOW, 27 TO 30 JUNE 2006.

Reviewed by Aleksandra Davidov Temerinski

The seventh international conference thematically and methodologically devised and organized by the art historian Alexei Lidov, Director of the Research Centre for Eastern Orthodox Culture, Moscow, was held in June 2006. Alexei Lidov has taken the first steps in this direction in the early 1990s, and his creativity and organizational abilities has led to Moscow becoming a new and important international centre where ideas are exchanged and fresh angles in the study of medieval Eastern Orthodox culture taken. These thematically well-defined conferences have in recent years balanced the number of participants coming from Eastern Europe and Russia and Western Europe and the USA, producing an inspiring atmosphere for exchange of ideas between scholars formed in the two culturally and methodologically different "schools". It should be emphasized that the proceedings not only are published regularly, but quite often complemented by publications such as catalogues of accompanying exhibitions or critical editions of the written sources relevant to the topic of the conference. The Centre's busy publishing activity is best illustrated by the recently published volumes: the first volume from the 2004 conference (*Hierotopy. The Creation of Sacred Spaces in Byzantium and Medieval Russia*, ed. A. Lidov, Moscow 2006), a selection of writ-

ten sources relating to relics, which were the subject of the 2000 conference (*Relics in Byzantium and Medieval Russia*, ed. A. Lidov, Moscow 2006), the English edition of the first conference, held in 1991 (*Jerusalem in Russian Culture*, eds. A. Batalov and A. Lidov, New York–Athens 2005), as well as the collection of abstracts from this year's conference (*New Jerusalem. The Translation of Sacred Spaces in Christian Culture. Material from the International Symposium*, ed. A. Lidov, Moscow 2006).

The topic of the 2006 conference – New Jerusalem. The Translation of Sacred Spaces in Christian Culture – has been intended to mark the 350 years of the New Jerusalem Monastery (1656) near Moscow, the life's work of Patriarch Nikon (1652–67) begun in the reign of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich Romanov (1645–76) and completed in the early 18th century.

A sacral, intellectual, spatial and visual expression of the Russian revival of the period, the Resurrection Cathedral of the New Jerusalem Monastery fully follows the ground-plan of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, the holiest of all Christian shrines. And this is not all: the layout of the monastery complex reflects the sacral topography of Jerusalem and its surroundings. Effecting an allusion to Heavenly Jerusalem, this complex near Moscow established a parallel to serve

as a basis for Moscow's claims to being, just like Constantinople, the Second Jerusalem, which is a recognizable medieval model of eschatological sacralization of cities, unfailingly coupled with royal ideology. Obviously, the nature of this grandiose undertaking was as much religious as it was ideological, the underlying idea being derived from the Byzantine theory of a single worldly kingdom of Orthodox Christians, the only successor of which following the fall of Byzantium could have been Russia, whose capital claimed the title of the Third Rome.

The cultic life of the monastery was interrupted by the Revolution in 1919, and the church suffered heavy damage in 1941. Most of the church exterior has been renovated, but the interesting baroque-style wall decoration in its interior mostly remains in a ruinous state. Its most striking element is a replica of the ciborium surmounting the tomb of Christ in Jerusalem, which inspires reflection on the relationship between original and replica in the context of Christian sacred places (*loca sancta*).

Unlike the previous conference, held in 2004, which was devoted to hierotopy, a new methodological strand within medieval studies introduced by Alexei Lidov, this one, with its 35 participants (from Russia, the USA, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania and Israel), was small-scale in character, thus creating an inspiring setting for fruitful discussion.

In approaching their themes, most authors recognized real and imaginary sacred spaces and mechanisms of their functioning in the eschatological context of the New/Heavenly Jerusalem. It is in this sense that may be interpreted the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and some associated phenomena (A. Lidov, A. Keshman). The position of Jerusalem as the centre of the world in medieval maps was among unavoidable

topics (A. Podossinov), the same as the liturgical tradition spreading from Jerusalem to Byzantium and to members of its commonwealth (A. Pentkovsky). A typology of *topoi* of the Holy Land in medieval Russian culture (A. Belyaev) was an introduction to a number of papers exploring the actual cases regardless of the place of their origin. A group of papers discussed medieval reception of Russian monasteries such as the New Jerusalem Monastery, the anniversary of which was a motive for the conference (G. Zelen-skaya), or the Savvino-Storozhevsky (X. Schedrina) and Solovetsky monasteries (O. Chumicheva). Another set of papers explored similar aspects beyond Russia (E. Bakalova & A. Lazarova). A number of authors recognized the New Jerusalem idea in the varied material of Christian art: in the architecture of a group of monuments (V. Sedov, A. Kazarian), in the exterior decoration of some churches (T. Samoilova, I. Stevovic), in the wall-painting of a group of churches (B. Cvetkovic) or of a single church (A. Weyl Carr), in a group of icons or in individual icons (R. Marx, S. Yavorskaya, G. Sidorenko, M. Plyuhanova, A. Davidov Temerinski), in cryptograms (G. Sidorenko), in church furniture (I. Sterligova, N. Isar), or in church textiles and vestments (A. Mutesius). Similar messages were recognized in the concept of the desert or cave hermitage as an image of the Heavenly Jerusalem (D. Popovic). Constantinople as the Second Jerusalem from the standpoint of political theology was also discussed (P. Guran), as well as the ideological and cultic shaping of some Balkan cities to the same effect (J. Erdeljan). The translation of sanctity in pilgrimage cultures in both East and West was also explored (A. Mousin). The earliest examples of the eschatological and soteriological concept of New Jerusalem were recognized in some early Christian cemeteries in the Holy Land (E. Maayan-Fanar). Some narrative

and visual examples from both East and West reveal a New Jerusalem meaning (G. Wolff and A. Hoffmann, B. Baert), and the Benedictine and Franciscan traditions of translating sacred spaces in Western Europe were also discussed (L. Evseeva, M. Piccirillo). In varied sources of non-material culture New Jerusalem themes are revealed (M. Chkhartishvily, O. Belova & V. Petrukhin). In America, at the dawn of the modern age, this theme was present in painting (G. Carr), and a hierotopic meaning was also sought for in an unrealized mid-20th-century renovation project for the Church of the Holy Sepulchre (R. Ousterhout).

Among the scholars who went furthest in their innovative interpretation was Alexei Lidov. Taking the well-known phenomenon of the Holy Fire miraculously occurring on Christ's tomb on Holy Saturdays as his starting-point, he interpreted some insufficiently elucidated phenomena such as „lanterns of the dead“, architectural structures occurring in medieval West-European cemeteries, as well as the lanterned domes introduced during the Renaissance, also explained by reference to the Resurrection Rotund in Jerusalem.

The second largest group of participants to Russia was the one from Serbia

with its five representatives whose papers attracted attention and inspired discussion. Danica Popovic was given the honour of not only a plenary paper (along with A. Lidov, R. Ousterhout, L. Belae and G. Zelenskaya), but also of giving the concluding remarks along with her colleagues from the USA, Great Britain, Russia and Bulgaria. Given that the so-called “Belgrade school” of art history has until recently occupied a prominent place among other world's centres for Byzantine studies, it is encouraging to see it resuming its former position.

This year's conference organized in Moscow by the Research Centre for Eastern Christian Culture explored some of the fundamental phenomena associated with sacred spaces and their eschatological meaning as expressed through various ways of creating “new Jerusalems”. Seemingly static, these phenomena nevertheless functioned in a variety of ways, depending on time, place and interests of certain social groups.

Demonstrating convincingly the significance of creativity in developing new methodological approaches and scholarly communication at a global level, the activity of the Moscow Centre offers a model to be followed.

GÁBOR ÁGOSTON, *GUNS FOR THE SULTAN. MILITARY POWER AND THE WEAPONS INDUSTRY IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE*. CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2005. Pp. 280.

Reviewed by Veljko Stanić

Gábor Ágoston's book emerged as a result of inadequate research into the role of military power and the weapons industry in the Ottoman Empire of the 16th–18th centuries, an epoch marked by a revolution in warfare. This Hungarian historian, currently teaching at Georgetown University, Washington, offers a historical analysis of the Ottoman gunpowder-based weapons industry and,

drawing from significant archive materials, challenges classical stereotypes about Islamic conservatism, examining in a simple and concise manner the contents and potentials of Ottoman military power, its causes and development, as well as the issue of raw materials necessary for an effective and competent equipment of the Ottoman Army with weapons based on gunpowder technology.

The main body of text, which includes 20 illustrations, 4 geographic maps and 31 tables, is divided into seven sections: *Introduction: Firearms and Armaments Industries, Gunpowder Technology and the Ottomans, Cannons and Muskets, Saltpetre Industries, Munitions and Ordnance Industries, Conclusions: Guns and Empire*. In addition to an appendix containing 69 tables, the book also includes clarifications on weights and measures, the bibliography and the index of personal and geographical names.

The use of firearms in European battles in the 1320s and 1330s, including the Balkans, had made the Ottomans recognize the necessity of equipping their army with the required arsenal by the end of the century. Adopted as a result of pragmatism and real needs, the new technology proved very efficient in the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. In the second chapter the author discusses the use of firearms by janissaries, the founding of naval and artillery forces, the role of foreigners in technology transfer and manufacture, and demonstrates that the Ottomans not only adopted gunpowder technology but even remained a powerful “gunpowder empire” until the 17th century. Resistance to the new weapons and changing styles of warfare was not caused by some distinctively Islamic mentality, indeed it is readily comparable with similar resistances offered by Europe’s disappearing feudal world. Some deeper socioeconomic and cultural reasons enabled the Empire to retain its military superiority over its neighbours until the end of the 17th century.

The third chapter, simply entitled *Cannons and Muskets*, is marked by exemplary quantitative evidence. Following his basic idea which rectifies the prevailing opinion, Ágoston analyses different types of artillery ranging from heavy and inefficient cannons to smaller mortars of different calibres, and compares them to

the weapons of the Ottoman enemies. Smaller cannons such as *şayka* and *baly-emeyez* as well as the smallest ones such as *şahi*, *saçma*, *prang*, *eynek*, *misket* and *şakaloz* were also used. Heavy artillery accounted for only 10 percent of the Ottoman siege force and was mostly used in defending significant fortifications such as Belgrade. Small arms carried by janissaries, such as rifles/muskets, corresponded to the standards of Spanish and Venetian firearms. Nevertheless, gunpowder and cannon ammunition production seems to have been a more significant feature of the Ottoman military industry than the manufacture of small arms.

The next two chapters look at the necessary economic basis of the Ottoman military industry discussing the supply of saltpetre, sulphur and coal, as well as gunpowder production. Although it has been thought that the Ottomans in many ways depended on the import of armaments and new technologies, there is no evidence for that in archive materials. Many saltpetre plantations demonstrate that the Ottoman Empire was able to produce enormous amounts. In the Balkans such plantations were at Priština, Drama, Melnik, Štip and Kumanovo, but Anatolian and Arabian regions were also significant raw materials bases. But there was less sulphur. It was brought from the Black Sea area, the Van province, Moldavia, the island of Melos, and partly from the Ohrid area in modern Macedonia. Coal was derived from a special “black tree” (*kaarağaç*). After the consideration of natural resources and needs, Ágoston places them in the context of Ottoman Government connections and saltpetre production within the taxation system known as *iltizam*. He is interested in the issue of government control and security mechanisms, frauds and embezzlements, labour force, as well as tax and military exemptions for the saltpetre-producing villages. His special attention is focused

on *ocaklik* or villages situated near saltpetre plantations, forests, gunpowder manufactures, mines, fortresses and mountain gorges whose inhabitants worked on specific tasks in accordance with the intentions of the central government. Relying on the original documentary evidence, the author stresses that the Ottoman Empire was able to produce sufficient supplies of saltpetre, which was the most important ingredient of gunpowder. Even when the Empire had to purchase additional amounts, for example during the war of 1693–94, when 65% of the total amount had to be supplied in that way, this did not significantly affect the Empire's total expenses.

Developed in the gunpowder factories of Constantinople, Cairo, Baghdad, Aleppo, Yemen, Belgrade, and elsewhere, gunpowder production would intensify in times of war. Examining the infrastructure of such factories in different parts of the Empire, their typology, manufacturing processes, output and gunpowder quality, Ágoston concludes that the Empire was able to satisfy its own needs deep into the 18th century, unlike many European countries. It was only at the time of a Russo-Turkish war in 1768–74 that a shortage of gunpowder affected the Ottoman army. The second half of that century witnessed a significant decline in production, from 761–1037 metric tonnes recorded in the 17th century to 169 metric tonnes, making imports unavoidable. As a result, Selim III (1789–1807) made a reorganisation of three main gunpowder factories, in Istanbul, Selanik and Gelibolu, but the reorganisation did not prove effective enough. So a new water-powered gunpowder factory was constructed in the coastal town of Azadli. By the end of the century the factory had reached the annual output of 1692–2256 metric tonnes.

The sixth section of the book analyses ore deposits providing ingredients necessary for ammunition and firearms pro-

duction. Relying on the Ottoman sources once again, the author suggests that the Empire suffered a serious shortage of local tin, which was imported from Europe, whereas other raw materials such as steel, lead and copper were produced in sufficient amounts in the Empire. With the authentic data at hand, the author makes a comparative evaluation of the Ottoman weapons. Discussing their size, the chemical components involved and the total production, he questions the earlier historiographic views of the Ottoman army as “technologically inferior”.

The research done in this book demonstrates that the Ottoman defeats at the end of the 17th century and especially in the second half of the 18th century were not the result of technological lags or an inadequate productivity of the military industry. Their causes should be sought for in advantages that European society had after the major economic and administrative reforms of that era. Besides that, battles were not won with better weapons but with command systems, control and training of troops. More developed ways of communication and funding prevailed although the Ottoman Army won battles in the 18th century including both the one against Russia in 1717 and against Austria in 1737–39. In the second half of the 18th century the Empire was exposed to huge financial strains, which seriously weakened central power. One of the main problems was its loose control of gunpowder production. Janissaries and the ulem were against the planned reforms of sultan Selim III because they considered them aimed against themselves.

In an expert and detailed manner, Gábor Ágoston's book opens the possibility for further research. It is particularly rich in data pertinent to the military industry and warfare styles in the Balkans.

A SMALL DIALECTOLOGICAL ATLAS OF THE BALKAN LANGUAGES

Reviewed by Biljana Sikimić

The project “Small Dialectological Atlas of the Balkan Languages” (hereafter Atlas) has been started by the Institute of Linguistic Studies of the Russian Academy of Science, Saint-Petersburg, in 1996, and since 1999 it has been running in parallel at the Institute of Slavic Philology at Marburg, Germany. The relevant questionnaires (syntactic, lexical and ethnolinguistic) were published in 1996/7. Fieldwork carried out according to these programmes between 1996 and 2002 collected extensive and cross-comparable dialectal material for the (formally, semantically and functionally) unrelated Balkan languages.

Since 1998 collections of papers resulting from the research group’s working meetings have been regularly published in Saint-Petersburg (*SDABL/МДАБЯ-Материалы рабочих совещаний*). Work of the research team has also been presented at several international linguistic conferences, notably at three Balkanological ones, the proceedings of which have already been published: *Актуальные вопросы балканского языкознания* (St Petersburg, 2003; Proceedings of the international conference held in St Petersburg in 2001), *Актуални проблеми на балканското езикознание, Аспекти на изследването на общобалканската лексика* (Sofia 2003; Proceedings of the international conference held in Sofia in 2002), and *Языки и диалекты малых этнических групп на Балканах* (St Petersburg–Munich 2005; Proceedings of the international conference held in St Petersburg in 2004).

Since 2001 the publishing house Bibern Verlag, Munich, has been regularly publishing two series of monographic contributions pertinent to the Atlas: *Materialien zum Südosteuropasprachatlas* and *Studien zum Südosteuropasprachatlas*.

The Small Atlas’s editor in chief is A. N. Sobolev, with H. Schaller, X. Ylli, A. Y. Rusakov and A. N. Sobolev as members of its international editorial board. Three purpose-designed questionnaires by Russian authors have been used: Syntactic (I. I. Voronina, Y. A. Lopashov, A. Y. Rusakov and A. N. Sobolev), Lexical (M. B. Domosiletskaya and A. V. Zhugra) and Ethnolinguistic (A. A. Plotnikova). Fieldwork research has been carried out by an international expert team: V. M. Bara, N. Bogdanović, A. B. Borisova, D. Gegovski, V. Zhobov, V. B. Zaykovskaya, T. V. Zaykovska, Ž. Jozić, M. Jovanović, T. Kahl, G. P. Klepikova, K. Koleva, K. Leluda-Voss, J. A. Lopashov, M. Marković, A. A. Plotnikova, A. Y. Rusakov, I. A. Sedakova, A. N. Sobolev, Z. Topolińska, E. S. Uzeneva and X. Ylli.

The mapping of dialectal material from twelve survey points representative of the dialects of all genetic subgroups of Balkan languages (Greek, Albanian, Romance and South-Slavic) has been carried out: Otok, Dalmatia, Croatia; Zavala, near Podgorica, Montenegro; Kamenica, near Knjaževac, Serbia; Peštani, Lake Ohrid, FYR Macedonia; Gega, near Petrič, Bulgaria; Gela, Central Rhodopes, Bulgaria; Ravna, Provadia District, Bulgaria; Muhurr, Peshkopeja District, Albania; Leshnjë, Çorovoda District, Albania; two Modern-Greek speaking settlements: Eratira, Kozáni District, and Kastelli, Peloponnesus, Greece; and one Aromanian, Krania/Turia, Grevena area, Greece.

Thus the Atlas includes material for the basic dialects of the unrelated Balkan languages south of the Danube, but it does not include Daco-Romanian dialectal material or data from Megleno-Romanian and Istro-Romanian speeches of South-Danubian Romanian dialects.

1 *Малый диалектологический атлас балканских языков, Пробный выпуск* [Small Dialectological Atlas of Balkan languages. Pilot volume], ed. Andrei N. Sobolev. Studien zum Südosteuropasprachatlas, Band 2. München: Biblion Verlag, 2003. Pp. 357.

The pilot volume of the Atlas (published 2003) maps several ethnolinguistic questions relating to the calendar: the term for St Athanasius' Day (18/31 January); the ornament made from threads for the day of the arrival of spring (1/14 March); St Andrew's Day (30 Nov/13 Dec); and the term for the (leading) figure of the Dodole ritual. Of syntactic topics, 48 questions (nouns, possessive pronoun *svoj*, adjectives,

verbs, phrases, prepositions, simple sentence structure and communication-oriented statement) are illustrated. There follow lexical questions (Maps 48 to 93) relating to nature (geographical appellatives and meteorology) and man (anatomical terms, human features, kinship terms, animal husbandry, beekeeping, diet and the like).

2 *Малый диалектологический атлас балканских языков*, ed. A. N. Sobolev. *Серия лексическая. Том I. Лексика духовной культуры* [Lexical Series. Vol. I. Lexicon of Spiritual Culture]. München, 2005. Pp. 432.

Volume I of the lexical series is devoted to the spiritual culture and, after the pilot volume, is the first integrative result of the Atlas project. It is edited by A. N. Sobolev, who also authored the maps. Material collection is based on the *Ethnolinguistic questionnaire* designed by A. A. Plotnikova. The volume's goal is to make it possible for the collected material to be further interpreted, which is apt to indicate the paths of development taken by the vocabularies of individual Balkan languages, to establish connections in dialectal lexes, and to enable the reconstruction of the formation processes of the Balkan linguistic league. The Atlas primarily addresses synchronic typological issues. It is guided by two main principles: the ideographical description of the Balkan linguistic map of the world and the principle of systemic totality, which involves the study of thematic and lexical-semantic word groups and of the semantic structure of each word in its functional context taken as broadly as possible.

Material collection is based on the onomasiological approach: the names for the same object in different dialects are identified (object, characteristic, action), using the same semantic properties in their

definition and linguistic identification. The presentation of the material includes the project section and subsection, the number of the question, the formulation of the question and all relevant linguistic and extralinguistic data and commentaries. For all examples Latin transcription is used: for Slavic and Greek dialects, the transcription adopted for the Common Slavic dialectological atlas; for Albanian speeches, the transcription adopted in Albanian dialectology; and for Aromanian, the transcription widely adopted in Aromanian studies. Additional information (usually extralinguistic in nature) is contained in commentaries.

Rather than mapping all the existing information (available to the user on the left-hand page), the Atlas only maps those that show the system of similarities and differences between Balkan dialects. It is assumed that any aspect of the form, semantics and function of the phenomenon under scrutiny (the name, time, place of ritual etc.) are eligible for linguistic comparison. Phenomena are interpreted bearing in mind their actual systemic statuses within individual cultures. The maps consistently reflect cases of contamination of various realia in the folkloric mind.

As a distinctive feature worth of being mapped, any linguistic or ethnographic feature (time, place, function) may be chosen. As the authors have given up the idea of making "pure genre" maps, the Atlas includes (in addition to purely linguistic: lexical, motivational, grammatical) combined linguistic and ethnographic maps as well as a number of purely ethnographic maps (e.g. the presence of a specific ritual dish, rite, belief). Not even the linguistic maps are "pure genre" as they often combine information about different linguistic levels. Some maps show similarities and differences in naming, lexeme phonetics, semantics, nominational motivations etc. There are also maps that combine such data with those from different linguistic levels, including phonetics and grammar, but with no etymological pretensions. In some cases, information other than the one planned is mapped (e.g. "first days of August" map), which is dictated by the material collected. It seems sensible to agree with the authors' assumption that the material collected from a larger number of points may have led to a different feature for mapping (form, motivation, semantics) from the one chosen: the maps reflect the potentials offered by the collected fieldwork material and should not be seen as absolute.

This volume contains 191 maps, those relating to the calendar cycle accounting for nearly a half of the total number, only three covering agricultural, harvest customs, a single map covering animal husbandry ("first milk"), about ten mapping the birth of a child, about thirty wedding and pre-nuptial customs, about twenty death customs and, finally, some thirty maps covering demonology and folk magic. This disproportion in the mapped realia between calendar and life cycle customs is likely to become more balanced with the publication of the second lexical volume, for which the material is collected according to the *Lexical questionnaire*.

A significant part of spiritual culture remains uncovered by either the Lexical or the Ethnolinguistic questionnaires (children's games, animals, plants, traditional medicine, crafts), although it is the customs and beliefs from this area that are much less religion-related.

The ethnolinguistic volume also contains material that has remained unmapped because it is either insufficient for such a purpose or shows lexical distribution according to genetic groups of Balkan languages. The Atlas does take into account the balkanological principle to treat a phenomenon as a Balkanism when it is registered in at least two linguistically unrelated languages and, accordingly, the linguistically grouped division is not mapped, but another, no less known, division is mapped nonetheless, that into Christians (and mostly Orthodox) and Muslims (especially conspicuous in the "calendar" portion of maps; moreover, explicit Christian symbols were sought for, such as, for example, the unmapped "name for the Christmas bread with Christian symbolism").

Interpretation of the maps is left to the users of the Atlas. In that, their firmest point of support is the fact that the material is collected at the same time and in the same way, although the question remains open as to whether the data recorded are always authentic or perhaps reconstructed from the participants' memories. It is expected that the necessary broader context of the mapped realia will be provided by the monographs on the sites surveyed.

The interdisciplinary approach of the first volume enhances its usefulness, the range of potential users being quite wide: in addition to linguists of various specializations, the Atlas may be useful to folklorists, ethnographers and anthropologists. But, just like the following, grammatical, volume, it has a serious limitation: the use of Russian as a metalanguage considerably narrows the range of its potential users.

3 *Малый диалектологический атлас балканских языков*, ed. Andrei N. Sobolev. *Серия грамматическая с преимущественным вниманием к структуре балканославянских языков. Том I. Категории имени существительного* [Grammatical Series with Emphasis on Balkan Languages Structure. Vol. I. Noun Categories]. *Materialien zum Südosteuropasprachatlas*. Herausgegeben von Helmut Schaller und Andrej Sobolev, Band 3. München: Biblion Verlag, 2005. Pp. 277.

Volume I of the grammatical series (with 127 maps) is devoted to the grammatical categories in Balkan languages usually marked in nouns (gender, number, case, and (in)definiteness). A single Balkan language or dialect with a given category grammaticalized and marked in noun form (the classical case is inflexion often syncretically containing indicators of different categories) is enough. Such cases are considered prototypical, and it is they that serve to establish the core of the category content, and as *tertium comparationis* in cross-linguistic comparison of phenomena, i.e. in studying syntactically free means of expressing grammatical meanings of the categories. The categories studied in this volume may also be studied within the framework of sentence grammar, but data systematization according to the function of separate forms better suits the purposes of the Atlas.

Different levels of the grammatical structure of Balkan languages are presented: word formation and inflexion, morphosyntax, syntax, interaction of grammatical and lexical meanings. In line with the project's general goal, neither has this volume any pretensions to an exhaustive typological description of grammatical similarities and differences between Balkan languages. The maps are selected in such a way as to show areal patterns in the distribution of linguistic parallels. Some maps show phenomena that are not explicitly envisaged by the

questionnaire. It should be emphasized that the Atlas, as a final result, fully maintains the systemic totality of description and offers much broader information than that traditionally studied by Balkan linguistics, whereby this discipline is introduced onto a fresh research level principle in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Some common Balkan phenomena which show no dialectal differences are also mapped. Priority in mapping is given to areally relevant or new facts. The user will find the use made more difficult by tersely formulated commentaries and the examples that are not translated into Russian as a metalanguage. For lack of space, the examples are not placed in a broader context. Dialectal phenomena are not contrasted with literary language norm. The user is expected to have at least passive knowledge of Russian, but also of Balkan languages in their standard forms, as well as the basics of Balkan linguistics and some Balkan languages, dialects included.

The material published in this volume is quite autonomous in relation to the questionnaire designed some ten years ago and it reflects the team's improved view of issues addressed by Balkan linguistics, which may be seen also from the independent numbering of maps and their titles, while the left-hand pages show the number of the question from the questionnaire and its formulation.

4 M. Bara, T. Kahl, A. N. Sobolev, *Die südaronumische Mundart von Turia (Pindos), Syntax, Lexic, Ethnolinguistik, Texte*. Materialien zum Südosteuropasprachatlas. Herausgegeben von Helmut Schaller und Andrej Sobolev, Band IV. München: Biblion Verlag, 2005. Pp. 489 + CD.

Of the monographs devoted to individual survey points covered by the Atlas project, four have been published: *Bolgarskij širokolykiskij govor* (2001), *Albanskij toskijskij govor sela Leshnja* (2002), *Albanskij gegskij govor sela Muhurr* (2003) and the co-authored monograph on the South-Aromanian speech from the village Turia or Krania in the Pindus, northern Greece (2005).

Field survey of the Aromanian village of Turia was carried out in September 2002 by an international team: Maria Bara, Thede Kahl and Andrei N. Sobolev. Pindic Aromanian speeches, which have not been monographically described so far, belong to the southern group of Aromanian. The speech shows a high degree of structural variation at all levels, so a single informant exhibits a large number of phonetic, morphological, syntactic and lexical variants. A powerful influence of Greek should be noted. The villagers' being fully bilingual, the survey was conducted both in Aromanian and in Modern Greek.

A particular transcription system, accepted in Romanian and Aromanian dialectology, is employed and supplemented with additional symbols: apostrophe marking stresses, colon to indicate lengths and exponentially incomplete sound realization, nonsyllabic *i* marked as *ĩ* (in Turia there is no phonological distinctions between the vocals *i* and *ā*, and unstressed *e* > *i*; *o* > *u*).

The only way to collect syntactic data within a short span of time is to have the informant translate the example from the questionnaire into the dialect. The pre-designed phrases illustrating the questions from the syntactic portion of the Atlas project were uttered to the inform-

ant in Greek, less frequently in Aromanian, and so the monograph shows the offered Greek patterns in parallel with the Aromanian equivalents received. As the offered grammatical structure exerts a powerful impact, the Aromanian syntactic examples are additionally compared with the material from longer texts. The syntactic questionnaire being for the most part designed on the basis of Balkan Slavic linguistic material, it contains many questions that are irrelevant to the grammatical structure of Aromanian because they fail to include specific grammatical categories (such as, for example, prepositional articles). This Slavic basis of the questionnaire is also responsible for omitting questions concerning a number of phenomena characteristic of the grammatical structure of Aromanian. Even so, the published material fully maintains the structure of the questionnaire employed in the already published monographs. The Turia material is included into the volume of the Atlas devoted to noun categories in the Balkan languages.

The second part of the monograph contains a lexicon according to the questionnaire designed for the Atlas: nature (geographical terms, meteorology), man (anatomical terms, human features, family and family etiquette, speech etiquette), man's work activities (cattle-breeding, poultry keeping, beekeeping, crops – corn, vegetable gardening – onion), and diet (foods, drinks, dairy products). The lexical material is presented in tables, a table containing all the questions from the Lexical questionnaire, even those to which there is no recorded answer.

The examples perfunctorily illustrate code switching mechanisms between Greek and Aromanian, but in accord-

ance with the concept of the Atlas, code switching is not marked (e.g. italic, or a different alphabet), nor are the examples translated into Russian, metalanguage of the monograph and of the Atlas as a whole. Ethnolinguistic material is presented in the form of thematic wholes following the sequence of the Ethnolinguistic questionnaire, but there are no data about nonexistent or unrecorded realia of the spiritual culture, which are plentiful. This, however, is unnecessary given that the Turia material is already included in the Ethnolinguistic volume of the Atlas. Ethnolinguistic entries have the form of brief ethnographic descriptions (in Russian) with key Aromanian terms in italic within the text or in parenthesis.

An appendix at the end of the study offers the dialectological transcripts of texts, with thematic subtitles but without marking survey questions. Ten excerpts from the texts are audibly available on the accompanying CD. The study includes a selection from the relevant bibliography.

The whole series of monographic volumes of the Atlas has received an en-

couraging response in the scholarly community world-wide and has already found application in contributions in the field of Balkan studies. Reviews of some volumes resulting from the Atlas project have been published in specialized periodicals such as *Zeitschrift für Balkanologie*, *Zeitschrift für Slawistik*, *Slavic and East European Journal*, *Acta universitatis Nicolai Copernici*, *Studia slavica*, *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, *Lingua Posnaniensis*, *Balkanistica*, *Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen*, *Dialectologia et Geolinguistica*, *OLA: Materialy i issledovanija*, and in reference journals from the Balkans such as *Rodopi*, *B'lgarski ezik*, *Balkanica*, *Srpski jezik*, *Lingvističke aktuelnosti*, *Svet reči*.

The exact scholarly significance of the SDABL is quite difficult to appraise at this moment. Apart from its undoubtedly remarkable scholarly and technical achievement, the SDABL is an undertaking which has succeeded in bringing Balkan scholars together round a single topic and in linking them with Europe's eminent scholarly institutions.

DEVELOPMENT OF ETHNIC STRUCTURE IN THE BANAT 1890–1992
(POPULATION: HUNGARY/ROMANIA/YUGOSLAVIA). ED. BY THEDE KAHL AND PETER JORDAN. MAPS BY HORST FÖRSTER AND JOSEF WOLF. TEXT BY JOSEF WOLF. VIENNA: AUSTRIAN INSTITUTE OF EAST AND SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN STUDIES, 2004. ONE ACCOMPANYING TEXT AND 4 COLOURED MAPS 73 × 60 CM.

Reviewed by Annemarie Sorescu Marinković

The Atlas of Eastern and Southeastern Europe is a map series published periodically since 1989 which offers up-to-date information on topics of demographic and economic relevance in central, eastern and southeastern Europe and aims to provide researchers, specialists and the interested public with background information on current events and advances. *Development of Ethnic Structure in the Banat 1890–1992* is edited by the Austrian Institute of East and Southeast European Studies

in Vienna within this series. It consists of four maps and an extensive accompanying text authored by the historian Josef Wolf (Institute of Danube-Swabian History and Regional Studies, Tübingen), which explains the settlement history and intercultural web of relationships characterizing this multiethnic region. The compiling of the present series of maps is the result of the regional research projects undertaken by the Institute of Danube-Swabian History and Regional Studies in

Tübingen. Its objective is to present “an academic and historic problem complex that centres on spatial preconditions for the existence and co-habitation of ethnic groups in shifting and overlapping spaces”, as its authors put it. The main issue the maps are trying to depict is the genesis and development of regional ethnic structures and thus the change of spatial distribution patterns.

The ethno-confessional diversity found in the Banat region is the result of migrations taking place there since the 15th century. Those of the 18th century have been among the most complex European continental migrations and have led to dramatic changes in the population and colonization structure.

The four maps (a scale of 1:400,000) present the ethnic structure of this cultural region, currently divided between four countries (Romania, Hungary, Serbia and Montenegro), synchronically and diachronically, by settlements and by four points in time: 1890 – Map A, around 1930 (more exactly 1930/31) – Map B, around 1950 (1949/53/56) – Map C and around 1990 (1990/91/92) – Map D. For representing of population figures by ethnic affiliation the maps use the diagram method, which, out of the three main methods used in cartographic representation (the other two being the planar and the dot method), has proved to be the most appropriate for this region, as it makes possible a clear distinction between relatively large numbers of different ethnic groups and also corresponds more accurately to their spatial disposition. All settlement names on the maps are also listed in the index which reflects changes in the official names of cities and towns during the studied period of time.

The four maps portray the evolution of ethnic structure in the Banat region, where, besides Serbs, Hungarians, Romanians and Germans (the four main ethnic groups that have helped to shape

the development of regional society since the end of the 18th century), Croats, Jews, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Ruthenians, Krasovians, Ukrainians, Roma, Czechs and others have also inhabited the area in the period from the late 19th century up to the times of recent political changes in the 1990. As the maps exemplify it, the mixed ethnic structure prevails to this day, although the proportions of individual ethnic groups have considerably changed, for example by intensive **Magyarization** at the end of the 19th century and up to WWI; by assimilation of many members of ethnic minorities by their respective countries after the reorganization of states after WWI; by the reduction in the number of German nationals and the eradication of the Jewish population during and after WWII. The final changes are due to intense urbanization and industrialization in communist times, which, especially in the Romanian part of the region, was coupled with immigration from other zones of the country. Up to WWI, the Banat was part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, after WWII being subdivided among Hungary, Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (subsequently Yugoslavia). Due to this subdivision, the official language also changed in the Romanian and Yugoslav parts of the Banat.

If we overlap the four maps we get an image of a *moving space* where, over time, everything has changed, developed or moved more than once: borders, inhabitants, place names etc. If in the beginning (1890, the first map) the Banat region belongs to the Hungarian part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the official language and names being Hungarian (Magyarization has started after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 and already left significant traces in the ethnic structure of the region), around 1930 (the second map) the Banat is divided among Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. In the

Romanian and Yugoslav parts, Romanian and Serbian are the official languages and official Romanian and Serbo-Croatian names, respectively, have been implemented. Assimilation of ethnic minorities by the nation state has started in all three countries. Around 1950 (the third map) the Yugoslav part of the Banat has lost almost all of its German population and the Serbian population component is significantly larger than before WWII. In the Romanian part the Romanian population share has also increased, but Germans are still present in a large number. In the last map (around 1990) we can see that toponymy has not changed significantly and the German minority has heavily declined in the Romanian part. Assimilation of other ethnic minorities by the state nations has continued and urban centres have strongly gained inhabitants at the expense of rural regions.

The accompanying text serves as a handbook for the correct interpretation of the data offered by the maps. Although they form a whole, the maps and the extensive text can also be used separately and for various purposes. The bibliography, which includes several hundred en-

tries, can make a book in its own right, being of an inestimable value for historians, ethnologists, anthropologists, sociologists and geographers interested in this region.

Development of Ethnic Structure in the Banat 1890–1992 is meant to serve as a working tool in describing the spatial distribution of the population and to “facilitate an explanation of ethnic interactive processes and an analysis of complex regional, sub-regional and local perspectives”. The text problematizes the interdependence between spatial distinctions of ethnic groups and other aspects that fall into the areas of linguistics, ethnology, minority and regional research, analyzing everything from an interdisciplinary point of view.

The Banat, a stable entity among the historic landscapes of eastern and central Europe, lately perceived as a cross-border historic regional identity, has aroused the interest of many researchers. However, this composite and extremely interesting multicultural situation has never been described in detail and evaluated at a larger scale. The present publication is the first extensive scientific study which does it.

DEVELOPING CULTURAL IDENTITY IN THE BALKANS: CONVERGENCE VS. DIVERGENCE, EDs.

RAYMOND DETREZ & PIETER PLAS. *MULTIPLE EUROPEs* VOL. 34. BRUSSELS:

PETER LANG VERLAGSGRUPPE, 2005. Pp. 239.

Reviewed by Marija Vučković

This volume comprises a collection of contributions presented at the international conference *Developing Cultural Identity in the Balkans: Convergence vs. Divergence*, held on 12 and 13 December 2003 in Ghent. The conference was organized by the Centre for Southeast European Studies at Ghent University.

The editors' *Introduction* opens this collection by giving a brief background to the subject. Detrez and Plas outlined convergent and divergent tendencies in

the development of common Balkan cultural identity, placing great emphasis on the processual nature of the main concepts (such as convergence, divergence and identity) and on the danger of their explicit or implicit essentialization. Summing up the results of previous research in the interdisciplinary domain of Balkan studies, the editors argue that linguistics in particular may offer conceptual and methodological tools for defining and analyzing cultural identity in the Balkans.

The contributions presented share an interest in the convergence-divergence dialectic of identity formation in the Balkans, underlining the significant role of ideology in this dialectic. The book's structure ranges from papers concerned with language ideology and multiple identities at the local, everyday level (Part I) to 'top-down' approaches mainly dealing with constructions of national ideologies on the official and institutional macro level (Part II).

Part I, entitled *Language, Society, Locality and Everyday Culture: Multioptional Identity across Time*, begins with the paper *From Orientalism to Democracy and Back Again. Turkish in the Balkans and in Balkan Languages*, in which Victor A. Friedman examines the symbolic role of Turkisms (and Turkish) in various processes of identity formation in the Balkans over the last two centuries. Under the Ottomans, Turkish connoted prestige, Muslim identity and urban sophistication. Friedman shows that since then the treatment of the lexis that entered the Balkan languages via Turkish has varied according to circumstances. It has been marginalized as well as encouraged during the standardization of Balkan languages (that generally go hand in hand with nation-building and nation-state formation). The use of Turkisms in formal contexts (such as the press) becomes a marker of 'democracy' in some Balkan countries that experienced the political transitions of the 1990s. In the ethnically mixed Gora region (SW Kosovo) Turkish serves as a neutral device for/means of negotiating social and ethnic relations.

Christian Voss's contribution *Linguistic Divergence and (Re)Convergence within the Macedonian Standard/Dialect Continuum* elucidates, from a diachronic perspective, divergent and convergent identity formation of the Slavic-speaking minority in Northern Greece within the context of general historical, political

and linguistic changes in the cross-border region of Vardar and Aegean Macedonia. Close attention is paid to individual speech strategies observed as linguistic divergence (hybridization and code-mixing) or convergence (linguistic purism). The author came to the conclusion that due to migrations, open borders and global ethnic networks "linguistic roofing and linguistic competence have become a highly personalized and individual affair".

Tanja Petrović, in her article *The Serbs of Bela Krajina between Local and National Identity*, attempts to trace the ways in which members of the Serbian local community in Slovenia adopt ideological concepts from above/outside, in order to interpret their own (everyday) life, social structure, value orientations and identity strategies. She also highlights the fact that the community members produce inconsistent, at times even contradictory voices in which different language ideologies coexist and compete with each other, reflecting the tension between 'local' and 'national'.

In the paper *Alien by Default. The Identity of the Turks of Bulgaria at Home and in Immigration* Magdalena Elchinova examines the shift, induced by an assimilation campaign known as 'Revival Process' in Bulgaria (1984–89), in the identity strategies of Bulgarian-born Turks, observed as 'Others' both in Bulgaria and in immigration in Turkey. Her research reveals that although the ethnicity is intensified at the local level under the influence of official ideology, other identity markers such as family model, kinship, gender, religious system and local affiliation are still significant in their in-group identity construction and also in inter-group relations.

Nada Alaica's contribution *A Mixing of Cultural Identities. The Croatian Borderlands in the Nineteenth Century* explores the common cultural identity of the Orthodox and Roman Catholic popula-

tions in the Habsburg Military Frontier in the 19th century. She points out that *krajišnik* (frontier man) self-identification was formed on the basis of shared military obligations that shaped their distinguishing lifestyle and unique socioeconomic position. In the same way, the principal opposition *krajišnik*: *paor* (peasant), perceived as such by *krajišniks*, did not include ethno-confessional factors: it was also founded on socioeconomic differences.

In the article *Christian and Muslim Converts from the Balkans in Early Modern Venice. Patterns of Social and Cultural Mobility and Identities*, Georgios Plakotos analyzes depositions of Balkan immigrants, predominantly mercenaries, given in Venetian ecclesiastic institutions during the procedure of their (re)conversion to Catholicism. These narratives, that contain accounts of their past and motives for conversion, demonstrate a continual shift from one religion to another, the pragmatic nature of multiple identities as well as strategies of narrative adaptation (in both form and content) to the context of inquisitorial procedure. Various social networks established among the Balkan immigrants in Venice (that represented a strategy for survival in a new and unfamiliar environment) may be understood as an expression of shared 'Balkan identity'.

Julia G. Krivoruchko's paper *A Case of Divergent Convergence. The Cultural Identity of Romaniote Jewry* introduces Part II of the collection entitled *The Nations, Ideology and Identity: Perspectives on Convergence and Divergence from Political, Literary and Cultural History*. It represents a reconstruction of Romaniotes' identity formation from the early Byzantine period up to now. They were influenced by the culture of the Greek Orthodox majority (which led to a language shift to Greek) and also by Italian and Iberian Jewish immigrants. The author considers other elements that entered the repertoire

of Romaniote customs to be 'religious or cultural Balkanisms' rather than 'Christian' or 'Greek'. Cultural homogenization of various Jewish communities, as a process of convergence, took place in Greece after World War Two. By the end of this process, unique Romaniote identity was replaced by broader identity of Greek Jewry.

In his article *The Bulgarian-Macedonian Divergence. An Attempted Elucidation*, Bernard Lory discusses one of the most complex and divisive (for the parties concerned) issue of Balkan history: development of Bulgarian-Macedonian relations during the 19th and 20th centuries. Lory presents the geographer's and historian's view on the topic and (re-)examines not only the arguments deployed by both parties, but also the same aspects of the issue "that have been hitherto confined to the shadowy margins of the great debate".

Basil C. Gounaris's contribution *Constructing and Deconstructing a Common Balkan Past in Nineteen-Century Greece* deals with the correlation between, on the one hand, Greek attitudes to the questions of identity (or origin) and of nation-state formation (both their own and of other Balkan communities) and, on the other, Greek construction of national history and tradition. Gounaris documents the view that the adjustment to the focus of Greek history from Hellenic past to Byzantium was in accord with the political expediencies of the time, which has given rise to divergent development of modern Greek national ideology.

In her paper *Convergences and Divergences in Nationalism through the Albanian Example* Nathalie Clayer argues that articulation of national ideology is neither monolithic nor is it always structured around divergences and oppositions vis-à-vis other ethnic-national groups. Her research on the development of Albanian nationalism shows how the construction of Albanian national identity has em-

braced diverse discourses, due to fact that other identities – social, political, regional, generational and religious above all – have exerted a considerable influence on that process. Convergence of national projects relating to different communities is to be seen in common elements and patterns of nation building as well as in hybrid or multiple identity constructs.

Boyko Penchev's article *Tsarigrad/ Istanbul and the Spatial Construction of Bulgarian National Identity in the 1860s and 1870s* is concerned with the role of Istanbul "as a spatial node, generating different political projects" and identification strategies in the Bulgarian Revival period: being the city with the largest Bulgarian

urban population, Istanbul was perceived as an ethnically and culturally heterogeneous "space of structural homelessness", opposed to the emerging construction of the pure, homogenous 'Homeland', or alternatively, as the political and symbolical centre of the Bulgarian nation.

Aiming to illuminate the complex and provocative issue of diverse processes of ethno-cultural interaction and identity formation in the Balkans, this collection of papers shows different disciplinary approaches (such as linguistics, anthropology, political, cultural and literary history), with noticeably blurred disciplinary boundaries.

JOHN R. LAMPE, *BALKANS INTO SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE: A CENTURY OF WAR AND TRANSITION*. NEW YORK: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2006. Pp. 338.

Reviewed by Aleksandra Kolaković

John Lampe, Professor of History at the University of Maryland, puts up in this book a picture of twentieth-century political, social, economic and cultural developments in the Balkans, relying on his previous research into the region (e.g. *Balkan Economic History 1550-1950: From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations*; *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country* and *Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of 20th-Century Southeastern Europe*). In dealing with the events in Greece, Albania, former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania, he devotes most of his attention to war and post-war periods or frequent changes the region has undergone, as such transitions have been influential in the process of accepting or rejecting different European ideologies, institutions and interventions.

The book is divided into eight thematically and chronologically organized chapters: 1. *Balkan States and Borderlands before the Balkan Wars*; 2. *Balkan Wars, First World War, Postwar settlements,*

1912-1922; 3. *Struggling with Liberal and National Transitions in the 1920s*; 4. *Illiberal Directions during the Depression Decade*; 5. *World War, Civil War, and the Communist Advantage*; 6. *Communist and Cold War Transitions, 1945-1963*; 7. *Continuity and Contradictions, 1964-1989*, and 8. *War and Transitions since 1989*, and each chapter is enriched with descriptive maps and tables showing text-related statistical data. The book is equipped with an index, and a selective but very useful bibliography, which is thematically arranged: *Balkans to 1918 and Beyond*, *Interwar Parties and Politics*, *Second World War*, *Transitions before and after 1989*, *National Identities, Societies, and Cultural Politics*, *Southeastern Europe 1945-1989* and *Southeastern Europe since 1989*.

This comparative study seeks to identify and explain the problems affecting the whole region and significantly influencing both intra-Balkan relations and the relations of the Balkan countries with the great powers. In the introductory chapter,

Lampe looks back at the early twentieth century as a period when the peoples of the region, finding themselves divided between vast empires and under the sway of great powers, sought to build the state and national identities of their own but also to win their freedom. Almost equal attention is devoted to the subsequent events in the Balkans during the war, interwar and post-war periods. The last chapter discusses the terminal phase of the collapsing communist system in the Balkan countries, the bloody break-up of Yugoslavia and directions of the region's development at the end of the twentieth century.

Lampe's comparative analysis gives equal attention to all momentous events in the history of each individual country but also of the region as a whole. The fourth chapter, for example, in the section entitled *Royal Regimes, Regional Divisions, Radical Alternatives*, and subtitled *From Aleksandar's Yugoslavia to Carol's Romania and From Boris's Bulgaria to Metaxas's Greece*, deals with the internal political scenes and the development of parliamentary and political life in all Balkan states. Lampe concludes the chapter by addressing the question of the ways and degrees in which the Balkans, i.e. individual Balkan nations, accepted European patterns and models, and the ways and degrees in which they adapted them to their respective milieus prior to the Second World War. To what extent has Lampe succeeded in keeping a balance in looking at the individual nations without losing sight of the region as a whole is best seen from chapter 7: *Continuity and Contradictions, 1964-1989*, made up of thematic subsections: *Socioeconomic Transitions Continued, Greece Survives the Colonels' Regime, Decentralized Yugoslavia and Centralized Bulgaria, National Stalinism in Albania and Romania and Struggling with Reform and Remembrance: Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia in the 1980s*.

Accompanied with descriptive maps of the Balkans as well as with tables providing different kinds of statistical data for the Balkan countries, the body of text becomes more readable. The maps help the reader to make a visual identification of geographical, state, political, and ethnic borders, while showing their changes in the course of events crucially affecting the region: wars, post-war changes, military movements, and ethnic groups. The tables provide the data concerning the number of citizens, size of the capitals, population and labour force structures, living standards and the directions of external trade. Such data are exceptionally important, given that Lampe devotes his attention not only to political and ideological developments in Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and the former Yugoslav republics, but also to their economic development, that is to say to all aspects of the region's development as a whole. It is an attempt to shed light on the road the Balkans has travelled in the twentieth century and on the relations between the Balkan nations and the rest of Europe through a comparative and broad analysis that makes this book interesting and significant.

Western reviewers recommend the book *Balkans into Southeastern Europe* as an introductory reading for the history of this, as they put it, problematic region. The author has relied on the knowledge he has gained while working at the Wilson Center, and on his earlier studies at large. Besides his first-hand experience with the region, his consultants have been Roumen Avramov, Ivo Bicanic, Mark Wheeler and Jean Tesche. The absence of cooperation with scholars from Serbia is observable, which also goes for the literature and sources used. The only Serbian publication cited was published in the 1950s (M. Djilas, *The New Class*, London: Thames and Hudson, 1957), and another, recommended for further reading, is a

forthcoming work by Prof. A. Mitrović of the University of Belgrade *Serbia's Great War 1914-1918* (Purdue University, 1 June 2007). Apart from the above-mentioned, Lampe has largely drawn on the research done by Maria Todorova, Charles and Barbara Jelavich, Miranda Vickers, Richard Crampton, Ivo Banac and Richard Clogg.

Lampe looks at the Balkans as a whole, bearing in mind its ethnic and religious

blends, frequent and devastating wars, external interferences and interventions, but also the periods when reforms in the Balkan countries resulted in the adoption of European ideas and institutions. Outlining the history of a region Lampe views as being traditionally separated from the rest of Europe, he nevertheless points to an inclusion of the Balkans, its peoples and countries into European processes at the end of the twentieth century.

RICHARD J. CRAMPTON, *THE BALKANS SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR*.
PEARSON EDUCATION LIMITED, 2002. Pp. 376.

Reviewed by Miroslav Svirčević

The Balkans since the Second World War by Oxford University professor Richard Crampton is a valuable and interesting monograph that discusses in detail the political, social and economic development of the Balkan countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, and Yugoslavia and her successor states) during three major periods connected with the rise, reign and collapse of the global communist order: 1) 1944-49/50: from the final agreement of the Great Powers (Great Britain, USA and USSR) on the post-war fate of the Balkans to the establishment of new governments and legal-political orders in the Balkan countries; 2) 1950-89: Cold War; and 3) 1989-2000: from the fall of the Berlin Wall to most recent times. This "historical novel" pays especial attention to post-war Yugoslavia founded on the Marxist political doctrine and the absolute power of the Communist Party and its untouchable leader Josip Broz Tito, to its swings between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War and, finally, to its unexpectedly brutal disintegration, accompanied by unparalleled national and religious clashes and ethnic cleansing. There are at least two reasons for this attention: because Yugoslavia strongly influenced the po-

litical configuration of the Balkans from the Second World War, and because its disintegration is seen as the best example of so-called *balkanization*, a term that has derogatory connotations in Western scholarship and publicism.¹ The term is stereotypically used as synonymous with barbarism, absolutism, irrationality, primitivism, intolerance and other dark aspects of man and human society, surfacing in their extreme form since the collapse of the global communist order and bloody civil war in Yugoslavia, and wiping out the basic values of modern civilization. In the last decades of the twentieth century Tito's Yugoslavia witnessed strong processes of retrograde populism, militarism, chauvinism and organized criminal, reducing all the Yugoslav nations (except Slovenians) to pre-civil, pre-political forms of ethnic-tribal existence. This state of affairs is comparable to Hobbes's description: *bellum omnium contra omnes*. It is Krleža's Balkan inn "where no sooner are the light turned off than knives are drawn." Consequently, the writer makes the fate of Yugoslavia and her successor

¹ Cf. M. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford University Press, 1997), 33-37.

countries the focus of his book. All other Balkan countries, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Greece, are given by far less space. Nevertheless, this does not affect the quality of his historical overview of developments in these countries. On the contrary, their historical development appears to be well studied.

In the first part of the book, the writer focuses on the changing political configuration of the Balkans in the wake of the Second World War. According to the agreement reached by Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, the largest part of the Balkan Peninsula found itself under new communist regimes which in their turn were under the powerful influence of the USSR and Soviet Communist Party. The only exception was Greece, which did not belong to the sphere of Soviet political interests. Crampton seems to give a fairly good picture of the process of establishing communist governments in Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania, as well as of the dramatic civil war in Greece between ELAS (armed pro-communist forces of the united left) and EDES (pro-Western and rigid anti-communist forces), ending in the defeat of the former. Nevertheless, there is one serious objection to be made. The controversial issue of the legitimacy of the new communist regimes in the Balkans is completely ignored, which then results in an incorrect picture of the post-war development of the Balkan countries. Namely, the reader is left with the impression that the transition of the Balkan countries into communism was a "natural" development. Quite the reverse is true. The communist movement, as a militant and totalitarian political force, seized power unlawfully in most Balkan countries, leaving it devastated after decades of its rule. This is very important to note if the fact is taken into account that communist parties in the pre-war period were only influential in some areas of the Balkans (Slovenia, Croatia,

Macedonia), while remaining marginal in others (Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria). The only Balkan state where the communist movement was quite strong was Greece, but Greece was spared from communist rule owing to the decision of the Great Powers. With these facts in mind, an objective approach would have required that the issue be discussed of the legitimacy of all "wartime representative bodies" (e.g., AVNOJ/ACNLY, which had no mandate to represent the Yugoslav nations) and post-war "elections" organized by Balkan communists. The communists would win the "elections" with a majority uncommon in modern democracies, which formed a formal-legal basis for the perpetuation of their unlimited rule, marked by massive abuses of human and political rights, amply using the police and secret police, brutally oppressing political "enemies" (most horrid examples being *Goli otok*, a full-scale Gulag in Yugoslavia, and concentration camps in the Danube delta in Romania), destroying economy with absurd ideological experiments (collectivization in agriculture, abolishment of private and introduction of so-called social property etc), shaking the social structure (destroying peasants, the middle class and the clergy while artificially creating a working class etc.), finally, brutally cutting off the whole region from the West not only politically but also in terms of culture, democratic tradition and civilization. One gets the impression that the writer deliberately chose to avoid this thorny question.

In the second part of the book, Crampton discusses the history of the Balkan nations during the Cold War. He gives a good analysis of their political and economic systems, and their foreign policies. Although Tito's "self-management socialism" was seen in the West as the most tolerant and liberal of communist regimes, it was comparable with the Warsaw Pact countries in ideological and police bru-

tality, regardless of what their individual foreign policies and relationship with the USSR were. After the break-up between Tito and Stalin in 1948, Yugoslavia kept a balance between the two opposed military and political blocs, pointing out its right to "its own path to socialism". She became the leader of the Non-alignment movement, which included former Western colonies, now independent nations, mostly African and Asian, and some Latin American. On the other hand, Romania, although a member of the Warsaw Pact, sought to pursue a more independent policy in relation to Moscow, especially after the death of Dej and with Ceausescu at the head of the Communist Party. The latter's regime, however, has become synonymous with terrible brutality and abuse of power. Until the end of the communist era, Bulgaria of Todor Zhivkov remained a loyal follower of the USSR, while Hoxa's Albania went through three phases: pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese and the phase of self-isolation. As the only non-communist country in the region, Greece was gradually overcoming the state of political instability, drawing closer to the West under the wing of the USA and NATO. Political struggle was fought between two rival parties: the socialist PASOK of Papandreu and the conservative New Democracy of Karamanlis. Since the settlement of the painful Cyprus Question (1960–61), strained relations with Turkey, and the fall of the regime of the Colonels (1967–74), Greece has succeeded in es-

tablishing a democratic system, eventually joining the European Union (1981).

The third part of the book gives a geo-political picture of the Balkans after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the USSR. All Balkan countries (except Greece) have undergone the process of political transition from totalitarianism to democracy, and committed themselves (at least declaratively) to human rights and freedoms, parliamentary government, free market economy and integration into the NATO and the EU.

By way of conclusion, it should be noted that the book was finished in 2000, which means that many important developments could not be included and analyzed. Two of these are certainly the entry of Romania and Bulgaria into the NATO and the assassination of the reformist-oriented Serbian Prime Minister Djindjić in 2003. Even so, Crampton's book considerably contributes to the elucidation of the most recent history of *Savage Europe* (as the Balkans was named in a guide published before the First World War),² headline news all over the world in the 1990s. Obviously, its main goal has been to identify the causes of the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia, which has left grief and ruins in its wake, without, however, highlighting adequately the responsibility of Titoism for that disintegration.

² Harry de Windt, *Through Savage Europe* (London: T. Fischer Unwin, 1907).

MARK MAZOWER, *THE BALKANS. FROM THE END OF BYZANTIUM TO THE PRESENT DAY*. A PHOENIX PAPERBACK. FOURTH EDITION, 2003. Pp. 176.

Reviewed by Miroslav Svirčević

The Balkans – from the End of Byzantium to the Present Day, a book by the British historian Mark Mazower, is a significant contribution to modern historiography, Balkan studies in particular. The writer

has been awarded twice: in 2000 (Wolfson History Prize) and in 2001 (Bentinck Prize). Although condensed, the book is written very systematically. It includes an in-depth discussion of all terms, geo-

graphic and climatic features and historical phenomena that have – in the author's view – decisively influenced the shaping and courses of the history of the Balkan nations from the fall of Constantinople in 1453 until the wars of Yugoslav succession in 1991–99. The reader gets the impression that this is a kind of a guide to a *Wild Europe*, and its main goal is to provide an introduction to the history of Southeastern Europe in the easiest way. At the same time, the book obviously seeks to offer a satisfactory answer to the question as to why this part of Europe remains, even in modern times, politically inferior to the West. The writer shows commendable objectivity, convincing argumentation and skillfully drawn parallels between similar phenomena from different epochs, an approach which may be very risky in modern historiography. Relying on the extensive and relevant literature from the field of Balkan studies, the author depicts the most important historical processes in the Balkans in the form of an easy-to-read novel whose parts are harmoniously put together to form a whole. Mazower first precisely defines the geo-political area of the Balkans. There follows an overview of its geographic and climatic features, of its multicultural structure and the distinct life style of Balkan nations, especially under Ottoman rule. In accordance with

these historical facts, the writer outlines the process of national awakening of the Balkan peoples, the establishment of their cultural institutions and progressive accumulation of state-building energies in the context of a slow but steady decline of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, i.e. opening of the so-called "Eastern Question", time and again decided by the Great Powers in accordance with their particular political interests. In the end, the writer attempts to explain the outbreak of hostilities in former Yugoslavia after the fall of communism, without resorting to prejudices about the Balkans and their nations widespread in Western scholarship and journalism. As a matter of fact, the writer suggests that the bloody wars in former Yugoslavia – accompanied by barbarism, ethnic cleansing and terrible retributions – were not an expression of the primitive mentality of so-called *Balkan man*, disposed to violence and atrocity, but an embodiment of new technological warfare of the modern era. Accordingly, Mazower, much like Maria Todorova, convincingly questions all derogatory labels and ideological stereotypes that have been attached to this European region ever since the Carnegie Endowment for Peace published a report on the Balkan Wars in 1914. The author of this review strongly recommends this book to readers.

BRANIMIR ANZULOVIC, *HEAVENLY SERBLA: FROM MYTH TO GENOCIDE*.
NEW YORK AND LONDON: NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1999. Pp. xiv + 233.

Reviewed by Miroslav Svirčević

During the latest Balkan crisis and wars of Yugoslav succession (1991–99) scores of books produced by Western scholars and publicists shared a common goal: to recognize and explain the reasons for the gory disintegration of Tito's Yugoslavia, a country once seen as the "most liberal" in the former Communist bloc. The basic

question Western observers addressed was what had caused the closely related Yugoslav peoples to break up amidst such hatred, destruction, mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing, accusations against which none of the warring parties can possibly defend itself. *Heavenly Serbia* by Branimir Anzulovic, an American of Croatian de-

scent, is one of such books, and it offers its own, and very biased, view of the causes leading to the latest Balkan tragedy.

The author struggles to create an impression of Serbs as the only and eternal culprits for all Balkan conflicts ever since Serbia achieved international recognition at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. In his view, all that the Serbs have ever wanted in their modern history is to take control of their neighbours in order to carry out their megalomaniacal and genocidal dream of re-establishing a Serbian empire. In the process, Anzulovic stresses, their political aggression has constantly and obsessively been aimed against Croats, at all times on a higher level of cultural development than Serbs. Seeking to substantiate this unfounded, malevolent and, in the last analysis, unhistorical thesis, Anzulovic offers some "well-proven evidence", which often lead him to absurd, indeed, quite dangerous conclusions. Once arranged in a system, they take on the aspect of a genuine racist theory such as that found in Hitler's *Mein Kampf* or in political projects such as the KKK. The underlying idea of this ideological pamphlet, which the book in fact is, is that the Serbs, ever since their first war of independence against Ottoman rule in 1804, have sought to create a Greater Serbia, nourished by the vindictive ideas of the Kosovo myth, by genocidal battle cries found in epic poetry (in particular in the *Mountain Wreath* by the Montenegrin prince-bishop Petar II Petrovic Njegoš), by their disposition towards violence resulting from a patriarchal social system under centuries-long Ottoman rule, by the totalitarian and very primitive culture of Orthodox Christianity incapable of producing a modern democratic culture because of its petrified caesaro-papism, and finally, owing to the understanding and ample support, especially during the Balkan Wars and the First World War, extended by the Great Powers, as ready as

ever to satisfy all Serbian political appetites. It seems obvious that what we have here is a "shovelled" pile of false information and distorted facts lacking support in historical evidence, or facts taken out of their historical context. They are not difficult to disprove by valid argumentation, which is to show that the book in fact is an incompetent and unscrupulous ideological defamation of a whole nation and its cultural achievement.

The author's first thesis is that the Kosovo myth is a call to avenge the Serbian defeat at the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, the eventual loss of independence and centuries-long enslavement under the multinational and religiously tolerant Ottoman Empire, with the view to attaining a "Heavenly Serbia". The first part of this thesis is ontological. This way of interpreting the so-called Kosovo myth is by no means a novelty, and can be found in some other ill-informed students of Balkan history, such as Ger Duizings, Michael Sells etc. The question that arises, however, is whether this interpretation is correct or superfluous. Careful examination of the historical facts that led to such a cultural phenomenon as the Kosovo oath (Kosovo covenant) shows that this is a superfluous, overtly biased and, consequently, incorrect interpretation of the message the phenomenon communicates. Firstly, rather than the Kosovo myth, it is the term Kosovo oath that does justice to the gist of the phenomenon. Secondly, the gist of the Kosovo oath, a variation of a biblical story, has never been a call for revenge or for the destruction of other peoples for the sake of an imaginary kingdom of God conceived centuries ago; rather, it has been an expression of core Christian values. The Kosovo oath assumed a mythic character in epic literature during the Ottoman occupation. By the beginning of the age of nationalism the Kosovo oath had been imprinted on the collective memory of the people as an ever-lasting

historical lesson and a source of political inspiration. Serbia's modern cultural pattern, built up between the First Insurrection (1804) and the First World War (1914), found creative inspiration in the Kosovo oath. In that sense, it has never been a destructive ideological principle; on the contrary, it has been a positive value inspiring the Serbs to work towards their political and cultural emancipation in keeping with European values and the European way of life. This is a fact which not even the way Milošević abused the Kosovo oath in his struggle for absolute power in Communist Yugoslavia – most readily observable in his 1989 speech delivered at the commemoration of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, offered by Anzulovic as the ultimate proof of his thesis – can overturn. A rigid Communist hardliner, lacking any understanding of Christianity and its values, Milošević had never really understood the Kosovo oath or taken it into account. He was interested in it inasmuch as he could use it as an instrument in his struggle for unlimited, Bolshevik-type of power.

As for the second part of the thesis, that the Ottoman Empire was religiously tolerant, it is only partly true. The Ottoman Empire was based on the *millet* system, and the millet system in its turn was based on religious criteria with the Muslim *millet* as privileged. The Empire's attitude towards the Christian *millet* (which included all Orthodox Christians irrespective of their ethnic origin) and its religious needs varied with the political situation: at times more tolerant, at others less tolerant or even completely discriminatory. What is interesting, however, is the context in which Anzulovic places his reference to this "inbuilt" religious tolerance of the Ottoman Empire. Describing tolerance as a feature also characterizing the multinational Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, he argues that, by contrast, it could never be adopted in the Byzantine

world because its cultural pattern was essentially at odds with the very notion of religious tolerance. For that reason, he argues, Serbs did not find religious equality sufficient, but demanded a privileged status, which they obtained when the Patriarchate of Peć, i.e. the Serbian Orthodox Church, was restored in 1557! Indeed, this line of reasoning results in an overtly racist attitude towards a great world civilization, one whose contribution to the cultural and political history of humankind may well be described as immeasurable. To say that there can be no religious tolerance in Orthodox nations is as preposterous as it is untrue. The past is replete with examples to the contrary. As for Serbia, a system of religious tolerance, unique in fourteenth-century Europe, was legally introduced in the reign of emperor Dušan (1331–55). At a time Dušan's Code stipulated legal protection for all recognized Christian confessions (Orthodox and Roman Catholic), Europe had experienced several waves of religious wars and fanaticism. This example alone shows how incorrect and malevolent Anzulovic's first thesis is.

A second key thesis is that another cornerstone of the alleged Greater Serbian policy in the Balkans is to be found in the poetic messages contained in the *Mountain Wreath* (especially in those centred round an event known as the "massacre of Muslim converts"), an epic by the Montenegrin prince-bishop Petar II Petrović Njegoš. Purportedly, his account of hatred against the enemies of Christian Serbs encouraged aggressive and murderous action again and again. In Anzulovic's distorted view, the *Mountain Wreath* is the climax of belligerent epic poetry calling for vengeance and genocide (which, in his view, marks almost all folk poems from the Kosovo Cycle), because the enemy is demonized to the point that paves the way to its total destruction. This is yet another in the series of Anzulovic's outrages

geous fabrications. Indeed, it takes much intellectual courage to label as genocidal a beautiful epic poem replete with humane messages. Much as the *Mountain Wreath* is a product of its environment, and especially of its time (the age of Romanticism and national revolutions in all of Europe, the Balkans included), it is also an expression of man's universal striving for humanity, justice and freedom, universal struggle for a more decent human life. In that sense, the most famous Serb poem has since 1847 been considered a pearl of European literature as a whole by all Western scholars. Only a biased and ill-disposed observer can choose to appraise this work of poetry and philosophy in the way Anzulovic does. Moreover, in order to underscore the alleged difference between Serbs and Croats in terms of civilization – namely, the latter's embedment in Western culture in contrast to the former – Anzulovic describes Croatian folk epics as the complete opposite to destructive and genocidal Serbian. His examples are *Osman* by Ivan Gundulić and *Odiljenje sigetsko* by Pavao Ritter Vitezović, where the poets treat the enemy with due respect. This is a typical example of how a manipulative use of half-truths may mislead an uninformed reader. Firstly, Ivan Gundulić was not Croat, but a Roman Catholic Serb of Dubrovnik. Anzulovic resourcefully evades the subject of Gundulić's poem. It is a well-known fact that Gundulić glorified Serbia's Middle Ages ("the ancient house of the Nemanjić"). The whole Book 8 is dedicated to Serbs, whereas the word "Croat" barely occurs in the poem. Would a Croat poet in his most beautiful epic have sung about another people, while barely mentioning "his own"? Gundulić was posthumously assigned to the Croatian ethnic group. Secondly, in his time Pavao Ritter Vitezović was a great, if not the greatest, admirer of the Serbian language and culture. In his *Serbica Illustrata*, he marvels

at the beauty of the language and its literary potentials. Were Anzulovic right, Vitezović would have done nothing of the sort. Would anyone appreciate the language of savages and barbarians calling for revenge and genocide?

A third key thesis is that it is in the nature and mentality of the Serbs to use violence, as a result of their centuries-long life in a patriarchal social system under Ottoman rule. Pursuing his ideological claim about a firm, specifically Orthodox, state–church–nation association (obviously adopted from Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*), given an additional boost in the Dinaric highlands and its patriarchal social context, the author infers that this pattern of culture further inflamed Serb expansionism at the expense of their neighbours, in particular Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Albanians.

This line of reasoning suggests that Anzulovic is completely ignorant of not only Orthodoxy and the patriarchal culture of Dinaric Serbs – whose past was marked by their day-to-day struggle to survive in an inhospitable natural environment and under foreign rule – he is also ignorant about patriarchal culture as such. For him, it a priori is a primitive form of communal life and thus requires no further discussion. And the patriarchal system is an exceptionally complex, multilayered and rich culturological phenomenon which involves highly structured social relations, and is essentially democratic in nature. Of course, this form of civilization was characterized by a low technical/technological level, which, however, does not necessarily mean that it was utterly primitive and lacked any rules and regulations. On the contrary, patriarchal societies were based on a strong moral and religious code respectful of highest values: honour, honesty, hard work, commitment to freedom and independence, selflessness, condemnation of crime. The highlanders of Montenegro and Hercegovina sum it all up in

the phrase "honour and valour". It is best seen from the norms of customary law regulating relations within extended families (*zadruga*) in the Balkans. A careful look at these norms shows that the central institutions of such communities (master of the house, mistress of the house, house council) functioned according to the principles of pre-state democracy, assuming responsibility for their members. In the absence of formal laws, these customs were transferred to the earliest domestic political institutions (tribal organization, village self-government). The Dinaric Serbs of Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro who resettled the deserted areas of Serbia (Šumadija) after Austro-Turkish wars in the 18th century, maintained their customs and adapted them to the new environment. This customary law was studied, and appraised with respect, by many scholars, including Valtazar Bogišić in the nineteenth century (*Collection of Current Customary Laws of South Slavs*, Zagreb: JAZU, 1867), and J. M. Halpern and B. Halpern (*A Serbian Village in Historical Perspective*, Prospect Heights: Waveland Press, 1986) in the twentieth century. Had Anzulovic given it all a closer look, his conclusions, combined with a balanced scholarly approach, would likely have been different.

Finally, Anzulovic accuses all Western powers, notably Great Britain and France, of political irresponsibility in nourishing and supporting alleged Serb megalomaniacal political aspirations, which were accomplished with the creation in 1918 of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – or, as he puts it – Greater Serbia, which, for the first time in history, put an end to Croatia's statehood. This statement is yet another Anzulovic's manipulation, and an easily disprovable one. It is obvious that not a single Western power would have permitted the creation of a Greater Serbia. As for Croatia's statehood, it lost independence in 1102, in the

wake of the Battle of Gvozd. From 1102 to 1918, Croatia was under the Crown of St Istvan, a province of Hungary, though in various political and legal arrangements.

With other errors, shortcomings and absurd qualifications added to these main theses of Anzulovic's book, a swarm of falsities and ideological labels, one gets a complete picture of the true worth of this book, ambitiously claiming to explain the causes of the tragedy the Balkans suffered in the last ten years of the twentieth century. So, for example, one can read that the date of the Battle of Rovine is 1394, whereas in fact it took place a year later, or that the leading figure of the Communist regime in the SFRY was Aleksandar Ranković, head of the secret police – which is used as another proof of Greater Serbian hegemonism in former Yugoslavia. Of course, leading figures of the Titoist regime, real policy- and decision-makers between the 1960s and 80s, such as Tito, Kardelj, Krajačić, Bakaric etc. are not so much as mentioned!

In making a long string of half-truths and outright falsities, and failing to mention a number of significant facts, Anzulovic simply continues a long-established anti-Serbian ideology observable in the political thinking of all those Croatian politicians and intellectuals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries whose programme is based on the implementation of the so-called Croatian state rights: Ante Starčević, Josip Frank, Eugen and Slavko Kvaternik, Ivan Andrović, Ante Pavelić, Franjo Tuđman. The objective of this political programme was the creation of an independent Croatian state the extent of which considerably exceeded the Croat-inhabited area and threatened Serbian existential interests. The programme involved physical and spiritual elimination of Serbs from the territories envisaged to become part of the independent Croatian state (mostly within the former

Austro-Hungarian Monarchy). A prerequisite for achieving that objective was to smear, indeed, to demonize the Serbs, offering “scientific” evidence for their forever being a people of barbarians and aggressors, incapable of civilized behaviour. With the building and spreading of such a stereotypical image the path is smoothed to political action, especially with Serbia in an unfavourable international position caused by the disastrous policies of Milošević’s regime. In that regard, Anzulovic is not much different from his preferred ideological models from the Croatian political past. Although wrapped up in a veil of “proven” scholarly theories, his discourse is contemptuous not only of the Serbs, their history and culture, but of the Orthodox Christian world as a whole. The only difference is the form he gives to his exposition of the Croatian state rights

programme, i.e. his rhetoric. One credit he must be admitted is for his wording, the method of exposition and the skill in manipulating facts. He expounds his views in a way that seems to work within the parameters of the modern world. Anzulovic seeks to present the underlying ideas of the retrograde 19th-century Croatian state rights programme as conforming to the rules set by the on-going processes of globalization and integration. Even so, his ideological argumentation is for the most part so stretched that his main conclusions become unconvincing and those subsidiary amusing. To put it briefly, Anzulovic’s book is of little scholarly value. It should be taken for what it is, an ideological pamphlet with clear political goals: to justify the process of creating an independent Croatian state and the related elimination of the Serbian people.

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