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The origin of the Institute goes back to the Institut des Études balkaniques founded in Belgrade in 1934 as one of a kind in the Balkans. The initiative came from King Alexander I Karadjordjević, while the Institute's scholarly profile was created by Ratko Parežanin and Svetozar Spanačević. The Institute published *Revue internationale des Études balkaniques*, which assembled most prominent European experts on the Balkans in various disciplines. Its work was banned by the Nazi occupation authorities in 1941.

The Institute was not re-established until 1969, under its present-day name and under the auspices of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. It assembled a team of scholars to cover the Balkans from prehistory to the modern age and in a range of different fields of study, such as archaeology, ethnography, anthropology, history, culture, art, literature, law. This multidisciplinary approach remains its long-term orientation.

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Three Votive Plaques from Upper Moesia

Abstract: The article proposes a new reading and interpretation of three inscriptions engraved on small bronze plaques in the shape of *tabula ansata* from the Danubian *limes* in Upper Moesia — two from *Pincum* and one from *Viminacium*, associating the inscribed objects with the cult of Jupiter Dolichenus. The revised inscriptions also provide new data on the Roman units stationed on the Upper Moesian Danube bank, as two of the dedicators are identified as members of the *ala Flaviana*.

Key words: Latin epigraphy, votive inscriptions, Jupiter Dolichenus, Roman *ala*, Upper Moesia.

Introduction

A fascinating feature of ancient epigraphy is that even the shortest inscriptions containing just a few words or small fragments can shed light on a phenomenon from the ancient past, provide a missing piece of evidence or raise new questions and topics. In an attempt to offer an accurate interpretation, an epigrapher must consider the physical appearance of the text-bearing object, the materiality of the text, consider the context(s) and historical connotations, and scrupulously compare it with relevant analogies. The value of written records is especially high in the regions where informative sources are scarce, as is the case of the province of Upper Moesia, which is in the focus of the present paper. Another characteristic feature of Latin epigraphy is the use of abbreviations that can often be very radical and sometimes very enigmatic, posing difficulties in front of its editor and opening room for more than one interpretation. The present paper is dedicated to such a case. It will attempt to offer a reinterpretation

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of three tiny but interesting inscriptions from the Danubian limes that have not attracted a lot of attention so far.

Three votive bronze plaques from Pincum and Viminacium

In 2003, Professor Miroslava Mirković published an important article, bringing to light eighteen new inscriptions from Viminacium and its environs. Among the published material, there are three particularly interesting inscribed objects that have not attracted much attention from scholars so far. These are three small bronze *tabullae ansatae*: two from *Pincum* (no. 1 and no. 2) and one from *Viminacium* (no. 3).

1. Small bronze plaque in the form of *tabula ansata*, 12 x 6.8 x 0.35 cm. Found in Veliko Gradište (*Pincum*) in 1998. According to the information provided in the edition, it was discovered in a grave among other material, which is not specified. It was kept in the ancient collection of the National Library in Veliko Gradište; now held in the National Museum Veliko Gradište.¹ (fig. 1, fig. 3.)

Mirković 2003, 97, no. 1, with a photo:

*I(nfernīs) D(is) Fl(avius) Am|monius q(uaestor) or q(uinquennalis?) | AL
FL ex vi|su posuit |⁵ pro filio.*

2. Fragmentary bronze plaque in the form of *tabula ansata*, 6,2 x 3,5 x 0,3 cm, upper and right side of the plaque lost. A punctured inscription framed by a punctured inscription field; letters: 3,5-5 cm. It was kept in the ancient collection of the National Library in Veliko Gradište; now held in the National Museum Veliko Gradište (fig. 2, fig. 3).

Mirković 2003, 98, no. 2, photo:

*I(nfernīs) [D(is)] | Domi[tius ±4]|LERIS dec(urio) M or AL? | Fl(avii?)
v(otum) s(olvit) l(ibens) m(erito).*

3. Inscription on a small plaque. According to the information provided to M. Mirković by D. Jacanović, the curator of the museum in Požarevac, the plaque was discovered in a grave (fig. 4). Lost.

Mirković (2003, 98, no 3, drawing) runs:

I(nfernīs) D(is) | S(extus) Alp(inius) Al|cimus.

According to the published readings and the interpretation, the inscriptions are dedicated to the *Inferi dii*: the radically abbreviated formula *I.D.* is expanded by the author as *I(nfernīs) D(is)*. This is a collective name for the under-

¹ I am grateful to the director of the National Museum "Veliko Gradište", Mr. Dragan Bogičić, and to Mr Željko Ivanović, for providing me with excellent photographs of the plaques.



Fig. 1. Inscription no. 1. *Pincum*.

Photo courtesy of: National Museum Veliko Gradište




Fig. 2. Inscription no. 1. *Pincum*.

Photo courtesy of: National Museum Veliko Gradište.



Fig. 3. Inscriptions 1 and 2. *Pincum*.

Photo courtesy of: National Museum Veliko Gradište.




Fig. 4. Drawing of
D. Jacanović.
After: Mirković 2003, p. 98.



Fig. 5. *Tabula ansata*
dedicated to I.O.M Dolichenus
from Egeta (Brza Palanka).
Museum Negotin.




Fig. 6. Dolichenian *tabula ansata*
from Roman castrum *Novae* (Čezava),
Iron Gates.




Fig. 7. Bronze Dolichenian *tabula ansata*
from Jasen CCID 104.
Photo: G. Kazarow, *JÖAI* 27, 22, fig. 107.




Fig. 8. *Nida*, Frankfurt 2016.
|Photo Martins & Wenzel 2018.



Fig. 9. *Nida*, Germania Superior, *CIL* XIII
7344 = CCID 521. Photo: EDCS.



Fig. 10. *Vetoniana* (Pfunz), Raetia, CCID 480. Photo: EDCS.




Fig. 11. *Vetoniana* (Pfunz), Raetia. CCID 481. Photo W. Slaby, EDCS.

world gods (Kropp 2008, 94; Urbanová 2018, 44), including the spirits associated with death. The most common epigraphic occurrence of the *inferi dii* is in the formula in Roman funerary inscriptions: *Dis Inferis Manibus*, which occurs more commonly in the form of *Dis Manibus*. This formula is typically abbreviated to *D(is) M(anibus)*, *D(is) M(anibus) s(acrum)* or less frequently *D(is) I(nferis) M(anibus)* and (cf. Raepsaet-Charlier 2002). Except for the funerary inscriptions, *Inferi dii* are invoked only in curse tablets (*tabellae defixionum*). For example, CIL XIII 7555 (Kropp 2008): *Data nomina | ad -----inferas ... CIL XIII 7553 Inimicorum nomina || ad -----infe|ros* (Urbanová 2018, 63); *Rogo Mane(s et Di?) inferi, ut (Ma)rius Fronto, (adv)ersariu(s) Sex(ti), sit vanus neque loqui possit contra Sextum* (for more examples: Kropp 2008, 94 ff.; Urbanová 2018).

The editor suggests that the purpose of these three plaques was funerary, assuming that they might have been attached to urns (or sarcophagi?) (Mirković 2003, 107). It is possible that this idea is based on the information about the finding circumstances that were provided to the author at the time of publishing: (*ad no. 1*, p. 107) “in a Roman grave, together with the remains of a cremated person (“in einem römischen Grab, zusammen mit den Überresten eines Kremierten.”) and *ad no. 3*: “in Viminacium in einem Grab gefunden”. However, the internal evidence in the texts of the inscription suggests that the plaques probably had a different purpose. Namely, the inscriptions contain formulas that are typical for votive inscriptions: the first inscription closes with the formula *ex visu posuit* (lines 4–6), stating that the *votum* is made “on account of a vision of a god”. The inscription further explains that the vow is made for the dedicant’s son: *pro filio*. The stereotyped formula *ex visu* (often attested in the form of *ex viso*, cf. Nedeljković 2014) is very common in votive monuments along with similar expressions: e.g. *visu monitus*, *somno monitus* (“on the account of a vision in sleep”) and *ex iussu*, *ex iussu dei ...* “on the account of a command of the

god” (Renberg 2003; Kajava 2014, 414–415; Rives 2014, 429; cf. Szabó 2016). The second inscription (no. 2, line 4) also contains the formula *v(otum) s(olvit) l(ibens) m(erito)*, which is typical of the same genre, further clarifying that the purpose of the object was doubtlessly votive. Therefore, it would be unusual if these inscriptions were funerary (cf. Rives 2014, 429).

In an attempt to better understand the character, purpose, and context of these inscriptions, it would be useful to reconsider the physical appearance of the text-bearing objects along with the textual evidence. Namely, as already mentioned, all three inscriptions are engraved on small bronze plaques shaped as *tabulae ansatae*, each having punctured holes through which the plaques were attached to an object that presumably had a ritual purpose. By their general appearance, dimensions, as well as the inscribed content, they compellingly resemble the quadrangular plaques in the shape of *tabula ansata*, dedicated to Jupiter Dolichenus. Several such plaques were found in relative vicinity, in different localities across the Danubian *limes*. The best-known example is a small bronze plaque, 10 x 14,5 cm (fig. 5), dedicated to *Iuppiter Optimus Maximus Dolichenus* from Egeta/Brza Palanka (Vučković-Todorović 1964–1965; AE 1966, 336; AE 1968, 453; *ILJug* 466; *CCID* 95, tab. 25) whose inscription runs as follows: *I(ovi) O(ptimo) M(aximo) Doli|cheni (!) c(o)hor(s) | I Cretu(m)*. It was found in a structure identified at that time as Dolichenum,² among a range of other artefacts belonging to this cult: statues with inscriptions and other objects, such as a triangular signum (Vučković-Todorović 1964–1965). Another analogous *tabula ansata* was discovered in the Roman military camp in *Novae* (locality Čezava, village Dobra), positioned on the Danube, at about 40 km downstream from *Pincum* (Grbić 2012): *I(ovi) O(ptimo) Dolicin(o) (!) | M. Cocceius Zeu|xius v(otum) s(olvit) l(ibens) m(erito)* (fig. 6). Farther along the Danube, towards *Ratiaria*, two bronze *tabulae ansatae* were found in the ruins of a *castellum* at the village of Jasen, located at 14 km from Vidin (*CCID* 104–105 = Zotović 1966, 97–98, n. 38, 39) (fig. 7), with other Dolichenian artefacts that include a typical triangular plaque with a relief (*CCID* 103) and a statuette (*CCID* 106).³ Direct analogies can also be found in other provinces, especially in the regions close to a *limes*. For example, a Dolichenian plaque in the shape of *tabula ansata*, found at the Roman town of *Nida* in Upper Germania (Frankfurt-Heddernheim) belongs to this type, (Hampel, Fluegen & Wenzel 2016, 92, photo = AE 2016, 1167; Martins & Wenzel 2018, 253, fig. 3, Archäologisches Museum Frankfurt):

² The purpose of the rounded structure in Egeta is now being reconsidered, see Gavrilović Vitas 2021, 110–111.

³ *CCID* 104: 6,3 x 10,8 cm: *I(ovi) O(ptimo) M(aximo) D(olicheno) | Aur(elius) Bas|sus sac(erdos) | servus eius* (fig. 7) and *CCID* 105: *I(ovi) O(ptimo) [M(aximo) D(olicheno)] | Fl(avius) Sabin[us et] | Valeria V[---]tinsa d(o)no(?) [d(ederunt)? d(e)?] | suo ex iusso (!) [dei](?)*.




Fig. 12 a-b.
 Votive standard from Mauer an der
 Url (AE 1939, 268 = CCID 298).
 Photo: Wolfgang Sauber, available
 at Wikimedia Commons under
 CC-BY-SA-4.0 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:KHM_-_Iupiter_Dolichenus_Mauer_Dreiecksvotiv_2b.jpg

Iovi | *Dolich*|*eno* (fig. 8); *CIL* XIII 7344 = *CCID* 521 (fig. 9): *I(ovi) O(ptimo) M(aximo) | Dol(icheno) | Masiac(ius) | Sequens | ex i(ussu) sol(vit)*. Next, two plaques from *Vetoniana* (Pfunz) in *Raetia*: *CIL* III 11926 = *CCID* 480 (fig. 10): *I(ovi) O(ptimo) M(aximo) | Doloceni (sic!) | Demittius | sacerdos | d(onum) d(edit)*, *CIL* III 11927 = *CCID* 481 (fig. 11): *I(ovi) O(ptimo) M(aximo) | Duliceno (sic!) | ubi fer(r)um | [nascit]ur || T(---) || F(---)*; *CIL* III 11928 = *CCID* 482: *[Io]v(i) | [D]ol(icheno?) | [---]* from *Municipium Claudium Virunum/Zollfeld* in *Noricum* (*CIL* III 6015, 4 = *CCID* 343): *I(ovi) O(ptimo) D(olicheno)*. The list of analogies goes on. Also, there are examples of typical Dolichenian triangular votive standards with the inscription fields between two *ansae*.

In the light of these analogies, the dedication I.D. in our plaques from *Pincum* and *Viminacium* may be understood as *I(ovi) D(olicheno)*. The name of the deity is typically attested as *I(uppiter) O(ptimus) M(aximus) D(olichenus)*; also, there are many epigraphic attestations of the variant *Iovi Dolicheno*, as well.⁴ For example, the triangular votive standard from *Mauer an der Url* (*CCID* 295) runs as: *I(ovi) D(olicheno) Postumius Celer dec(urio) ex imp(erio)* (fig. 12). The theonym is frequently attested in a vulgar form: *Dulcenus*, *Dolicinus*, etc. (Vágási 2020; cf. Grbić 2012). The fact that another inscription dedicated to *Iuppiter Optimus Maximus Dulcenus (sic!)* was discovered at *Pincum* supports the proposed interpretation. It is the inscription on a small statue base (12,5 x 5,6 x 8 cm) with traces of the lost statue. It was found at the Roman fortification in 1899 and published in 1901 by Ladek, Premerstein and Vulić (*CIL* III 14503, 1; *AE* 1902, 20). It was long considered lost, before it was rediscovered relatively recently in the Banat Museum of *Timișoara* and it was published — for the first time with a photograph — by Romanian scholars Calin Timoc and Imola Boda (Timoc & Boda 2016).⁵ Based on this inscription, it is assumed that there was a sanctuary or a shrine dedicated to the cult of *Dolichenus* at *Pincum* (cf. Gavrilović Vitas 2021, with bibliography). The inscription was set up by two *leg(ionis) sig(niferi)*, the standard-bearers in the legion *VII Claudia*, *Aelius Silvanus* and *Aelius Leonides*. Another inscription was found at *Kličevac*, a village not far from *Viminacium* and *Pincum* (Petrović 2004, 217–224). Other attestations in this stretch of the Danubian limes include many sites such as *Novae* (Čezava), *Diana* (Karataš), *Rtkovo*, *Egeta*, *Aquae*, *Jasen*, *Pojejena de Sus*, *Drobeta*.

The proposed interpretation may be reinforced by reconsidering another important aspect: who were the people who made these vows? In the commen-

⁴ Cf. e.g. *CIL* XIII 7343 = *CCID* 520; *CCID* 462; *CCID* 301.

⁵ Thanks to this discovery it is now known that the marks on the upper side show traces of four hooves that, according to the authors, “suggest a moving bovine, which can only be the Dolichenian bull ridden by a deity” (Timoc & Boda 2016, 122).

tary of the inscription no. 1, M. Mirković interprets the agglomeration of letters *AL FL* in the line 4 as an unattested toponym or a previously unattested imperial domain. Assuming that *AL* could be read as *AE*, the author proposes that it could stand for *Ae(liana)*, *Ae(lia)* analogously to *Aeliana Picensia* — an attested imperial domain whose administrative centre was most likely in the homonymous settlement *Pincum*. Accordingly, the author proposes that the letters *FL* should be read as *Fl(aviana) / Fl(avianum)*, associating this with the toponyms *Flaviana* and *Augustoflaviensia* in Moesia Prima attested in *Notitia dignitatum* (Or. XLI 13 and 33). The position of the latter, not far from Margum and Pincum, is indicated in the text of the *Notitia: contra Margum in castris Augustoflavianensibus*. The author suggests that the whole region of Viminacium and Margum may have been named *Flaviana* or *Flavianum*.

Taking *Fl* as a toponym, the author interprets *Q* in line 3 as *q(uaestor)* or *q(uinquennalis?)*, a magistrate of the hypothetical *Aelia Flaviana*. Next, in lines 3–4 of the inscription no. 2, the first edition gives *dec(urio) M (?) Fl(---)*, proposing that the attested person *Domi[tius ±4] | LERIS*, could also have been a municipal *decurio*. Finally, a municipal role can be assumed for *S(extus) Alp(inius) Alcimus*, the dedicant of the inscription no. 3 found in Viminacium, although this is the only inscription out of the three that does not specify the occupation of the dedicant. Namely, this person is most probably identical with a namesake *decurio* of the *municipium Aurelium Augustum Margum*, attested in a votive inscription from the Roman *municipium Margum* (*IMS* II 315), in the environs of Viminacium (*IMS* II, p. 208–211; Mócsy 1970, 144–145). The placename is attested on brick stamps found at Veliko Gradište (Premerešin & Vulić 1903, Bbl. 56, nos. 83–83, drawing, cf. Bbl. 12 = *AE* 1903, 299): *Pinco, Cast(ra) Pinc(ensia)*. However, the letters *AL* in plaque no. 1 are very clearly visible; there is no trace of any upper horizontal *hasta* that could belong to an *E*. Therefore, the assumed reading *AE* does not seem probable, which influences the interpretation of the inscription in question, as well as the reading of the following inscription no. 2. Given that the reading *AL* is certain, the letters *AL FL* should probably be expanded as *al(a) Fl(aviana)*. Consequently, the persons attested in inscriptions 1 and 2 should be considered as members of an auxiliary unit, an *ala*, and not municipal magistrates of an unattested town/region called *Flaviana* (?), especially since the inscriptions were found at *Pincum*, whose ubication at Veliko Gradište is fairly certain (cf. Kanitz 1892, 23–24; Mócsy 1970, 51; 1974, 96; Petrović 2019, 75–76)⁶. As already mentioned, Pincum was an administrative centre of the *metalla Aeliana Picensia* (Dušanić 1977, 76; *BMC* III, 533, no. 1853, 1853; Mirković 1968, 103). This might have been the capital of the hom-

⁶ There have been sporadic archaeological finds, see e.g. Cunjak 1986, 57–58; Jacanović 1990, 110, sl.1.

onymous *civitas Pincensium*, located in that part of the province (cf. Nikolić 2018 for the bibliography), although reliable data are missing. In the seventeenth century, Count Marsigli witnessed the existence of a Roman castrum with rounded towers, 45,5 x 45,5 m. Already at the time when Felix Kanitz visited the site, only one wall was still visible (Kanitz 1861, 201; 1892). If the proposed interpretation is correct, the revised view of the dedicatory aspects becomes more likely, considering the incredible popularity of the cult of Juppiter Dolichenus among the members of the Roman army in the second and third century CE, and taking into account the new insights into the mechanisms of its spread,⁷ the interpretation of the monuments.

The unit mentioned in these inscriptions could be identified as *ala Gallorum Flaviana* (Matei-Popescu & Țentea 2018, 21–23; Ferjančić 2018, 657). This *ala* was possibly stationed in Moesia from the times of Vespasian; it was attested in Lower Moesia in military diplomas from the year 92 CE. Also, it is attested in brick stamps in the Roman fort *Carsium* (Hârșova, near Constanța) as *ala Gallorum Flaviana* (AE 1992, 1496), as well as *ala Flaviana* (AE 1998, 1145). Based on the evidence from military diplomas, it is assumed that the unit was transferred to the north of the Danube, to Lower Dacia, at the beginning of Hadrian's reign; its departure was most probably connected to the conflicts with the Iazyges and the Roxolani in 117–119 CE (Ferjančić 2018, 65). Already in 126, the *ala* was transferred to Upper Moesia (AE 2014, 1648), where it was subsequently attested in diplomas from 132 (RMD 247), 135 (AE 2017, 1762), 136/7 (AE 2015, 1887), 144–146 (RMD 402), 151 (RMD 405) 145–154 (AE 2008, 1741), 160 (AE 2014, 1651), 161 (RMD 55) (Ferjančić 2018, 65–66, Table 21). The earlier literature offers no hypotheses on where the unit might have been stationed.⁸ If the reading of the inscriptions of our two plaques is correct, it would be an indication that the *ala* was possibly stationed either in *Pincum* or at least in that area during its stay in Upper Moesia. Because of its position on the Danube bank, at the mouth of the auriferous *Pincus flumen* (the Pek River), the place had an important administrative, military, and strategic role even in the period when that stretch of the Danube ceased to be the border of the Empire. Thanks to the record in *Notitia dignitatum* we know that *Pincum* hosted *cuneus*

⁷ The immense popularity of the cult of Juppiter Dolichenus in the second and third century CE is reflected in the cult's popularity in contemporary research, which produced a very extensive bibliography. Important new developments in the research field are marked by the work of Anna Collar, who applied the social network theory to explain the popularity and spread of the cult of Jupiter Dolichenus among the members of the Roman army, see Collar 2011.

⁸ Matei-Popescu & Țentea (2018) assume that it was stationed within action range of the *legio VII Claudia*, namely *Viminacium*.

equitum Constantiacorum (Not. dign. XLI 12) and *cuneus equitum Delmatarum* (Not. dign. XLI 18) in the late period.

The dedicator of the first inscription, *Flavius Ammonius* was *q. al(ae) Fl(aviana)*, which could be read as *q(uaestor) al(ae) Fl(aviana)*. In the auxiliary units (*alae, cohortes* and *numeri*), the *quaestor* was an officer in charge of the regiment's treasury, a *quaestura*. One of the main tasks of the *quaesturae* of the equestrian units may have been the purchase and upkeep of horses (Davies 1969, 429–59, esp. 448). For example, among the attested cases of this position is the famous “captor of the Decebalus”, *Ti. Claudius Maximus*: one of his offices, listed in the inscription from Philippi, was *qu(a)estor equit(um)* (Speidel 1970, 144 with note 19 = AE 1969/70, 583). Also, a rich dossier of inscriptions from Dacia and Lower Moesia mentioning *quaestura*,⁹ sheds some light on this institution in the Roman army regarding the collective *vota* of the soldiers (Schmidt Heidenreich 2020).

Considering all the described analogies, the distribution of the Dolichenian monuments in the stretch of the Danube bank between Viminacium and Ratiaria, which, furthermore, closely resemble the appearance and the expression, on one hand, and the absence of direct analogies that would speak in favour of the reading *Inferi Dii* on the other, and I propose a new reading of the inscriptions:

Inscription no. 1:

*I(ovi) D(olicheno) Fl(avius) Am|monius q(uaestor) | al(ae) Fl(aviana) ex
vi|su posuit |⁵ pro filio.*

Inscription no. 2:

*I(ovi) D(olicheno) Domi[tius Va?]|leris (sic) dec(urio) al(ae) | Fl(aviana?)
v(otum) s(olvit) l(ibens) m(erito).*

Inscription no. 3:

I(ovi) D(olicheno) | S(extus) Alp(inius) Al|cimus.

Abbreviations

AE — *L'Année épigraphique*, Paris.

CIL — *Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum*, Berlin.

CCID — Hörig, Monika Schwertheim, Elmar *Corpus Cultus Iovis Dolicheni*, Leiden 1987.

RMD — *Roman Military Diplomas*, London.

⁹ CIL III 798; AE 1912, 5 (*Ad Mediam*, Mehadia), AE 1983, 847 (*Micia*), AE 1950, 16 (*Cumidava*), AE 2015, 1151 (*Resculum proveri*).

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A Hypothesis about the Origin of Závaš's Cross (or about a Lost Serbian Reliquary)

Abstract: The documents testifying to the conflict between Serbian king Stefan Uroš I (1242/1243–1276) and Hungarian king Béla IV (1235–1270) from the 1260s also bring news about the Serbian king's reliquary that was seized at the time. Following the destiny and specificities of Závaš's cross, we indicate the possibility of this being the same precious item.

Keywords: Stefan Uroš I, Závaš of Falkenštejn, Béla IV, reliquary, True Cross, treasury

A part from obvious and indisputable transfers of literary concepts from the Serbian to the Hungarian milieu and vice versa, material heritage in the form of items of religious or other content was doubtless transmitted within cultural patterns as a consequence of mutual contacts.¹ One precious reliquary – the staurotheke which we assume to have originated from the Serbian milieu may be classified into such category.² Namely, it is known that the True Cross relic (*Lignum Crucis*) is highly venerated in the entire Christian world, both Orthodox and Roman Catholic. The main centres of its cult and places wherefrom the relics were disseminated were Jerusalem and Constantinople.³

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¹ About the examples of transmission of literary cultural patterns, I. Komatina, "Cultural translation and transmission in the Serbian-Hungarian relations during the mid XIIIth century" (in preparation).

² D. Popović, "On Two Lost Medieval Serbian Reliquaries. The Staurothekai of King Stefan Uroš I and Queen", *Balcanica* 50 (2019), 39–40. Dr Danica Popović gave important suggestions for this paper, and I sincerely thank her on this occasion as well. Also, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the Cistercian Abbey of Vyšší Brod, which kindly provided me the photos of the Závaš's cross.

³ The cult of the True Cross relic sprang up owing to the pilgrimage of empress Helen, the mother of emperor Constantine I, who found the place and the cross on which Christ was crucified. Emperor Constantine deeply respected the True Cross relics. As of the time of emperor Heraclius (610–641), Constantinople became the seedbed of the True Cross cult after Heraclius transferred its major part from Jerusalem to that city, W. S. Wood, *True cross in tradition, history and art* (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's and son, 1898), 114–126; W. C.

In time, the right to distribution of the relics became an exclusive prerogative of the Byzantine emperor.⁴ In Serbia, its cult was particularly fostered owing to Stefan Nemanja and St Sava, as well as subsequent members of the Nemanjić house.⁵ Just like his predecessors, king Stefan Uroš I (1242/1243–1276) possessed the staurotheke with a True Cross relic. We learned of this staurotheke and its intangible and tangible value in a quite unusual way. Namely, of five preserved documents that testify to the king Uroš's attack on Mačva, which, in all probability, took place in late 1265 or early 1266, two of them mention that when clashing with the Serbian king, the Hungarians seized, among other things, a precious cross.⁶ This document, dated in the publication 9 April 1269 and incorporated in the charter of 13 July 1275 (Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár, HU-MNL-OL-DL 671),⁷ reads that king Béla IV issued it in order to award with


Prime, *Holy Cross. A history of the invention, preservation and disappearance of the wood known as the True Cross* (New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & company, 1877), 23–30; A. Frolow, *Les reliquaires de la Vraie Croix* (Paris: Institut français d'études byzantines 1961), 55–74; D. Popović, "Relikvije Časnog krsta u srednjovekovnoj Srbiji". In *Konstantin Veliki u vizantijskoj i srpskoj tradiciji*, ur. Lj. Maksimović, (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike, 2014), 99–121, with a detailed overview of literature dedicated to the True Cross relic.

⁴ Frolow, *Les reliquaires de la Vraie Croix*, 55–152. The True Cross relics came to the West most often as gifts of Byzantine emperors until the time of the Fourth Crusade, while as of 1204 their appearance in the West became widespread, Frolow, *Les reliquaires de la Vraie Croix*, 88–89, 144–147; H. A. Klein, "Eastern Objects and Western Desires: Relics and Reliquaries between Byzantium and the West", *DOP* 58 (2004), 300–306.

⁵ About the possession and importance of the True Cross relic from the time of Stefan Nemanja until the disappearance of the Serbian medieval state with extensive quotation of medieval sources testifying to it, Popović, "Relikvije Časnog krsta u srednjovekovnoj Srbiji", 99–121 (with annexes). See S. Marjanović Dušanić, *Vladarske insignije i državna simbolika u Srbiji od XIII do XV veka* (Beograd: SKZ & Clío, 1994), 32–33, 123–124; B. Miljković, "Hilandarski Časni krst i stara manastirska stavroteka", *ZRVI XXXVIII* (1999/2000), 287–297.

⁶ *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae ecclesiasticus ac civilis*, IV/3, ed. G. Fejér (Budae: Typis typogr. Regiae Universitatis Ungaricae, 1829), 490–493; Fejer, *Codex diplomaticus*, V/1, 24–25.

⁷ It is worth noting that the transcript clearly shows that Béla's original charter was lost, but that in 1275 nobleman Michael Csák arrived before king Ladislaus IV asking him to confirm the privileges granted to him by king Béla IV because the charter was lost, Fejer, *Codex diplomaticus*, V/2, 248–249. Since the lost charter was compiled by notary Demetrius, king Ladislaus IV invited him to confirm, as a scribe, that he compiled it, which was done. Michael then "clearly presented" to king Ladislaus "the confirmation letters" of king Stephen V, "the content and outline of the lost charter under the main seal of king Béla, of blessed memory... compiled, of the following content..." and stated the privilege of king Béla IV, whose contents we described and which is dated 9th April 1269. After the contents are retold, it is specified that king Ladislaus IV wishes to confirm the privileges granted by his grandfather and father, Fejér, *Codex diplomaticus*, V/1, 249–250; I. Komatina, "O vremenu napada kralja Uroša I na Mačvu u njegovom zarobljavanju", *ZRVI LVIII* (2021), 83–84.



Závíš's cross (front side), Cistercian Abbey Vyšší Brod, photo archive



Záviš's cross (back side), Cistercian Abbey Vyšší Brod, photo archive

estates reputable nobleman Michael Csák for his merits in the clashes with the Serbian king.⁸ During these skirmishes, Michael Csák was even wounded and the Hungarian army managed to seize, as we explained, the precious cross, as well as weapons, and took captive the son-in-law of king Uroš and his treasurer's son.⁹ All this was confirmed, as stated in the charter, by king's daughter Anna and grandson Béla.¹⁰ King Béla IV then questioned the captives who said they would break free "once they collect 800 marks for (our faithful) Michael", while "the same Michael received from them the precious Lord's wooden cross before the eyes of duke Béla", which king Béla IV with his queen, "the dearest wife", wished to see.¹¹ King Béla IV and queen Maria saw that it contained the Lord's wood, was one and a half palms long, and one palm wide; was encrusted in gold (worth) ten marks, wondrously adorned with magnificent gemmae and precious stones, with the estimated value of five hundred marks of gold, precious stones and gemmae.¹² The fact that the king was to give to Michael Csák 500 Hungarian marks for the relic, while 800 Hungarian marks were to be paid out for the redemption of the noblemen, testify sufficiently to the kind of relic it was. Any suspicions about the statement concerning the manner in which the cross was obtained and its value contained in the charter dated 9th April 1269 but preserved in the transcript from 1275 completely disappear with the discovery

⁸ As stated in the document, king Béla IV sent military aid to Béla Rostislavich (nepotem nostrum Belam ducem de Macho), the son of king's daughter Anna and Rostislav Mikhailovich, the ruler of Mačva. About Béla Rostislavich, Đ. Hardi, "Gospodari i banovi onostranog Srema i Mačve u XIII veku", *Spomenica Istorijškog arhiva Srem* 8 (2009), 73–74.

⁹ "...Michael, filius Petri de genere Chak, in conflictu ipsius regis contra oppositam aeiem fortiter dimicauit, letale vulnus excipiens, laudabiliter preliando, sicut etiam per karissimum ducem Belam nobis constitit, vt idem Michael in ipsa area certaminis, duos Barones, videlicet generum eiusdem Wros, et filium magistri tauarnicorum suorum, captiuasset, quos cum armis militaribus et dextrariis valentibus, nobis presentauit..."; Fejér, *Codex diplomaticus*, IV/3, 491; S. Stanojević, "Da li je kralj Uroš 1268. god. bio zarobljen od Mačara?", *Glas SKA CLXIV* (1935), 202–203; Popović, "On Two Lost Medieval Serbian Reliquaries", 39–52.

¹⁰ "...nobis presentauit; quorum veritas et noticia per karissimam filiam nostram, Annam ducissam, et karissimum nepotem nostrum Belam, Ducem de Macho, nobis fuit reuelata..."; Fejér, *Codex diplomaticus*, IV/3, 491.

¹¹ "...qui per nos cum fuissent inquisiti, retulerunt, vt cum Michaele fideli nostro in octingentis marcis conuenissent, se redempturos, de quibus etiam idem Michael crucem pretiosam de ligno Domini, ad visum Bele Ducis recepisset quam nos vna cum regina consorte nostra karissima inspicere requisuissemus..."; Fejér, *Codex diplomaticus*, IV/3, 491.

¹² "...ipsam crucem vidimus continere de ligno domini longitudinem vnus palme, et dimidie, latitudinem valere palmam; formatam in auro decem marcarum, preciosis gemmis et lapidibus mirabiliter ordinatam, estimantes in valore quingentas marcas; auri, lapidum, et gemmarum..."; Fejér, *Codex diplomaticus*, IV/3, 491; Popović, "On Two Lost Medieval Serbian Reliquaries", 41–43.

of almost the same testimony about king Uroš's attack on Mačva, the seizure of the precious cross and weapons, and the captivity of the son-in-law of king Uroš and the son of his treasurer in the original charter of 15th June 1270 (Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár, HU-MNL-OL-DL 712). King Stephen V issued it to brothers Dominic and Michael Csák so as to confirm the privileges granted to them by his father, late king Béla IV for their merits in Mačva against Serbian king Uroš I.¹³ Also, the description of the cross in that charter is almost identical to its description in the charter dated 9th April 1269.¹⁴ It is worth noting that both charters mention that Michael Csák, i.e. brothers Michael and Dominic Csák, agreed to deliver to king Béla IV such a wonderful relic, but only in exchange for an estate, stated as "a land called Erdeuchucana... in the Simigiensi county".¹⁵

Namely, after 1265/1266 Hungarian king Béla IV possessed the important True Cross relic which had belonged to Serbian king Uroš and which, in all probability, was of high material value, in addition to spiritual. It should be emphasised that this reliquary ranks among proven symbols of the royal treasury, i.e. is of confirmed authenticity and antiquity. In the Serbian scientific milieu, and it seems beyond, the king Uroš's staurotheke is considered today lost given the sparse and almost no data about its further destiny both in domestic sources and those of western provenance.¹⁶

Dealing with the biography of Serbian king Uroš and collecting material about this distinguished Serbian king, I came across an important note by editor János Bak in his *Online Decreta Regni Mediaevalis Hungariae. The Laws of the*

¹³ It also notes that the king's son-in-law and the son of his treasurer were taken captive, that 800 Hungarian marks were to be paid for the redemption of noblemen, and that king Béla IV and the queen personally assessed the value of the relic, "...et filium magistri Tawarnicorum eiusdem captiuassent, quos cum armis militaribus et dextrariis valentibus eidem Domino Bele Regi presentassent; qui quum per eundem fuissent requisiti, sibi taliter retulissent: vt cum praedictis Dominico et Mycliale in octingentis marcis conuenissent, se redempturos, de quibus eciam antedicti Dominicus, et Mychael crucem pretiosam de ligno Domini recepissent, quam idem Dominus Bela, vna cum matre nostra karissima consorte eiusdem, inspicere requisissent, ipsam crucem vidissent contineri de ligno Domini..."; Fejer, *Codex diplomaticus*, V/1, 25.

¹⁴ "...ipsam crucem vidissent contineri de ligno Domini, longitudine vnus palmae et dimidia, latitudinem valere palmam, formatam in auro decem marcarum, preciosis gemmis et lapidibus mirabilibus ordinatam, estimantes in valore quingentas marcas quam sibi pro pecunia dare recusassent..."; Fejer, *Codex diplomaticus*, V/1, 25.

¹⁵ "...pro concambio dominicae crucis, mirabiliter ordinate, quamdam terram conditionalium nostrorum, Erdeuchucana vocatam, prope villam Vyssunta, in Comitatu Simigiensi..."; Fejér, *Codex diplomaticus*, IV/3, 491; "...pro tali igitur preciosa re quamdam terram conditionalium suorum Erdewchukuna vocatam, in comitatu Symigiensi constitutam..."; Fejér, *Codex diplomaticus*, V/1, 25.

¹⁶ Popović, "On Two Lost Medieval Serbian Reliquaries", 39–43, 49–52.

Medieval Kingdom of Hungary. In the confirmation privilege for the petty nobility of king Béla IV and his sons Stephen and Béla the Younger of September 1267, they at the end take an oath to keep their promise, invoking the name of the Lord, the Holy Gospels and the Life-Giving wood of the Lord's cross: "...Sic nos Deus adiuvet et sancta Dei evangelia et vivificum dominice crucis lignum...". The editor then adds that "vivificum dominice crucis lignum" probably refers to the Holy Cross relic (staurotheke) and assumes it is a part of treasure of the Árpád dynasty. It is known, as underscored by editors, that the Esztergom staurotheke was never owned by the royal family,¹⁷ but that Závaš's cross was in possession of the royal family "around 1267 until it came to Bohemia with the treasures of King Béla's daughter, Anna."¹⁸ Anna, the duchess of Mačva and daughter of king Béla IV came to Bohemia after her father's death in 1270, fleeing from Hungary before her brother, king Stephen V.¹⁹ Based on the document from 1271, we find out that new Hungarian king Stephen V renounced the right to the above mentioned treasury.²⁰ A few years later, the treasury was subject to a dispute between Bohemian king Přemysl Ottokar II (1253–1278) and new Hungarian king Ladislaus IV the Cuman, but the cross, despite the wish of

¹⁷ J. Bak, *Online Decreta Regni Mediaevalis Hungariae. The Laws of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary* (Logan: Utah State University, 2019), 189, nap. 19; A. Somogyi, "La staurotheque byzantine d'Esztergom", *Balkan Studies* 9 (1968), 139–154.

¹⁸ Bak, *Online Decreta Regni Mediaevalis Hungariae*, 185, 189, n. 19 (the privilege in entirety 183–189). We believe it is worth noting that the oath may have been given even without the presence of the relic, i.e. importance was imparted to the oath by the very invocation of those names and the name of the Lord, but this does not exclude the possibility that the legal act could often be carried out before the very sacred objects, S. Stanojević, *Studije o srpskoj diplomatiji*, I (Beograd: Srpska kraljevska akademija, 1928), 299–300; G. Laing, *Bound by Words: Oath-taking and Oath-breaking in Medieval Iceland and Anglo-Saxon England* (Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University 2014, doctoral dissertation), 27–35.

¹⁹ J. Deér, *Die heilige Krone Ungarns* (Wien: Denkschriften der Öster. Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Klasse 91. Bd, 1966), 251–261; É. Kovács, "Signum crucis–lignum crucis: A régi magyar címer kettős kereszttjének ábrázolásairól". In *Eszmetörténeti tanulmányok a magyar középkorról*, ed. S. György (Budapest: Akadémiai Budapest 1984), 407–423.

²⁰ Hungarian king Stephen V and Bohemian king Přemysl Ottokar II signed a peace agreement in July 1271, which interestingly notes that the Hungarian king renounces the royal insignia, i.e. the crown, sword, necklace, star, shields and other precious items and valuables that his sister duchess Anna brought to Bohemia: "...Renunciamus insuper iuri et actioni, nobis et nostris heredibus competentibus, de insigniis regalibus, corona videlicet, gladio, monili, stella, scutellis et aliis clenodiis ac thesauro, delatis per Dominam Annam in regnum Bohemorum..."; Fejér, *Codex diplomaticus*, V/1, 126; I. Komatina, *Kralj Stefan Uroš I Veliki i njegov vek* (Beograd: Istorijski institut, 2021), 228–230.

It is in the charter of 1271 that we find the first certain testimony to the conclusion of marriage between the son of Serbian king Uroš, Dragutin and the daughter of Stephen V, Katalina, Komatina, *Kralj Stefan Uroš I*, 226.

Hungarian kings to return the alienated treasure, remained in Bohemia.²¹ In regard to our topic, it is important to state the hitherto knowledge about Závěš's cross and indicate why duchess Anna transferred it to Bohemia.

Závěš of Falkenštejn (c. 1250–1290) was a Bohemian nobleman who played an important role in the struggle against Rudolf of Habsburg after the death of Bohemian king Přemysl Ottokar II in the battle on the Marchfeld in 1278.²² Závěš married queen Kunigunda, the daughter of duchess Anna and the granddaughter of king Béla IV, i.e. the widow of the above mentioned Bohemian king, and assumed power in Bohemia in the name of their underage son Wenceslaus II (1278–1305).²³ Several years after Kunigunda's death in 1285, in 1288 he married Hungarian princess Elisabeth, the sister of the then Hungarian king Ladislaus IV. In the context of conclusion of the new marriage, we find out that Závěš earlier appropriated "not only the wife, but also the treasury and the entire glory of late king Ottokar", i.e. certainly the treasury that used to be in possession of late queen Kunigunda, i.e. her mother duchess Anna, with the aim of leaving an impression on new bride Elisabeth and the Hungarian court.²⁴ Ac-

²¹ Based on the agreement between Roman-German king Rudolf of Habsburg and Hungarian king Ladislaus IV from 1277, *Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum* (Const.) 3, ed. J. Schwalm, MGH Leges (Hannoverae – Lipsiae: Impensis Bibliopolii Hahniani, 1904–1906), 140, 144; Bohemian king Přemysl Ottokar II committed to return to the Hungarian king the treasury brought to Bohemia by his aunt Anna, the duchess of Mačva, "...tamen promittens rex Boemie memorato regi Ungarie omnes thesauros reddere..., videlicet duas coronas aureas et scepra regalia, ac preciosissimam amphoram auream nobilissimis gemmis undique adornatam mire pulcritudinis, et alia quam plura clenodia aurea..."; *Continuationes Claustroneburgenses, Scotorum, Sanctucensium Zwetlenses, Novimotenses, Vindobonenses*, ed. W. Wattenbach, MGH SS, IX (Hannoverae: Impensis Bibliopolii Aulici Hahniani), 708, and it is then noted that his wife queen Kunigunda, Anna's daughter encouraged him to fulfil what was promised: "promissiones factas, sicut anno priori per arbitros diffinitum extiterat, resignare recusavit"; *Ibidem*, 709, while in 1278 there is also a note of the interesting explanation of Přemysl Ottokar II as to why, despite this, he did not want to return the royal insignia that were also a part of the treasury that duchess Anna took to Bohemia: "dyademata vero regis Ungarie reddere noluit, asserens quod hec et alia iuveni regi Ungarie adhuc puerulo usque dum perveniret ad annos discretionis, dignis quam alius et fidelius teneretur propter lineam, consanguinitatis conservare"; *Ibidem*, 709.

²² J. Žemlička, "The Realm of Přemysl Ottokar II and Wenceslas II". In *A History of the Bohemian Lands*, eds. J. Pánek et al., (Prague: Charles University, 2018), 117.

²³ *Petra Žitavského kronika zbraslavská*, ed. J. Emler, *Fontes rerum Bohemicarum*, IV (Praha: nákladem nadání Františka Palackého 1884), 22; Žemlička, "The Realm of Přemysl Ottokar II and Wenceslas II", 117–118.

²⁴ "...Sed quoniam non solum uxorem, verum etiam thesaurum universumque apparatus regis Ottakari olim defuncti sibi vendicaverat, regalibus sibi assumptis insigniis in Ungariam proficisci disposuit, quatenus regis sororem sibi nuper desponsatam duceret et forsitan cultu decoratus regio gloriosus in aliene gentis presencia compareret..."; *Petra Žitavského kronika*

According to the *Zbraslav Chronicle*, he was plundered on his way to Hungary, but doubtless preserved a lot of treasure. In 1289, Bohemian nobleman Závíš was taken captive by his stepson king Wenceslaus II, who accused him of treason because he refused to hand over the property of his late mother queen Kunigunda, and then sentenced him to death. In August 1290, he was beheaded in front of the Hluboká castle in the presence of his brothers.²⁵

The first written mention of the cross appears in a document dated 1st August 1464, which is kept in the archive of the Vyšší Brod monastery. Abbot Thomas and the monastery confirmed thereby that John of Rosenberg returned to them the monastery seized from them by his father Oldřich, and there is also the first note about the cross, i.e. it was returned on that occasion: "...item magnam crucem auream, quam legavit dominus Zawissius..."²⁶ In the somewhat younger Rosenberg'sche Chronik by Jacob of Novohrad, there is a note from 1479 in the monastic necrology: "Anno domini M^oCCLXXX, IX Kalendas Septembris obiit dominus Zawissius de Falkenstain, qui donavit huic monasterio lignum sacrosancte crucis domini preciose ornatum et sepultus est hic in capitulo nostro", confirming the donation of the cross to the above monastery by Závíš of Falkenštejn.²⁷ According to the even later Rosenberg'sche Chronik by Norbert Heermann from the 17th century, he donated the "precious item, i.e. the golden cross with precious stones with a True Cross relic" to the Vyšší Brod monastery in the southeast of present-day Czechia shortly before he passed away.²⁸ It is based on this statement that it is presumed that Závíš gifted the

zbraslavská, 31; P. Komatina, "Kralj, kraljice i srodnici. Bračne strategije i pravci politike". In *Sveti kralj Milutin. Vladar naraskršću svetova*, ur. S. Pirivatrić, S. Marjanović Dušanić, D. Popović, (Beograd: Zadužbina Svetog manastira Hilandara, 2022), 97.

²⁵ "...Post hec rex municiones regni, quas Zewischius in sua potestate habuerat, recuperare satagens, fratrem suum, duces Nicolaum, exercitus sui ductorem constituit, qui circa castrum, quod Vroburg vulgo dicitur, figens tentoria, presertim cum amici Zewischii desuper habitantes ipsum castrum resignare renuerent, Zewischius in eiusdem castris suburbio fratribus suis aspicientibus, decollari mandavit, quatenus ceteris ex hoc metu incuteret et eos ab insidiosis insultibus timore supplicii refrenaret...", *Petra Žitavského kronika zbraslavská*, 32–33; K. Chytil et al., *Kříž zvaný Závíšův* (Praha: Archeologická komise, 1930), 14; Žemlička, "The Realm of Přemysl Ottokar II and Wenceslas II", 118.

²⁶ *Urkundenbuch des Cisterzienser Stiftes B. Mariae zu Hohenfurth in Böhmen*, ed. M. Pangerl, *Fontes rerum Austriacarum. Dipolmata et acta XXIII* (Wien: Aus der kaiserlich-königlichen Hof- und Staatsdruckerei), 1865, 303; Chytil et al., *Kříž zvaný Závíšův*, 15.

²⁷ Chytil et al., *Kříž zvaný Závíšův*, 15.

²⁸ "...Herr Zawiss hat ain khostliches Clainot, das ist ain guldens Craicz mit Edlstain, mit ainer Partikl Holz von dem h. Craicz, daran unser Haill gestorben wardt, diesem Closser khurz vor seinem Ende verehret...", *N. Heermann's, Rosenberg'sche Chronik*, ed. M. Klimesch (Prag: Königl. Böhmische gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, 1897), 36.

precious cross to the Vyšší Brod monastery somewhat before his death, and certainly after Kunigunda's death, i.e. between 1285 and 1290.²⁹

Záviš's cross is still kept in the Vyšší Brod monastery as one of the most revered relics in Czechia, while in 2010 it was declared a national cultural monument.³⁰ In scientific works it is noted that the original cross is 44.5 cm high and 28 cm wide, while the upper horizontal beam is 23.5 cm wide. The base and statue of Christ were added later.³¹ According to Karel Chytil, the cross contains 51 precious stones of blue, red, violet and green colours and four large pearls, including 22 medium-size pearls.³² It is made of silver with little leaves of Arabian gold. On the front, at the section of the vertical and lower horizontal beam, there is a cross-shape opening, containing a silver-gilt presentation of the Crucifixion. Below it there is the most valuable relic – the True Cross wood. The back is adorned with Byzantine medallions which, covered in enamel, show eight saints with their images and names written in Greek: Georgius, Paul, Thomas, Georgius, Peter, John the Theologian, Luke, Demetrius and Athanasios. It is stated with high certainty that they are of Byzantine origin – one from the 10th century, five from the 12th century, three from the 12th, i.e. 13th century.³³

There are today in science several hypotheses about the origin of Záviš's cross. The nature and origin of individual parts of the cross and the manner of their creation doubtless influenced such differing views. Emanuel Poche believes it belonged to Bohemian kings, while Karel Chytil states it was produced in art workshops in the Meuse valley in the first half of the 13th century (c. 1230–1250), but that Záviš came into its possession through his wife Kunigunda, the daughter of Hungarian princess Anna and prince Rostislav Mikhailovich, or through his second wife Elisabeth.³⁴ However, Chytil concludes: "We feel the historical and artistic value of the work, but when and where, on whose order and who

²⁹ N. Heermann's, *Rosenberg'sche Chronik*, 36; Chytil et al., *Kříž zvaný Závišův*, 14–15.

³⁰ [https://cs.wikipedia.org/wiki/N%C3%A1rodn%C3%AD_kulturn%C3%AD_pam%C3%A1tka_\(%C4%8Cesko\)](https://cs.wikipedia.org/wiki/N%C3%A1rodn%C3%AD_kulturn%C3%AD_pam%C3%A1tka_(%C4%8Cesko)) (last accessed on 3rd August 2022).

³¹ J. Franc, J. J. Berka, *Zawisch-Kreuz: eines der wertvollsten Reliquiare der Welt Libice nad Cidlinou Verlag Gloriet s.r.o.* 2013 (brochure); Chytil et al., *Kříž zvaný Závišův*, 18.

³² Chytil et al., *Kříž zvaný Závišův*, 25. The cross was initially adorned with 44 gemmae and 166 pearls, while A. Cechner states it had 174 pearls https://encyklopedie.ckrumlov.cz/cz/region_histor_zavikr/ (last accessed on 3rd August 2022).

³³ The preserved engraving of Gerhard Gross from the late 17th century reveals later changes, Chytil et al., *Kříž zvaný Závišův*, 17–22; K. Chytil, *Byzantské emaily Závišova kříže ve Vyšším Brodě* (Praha: Seminarium Kondakovianum, 1930), 17–22, 31–57.

³⁴ Chytil et al., *Kříž zvaný Závišův*, 16–17, 62–63. Chytil also allows the possibility that the cross belonged to the family of Anna's husband Rostislav Mikhailovich, the Chernigov princes in Russia, Chytil, *Byzantské emaily*, 25–26.

created it, remains a mystery for us.³⁵ Herman Fillitz believes that, judging by the manner of its production, it must have been created in the Kingdom of Sicily, but emphasises that it is a double cross of Byzantine type, adorned with Byzantine enamel.³⁶ Hungarian art historians such as T. Gerevich, J. Deér, Eva Kovács and I. Takács believe that the cross originates from the Hungarian royal treasure of the Árpád dynasty and that it came to Bohemia in the 13th century.³⁷ In recent times, the opinion of Hungarian art historians has also been shared by Jiří Franc, who holds it belonged to king Béla IV and that Anna de Macsó brought it to Bohemia together with the royal treasury while fleeing from her brother Stephen V.³⁸ Petr Balcárek also assumes that the cross originates from the estate of Kunigunda Rostislavna or perhaps from the property of Béla IV.³⁹ Also, art historians noticed an important detail – Závíš of Falkenštejn could not have bought the cross, as it was doubtless a precious item, a reliquary that could be owned only by a king or a close member of the royal family.⁴⁰ For the sake of reminder, as testified by the *Zbraslav* chronicler, Závíš appropriated not only the wife, but also the treasure and the entire glory of king Ottokar. It should also be noted that Bohemian king Ottokar II had a different, but certainly an equally precious reliquary, just as Hungarian king Béla IV.⁴¹

Art historians unanimously believe that the double cross type such as Závíš's was taken from Byzantium. Namely, the double cross (*crux gemina*) first “became popular” in Byzantium, particularly after the iconoclastic controversy during the 9th century with the acceptance of tradition about the discovery of the True Cross, while its creation was most probably spurred by the testimony in the Gospel of John (John 19:19), according to which the upper shorter hori-

³⁵ Chytil et al., *Kříž zvaný Závíšův*, 27.

³⁶ H. Fillitz, “Das Kunstgewerbe der romanischen Zeit in Böhmen”. In *Romanik in Böhmen. Geschichte Architektur, Malerei, Plastik und Kunstgewerbe*, eds. E. Bachmann, J. Mašín and H. Fillitz (München: Prestel-Verlag, 1977), 237, 252–253.

³⁷ Deér, *Die heilige Krone Ungarns*, 251–261; E. Kovács, “Béla és Antiochiai Anna halotti jelvényei”, *Művészettörténeti Értesítő* XXI (1972), 1–14; T. Gerevich, “Magyarországi művészet Szent István korában”. In *Szt. István emlékkönyv*, III, ed. S. Juszinián (Budapest: A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia kiadása), 81–110; I. Takács, “Corona et Crux. Heraldry and Crusader Symbolism on 13th century Hungarian Royal Seals”, *Hortus Artium Medievalium* 21 (2015), 58.

³⁸ J. Franc, J. J. Berka, *Zawisch-Kreuz* (brochure).

³⁹ P. Balcárek, *Byzantium in the Czech Lands (4th–16th centuries): Historical and Art Historical Perspectives*, (Leiden: Brill 2022), 318–319. He also leaves the possibility that it could have been brought to Bohemia by Elisabeth, Závíš's second wife, who once was the Queen of Serbia.

⁴⁰ Chytil et al., *Kříž zvaný Závíšův*, 61–62; E. Poche, *Svatovitský poklad*, Praha 1971.

⁴¹ Fillitz, “Das Kunstgewerbe der romanischen Zeit in Böhmen”, 252–253.

zontal beam contained the inscription INRI (Iesus Nazarenus Rex Iudaeorum), while Jesus' arms were nailed on the longer beam.⁴² In Byzantium, the double cross was an important part of the royal insignia – the sceptre, and this type of the cross first spread across the countries under direct Byzantine rule.⁴³ Already at the time of king Géza I (1074–1077), the Hungarians accepted the royal insignia – the crown sent by Byzantine emperor Michael VII Doukas (1071–1077), which was certainly based on insigniological and hierarchical understandings of Byzantium.⁴⁴ At the time of king Béla III (1172–1196), the double cross also appeared on coins that he issued during the last years of his rule, and the same symbol later appeared on the large seal of king Emeric (1196–1204) and his and his successors' orbs from the 13th century, while there is no evidence that it was used as an element of the royal coat-of-arms before the rule of Béla IV.⁴⁵ D. Popović put forward important assertions that the double cross became “not only a customary form of Byzantine staurotheke, but also the metaphor of the relic itself, gaining in such way a recognisable identity”, and added that “particularly in the western world, such cross indicated the Byzantine origin of the sacred item and was therefore the guarantee of its authenticity”.⁴⁶ In Serbia, on the other hand, given that it belonged to the Byzantine spiritual and cultural circle,

⁴² Frolow, *Les reliquaires de la Vraie Croix*, 120–131; Wood, *True cross in tradition, history and art*, 134–139, 356–357.

⁴³ Frolow, *Les reliquaires de la Vraie Croix*, 95–97, states that rulers in the area of Bulgaria and Serbia, often aiming to emulate Byzantine emperors, gifted reliquaries with True Cross relics.

⁴⁴ Although it was later changed, Deér, *Die heilige Krone Ungarns*, 251–261; D. Vojvodić, “Ka carskom dostojanstvu kraljevske vlasti. Vladarske insignije i ideologija u doba prvih Nemanjića”. In *Kraljevstvo i arhiepiskopija u srpskim i pomorskim zemljama Nemanjića*, ur. Lj. Maksimović, S. Pirivatrić (Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti i Srpski komitet za vizantologiju, 2019), 315–326.

⁴⁵ Kovács, “Signum crucis – lignum crucis”, 407; P. Engel, *The Realm of St. Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary, 895–1526* (London – New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 86; Takács, “Corona et Crux”, 55–61. About the Byzantine origin of the Esztergom staurotheke, one of the most important examples of the reliquary with the presentation of the double cross in Hungary, Somogyi, “La staurotheque byzantine d'Esztergom”, 139–154; G. Prinzing, “Zur Datierung der Staurothek von Esztergom aus historischer Sicht”. In *Ars Graeca – Ars Latina. Studia dedykowane Profesor Annie Różyckiej*, ed. Wojciech Balus (Krakow: Wydawnictwo UJ, 2001), 87–91; G. Prinzing, “The Esztergom Reliquary Revisited. Wann, weshalb und wem hat Kaiser Isaak II. Angelos die Staurothek als Geschenk übersandt?”. In *ΦΙΛΟΠΛΑΤΩΝ. Spaziergang im kaiserlichen Garten. Schriften über Byzanz und seine Nachbarn. Festschrift für Arne Effenberger zum 70. Geburtstag*, eds. N. Asutay-Effenberger and F. Daim (Mainz: Römisch-Germanischen Zentralmuseums, 2013), 247–256; Takács, “Corona et Crux”, 57. The suspicion that the staurotheke was part of the royal wealth of the Árpáds, cf. Bak, *Online Decreta Regni Mediaevalis Hungariae*, 189, n. 19.

⁴⁶ Popović, “Relikvije Časnog krsta u srednjovekovnoj Srbiji”, 103.

the double cross symbol was present already from the 9th century and is seen in various presentations of Uroš's predecessors and successors on the Serbian throne.⁴⁷ As Serbia also fostered strong insigniological Byzantine tradition, the question is posed as to whether there are grounds to recognise an important sacred item such as Závaš's cross as today's lost reliquary of king Uroš, about whose unusual, but partial destiny after the conflict with the army of king Béla IV we find out from the above documents kept in the National Archives of Hungary and the Slovak National Archives.⁴⁸

Namely, the said documents testify that a highly precious reliquary was seized during the struggles in Mačva between the Serbian and Hungarian army in late 1265 or early 1266. It is known that Hungarian heir to the throne Stephen feared for his position at the time, believing that king Béla IV was much more inclined to his sister Anna, the wife of the ban of Mačva Rostislav and to his younger brother Béla, the duke of Slavonia. After the death of Rostislav Mikhailovich in 1262/1263, the Duchy of Mačva was governed by his wife, duchess Anna with her sons Michael and Béla.⁴⁹ The tensions between cousins calmed down for a little while when king Béla IV ceded to Stephen all territories

⁴⁷ The well-known specimens with a clear representation of the double cross are the seal-die of Strojimir (9th century), T. Živković, "Golden Seal of Strojimir", *Istorijski časopis* 55 (2007), 23–29; the seal of John Psellos, the bishop of Polog, in the area of the Ohrid Archbishopric (11th century), *Catalogue of Byzantine Seals at Dumbarton Oaks and in the Fogg Museum of Art*, vol. 5, The East (continued), Constantinople and Environs, Unknown Locations, Addenda, Uncertain Readings, eds. E. McGeer, J. Nesbitt, N. Oikonomides (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, Trustees for Harvard University, 2005), no. 127.1, 157–158, under whose jurisdiction Serbia was at the time; the fresco of Stefan the First-Crowned (13th century) with the double cross symbol preserved in the Mileševa monastery, Vojvodić, "Ka carskom dostojanstvu", 315–354; the coinage of king Radoslav that fully emulated Byzantine patterns, unlike the seals that also carry western influences, B. Hekić, *Pečati srpskih srednjovekovnih vladara između zapadnih i vizantijskih uzora* (Belgrade: Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, 2021, doctoral dissertation), 267–268; the coinage of kings Dragutin, Milutin, Stefan Dečanski and Stefan Dušan (13–14th centuries), V. Ivanišević, *Novčarstvo srednjovekovne Srbije* (Beograd: Stubovi kulture, 2001); V. Ivanišević, "Obim kovanja srpskog srednjovekovnog novca kraljevskog perioda". In *Kraljevstvo i arhiepiskopija u srpskim i pomorskim zemljama Nemanjića*, ur. Lj. Maksimović, S. Pirivatrić (Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti i Srpski komitet za vizantologiju, 2019), 503–520, and numerous representations of Serbian kings and saints in frescoes in medieval monasteries.

⁴⁸ Komatina, "O vremenu napada kralja Uroša I na Mačvu", 92–96.

⁴⁹ S. Stanojević, "Kralj Uroš", *Godišnjica Nikole Čupića* 44 (1935), 42–43; M. Dinić, "O ugarskom ropstvu kralja Uroša", *Istorijski časopis* 1 (1948), 30–36; S. Ćirković "Zemlja Mačva i grad Mačva", *Prilozi za KJIF* 74 (2008), sv. 1–4, 5–6. In the document of 13th April 1264, Rostislav is mentioned in the context of the Battle of Jaroslaw in 1245, Fejér, *Codex diplomaticus*, IV/3, 197, while in the papal charter of 15th July 1264 he is mentioned as deceased, A. Theiner, *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia*, I (Romae: Typis vaticanae

east to the Danube including Erdély and Srem.⁵⁰ However, heir to the throne Stephen continued to attack the territories belonging to his mother and sister Anna, which is why she raised an army in 1264 and forced Stephen to withdraw.⁵¹ In autumn 1264, a ceremony was held in Vienna to mark the wedding of Béla the Younger and Kunigunda, the daughter of markgrave of Brandenburg, while Serbian king Stefan Uroš I was even among the wedding guests, which also indicated peaceful relations between Hungary and its southern neighbour, Serbia.⁵² However, already next year Stephen launched a counter-attack and forced his father to conclude peace and confirm the earlier distribution of territories. Serbian king Uroš most probably availed of these circumstances of mutual conflicts and “rose out of haughtiness”. As further stated by king Béla IV in the charter dated 8th April 1264 (1268 or 1269!), “he not only rejected our jurisdiction [Hungarian, note by I. K.], but he also daringly attacked the borders of our [Hungarian, note by I. K.] kingdom, wreaking havoc and destruction, and inflicting numerous losses...”⁵³ We find these lines in the first of five pre-

nis, 1859) 273, given that we hold that Rostislav died in 1262/1263. Komatina, *Kralj Stefan Uroš I*, 220, note 775.

⁵⁰ P. Rokai, et al. *Istorija Mađara* (Beograd: Clio, 2002), 87; Komatina, *Kralj Stefan Uroš I*, 218.

⁵¹ Zsoldos, *Családi ügy*, 11–143; Komatina, *Kralj Stefan Uroš I*, 218.

⁵² *Annales Otakariani a. 1254–1278*, ed. D. R. Köpke, MGH SS, IX (Hannoverae: Impensis Bibliopolii Aulici Hahniani, 1851), 186–187, reads that the ceremony was held on 28 September 1264, on St Wenceslaus Day near Pozsony (Bratislava) in the presence of leaders from different countries, but king Uroš is not mentioned. King Uroš's presence at the above ceremony is not mentioned in the Brandenburg Chronicle either, “Hic a. d. 1264 filiam suam Conegundim maritavit Bele, filio Bele regis Ungarie...”, *Chronica Marchionum brandenburgensium, Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte*, ed. R. Koser (Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1888), 126. The *Rhymed Chronicle* contains the following lines: “...siner süne wärn zvéne dâ / Stephan unde Wêlâ / die dâ gekrônet sâzen / und der kunic von Râzen / und der kunic von Matschouwe / des selben hûsfrouwe / was ân underwint / kunic Wêlâns kint – / und der kunic von Sirvie...”, *Ottokars Österreichische Reimchronik*, ed. J. Seemüller, MGH Deutsche Chroniken, V/1 (Hannoverae: Impensis Bibliopolii Hahniani), 1890 106, i.e. it is explicitly stated that the Serbian king (kunic von Sirvie) was with king Béla. The news about the conclusion of the said marriage is also found in the work of somewhat later Austrian historian T. Ebendorfer, *Chronica Austriae*, ed. A. Lhotsky (Berlin: Weidmann 1967), 133–134; M. Gavrilović, “Srbi u delima austrijskog hroničara Tomasa Ebendorfera”, *ZMSI* 98/2 (2018), 11–12.

⁵³ *Codex diplomaticus patrius Hungaricus*, VIII, ed. I. Nagy (Budapest: Typis societatis Franklinianae, 1891), 96–97. Most researchers agree that the charter is doubtless original, but the dating is by all means wrong. In historiography, the charter is most often dated 1268 or 1269. Pauler, *A Magyar nemzet története az Árpád-házi királyok alatt*, II, ed. Gy. Pauler (Budapest: Atheneum Irod. és Nyomdai R.T., 1899), 265–271, opts for 1268. I. Szentpétery brings regesta and dates it 8th April 1269, but adds a question mark along with the year, Az

served documents that testify to the conflict between the Serbian and Hungarian armies. We learn from it that king Uroš was not only defeated in the battle, though it is not stated where, but also that he was taken captive together with his magnates, while in the sign of triumph, the king's flag was taken to Buda.⁵⁴ This document does not mention the seizure of the precious cross, which, by all odds, was not with Serbian king Uroš at the time. Another charter, the second in terms of the time of creation, testifies to the struggles in Mačva. Namely, the above mentioned charter of king Béla IV, dated 9th April 1269 and incorporated in the charter of 13th July 1275, states that the mentioned Hungarian king sent an army to help Béla Rostislavich, the son of late duke of Mačva Rostislav, against Uroš, the king of Serbia, who "wreaked havoc in the land of Mačva". It also explicitly states, as we emphasised in the first part of the paper, that Hungarian magnate Michael Csák seized the cross that belonged to king Uroš I and that king Béla IV had to give the estate to Hungarian nobleman Michael Csák in order to redeem it. Furthermore, the charter dated 9th April 1269 reads that *duchess Anna and her son Béla* confirmed the news and the truth "that on that battlefield the same Michael took captive two magnates, i.e. the son-in-law of the same Uroš and the son of his treasurer". These very lines directly testify why the precious item was not with the king when he was captured, as attested by the first preserved document about the conflict, dated 8th April 1264 (1268 or 1269!), but that it doubtless belonged to him. Namely, as seen from the following document dated 9th April 1269, it was taken away from the king's treasurer, who certainly had the task to take care of it, but, by all odds, was in another part of the battlefield during the combat. As highlighted above, such reliquary could be in possession only of a king or a close member of the royal family. It also further states that "of them [Serbian captives, note by I. K.], Michael received the precious cross of the Lord's wood "before the eyes of duke Béla", which king Béla with queen Maria Laskarina then wanted to inspect.⁵⁵ In the charter that

Árpád-házi királyok okleveleinek kritikai jegyzéke. Regesta regum stirpis Arpadianae critico diplomatica, III, ed. I. Szentpétery (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1930) 488–489. T. Smičiklas states it was issued on 8 April 1268 or 1269, *Codex diplomaticus regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae et Slavoniae*, V, ed. T. Smičiklas (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1907), 484–485. After a diplomatic analysis in the paper, Komatina, "O vremenu napada kralja Uroša I na Mačvu", 74–76, we opted for 1268 or 1269.

⁵⁴ "...et in signum triumphii vexillum eiusdem Vros regis ante aulam nostre maiestatis erectum exhibuit et ostendit...", Nagy, *Codex diplomaticus patrius*, VIII, 97. As the following four documents that mention the Serbian-Hungarian conflict state that he was attacking Mačva at the time, there is no reason why the place of the conflict, spoken about in the first document, although it is not explicitly stated, should not be Mačva, Komatina, *Kralj Stefan Uroš I*, 221.

⁵⁵ Fejer, *Codex diplomaticus*, IV/3, 491.

Stephen V issued on 15th June 1270 to confirm the privileges for Michael Csák's war merits in Mačva, though they are in that charter also ascribed to Michael's brother Dominic Csák,⁵⁶ it is stated, similarly to the previously mentioned document, that Dominic and Michael received from the Serbian captives the precious cross of the Lord's wood, and that the king and queen asked to see it, but it is omitted that this took place "before the eyes of duke Béla."⁵⁷ As we have stated, what both charters (1269 (1275) and 1270) have in common is that they contain a valuable and relatively detailed description of the seized precious item to which we shall devote particular attention. Before that, it is worth noting that two more original charters from 1271 and 1272 testify to the conflict between the Serbian and Hungarian armies in Mačva. Namely, queen Elisabeth, the wife of new Hungarian king Stephen V, awarded a certain Emeric with estates in Teskánd and Dobronhegy since he, during the rule of king Béla IV and queen Maria, fought in the army sent by the said queen "against the king of Serbia", when "the same king was captured".⁵⁸ The last, fifth document that mentions Béla IV's warfare against the Serbian king in Mačva, was created in 1272 and was issued by king Stephen V in order to grant to Michael and Dominic Csák the land of Kőrös in recognition of their merits in the warfare. It also states that Uroš rose above his power, wreaked havoc in the land of Mačva and was taken captive in the conflict with the army of king Béla IV.⁵⁹ So, the charters of 1264 (1268 or 1269!), 1271 and 1272 testify to the capture of the king and his magnates, while the charters of 1269 and 1270 speak about the capture of the king's son-in-law and the son of the king's treasurer by Michael, i.e. the Csák brothers.

Hence, two documents directly testify that the cross came to the treasury of king Béla IV after the conflict between the Serbian and Hungarian armies in Mačva in 1265/1266. It is this treasury that duchess Anna, according to other sources, took away with her after her brother Stephen V seized power in Hungary in 1270 and then delivered it to her daughter Bohemian queen Kunigunda, who later married Závíš of Falkenštejn.⁶⁰ This clearly indicates that, in spatial and chronological terms, a valuable relic, such as the cross of king Uroš, could

⁵⁶ Fejér, *Codex diplomaticus*, V/1, 24–25; Stanojević, "Da li je kralj Uroš 1268, god. bio zarobljen od Mađara?", 203. Stephen issued the document shortly after the death of his father king Béla IV (3rd May 1270), whose last wish was that Přemysl Ottokar II should take care of and protect duchess Anna and her successors from his son and heir Stephen V, Z. J. Kosztolnyik, *Hungary in the Thirteenth Century* (New York: East European Monographs, 1996), 247, 258.

⁵⁷ Fejér, *Codex diplomaticus*, IV/3, 490–493.

⁵⁸ *Zala vármegye története*, Oklevéltár I. (1024–1363), eds. I. Nagy, D. Véghely et Gy. Nagy (Budapest Históriaantik Könyvesház Könyvker. és Kiadói Bt.), 1886, 57–60.

⁵⁹ Fejér, *Codex diplomaticus*, V/1, 238.

⁶⁰ Chytil, *Byzantské emaily*, 25.

have arrived in the Bohemian milieu. Apart from historical circumstances and documents that indubitably testify that a Serbian precious item – a cross, was confiscated by the Hungarian king, and was then, in all probability, transferred to Bohemia, which allows for the possibility that the still mysterious origin of Závaš's cross can be recognised in it, the description of the precious item found in the two documents seems to further corroborate the presented hypothesis since they contain a relatively detailed description of Uroš's reliquary.

It is stated that "it contains the Lord's wood of the length of one and a half palms, and the width of one palm; that it is encrusted with gold of ten marks, wondrously adorned with magnificent gemmae and precious stones, estimated at five hundred marks of gold, precious stones and gemmae".⁶¹ So, the length of Uroš's lost reliquary was one and a half palms, i.e. spans, and its width was one palm. One palm could equal 22–28 cm, i.e. in terms of today's metric system, this suggests a relative measure indicating that the dimensions of Uroš's reliquary could be, in the broadest sense, from 22x33 cm to 28x42 cm in today's measurements, of course with smaller deviations.⁶² In this regard, it is perhaps the safest to describe the size of the reliquary in the 2:3 ratio. The same ratio can be ascribed to Závaš's cross, whose size, according to today's metric system, equals 28x44.5 cm. Also, Uroš's lost reliquary was encrusted in gold worth ten marks, while the decoration of precious stones and gemmae is estimated at 500 marks. It seems worthwhile to point out to the term *gemma*, *gemmae* (f.), which we kept in the original form in translation from Latin for several reasons. The term *gemma* can signify a bud, an object or decoration made of a precious stone – a ring, seal, die, seal or pearl. In our case, the precious decoration may be the wonderful Byzantine medallions (made of enamel), although the possibility that those were pearls should not be excluded either.⁶³ It should be emphasised that Serbian 13th-century reliquaries were adorned with Byzantine enamel. The Peć manuscript of Domentijan's *Life of St Sava*, Uroš's uncle, the section describing the translation of the relics of St Sava from Tarnovo to Mileševa reads that Sava's incorrupt body was placed in the wooden coffin and presented to the faithful

⁶¹ Fejer, *Codex diplomaticus*, IV/3, 491; Fejer, *Codex diplomaticus*, V/1, 25.

⁶² I. Bogdán, *Longitudes and Surveys of Hungary, 1601–1874* (Budapest: Publications of the Hungarian National Archives, IV. Archives and Historical Source Sciences 6, 1990), 134–135; I. Bogdán, *Space, Volume, Weight and Piece Scales in Hungary until 1874* (Budapest: Publications of the Hungarian National Archives, IV. Archives and Historical Source Sciences 7, 1991), 677–678; M. Vlajinac, *Rečnik naših starih mera u toku vremena*, IV (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka, 1974), 696–698, 704–705, used in the Serbian language are also the terms *peda*, *pedak*, *pedalj*, *pedaljka*, *pedanj*, *pedao*, *pedenj*, *pedlja*, *pedo*, *peđo*; Popović, "On Two Lost Medieval Serbian Reliquaries", 42–43.

⁶³ M. Divković, *Latinsko-hrvatski rječnik* (Zagreb: Kr. slavonsko-dalmatinska zemaljska vlada, 1900²), 446.

for veneration “..[и] иже послѣд(ь) сребромъ и злато[м]ь б(о)ж(ь)ствьныхъ въразь изва[та]нк[мь] съ хинев[с]ы...”, i.e. as art historian Bojan Miljković correctly indicated the meaning of the Serbian-Slavonic text, the sarcophagus somewhat later got the silver and golden revetment adorned with divine images in enamel, in which one should certainly recognise the images of saints in medallions such as those in Závašs cross.⁶⁴ The description of the deposit of župan Desa, the nephew of king Uroš, which was kept in Dubrovnik from the mid-13th century, also refers to numerous reliquaries adorned with enamel.⁶⁵ Analysing Serbian reliquaries, art historian Danica Popović indicated, among other things, the material value of Uroš's lost reliquary. She noted that it was, in all probability, the so-called Hungarian mark, also known as the mark of king Béla IV, which equalled 233.35 grams of silver, which means the reliquary was worth 116.676 kg, i.e. the value in gold would equal around 3000 of the then Florentine florins.⁶⁶ It should also be borne in mind that the fact that Závašs cross was certainly thoroughly remodelled, i.e. subjected to an intervention, which was, as

⁶⁴ B. Miljković, *Žitija Svetog Save kao izvori za istoriju srednjovekovne umetnosti*, (Beograd: Vizantološki institut SANU, 2008), 197, f. 695 (Slav. hineu[s]’i < Gr. χύμεισις, χείμεισις); D. Popović, “Mošti Svetog Save”. In *Pod okriljem svetosti. Kult svetih vladara i relikvija u srednjovekovnoj Srbiji* (Beograd: Balkanološki institut SANU, 2006), 82.

Also, in the later Ta’likizade’s narrative we find an interesting description of relics held in the Mileševa monastery. Described, among other things, is the sarcophagus where St Sava’s relics were held – it is stated that it was wooden with silver revetment of around 23 kg, N. Filipović, “Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Pasha and the Ottoman Non-Muslims”: in *Entangled Confessionalizations? Dialogic Perspectives on the Politics of Piety and Community-Building in the Ottoman Empire, 15th–18th Centuries*, eds. T. Krstić, D. Terzioğlu (Gorgias Press, Piscataway, NJ, 2022), 623.

⁶⁵ On 1 July 1281, Uroš’s son and successor king Dragutin sent his people to take Desa’s deposit, which is when its detailed description was made. The deposit contained icons, church vestments, tetraevangelions and other items important for spiritual life in Serbia, and, among other things, “...pecia una de xamito per quadrum de palmo uno et dimidio cum smaldis et perlis; “...Item liber alius evangeliorum cum tabulis operatis argento et cum petris duplicibus et cum smaldis...; “...caput sancti Gregorii, una cum cruce smaldi in vertice...; “...Smaldi tres parvi et bocla una de argento deaurata...”, i.e. numerous sacred items adorned with enamel (smaldus in middle Latin certainly implies enamel, *Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis*, VII, éd. C. du Cange et al. (L. Favre, Niort 1886), col. 501a; *Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis regni Hungariae*, con. A Bartal (Academiae litterarum Hungaricae, Lipsiae 1901), 617. There is also a detailed description of valuable objects from everyday life (valuable fabrics, glasses, sashes, scarves, mirrors etc.), *Codex diplomaticus regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae et Slavoniae*, VI, ed. T. Smičiklas (Zagrabiae: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1908), 390–391. About the deposit of župan Desa in detail, M. Malović Đukić, “Poklad župana Dese”. In *Kralj Vladislav i Srbija XIII veka*, ur. T. Živković, (Beograd: Istorijski institut SANU, 2003), 31–39.

⁶⁶ Popović, “On Two Lost Medieval Serbian Reliquaries”, 42, notably f. 12.

a rule, typical of authentic reliquaries, does not allow us to fully construe the original appearance of Uroš's relic.⁶⁷ There is no doubt that the double cross of king Uroš could also have a handle similar to known to us and preserved reliquaries from the Serbian milieu – the staurotheke of St Sava, kept today in the Diocesan Museum of Pienza, or the staurotheke of the church of Sts Peter and Paul in Ras, which was a gift of king Stefan Uroš II Milutin and is kept today in St Dominic's convent in Dubrovnik.⁶⁸ A separate question is whether the potential handle of Uroš's reliquary carried an inscription or not.⁶⁹ Therefore, based on the outer beauty and material value of the cross, we could say that the "cruce[m] pretiosam de ligno Domini", as Uroš's reliquary is called in documents, could in fact be Záviš's "lignum sacrosancte crucis domini preciose", as stated in the charter of the Vyšší Brod monastery.⁷⁰ Apart from the exceptional material value, Uroš's staurotheke is invaluable in spiritual terms, just as Záviš's cross is, as it is stated that it contains True Cross relics.

Hence, although Záviš's cross has underwent numerous changes to date, its preserved initial dimensions and the testimony to its rich decoration and material value even before the subsequent modifications and creation of the base indicate that the equally valuable reliquary of Serbian king Uroš I should perhaps be recognised in it. Such type of staurotheke of Byzantine features, i.e. the double cross, was rather widespread in the Serbian milieu at the time of the Nemanjić dynasty, with Uroš also being its significant representative. Namely,

⁶⁷ There is evidence of numerous examples of reliquaries from the Serbian milieu continuing their religious path in the treasuries of cities in the West, where they underwent significant changes, primarily due to their veneration, and it was mainly through the care of new owners that the exterior of the precious items was changed, i.e. restored, such as the reliquary where the right hand of John the Forerunner was kept, which originated from the Serbian milieu and which was, amid unusual historical circumstances, purchased by pope Pius II, who, in 1461, gifted it to the cathedral temple of the city of Siena. In 1482, reputable nobleman Alberto Aringhieri built, along the cathedral, a separate chapel dedicated to St John the Baptist, intended for keeping the relic of the Forerunner's right hand. It is owing to his care that the precious relic got a new luxurious gold revetment – more details in D. Popović, "The Siena relic of St John the Baptist's right arm", *Zograf* 41 (2017), 77–92. Pope Pius II also bought from the last ruler of Morea despot Thomas Palaiologos the relic of the True Cross, i.e. the staurotheke which is rightly believed to have belonged to first Serbian archbishop Sava (1175–1235), and then gifted it to his native town of Pienza, D. Popović, "A staurotheke of Serbian provenance in Pienza", *Zograf* 36 (2012), 157–167.

⁶⁸ D. Popović, "The staurotheke of the church of Sts. Peter and Paul in Ras, Serbia. A contribution to research", *Zograf* 42 (2018), 73–84.

⁶⁹ Even if there was an inscription about the attribution of the relic, it is not surprising that the charters mentioning the reliquary do not state this detail, because the precious cross, as the spoils of war, belonged since then to the victorious side, in our case Hungarian king Béla IV.

⁷⁰ Fejer, *Codex diplomaticus*, IV/3, 491; V/1, 25; Chytil et al., *Kříž zvaný Závišův*, 15.

the mentioned staurothekes in the form of the double cross of Sava Nemanjić (St Sava), the brother of Uroš's father Stefan the First-Crowned and the reliquary of Uroš's son and later Serbian king Milutin (1282–1321), are an example of the importance and, to an extent, the cult of staurothekes in the Serbian ruling family.⁷¹ This is also indicated by the today unfortunately lost reliquary, the double cross of Serbian queen Jelena, the wife of king Uroš I, which also had an unusual destiny since it was for some time in possession of the Austrian Habsburg dynasty, whose attitude towards it was almost magical.⁷²

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Finally, we wish to conclude that we have presented a new hypothesis about the origin of Závíš's cross, i.e. we would like to state that the lost reliquary of Serbian king Uroš I should perhaps be recognised in it. First of all, the documents describing the great victory of the Hungarians against the Serbs on the battlefield in 1265/1266 in Mačva (Sirmia Ulterior) indubitably suggest such conclusion. Serbian king Uroš was taken captive and the declaration of the triumph was further reinforced with the seizure of the flag of Serbian king Uroš, which was officially presented before the court in Buda. The documents testify that the precious reliquary of king Uroš was also confiscated during the combat. Attesting to the value of the reliquary is the fact that in order to come into its possession, Hungarian king Béla IV had to cede an estate to his magnate. Also, it should not be overlooked that it was an authentic sacred item which ensured effectiveness that was questionable after 1204 and the "inflation" of the True Cross relic in the western Christian world. The beautifully adorned double cross of king Uroš was certainly kept for several years in the royal treasury, which duchess Anna later transferred to Bohemia. The treasury then belonged to her daughter, Bohemian queen Kunigunda, and was later appropriated by her second husband Bohemian nobleman Závíš of Falkenštejn. As testified by the history of priceless relics, which is, as a rule, unusual, he gifted the precious reliquary of the double cross to the Cistercian Abbey of Vyšší Brod, where it is, as it befits, kept and venerated.

⁷¹ Popović, "A staurotheke of Serbian provenance in Pienza" 157–170.

⁷² Popović, "On Two Lost Medieval Serbian Reliquaries", 43–52.

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Experiencing Disease and Medical Treatment in Renaissance Italy: Cardinal Pietro Bembo and his Circle

Abstract: This article, which examines contemporaries' personal experience of illness in Renaissance Italy, is part of a growing literature which concentrates on the patient rather than the practitioner. The basis of this study is the correspondence of Pietro Bembo, the well-known humanist, papal secretary and latterly Cardinal, with his cousin Gian Matteo Bembo and his long-standing secretary and friend, Cola Bruno. These letters are revealing of how a non-medical man understood and described illness in the sixteenth century, and his personal experience associated particularly with "mal delle reni", which he shared with his friends and recommended treatments. It also reveals his attitude towards medical practitioners, ranging from scepticism to fully embracing new therapies such as Holy Wood, which was used to treat the new epidemic disease of the Great Pox. Indeed he shared his enthusiasm for the efficacy of this drug with his great friend the physician Girolamo Fracastoro, the author of *Syphilis*, the poem which he dedicated to Bembo, and also of the treatise *De contagione et contagiosis morbis* (1546).

Keywords: Pietro Bembo, Girolamo Fracastoro, Gian Matteo Bembo, Cola Bruno, the Great Pox, "mal delle reni"

Attendete a star sano. L'acqua del legno ha guarito in pochi di una doglia e gravezza, nella persona della qualità della vostra, a M. Cola. Questo dico a fine che, se la vostra doglia e gravezza continuasse, ne deste aviso, chè vi manderei del Legno, e il modo di pigliar l'acqua. Fate che io intenda alcuna cosa dettavi di me a Zara dalla vostra Santa.¹

This letter dated 13th June 1538 was written by the famous humanist Pietro Bembo to his cousin, Captain Gian (Giovanni) Matteo Bembo.² The Cap-

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¹ Pietro Bembo. *Lettere*, vol. 4 (1537-1546), ed. Ernesto Travi, (Bologna: Commissione per i testi di lingua, 1993), 118, no. 1936.

² The most recent biography of Pietro Bembo (Venice, 1470 – Rome, 1547) is: M. Faini, *Pietro Bembo. A Life in Laurels and Scarlet*, (Cambridge: Modern Human Research Asso-

tain had recently been sent by the Republic of Venice to take charge of Kotor, known to the Venetians as Cattaro and part of their possessions in the eastern Adriatic, during their on-going war against the Ottoman Empire.³ The two main features of Bembo's letter of 13th June which are particularly relevant to our theme, neither of which have been subject to analysis, are the description of the pains from which Gian Matteo Bembo suffered and the treatment with Guaiacum or Holy Wood, which, as we shall see, was the cure-all drug recommended by many doctors for incurable diseases in the first half of the sixteenth century. It is also significant that Bembo compares Gian Matteo's symptoms with those of the third actor in this drama, his secretary Cola (Niccolò) Bruno, a cleric from Messina. Cola was his inseparable friend, secretary, librarian and faithful literary collaborator for almost half a century, and with whom he shared information about sickness and treatment.⁴

This article will take Bembo's correspondence with his two friends as its point of departure to examine contemporaries' personal experience of sickness in Italy in the first half of the sixteenth century, a theme which has recently begun to attract more attention from scholars.⁵ What makes this topic of particular interest is the position of Bembo as one of the leading humanists at the time, who frequented noble courts, such as the Este in Ferrara, became the official historian of Venice, and whose intellectual achievements were recognised by the papacy from Leo X to Paul III, who elevated him to the cardinalate. Also significant for our theme is Pietro Bembo's close friendship and correspondence with the well-known physician Girolamo Fracastoro, who was regarded at the time as one of the main medical experts on contagious diseases. Fracastoro was especially renowned for his writings on the Great Pox or the French Disease, the new epidemic which had rapidly spread with such devastating effects across

ciation, 2017). On Gian Matteo Bembo (Venice, c. 1491 –?, c.1570), see P. Fortini Brown, "Becoming a man of empire: the construction of patrician identity in a republic of equals". In *Architecture, Art and Identity in Venice and Its Territories, 1450–1750: Essays in Honour of Deborah Howard*, eds. Nebahat Avicioğlu, Emma Jones, (London: Routledge, 2013), 231–249; Ead, "Pietro Bembo e l'arte della diplomazia". In *Pietro Bembo e le arti*, eds. Guido Beltramini, Howard Burns, Davide Gasparotto, (Venice: Marsilio, 2013), 37–47.

³ K. M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571)*, vol. IV: *The sixteenth century from Julius III to Pius V*, (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1984).

⁴ On Cola Bruno (Messina, 1480 – Padua, 1542), see V. Cian, *Un medaglione del Rinascimento: Cola Bruno Messinese e le sue relazioni con Pietro Bembo (1480 c.–1542). Con appendice di documenti inediti*, (Florence: G. C. Sansoni, 1901); Cola Bruno's testament, from the Archivio di Stato di Padova is published in: F. Piovan, "Il testamento di Cola Bruno", *StEFI Studi di erudizione e di filologia italiana* I (2012), 188–189; cf. also M. Faini, *Pietro Bembo*, 27.

⁵ See M. Stolberg, *Experiencing Illness and the Sick Body in Early Modern Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); S. Cavallo, T. Storey, *Healthy Living in Late Renaissance Italy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

Europe from the mid-1490s.⁶ Significantly, Fracastoro's poem *Syphilis sive morbus gallicus*, was dedicated to Bembo. The poem had been conceived between 1510 and 1512, and Fracastoro wrote it in the period when Bembo was employed by Leo X as papal secretary, 1513–1521. Bembo had in fact been closely involved in editing the first draft of the book. It appeared, much to Fracastoro's disgust, in an unauthorized version full of errors in 1525 in Venice, but the final version was published five years later both in Venice and in Verona, where he lived.⁷ Bembo, moreover, had much appreciated the compliment paid to him when Fracastoro dedicated the poem to him, sharing as he did a deep knowledge and love of the classics.⁸ It is also significant that Gian Matteo Bembo was also on friendly terms with Fracastoro, as evidenced by the letters of support that the physician sent to Pietro Bembo at a time when Gian Matteo's career was in crisis.⁹

The correspondence most relevant to our theme spans the years 1538 to 1541. The discussion will follow a broadly chronological trajectory, and relate to two main geographical locations, Kotor, where Gian Matteo was based, and then Rome, to where Bembo himself moved from Padua in 1539. Our aim is not to attempt a form of retrospective diagnosis,¹⁰ but rather to discuss how contemporaries understood disease as a collection of symptoms within a Galenic paradigm. These letters, then, reveal Bembo's attitude towards disease, his

⁶ For studies of this disease in Italy see: J. Arrizabalaga, J. Henderson, R. French, *The Great Pox. The French Disease in Renaissance Europe* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997); E. Tognotti, *L'altra faccia di Venere. La sifilide dalla prima età moderna all'avvento di AIDS (XV-XX secolo)*, (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2006).

⁷ G. Eatough, *Fracastoro's Syphilis*, (Liverpool: Francis Cairns, 1984), Introduction; *Scritti inediti di Girolamo Fracastoro*, ed. Francesco Pellegrini (Verona: Valdonega, 1954), 8, 14; S. Pearce, "Fracastoro on Syphilis: Science and Poetry in Theory and Practice". In *Science and Literature in Italian Culture: From Dante to Calvino*, eds. Pierpaolo Antonello, Simon A. Gilson (Oxford: Legenda, 2004), 115–135.

⁸ *Fracastoro's Syphilis*, ed. and trans., Eatough, 4. Pietro Bembo in his *History of Venice* mentioned Fracastoro's skill in alleviating the suffering from "crudel morbo, che mal Francese si chiama", see P. Bembo, *Della historia Vinitiana: volgarmente scritta libri XII*, (Venice: Ziletti 1570), 37–38.

⁹ On 12 September 1544 Fracastoro declared that it was shameful Gian Matteo had not been made a Cavaliere for his truly extraordinary achievements in Kotor; see *Lettere di principi*, 142–149; P. Fortini Brown, "Pietro Bembo e l'arte della diplomazia", 45–46.

¹⁰ J. Arrizabalaga, J. Henderson, R. French, *The Great Pox*, ch. I; J. Arrizabalaga, "Problematising Retrospective Diagnosis in the History of Disease", *Asclepio: Archivo Iberoamericano de Historia de la Medicina y Antropología Médica* (2002), 51–70; A. Karenberg, "Retrospective Diagnosis: Use and Abuse in Medical Historiography", *Prague Medical Reports* 110 (2009), 140–45; J. Andrews, "History of Medicine: Health, Medicine and Disease in the Eighteenth Century", *Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies* 34, 4 (2011), 503–515.

recommendations of a number of treatments which he regarded as efficacious, and along the way reflected his attitude towards the medical profession.

Kotor

Our story begins in the late 1530s in the strategically important town of Kotor, at the time when *La Serenissima* joined the Holy League to confront a threat posed by the Ottoman Kapudan Pasha Hayreddin Barbarossa against the whole Mediterranean (in February 1538). In the summer of 1538, Gian Matteo has been sent by Venice as *Rettore e Provveditore di Cattaro*, based on his excellent reputation as a captain in Zadar. Pietro Bembo wrote to Gian Matteo to congratulate him on his appointment soon after his arrival to Kotor: "I am very pleased, not only that you have come to Kotor, but also that you liked it more than you expected".¹¹

In 1539 the city was threatened by the Ottoman navy, after Barbarossa had conquered Castelnuovo (Herceg Novi) where he massacred between 3,000 and 4,000 Spanish soldiers who had defended the fortress.¹² It is from the correspondence between Pietro Bembo and his cousin that we learn details not only about his waiting for the Ottoman attack, but also Gian Matteo Bembo's personal battle against his ailments of "doglia e gravezza". Bembo also discussed Cola's health, for, as he mentioned to Gian Matteo, Cola had evidently become ill some years before. In 1536, Pietro Bembo had written a letter to Gian Matteo, when he was still captain in Zadar, expressing concern about Gian Matteo's "gravi infermità". In the same letter Pietro mentioned that Cola had "un poco di mal di fianco, anzi molto mal di fianco".¹³ However, as we have seen from the letter cited at the beginning of the article, the disease had obviously progressed over these two years for, like Bembo's cousin, he suffered from "doglia e gravezza".¹⁴

¹¹ *Molto mi piace non solo che siate giunto sano e salvo a Catara, ma che il luogo vi sia piaciuto più che non pensavate*, see Pietro Bembo. *Lettere*, vol. 4, 121, no. 1940. Cf. also P. Fortini Brown, "Pietro Bembo e l'arte della diplomazia", 42.

¹² K. M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571)*. IV, 430–433, 446–448, et passim; M. Á. de Bunes Ibarra, "Carlos V, Venecia y la sublime puerta: la embajada de Diego Hurtado de Mendoza en Venecia". In *Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo político en Europa (1530–1558)*, eds. José Martínez Millán, Ignacio Ezquerro Revilla, (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, 2001), 594–595; N. Samardžić, *Karlo V*, (Belgrade: Centar za modernu politiku, 2005), 251–267, 437–440. M. Pellegrini, *Guerra Santa contro i Turchi. La crociata impossibile di Carlo V*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2015).

¹³ Pietro Bembo. *Lettere*, vol. 3 (1529–1536), ed. Ernesto Travi, (Bologna: Commissione per i testi di lingua, 1992), 651, no. 1760. (10. May 1536).

¹⁴ Pietro Bembo. *Lettere*, vol. 4, 118, no. 1936. *Santa monaca* was Franceschina da Zara, a profetessa upon whose advice and miraculous protection cardinal Pietro Bembo depended, see

As so often during the course of illnesses, there were periods when patients improved and others when they got worse. Such was the case with Cola in September 1538 when Bembo wrote from Venice on the 10th about “mal vostro delle reni”, suggesting that he took Holy Wood (“Ho inteso d'altrui che sono guariti del mal vostro delle reni con l'acqua del legno.”)¹⁵

By the 24th, Bembo was in Padua, one of Europe's largest centres of medical teaching. Writing to a physician Maestro Carlo Gualteruzzi, presumably to ask his advice about treatment, he mentions both Cola's and his own ailments: “Il mio M. Cola, tornato di Villa nuova, s'è malato, e ha una febre che non è già con cattivi accidenti, ma non lascia che ogni dì non gli venga”; “ho ora un altro incremento, che è segno quanto queste cose mondane sono deboli e inferme”.¹⁶

Gian Matteo was also feeling unwell in this period, as he wrote on 6th August 1539 to Clarissimo Signor Generale Capello:

“come io aspettava l'armata, et l'essercito di Barbarossa sotto questa città [...] Nè temo d'altro, che di ammalarmi per le gran fatiche di due mesi: che, per dire il vero, io non dormo, et se pure alle volte io prendo sonno, ciò faccio vestito et con sinistro. Il giorno poi sempre mi convien trovarmi per tutto: ma il peggio è il bisognarmi ascendere molto spesso questo monte, et andar nel Castello, cosa, che mi affanna, et indebolisce molto”.¹⁷

So far, then, what evidence we have about the state of health of Gian Matteo Bembo and Cola in the 1530s? One of the main symptoms mentioned by contemporaries who suffered from the Great Pox was pain (*doglia*) and a more general condition of *gravezza* or heaviness of the body. Cola suffered as well from “mal di fianco”, and fever on one occasion. Gian Matteo instead had more generic conditions, as in the case of his “grave infermità” when he was *Conte*

V. Živković, “Osanna da Cattaro and Franceschina da Zara: Living Saints as Spiritual Protectors during the Ottoman Siege of Kotor”, *Initial. A Review of Medieval Studies* 6 (2018), 123–136.

¹⁵ *Pietro Bembo. Lettere*, vol. 4, 130, no. 1954. We have chosen to keep the original phrase “mal delle reni” rather than try to translate it into modern terms since, as the anonymous reader noted ‘the diagnosis of a kidney disease is not certain in the light of modern medicine’, and indeed this may be very well be a general term which includes a number of conditions. We are grateful for the reader's comments.

¹⁶ *Pietro Bembo. Lettere*, vol. 4, 133, no. 1957.

¹⁷ *Lettere di principi le quali o si scrivono da principi, o a principi, o ragionan di principi, all'illustriss. et reveren. card. Carlo Borromeo*, libro primo (Venice: G. Ziletti, 1562), 136–137. Vincenzo Capello (1469–1541) was the Venetian admiral who served the Christian Holy League as the *Provveditore dell'Armata*, see E. Pujeau, “La Préveza (1538) entre idéologie et histoire”, *Studi Veneziani*, n.s. 21 (2006), 155–204.

of Zadar in 1536,¹⁸ and in 1539 he suffered from what sounds like exhaustion as he prepared for the defence against the potential Ottoman siege, as he regularly toiled up the very steep hill around Kotor in the summer heat.

Treatment

One of the most significant features of the Bembo correspondence in this period is the insistence on the curative properties of *Acqua del legno*, Holy Wood or guaiacum, also known as *legno nefritico*, *lignum indicum*, *lignum vitae*, and described as «un dono quasi divino».¹⁹ It was especially recommended for treating pain, and, as Fracastoro wrote, particularly efficacious for that caused by the new epidemic of the French Disease or the Great Pox. First mentioned in 1516, it was a hard and resinous wood imported from the West Indies (Hispaniola), and lauded by the indigenous population as a “saving god”, as underlined by Fracastoro in his poem *Syphilis*:

The land (Hispaniola) is fertile in gold, but made far richer by one tree – they call this in the sounds of their native speech Guaiacum [...] the wood is almost like hard iron [...] That foreign race adores this tree and is very eager in its efforts to rear it Nor is anything more sacred to them or of more important use; for all hope lies in it against this plague which the heavens have there made eternal.²⁰

In a letter written by Bembo to Fracastoro from Padua on 26th November 1525, he thanks him for the way that he had described the Holy Wood: “In questo libro la favola del legno non potria esser meglio pensata, nè starci più propriamente di quello che ella vi sta, nè in più atto luogo posta”.²¹

Then on 5th January of the following year, he returned to the subject of the Legno Santo, which he himself had used successfully and recommended to others for the cure of intractable ailments: “Dove quella del legno mi soddisfa ed empie l’animo meravigliosamente. Senza che, per essere il legno cosa nuova,

¹⁸ From August 1534 until November 1537, see P. Fortini Brown, “Pietro Bembo e l’arte della diplomazia”, 41–42.

¹⁹ F. Pellegrini, *Trattato inedito in prosa di Gerolamo Fracastoro sulla sifilide* (Verona: La Tipografica veronese, 1939), 203. On Legno Santo (guaiacum), see R. S. Munger, “Guaiacum, the holy wood from the New World”, *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 4.2 (1949), 196–229; J. Henderson, “Fracastoro, Mal Francese e la cura con il Legno Santo”. In *Gerolamo Fracastoro. Fra medicina, filosofia e scienze della natura*, eds. Alessandro Pastore, Enrico Peruzzi (Florence: Leo S Olschki, 2006), 73–89.

²⁰ *Fracastoro’s Syphilis*, 87–89.

²¹ *Pietro Bembo. Lettere*, vol. 2 (1508–1528), ed. E. Travi (Bologna: Commissione per i testi di lingua, 1989), 316, no. 621 (26th Nov. 1525).

ella vi sta più propriamente che non fa quella dello argento, che è cosa trita e ad ognuno famigliare, come sapete".²²

The administration of Legno Santo was part of a forty-day course of treatment, which was intended to lead to the evacuation of the putrefaction of the humours and morbid matter, which was seen as the essence of the disease. This was to be achieved through sweating and purging, combined with a light diet. Thus pills of aloe and hellebore were first to be taken, along with a series of strong simple medicines, such as Canna and China root or sarsaparilla.²³ There were three different products produced from Guaiacum, each of which had a different but related purpose. The wood was first cut up into small pieces almost like sawdust and then soaked in water in a ratio of eight parts of water to one part wood. The water was then boiled until reduced to half its original volume. The foam produced during the boiling was then to be dried and used as a drying powder on sores; a concentrated solution was drunk regularly; and a weaker solution, which was obtained by re-boiling the wood, was drunk during meals.²⁴

The fame of Guaiacum in this period was initially put down to its role as an almost miraculous cure for the Great Pox leads us next to consider briefly the nature of the disease in order to assess whether it is possible that Bembo or his two correspondents may have suffered from it.

The Great Pox was one of the most severe epidemics to affect renaissance Europe. Though its origins have been debated, it is generally accepted that it began in the mid-1490s in the Mediterranean and then spread rapidly from Spain and Italy and then north of the Alps. Its nomenclature varied according to the nation of the chronicler from the French term *Mal de Naples* to the much more common description *Mal Francese* or *Morbus Gallicum*. While the French blamed southern Italians for giving them the disease when their army was in Naples, the Italians and many other Europeans blamed the French for spreading the epidemic through the peninsula and across the Alps.²⁵ According to the early sixteenth-century Spanish doctor Joan Almenar, diseases and other

²² Pietro Bembo. *Lettere*, vol. 2, 327, no. 634: 5th Jan. 1526. Pietro Bembo wrote more letters to Fracastoro in praise of his poem, *Ibid.*, vol. 3, 189, no. 1158: 8th Oct. 1530; vol. 4, 209–210, no. 2058: 13th April 1539; vol. 4, 569–570, no. 2538: 20th May 1546.

²³ J. Henderson, "Fracastoro, *Mal Francese* e la cura con il Legno Santo", 80.

²⁴ R. S. Munger, "Guaiacum, the holy wood from the New World", 206–209; J. Arrizabalaga, J. Henderson, R. French, *The Great Pox*, 100–102, 188–189. The complex nature of the Legno was described by Fracastoro's contemporary, Niccolò Massa, in his *Liber de morbo gallico* (Venice: F. Bindoni e M. Pasini, 1527; Italian translation of 1566).

²⁵ A. Foa, "The New and the Old: the spread of Syphilis (1494–1530)". In *Sex and Gender in Historical Perspective*, eds. Edward Muir, Guido Ruggiero, (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 33; J. Arrizabalaga, J. Henderson, R. French, *The Great Pox*, ch. 2.

calamities befell humans as a punishment for their sins; some diseases were specifically related to mortal sins and he claimed that since the French Disease was akin to leprosy, it was related to lust, which should be avoided so as to preserve themselves and recover their health.²⁶

In addition to spreading rapidly across Europe, the French Disease spread across all levels of society from secular rulers and Church leaders to the professional classes and the poor. Indeed what made it so well-known at such an early stage of the outbreak was that Mal Francese claimed many well-known literate victims, whose illness and treatment was recorded, whether by patrician families, such as the Este dukes in Mantua, members of the papal court or of literary academies, who wrote satirical poems and plays about poxed courtesans or their own experiences with the disease.²⁷

In the case of Bembo and his circle of correspondents, we should not make the a priori assumption that they suffered from Mal Francese, even though they might have had many opportunities to contract the disease. Gian Matteo, for example, as a member of the army would have encountered poxed courtesans, and indeed French soldiers are said to have contracted the Great Pox from prostitutes in Naples and then carried it with them back to northern Europe. Pietro Bembo himself as a young man had numerous love affairs at a time and could therefore have had the opportunity to contract the disease at a time when it was spreading rapidly through Europe. He was based for some time at both the Este court of Mantua and the papal court in Rome, where it was no secret that a number of prominent men had contracted the disease.²⁸

However, even if Bembo recommended Guaiacum, which is best known as a treatment for the Great Pox, it does not mean that he and his friends suffered from it. In contrast, many other contemporaries who had contracted this terrible disease, did not hesitate to mention the other main symptoms, which included pustules, gummata, sores, scabs, and abscesses in the groin. For example, in his poem on the Great Pox published originally in 1510-1511, the Siense poet and actor Lo Strascino, recounted in detail the different types of pain and

²⁶ J. Arrizabalaga, "Medical Responses to the „French Disease” in Europe at the Turn of the Sixteenth Century". In *Sins of the Flesh: Responding to Sexual Disease in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Kevin Siena, (Toronto: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 2005), 33–55.

²⁷ J. Arrizabalaga, J. Henderson, R. French, *The Great Pox*, chs 3 and 6; D. Zanrè, "French Diseases and Italian Responses: Representations of the Mal Francese in the Literature of Cinquecento Tuscany". In *Sins of the Flesh*, ed. K. Siena, (Toronto: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 2005), ch. 7.

²⁸ J. Arrizabalaga, J. Henderson, R. French, *The Great Pox*, 44–50, 113, 142–144. See Carlo Dionisotti, "Pietro Bembo", *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, 8 (1966), https://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/pietro-bembo_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/

torments he suffered.²⁹ Fracastoro in his book *De contagione* went as far as describing pain as “the most cruel” of all the symptoms of the disease.³⁰ It was the sores and gummata which caused the tremendous pain, since these ate away the flesh and eventually even the bones. However, none of these symptoms were described in the Bembo correspondence, and in one letter that Pietro Bembo wrote to his cousin Gian Matteo on 8th December 1542, he even admits that he did not know the identity of the disease from which he was suffering: “Mi duole del vostro fastidio, ancora che non sappia di che qualità si sia.”³¹

The lack of discussion of any of these obvious symptoms identified by contemporaries as typical of Mal Francese, cannot be taken to suggest that these three men had caught this disease, despite it being widespread in society, any more than Bembo’s enthusiasm for Legno Santo can be taken as proof.

While it is true that all three men suffered from severe pains, they were also typical of many other chronic diseases at the time. Furthermore, while Niccolò Massa and Girolamo Fracastoro included Legno Santo in their treatises on Mal Francese, both underlined that it was also efficacious in the treatment of a wide range of diseases. This again suggests that while it may have been seen as a specific against the Great Pox, a patient to whom it was prescribed may not have had this disease. A similar argument can be made about Theriac, the other miracle drug, best known for its use against plague, but which was seen as a sovereign remedy against a wide range of intractable diseases. In fact, in two letters written in April 1529, Pietro Bembo had mentioned theriac in its successful cure of Gian Matteo Bembo’s sons: “Ho cara la medicina della Tiriaca”; “Et vi ho inteso della Tiriaca”³²

Guaiacum, like theriac was very expensive to buy, and could only be afforded by the more affluent, who could have bought it directly from a pharmacy.³³ However, one of the largest institutional consumers of the Holy Wood

²⁹ N. Campani, *Lamento di quel tribolato di Strascino Campana senese, sopra el male incognito el qual tratta de la patientia & impatientia* (Venice: Zoppino, 1521).

³⁰ H. Fracastoro, *De contagione et contagiosis morbis et eorum curatione, Libri III*, trans. and ed., W. Cave Wright (New York and London: G.P. Putnams and Sons, 1930), 137–139.

³¹ Pietro Bembo. *Lettere*, vol. 4, 440, no. 2360.

³² Pietro Bembo. *Lettere*, vol. 3, 27–28, no. 949. In a letter written on 12th May 1528, Pietro Bembo greets Gian Matteo with the words: “Attendete a tener (voi) sani co’ vostri, e schifar le medicine quanto il Diavolo.”, see Pietro Bembo. *Lettere*, vol. 2, 518, no. 880.

³³ See the study by James Shaw and Evelyn Welch, *Making and Marketing Medicine in Renaissance Florence*, The Wellcome Series in the History of Medicine: Clio Medica (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011), 298–299, where they discuss the stocks of guaiacum kept by a major pharmacy in Florence, the Speziale del Giglio. Cf. also J. Flood and D. Shaw, “The Price of the Pox in 1527: Johannes Sinapius and the Guaiac Cure”, *Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance* LIV/3 (1992), 691–707.

were the Incurabili hospitals, which had been founded throughout Italy between the 1490s and 1520s in cities from Venice, Padua, Ferrara, Brescia and Genoa in the north to Bologna, Florence, Rome and Naples to treat free poor incurables. These hospitals became vast consumers of guaiac, as their surviving records attest. At the Incurables hospital of San Giacomo in Rome, guaiac was distributed free to thousands of sufferers, at vast expense to the hospital.³⁴

It is also significant for our theme, that while the Incurabili hospitals may have been best known for the treatment of Mal Francese, and many may have been established originally for this purpose, in fact they came to cater for a wide range of intractable conditions. This role is reflected in Pope Leo X's Bull *Salvatoris Nostris* of 1515 when he re-designated the hospital for the treatment of "the sick poor all infected with various kinds of incurable diseases". This is confirmed by a detailed study of their patient records for the sixteenth century, which has shown that of over 4,500 people admitted in the year 1569–1570, only 20 per cent were diagnosed with a symptom associated with the Great Pox.³⁵

Rome is the geographical centre of our final section, which examines in more detail how Pietro Bembo and his friend Cola described their symptoms in the early 1540s, at a time when both men were suffering from ill health.

Rome

Pietro Bembo had already visited and stayed a number of times in Rome, beginning in 1508, attracted by opportunities to work for the papacy. His first major appointment was with the Medici pope Leo X when he was appointed as Latin secretary and then papal ambassador to Venice. However, he had already begun to suffer from bouts of ill health, including a serious period of four months in 1518, which returned in a more serious form in 1521, so that he had had to leave Rome and go home to Padua. The Rome to which he returned in the late 1530s was a very different place compared with the early 1520s. In the interim the city had suffered from a devastating plague and siege in the 1520s, and the Church had encountered a massive challenge from the Protestant Reformation. The papal court was now dominated by the reformist pope Paul III, who was to establish the main facets of the Counter-Reformation from the Jesuit Order to the Inquisition and the Council of Trent. It was, then, within this context that Bembo found himself, promoted secretly by Pope Paul to the cardinalate in 1538, and officially declared in this role the following year. This entailed Bembo going to live in Rome the following year, leaving his young family in the care of his good friend and secretary Cola.³⁶

³⁴ J. Arrizabalaga, J. Henderson, R. French, *The Great Pox*, ch. 8.

³⁵ J. Arrizabalaga, J. Henderson, R. French, *The Great Pox*, 155, 204.

³⁶ Cf. also M. Faini, *Pietro Bembo*, 27.

While his elevation to the cardinalate represented a new dazzling career at the centre of the Catholic Church, it must also have proved a challenge to the sixty-eight year-old Bembo, whose health had already been declining for some time. The letters written by Bembo to Cola in the early 1540s therefore provide a fascinating patient's eye-view of those ailments he shared with Cola and the various treatments which he found most efficacious. He is solicitous of his friend's health, giving him advice on how to look after himself, not to tire himself out, as he is tormented by a sickness associated with "un mal di reni". While doctors are mentioned along the way, he demonstrates at times a certain scepticism of their practices, aligning himself with many of his contemporaries, who combined self-treatment with consulting a variety of practitioners from officially registered physicians to unlicensed empirics.³⁷

The main problem which both Bembo and his friend Cola suffered from was "chi ha offeso le rene e ha alcuna difficoltà nell'urinare, o altro impedimento in quella parte", as he wrote on 7th March 1540.³⁸ Indeed both of them had had shared health problems for some time, and both suffered particularly badly in this decade. Bembo wrote on 5th July about his "indisposizione delle vostre reni", which had evidently become more serious: "Voi sapete quanto stessi male qui in Roma del male delle reni, e come io fui cento volte vicino alla morte".³⁹ Then on 12th March 1537 Cola Bruno wrote to Pietro Bembo from Padua: "et come che le mie reni rotte et distemperate non mi lascino poter far molta fatica[...]".⁴⁰

As mentioned above, Bembo had been suffering over a long period from problems with "mal delle reni", and had had a particularly bad bout in 1518, which had improved considerably the following year, as he mentioned in a letter of 1st October 1519 to Bernardo Bibbiena, Cardinal of S. Maria in Portico. This letter is particularly interesting, since for the only time in his correspondence Bembo sought to explain the cause of his ailment in humoral terms:

Ora di quella mala qualità delle reni, che così lungamente mi tormentò, pochissima noia sento ... Emmi rimasto un catarro che dalla testa mi scende alle reni, il quale col primo mal mio incominciò ne' mai poscia m'ha lasciato, che per la lunga dimora fatta con meco è molto malagevole a sbarbare.⁴¹

The idea that diseases travelled around the body was a common one since they related to the four humours which were seen as bodily fluids, which when corrupted caused putrefaction and then sickness. Here Bembo is talking about

³⁷ For Cola Bruno's problems with "mal delle reni" see V. Cian, *Un medaglione del Rinascimento*, 66–67; F. Piovan, "Il testamento di Cola Bruno", 176.

³⁸ *Pietro Bembo. Lettere*, vol. 4, 290–291, no. 2164.

³⁹ *Pietro Bembo. Lettere*, vol. 4, 312–315, no. 2199.

⁴⁰ Cola's letter is published in V. Cian, *Un medaglione del Rinascimento* (appendix), 87.

⁴¹ *Pietro Bembo. Lettere*, vol. 2, 134, no. 392. Cf. also M. Faini, *Pietro Bembo*, 93–94.

catarrh, which at the time was seen as deriving from the brain since the brain was seen as particularly moist and cold. When sufficient matter had accumulated in the brain, it then moved to other parts of the body, which were “mal delle reni” in Bembo’s case.⁴²

The accumulation of corrupt humours within the body, whether in the form of catarrh or phlegm, was the reason that much contemporary medicine was concerned with evacuation and purgation. Indeed one of the main themes of Fracastoro’s treatise *De contagione* was the necessity to deal with the phlegm produced by the Great Pox within the body, which was then externalised in the suppurating sores on the outside.⁴³

As with many people in this period, friends and relatives exchanged not only information about their health, but also offered advice on what they had discovered to have been the best methods of treatment, which in Bembo’s case did not include the drastic purgations recommended by the medical profession. Thus when writing on 7th March, Bembo recommended to Cola a certain ‘electuary’: “ho fatto una meravigliosa esperienza e pruova”. He was particularly impressed, because it was “assai dilicato a pigliare”, probably in contrast to many of the more unpleasant cures offered by doctors. In fact, he did not rely on his recommendation alone, for as he wrote to a friend of his called Vincenzo “che si sentiva stare a gran pericolo di non guarir mai, lo ha usato già tre anni, e come incominciò ad usarlo non ha mai più sentito offesa alcuna”. The emphasis here, as with Bembo’s own experience, was to emphasize that just as the electuary was pleasant to take, so it had no side-effects, clearly in comparison to other medical treatments available. He also discusses the method of administering the treatment, for while Vincenzo had taken it every 15 or 20 days, he recommends a more frequent use: “Se io fossi in voi incomincerei subito ad usarlo, nè il lascerai mai più essendo così facile e piacevole medicina”.⁴⁴ Although Bembo never actually disclosed the identity of this electuary,⁴⁵ he did reveal in some detail two more treatments which he recommended for their efficacy in treating “mal delle reni”.

On 8 July he wrote to Cola, possibly in response to a letter from him asking for a new remedy. Evidently, the electuary had not worked as well as he had hoped. By this stage Bembo was obviously convinced of the efficacy of sheeps’ milk: “poi sapete quanto lungamente io usai il ver del latte di pecora, il quale fu quello, senza dubbio, che alla fin fine me ne liberò”. Furthermore, he

⁴² On the four humours as bodily fluids, see M. Stolberg, *Experiencing Illness*, 95–97.

⁴³ Fracastoro, *De contagione*, 149–150.

⁴⁴ *Pietro Bembo. Lettere*, vol. 4, 290–291, no. 2164. Also cited in Piovan, “Il testamento di Cola Bruno” 176.

⁴⁵ It may have been that recommended by Niccolò Massa: see below, note 47.

advised him to buy two sheep in order to make sure that he had a regular and fresh supply of milk! Bembo describes his own condition in dramatic terms: “Di quello m’incresce e duole infino nel mezzo dell’anima”, “io fui cento volte vicino alla morte”. However, as if this might be some comfort to Cola, he tells him that it is a common ailment: “Voi sapete quanto stessi male qui in Roma del male delle reni”, suggesting this was a popular treatment in Rome, presumably among his ecclesiastical colleagues.

Bembo was also solicitous in his advice to Cola, for he provided instructions on how to take it – “Pigliarete il latte ogni mattina caldo, come egli uscirà delle poppe della pecora”, and he was sure that this would cure him, as it had Bembo himself. He also said that it was important not just to take it a few times, but should be taken over a long period, which, as he attests, was no hardship, because the “medicina è piacevole e dilettevole”. He then recommended that he should lie down and sleep, which he regarded as the best cure, and reflects more general medical knowledge of the time about rest and sleep, as one of the Six Non Naturals as essential for health.⁴⁶

As was true of many early modern patients, while Bembo took the advice of doctors, he also permitted himself to adapt their advice according to his experience. Thus he noted that even though sleeping after the treatment was against medical advice, he should ignore doctors: “Il qual sonno, a giudizio mio, fu quello che più mi giovò: e pare che sia contro le regole delle medicine per quello che mi diceva il nostro maestro M. Ieronimo da Ogobbio [Girolamo Accoramboni]. Vorrei che sopra ciò non vi consigliaste con medico alcuno, ma vi metteste a prender questo latte senza punto pensarvi sopra, poscia che egli in me tanta e si manifesta pruova fece”.⁴⁷ In fact, Girolamo Accoramboni was a well-established physician practising in Rome and was an authority on the use of milk as a treatment, having published a *Tractatus de Lacte*, in 1536.⁴⁸

Bembo returned to the subject of their health in the autumn. On 25th September he wrote asking “mio Reverendo Maestro Cola Bruno” if he was suffering from “mal del fianco”, which was evidently a condition which they shared and had discussed in the past. Bembo talks in fulsome language about the merits of agrimony, or Eupatorio, which is “una cosa approvatissima e meravigliosa”, and

⁴⁶ See S. Cavallo, T. Storey, *Conserving Health in Early Modern Culture. Bodies and Environments in Italy and England* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), Introduction.

⁴⁷ Pietro Bembo. *Lettere*, vol. 4, 312–315, no. 2199.

⁴⁸ E. Andretta, *Roma medica: anatomie d’un système médical au XVIe siècle*, (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2011), 219–284. Before Accoramboni, Niccolò Massa prescribed the use of milk as a treatment for *malfranciosati* in his book written in Latin in 1527 (*Liber Morbo Gallico*) and in Italian in 1566: *Il libro del mal francese, composto dall’Eccell. Medico, & Filosofo M. Nicolò Massa Venetiano. Nuouamente tradotto da un dottissimo Medico, di Latino, nella nostra lingua Italiana*, (Venice: Giordano Ziletti, 1566), 221, 244, 307.

had cured him from “due fistole”! Returning to the subject on 10th December, he also recommended agrimony for “dolori di fianco”; in fact, he had also advised the Cardinale di San Jacopo to take it and as a result “ne ha sentito grande giovamento”.⁴⁹

Again Bembo was careful to provide the methods of preparation and treatment. When writing in September, he recommended “far bollire della Agrimonia, e pigliar due dita di quella acqua tepida, leva tutto quel male”. Then, he tells Cola that, following the advice of “Maestro Federico nostro” [Federico Delfino], la bollitura de’ calare per lo terzo”.⁵⁰ He also says that it should be possible to purchase the medicine already prepared from a pharmacy, as had the Cardinale di San Jacopo, who had brought it from ‘certain friars’ in Rome, who were well equipped with distillation equipment. He suggests that Cola might purchase it from the Jesuits in Padua, who may still be producing it for sale, underlining that it is best if the solution of agrimony is prepared locally, so that it remains fresh, rather than being purchased and sent from further away.⁵¹

By December 1540, Bembo’s own health had clearly deteriorated because he reveals more about his own condition and treatment. He continued to suffer from his existing problems. Indeed he recounted that his symptoms became dramatic when he rode his horse; he has to urinate often and when he does his urine is black, a condition he evidently shared with Cola. It is interesting, moreover, that this too was a symptom common to Mal Francese.⁵² But there was also relief for his condition, which improved if he rested, as when he went on his habitual two-mile walk. He tells him that he has taken the “latte di pecora”, which had had a good effect in the past, but evidently was no longer efficacious to treat his deteriorating health. Having provided this information, he requests Cola to approach two doctors whom they both know, Maestro Paolo da Noale and Maestro Ieronimo da Urbino, for remedies for his condition. However, because he is still sick, he decided not to accompany the pope to Bologna, but to remain in Rome until mid-January.⁵³

⁴⁹ Pietro Bembo. *Lettere*, vol. 4, 324–325, no. 2210.

⁵⁰ Federico Delfino, mathematician, astrologer and friend of Pietro Bembo, whom Bembo mentioned in his second testament written in 1544, see: <http://cardinaliserenissima.uniud.it/joomla/109-bembo-pietro-regesto-2>

⁵¹ Pietro Bembo. *Lettere*, vol. 4, 324–325, no. 2210.

⁵² N. Massa, *Il libro del mal francese*, 71, 117, 165, 182, 263, 281.

⁵³ Pietro Bembo. *Lettere*, vol. 4, 333, no. 2220 (“Io non sono molto gagliardo con le mie rene nel cavalcare, però che se io cavalco sei od otto miglia fo una orina spessa e nera, come erano le vostre. Ho preso a bere la mattina, innanzi di, del latte di pecora, che a tempo di Leone mi guarì, come sapete. [...] Il mal mio è quello che io detto v’ho, e dappoi che ho cavalcato, e nel cavalcare, ancora ho una debolezza delle reni grande, la qual poi mi si parte a riposo, e così la spessezza e nevrura dell’orina. Il camminare non mi nuoce gran fatto, nè fo quella orina

The main treatments he mentioned, sheep's milk and agrimony were well-known and recommended by physicians in their treatises.⁵⁴ However, Bembo only discusses the use of single, simple medicines, whereas physicians, combined them with other ingredients, as in the following passage in Niccolò Massa's *Il libro del mal francese*: "[...]ne le difficultà de la orina, et in molte obstruizioni l'agrimonia [...] Decottione de la chyna ad un'altro modo [...] altri la fanno bollire hor con semplici solventi [...] come è la betonica, iva, stecade, agrimonia, cicorea, e simili".⁵⁵

Conclusion

What, then, do we learn from Pietro Bembo's correspondence with his cousin Gian Matteo and his friend and secretary Cola concerning their health and sicknesses over the years between 1538 and 1541? Bembo is particularly concerned about Cola's various ailments, many of which Bembo himself came to suffer. Clearly, Cola was much more sick than Bembo, since, despite being ten years his junior, he died at the age of sixty-two in 1542. Bembo himself eventually succumbed to the same illness, dying at seventy-seven, on 18th January 1547, after suffering from a short fever.⁵⁶

As is evident from the correspondence, their illnesses grew them even closer together, despite being physically apart, especially as Cola looked after Bembo's children in Padua, while the latter was in Rome. Not only did they share common symptoms, but also throughout their lives they had shared intellectual interests, as was hinted in Bembo's short note to Cola on 10th December 1540:

M. Cola. Guardarate in quelli fogli avuti, di mano del Petrarca, che sono nella cassetta di cipresso, dove vi sono alcuni pezzi delli capitoli de' *Trionfi*, se vè quello della *Divinità*, e se vi sono quelli due versi:

"Vedrassi quanto in van cura si pone:
E quanto indarno s'affatica e suda".⁵⁷

ancora che io camini due miglia, sì come io fo molto spesso, e per dir più il vero, ogni dì che non sia consistoria e non piova.")

⁵⁴ *I discorsi di M. Pietro Andrea Matthioli Medico Sanese, ne i sei libri della materia medicinale di Pedacio Dioscoride Anazarbeo* (Venice: F. Valgriso, 1557; repr. Bologna: Arnaldo Forni Editore, 1984), 214–217, 478.

⁵⁵ Massa mentions that agrimony helps to clear obstructions as when somebody finds it difficult to urinate, see *Il libro del mal francese*, 176, 192, 298–299.

⁵⁶ G. Mazzuchelli, *Gli scrittori d'Italia cioè notizie storiche, e critiche intorno alle vite, e agli scritti dei letterati italiani del conte Giammaria Mazzuchelli Brescino*, vol. 2, parte 2, (Brescia: Giambatista Bossini, 1753), 748.

⁵⁷ Pietro Bembo. *Lettere*, vol. 4, 333, no. 2220.

Their correspondence also tells us much about the attitude of an educated Renaissance man towards medicine, treatment and the medical profession. Bembo's medical knowledge was part of a general knowledge, which would have been absorbed from home, from contacts with doctors at the Este courts of Mantua and Urbino, his medical colleagues in Padua, and subsequently at the papal court in Rome. He was also part of the more general culture of medical humanism, as reflected in his close friendship with Girolamo Fracastoro.

What is striking, though is that Bembo, does not talk about the conditions from which he and Cola suffered in humoral terms, but more as a collection of symptoms, especially dwelling on pain. As we have seen, the only exception to this rule is his letter of October 1519 to the Cardinal of S. Maria in Portico where he discussed the role of catarrh associated with "male delle reni". This is in contrast to contemporary physicians, such as Pietro Andrea Mattioli in his *Discorsi* or commentary on Dioscorides' *Materia medica*, published in 1544, three years before Bembo's death:

L'erba dell'Eupatorio è composta di parti sottili, e ha virtù fuori di manifesta calidità d'incidere, et di mondificare, lo onde apre, e netta le oppilationi del fegato: al quale giova anchor a fortificandolo con una certa parte che ha del costrettivo.⁵⁸

Mattioli's language here depends on the work of the great Roman physician Galen and more broadly refers back to the Greek and Arabic medical tradition. It is based on the humoral model whereby the body is seen as healthy when the four humours are in balance, but when they become blocked or corrupted or over-heated they can cause disease. According to this passage the virtues of euphorbia, among others, are that it has heating properties and can clear obstructions of the liver and fortify it when it is weak.

Even if Bembo did not normally talk in humoral terms, but rather concentrated on symptoms, he clearly did have knowledge of medicine reflected in the treatments he recommended to both his cousin and to Cola, as in his description of the preparation and dosage of both sheep's milk and agrimony, which evidently he had heard from other patients were successful. But one of the most significant cures which he adopted was Guaiacum, which, although initially associated with the cure of the Great Pox, it was also, like theriac, regarded as a cure-all for many intractable diseases. He presumably learned most about Guaiacum from his physician friend Girolamo Fracastoro and indeed, it would appear that as his health declined he came to rely more on the advice of a series of medical practitioners.

⁵⁸ *I discorsi di M. Pietro Andrea Matthioli*, 478.

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The Second Eastern Crisis (1875–1878): Echoes, Volunteers and Italian Interests

Abstract: The actions of Balkan insurgents during Eastern Crisis of 1875–1878 were closely followed by Giuseppe Garibaldi and his supporters as well as by the Italian politicians and writers that were a part Mazzini's school of thought. Garibaldi actively sustained the insurgents and his *red shirts* went to fight in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the first year of the Crisis. When the uprising evolved into a war of Serbia and Montenegro against the Ottomans the involvement of *red shirts* as well as the one of volunteers in general was considerable reduced, with the exception of the Russian contingent under the commandment of the Russian general Mikhail Chernyaev. However, the interest for the ongoing developments in the Bosnia and Herzegovina only changed the form, since Italian politicians and journalists made several projects trying to mobilize Italian general public to support South Slav cause. The Venetian writer Marco Antonio Canini even imagined a confederal solution for the nations in the Danube basin thus trying to overcome the conflicts between the nascent nationalisms that could dispute among them the territorial heritage of the Austria-Hungary after its projected demise. None of the projects were put in practice, but they remain as testimony of Italian interest and involvement into the Great Eastern Crisis and its consequences.

Keyword: Eastern Crisis (1875–1878), Giuseppe Garibaldi, volunteers, insurrection

In a recent essay, Armando Pitassio asked why the Italian military formations that joined the Yugoslav Liberation Army in the autumn of 1943 ended up being included in a Division named Garibaldi. At the time this was not the only case that this name was used for formations that defected to the resistance side against the Germans. In spite of the fact that the Italian Communist Party, based on Gramsci's writings, had previously expressed serious doubts about the validity of the Italian Risorgimento movement and its leaders, they came to use the name of perhaps the best known of the Risorgimento's protagonists. The communists had criticized Garibaldi for what they perceived as his pro-royalist

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sentiments, but, above all, after the famous 7th congress (1935) of the Communist International, the Italian communists were called on not to despise potential allies, whether they be social democrats (until then social-traitors) or more generically democrats, the successors of the Risorgimento Left. Therefore, the Italian communists, those closest to Tito and the resistance movement he led, no longer opposed the use of the figure of the Duce dei Mille to indicate the Italian resistance formations, and this also happened - as is well known - in the resistance movement in Italy.¹

If, however, a Garibaldi Division operated in Yugoslavia, this was not only due to the 'clearance' of the figure of Garibaldi by the Communist Party, but also because among the South Slavs the myth, the legend or, more simply, the memory of the Hero of the Two Worlds persisted. It is known that, in the 19th century, the myth of Garibaldi spread from one end of Europe, if not the globe, to the other, but it found particularly fertile soil among the South Slavs. Men from the Balkan Peninsula served in the ranks of The Thousand, and this already had significance, as Georgi Neshev points out in his book *Volontirite za Džuseppe* (Giuseppe's Volunteers),² but above all, it was the events commonly referred to in historiography as the Second Eastern Crisis that strengthened the memory of the *Red shirts* and their leader.³

It began with the uprising of the rural populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina for both economic and national reasons. According to the French consul in Sarajevo, Patin, the inhabitants of Bosnia were predominantly in favour of autonomy, while the party that wished for a union with Serbia was not the most numerous, nor were those who wanted annexation to Austria-Hungary.⁴ The national undertones soon became apparent when the governments of the two

¹ A. Pitassio, "Una questione marginale, ma non troppo. La denominazione delle formazioni militari italiane a fianco della Resistenza jugoslava." In *Caro nemico. Soldati pistoiesi e toscani nella Resistenza in Albania e in Montenegro. 1943-1945*, ed. Lia Tosi, (Pisa, Publisher ETS: 2018), 185-197.

² G. Neshev, *Volontirite za Džuseppe. Bălgari v otrjadite na Garibaldi - Giuseppe's volunteers. Bulgarians in Garibaldi's detachments* (Sofia: Izdatelstvo Otechestvo, 1988).

³ M. Priante, "Giuseppe Garibaldi: Hero in the Piedmont of the Balkans. The reception of a narrative of the Italian Risorgimento in the Serbian press." In *Italy's Balkan Strategies*, ed. Vojislav Pavlovic, (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2014). This author deals with a detailed analysis of the creation of the Garibaldi myth, primarily at the beginning of the 1860s, but does not deal with the reasons for strengthening his positions during the 1870s.

⁴ P. Gelez, "Les agents consulaires français de Sarajevo vis-à-vis de la Serbie." In *La Serbie et la France: une alliance atypique. Relations politiques, économiques et culturelles 1870-1940*, dir. Dušan Bataković, (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2010), 225. Patten states: « Beaucoup de musulmanes et la presque totalité des catholiques sont autonomistes; les Grecs orthodoxes [Serbes orthodoxes] sont partagés en trois partis: les uns rêvent d'une annexion à l'Autriche, les autres travaillent pour la réunion de la Bosnie et de la Serbie et pour

Slavic Balkan states then in existence, Serbia and Montenegro, decided to launch military interventions in aid of the insurgents, whom they considered brothers in blood and religious faith. The war of the two Principalities still under the high sovereignty of the Sultan against the troops of the Ottoman Empire took a turn for the worse for the former, and particularly for Serbia, so much so that, through the mediation of the Powers, primarily Great Britain, an agreement was sought at the Constantinople Conference. It is well known that all this ended in a deadlock after that, in a coup de théâtre, the Sultan issued a Constitutional decree, which, however, was in force for little more than a year. The Russo-Turkish conflict ensued, with all the consequences that need not be recalled here, including the suspension of the Constitution by Sultan Abdul-Hamid II.⁵

Instead, it should be noted that many volunteers came to the aid of the insurgents in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both from Russia, with the full approval of the St. Petersburg government, and from Western countries. The same cannot be said for the insurgents in Bulgaria in April 1876, to whose aid no one had come. About the Aprilskoto vŕstanie I recall the seminal book *Istorija na Aprilsko tovŕstanie 1876*, (History of the April Uprising 1876) written many years ago by Juno Mitev,⁶ which speaks only of tokens of solidarity and nothing more. Not all, but at least a good proportion of the volunteers who flocked to the Western Balkans, wore red shirts. That can help us better understand why decades later, in 1943, it did not sound strange to form a resistance formation named after Garibaldi. In 1875–76, the old man from Caprera was no longer in a position to lead an expedition, although he had done so a little earlier during the Franco-Prussian war. Nevertheless, he endeavoured to spend a small amount of his own money, name and prestige in favour of that intervention to help the insurgents, inspired by the solidarity between nationalities that had already been experienced so many times during the 19th century.⁷

la formation d'un royaume slave, les derniers, enfin, se rattachent aux catholiques et musulmans et sont partisans de l'autonomie”.

⁵ Classic literature recommendation: A. J. P. Taylor, *L'Europa delle grandi potenze. Da Metternich a Lenin* (Bari: Laterza, 1961), 323–357. And as for Russia, also a classic work: H. S. Watson, *Storia dell'Impero russo. 1801–1917* (Turin: Einaudi, 1971), 405–418. In the book G. del Zanna *La fine dell'Impero ottomano*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012), the author writes on several occasions about the impact this crisis had on the future of the Ottoman Empire.

⁶ J. Mitev, *Istorija na Aprilskoto vŕstanie, 1876*. (Sofija: Jusautor, 1988).

⁷ A. Tamborra, *Garibaldi e l'Europa. Impegno militare e prospettive politiche* (Roma: Fusa, SME, 1983), 140–150.

An overview of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian uprising can be found in old works by Milorad Ekmečić⁸ and M. Radojčić⁹, supplemented with many shorter writings of a documentary nature. Among the latter, a text by Rade Petrović, dating from 1959 and dedicated to the Insurgent Support Committee set up in Dubrovnik¹⁰, is of some interest here. Ekmečić himself edited a volume¹¹ concerning the resistance of the population to the subsequent occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austro-Hungarian troops, following the decisions passed at the Congress of Berlin. It was almost another war: in 1908, addressing Italian public opinion in particular, Jovan Dučić (later a famous writer and diplomat) spoke¹² of 10,000 soldiers of the Dual Monarchy who had fallen - also due to illness - in the occupation of what others called New Austria¹³; the American scholar Robert Donia calculated the losses at half that figure¹⁴, while Noel Malcolm downplayed the Bosnian resistance and the number of Austro-Hungarian casualties (946 dead and 3,980 wounded).¹⁵ Compared to those scholarly or general publications, Serbian or Bosnian scholars have certainly taken steps forward that we will not illustrate here.¹⁶

⁸ M. Ekmečić, *Ustanak u Bosni, 1875–1878* (Uprising in Bosnia, 1875–1878) (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1973) (reprinted in Belgrade: Službeni list FRY, 1996).

⁹ M. S. Radojčić, *Herzegovina 1875–1878* (Nevesinje: Opštinski odbor Saveza boraca NOR-a, 1961) The most classic source is G. Novak, *Italija prema stvaranju Jugoslavije* (Italy's attitude towards the creation of Yugoslavia), (Zagreb: Hrvatski štamparski zavod 1925).

¹⁰ R. Petrović, "Djelovanje dubrovačkog odbora za pomaganje hercegovačkih ustanika 1875–1878 godine" (Activities of the Dubrovnik Committee for Helping the Herzegovinian Insurgents in 1875–1878), *Godišnjak istorijskog društva Bosne i Hercegovina*, X (1959), 221–245.

¹¹ M. Ekmečić, *Otpor Austrougarskoj okupaciji 1878. Godine u Bosni i Hercegovini* (Resistance to the Austro-Hungarian occupation in 1878. Years in Bosnia and Herzegovina) (Sarajevo: Academy of Sciences and Arts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1979).

¹² J. Dučić, *L'annessione della Bosnia e dell'Erzegovina e la questione serba* (Roma: Tipografia Labicana, 1908).

¹³ G. Marcotti, *La nuova Austria, impressioni di G.M.* (Firenze: G. Barbèra, 1885).

¹⁴ R. Donia, "The battle for Bosnia: Habsburg military strategy in 1878". In *Otpor Austrougarskoj okupaciji*, cited p. 120, where he states that Vienna had to bring an occupation contingent of 72,000 to 268,000 people, more than a third of the entire imperial army.

¹⁵ N. Malcolm, *Storia della Bosnia dalle origini ai giorni nostri* (Milan: Bompiani, 2000), 191; *Bosnia, a short history* (London: Basingstoke, Papermac), 1996.

¹⁶ According to the opinion of S. K. Pavlowitch, *Serbia, la storia al di là del nome* (Trieste: Beit, 2010), 107, during the resistance against the Austro-Hungarian occupation, "Serbian leaders and instigators fought together with Muslim militants" and not only in Bosnia, but also in Herzegovina. However, "Serbia avoided getting involved in any way because it did not want a direct conflict with Austria-Hungary".

With regard to the Italian volunteers, the greatest contribution is just as old and remains that of Marcella De Ambrosis, which appeared in a Mantua publication.¹⁷ Angelo Tamborra and other scholars¹⁸ revisited the subject several times over the years. A history of Montenegro that has appeared in Italy, thanks to Antun Sbutega, does not mention those volunteers, although it carefully retraces the various phases of the uprising in Herzegovina and the Turkish-Montenegrin war (in two stages, 1876 and 1877)¹⁹; yet the greatest influx of foreign fighters was precisely in Herzegovina, perhaps a more accessible area than Bosnia.

Ultimately, we have a sufficiently clear picture of that movement of solidarity between nations fighting against a power considered foreign, but not by all peoples. This was the prevailing ideological axis (nationalities versus empires) of the time. Of course, the question remains as to what the participation of the Muslim peasant community was in those events, but it has been said above that, for some of them, the preferred route was not secessionist but autonomist. I mention this because, of course, the volunteers could have asked themselves whether they were doing so in aid of a national group without any qualms, or whether they were working against another community. A few decades later, there were volunteers in red shirts (in 1912 above all, but also more tenuously in 1897) who questioned whether it was appropriate and fair to fight for one nationality if one ended up fighting not only against an expansionist Empire but also against another nationality.²⁰ As far as historiography has revealed, doubts about the just cause for which one was going to fight do not seem to have arisen

¹⁷ M. Deambrosis, "La partecipazione dei garibaldini e degli internazionalisti italiani alla insurrezione di Bosnia ed Erzegovina del 1875–76 e alla guerra di Serbia". In *Studi garibaldini e altri saggi*, a cura di Renato Giusti, (Vicenza: Museo del Risorgimento, 1967), 33–82; Eadem, "Garibaldini e militari italiani nelle guerre ed insurrezioni balcaniche: (1875–1877)". In *Giuseppe Garibaldi e le origini del movimento operaio italiano (1860–82)*, a cura di Renato Giusti, (Mantova: Tip. Grassi, 1984), 29–51.

¹⁸ J. Pirjevec, "Italijanska Levica in vstaja v Bosni i Hercegovini 1875–76. In 100-godišnjice ustanaka u Bosni i Hercegovini, drugim balkanskim zemljama i istočnoj krizi 1875–1878 godine (Hundredth anniversary of the uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina, other Balkan countries and the Eastern crisis of 1875–1878) ed. Rade Petrović, I, (Sarajevo: Academy of Sciences and Arts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1977); E. R. Terzuolo, "The Garibaldini in the Balkans, 1875–1876", *The International History Review*, IV 1 (1982), 113–126; A. Pitassio, "L'Estrema Sinistra e il movimento garibaldino di fronte alla crisi d'Oriente del 1875–1878", *Europa Orientalis*, II (1983), 107–121; A. Tamborra, *Garibaldi e l'Europa, impegno militare e prospettive politiche*, 136–147.

¹⁹ A. Sbutega, *Storia del Montenegro dalle origini ai giorni nostri* (Rubbettino: Soveria Mannelli, 2006), 290–294.

²⁰ F. Guida, "Ettore Ferrari e il volontarismo garibaldino nel Sud-est europeo". In *Ettore Ferrari's Liberal Democratic Project*, ed. A.M. Isastia, (Milan: Franco Angeli 1997), 61–72; Idem,

on a massive scale. However, if episodes such as that of 1912 did not occur, it is known that, in the anarchist camp, Errico Malatesta opted to personally come to the insurgents' aid, against Bakunin's judgment. The latter believed that going to fight in the Balkans was like 'those good people in England who made socks for the faraway Negroes and forgot the poor of their country'. Malatesta, however, believed that 'wherever Carthage is fought, Rome is defended'.²¹ For his part, an old Garibaldian from Iași, Teodor Dunca, who in 1866 had fought in Trentino and had claimed to have 1,500 men ready to fight against Austria in Bukovina and Transylvania, but in 1876 only spoke of 'a handful' of his followers, asked Garibaldi for advice on how to proceed, stating 'we never want to make a mistake in choosing the flag to follow'.²² Perhaps there real difference was between those who looked mainly to Montenegro as opposed to those that looked to Belgrade, and those who followed the local leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There was no full awareness of marked ethnic and national diversity.

The influx of volunteers had taken place quite early. As is known, the insurrection had begun in Herzegovina near Nevesinje on 9 July 1875 and soon the insurgents reached a considerable size: 25,000–30,000 men, roughly equal to the forces that the Sublime Porte could deploy. In Herzegovina, a real war was waged from the very beginning, to which the Montenegrin troops under the command of Petar Vuković, father-in-law of Prince Nikola Petrović-Njegoš, and General Peko Pavlović made a large contribution. That same summer, the first Garibaldini (Count Carlo Faella, Captain Firmino Nerini and Federico Violante) and volunteers from other countries arrived through Dalmatia. Only in part did the Austro-Hungarian police succeed in preventing this transit. In the end, there were 390 Redshirts, 284 French and a few dozen from other countries. The number of French volunteers was striking in a country where « la France n'a pratiquement aucun intérêt commercial à défendre à Sarajevo » and where « de 1853 à 1878, il n'y a eu pour ainsi dire qu'un seul citoyen français en Bosnie, d'origine algérienne ». ²³

Garibaldi's leading representatives made contact with the *voivode* Miho Ljubibratić; the most notable among them were Count Vivaldi Pasqua, Garibaldi's representative, and Ljubibratić's aide-de-camp, Celso Ceretti, who operated at the mouth of the Neretva with one of his regiments. Prince Petrović Njegoš

"L'ultima spedizione garibaldina in Grecia (1912)". In *National Unity and Independence in Italy and Greece* (Firenze: Olschki 1987), 191–220.

²¹ A. Tamborra, *Garibaldi e l'Europa, impegno militare e prospettive politiche*, 139.

²² Idem, 148.

²³ P. Gelez, "Les agents consulaires français de Sarajevo vis-à-vis de la Serbie". In *La Serbie et la France, une alliance atypique. Relations politiques, économiques et culturelles 1870–1940*, ed. Dušan T. Baraković, (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2010), 218.

asked if Garibaldi's sons would personally come to Montenegro if he officially declared war. For the prince, having the Garibaldis at his side meant assuming a privileged position even in the face of Serbia. In fact, even when, in July 1876, the insurrection turned into open war against Turkey on the part of Montenegro and Serbia, there were still western volunteers in the field, to which were added the (very numerous) Russian volunteers led by General Mikhail Grigoryevich Chernyaev, to whom the Serbian government entrusted the command of its army. The publicist and jurist Giuseppe Barbanti Brodano, from Modena but serving as a provincial councillor in Bologna, who participated in the Serbo-Turkish war in 1876, left a diary entitled *In Serbia. Ricordi e studi slavi*.²⁴

That enthusiastic rush of volunteers naturally had more political and symbolic than military significance. It was, however, part of a twofold context. On the one hand, there was the initiative of the two Principalities, Serbia and Montenegro, which had certainly supported and even incited the uprising from the beginning, and then went to war against the sovereign rule of the Ottomans. The other factor was the diplomatic action of the Great Powers, primarily Russia and Austria-Hungary. It is well known that, while in Constantinople three sultans (Abdülaziz I, Murad V, and finally Abdul-Hamid II, destined to remain on the throne until 1909) replaced each other in quick succession over a few bloody and tumultuous months²⁵, international diplomacy dictated the pace of the ongoing crisis. Indeed, the Serbian troops were overpowered by the Turks at the Battle of Krevet, and thus the idea that the Balkan peoples could free themselves from Ottoman rule was not realised, despite the successes of the Montenegrins. The Serbian-Turkish conflict was temporarily put to rest due to an intervention of the Great Powers, but the disagreements over the future of the Balkan peoples remained and were not resolved at the Constantinople Conference in December 1876. The international tensions led to an open conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, the consequences of which are well known. In this second phase of the Eastern crisis, the volunteers no longer had a role, except for the Bulgarian volunteers organised by the Russian General Staff (the city of Samara donated a flag to them). The core of the Bulgarian Legion consisted of Bulgarians who had fought as volunteers alongside the Serbs in 1876 in the regiment led by Russian General Chernyaev. In this respect, some westerners (Canini, Cazzavillan) were not supported by the Romanian govern-

²⁴ G. Barbanti Brodano, *In Serbia. Ricordi e studi slavi* (Bologna: Società editrice delle Pagine sparse, 1877). The second edition bears a different title: *Sulla Drina. Ricordi e studi slavi*, (Milano: Bignami, 1878). There is an edition in the Serbian language: *Гарибалдинци на Дрини 1876*, превод Миодраг Ристић. Београд: Српска књижевна задруга, 1958.

²⁵ S. J. Shaw, E. Kural, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. II, Reform, Revolution, and Republic: the Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 164–175. This monograph is highly debatable.

ment, which had remained prudently on the sidelines until then, only to become involved in the Russian-led war.²⁶

While the situation across the Adriatic continued to be heated, an event of considerable political and historical importance took place in Italy in March 1876: the coming to power of the first left-wing government, headed by Agostino Depretis. Perhaps this news served to encourage initiatives in favour of the southern Slavic populations in revolt. In that year, the political propaganda activities of the League for the Liberation and Fraternisation of the Slavic-Hellenic Peninsula, set up at that time by the Venetian Marco Antonio Canini, a good connoisseur of the Balkans, stood out. Nikša Stipčević wrote about him in the 1970s in a number of essays that were later included in the volume *Dva preporoda* (*Two revivals*).²⁷ As far as I have been able to ascertain, Canini was not able to actually send a formation of volunteers to Bosnia or Herzegovina, but only a few individual volunteers, and yet his propaganda activities had a discrete echo.²⁸ Support for the insurgents had hitherto been of a very varied nature as it was provided by people who sometimes differed in their political views: Garibaldians, Mazzinians, anarchists and other democrats. Canini wanted to add something to that generous but generic impetus: a political project and interlocution with those in charge in both Rome and Belgrade. The political project was a variation of an earlier and already known one. It was a matter of applying the principle of the collaboration of peoples within the framework of a future confederal polity. Here we must remember that even a champion of the national idea such as Mazzini, faced with the composite ethno-national reality of the Danube valley, admitted an exception to the formula of the unitary national state, imagining and proposing a different model, the confederation, which would allow, at the same time, respect for individual national identities, but also the formation of a state of respectable size and strength, removing the burning problem of the dispute between different nations over the same territory.²⁹

²⁶ F. Guida, *La Bulgaria dalla Guerra di liberazione alla pace di Neuilly. Testimonianze italiane* (Roma: Bulzoni, 1984), 16–17.

²⁷ N. Stipčević, *Dva preporoda. Studije o italijansko-srpskim kulturnim i političkim sezama u XIX veku* (*Two revivals. Studies on Italian-Serbian cultural and political relations in the 19th century*) (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1979).

²⁸ F. Guida, *L'Italia e il Risorgimento balcanico. Marco Antonio Canini* (Roma: Edizioni dell'Ateneo, 1984), 284–290.

²⁹ Idem, "Idea di nazione e questione delle nazionalità nel pensiero di Giuseppe Mazzini", in *Cuadernos de historia contemporánea* (Madrid, 2001), 28, 161–175; Idem, "Mazzini e il problema delle nazionalità con particolare riguardo all'Europa orientale". In *Le lotte secolari di italiani e bulgari per la creazione di uno Stato indipendente*, ed. Nikolai Mandazhiev, (Sofia: Gutenberg 2006), 299–321; Idem, "Giuseppe Mazzini e l'Europa orientale". In *Il mazziniana-*

Canini, while claiming never to have been a Mazzinian³⁰, was of a similar opinion and already in the early 1860s had become an advocate of the confederation project endorsed by Kossuth (although not particularly enthusiastically) and Klapka, as well as a number of eminent Italian figures. At that time, assuming the collapse of the Austrian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, it was a matter of including Hungary, Croatia and the Romanian lands in the project. After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, in 1875–76, however, only the Western Balkans were mentioned, primarily Serbia with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Greece. Canini also tried a new approach with Kossuth, who lived in Italy, but it was completely in vain and almost unpleasant³¹, and a more cordial conversation initiated with a Hungarian deputy in the Pest Diet, Babes, elected in Timișoara³², was not followed up. Hence an association or league that looked towards the Slavic-Hellenic area whose president was – it's hard to imagine another name – Giuseppe Garibaldi was established on 8 August 1876. Among the founders were Garibaldi's doctor Timoteo Riboli, two deputies (Giuseppe Bargnani and Achille Maiocchi), some military personnel (Colonel Carlo Mariani, Major Libero Chiesa, Captain Alcibiade Moretti) and finally Giambattista Prandino. News of the formation of the League was delivered by an important Milanese newspaper, *Il Secolo*, and by the Zadar-based *Narodni List* (founded in 1862 and still in print today).³³

The League hoped and pledged to end Ottoman rule in the Balkans and create a Slavic-Hellenic confederation. In it, the individual state entities (which were not clearly defined) would enjoy extensive autonomy. As in all confederation projects, the main problem to be solved was to guarantee the equal dignity of the members of the confederation, especially since they were already consti-

nesimo nel mondo, IV (2011), (Pisa: Istituto Domus mazziniana (supplemento al Bollettino della Domus mazziniana di Pisa), 2012), 121–145.

³⁰ Idem, "Marco Antonio Canini e la Grecia: un mazziniano suo malgrado", *Balkan Studies*, XX I (1979), 343–392.

³¹ In a letter sent to Jovan Ristic on September 26th 1876, Canini described it as follows: "Il y a une semaine je me rendis exprès chez Kossuth dans les environs de Turin; je lui apportais une lettre signée par tous les membres du Comité [...] nous le prions de rompre son silence et dire un mot au meeting ou autrement en faveur de la fraternisation des Madjars et des Serbes...jamais, jamais répondit-il. [...] Je finis par me lever en lui disant: Monsieur, je vois qu'on peut dire des Madjars, du moins de ceux de 1848, ce que l'on a dit des émigrés Français, qu'ils n'ont rien oublié et rien appris". N. Stipčević, "Marko Antonio Kanini i Srbija" (Marco Antonio Kanini and Serbia), *Jugoslavenski istorijski časopis* 3–4, (1976), 149–150.

³² See Canini's correspondence in the Neapolitan daily *Il Pungolo* dated September 29th 1877, but also one of his letters addressed to Angelo De Gubernatis, dated April 21st 1877, from Milan (Biblioteca nazionale centrale, Raccolta De Gubernatis, 22, 52).

³³ F. Guida, *L'Italia e il Risorgimento balcanico. Marco Antonio Canini*, 285.

tuted states and it mattered little that, according to international law, the sultan still exercised his high sovereignty (*suzeraineté*) over some of them. On 3 September, Canini led a crowded rally in Milan. Two weeks later, on 17 September 1876, a meeting was held in Turin chaired by Senator Giovanni Siotto Pintor. Canini took the floor, and, in the southern Slavic world, attributed to Serbia and Montenegro the role that Piedmont and Lombardy had played in Italy. At the same time, the Standing Committee for the Relief of the Slavic Cause, in which Garibaldi and an important politician, Benedetto Cairoli, were active, met in Rome.³⁴

Canini's relations at the time were mainly with Matija Ban, a prominent intellectual but also a collaborator of Jovan Ristić, then Minister of Foreign Affairs and leader of the Liberal Party. It was, indeed, a political collaboration or conversation, but it also concerned the literary and editorial field. Canini sent some of his writings to Ban and tried to have the play *The Fall of Novgorod* that the Dubrovnik writer had written performed in two important theatres in Milan, with the help of the man of letters Cleto Arrighi (real name Carlo Righetti).³⁵

The ambitious projects of Canini and the League soon proved impossible to realise. On the one hand, it was difficult to raise funds for the insurgents, especially among the wealthier classes. On the other, Depretis gave only general consent to a document supporting the struggle of Serbia and the peoples of the East, which was delivered to him by Canini, Siotto Pintor, Luigi D'Ancona, Count Tommaso Dell'Isola, and the member of the Parliament Leopoldo Colombini. Depretis' moderate sympathy, however, clashed with the cautious approach of Foreign Minister Luigi Amedeo Melegari, a former Mazzinian. The

³⁴ Ibidem. Of course, the Italian police and the government from Rome closely monitored such initiatives. Among the many dispatches that talk about it, those preserved in the Historical-Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are most important. These outbound dispatches contain information on the relations between the Slavic Committee in Rome chaired by Professor Placidi and various agitators in the Ottoman provinces, such as Mateo Orzionovich, aka Mateowitch, who was suspected of having sold the same information to the Ottoman authorities. Registro Copialettere II, Greece, no. 14/13, April 19th 1877; 15, MAE to Cestara, consul in Corfu, April 29th 1877; 16, MAE to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, April 29th; 18, MAE to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Italian administration followed the tracks of various internationalists who were known to reside in several cities abroad, primarily Italians who were ready to go as volunteers to Serbia and Greece.

³⁵ N. Stipčević, *Marko Antonio Kanini i Srbija, 152–159* (with the contents of Ban's and Canini's letters). Seven years earlier, in 1869, the National Theater was opened in Belgrade, as proof of the progress of Serbian society in the theater field as well. This theater was opened after the Carina theater (1842) and the theater in the Hotel Jelen (1847). Source: K. Mitrović, "Europeizzazione e identità: cultura visiva e vita quotidiana a Belgrado nel XIX secolo". In *Citta dei Balcani, città d'Europa. Studi sullo sviluppo urbano delle capitali post-ottomane 1830–1923*, a cura di Marco Dogo e Armando Pitassio, (Lecce: Argo, 2008), 97.

Italian government did not want to get involved in the incipient crisis. In vain, Canini speculated that a large Italian contingent, together with Romanian and possibly Spanish troops, would be in charge of pushing the Ottoman army to the south of the Balkans when it was decided to grant autonomy to Bosnia, Herzegovina and possibly Bulgaria. If in Dalmatia one of his envoys was badly received as he was suspected of wanting to support the pro-Italian autonomist party against the Croatian (and Serbian) national party, in Italy the objection were voiced that Russian support for Serbia was dangerous and self-interested, so some protested: "Shall we help Russia make new conquests?"³⁶

In contrast, a well-known intellectual of the time, Angelo De Gubernatis (married to Bakunin's cousin Sophia Bezobrazova) who was about to go to Russia for a conference of orientologists, did not go out of his way to set up a committee of the League in Florence and popularise it in Russian circles, but its programme was nonetheless taken up in a couple of newspapers in St. Petersburg and Odessa.³⁷ Finally, Canini went to Serbia more or less during the Constantinople Conference, i.e. towards the end of 1876, when the armistice had been in place for months. He later wrote that he had worked to put together a new corps of volunteers of various nationalities and that he had spoken on the banks of the Sava to a group of young people from Livorno, alongside Serbs and Croats. The latter, hearing a translation of his speech, applauded, shouting 'živio Talija'.³⁸ Basically, Ristić dropped any real collaboration with that ephemeral Italian organisation.

While he might not have proposed an equally ambitious political project, Ljudevit or Ludovico Vuličević, editor of the Trieste-based newspaper *Il Cittadino*, who also worked for other newspapers, supported the insurgents' cause, too. As Petrović reported to Tamborra in his letter from Sarajevo, dated 28 July 1979³⁹, Vuličević in Trieste had a role in the recruitment and organizing of volunteers to be sent to Herzegovina through the Ragusa / Dubrovnik Committee headed by the lawyer Pero Čingrija, destined for an important political future. This was the Dubrovnik Committee for Aid to Insurgents in Herzegovina (Dubrovački odbor za pomoć hercegovačkim ustanicima).⁴⁰ In 1875, however, Vuličević was also taken by the specific events in Dalmatia: that year

³⁶ N. Stipčević, *Marko Antonio Kanini i Srbija*, 156.

³⁷ Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze, Raccolta De Gubernatis, 22, 52, Canini a De Gubernatis, 25 luglio e 3 agosto 1876.

³⁸ *Il Pungolo*, May 4th 1877.

³⁹ The letter is in the possession of the author.

⁴⁰ R. Petrović, "Djelovanje dubrovačkog odbora za pomaganje hercegovačkih ustanika. 1875–876 godine", cit., 236–237; A. Tamborra, *Ljudevit Vuličević tra Slavia e Italia* (Roma: Institute for the Study of the Italian Risorgimento, 1986), 59–63.

he published the volume *Partiti e lotte in Dalmazia*⁴¹, as Luciano Monzali⁴² also recalled a few years ago. As Tamborra illustrates in his biography of Vuličević, a tormented figure torn between religion and social-political commitment, the Trieste Committee split amidst considerable controversy. While the latter was all in favour of Ljubibratić, Eugenio Popovich from Trieste, of Montenegrin origin, supported instead the aspirations of Prince Nikola Petrović Njegoš. The president of that committee, Velimir Lombardić, struggled somewhat to hold the two factions together. As a result, Vuličević took a strong Serbophile stance, for some time distancing himself from the Croatian world with which he had closer ties. He described the events in the Balkan peninsula as a 'Yugoslav war'. This was soon followed by his conversion to the Waldensian Church.⁴³

Among those who took advantage of the organisational help of the Trieste centre were some men close to Garibaldi such as Luciano Montalti, Giuseppe Gomberti and Federico Volante. The centre, moreover, had relations with another hub created in Venice around Roberto Galli, editor of *Il Tempo*, a man who in the following decades was still known for his interest in Balkan affairs and in particular those of Greece, so much so that today there is a street named after him not far from the Acropolis and next to the one dedicated to Garibaldi. It was precisely by *Il Tempo* that Agostino Zanusso, who also wrote for the well-known Milanese newspaper *Il secolo*, was sent to Herzegovina as a reporter. It should be remembered that *Il Corriere della sera*, which eventually replaced *Il secolo* as the leading paper, was founded in Milan in 1876. With Zanusso was another war correspondent, Oreste Corsi, editor of *La Nuova Torino*. The latter sent a series of reports between August and October 1875 that perhaps deserve to be studied in more depth. Both of these journalists, as well as those who had encouraged or helped them to travel across the Adriatic, from a personal point of view, were strongly involved in the on-going struggle.⁴⁴

These are some particular examples of the presence of Italians or persons active in Italian circles among those who tried to intervene in the events that determined the fate of the southern Slavic peoples in the mid-1870s. Those initiatives did not lead to concrete results and lagged far behind the actions of the governments. It was the latter that caused Bosnia-Herzegovina to ultimately be entrusted to the administration of Austria-Hungary, while Serbia and Montenegro continued on their historical trajectory, now as independent states, vacillating between close relations with Vienna, at least for a few years, and Pan-

⁴¹ L. Vuličević, *Partiti e lotte in Dalmazia* (Trieste: Tergesteo, 1875).

⁴² L. Monzali, *Italiani di Dalmazia. Dal Risorgimento alla Grande guerra* (Firenze: Le Lettere, 2004), 55.

⁴³ A. Tamborra, *Ljudevit Vuličević tra Slavia e Italia*, 60–76.

⁴⁴ Idem, 62–63.

Slavic and Russophile sympathies. Italy, whose rulers did not always look sympathetically on projects like Canini's or volunteer expeditions, did not gain much from this. However, the extensive agitation described here retained a symbolic significance that was not entirely negligible in the expectation that the policies of individuals and associations would dovetail with those of governments.

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The Opening of the Italian Legation in Belgrade in 1879 and Relations between Serbs and Italians in the 19th Century

Abstract: This essay focuses on the opening of the Italian diplomatic Legation in Belgrade in 1879 after the Serbia's independence. This new beginning of the Serbian-Italian political relations is seen in the framework of the reorientation of the Italian foreign policy after the fall of the French Second Empire and the rise of the Imperial Germany. A great role in this process was played by Count Giuseppe Tornielli Brusati di Vergano, former Secretary General of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Italian Kingdom. He was entrusted to open the Italian Legation in Belgrade and in Bucharest, thus inaugurating a new phase of the Italian action in South-eastern Europe and the Eastern affairs. This question is analyzed in a broader chronological space such as the long tradition of cultural and political exchanges between Serbs and Italians during the epoch of the national Risorgimento.

Keywords: Italy, Serbia, diplomatic relations, Risorgimento

On 26 September 1879, Count Giuseppe Tornielli Brusati di Vergano (1836–1908) arrived in Belgrade as extraordinary envoy and plenipotentiary minister.¹ The Legation of Italy was opened, and thus the newly independent Principality of Serbia and the Kingdom of Italy, which had been ruled for a few years by the historical Left, established stable diplomatic relations. As is well known, however, the political relations between Italians and Serbs were much older and dated back at least thirty years, to the time of the revolutions of 1848. Therefore, this paper is divided into two thematic parts. The first traces, in broad strokes, the highlights of those relations through most of the 19th century, up to the moment when Serbia gained independence in 1878, following the decisions of the Congress of Berlin. The second deals with the events that led to the opening of the Italian Legation, seen as a moment of reworking of Rome's policy towards Belgrade and framed in the perspective of the above mentioned long

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¹ Historical and diplomatic archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter ASDMAE), Rome, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Italy (hereinafter MAERI), b.1411: Tornielli to Cairoli, Belgrade, September 26th 1879.

tradition of political relations and constituting the ground on which the Italian government set the policy of the newly unified Italy towards the small Serbian state.

1. Serbs and Italians in the Risorgimento

The reconstruction of Serbian-Italian relations during the Risorgimento has been fruitfully carried out throughout the 20th century and has often been inevitably affected by the different phases that marked the relations between Italy and Yugoslavia and, more recently, by the events that took place on the other shore of the Adriatic in the 1990s.² During the 19th century, the relations between Serbs and Italians became relevant due, firstly, to the common aspiration to form their respective nation-states that were to give political recognition to an already culturally formed nation. The outcomes of those historical paths were rather dissimilar due to the different political and economic conditions in which the two peoples found themselves, but also due to their different historical and cultural traditions. Yet, starting from the revolutions of 1848, thanks to the initiative of the ruling class of the Kingdom of Sardinia, relations between the Serbs and the Italians became concrete and, in the period between 1849 and 1878, the Principality and the Serbian communities of the Habsburg Monarchy were seen by the Italian political elites (both moderate and democratic) as the nexus of the Eastern Question and the place where there was the highest chance of a change in the international balance of powers.

Before 1849, direct relations between the Serbs and Italian society were sporadic. One may mention here the Piedmontese doctor Bartolomeo Silvestro Cuniberti, personal doctor and associate of Prince Miloš Obrenović, who published a work on Serbian affairs in the first half of the 19th century.³ Moreover, in the work of great patriots and intellectuals, such as Giuseppe Mazzini and Niccolò Tommaseo (just to mention two of the most relevant), interest in the Slavic world and, consequently, in the Serbs and Serbia existed even in the years preceding the Revolutions of 1848.⁴ An attentive observer of the international

² A. D'Alessandri, "Afterword" In S. K. Pavlowitch, *Serbia. La storia al di là del nome*, (Trieste: Beit, 2010), 321–332; A. D'Alessandri, "La dissoluzione della Jugoslavia e i Balcani visti dall'Italia". In *Dopo la pioggia. Gli Stati della ex Jugoslavia e l'Albania (1991–2011)*, ed. Antonio D'Alessandri and Armando Pitassio, (Lecce: Argo, 2011), 17–33.

³ B.-S. Cunibert, *Essai historique sur les revolutions et l'indépendance de la Serbie depuis 1804 jusqu'à 1850* (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1855).

⁴ J. Pirjevec, "Mazzini e gli slavi dell'Austria e della Turchia" In *Mazzini e il mazzinianesimo* (Atti del XIV Congresso di storia del Risorgimento italiano (Roma: Istituto per la storia del Risorgimento italiano, 1974), 301–412; by the same author, *Niccolò Tommaseo tra Italia e Slavia* (Venezia: Marsilio, 1977); N. Stipčević, *Dva preporoda. Studije o italijansko-srpskim*

reality of his time, such as the Piedmontese historian and politician Cesare Balbo, could draw attention to certain internal political events in the Serbian Principality, which took place between 1842 and 1843, and which led to the change of the ruling princely family (from the Obrenović to the Karađorđević dynasty).⁵ In the two-year revolutionary period of 1848–1849, the first direct relations of the Savoy Piedmont with the political world of the Serbian Principality were established. The interconnection between Italian affairs and the Eastern question was then clearly identified. The first official Italian diplomatic mission to Belgrade was dispatched in 1849. It was entrusted to Consul Marcello Cerruti, an envoy of the government of the Kingdom of Sardinia, headed by Vincenzo Gioberti. At the beginning of that year, in fact, as the war effort against Austria was being reorganised, the Autonomous Principality of Serbia was attributed a strategic function and a key role in the framework of both the ongoing struggle in Hungary against the Habsburgs and as the link that connected it with the Italian question. The Sardinian consul's mission was part of the Italo-Hungarian political arrangements aimed at cooperation between Turin and Pest in the struggle against Austria, their common enemy.⁶ When the Sardinian consulate in Belgrade closed towards the end of 1849, due to the failure of the Piedmontese initiatives in the war that took place in March of that year, the diplomat who, albeit indirectly, continued to follow Serbian political life was Baron Romualdo Tecco, Minister Resident of the King of Sardinia in Constantinople.⁷ A firm believer in the intimate dependency between the Eastern Question and the Italian question, he continued in the following years to contribute, from his post in Constantinople, to the elaboration of an eastern policy of the Savoy kingdom, laying the ground for the policy pursued shortly afterwards by Cavour.

The post-1849 relations between Serbs and Italians can be divided into two phases: firstly, those linked to the unification of the Peninsula, which lasted from the 1850s until 1861 and, secondly, those of the 1860s, which saw the Ital-

kulturnim i političkim vezama u XIX veku (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1979), 13–61; more recently: A. D'Alessandri, "L'eupeismo mazziniano tra teoria e realtà: il caso degli slavi del Sud". In *Dalla Giovine Europa alla Grande Europa*, ed. Francesco Guida (Roma: Carocci, 2007), 129–146.

⁵ A. D'Alessandri, "Cesare Balbo e la Serbia", *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento*, CIV II (2017), 7–24.

⁶ P. Fornaro, *Risorgimento italiano e questione ungherese (1848–1867). Marcello Cerruti e le intese politiche italo-magiare* (Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 1995); G. Quazza, "La politica orientale e balcanica del Regno sardo nel 1848–49", *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento*, XXXV II–IV (1948), 151–167.

⁷ G. Quazza, "La politica orientale sarda nei dispacci del Tecco (1850–1856)", *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento*, XLVIII IV (1961), 663–680.

ians grappling with the Venetian question and the Serbs in the Principality attempting to lead a movement to liberate South-eastern Europe from Ottoman domination. Sardinian consular personnel were therefore constantly present in Belgrade; suffice it to mention here the names of Francesco Fortunato Astengo and Stefano Scovasso, the last representative of Savoy Piedmont, who succeeded Eugenio Durio in February 1861, and the first consul of the new Kingdom of Italy (until the end of 1867).⁸

Regarding the first phase, let us recall that the Kingdom of Sardinia, following the Treaty of Paris of 1856, became one of the six protector states of the Ottoman Empire's Christian populations and states. However, Cavour's initiative for an active policy on the Danube began shortly afterwards, at the end of 1858 when, after the Plombières Agreement, a war with Austria was again being prepared. The idea was then to reorganise an insurrection against the Danubian monarchy among the various nationalities subject to it, such as Serbs, Croats, Romanians and Hungarians. In fact, an attempt was made to readapt the strategy of 1849 to the new situation and the changed international context, while at the same time attempting to coordinate the official diplomatic actions with the covert and parallel action of grassroots initiatives, which could be traced back to the democratic and revolutionary line-up of European national movements. In this context, the Principality of Serbia once again took on fundamental strategic importance in the eyes of the subalpine ruling class. It was thus decided to reopen a consulate in Belgrade in March 1859, a task entrusted to the aforementioned Astengo.

During the two-year period of Italian national unification (1858–60), however, despite the absence of concrete moments of collaboration between Serbs and Italians, Count Cavour pursued a policy towards the Ottoman Empire and its vassal governments informed by the conviction, already present in the intuitions of the Polish prince Adam Czartoryski and others, that the regeneration of Europe and the solution of national problems would be possible through a broad rethinking of the international political framework, then strongly influenced by the Eastern Question.⁹

⁸ Lj. Banjanin, "Francesco Fortunato Astengo, console del Regno sardo a Belgrado", *Studi piemontesi*, XXVIII 1 (1999), 181–198; about S. Scovasso (1816–1887) si veda *La formazione della diplomazia nazionale (1861–1915)*, *Repertorio bio-bibliografico dei funzionari del Ministero degli Affari esteri* (Roma: Istituto poligrafico e zecca dello Stato, 1987), 668–669.

⁹ A. Tamborra, *Cavour e i Balcani* (Turin: Ilte, 1958). About Czartoryski, whose character has been studied in detail by various historians, we could cite two older works: M. Handelsman, *Czartoryski, Nicholas 1er et la question du Proche Orient* (Paris: A. Pedone, 1934) and by E. Di Nolfo, *Adam Jerzy Czartoryski e il Congresso di Parigi* (Padua: Marsilio, 1964).

The authorities in Belgrade, however, were not fully prepared to commit themselves directly to an eventual conflict against the Habsburg “giant”. Just as in 1848–49 a cautious approach had been maintained (the influx of Serbian volunteers across the Danube had been favoured, but there had been no direct intervention by the Principality), so in the face of the war events involving France, the Kingdom of Sardinia and Austria in 1859, Belgrade remained on the sidelines. Significant in this regard is a remark by Ilija Garašanin, who was not in political office at the time. In April of that year, he wrote a memorandum entitled *Nekoliko reči o ratu u Italiji* (A few remarks on the war in Italy) in which he saw the Italian unification process as a model to be followed rather than an ally with whom to conduct a common struggle. He was aware of the profound differences between Italy and Serbia on the one hand and between Italy and the Danubian (Austria) and Balkan (Turkey) worlds on the other. This made a concrete alliance hardly feasible. Instead, it was possible to skilfully insert oneself into the diplomatic game of the Powers, as the Kingdom of Sardinia was trying to do at the time, in order to realise its objectives.¹⁰

Having reached the goal of national unification, the newly-born Italy, towards the end of 1861, reduced its activism in the Danubian-Balkan area and, consequently, in Serbia. The Savoyard Piedmont was replaced by the new unified Kingdom, i.e. a state with major internal adjustment problems and considerable international responsibilities. Grappling with the problems related to the recent proclamation of unity and, above all, fighting for its own international recognition, Italy, led by Baron Bettino Ricasoli, settled in those months on conciliatory positions essentially aimed at keeping the Balkan region quiet. In particular, it was vital for the Italian government, at least at that delicate moment, to obtain an agreement between the Christian populations and the Ottomans. The instructions sent to Constantinople to Marcello Cerruti (then the regent of the Constantinople Legation) had the same tone: “a policy of conciliation seems to us to be in the present conditions the healthiest and most useful for both sides”.¹¹ In this way, Ricasoli hoped, no disagreements would arise with the Sublime Porte and the other Powers, nor would Italy lose the sympathy of the Christian populations of the East.

About a year after the Unification, in June 1862, a crisis broke out between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire, following the Turkish shelling of Belgrade. This was the first important international test of the Kingdom of Italy, in which the representatives of Victor Emmanuel II's government, found them-

¹⁰ D. Mackenzie, *Ilija Garašanin: Balkan Bismarck* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1985), 224–226.

¹¹ Ricasoli to Cerruti, Turin, 12th December 1861. In *I documenti diplomatici italiani* (hereinafter DDI), series I, vol. I, 525–526.

selves defending, before the plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers of Europe, the legitimacy of the recently completed unification process and Victor Emmanuel II's new title of King of Italy, and no longer of Sardinia.¹² However, the era of the struggles of the Risorgimento was drawing to a close and it was precisely in that phase that the new eastern and Balkan policy of the Kingdom of Italy began to take shape, amidst many contradictions. In this new policy, there was no longer any place, at least from the point of view of the governments in office, for revolutionary solutions to problems (both internally and externally).

In essence, the dilemma of Italian-Serbian political relations immediately after unification was as follows: to count on the potential of the government in Belgrade, and possibly also of the national movements in South-eastern Europe, for the completion of Italian unification or to initiate its own autonomous power policy to achieve this goal? This contradiction was present throughout the 1860s and up to the Capture of Rome in 1870, although on several occasions (for instance, the alliance with Prussia in 1866) the latter option seemed more preferable, although without losing sight of the former. Perhaps it was also this hesitation that was the reason for the dubious results achieved in foreign policy by the Kingdom of Italy in the 1860s. After the annexation of Veneto, a new chapter opened. The Italian foreign policy after 1866 increasingly evolved into the policy of a Great Power, which was entering by right into the vast game in which the Eastern interests of the major European states had been pitted against each other for more than half a century. The words used by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Di Campello, in July 1867, effectively summed up the policy of the Kingdom of Italy at the end of the 1860s with regard to eastern affairs and, therefore, Serbia as well: "[...] any upheaval that could take eastern affairs off the peaceful track cannot be favourable to the real interests of Italy, which for many reasons is being led at this time to concentrate all efforts on the reorganisation of its internal affairs."¹³

In short, for an open competition with the Great Powers, Italy had to wait until it too became a true Great Power: an autonomous action of the new unitary state in the eastern concert, moreover, would not have been conceivable as long as, due to its position in the international framework, determined by its still incomplete unification, Italy was forced to maintain a waiting position which, especially after the fall of the Second French Empire, meant isolation.

¹² A. D'Alessandri, "The Muslim Question in Serbia: the 1862 Bombardment of Belgrade and the Newborn Kingdom of Italy". In *Italy's Balkan Strategies (19th-20th century)*, ed. V. G. Pavlović, (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2014), 29–43.

¹³ Instructions given by Minister of Foreign Affairs Di Campello to Minister Caracciolo di Bella in St. Petersburg on July 29th 1867 in DDI, series I, vol. IX, 91.

Until 1878, therefore, Italian foreign policy was essentially one of settling and repositioning in an era of great change.

With the fall of the Right in 1876, it was the men of the Left who represented Italy at the Berlin Congress. On that occasion, Italy was too weak to implement an energetic policy and the government in Rome was left empty-handed. After all, it had not asked for anything, not least because Italian politicians were still loyal to their Risorgimento cultural background of respecting the principle of nationality on which the new unitary state had been founded. For the time being, therefore, a neutral attitude to the Eastern Question continued to be maintained, also because the men in power felt mostly distant from the issues of the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire. The problems they perceived as closer were the balance in the Mediterranean (the Tunisian question) and the relationship with France, as well as the question of irredentist lands (relations with Austria-Hungary) and, later, attempts at colonial expansion. However, as Pietro Pastorelli has observed, a new element in the Left's foreign policy was that, thanks to the alliance with Germany, both the problem of the country's strategic security and that of the completion of unification could be solved, favouring a gradual "reorientation" of Austria in accordance with the concepts of Cesare Balbo.¹⁴

2. *The opening of the Italian Legation in Belgrade*

The new season of Italo-Serbian relations in the aftermath of the Congress of Berlin must therefore be seen taking into account this new element, i.e. the tendency towards greater collaboration with the Imperial Germany as well as the long tradition of relations during the previous decades, of which the most salient points have been summarised so far. Finally, it must be remembered that a not insignificant role in the choices concerning Italian diplomacy in those years was also played by the complex rotation and rationalisation of diplomatic personnel and representations abroad.

This circumstance, i.e. the fact that Italian foreign policy was in a phase of transition and transformation in the period between the end of the Second French Empire and Italy's accession to the Triple Alliance, did not mean losing sight of or neglecting issues relating to the Balkans and so-called European Turkey, which had long been the table around which the interests of the European Powers were compared. In addition to the major figures that directed foreign policy at the time, there were also other leading figures in Italian diplomacy who

¹⁴ P. Pastorelli, "Il principio di nazionalità nella politica estera italiana". In *Nazione e nazionalità in Italia*, ed. Giovanni Spadolini (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1994), 188.

hoped for a repositioning of the country's international status. Although with decidedly more Austrophobic accents, some figures, such as Count Giuseppe Tornielli, were advocates of a rapprochement with imperial Germany.

Before going to Serbia, the Piedmontese diplomat had been Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry from April 1876 to December 1878.¹⁵ In his unpublished diary from those years, Tornielli noted down some remarks on the effects French foreign policy could have on Italy and stated (in June 1877) that “never will Italy place itself in a field where it will not be alongside Germany. Union with Germany is our strength against those who would attempt to undermine our national existence”.¹⁶ Tornielli was convinced of the solidity of the relations between Rome and Berlin and identified it as the cornerstone of future Italian foreign policy. At a time when the Eastern Question was increasingly attracting the attention of European governments, the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry was expressing deep concern about the plans for the territorial enlargement of Austria-Hungary to the detriment of the Ottoman Empire, about which there were various rumours in diplomatic circles. He saw such a possibility as a serious threat to Italy. Tornielli's diary once again contains extensive remarks on this issue, in particular the pages dedicated to the conversation he had with Robert von Keudell, Germany's ambassador to Rome. The German diplomat had observed that Italian objections against a possible Austro-Hungarian enlargement in the Balkans aroused the suspicion that they might attempt to obtain territorial adjustments to the detriment of Vienna, linking the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina to that of Trentino. Tornielli denied such a scenario and observed that the real problem lay in the increase of Austria-Hungary's power and influence in the Balkans and the Adriatic, thus causing damage to Italy. He summarised the position of the government in Rome as follows: “We have never asked and do not ask Austria to cede an inch of land to us. [...]. Our demands were always limited to preserving the status quo of military forces between Austria and Italy in such a way that sooner or later the Empire would not succeed in regaining a predominance over Italy that would be fatal not only to our interests but also to those of the other great powers that see in the independent existence of Italy a guarantee of their own”.¹⁷ Tornielli finally expressed to

¹⁵ On Tornielli's personality see: E. Serra, “Giuseppe Tornielli Brusati di Vergano”, *Storia e politica*, III 3 (1963), 336–363.

¹⁶ State Archives of Forlì-Cesena (hereinafter ASFC), Forlì, Tornielli Brusati Family Archives, b. 2: note dated June 29th 1877. The unpublished diary of Giuseppe Tornielli covers a rather limited period of time, from June 12th 1876 to December 30th 1877. It mainly contains information about the meetings and conversations he had with various foreign diplomatic figures in the domain of his function as Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*: note from July 2nd 1877.

his interlocutor his conviction that a weakened Italy subjected to the dominance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire would be contrary to the interests of Germany itself, from which he therefore expected political and diplomatic support.

In a meeting with the British ambassador in Rome, Augustus Paget, which took place a few weeks later, he also observed, specifying his ideas, "that the enlargement of Austria in Bosnia and Herzegovina also affects German interests in that it materially and morally weakens Italy, the natural ally of Germany"¹⁸ and that "in the position of Italy in relation to France and in relation to Austria there is no difference. The moral or material enlargement of one or the other of those two states constitutes a danger for us". Torielli, in short, was convinced that a genuine balance of power had to be maintained between Italy and its two neighbouring powers to the west and east. The position of the government in Rome was to maintain the status quo, in compliance with the provisions of international treaties, but if the French and Austro-Hungarian neighbours had taken action that compromised the balance between the Powers, then the circumstances would have required Italy to act to obtain the necessary compensation.¹⁹

These ideas, explicitly expressed as they were conveyed in a personal and private diary, provide a framework for understanding not only the spirit in which Torielli travelled to Belgrade in the autumn of 1879, but also for enriching our knowledge of Italy's foreign policy decision-making processes in those years. Torielli had a broad and articulate vision of what Rome's foreign policy strategy should have been and it is worth mentioning here one aspect that was fundamental to him: the importance of affairs concerning the Ottoman Empire and the relations between the Powers within the framework of the Eastern Question: "The most pressing concern facing Italy at this time is towards the East".²⁰ Within this framework, however, there were also less convincing considerations by the Italian diplomat, who went so far as to suggest a bold comparison between the Balkans at that time and the organisation of the Italian peninsula in the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna, revealing an attitude towards those regions with an imperialistic undertone and a substantial underestimation of the national problems of those peoples:

Let us see, for example, whether it is convenient [...] to allow small states without a life of their own to form on the Balkan peninsula, which will necessarily fall into the orbit of Austrian or Russian influence; whether it is in our common interest that a struggle for influence between Austria and Russia be engaged in, which would create a permanent state of unrest in Europe; whether it would not be more advantageous for us and for you to give the small political entities a

¹⁸ Ibidem: note from July 29th 1877.

¹⁹ Ibidem: note from July 30th 1877.

²⁰ Ibidem: note from July 29th 1877.

federative bond, whether it would not be preferable to patronise the formation of secondary states of sufficient importance, to extend Greece, to do something with Montenegro, with Serbia finally, to establish a political system on the Balkan peninsula similar to that established in Italy in 1815, and which in truth had only one very serious defect, that of violating the national sentiment of our country, whereas the Balkan peninsula, populated by different nationalities, would offer no such drawbacks in this respect.²¹

These assumptions, taken mainly from Torielli's private papers, have the advantage of offering a "behind the scenes" look at the Italian attitude towards Serbia and the Balkans, less conditioned by the official formulas of diplomatic correspondence and, probably, more frank and original. The opening of the Italian Legation in Belgrade, where, before Torielli's arrival, only a consular agency was active, run by Luigi Joannini Ceva di San Michele, should also be placed in this framework. After the crisis of 1875–78, the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin had obliged the Balkan states and, therefore, Serbia as well, to implement a series of internal reforms that, once accomplished, would have given the go-ahead for official recognition by the Powers and, consequently, the opening of stable diplomatic relations.²² In the Italian diplomatic documentation concerning Serbia between the summer of 1878 and that of the following year, three main issues stand out: the delineation of the new borders (an international military commission was set up to this end, in which Italy also participated), respect for minority rights (especially of the Jewish community) and, above all, relations with Austria-Hungary, to which the Principality was increasingly bound, not only politically but also economically (exclusive railway concessions, trade agreements and a customs union to be realised within three years).²³ Therefore, the increased importance of Serbia for Italian diplomacy is unsurprising, precisely in light of the energetic Austro-Hungarian actions towards the Principality and the Balkans in general.

The project to open the Legation in Belgrade was tackled in Rome at the same time as the opening of the Legation in Bucharest, another post considered fundamental for Italian interests in Eastern Europe. Delays, especially in Romania, in the application of certain clauses of the Treaty of Berlin had delayed the start of the two new missions. Finally, in the autumn of 1879, Giuseppe Torielli was appointed to inaugurate stable relations with both Serbia and Romania, at a time when negotiations for the international recognition of Romanian indepen-

²¹ Ibidem: note from July 30th 1877.

²² ASDMAE, MAERI, *Registri copialettere in partenza*, b. 1210: Depretis to Joannini, February 14th 1879.

²³ ASDMAE, MAERI, b. 1411: Joannini to Cairoli, Belgrade, July 22nd 1878.

dence were to be concluded.²⁴ From a personal point of view, the former Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry was firmly resolved to go to Bucharest and, in a letter to his wife confided that he would never give up unless he was immediately offered something better.²⁵ This uncertain situation dragged on for a few more weeks also because, in those very days, the second government led by Benedetto Cairoli was taking office. Tornielli, moreover, looked to Bucharest as his permanent destination while he had no intention of moving to Belgrade and taking up residence there.²⁶

In the days following the formation of the Cairoli government, therefore, the rotation of diplomatic personnel was arranged and it was decided to entrust Tornielli with that double mission in the two Balkan capitals: "The character of my mission in Belgrade will not change. I will go and open [...] the legation, but the mission will have to be essentially temporary."²⁷ The reasons for this choice were mainly organisational and financial, particularly the budget and diplomatic personnel available at that time.

Tornielli's first impressions of his new location were not enthusiastic. He described Belgrade as a large village, rather picturesque but lacking in any comforts. In addition to some practical difficulties, he joked about the small size and lack of prestige of the diplomatic corps accredited in the Serbian capital.²⁸ In general, Tornielli's private correspondence records his desire to move to Bucharest as soon as possible, considering his stay in Belgrade entirely transitory. On 7 October, he had an audience with Prince Milan and Foreign Minister Jovan Ristić. On that occasion, he was reminded of the commitment and favour that Italy had always shown towards Serbia over the past years.²⁹ This confirmed that the establishment of stable diplomatic relations with Serbia in 1879 was a natural step in the evolution of a long tradition of political ties. However, Tornielli was convinced that Italy's name and prestige alone was not enough to guar-

²⁴ See: D. Caccamo, "L'Italia, la Questione d'Oriente e l'indipendenza romana nel carteggio del consolato italiano a Bucarest (1870-1879)" *Storia e politica*, XVIII I (1979), 65-124.

²⁵ ASFC, Tornielli Brusati Family Archives, b. 6.1: Tornielli to Olga Rostopchine, Rome, July 11th 1879.

²⁶ *Ibidem*: Tornielli to his wife Olga Rostopchine, Acqui, August 19, 1879; About the various reasons why Tornielli was more in favor of Bucharest than Belgrade, among which we should not ignore the higher salary he received as the head of the mission in the Romanian capital. R. Dinu, "Giuseppe Tornielli Brusati di Vergano. Notes regarding his diplomatic mission in Romania 1878-1887", chapter in R. Dinu, *Studi italo-romeni. Diplomazia e società (1878-1914)*, (București: Editura Militară, 2009), 312-314.

²⁷ ASFC, Tornielli Brusati Family Archives, b. 6.1: Tornielli to his wife Olga Rostopchine, Acqui, August 22nd 1879.

²⁸ *Ibidem*: Tornielli to his wife Olga Rostopchine, Belgrade, September 28th 1879.

²⁹ ASDMAE, MAERI, b. 1411: Tornielli to Cairoli, Belgrade, October 10th 1879.

antee an important position in the Principality as: "Sympathy for Italy, as the embodiment of the new right of national determination, is weakened, but not extinguished. It will depend largely on us, I believe, to rekindle and revive this feeling. However, while we should not rush ahead of everyone, we must not be the last ones either".³⁰

After a couple of months in the Serbian capital, he finally arrived in Bucharest in late December, where he stayed until the end of 1887, when he was transferred to Madrid. The Italian government was about to recognise the independence of the Romanian Principality and, therefore, Torielli went there to inaugurate the Legation and stable relations between the two countries.³¹ He also formally held the post in Belgrade, which was in fact entrusted to Alberto Pansa, as *chargé d'affaires*.

Tornielli firmly believed in the importance of political relations between Italy and the countries of South-eastern Europe. In fact, he can be considered one of the advocates of strengthening these relations, even through the opening of structured diplomatic representations. In a letter to Benedetto Cairoli, dating back to his stay in Belgrade, Torielli considered it an absolute necessity for Italy to promote its influence in the region, taking advantage of the general sympathy of the population. Italy had a moral strength that allowed it "to re-establish in its favour the balance of forces that others could upset or break to our detriment". This also meant that the government in Rome should not subordinate its own policy to that of the other Powers; on the contrary, Italy had to promote its own initiatives. The moral strength with which Italy was endowed, according to Torielli, lay in the fact that "for the young nations that are rising, forming or developing in the European East, Italy is the embodiment of the fundamental and regenerating principle of European public law. As such, it is regarded as the advocate and apostle of the rights of peoples yearning for their national reconstitution".³²

Tornielli was nevertheless convinced that his stay in Belgrade had been useful to him and noted in 1879: "By coming here I have acquired a more complete and much clearer understanding of things in these countries that will be the theatre of events that will decide in Europe the question that I consider vital for Italy, of the preponderance of the new law of nations over the ancient system of the balance of states. The interest we have in reviving our influence in these

³⁰ ASDMAE, Fund Alberto Pansa, Correspondence, b. 6: Torielli to Alberto Pansa, Belgrade, October 3rd 1879.

³¹ ASDMAE, Fund Alberto Pansa, Diary (1875–1905), b. 1: note dated December 6th 1879.

³² ASFC, Torielli Brusati Family Archives, b. 1: sketch for Torielli's letter to Cairoli, October 19th 1879.

countries is such that I do not understand how Rome has not yet thought of recognising Rumenia". These considerations, of course, were also linked to the events surrounding his transfer. With respect to Serbia, Tornielli went on to say: "I personally believe that I have rendered a service to the cause of our influence in Serbia by offering to the Ministry to personally inaugurate our diplomatic relations with this principality, the importance of which we do not know or appreciate exactly how important it could be in certain scenarios".³³

Tornielli's activity in Belgrade, however, does not seem to have been particularly conspicuous, given his short stay in the Serbian capital. His main achievement was that he clearly emphasised the need for Italy to pursue an active policy in South-eastern Europe. In fact, in the following years, several diplomats took turns in Belgrade but none of them remained there permanently and thus failed to provide continuity to the Italian presence in Serbia. Only the arrival of Vittorio Sallier de la Tour in 1884 gave greater stability to the Legation.

In the diplomatic correspondence of those years, immediately following Serbia's independence, the recurring element that emerges is, as already mentioned, Austria-Hungary's impetuous political and economic action towards Belgrade. The extension of Vienna's influence in the Balkans, already ensured by the administration in Bosnia, also involved the establishment of close ties with the Balkan principality through economic investments and trade agreements. The issue of railway construction was one of the most effective tools used by the Austrians to increasingly bind Serbia to the Empire, and the political impact of this naturally did not escape the Italian representatives. On the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian government had not ignored the Austrophobic attitude of a man like Tornielli during his weeks in Serbia. The imperial foreign minister, von Haymerle, had complained about this to the Italian ambassador in Vienna, di Robilant, who wrote:

Count Tornielli during his stay in Belgrade would constantly explain his action in a hostile direction to Austria, pointing out to the Serbian government the dangers of the Austrian occupation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also advocating the idea of the Balkan League. Baron Haymerle added that Count Tornielli, now having to go to Bucharest, would do well not to explain his actions there in a manner equally hostile to Austria-Hungary, thus creating embarrassment for the imperial government.³⁴

³³ Ibidem, draft of Tornielli's letter to Depretis, November 4th 1879. The letter (the final version of this letter is preserved among Depretis' letters in the Central State Archives in Rome) is published in full in R. Dinu, "I Missi del Re. Note e documenti riguardanti la storia della Legazione italiana a Bucarest (1879-1914)", chapter in R. Dinu, *Studi italo-romeni*, 278-281.

³⁴ Di Robilant to Cairoli, Vienna, December 15th 1879, in DDI, s. II, XII, 371.

Moreover, the reputation of being an opponent of Rome's rapprochement with Vienna had followed Tornielli for several years. This was an uncommon orientation in the Italian diplomatic circles of the time, largely in favour of reconciliation with Austria-Hungary, which instead, according to Tornielli, should be opposed in its hegemonic programmes towards the Balkans.³⁵

However, the Italian governments, as we know, decided to make choices in a different direction, preferring to remain mostly spectators in the so-called Eastern Question. At the same time, however, Italian diplomacy and the governments in office were well aware of the importance of the two Principalities, Serbia as far as Rome's relations with Austria-Hungary were concerned and Romania as far as relations with St. Petersburg and, again, Vienna were concerned. As we can read in some of Tornielli's letters addressed to Carlo Alberto Maffei di Boglio (Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry) and Giacomo Malvano (Director of the Political Affairs Direction), a major problem was the lack of appropriate instruments: qualified personnel and financial resources that would finally allow Italy not to be a second-rate player in the Eastern Question.³⁶

Tornielli's wishes and proposals therefore did not find fertile ground at the Consulta and, very soon, both Serbia and Romania advanced their process of rapprochement with the Dual Monarchy. In Rome, too, the option of an alliance with Vienna was gaining ground. The alliance with Germany (which the representatives of the Left had hoped for some years already) and with its old rival, Austria-Hungary, gave more determination to the eastern and Balkan policies and strategies of the Kingdom of Italy, opening a completely new chapter even in relations with Serbia itself. The opening of the Italian Legation in Belgrade, therefore, must be interpreted as the epilogue of a long tradition of relations between Italians and Serbs during the 19th century, rooted in the common belief in the principle of nationality. At the same time, it was the starting point for a new season of political relations that, contrary to Count Tornielli's wishes, would long take place under the banner of the Habsburg imperial eagle.

³⁵ See the analysis of L. Monzali, *Italiani di Dalmazia. Dal Risorgimento alla Grande Guerra* (Florence: Le Lettere, 2004), 127.

³⁶ ASFC, Tornielli Brusati Family Archives, b. 1: Tornielli to Maffei, Belgrade, October 25th 1879, Tornielli to Malvano, October 25, 1879.

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Movies about the First World War: Shaping the Collective Memory. Cases of Serbian/Yugoslav and Greek Cinematography

Abstract: The First World War brought radical changes to the political map of Europe and took more than 15 million lives on both warring sides. This conflict of unprecedented proportions has left deep traces on the lives of people who found themselves in a whirlwind of war. Therefore, it is no wonder that the theme of war was present in various types of human creativity – through literature (especially autobiographical genres), art, but also popular culture, where movies rightly took centre stage. Even during the period 1914–1918, the film became the main weapon of propaganda. Through this instrument, the message was able to reach quickly a large number of people, regardless of their social status and level of education. After 1918, the film served as a popular medium through which the memory of war events was preserved. The first movies exuded the anti-war spirit at the moment when post-war Europe was facing long-term economic consequences that had surfaced. Pacifist messages could be seen in different film productions, which to a large extent looked up to Hollywood, the most significant film industry in the world. The same was in the case of smaller allied countries such as Greece and Serbia, which both paved a different path of development due to the complexity of historical processes conducted in these Balkan countries. This paper aims to point out these different developments and shed light on lesser-known facts about Yugoslav and Greek WWI cinematography.

Keywords: First World War, collective memory, war movies, Serbian cinematography, Yugoslav cinematography, Greek cinematography

I

The gunshot by a young Serb from Bosnia, Gavrilo Princip, who assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, was a spark that lit the war flame in Europe leading it to the largest and the bloodiest war in history until then. The four-year war brought radical changes on the political map of Europe and took more than 15 million lives on both warring sides.¹ This conflict of unprecedented proportions has left deep traces on the lives of people who found themselves in a whirlwind named the

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¹ S. Everett, *The Two World Wars. World War I*, Vol. 1 (Connecticut: Bison books, 1980), 248.

Great War. Therefore, it is no wonder that the theme of war was present in various types of human creativity – through literature (especially autobiographical genres), art, but also popular culture, where movies rightly took centre stage. Even during the war, the film became the main weapon of propaganda. Through this instrument, the message was able to reach quickly a large number of people, regardless of their social status and level of education.² Lenin soon realized its advantages during the Russian Revolution, while the American Committee on Public Information was also using movies to “enlighten” its compatriots.³

After the war, the film gained a different role, actively participating in shaping memories and interpreting events from the period 1914–1918.⁴ As a medium in which creation veterans⁵ themselves were often taking part, bringing in some of their memories and emotions, the film became, in addition to its artistic significance, also a valuable historical source for the study of the past. This period exuded an anti-war spirit, at a time when countries on both warring sides had to face the harsh consequences of a four-year conflict. Difficult economic situation accompanied by existential insecurity, rising unemployment and job

² At first, the film – as well as popular culture in general – encountered resistance among the elite, which was inclined toward the so-called high culture such as opera or theater. Nevertheless, it managed even before WWI to become the favorite form of entertainment for all social classes: K. Maze, *Bezgranična zabava: uspon masovne kulture: 1850–1970* [Unlimited Amusement: the Rise of Mass Culture: 1850–1970] (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2008), 11–14.

³ The CPI which was founded to influence public opinion to support the entrance of the USA in WWI, encouraged different propaganda activities, while for this purpose the film served as an already favorite form of entertainment. Along with the propaganda movies themselves, the Committee encouraged short patriot talks that volunteer speakers gave in movie theaters during changing film reels. In this way, during the last two years of the war, more than tens of millions of viewers heard the speeches of 75,000 people in the designed campaign called “Four Minute Man” (it took about four minutes to change a film reel when showing feature-length films): A. Axelrod, *Selling the Great War: the Making of American Propaganda* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 47–48, 94–95.

⁴ “Many times we have been told that the film is capable of imprinting in the minds of people as much truth about history in one afternoon as the whole months of learning”: statement by film director D. W. Griffith, see T. Žiro, *Film i tehnologija* [Film and Technology] (Belgrade: Clio, 2003), 109.

⁵ To preserve the image of the Great War from oblivion, the war participants were publishing their experience during the 1920s and 1930s, some of which were used for film adaptations. It was not a solitary case that besides the author, the director himself shared the experience of WWI. The American silent war movie *Wings* (1927), which won the Oscar for the best film at the first American Film Institute Awards, provided an authentic view of the world conflict. This film was written, directed, and starred firsthand by veterans of the last war: L. Midkiff DeBauche, *Reel Patriotism: the Movies and World War I* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1997), 160–161, 190.

losses due to war devastation, veterans' attempts to find their place in post-war society, and over-indebtedness of the country due to war loans are just some of the reasons for the gloomy picture of everyday life and general depression that existed across the world. Having found themselves in such a situation after years of warfare and uncertainty about "bare life", unsettled in society, strangers even to their own families due to long-term separation and war experience that changed them permanently, it is understandable that veterans were mostly negative about everything related to the war, which – after all – did them no good.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the first war films sent a strong anti-war message. In such an atmosphere, it is even less surprising that they were well-received by the audience and gained worldwide fame. Even the one considered the most popular war film – and one of the best of all time – sent the same pacifist message. *All Quiet on the Western Front* (1930) directed by Lewis Milestone is based on the novel of the same name by Erich Maria Remarque, who was a German soldier on the Western Front. The story follows three schoolmates who went to war at the very beginning of adulthood. In addition to the initial enthusiasm, the young soldiers soon felt all the hardships of the trench life and the ruthless war that was taking more and more of their comrades. At the end all the actors died, even the main character Paul while trying to catch a "ray of hope" – a butterfly flying over his trenches. The movie, which carries a strong anti-war message, points out the futility of war. Such a message was not always in agreement with the official policy adopted by totalitarian regimes in the post-war world. In the Third Reich, the movie was banned, while Remarque's novel was destroyed in the Nazi book burnings of 1933.⁶ In some countries, the film was screened in a censored form, while the end itself was changed.⁷ Even when it was finally shown to the audience in 1950, the revised version was 40 minutes shorter than the original. However, such "interventions" did not prevent the movie from gaining worldwide fame and being included in the list of the best films ever made. This masterpiece is one of the best-screened testimonies

⁶ More about the movie ban, see M. Eksteins, "War, Memory and Politics: The Fate of the Film *All Quiet on the Western Front*", *Central European History* 13/1 (1980), 60–82. More about the Nazi book burnings, see P. Gej, *Vajmarska kultura: autsajder kao insajder* [Weimar Culture: the Outsider as Insider] (Belgrade: Geopoetika, 1998), 186–187, A. Mitrović, *Angažovano i lepo: umetnost u radoblju svetskih ratova (1914–1945)* [Engaged and Beautiful: Arts in the Period of World Wars (1914–1945)] (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1983), 161–168, Ibid., *Vreme netrpeljivih: politička istorija velikih država Evrope, 1919–1939* [Age of Intolerant: Political History of the Great European Powers, 1919–1939] (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1974), 482–489.

⁷ More about different changes that the movie has undergone and often censorships, see A. Kelly, "All Quiet on the Western Front: brutal cutting, stupid censors and bigoted politicians (1930–1984)", *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 9 (1989), 135–150.

not only about WWI but the war in general. Milestone himself was glad to announce that the film became very popular, although it was shown to viewers in a shorter and reworked version: "The picture proved to have a longer life than many a politician and is still going strong in spite of brutal cutting, stupid censors and bigoted politicians".⁸

Besides leaving its mark on world cinema, *All Quiet on the Western Front* paved the way for anti-war films during the interwar period.⁹ The first Hollywood movie adaptations of WWI, which revived the war testimonies of veterans, were well received by the audience. In addition to depicting the war events, in the movies very often was obvious the transformation of the protagonists themselves. Most often, the films began with scenes of idyllic life before the war and ended with the return of soldiers to their homes, which would complete the story. Created in the same anti-war spirit, these movies are imbued with similar motives. Undoubtedly, patriotism is the most common one. For obvious reasons, this feeling dominates even more in films made during the war, which, along with depictions of war efforts served to boost public morale, while after the war, touching stories of ordinary people who were participants in the events of 1914–1918 came to the fore.¹⁰ Their perception of the war and authentic true stories made a mark on the films. Veterans even represented a significant part of the cinema audience who actively gave feedback, thus influencing the reception of films with such themes in public.

As the culmination of patriotism and heroic act, death was presented – the motif of the most sublime sacrifice that the protagonists can offer. This motif was very popular in various art forms in the years after the war, so it did not

⁸ A. Kelly, *Cinema and the Great War* (London: Routledge, 1997), 46.

⁹ In addition to the aforementioned production *Wings*, which, besides showing a heart-warming story, represents a true spectacle due to pictures of air battles and the U.S. air force, *The Big Parade*, as well as *What Price Glory?* (1927) are also worth mentioning. These silent films highlight an ordinary man who describes the tragedy of war from his perspective. They represent authentic testimonies of veterans from the Western Front: M. T. Isenberg, "The Great War Viewed from the Twenties: *The Big Parade* (1925)". In *American History/American Film: Interpreting the Hollywood image*, ed. J. E. O'Connor and M. A. Jackson, (New York: Ungar Publishing Company, 1979), 22; K. Brownlow, *The Parade's Gone By* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 296.

¹⁰ This transition can be seen in the portrayal of the enemy in the movies. Before America entered into WWI, the image of Germans portrayed in a negative light served as a support for national goals. They are presented as Huns villains, who "are throwing babies out the window", "raping young women", "killing innocent civilians", etc. (characteristic films are *The Kaiser*, *The Beast of Berlin*, and *The Prussian Cur*). Hollywood films made in the 1920s are showing a more moderate image of Germans as enemies, while there is also a place for sympathy because of the war destruction that affected both sides: Midkiff DeBauche, *Reel Patriotism*, 36, 196.

bypass the film, although it was essentially an anti-war character. Even if it did not contribute to the glorification itself, the cult of the fallen soldier who died for his country tried to disguise the horror of war and justify its purpose.¹¹ On the other hand, the opposite of death is love which defies everything. Almost all war films are imbued with this pure emotion, creating a contrast between scenes full of tenderness and brutality of war. It is most often about the soldier's love for woman,¹² but also the homeland, nature, peace, and everything that is not related to the war. Probably the most shocking scene in *All Quiet on the Western Front* is when the protagonist Paul dies trying to catch a butterfly that landed next to his trenches. His reach for the butterfly was enough for the French soldier to locate him. Realizing the futility of war and sadness because of the loss of his brothers-in-arms, he tried to reach for the butterfly, that "glimmer of hope" that would connect him with his pre-war life.¹³

Movies like *All Quiet on the Western Front*, *The Big Parade*, and *What Price Glory?* represent epochal works not only about WWI but about the war in general. Numerous awards testify to their success, as well as the general interest of the audience, which does not abate for these classics even today. The American industry recorded several other smaller achievements,¹⁴ but the mentioned titles paved the way for war films in European cinemas, which to a large extent looked up to Hollywood, the most significant film production in the world. The

¹¹ More about the cult of the fallen, which is nurtured in the allied countries and Germany through commemorative activities, monumental architecture, military cemeteries, but also through various art forms, see G. L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 7, 70–106.

¹² Love stories in war-themed movies have, among other things, contributed to a larger number of female cinemagoers: Midkiff DeBauche, *Reel Patriotism*, 193.

¹³ At the beginning of the film, Paul as a little boy and his sister are collecting butterflies. Thus the butterfly symbolizes the home as Paul remembers it and represents an attempt to connect with what is left of his previous life far behind the trenches of death.

¹⁴ In the following decades, several movies about WWI were made: *The Last Flight* (1931), *Gold Diggers* (1933), *Three Comrades* (1938), and *The Roaring Twenties* (1939) dealt with social problems and topics such as the plight of returned soldiers who struggle to find a job. Due to such circumstances, some are turning to crime as in the movie *The Roaring Twenties*. The anti-war achievement *The Man I Killed* (1932) was also noted, which indicates the meaninglessness of war and the power of forgiveness; after the war, a French soldier is looking for the family of a German soldier he killed in battle to seek forgiveness. Among the last great Hollywood achievements about WWI was *Paths of Glory* (1957), which referred to the cruelty and injustice of military decisions. A French colonel (Kirk Douglas) refused to sacrifice his soldiers in a suicide attack on the enemy: Kelly, *Cinema*, 100–137, M. Hammond, *Great War in Hollywood Memory, 1918–1939* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2019), 127–238, M. Paris, *The First World War and Popular Cinema: 1914 to the Present* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 138–161.

German film industry produced several achievements such as *Westfront 1918* (1930),¹⁵ *Comradeship* (*Kameradschaft*, 1931),¹⁶ and *No Man's Land* (*Niemandland*, 1931).¹⁷ Important movies of British production – *Journey's End* (1930)¹⁸ and *Tell England* (1931)¹⁹ – both exude an anti-war spirit.²⁰ It is worth looking briefly at the title *Blighly* (1927), which deals with the social aspects and post-war problems of veterans. The director himself pointed out the need to make a film in a different tone because most of them are based on “heroism and sacrifice”, which the audience less and less prefers.²¹ At the center of the story is a British soldier who after the war returns to his old job as a driver. Finally, the picture would not be complete without the mention of war cinematography in another of the European great powers – France. *The Grand Illusion* (*La Grande Illusion*, 1937) has been included in the list of the best films ever made. Apart from gaining world fame, it is also considered the only WWI film that does not contain

¹⁵ The movie is based on the novel “Vier von der Infanterie” by Ernst Johannsen, who was himself on the Western Front. This film was also targeted by the Nazis, who perceived pacifist films as a threat to their aggressive policy. The story follows four German soldiers who experienced the horror of trench warfare on the mentioned front. Using the latest audio technology, the director managed to faithfully portray the thunder of cannons and the noise of battles at the front: M. Helmert, “The Transition from the Silent into the Sound Era in German Cinema: The Innovative Use of Sound in Pabst’s *Westfront 1918*”, *Music, Sound, and the Moving Image* 12/2 (2018), 121–139.

¹⁶ In this movie was also pointed out the possibility of reconciliation between the two sides, when a group of German miners took the initiative to rescue their French colleagues who remained trapped due to an explosion in the mine. The movie was inspired by a true event, a coal mine disaster in the north of France in 1906.

¹⁷ The story begins in a destroyed and abandoned house behind the trenches, where people of different nationalities find refuge – a French soldier, a British officer, a Jewish tailor, a dark-skinned dancer, and a German carpenter. Due to the troubles that befell them, they managed to regain their humanity and turn against the only common enemy – war: Kelly, *Cinema*, 77.

¹⁸ One of the most famous movies of that period, which represents an adaptation of the play of the same name by Robert Cedric Sherriff, who fought on the Western Front. The film’s director, James Whale, also a veteran from the same front, contributed in his way to bringing the authentic war experience to the cinema screen; he tried to compensate for the shortcomings of the then still undeveloped sound technology by creating a claustrophobic atmosphere in the trenches.

¹⁹ *Tell England* showed the battles of British troops in the Gallipoli campaign.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 47–64, B. McFarlane & A. Slide (eds.), *The Encyclopedia of British Film* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 33, 49, 700, 816.

²¹ A. Brunel, *Nice Work: The Story of Thirty Years in British Film Production* (London: Forbes Robertson Ltd, 1949), 126.

war scenes.²² Although none of them achieved the fame of *The Grand Illusion*,²³ several other successes were recorded in French war cinematography.²⁴

All of these films exuded the anti-war spirit at the moment when post-war Europe was facing long-term economic consequences that had surfaced. An ordinary man and his superhuman suffering were more frequently in the foreground. The national element was overcome and the films were enthusiastically accepted in countries of both warring sides, in which the average cinemagoer, a veteran of the last war, could find himself and identify with the suffering of the protagonist. On the other hand, due to their pacifist message, they posed a threat to totalitarian regimes whose shadow was increasingly hovering over Europe.

II

Pacifist messages could also be seen in the production of smaller allied countries such as Greece and Serbia, but both of them paved a different path of development due to the complexity of historical processes conducted in these Balkan countries. For Serbia, which lost almost 1/3 of its pre-war population, the only compensation was the realization of the great idea of Yugoslavism, while for Greece in 1918 the war was not even over. In the first case, the new state facing many problems in the integration of three nationalities into a common system quickly forgot about its soldiers from the Macedonian Front, who had then become war invalids and/or were in miserable financial situation. The history of

²² There are very few images of killings through the film, and the main part of the action takes place in a German prison camp. The director tried to point out the futility of war with a story about human solidarity; the closeness of the various prisoners who help each other to survive transcends all national and class differences: D. Parkinson, *Istorija filma* [History of Film] (Belgrade: Dereta, 2014), 123.

²³ The film suffered a similar fate as other anti-war movies of the time; it was banned in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Interestingly, although he banned it in 1937, Mussolini preserved one copy of the film for his archive and organized private screenings attended by prominent Italian citizens and film directors: Kelly, *Cinema*, 90.

²⁴ *I Accuse* (*J'accuse*, 1919), a pacifist film with a strong anti-war message (it culminates in an anthological scene in which the dead soldiers rise from their graves and go to their relatives to warn them so that their sacrifice should not be in vain), as well as *Verdun* (1928) which shows a reconstruction of the most famous, but also the bloodiest French victory in WWI. To portray the fight scenes as faithfully as possible, the director hired amateur actors who were acquainted with the trench warfare in the last war and used to a large extent authentic videos from 1916: Brownlow, *The Parade's*, 531–534, C. Crisp, *French Cinema – A Critical Filmography: Volume 1, 1929–1939* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015), 183–186. More about the anthological scene in the movie *I Accuse*, see M. Hurcombe, “Raising the Dead: visual representations of the combatant’s body in interwar France”, *Journal of War and Cultural Studies* 1/2 (2008), 159–174.

WWI was neglected in every way. Oblivion and inadequate care of war memories in Yugoslav society were products of different causes.²⁵ Since in different parts of the country WWI was perceived in multiple ways with important and essential differences, where it was a case of completely different war experiences that are not compatible with each other²⁶ – especially when you bear in mind the Austro-Hungarian military conscription of a part of the population – it is not surprising that Yugoslav cinematography was not very fond of WWI movies.

However, even in such a “hostile” environment and lagging behind certain allied film industries, several titles about the Great War were produced. The first one was *Through Storm and Fire* (*Kroz buru i oganj*, 1929), however, not much could be said about it since it has not been saved. It is known that the struggle of civilians in occupied Serbia against enemy troops is at the center of the action. The domestic audience showed great interest after the first screening; the film was shown for 33 days in a row in cinemas, which was a great success even for foreign films of the time that usually attracted more viewers.²⁷ It was followed by *In God We Trust* (*S verom u Boga*, 1932) directed by Mihajlo Al. Popović, who first took a role as an actor in the previously mentioned film, whilst came up with the idea of his own by watching war invalids begging on the city streets. Like other war films of the time, it began with depictions of idyllic life before the war; the harmony of church bells and the songs of reapers were interrupted by the declaration of war and following mobilization. The film, which shows

²⁵ Oblivion was a reflection of the lack of organization of war veterans from the Macedonian Front, their leadership and affiliations, and also because of social and political instability in general. The limitation of financial resources also had its role in this “collective amnesia”. However, probably the main cause of this negligence lied in the positions of politicians from the former territories of the Habsburg Monarchy who expressed dissatisfaction whenever the war role of Serbia was emphasized in the creation of the Kingdom. Although the ultimate goal of national unification was - at least in theory - achieved, there was an internal division between the “victorious” and the “defeated” side in the First World War. Therefore, the study of WWI was interrupted to avoid conflicts among “brother” nations: O. Manojlović Pintar, *Tradicije Prvog svetskog rata u beogradskoj javnosti, 1918–1941: magistarski rad* [Traditions of the First World War in the Belgrade Public Opinion, 1918–1941: Master Thesis] (Belgrade: Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, 1996), 23–38, D. Šarenac, *Top, vojniki i sećanje: Prvi svetski rat i Srbija 1914–2009*. [Cannon, Soldier and Memory: Serbia and the First World War 1914–2009] (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2014), 154, 213–219, 242–260.

²⁶ More about the cult of “victory” and “defeat” among the Yugoslav veterans, see Dž. P. Njuman, *Jugoslavija u senci rata: ratni veterani i stvaranje nove države, 1903–1945* [Yugoslavia in the Shadow of War: Veterans and the Limits of State Building, 1903–1945] (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2018), 15–59.

²⁷ D. Kosanović, *Kinematografija i film u Kraljevini SHS/Kraljevini Jugoslaviji, 1918–1941* [Cinematography and Movie in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 1918–1941] (Belgrade: Filmski centar Srbije, 2011), 95.

the suffering of the Serbian people and the war devastation, follows the tragedy of a rural family in WWI. Images of destruction are overwhelmed with a sense of terrible martyrdom, while Popović uses the scene of the crucifixion as an epiphany of death – a sublime sacrifice to save others.²⁸ As in war films of European and American production, the story ends with the return of soldiers from the war, while the final shot is also characteristic: three boys dressed in national costumes are seen while the Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian anthems successively follow.²⁹

The final shot was a reflection of the new representations of the past in the newly created state. In a country where it was not possible to emphasize a certain national group and where the equal role of all peoples in the creation of the Kingdom was insisted on, an official state version of the events that took place during the war had to be established soon. According to that version, all parts of society participated and suffered equally in the war, regardless of whether they were those who died of starvation and cold in Albania, those who remained in the occupied country, or those from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia who were recruited for the needs of the Austro-Hungarian army.³⁰ From time to time state policy imposed “correct” representations of the past,³¹ while occasionally the intervention was even more open. In the case of *The Calvary of Serbia* (*Golgota Srbije*, 1939) by Stanislav Krakov, the most significant anti-war achievement until WWII and the best documentary in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, it was repeatedly filmed, censored, banned, suppressed for almost ten years, went through three title changes, three premieres and two censorship.

Initially, the film was shown in silent version under the title *Honor of the Fatherland* (*Za čast otadžbine*) in May 1930, when it was banned by cen-

²⁸ N. Daković, “Mythomoteur i Veliki rat” [Mythomoteur and Great War], *Zbornik radova Fakulteta dramskih umetnosti* 25/26 (2014), 141.

²⁹ A. Janković, “Veliki rat i jugoslovenski film” [Great War and Yugoslav Film], *Medijski dijalozi: časopis za istraživanje medija i društva* 21 (2015), 440.

³⁰ Over the years, this simplified version of history and a distorted picture of the war has proved completely wrong: Manojlović Pintar, *Tradicije*, 34–38.

³¹ It should be borne in mind that the film was extremely suitable for that because for a long time it was the only form of accessible mass entertainment in Yugoslavia. Thus, the cinema served as an educational tool for the semi-literate peasant population, but often also as a tool for propaganda: Kosanović, *Kinematografija i film*, 48–50. More about the use of film for propaganda purposes, see D. Tadić, *Propagandni film* [Propaganda Film] (Belgrade: Spektrum, 2009), 155–168, A. Vranješ, *Partizanski filmovi i propaganda* [Partisan Films and Propaganda] (Banja Luka: Glas srpski, 2008), 73–82, B. Simić, “Film in the service of state propaganda during the 1930s, cases of Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria”, *Tokovi istorije* 2 (2012), 64–76.

sors who were bothered by how Austro-Hungarian soldiers were presented.³² In the film that follows the war agony of the Serbian people during 1914–1918, Krakov who was also a participant in the war,³³ reconstructed scenes of the Albanian retreat and liberation of Serbian cities in 1918 using archival material and recording sequences “with surviving participants in an authentic environment”. The newly recorded version which was sounded was released in March 1940 but waited for several months because it did not receive censorship due to “preventive diplomacy”, i.e. a possible impact on the deterioration of Serbia’s relations with neighboring countries.³⁴ The re-edited film was renamed *Fire in the Balkans* (*Požar na Balkanu*) and at the dawn of WWII, it finally received permission to be shown. The film tape was buried in the ground and so survived the war devastation. One of the owners of “Artistic Film” handed it over to the new authorities, which, due to the political pattern and negligence of the state bureaucracy, enabled a new projection only in the early 1970s. Then, this “forbidden version” in a new montage and under the name of *The Calvary of Serbia* finally saw the “light of day” in front of an audience that did not hide its enthusiasm.³⁵

In *The Calvary of Serbia*, which represents a valuable testimony to the Serbian war efforts that influenced the construction of national identity in Yugoslav society, the motif of sublime sacrifice for the sake of others and liberation of the homeland was emphasized. The motif of sacrifice and martyr’s narrative is also present in *In God We Trust*. Both of these films can be considered anti-war modeled on foreign cinematography.³⁶ It is also worth mentioning that these

³² P. Volk, *Istorija jugoslovenskog filma* [History of Yugoslav Film] (Belgrade: Institut za film, 1986), 86.

³³ Krakov occupies an important place in the field of remembrance of the First World War with its literary and film opus, which often interact with each other. He was a prolific writer who left valuable testimonies about the war. His descriptions of less conventional topics are also interesting, in which he dealt with the image of foreign allies on the Macedonian Front, but also the entertainment of soldiers and everyday life. His works on WWI are: *Through the Storm* (*Kroz buru*, 1921), *Wings* (*Krila*, 1922), *Our Last Victories* (*Naše poslednje pobeđe*, 1928), *Crown Prince Peter* (*Prestolonaslednik Petar*, 1932) where the war is presented in segments, and his autobiography *Life of a Man in the Balkans* (*Život čoveka na Balkanu*, 1997) which is published posthumously.

³⁴ Among other things, the film was censored due to sequences that negatively portrayed Bulgarian soldiers, at a time when Yugoslavia had been trying since the Balkan Pact (1934) to bring the two countries closer together: Kosanović, *Kinematografija i film*, 42.

³⁵ Volk, *Istorija*, 85–86.

³⁶ The closing scene of *In God We Trust* set in a cemetery full of crosses, where the soldier explains to his son “when you grow up, you will understand”, expresses the sense of tragedy and the nonsense of war: R. Vučetić, “Film/Cinema (South East Europe), 1914-1918 Online. *International Encyclopedia of the First World War* https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/filmcinema_south_east_europe (last accessed May 2022).

lonely attempts of movies about WWI have immense historical value at a time when Serbian and Yugoslav³⁷ cinematography were not institutionalized and systematically organized, but were independent projects led mostly by amateur directors who could only get required knowledge abroad. So, this is not about organized national cinematography, which could only exist with the support of the state. And to the state itself, which used the film to promote its principles, such topics were not a priority.³⁸

With the war devastation during the period 1941–1945, the civil war, and the process of erasing memories of the Karađorđević dynasty, historical discontinuity and room for blankness in the collective memory were created. By implementing the policy of “brotherhood and unity”, a large part of commemorative ceremonies were abandoned and one of the most important elements of preserving memories disappeared with them. Also, since the 1950s there was not a single historical handbook that referred to WWI.³⁹ The situation was similar in film production. In general, during the second half of the 20th century, the political, ideological, sociological, and historical context of Yugoslav cinematography was not favorable to the significance of WWI, from which Yugoslavia emerged as a product.

Only on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary, a significant achievement was made, which is also the best domestic film about the Great War. *March on the Drina* (*Marš na Drinu*, 1964) attracted a lot of attention from the public; it was the first movie of Tito’s Yugoslavia on the theme of WWI, perceived as an introduction to the creation of the Kingdom. As the plot of the film is based on the Battle of Cer, there was curiosity (and fear) regarding the approach to that battle as a great victory of the Serbian army. However, the director Živorad Žika

³⁷ Worth mentioning is the Croatian film *Life Goes On* (*A život teče dalje*, 1935), which points out the price of the personal sacrifice of the participants in the war. The fake news about the death of the husband in the prison camp caused problems when his wife remarried due to a difficult financial situation. The main actor who escaped from the camp comes back home, where he finds out that his wife is about to deliver another man’s baby. Realizing the harsh reality that “life goes on”, he leaves for good while his wife never knew of his comeback.

³⁸ The most characteristic example is the Partisan films that were very popular in Yugoslav cinematography: Vranješ, *Partizanski filmovi*, 96–145, R. Vučetić, *Koka-kola socijalizam: amerikanizacija jugoslovenske popularne kulture šezdesetih godina XX veka* [Coca-Cola Socialism: the Americanization of Yugoslav Popular Culture in the 1960s] (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2020), 125–144, M. Čolić, *Jugoslovenski ratni film* [Yugoslav War Film], 2 Vols. (Belgrade: Institut za film, 1984).

³⁹ Only in the 1950s military historians took the first steps in publishing a small number of studies on the Balkan Wars and WWI. However, for obvious reasons, the main interest of historians lied in WWII which had left deep scars after the “fratricide”: P. Opačić, “Jugoslovenska vojna istoriografija o Prvom svetskom ratu” [Yugoslav Military Historiography of WWI], *Zbornik radova* 3 (1985), 105–106.

Mitrović pointed out that he wanted to bring family tragedies above the national ones.⁴⁰ And those tragedies, as in other war films that were made in Yugoslavia and around the world, exist to remind us of the futility of war and the waste of human lives. As in *The Calvary of Serbia*, the motif of death is symbolically represented by the movement of the camera over the dead bodies scattered after the battle and stopping at the roadside monuments known as “krajputaši”.⁴¹ In the final frame, the mortally wounded protagonist uttered through his teeth the first curse ever in the Yugoslav film – “Drino, goddamn it!”. There is a clear message before the eyes of the spectators: the battle was won and the state was created but at the costly price of the disappearance of entire generations.⁴²

Mitrović also successfully put nationalism in the background in the very depiction of the enemy, which was shown in the crowd, without specifics and close-ups. Therefore the movie lacks one personalized image of the enemy, which was intended to cover up or at least mitigate the participation of compatriots in Austro-Hungarian uniforms in the Battle of Cer. After the most significant Serbian movie about WWI, none of them united thematically and provided such emotion as *March on the Drina*, nor did it occupy so much public attention.⁴³ Some titles such as *Sarajevo Assassination* (*Sarajevski atentat*, 1968), *The Assassination at Sarajevo* (*Sarajevski atentat*, 1975), and among the last films made in the former Yugoslavia *Last Waltz in Sarajevo* (*Poslednji valcer u Sarajevu*, 1990) are interesting due to different interpretations of one of the most important figures of WWI, Gavrilo Princip, who has been presented with a lot of contradictions in the decades of the common state. In his case, the path from hero to villain was

⁴⁰ Asked to define the style of the *March on the Drina* at the time of filming, Mitrović answered succinctly: “The cinematic unity of this story should be preserved, protected from the national-victorious *pathos* and enthusiasm, because no matter how magnificent that victory looked in historical assessments and military analysis, it is completely different if viewed through the suffering, efforts, blood, and death of a Serbian soldier, ordinary and modest, and we make a film about such people... And that’s why, instead of loud and big patriotic words – swearing, teeth clenching, cramp, and death”: M. N, “Tvrd, muški realizam” [Hard, Masculine Realism], *Politika* (6 June 1964), 28.

⁴¹ “Krajputaši” played a significant commemorative role in Serbia. In memory of the fallen soldiers, the production of roadside monuments increased in large numbers after the Balkan Wars and the First World War: Manojlović Pintar, *Tradicije*, 40–41, see also B. V. Radičević, *Seoski nadgrobni spomenici i krajputaši u Srbiji* [Rural Tombstones and Roadside in Serbia] (Belgrade: Jugoslavija, 1965).

⁴² D. Batančev, “Šta je muškarac bez puške i penisa: dekonstrukcija heroja u srpskim filmovima o Prvom svetskom ratu” [What is a Man without Rifle and Penis: Deconstruction of a Hero in Serbian Movies about the First World War], *Časopis za povijest zapadne Hrvatske* 8 (2013), 117.

⁴³ The film even won the Audience Award at the Pula Film Festival, where it was shown: Šarenac, *Top*, 246.

not long, while such presentations served to shape national memories.⁴⁴ After the shooting for the film *Assassination at Sarajevo*, the director Veljko Bulajić, who was already famous for his partisan movies, commented on the role of Princip and other participants in the unfortunate event that served as an occasion for the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war. In the movie, they are not presented as conspirators, but as “poets, revolutionaries, patriots”, who “shot at Ferdinand with their hearts”.⁴⁵ During the later period and in completely different historical circumstances, on the eve of the celebration of the centenary in 2014, another film that contained a picture of Princip saw the light of day. *I Defended Young Bosnia* (*Branio sam Mladu Bosnu*) is a story about the Sarajevo assassination told from the perspective of Princip and his comrades.

⁴⁴ Probably the best example of these radically different interpretations of Princip is the commemorative plaque placed in his honor in Sarajevo. On the day of its revelation on 2 February 1930, newspapers from Belgrade published an article full of enthusiastic words about its “owner” and characterized the monument as a sign of self-sacrifice. During WWII, the plaque was taken off by German soldiers, who thought that this could be an ideal present for Führer’s 52nd birthday. On that day, the oldest Croatian daily newspaper from Rijeka wrote that this “shameful plaque in honor of murderer Princip” was finally taken away, while the *Sarajski novi list* that “Sarajvo” – as the Ustaše named the city – “has cleaned itself of the Vidovdan stain”. As was expected, after the war another plaque was revealed accompanied by several manifestations and a formal ceremony. In the latest war, in 1992, the plaque had been removed again until 2004, when it was revealed by the authorities of then independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. So, the commemorative plaque was revealed on the same spot even four times during the turbulent years of the common state. Memorial words were different every time. Princip was characterized occasionally as a national hero and sometimes as a terrorist, and the texts were written from time to time in the Latin alphabet and sometimes in Cyrillic in just a few decades. It is also worth mentioning that the first plaque was not a state initiative at all (due to external and internal reasons) and was placed by friends and relatives of Princip and his comrades without the presence of state officials: R. Ljušić, *Princip Gavrilo: (1895–1918): ogleđ o nacionalnom heroju* [Princip Gavrilo: (1895–1918): an Essay on the National Hero] (Belgrade: Novosti, 2014), M. Mašović-Nikolić, “Lik Gavrila Principa u savremenoj srpskoj književnosti” [Gavrilo Princip as a Character in Contemporary Serbian Literature], *Zbornik radova Fakulteta dramskih umetnosti* 25/26 (2014), 307–315, I. Velisavljević, “Tri lica Gavrila Principa: Gavrilo Princip u jugoslovenskom filmu” [Three Faces of Gavrilo Princip: Gavrilo Princip in the Yugoslav Film], *Beogradski književni časopis* 36/37 (2014), 310–326, D. Trbojević, “Politika sećanja i identiteta: simbolička upotreba lika i dela Gavrila Principa u političkim narativima na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije” [Politics of Remembrance and Identity: Symbolic Use of Image and Work of Gavrilo Princip in the Political Narratives in the Territories of Former Yugoslavia], *Hereticus* 14 (2016), 247–260, T. Rosić, “Bunt u ulici Gavrila Principa u Beogradu” [Rebellion in Gavrila Principa Street in Belgrade], *Kultura* 163 (2019), 46–63, etc.

⁴⁵ M. Durić, “Sprega mladosti i filmskog iskustva” [Combination of Youth and Film Experience], *Politika* (5 August 1975), 10.

In addition to films in which WWI appears fragmentary,⁴⁶ the image of Serbian cinematography about this event would not be complete without referring to *St. George Shoots the Dragon* (*Sveti Georgije ubiva aždahu*, 2009) directed by Srđan Dragojević, which was announced as a project of national importance. The plot of the film covers the period of the Balkan Wars and the First World War until the Battle of Cer. In addition to depicting battles, as opposed to the “male world of war”, there is a love triangle between the main actors in the film. At the end, two widowed women pull a cart with the corpses of men killed in battle. A strong message is conveyed about the futility of war; it is ironically presented that only in Serbia one can experience five seasons – autumn, winter, spring, summer, and war. The season of war has been going on for a long time, and the reason for it is not the liberation of the Serbian people but the inevitability of the “Balkan-Serbian *fatum*”,⁴⁷ which people from this region cannot avoid. The myth of Kosovo and the sacrifice for own country was changed and turned into the martyrdom of the soldiers from Cer.⁴⁸

III

Martyr’s death, the ultimate sacrifice for the country, and the futility of war conflict marked films about the First World War in various national cinematographies. These segments are also present in another Balkan film production, which, in addition to war depictions, did not miss the opportunity to provide overly negative and stereotypical notions about its neighbor and centuries-old enemy.⁴⁹ Similar to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and later of Yugoslavia, Greece until the Second World War had directors who acquired the craft abroad, while they mostly worked independently and without the help of the

⁴⁶ WWI is also the theme of the films: *Where the Yellow Lemon Blooms* (*Gde cveta limun žut*, 2006) by Zdravko Šotra which is a feature-length documentary, the drama *Convalescents* (*Rekonvalescenti*, 2006) based on a short story by Dragiša Vasić, the most expensive title of Serbian film industry *Charleston & Vendetta* (*Čarlston za Ognjenku*, 2008), and *Solemn Promise* (*Besa*, 2009) by Srđan Karanović which was Oscar-nominated.

⁴⁷ Daković, “Mythomoteur”, 154.

⁴⁸ The myth of Kosovo found its way in the resurrection of a Serbian soldier from Cer, the Albanian coast, and the Macedonian Front. This important element of Serbian national consciousness was noticed by some allies, war journalists who covered the exploits of the Serbian army on the Macedonian Front, such as John Reed and Harry Collinson Owen – Dž. Rid, *Rat u Srbiji 1915*. [The War in Eastern Europe] (Cetinje: Obod, 1975), 54; H. Collinson Owen, *Salonica and After: the Side Show that Ended the War* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1919), 136.

⁴⁹ In Greek popular discourse, a *Turk* is almost synonymous with the word *enemy*: P. Mini, “The Image of the Turk in Greek Fiction Cinema: an Overview”, *Études Balkaniques* 53 (2017), 55.

state. However, in matters of national interest, such as the operations of the Greek army in Asia Minor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided in 1919 to make a film that would serve propaganda purposes. The three Gaziadi brothers, whose family was originally from Constantinople, went to the front line the following year and made the first feature-length silent film *Greek Miracle* (Το ελληνικόν θαύμα, 1922), which consisted of authentic footage of the war.⁵⁰ Another Greek director tried his hand at directing a film with the same theme, using authentic shots made by war photographers in Asia Minor. Achilleas Madras as well as the Gaziadi brothers was originally from Istanbul, which was certainly an additional impetus in the creative enthusiasm for the tragedy of the Greek people in today's Turkey. His film *War Refugees* (Πρόσφυγες του πολέμου, 1921) showed the operations of the Greek army from the winter of 1920 until the final collapse of Asia Minor, which ended with scenes of persecution.

Until the Second World War, the two mentioned directors remained dominant in shaping the memory of WWI, while their productions took the form of feature films. They pointed out the profound changes that the war had left on society, while in the film *The Downpour* (Η μπόρα, 1929) the tragedy of the Greek people was shown through a love triangle.⁵¹ Also during the later period, the Greek movie about WWI did not leave the scenes of persecution of the Greek population of Asia Minor, while some dealt with the issues of integration of refugees into Greek society, which did not always receive a warm welcome from their compatriots. Movie *1922* (1978) of Nikos Koundouros is based on the novel "Number 31328" written by Elias Venezis, who spent 14 months in a Turkish labor camp. Additionally, the film is enriched with true stories of people who survived an event better known in Greek historiography as the Asia Minor Catastrophe. This is the last phase of the Greco-Turkish war (1919–1922), which ended with the massacre and deportation of the Greek population. The film won great awards at the Thessaloniki International Film Festival,⁵² despite

⁵⁰ M. Arkolakis, "Οι αδελφοί Γαζιάδη: η εμφάνιση των βιομηχανικών ταινιών στην Ελλάδα του Μεσοπολέμου" [Gaziadi Brothers: The Appearance of Feature Films in Interwar Greece], *The Athens Review of Books* 63 (2015), 41.

⁵¹ As in the Croatian film *Life Goes On*, the story follows two Greek soldiers who are fighting side by side in Asia Minor. After severe injuries, one suggested to his comrade-in-arms to leave him behind. With a promise that he will take care of his spouse, he leaves unaware that his fellow soldier has survived. After he falls in love with the wife of his best friend, with whom he starts living together. The surviving soldier finally came to his hometown, but when he realized the new situation, he leaves for good while nobody was aware of his comeback: V. Karalis, *A History of Greek Cinema* (New York: Continuum, 2012), 20.

⁵² The film won hearts and an audience award. However, it should be borne in mind that several decades of conflict were not enough to heal wounds, especially if they are reopened by events such as the Istanbul pogrom in 1955 when the Turks expelled the remaining Greek population of Istanbul and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Besides, Thessaloniki,

being sharply criticized for its “lack of political sobriety”⁵³ and censorship that banned it for several years.

Koundouros’ film showed a great deal of passion for traumatic events, as did other similar titles in the first decades of the post-war period.⁵⁴ However, there have been attempts by some film directors to strive for a more objective approach, emphasizing the humanity of ordinary people. A typical example is *The Odyssey of an Uprooted Man* (Η Οδύσσεια ενός ξεριζωμένου, 1969), where the protagonist, a refugee from Asia Minor who grew up in Greece, wants to return to Turkey to find his father who was captured by the Turks in 1922. On the way, he is helped by various Turkish characters which therefore win the sympathy of the audience, while the conflict of 1919–1922 is presented as “an unfortunate circumstance that has made both sides unhappy.”⁵⁵ In addition, the film emphasizes the cultural ties between the two countries, which are especially reflected in the music; in one scene the protagonist listens to well-known among refugees oriental songs called *amanes*, while in another he sings one mixing Greek and Turkish words.⁵⁶ Also worth mentioning are *The Weeping Meadow* (Το λιβάδι που δακρύζει, 2004), as well as *Smyrna, the Destruction of a Cosmopolitan City, 1900–1922* (Σμύρνη, η καταστροφή μιας κοσμοπολίτικης πόλης, 1900–1922, 2012). The Greek tragedy is reflected in *The Weeping Meadow* through the story of a family from WWI to the civil war in Greece (1946–1949). The film shows the fate of refugees, the exchange of population between the two sides, and the social problems they faced. The historical documentary of Maria Iliou about

as well as the north of Greece itself, has been always traditionally populated by refugees who just made up a large part of that same audience.

⁵³ The film shows an extremely negative image of the Turks, “cutthroats and rapists”: M. Chalkou, “1922 (Νίκος Κούνδουρος, 1978)” [1922 (Nikos Koundouros, 1978)]. In *Λεξικό λογοκρισίας στην Ελλάδα: καχεκτική δημοκρατία, δικτατορία, μεταπολίτευση*, ed. P. Petsini & D. Christopoulos (Athens: Kastaniotis, 2018), 531.

⁵⁴ More moderate, but again quite a one-sided representation of the Turkish side in the conflict, could be spotted in the films: *Persecution* (Διωγμός, 1964) with images of Smyrna in flames and the forced deportation of Greeks from the coast of Asia Minor, *Heavy is the Curse of Discord* (Βαριά κατάρα ο διχασμός, 1968) about the attempts of a Greek veteran to find peace, *Uprooted Generation* (Ξεριζωμένη γενιά, 1968) about the efforts of family members who were separated during the deportation to find each other, while a similar theme is also in the films *The Refugee* (Ο πρόσφυγας, 1969), *Refugee Girl on the Run* (Κυνηγημένη προσφυγοπούλα, 1969) and *The Woman of Smyrna* (Η Σμυρνια, 1969): Y. G. S. Papadopoulos, “Uprootedness as an Ethnic Marker and the Introduction of Asia Minor as an Imaginary Topos in Greek Films”. In *Ottoman Legacies in the Contemporary Mediterranean: the Balkans and the Middle East Compared*, ed. E. Ginio – K. Kaser (Jerusalem: The European Forum at the Hebrew University, 2013), 340–341.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 341–343.

⁵⁶ Mini, “The Image”, 60.

Smyrna represents a refreshment in a series of films about Asia Minor. With a much more moderate image of the *Other*, while avoiding traditional images and stereotypes that are free of nationalist charge, the film is about the downfall of Smyrna, a city where Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Jews, and many others have lived together for centuries.⁵⁷

Greek cinematography about the First World War fully looks back at the end of the Greek-Turkish conflict that culminated in the summer of 1922 with the killing and persecution of the Greek population. Moreover, it not only refers to the very end but also completely to the Greco-Turkish war. In other words, there was no place in cinematography for war events before 1918. This phenomenon can be explained by the initial Greek unwillingness to enter the conflict, and then by the rapid Turkish capitulation in October 1918, which thwarted the expansionist aspirations of Athens. For the Greeks, the Greco-Turkish war was a natural continuation of the European conflict and an opportunity for the liberation of the “Greek holy lands”.⁵⁸ The films mostly failed to bypass nationalist aspirations and egocentrism, as well as the usual stereotypical images, which were also the features of some Serbian war films. However, there were some more realistic representations of the *enemy*, as well as the placement of ordinary people as heroes in the center of the story. The tragedy of the Greek people is personified in the characters of the protagonists who lost their property, their freedom, and finally, their lives. A common motif is an attempt of the main characters to connect with their previous lives, while some are looking for missing members of their families. Following the example of other world productions, love appears as a component that defies death and national hatred.

Greece sought its interpretations of Ottoman rule in the Balkans, while Serbia encountered the same stumbling block in radical notions of Princip. Interpretations of this kind are no different from the rest of the world; it would be enough to think of fascist ridicule in Charlie Chaplin’s comedies. Each of these national productions used the seventh art to promote its ideology. Another common feature is that the initial achievements of the two Balkan cinematographies were mostly independent works of newly trained domestic film directors. However, unlike in Greece where from time to time existed the support of the state, Serbian traditional film did not enjoy or at least did not have to a large extent the

⁵⁷ A. Koutsourakis & M. Steven, *The Cinema of Theo Angelopoulos* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 144.

⁵⁸ About the tradition of WWI in Greek collective memory, see J. Tomašević, *Veliki rat i “mali” čovek: svedočenja srpskih vojnika* [Great War and “Little” Man: Testimonies of Serbian Soldiers], (Novi Sad: Prometej, 2018), 278–279.

support of the king, and then the communist regime, which was more in favor of making partisan movies. During the years of the common state, only some titles about the Serbian army from 1914–1918 made their way through a mass of red five-pointed stars. Even the fall of communism did not automatically mean the beginning of serious production. In the years that followed, the memory of the First World War was largely reworked, reshaped, and re-instilled and it was used for inflammatory propaganda at the moment when the conflict flared and when the people of former Yugoslav republics were searching again for their national identities.

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The March on Rome and its Consequences. Views of Yugoslav Contemporaries

Abstract: This paper looks at the Yugoslav public's reactions to the rise of fascism and Mussolini's coming to power in Italy. The main source for the analysis of this change at the top of power structure have been texts published in the contemporary Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian daily press, periodicals and publications. Among their authors were active diplomats of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, influential political figures of diverse political leanings. Observation of the rise of fascism, its violent "methodology" of disposing of its political rivals, the misplaced response of the traditional centres of power and the ceding of ground to the fascists caused concern on the east side of the Adriatic over further radicalization of Italian nationalism and irredentist claims in spite of the obligations assumed under the treaties concluded by the two governments.

Keywords: Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Italy, Dalmatia, irredentism, fascism, Fiume/Rijeka question, nationalism

The presence and importance of Italian affairs in the political, public and cultural discourse of the Yugoslav state at the very beginning of its existence emerged as significant even to those environments which, on account of their historical, geographical and political distinctiveness, had not seen relations with the Kingdom of Italy as a priority before the unification of 1918. This was the case with the public in the part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS) which had formed part of the Kingdom of Serbia until 1918. The experience of Serbian politicians with the Italian allies since 1915 included a traumatic encounter with their political and territorial claims during the First World War, during the diplomatic struggle of the Yugoslav delegation at the Peace Conference and in the first post-war years.¹ Disputes and unresol-

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¹ This problem has been much discussed by historians on both sides of the Adriatic, to mention but a few relevant titles: A. Mitrović, *Jugoslavija na konferenciji mira u Parizu 1919–1920* (Belgrade: Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika SR Srbije, 1969); D. Šepić, *Italija, saveznici i jugoslavensko pitanje, 1914–1918* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1970); B. Krizman, *Vanjska politika jugoslavenske države 1918–1941. Diplomatsko-historijski pregled* (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1975), 9–11, 22–30, 38–43; D. R. Živojinović, *America, Italy and the Birth of Yugoslavia (1917–1919)* (Boulder: East European

ved issues (Istria, Zadar/Zara, Rijeka/Fiume, Adriatic islands etc.) became the central foreign-policy problem for the Yugoslav government, with a considerable impact on intra-political relations between the Yugoslav political and national centres. Besides, they required that the public be acquainted better and in more detail with Italy's complicated post-war political and social situation. An important role in this was played by the press, especially the most influential dailies (*Politika*, *Vreme*, *Pravda*)² and magazines (*Nova Evropa*, *Srpski književni glasnik*, *Jugoslavenska njiva*, *Misao*), among the contributors of which were representatives of Yugoslav diplomacy and politics. Analyses of the consequences and nature of the fascist coup, including considerations of their effects on Yugoslav-Italian relations, were largely the product of a thorough familiarity with Italian circumstances, often with a more careful and more in-depth approach than the one that should have been offered by official foreign policy. Some of the authors (Živojin Balugdžić, Jovan Jovanović-Pižon, Ivo Andrić) were active or former diplomats and their texts can therefore only in part be seen as "expressing a personal view". Their observations about the rise of fascism in Italy served as a basis for writing this paper. The fact that most of the Yugoslav diplomatic material from the period under study is lost makes their importance for understanding the Yugoslav views on the new regime even greater.

Nationalism, "a powerful factor in moments of general agitation"

In the period immediately preceding the "March on Rome", the Yugoslav and especially Serbian public was focused on an important commemoration, the tenth anniversary of the Serbian victory at the Battle of Kumanovo in the First Balkan War. Apart from the developments in Italy, public attention was also focused on the political crisis in Greece, caused by her defeat in the war with Turkey,³ and on improving relations with Bulgaria.⁴ Albanian bands kept on making raids across the Yugoslav border; in Hungary, after the quelling of the commune in

Quarterly, 1972; D. R. Živojinović, *La Dalmazia o morte: italijanska okupacija jugoslovenskih zemalja 1918–1923* (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2012); M. Cattazuzza, *L'Italia e il confine orientale 1866–2006* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007), 128–167.

² We shall limit ourselves to only a few most influential dailies and periodicals published in Belgrade and Zagreb.

³ R. Klog, *Istorija Grčke novog doba* (Belgrade: CLIO, 2000), 101, 102.

⁴ The signing of the treaty with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in March 1923, among other things, cost the Bulgarian prime minister, Stamboliiski, his life as early as June that year. He was killed in a military coup with the support of the IMRO. In September there was a communists uprising which was also brutally quelled. See D. Popov et al., *Istorija Bugarske*, ed. S. Pirivatrić (Belgrade: CLIO, 2008), 315, 317; A. Pitassio, *Storia della Bulgaria contemporanea* (Passignano: Aguaplano, 2012), 30–32.

Budapest and the Entente's intervention, Admiral Miklosz Horthy consolidated his power, with attempts at "partial restoration" of the Habsburgs. These three neighbouring states, plus Austria, became a zone of Italian political interest and of creating a revisionist "bloc" aimed at obliterating the results of the Paris peace treaties. An important factor in the destabilization of the Kingdom of SCS was Italy's sponsorship, especially after Mussolini's rise to power, of separatist political and military organizations (Kosovo Committee; J. Franks's followers in Croatia; IMRO; supporters of the Petrović dynasty in Montenegro).⁵ To top it all, an "internal political front" was opened (the Law on the Protection of the State; the raising of the "Croatian question"; a rift in Serbian political parties; difficulties involved in the country's economic unification etc.).

During the First World War Benito Mussolini advocated the full implementation of the terms of the London Treaty of April 1915. He stated his views on the issue in 1915, in the article "Italia, Serbia e Dalmazia" published in *Il Popolo d'Italia* on 6 April 1915.⁶ In the summer of 1917, in the same daily, he attacked the Corfu Declaration and the Serbian government, denying the Slavic character and existence of the South-Slavic population in Istria, Gorizia and the environs of Trieste.⁷ He demanded, "for reasons of strategic security", that some territories – the Dalmatian islands and the Dalmatian coast down to the Neretva river – be secured for Italy "once and for all". After the Italian disaster at Caporetto in October 1917, he became somewhat more moderate as regards the Adriatic question, advocating, in 1918, contacts with the South Slavs in Austria-Hungary. Serbia again was an allied country which took upon itself the responsibility to unify the South Slavs.⁸ In 1918–20, relations between Italy and the Kingdom of SCS were marked by discontents, anxieties and doubts about the possibility of normalization as a result of the Italian occupation of a part of the eastern Adriatic coast, the capture of Rijeka by D'Annunzio's stormers, border disputes, the oppression of the local minorities. The signing of the Rapallo Treaty in November 1920 did not bring the expected improvement, and the

⁵ On the ties of D'Annunzio and Sforza with the anti-Yugoslav emigration in 1919–1920, see M. Bucarelli, "Delenda Jugoslavia". D'Annunzio, Sforza e gli 'intrighi balcanici' del '19-'20", *Nuova storia contemporanea* 6 (2002), 19–34. For the later period and the support of Mussolini's regime to these movements, see S. Troebst, *Mussolini, Makedonien und die Mächte 1922–1930. Die "Innere Makedonische Revolutionäre Organisation" in der Südosteuropapolitik des faschistischen Italien* (Cologne, Vienna: Böhlau, 1987).

⁶ B. Mussolini, "Italia, Serbia e Dalmazia", *Il Popolo d'Italia*, 6 Apr. 1915. See also in M. Bucarelli, "Mussolini, la questione Adriatica e il fallimento dell'interventismo democratico", *Nuova rivista storica* XCV/1 (2011), 1–5.

⁷ Bucarelli, "Mussolini, la questione Adriatico", 18, 19.

⁸ E. Milak, *Italija i Jugoslavija 1931–1937* (Belgrade: ISI, 1987), 19–21; Bucarelli, "Mussolini, la questione Adriatico", 25, 26.

document was harshly criticized as capitulatory by the Yugoslav public. In Italy, in much the same way, the leader of the fascist movement decried the agreement as the “capitulation of the Italian government”, a “short-lived and ephemeral” document, announcing its “revision”.⁹

Until 1922 the new ideological and political phenomenon, fascism, was referred to in Serbian and other Yugoslav newspapers and periodicals, sporadically at first and then ever more frequently, as the most radical actor of Italian irredentist anti-Yugoslav politics on the rise.¹⁰ Its followers drew attention to themselves by violent, destructive actions against the Slovenian and Croatian institutions and their members in Istria, Zadar, Rijeka, Trieste. They quickly took the place hitherto reserved for the traditional nationalists and pushed their “forerunner”, D’Annunzio, out of the way. The press covered the fascists’ ever more conspicuous attendance at the rallies of the nationalists and irredentists, their brutal showdown with the left and rapid taking of the political space.

In January 1922, in an issue of the periodical *Misao* (Thought), the first president of the Serbian Social Democratic Party, journalist and writer Dragiša Lapčević, sees Italian Balkan policy as the consequence of a failed colonial adventure. He argues that the “world war” was a godsend to Italy and that she, “under the pressure of economic difficulties, claims territories in the Balkans so that she may send there some of her demographic ‘surplus’ in a ‘parasitic rôle.’ What lies behind is her intention to close the Adriatic Sea to all competitors and gain a ‘de facto monopoly’ of it”. Italy “is in a hurry to destroy the illusion of the state of Fiume... and to annex it; so she does not honour the agreement concluded in Rapallo, so the fascist rage is crushing up our national element in the seized regions... organizing incidents... She is the biggest threat to the peace in the European south-east today.”¹¹

In mid-May, Živojin Balugdžić, a diplomat of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of SCS/Yugoslavia, and an influential foreign affairs analyst,¹²

⁹ For Mussolini’s criticisms of the Rapallo Treaty at the regional assembly of fascists for Venice held in Trieste on 6 February 1921, see Milak, *Italija i Jugoslavija*, 24. The negotiations at Santa Margherita conducted from March to October 1922 were concluded by the signing of the conventions, among the results of which, after their ratification by the Italian Senate on 21 February 1923, was the withdrawal of Italian troops from the rest of the occupied Yugoslav territory in Dalmatia, see Živojinović, *Dalmazia o morte*, 421–423.

¹⁰ On the irredenta, see Živojinović, *Dalmazia o morte*, 273–309. Before the opening of the conference in Paris in January 1919, Mussolini, following the example of D’Annunzio and the editor of *Corriere della sera*, L. Albertini, published an epistle to the Dalmatians in *Il Popolo d’Italia*, *ibid.*, 312, 365.

¹¹ D. Lapčević, “Italija na Balkanu”, *Misao* IV/2 (Belgrade), 16 Jan. 1922, 134–136.

¹² Ž. Balugdžić, “Politika Italije pre i posle rata”, *Srpski književni glasnik* (SKG) n.s., VI/2 (Belgrade), 16 May 1922, 109–118. Živojin Balugdžić (1868–1941) pursued law studies in Belgrade and Geneva. From 1903, he served as secretary to king Peter Karadjordjević, head of the press

writes in the *Srpski književni glasnik* (Serbian Literary Herald) that Italian nationalism is a “modern... movement... grafted onto the vague aspirations of older generations” who saw in irredentism “an ‘emotion’ rather than a task that ought to be fulfilled”. Rijeka, which has become the focus of irredentist politics after the war, “had no role whatsoever in the nationalist developments before 1914”. In the psychosis of overheated nationalism, “it is this vagueness of feelings... emotions that in a social and political setting such as Italian necessarily becomes a powerful factor in moments of general agitation”.¹³ In Balugdžić’s perception of Italian collective political psychology an important role is played by the “emotionality of the masses”, in which “all practical programmes of political groups dissolved quickly” before Italy’s entry into the war. Italy is “still under the pressure of the emotional restlessness which, three years ago, propelled a strange mixture of elements called fascism to the surface”. It has managed to re-melt and absorb all earlier nationalist and irredentist elements. It has not been content to conquer home turf. Mussolini has been working “energetically... on making fascism a factor which would steer the government’s foreign policy”.¹⁴ Balugdžić links the growing influence of fascism and related groups to the weakening of the Socialist Party. Thus, “there is no seriously organized group left to oppose fascism.” The socialists have been willing to support any government which would “declare war on the fascists”, whereas the *Popolari* have been reluctant for fear that “the removal of fascism might strengthen the socialist current too much”. After Giovanni Giolitti and Carlo Sforza stepped down, their successors have proved unable to resist the pressures of fascism. Thus Italy has found herself in a “*cercle vicieux*, because the internal economic difficulties make fascism stronger, while preventing Italy from devoting herself to internal consolidation through getting her foreign affairs in order”. He believed that such a situation was untenable in the long run and expected a resolution.¹⁵

Commenting on Balugdžić’s views on 16 August 1922, an anonymous author lays some of the responsibility for the poor relations between the two countries on Yugoslavia, and finds justification for the emergence of fascism.

bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Serbia, consul, legation minister. He was retired in 1935. In 1926 he served as Yugoslav minister in Rome, but was recalled in 1927 because of his conflict with Mussolini. He later was appointed minister of the Kingdom of SCS in Berlin. An interesting and detailed, though occasionally acerbic, portrait of his was penned by Miloš Crnjanski, who, at the beginning of Balugdžić’s long service in Berlin, was a correspondent of the press bureau; see M. Crnjanski, *Embassade I-III* (Belgrade: Nolit, 1984), 7–162. Balugdžić was also one of the main foreign affairs analysts for Belgrade’s daily *Politika*, publishing his texts under the pseudonym “XYZ”.

¹³ Balugdžić, “Politika Italije”, 115.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., 118.

The Italian internal crisis is “essentially an economic problem... to a very small extent a consequence of *the romantic period* [original emphasis]... as Mr Balugdžić conveys... the words of the leader of Italian fascism”. “Nationalism and fascism in Italy... [is] ‘romantic’ only secondarily... it saved that country, injured by war, from a revolution; in foreign policy, it quite logically corresponded to the pre-war imperialist territorial understanding of diplomacy of the Great Powers in Europe.” The London Treaty “was completely in the spirit of the well-known Russian, English and French ambitions”. “Keeping an eye on our aspirations”, Italy “could not renounce it completely” because of, among other things, her “diplomats and politicians... that they could become convinced so soon of the good intentions and statesmanship abilities of Austria-Hungary’s successors”.¹⁶ The anonymous author’s proposal was to “neutralize” Italian imperialism by accepting the Italian demographic “surplus” and settling them “in the interior of our large but underpopulated country”. The author’s conclusion was that “fascism and nationalism in Italy are ‘a necessary evil’ which will be channelled into action in favour of the true interests of the Italian people, essentially one of the most peaceable nations, and therefore, if there is a will on both sides to cooperate in the interest of the progress of both countries, the protection of our population under the Italians will be secured”.¹⁷

In an October issue of *Nova Evropa* (New Europe), released before the March on Rome, the Croatian and Yugoslav politician Josip Smodlaka expresses his doubts about Sforza and Giolitti’s assurances of Italy’s readiness to settle the dispute with the Kingdom of SCS by agreement since she has already secured Trieste, Pula/Pola and Gorizia for herself, and the status of a free city for Rijeka.¹⁸ There is in the Kingdom of SCS “no imperialist party comparable to the Italian nationalists who, spurning the will of the people whose fate is in question, demand, contrary to every national and democratic principle, the annexation of the South-Slavic coast of the Adriatic, the Greek islands of the Archipelago [the Dodecanese], Asia Minor etc.”¹⁹ He condemns the brutal treatment of the Sou-

¹⁶ ***, “Italija i mi”, SKG, n.s., VI/2, 16 May 1922, 603–608. That Mussolini’s coming to power was “Italy’s salvation” from “Bolshevik revolution” was also the view held by West-European governments immediately after the March on Rome; E. Gentile, “The March on Rome: How Antifascists Understood the Origins of Totalitarianism (and Coined the Word)”. In *Gaetano Salvemini Colloquium/Harvard University*, eds. Renato Camurri & Charles Maier (Rome: Viella, 2013), 28, quotes from Salvemini’s letter from Paris of 11 November 1922: “Everybody is on cloud nine because they all believe fascism ... defeated bolshevism.”

¹⁷ ***, “Italija i mi”, 608.

¹⁸ J. Smodlaka, “Talijansko-južnoslovenski sporazum”, *Nova Evropa* (NE) 1/3, 14 Oct. 1922, 99–110.

¹⁹ According to Smodlaka, *ibid.*, 99, it is “not an accident” that after the publication of Wilson’s message to the Italian people “Messrs Sonnino, Barzilai, Luzzati, Nathan and Meyer, the five great

th-Slavic population and their institutions in the areas incorporated into Italy in 1918–19. In his view, the Italian “old-style” politicians are looking in a wrong direction, watching “the world through the old eyes” (again) and seeking, for the fulfilment of their maximalist demands, an alliance with “Germany against the Slavic world”. He argues, in a passage written in an anti-Semitic tone, that some of the blame for that policy lies with “Italian-Jewish imperialists”, those of them who have “close family, business and mental ties with Hungarian and German-Austrian Jews”. Italy is behind the Albanian bands’ cross-border raids under the command of Italian officers, behind the supporters of the ex-king of Montenegro, Nicholas, behind the actions of “Bulgarian komitadji”, the “Hungarian red army”, behind the stirring of Muslims in Old Serbia to rebellion, Italy supports “Radić’s fickle republicans in Croatia”.²⁰ Yugoslavia and Italy have a common and by far the most dangerous enemy: Germany, “from which Austria is only temporarily separated”. Germany, once recovered, will once again begin her drive to the East and South-East, the “three main directions of her expansion” being Trieste, Thessaloniki and Constantinople.²¹

Fascism as a “state of collective exaltation”

In early September 1922, Miodrag Ristić, quite an expert on Italian circumstances, was sent to Italy by the most influential liberally-oriented Belgrade daily, *Politika*, as its special correspondent, and began to publish his “Letters from Italy”.²² His first report deals in detail with the Italian economy, demography, dire consequences of war, and economic and social crisis. He remarks that the Italian people “has never before – since the very beginnings of the Risorgimento until today – been as national... as dynamic as it is now, since the end of the war onwards...” Whereas the older generation feared that the tremendous war effort might lead to national disintegration, it is younger generations, “those who will try one day, probably, to misuse this action of theirs... who have won a victory over the older generations”.²³

In Trieste, he observes the atmosphere of “neglect, lethargy, something dead”, a city which, once annexed to Italy, has seen an economic decline and lost

Jews and even greater Slavophobes, not to mention Sem Benelli and other second-rate greats, found themselves at the head of the nationalist protests and furious anti-Slav movement in Italy”.

²⁰ Ibid., 101, 102. On the contacts of Carlo Sforza, foreign minister of the Kingdom of Italy (1920–21) and D’Annunzio with separatists from the Kingdom of SCS, see Bucarelli, “Delenda Jugoslavia”, 19–34.

²¹ Ibid.

²² During the First World War Miodrag Ristić found refuge in Italy, where he met Mussolini in the spring of 1918; M. Ristić, “Beneto (!) Musolini”, *Politika*, 4 Nov. 1922.

²³ M. Ristić, “Šta sam video u Italiji. Pismo Politici”, *Politika*, 6 Sept. 1922.

its former role. Apart from young people “entertaining themselves patriotically” and a flagging commercial activity, “one cannot help noticing the building of the ‘National Hall’ burnt down... with only its walls still standing” – the former seat of “all Slovenian associations in Trieste, a savings bank, a theatre, a hotel, and the offices of a few Slovenian trading societies”.²⁴ On the Lido of Venice he watches the wasteful luxurious life of the aristocracy and the “nobility by money”.²⁵ In Bologna he sees gangs of youths armed with sticks; in the shop windows of “haberdashery stores you can see such sticks displayed most prominently... I knew that those lads with sticks were fascists who carried them as visible weapons by day because, if need be, they had other weapons, smaller and not made of wood”.²⁶

One of the first who offered more exhaustive information about the genesis, ideology and “methodology of violence” of the fascists was Vojislav Gerasimović in an article (“Italian fascists”) which the *Politika* borrowed from the SKG and published on 16 September 1922.²⁷ Gerasimović provides a brief history of Mussolini’s movement, which was created after two and a half years of a vehement campaign in *Il Popolo d’Italia* “against Bolshevik phenomena”, when he founded cells of the “Italian Fasces of Combat”. During a few months of a “bloody civil guerrilla” war, by the end of 1921 and beginning of 1922, the fascists thwarted the Italian communists’ “sporadic attempts” to carry out an overthrow. In the next parliamentary election they won 34 of 533 seats, but have soon become the most active and most dangerous opponent of every government.²⁸ Their political weight is such that “no government in Rome can survive without making some concessions to the fascists”. The explanation for that is the “abnormal” post-war situation in Italy and the political dynamism of the leader of the fascist movement, “a Caesarist personality par excellence... the epitome of a man of idea and strength”, with a great demagogic talent. In a situation such as Italian, he has been able to “sway all sorts of disaffected people, now inflaming, now taming their rampant energies... this best organizer and most eloquent tribune of Italy”. Some of the responsibility for the extent and rapidity of fascist expansion lies with the Giolitti government, which thought the fascists could be of use in putting a stop to the bolshevization of Italy.²⁹ “An excellent political psychologist”, Mussolini calls himself a “revolutionary,

²⁴ M. Ristić, “Šta sam video u Italiji”, *Politika*, 17 Sept. 1922.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ V. Gerasimović, “Talijanski fašisti”, *Politika*, 16 Sept. 1922. *Politika* borrowed excerpts from his article originally published under the same title in SKG VII/I, Sept.–Dec. 1922, 146–149.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

but like Mazzini; a republican, but only in his aspirations; a trade unionist; but first and foremost, an Italian”.³⁰ Fascist ideologues and propagandists emphasize that their nationalism is different from that of the conservatives; that they speak about the struggle against those who got rich during the war; that they are for the abolition of large landed estates and a gradual liberation of the peasantry, for free trade. But they cleverly mask their “imperialism, tougher even than that of the nationalists, under the guise of a panegyric to the spreading of Roman culture, and the necessary placement of Italian emigrants, workers and peasants who ought to be protected and employed in the areas taken from the ‘deceived Italy’ by ‘greedy’ allies and ‘wild’ neighbours”. With the help of the state and financed by “terrified industrialists”, “willing or coerced”, they have been influential in swaying a part of the working class by promises, while stirring their disappointment at the inactivity of the socialists. The success of the fascist political minority comes from their ability “to take advantage of the situation because of the insufficient activity of the other parties. An organized minority impose their will on the anaemic majority”. Fascist foreign policy is based on the assertion that Italy “has so far been humiliated and insulted everywhere. Nice, Tunisia, the former German colonies, Dalmatia and Rijeka – she lays claim to all of that and should get that as soon as possible – fascism argues”. The plan is to be carried out through Italy’s internal strengthening and an adventurous, revisionist foreign policy. Gerasimović’s cautiously concludes that such politics may have “some success” among the “sensitive and ill-informed Italians because of the overblown ambitions of a people whose unification was achieved relatively easily and because of a huge lack of knowledge about the neighbouring peoples”.³¹

Shortly before the fascists took power, Miodrag Ristić revisited the question of the “moral state of Italian society”. Particularly influential in causing a collective psychological, social and political trauma has been the experience of the First World War, which the Italian socialists have failed to understand. Ristić believes that they “mostly ruined socialism as a party – if not as an idea – and provided one of the crucial conditions for the dizzying success of fascism”. Fascism “became aware, more than nationalism itself, of that victory... it exploited it to its own advantage the most and in the most expedient way”, it became “its apologist... giving rise to this current social... state of *collective exaltation*”. What “outsiders and friends of the Italian people” will think about that collective exaltation is another matter, “but Italian society itself, its bourgeois part in particular, feel themselves to be in a new moral state which largely makes them self-satis-

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

fied”.³² In such an “exalted society”, fascism, violent in itself, “and extremely, both in procedure and in conception”, has imposed itself; only the Italian countryside and the “unswerving communist ranks” have remained out of its reach. The rest of Italian society “either... fully accept the ferocities of fascism or at least endure them without protest”. Entire middle and higher strata of the urban population, who in 1919 and 1920, in spite of Bolshevik phenomena, remained unswayed by nationalism, the “absolute precursor of fascism... and countless individuals” are now extreme nationalists and fully under the sway of fascism, spiritually and materially”. Hard-working urban families, peaceful only yesterday, “sensible until two years ago, now delightedly accept fascism as a personal, social and national blessing, and praise its procedures, perfectly violent”. Fascism “has enchanted” the young post-war generations, “has given them, at least they believe it has, both the greatest self-confidence and the greatest strength”; they join its punitive expeditions, which take place “on a daily basis”. “In this state of collective exaltation are older people, too, and not only men but also women, from the bourgeois and civil service strata. “Almost the entire people” make up the audience at their public rituals, which they perform on a daily basis, and there, side by side with fascists, one can see soldiers and officers of the Italian armed forces; so it appears that, with few exceptions, the military, too, “by its moral state, belongs to fascism”. Ristić points out “that the army is conspicuously passive even in front of the most violent and most brutal acts of fascists”. His assessment, which soon proved to be accurate – and fatal to the further course of events in Italy, was: “The Italian army cannot turn its arms against fascists. It could fire even at Garibaldi; it could make it seem that it fired at D’Annunzio; it cannot fire at fascism: no one can make it do that.”³³

In his report of 11 October Ristić finds that “the whole of Italian society is in the sign of fascism”. Fascists state openly “that the ‘liberal state’ must make way for the ‘fascist state’”.³⁴ The new Italian reality, created by the storm of fascism and the weakness of the Italian liberal governments, unable and unwilling to combat it but also with no prospect of collaborating with it, is “a fact of the first order”. Fascism has acquired an “untouchable” and “sacrosanct position” by doing such things and in such a way that “in domestic and foreign policy relations... no government aware of its great responsibilities for its country can collaborate with it”. “Even if such a government, willing to cooperate, happens to be found, it will fail. Both numerically and in its violence... it [fascism] is such today that no government can be its collaborator... [a government] must either

³² M. Ristić, “Šta sam video u Italiji. Moralno stanje italijanskog društva” III, *Politika*, 10 Oct. 1922.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ M. Ristić, “Šta sam video u Rimu”, *Politika*, 11 Oct. 1922.

be with it through and through or at least put up with it." Mussolini has realized what it is that can attract the largest part of bourgeois society: "the paroxysm not of pain, but the paroxysm of exaltation", which no other "social force" has been able or has known how to offer. Socialism, especially in its communist version, has frightened the bourgeoisie, especially its middle strata; democracy of all leanings has been "morally and intellectually" incapable of offering anything of the kind. Fascism has offered the Italian bourgeoisie an assurance that it is the movement which will, using violence amply and gladly, restore the nation's lost self-confidence and "justice, in and out of the country". Ristić notices the process of creating a fascist "martyrology" through emphasizing its sacrifices in its brutal confrontation with communists: "Fascism... celebrates the sacrifices it made. It states openly its readiness to make further sacrifices." Having disposed of the communists, it turned on "traditional socialism, which is fully national, and then started the struggle against democracy... After that, it has had to end here, where, at the very beginning, it did not at all intend to end... an assault on the state itself". The state "privileged all those 'bad plants' fascism fought before it has turned on the state itself".³⁵ Fascists have also been dissatisfied with "giving in" to the allies or with the way in which the Germans in Trentino and the Yugoslavs in Istria are treated ("too tolerantly").

It is too late now, Ristić concludes, for a liberal state to be able to do anything to contain fascism, the evil spirit, the "paroxysm of exaltation", which mostly the government itself released from the bottle of discontent in order to govern more easily. It made that mistake prompted by high circles of industry and capital, frightened by communism. The moments of "collective self-deception on the one hand, and the insufficient intelligence of the bourgeois intelligentsia on the other, have led to fascism being seen as the greatest blessing".³⁶ He asks if it is possible at all for the Italian nation, "so cruelly, tragically steeped in fascism", to neutralize or contain the influence of the fascists by co-opting them into the government. He is not optimistic. Ten days before the dilemma about the relationship between the fascists and the liberal state was resolved the way it was, Ristić thought "with fear" that the negative aspects of fascism would prevail in that struggle. So, "it appears that fascism has to unleash all of its own tragic destructiveness on what it claims to love the most passionately!" – the Italian state.³⁷

A report from Trieste *Politika* published on 22 September warns to the fact that at a rally in Udine Mussolini stated in front of 25,000 fascists that "there is no complete unification of Italy... unless Rijeka, Dalmatia and other lands are

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

returned to us". He threatened that the fascists would make Rome "their own city... clean, disinfected of all corrupt and dirty elements". Peace agreements are not good for Italy; "Italy is lucky to have not only the national but also a fascist army..., and the Italian ministers should not forget that". The fascist "renewal of Italy" leaves aside the question of monarchy: monarchy "can gain nothing at all by being against what nowadays is called fascist revolution".³⁸ On 7 October the *Politika* brings the statement of the Italian foreign minister Carlo Schanzer about the difficult position of Luigi Facta's government, announcing that it will be forced to resign by the end of the month. According to Schanzer, the fascists "are the true masters in Italy today" although they are a minority in both houses of parliament. The government cannot issue any domestic policy regulation without their consent, and their growing influence in the area of foreign policy makes it impossible for the government to run it autonomously. Relinquishing power to the fascists is the "only way to avoid a bloody civil war in Italy".³⁹ This piece of information was promptly denied by the prime minister, Luigi Facta: the government "will remain in office" and "continue to discharge its duty to the end", and it will ensure peace in the country "at all costs".⁴⁰ Mussolini replies from Milan the same day that the government will "soon" be ousted and the unnatural duality of there being two states abolished: "One is liberal, the other is fascist. The former has to make way for the latter. If parliament is not dissolved and an election called, the fascists will do it themselves."⁴¹

After 28 October 1922: From now on the Italian government is fascism only

On the last day of October Miodrag Ristić, in conclusion of his report about the new, fascist government, points out the importance for the Kingdom of SCS of this change in its neighbourhood. "Three days ago fascism... imposed itself from the outside... on the Italian government; from now on the Italian government is fascism only." Under the new circumstances, with a fascist-led government, "concerted efforts should be made nonetheless... to establish contact, normal relations with our Fatherland". Also, "our government has the duty to do all that depends on it to avoid the possibility of the current Italian crisis... affecting our Fatherland harshly, and very roughly. If we sincerely wish to have good relations even with fascist Italy, we must not, even for a moment, let her cause us not just

³⁸ "Ka diktaturi fašizma", *Politika*, 22 Sept. 1922.

³⁹ "Fakta se povlači. Fašisti na vladí", *Politika*, 7 Oct. 1922.

⁴⁰ "Fakta ne ustupa mesto", *Politika*, 9 Oct. 1922.

⁴¹ "Musolini obara vladu", *Politika*, 9 Oct. 1922.

great but any trouble.”⁴² The news of fascists rampaging in Trieste, Rijeka and Sušak, published in the same issue of the *Politika*, was yet another reason for concern. The incursion of a fascist band into Sušak and their attempt to seize a vehicle and attack the Continental Hotel led to a clash with “our nationalists”. Yugoslav border authorities arrested a few fascists who tried to cross into Yugoslavia at Martinšnica; refugees from Rijeka brought the news about the socialist clubs having been set on fire and the threats that Sušak would be attacked.⁴³ Information came from Split that in the night between 8 and 9 October an armed group of Italian fascists crossed into the Yugoslav part of the “third zone” (the demarcation zone) towards Zadar in order to prevent its evacuation at all costs. Added to this news was a report on the demolition and setting on fire of the Slovenian Consumers Cooperative in Renče. Mussolini’s statements that he “will pursue a policy of friendship and faithfully honour the agreements” are not convincing as the fascists attack the border in Istria and threaten Dalmatia – this is the conclusion of the report on the situation on the Yugoslav Adriatic coast where the news of Mussolini’s coming to power have caused very painful feelings, “even some sort of panic”.⁴⁴

Shortly after Mussolini’s takeover, the distinguished politician, ex-minister, diplomat and public figure Jovan Jovanović Pižon published in the SKG, under the pseudonym “Inostrani” (Foreign correspondent) his view of the new situation in Italy.⁴⁵ He enumerates all the promises Mussolini made as regards respecting constitutional order, depoliticizing the armed forces, pacifying fascist violent “activism”, but also the measures for “strengthening the state” with the support of the fascist movement, the state that he, in his very first address at parliament, renamed the “fascist state”, announcing that he wants “full power, just as he takes on full responsibility”. What the Yugoslav public was interested in was the part of his speech about foreign policy in which he emphasized that there were before the Italian legislature two agreements with Yugoslavia: the Rapallo Treaty and the Santa Margherita Conventions; that he found European policy “as regards renewal” bad and that direct trade relations were better than endless “chewing over at conferences”. That Italy’s motto would be “those who want something from Italy must give something in return”, that a strong Italian government and the same kind of politics did not mean “the policy of imperialism but of national interest”. He found the relations with Yugoslavia and Greece to be “correct”. In a statement he gave after the speech, Mussolini said that Yugoslav politics should shift its interest to Thessaloniki. Jovanović concludes pessi-

⁴² M. Ristić, “Ukrštenih mačeva”, *Politika*, 31 Oct. 1922.

⁴³ “Fašiste na vlasti”, *Politika*, 4 Nov. 1922.

⁴⁴ “Fašisti na delu”, *Politika*, 10 Oct. 1922.

⁴⁵ Inostrani [Jovan Jovanović Pižon], “Nova vlada u Italiji”, SKG, n.s. VII/1, 547–549.

mistically that such a “recommendation” is not in contradiction with Mussolini’s views and that “real difficulties” will arise after the ratification of the agreement with the Kingdom of SCS.⁴⁶

The *Politika* editorial of 1 November 1922 harshly criticized the government for “indecisiveness and ignorance” in its political and diplomatic approach to the dispute with Italy. These were characteristics of all governments “from... Mr Stojan Protić’s to the cabinet of Mr [Milenko] Vesnić”. The result was the “worst outcome” for the Kingdom of SCS: the Rapallo Treaty. Neither its form nor its content are something “its creators, those two dead men, can be proud of: Vesnić who died and Trumbić who buried himself politically.”⁴⁷ Not even such an agreement was Italy willing to honour; so new negotiations were launched at Santa Margherita, where the Yugoslav delegation went with the intention to get rid of the Italian military presence in a part of its state territory (evacuation of the “third zone” in Dalmatia) and gain concessions from Italy. The conventions providing for the implementation of the Rapallo Treaty were still unratified when the fascist government took office. This change in Rome gave rise to doubts about the prospect of their ever being ratified. Some of the responsibility for the fact that the agreement was not ratified six months after it had been signed by the Italian government lay with Pašić and Pribićević because of their hesitancy, indecisiveness, lack of knowledge of the Italian situation, and politically tactless actions. In the meantime, the fascists gained ground and became more influential in Italian politics. “The fascist danger was seen by all as the only serious danger; only not by our responsible factors. They assumed that Italy was a well-ordered country and that the cabinet they were negotiating with was a long-lived one.” Some of the blame was also laid on the Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Rome whose reports, propping up such an assumption, added to the somnolence of its government. “So, as in the case of working out the Rapallo agreement, one went from one situation into another with indecision and ignorance, ending up in the most difficult situation – the cabinet of Mr Mussolini.”

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 549.

⁴⁷ “Neodlučnost i neznanje”, *Politika*, 1 Nov. 1922. A few months earlier J. Jovanović-Pižon (“Inostrani”), “Politički pregled. Spoljna politika - Oko Rapalskog ugovora”, *SKG*, n.s., VI/1, May 1922, 65–68, harshly criticized the Treaty of Rapallo signed on 12 November 1920 by: “...Dr M. R. Vesnić, Dr A. Trumbić and Kosta Stojanović in the name of our state, and Giolitti, Sforza and Bonomi in the name of Italy, [which] is not only a bad but also a badly stylized international agreement. Its terms are so unclear that they can be interpreted in all manner of ways, especially when interpreted by such lawyers as Italians.” Jovanović writes that the Italian side negates the status of the port of Baroš, although it is referred to in Sforza’s letter to Trumbić which “is an integral part of the whole agreement... Italy will lose before every international court should she choose to defend her claims in that way. Both this excuse and the one concerning the influence of the fascists on decision making are bad signs and proofs of Italy’s insincerity and unchanged ambition to make us dependent on her in the Adriatic...”

If the conventions happen to be “dishonoured because of the fascist takeover, that sort of politics will also be responsible for the failure. Needless to say, of course, the main culprit for the whole failure is on the other side of the Adriatic, in Rome.”⁴⁸

The *Politika* editorial of 18 November 1922 criticized the head of the Yugoslav Legation in Rome, Vojislav Antonijević. In response to the questions posed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the fascist overthrow came assurances, based on the information supplied by the minister, that the “fascists are no threat whatsoever and the possibility of their coming to power should be ruled out... that the Italian parliamentary groups will, by co-opting them into the government... appease and put them out of action completely”. Antonijević assured his government that Facta would remain in office and that the king had refused his resignation, even though the opposite had already been publicized and known – *urbi et orbi*. At the moment when Mussolini had been given a mandate by the king and formed his cabinet, of which all Italian newspapers wrote at length, Antonijević cabled that the fascist attempt to come to power had failed because the king resisted them and instructed Facta to remain at the head of the government! When the Yugoslav foreign ministry’s attention was called to what was going on and the fact that all news agencies’ reports contradicted the minister’s reports, the ministry expressed doubts about the trustworthiness of the agencies!⁴⁹ This editorial ended with the conclusion that “it is an irony... and, to the European observers of the political circus, the greatest surprise, that our government offered the hungry Italian wolf a meek little lamb in the figure of our minister in Rome, Mr Voj. Antonijević.” He would be more suitable as “head of a consulate... We even believe that Mr Antonijević would, as consul in Corfu, in his capacity as keeper of the military and refugee cemetery, send very good reports to our government on the state of the graves of our martyrs”.⁵⁰

Yet, obliviousness to the true nature of the fascist takeover was not a “privilege” of the Yugoslav minister: the US ambassador to Italy, Richard Child, for example, wrote on 31 October, after the fascists’ triumphant parade: “It’s been a fine revolution of young people here. There is no danger. A lot of enthusiasm and colours. We all liked it.”⁵¹ A few days later he reported to Washington that “never has there been a revolution carried out more quickly and more successfully”. E. Gentile quotes the leading figures of the Italian left, whose comments on the fas-

⁴⁸ *Politika*, 2 Nov. 1922.

⁴⁹ “Naš poslanik u Rimu”, *Politika*, 18 Nov. 1922.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Gentile, “The March on Rome”, 28.

cist march to power were sarcastic and belittling (“opera buffa”, “una carnevalata”, “una parentesi studentesca”).⁵²

Milan Durman, a Marxist intellectual, criticized the influence of fascist “methodology” on some right-wing organizations in Yugoslavia (“which, it is true, have different names but all share the same rationale and a markedly class character”); they were used for suppressing workers’ organizations, as in the case of the “Popular Guard” during the strike of miners in Tuzla. Much the same situation was seen after an attempt on the life of Regent Alexander and the assassination of interior minister Drašković by members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, but in that case it was the authorities that used force. Even so, Durman concluded optimistically that “until the working class rises again... there will be nothing else to do but that which we have in Italy, i.e., the struggle of progress against reactionaries... All regimes and all guards and defences have been unable to stop the course of history, which inevitably brings down those who oppose it, even with Mussolinis temporarily in power”.⁵³ In the same issue of *Nova Evropa*, Bozidar Adžija, another far-left intellectual, saw irredentism as the source of fascism, which then developed with the help of Italian governments. The movement was led by the member of parliament Mussolini “in the spirit of extreme chauvinistic nationalism and imperialism” with the special task of stripping the Slavic areas occupied by Italy (Istria, Gorizia, part of Dalmatia, Primorje) of their Slavic character and “presenting these parts as purely Italian to Europe”. “Thanks to the incapability and senility of our foreign policy”, their method worked “much to the advantage of Italian diplomacy and greatly contributed to the purely our parts being taken from us.” In the earliest days of the fascist movement, prime minister Giolitti used fascists to quell workers’ strikes; fascists also promptly joined in terrorizing the Yugoslav minority. Adžija found that the authorities had never made “a sincere attempt to crush or even dissipate the fascist movement”, but rather it was tolerated and backed by every government. A weak attempt was made by Facta’s first government, which cost it dearly. His second cabinet also capitulated to the fascists by dissolving parliament and calling an election: fascism threatened with armed conflicts and a raid on Rome, which they indeed made in late October 1922. “Fascism endangers not only the consolidation of the Italian economic and political situation but it is the greatest threat to general world peace today. This requires an urgent uniting against fas-

⁵² Including the leaders of the Socialist and Communist parties; Gentile draws on Pietro Nenni, who remembered that shortly before the fascist “bloodless coup” the key figures of the left had gone to Moscow to attend a Comintern congress, convinced that nothing major was going to happen in Italy. “Trivialization” of the March on Rome went on for months after the formation of Mussolini’s government in anticipation of its crumbling and fall. According to Gentile, the fascist overthrow was termed “March on Rome” by Italian antifascists. Gentile, *ibid.*, 32–35.

⁵³ M. Durman, “Radnička klasa i fašizam”, *NE VI/9*, 21 Nov. 1922, 270–272.

cism, both in Italy and at home.” The emergence of fascists is an encouragement to the other enemies of the Yugoslav state in its neighbourhood. Budapest “... hails fascist Italy as its best ally”; so, “a period of great trial for our state sets in, which will require a very clever peace-making foreign policy, based on the principles of democracy and most far-reaching public control. The downfall of our own reactionary forces and the challenging of every foreign policy pursued ‘in camera caritatis’ would be the best response to fascist challenges, those already posed and those yet to come.”⁵⁴

Ivo Andrić on Italian fascism

The writer and diplomat Ivo Andrić, the only Yugoslav Nobel laureate for literature (1961), had an opportunity at the very beginning of his career in the diplomatic service of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – serving in the Vatican (1920) and Trieste (1922–23) – to follow the rise of fascism on the chaotic political scene of Italy.⁵⁵ In the first half of the 1920s he published five texts on fascism, based, as he remarked in a footnote to the “Fascist revolution”, on his “personal observations” and the literature on fascism coming both from those who belonged or were close to the movement and from the opposition.⁵⁶ Since none of his official reports prior to the mid-1930s has survived, these contributions he made are the only available source for the views that he, as a diplomat and a contemporary, held on the rise of fascism and its consequences.⁵⁷ In 1923 he wrote two texts on

⁵⁴ B. Adžija, “Fašizam u Italiji”, *NE* VI/9, 21 Nov. 1922, 278–280. In early July 1922, in an analysis of Italian post-war politics, he was of the view that its attitude towards the Yugoslav state “cannot be called friendly even with the best will in the world”. The Italian bourgeoisie “neither wanted nor anticipated the disintegration of the Habsburg monarchy”. With the creation of Yugoslavia, “those hopes of the Italian imperialists were shattered, and their dream about total rule over the Adriatic Sea remained on the paper of the London Treaty... the imperialists in Italy, in their angry powerlessness, cannot forgive us that”. See B. Adžija, “Današnja Italija”, *NE* XII/9, 21 Sept. 1922.

⁵⁵ On Andrić as a diplomat, see R. Popović, *Životopis Ive Andrića (1892–1975)* (Belgrade: Zadužbina Ive Andrića, 1980); M. Milošević, *Ivo Andrić, Diplomatski spisi* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1992); Ž. B. Juričić, *Ivo Andrić u Berlinu, 1939–1941* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1989); D. Glišić, *Ivo Andrić, Kraljevina Jugoslavija i Treći rajh 1939–1941*, vol. I (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2012).

⁵⁶ Andrić states that, when writing his article “Fašistička revolucija”, *Jugoslavenska njiva* VII, I/8, 1923 (Zagreb), “apart from his personal observations”, he drew on the publication *Fascism* that an anonymous Italian author published in Milan in 1922 under the pseudonym “Member of Parliament”. He describes the Italian author as “very well-versed” in the phenomenon of fascism. See I. Andrić, *Sabrana djela, Eseji* I, 198. All his texts on fascism in Italy used in this study are published in his collected works, *Sabrana djela*, vol. 12: *Istorija i legenda – Eseji, ogleđi i članci* I (Sarajevo 1981). Page numbers in the footnotes below refer to the pagination of this volume and edition of his *Sabrana djela*.

⁵⁷ Milošević, *Ivo Andrić*, 11–14. Andrić’s first contribution on Italy was of a literary nature, a review of D’Annunzio’s book *Nocturno*: I. Andrić, “Jedna ratna knjiga Gabriele Danuncija”, *Misao*

fascism: “Fascist revolution” and “Benito Mussolini”.⁵⁸ Andrić did not lose interest in the developments in Italy when he left the country to take another post; having taken his doctoral degree in Graz, he was transferred to the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, where he continued writing about Italy.⁵⁹

Andrić’s first text on fascism draws attention to the fact that there is, outside Italy, “especially among the general public, a widespread and simplified understanding of fascism”, its driving forces and goals. To some, it is a “cruel reaction and blind terror of paid gangs in the service of capitalism and militarism”; to others, it is a “magnificent revolt of national consciousness and enlightened classes against the mindless red terror of the seduced masses and Moscow agitators”. In his view, fascism is “a bit of both, but it is also the product of many and diverse influences which... completely elude the stereotypes and slogans of the broad masses, who are prone to generalizations.”⁶⁰ He does not call the “revolutionary nature” of fascism into question, but emphasizes that its origins can be traced back to 1914, the period of fierce strife between Italian interventionists and supporters of neutrality. The hard core of the interventionist current was composed of persons who either belonged to or abandoned the socialist movement (Mussolini, Bissolati); they saw war as a “revolutionary phenomenon”, as an opportunity for the liberation and emancipation of the proletariat. Unlike Bissolati, who remained moderate and peaceable after the war, Mussolini, together with D’Annunzio, rejected the peace as unjust and unacceptable to Italian interests. Such circumstances brought “revolutionary interventionism” and the “intransigent nationalism” of the conservative elite closer together, and they proceeded united until they “got lost in one another completely”.⁶¹ *Fascio Italiano di combattimento* was created in the spring of 1919 amidst the post-war confusion, disappointments, economic and political crisis, sudden rise of the socialists in the elections that followed one after another, accompanied by a rift in the Socialist Party over tactics and goals, increasingly brutal confrontations between political opponents. The change set in when the *fascii*, composed of the “uncared-for minority of interventionists, veterans, university students, former army officers, idealists and pugnacious types, ardent patriots and foggy-headed

X/6 (1922), 1793–1706 (*Sabrana djela, Eseji I*, 260).

⁵⁸ Andrić, “Fašistička revolucija”, *Sabrana djela, Eseji I*, 198–207; I. Andrić, “Benito Musolini”, *Jugoslavenska njiva VII/12*, 1923 (*Sabrana djela, Eseji I*, 209–221).

⁵⁹ I. Andrić, “Slučaj Mateoti”, *Jugoslavenska njiva VIII, II/4*, 1924 (*Sabrana djela, Eseji I*, 219–224); I. Andrić, “Stanje u Italiji”, *Jugoslavenska njiva IX, I/2*, 1925; I. Andrić, “Križa fašizma-Križa Italije”, *Jugoslavenska njiva IX, I/3*, 1925 (*Sabrana djela, Eseji I*, 225–230); I. Andrić, “Stanje u Italiji”, *Jugoslavenska njiva IX, II/2*, 1925. He published these texts under the pseudonym “Res”.

⁶⁰ Andrić, “Fašistička revolucija”, 198.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 199.

revolutionaries”, sensed that, in the northern agrarian areas, “revolutionary fervour” was fading away and the reaction of proprietors, big and small, the employers, was growing stronger. The latter began to help, in every possible way, the fascists in their actions against the socialists, “for reasons less than ideal”. The passive attitude of the authorities towards the fascists was increasingly turning into benevolence. The peasantry, “the least aware of all, turned their support to the fascists as quickly and fanatically as they had to socialism two years earlier”. The most important economic factor, the big industry of the north, recognized and accepted fascism as an “instrument for getting rid of the communist nightmare”, and spared no effort to support it. Taken together, Andrić concludes, these factors led to fascism spreading “like wildfire”.⁶² Fascists used the “methodology” of overt violence, punitive expeditions, to remove their opponents: “clashes, murders, and all manner of violence became an everyday occurrence. Well-to-do classes assisted, the press covered up, and the authorities pretended to be deaf and blind.” While the “socialists were holding long discussions and referendums for or against the ‘use of force’, a resolute and ruthless minority was spilling living blood and implacable kerosene.” This fascist tactic, with assured “unaccountability and impunity for any form of violence, and the cult of the cudgel (the sung-about *manganello*) and the Browning”, attracted “romantic youths and criminals alike”.⁶³

In Rome in 1921, during the (third) congress of fascists, Andrić watched their threatening street choreography, processions and marching. In black shirts “with skulls, ruffled hair and a military step, they passed through the quiet streets of Rome... With the exception of a few enthusiastic, bearded professors, proprietors’ sons and spectacled students, all those were brutal, unintelligent faces of fierce small-town types. Bare-headed, pale and blue with cold, in a state of furious ecstasy, they carried their little flags and their characteristic slogans (‘Me ne frego!’ – I don’t care!; ‘Disperata’ – Desperate) and waved their knotty cudgels or simple pieces of crude iron and lead, obviously consecrated by the tradition of many brawls... That was a dark, cruel province which came to Rome, thirsty for fighting and power; that was the flip side of communism which failed... an invasion of the dregs of society and upstarts.⁶⁴

In his forceful “vivisection” of what he saw in Rome, Andrić paints a portrait of the leader of the fascist movement and his cult in the making, “which has been little spoken about before. In a long dark brown coat, with a broad yellow face and burning eyes, he walked briskly, catching everyone’s eye. There was something cruel and friarly about him. That was Benito Mussolini”. He was for the

⁶² Ibid., 203.

⁶³ Ibid., 204.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

first time titled as *Duce* at the congress. Only a year later, “that dark, wildly frothing torrent carried him up and made him master of Italy and its fate”. He is a “cruel sentimentalist” from Romagna, “not over-burdened with much knowledge or scruples, a good reader of the masses”. “He has been likened to Napoleon and he does not seem to find it displeasing.” “Understandably, one can hardly say something good [about him]... the man brought by strong upheavals to the surface from the darkness of lower strata and already wrapped in legend and the smoke of a hysterical cult... he imposed his will and his name on the bloody and murky movement called fascism although he could not give it a broad and concrete programme...”⁶⁵ While rising to power, he showed mercilessness at first to workers’ organizations, by burning down their centres, “which he had used to build himself”, and then started an attack on all institutions of bourgeois society. His goal was to replace the liberal state with the fascist one. He founded a fascist militia accountable to him only, installed his men into all positions of some import in the state, paid court to the Vatican. Yet, at the very beginning of his rule, Andrić concludes, it was impossible to recognize the real goal of his dictatorship, whether it was a “distinctive renewal or chaos”; whether Mussolini, with almost all instruments of power in his hands, “would enrich the life of the peninsula with new values or be gone together with his décor of black shirts and bloodied cudgels, and the troupe of his naive or guileful admirers, to make way for new people and new fights?”⁶⁶

Somewhat later, Andrić published a biography of Mussolini, drawing on three biographies by Italian authors released in late 1922, which were “intended either as propaganda for the masses or as glorification of leaders and dictators”. He was doubtful about their trustworthiness, but emphasized that he would try nonetheless to draw, from “countless commonplaces, stylistic overstatements and patriotic exaggerations”, the picture “of an interesting dictator as it emerges from his speeches and actions before he came to power”.⁶⁷ He called attention to Mussolini’s ability to manipulate the masses and brutality in crushing the socialist movement. Although Andrić drew on the Italian authors who did not conceal their sympathies towards Mussolini, he diplomatically avoided pronouncing his opinion until the very end of his text. To the ruling elite, which had made fortune during the war, frightened and annoyed by post-war instability, Mussolini offered the “prospect of and then secured undisturbed ownership of property”, promised peace and order in the country and the restoration of its prestige outside

⁶⁵ Ibid., 205.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 207.

⁶⁷ I. Andrić, “Benito Musolini”, 209, 210. Andrić lists these three biographies: E. Settimelli, *Benito Mussolini* (Piacenza 1922); A. Rosatro, *Mussolini* (Milan: Ed. Modernissima, 1922); and O. Danese, *Mussolini* (Mantova: Edit. Paladino, 1922).

the country. To the military officers and war veterans, he promised acknowledgment for their war service; to the young generation, “infected with the post-war psychosis of sports and adventure”, he secured an “unpunished flight of passions, boisterous ceremonial, black shirts and cheap glory”. Those who did not take a “stance” on his politics or rejected it were left “cold-bloodedly to the ‘action’ of his *squadristi*, i.e., cudgels, castor oil, fire, exile, and all manner of abuses”. Mussolini brought the state to its knees by his “bloodless and quite theatrical” march on Rome, “seized power from the good-hearted Facta, and then, just like that, in a black shirt and still panting from marching, he appeared before the king and received (in fact, took) rule over Italy”.⁶⁸

Andrić returned to Italian themes at the moment Mussolini’s regime was in the worst crisis since the takeover, caused by the brutal murder of one of his fiercest critics and opponents, Giacomo Matteotti, a socialist member of parliament. The interval between the March on Rome and Matteotti’s murder provided sufficient evidence for the true nature of Mussolini’s regime. In the text prompted by that crime – which brought Mussolini to the edge of the political abyss, but he managed to pull back from it – Andrić is a harsh and uncompromising critic.⁶⁹ Matteotti’s murder was a crime “at once outrageous and horrible, common and ordinary”; that, in a country that calls itself the “mother of law”, in Rome, in broad daylight, the president of a party gets abducted, taken out of the city, murdered in the bestial manner and his body mutilated. But, however horrible it may seem, in Italy, where the fascist reign of terror becomes increasingly barefaced, such acts are “a common... and everyday occurrence... that a dozen young men in black shirts intercept a member of parliament... and beat him to death.” This is what happened to the socialist members of parliament De Vagno and Piccinini; the liberal leader G. Amendola was beaten. A similar fate befell even a fascist member of parliament, professor Misuri, who had criticized the “methods” of some of his party’s leaders in parliament. The situation in the interior of the country, far from spotlights, was even worse; there, murders and terror became the “essence of fascism, a permanent and efficient method”.⁷⁰

Andrić calls attention to the emerging fascist elite who imposed themselves on the old aristocratic and bourgeois elites by their provincial, brutal, upstart pushiness. Violence took root among the young storm troopers of the fascist movement in particular. It led to a distinctive psychology encouraged by absolute impunity for crime: “the bloody eagerness began to be rewarded”. With Mussolini, there arrived in the capital “an entire swarm... of Bar candidates or, often, just second lieutenants by occupation, who had contributed to the fascist cause”,

⁶⁸ Andrić, “Benito Musolini”, 220, 221.

⁶⁹ Andrić, “Slučaj Mateoti”, 219–224; Andrić, “Križa fašizma-Križa Italije”, 225–230.

⁷⁰ Andrić, “Slučaj Mateoti”, 219.

and took the most important posts in the state administration, in ministries. Having received the highest honours, titles (in some cases, “Mussolini himself arranged for their marrying aristocratic ladies”), they became the backbone of the new, fascist elite. They were accompanied by an army of “satellites, their partisans and poor relatives from the provinces. Many a low-ranking local official or secretary of the local organization of the Fascist Party, in Cosenza or somewhere in Abruzzi, now was chief of an entire department, put on a monocle and began to feel and demonstrate what power meant.” They all belonged to the wartime generation, growing up under the sign and cult of force and violence. Instead of starting to abide by the law and order – which they called for when they rose to power – they created “an unfortunate and, above all, repulsive mixture of revolutionary means and legal measures”, as suited the current moment’s interests and party leaders. Where that proved to be impossible, they resorted to the fascist measures from the period prior to their rise to power: beating, furniture demolition, setting newspaper offices on fire. As a result, “the loudest and the most ruthless, irresponsible elements with criminal instincts and no ideology whatsoever, became the most influential”. The opposition press openly and aptly named that phenomenon: “banda di Viminale (Viminale – Interior Ministry)” or the “fascist Cheka”.⁷¹

In the shadow of Mussolini’s unchallengeable figure, “there began, in the name of Fascism – the saviour, a headless hunt for money and honours, abuse of position, blackmailing of industrials, a disgusting cancan of upstarts and vagabonds”. With no intention of responding to the protests, interpellations and debates by what was left of the liberal and socialist opposition, the regime, through its interior ministry, orchestrated beating attacks on them instead: “the bloody fascist cudgel was moved from their party premises to state offices and responsible ministries”. Political bullying was unstoppable; “a few desperados heaped violence upon violence. Until, in their fury, they began to think that the squares of Rome are the same thing as the narrow streets of their hometowns where people beat one another without court or witnesses, that the whole of Italy was a fascist domain and that Europe had no conscience at all.” The murder of the socialist parliamentarian Matteotti was the bloody crown of such beliefs and actions, leading to the crisis of the fascist regime (“fascist Caporetto”), prompting all of Mussolini’s conscious, hitherto reticent opponents, “from communists to clericalists”, to raise their voice in unison and leave parliament in protest. This last open protest put Mussolini into such a situation that he “began to take a defensive attitude for the first time... comparing his party to a besieged fortress which is to be defended to the last breath”, launching a new “phrase about one needing to ‘live dangerously’ (*vivere pericolosamente*)”. Andrić finds that Mus-

⁷¹ Ibid., 221.

solini, with this phrase, which strikes a chord, and quite poorly, somewhere between a hackneyed D'Annunzio and a tired Marinetti, finally bowed to the radical right wing of his party and fully identified himself with those provincial blackshirts who, a few days after Matteotti's murder, had marched the streets of Rome, singing: "Noi siamo fiorentini; Portiamo il coltello in boca; Guai a chi ci tocca!"⁷² He accurately describes Mussolini's behaviour as skilful manoeuvring but he also demonstrates "how far he and his party are from the normalization of the situation and constructive work he spoke of so much only yesterday."⁷³

* * *

In the months preceding the March on Rome, the Yugoslav daily press and periodicals paid considerable attention to the entry of the fascists onto the political scene of Italy, their rapid conquest of the political space and brutal elimination of political opponents, the too permissive attitude of the liberal governments fearful of a strong left, but most of all to the fascists' newly-won position of leadership at the head of the radical nationalist and irredentist right in the conflict with the Kingdom of SCS. Most of the authors of these texts were distinguished figures of the Yugoslav political and intellectual scene, diplomats and writers. Their writing about the rise of Mussolini and his followers to power, the political and ideological programme of fascism, but also about fascism as "collective self-deception" of Italian society, was a clear warning as to its possible consequences for the relations between Italy and the young Yugoslav state. As one of the authors remarked, the emergence of this new radical political and ideological phenomenon was a sign of new and much more dangerous times, and posed "the greatest threat to general world peace". The texts about the political developments in Italy also show good understanding of the state of a society in a deep post-war crisis, which those who carried the greatest responsibility for it, resorting to wrong instruments, failed to resolve: the highest levels of the Italian state, the leading liberal politicians, the political parties, the economic elite – by "making a pact with the devil" against the left. Having entered Rome, the fascists soon charged a high price – the appropriation of all instruments of power. Based on all that has been presented here, the Serbian and other Yugoslav "observers" may be said to have had much fewer illusions than some other European contemporaries about the true nature of Mussolini's successful political manoeuvre made in late October 1922 and about what it might bring in the future. Part of the same set of issues was also the harsh criticisms levelled at Yugoslavia's official Italian policy, whose mistakes and bad solutions were being pointed out with little ambiguity.

⁷² "We come from Florence; we carry a knife between our teeth; woe betide anyone who touches us!"

⁷³ Andrić, "Slučaj Mateotti", 224.

The importance of relations with Italy required staying abreast of all further developments in the neighbourhood, on the west side of the Adriatic, as evidenced by the large number of articles in the Yugoslav daily press and periodicals.⁷⁴

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⁷⁴ An issue of *Nova Evropa* of September 1925 (XII/9) was devoted to Italian themes from the pen of Italian authors: G. Papini, G. Ferrero, A. Tilger, G. Prezzolini. Two years later, yet another issue was entirely devoted to Italy (*Savremena mislena Italija*, NE XV/10–11, May 1927), bringing authors of different political and ideological leanings together in one place: A. Tilger, B. Croce, M. Viciquerro, G. Amendola, G. Ferrero, G. Renisio, L. Salvatorelli, O. Zuccarini, G. Papini.

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Italy in the Writings of Slobodan Jovanović¹

Abstract: Slobodan Jovanović made frequent stays in Italy since his earliest childhood, which contributed to his thorough and comprehensive understanding of Italian history, politics, science, culture and arts. His father, Vladimir Jovanović, maintained close contact with Mazzini, whose liberal nationalism he embraced and followed. Some of their closest family members resided in Rome during the First World War, because Vladimir Jovanović's son-in-law, Mihailo Ristić, served as Serbia's minister to Italy (1914–17). For about half a century Slobodan Jovanović was an interpreter of Italian political history, of its influence on Serbian and Yugoslav history, and of the work of Italian statesmen and theorists, notably Machiavelli. In the 1930s he taught a doctoral course on Italian public law and corporate system. After the Second World War he lived in exile in London. Some of the works he published there showed that some solutions in the constitution of socialist Yugoslavia, presented as an original invention, had already existed in interwar Italian corporate law.

Keywords: Slobodan Jovanović, Machiavelli, Machiavellianism, Mazzini, Garibaldi, Cavour, Crispi, Pareto, Portigliotti, Marchesini, Ferrero, corporate law

Slobodan Jovanović (1869–1958) was one of the most distinguished scholars and professors of the University of Belgrade, president of the Royal Serbian Academy, rector of the University of Belgrade, dean of its Law School, editor of the *Srpski književni glasnik* (Serbian Literary Herald).² Having completed his law studies in Munich, Zurich, Geneva and Paris (École libre des sciences politiques), he served as a diplomat responsible for providing protection and aid to

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² Slobodan Jovanović – *Life, Work, Times: on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of his birth*, ed. K. Čavoški and A. Kostić (Belgrade: SASA, 2019); B. Milosavljević, *The World and Times of Slobodan Jovanović (1869–1958)* (Belgrade: SASA, 2021); B. Milosavljević, *Slobodan Jovanović. Teorija* (Belgrade: Balkanološki institut SANU, 2017); D. N. Basta, *Pet likova Slobodana Jovanovića* (Belgrade: JP Službeni list SCG, 2003); A. Pavković, *Slobodan Jovanović: an unsentimental approach to politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); M. Jovičić, *Slobodan Jovanović: ilustrovana monografija* (Belgrade: Vajat, 1997).

the Serbs outside Serbia at a department similar to the departments for Eastern affairs of the European foreign ministries, and as a diplomat in the capital of the Ottoman Empire. During the Balkan Wars and the First World War he was head of the press bureau of the intelligence division of the Serbian High Command. In his capacity as a legal expert he took part in the Peace Conference in Paris and in drafting the constitution of the newly-created state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. He was a founding member and chair of the Serbian Cultural Club in 1937, Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the country and then, from 1941 to 1943, in exile in London, where he lived until his death in 1958. His seventeen-volume collected works were published in the interwar period. He left behind an extensive body of work.

Slobodan Jovanović's contact with Italy began in his early childhood and subsequently developed through his thorough study of Niccolò Machiavelli's political theory, Italian culture, art and music, Italian political systems, the role of the Italian unification movement in the history of the Serbian unification movement in the nineteenth century, his interpretation of the relationship between the Italian and Serbian interests in the Adriatic and the Balkans, and finally, through his frequent travels to Italy, where he visited museums and art galleries, attended opera productions and concerts.

That Slobodan Jovanović's connection with Italy was quite personal can be seen from the memories his father, Vladimir, committed to paper. Namely, Slobodan Jovanović was born in Novi Sad, in what then was Austria-Hungary, in 1869. His father, a political émigré at the time, left for Switzerland after his son's birth, and then to France. Upon returning from Paris, he spent the summer of 1870 in Novi Sad with his wife Jelena and son Slobodan. Then the family left for Naples, where they spent the winter. At the time of his first stay in Italy then Slobodan was about a year old. His father made a note about their visit to Pompeii:

One day, during our visit to the excavated ruins of Pompeii, Jelena, carrying our little son [Slobodan Jovanović] in her arms, stopped by a wall and tried to get him standing against it; he wriggled free from her arms and began to walk. From then on he walked on his own holding someone's hand.³

It was in Italy, then, in Pompeii, that Slobodan Jovanović took his first steps. This early personal connection would be just a childhood anecdote had

³ V. Jovanović, *Uspomene*, ed. and preface V. Krestić (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1988), 270 [source: Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (ASANU), Dragoslav Stranjaković Papers, 14556/144].

his father not had deeper and quite important political connections with Italy.⁴ Having completed his studies abroad, Vladimir Jovanović made frequent stays abroad (the longest in Geneva), where he made many acquaintances and friends. While in London in 1862 he met Mikhail Bakunin, who introduced him to Giuseppe Mazzini.⁵ Owing to Mazzini's recommendations, he had a very interesting meeting and confidential conversation (in the spirit of Mazzinian ideas) with William Gladstone, the then British finance minister, of which he made a note.⁶ He had meetings with Mazzini in different places. He left us a detailed description of their secret meeting in a villa on the shore of Lake Lugano in 1863, which provides a vivid picture of Mazzini's well-known secretive working style:

After the meeting and conversation with [Marco] Minghetti, I left Turin for Milan. There I had a meeting with the editor of the magazine *Il Diritto*. At my request to tell me where I could meet Mazzini, he gave me the address of a lady in Lugano and told me that I would learn Mazzini's whereabouts from her. I promptly set off for Lugano. I arrived in Lugano in the early evening. I had to spend the night there, so I took a hotel room. I hastened to learn about Mazzini's whereabouts. When I knocked at the door of the house I had been referred to in Milan, a young man opened it. I showed him the address of the lady I wanted to speak with. He said that the lady resided in a villa by Lake Lugano and that he was ready to take me there. In reply to my question: was it not too late in the day for the visit and would it not be better to postpone it for the next day, he said that the lady had already been notified of my arrival by a telegram from Milan and that she instructed him to take me to her villa

⁴ Vladimir Jovanović (1833–1922) served as finance minister (1876–1878, 1878–1879, 1880), president of the Serbian Learned Society (1884–1886), predecessor of the Royal Serbian Academy, (lifelong) senator, member (1890–1903) and vice-president of the State Council, professor of political economy at the Great School in Belgrade (1863–1864), member of parliament, ideologue of the Liberal Party and the United Serbian Youth. He graduated from the Belgrade Grammar School (1850) and the Lyceum in Belgrade (as one of the best students). Provided with a state grant, he pursued his higher education (agronomy, finances, economics) in Hohenheim (Württemberg), when he made a tour of Germany and France. He left Serbia for political reasons for the first time in 1860 because of his disapproval of Prince Miloš Obrenović's style of rule. He lived and worked in London, Geneva, Novi Sad. He died in Belgrade in 1922. See H. Wendel, "Vladimir Jovanović 1833–1922", *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 11 Mar. 1922, p. 1; "Vladimir Jovanović", *Samouprava*, 2 Apr. 1922, p. 2.

⁵ V. Jovanović, *Uspomene*, 148–149.

⁶ The meeting with Gladstone seems to have taken place in 1864. In Jovanović's *Uspomene*, 118–121, 151, this meeting is described before the one with Mazzini (who recommended him to Gladstone). Mazzini's letter of recommendation to minister Milner Gibson is dated 1 February (no year). E. F. Richards, the editor of *Mazzini's Letters to an English family*, vol. III: 1861–1872 (London–New York: John Lane, 1922), 65–68, assumed the year was 1864 ("almost certainly 1864"). This volume also contains (pp. 67–68) Slobodan Jovanović's letter to Mrs E[linor] F. Richards, signed Slobodan Iovanovitch and dated Corfu, 5 April 1917.

as soon as I should arrive. So, we were on our way together [...] We arrived at the villa about half past eight (in the evening). My escort entered to announce my arrival. I was invited in immediately. I had to walk down a long hall to the stairs leading to the first floor of the two-storey villa. On either side of the hall was a row of rooms. As I walked down the hall I noticed that the door of a room was left ajar. When I got upstairs I was ushered in a salon. My escort said that the “lady” would join me right away and left. And indeed, the door of the adjacent room opened and Mazzini walked quickly into the salon and towards me, holding out his hand for a shake without a salutation. He looked somewhat different: his hair cut short, moustache a bit trimmed and dyed black, hair also dyed black. Had I run into him in that edition somewhere after London, I would not have recognized him easily. He explained that while on travel and in Italy he had to “disguise” himself so as not to be recognized and thwarted in his efforts by his political opponents, and also to spare his friends from being “compromised”. This was the reason why even his friends had to be accompanied by his trusted man in Lugano, having been directed to the latter at the address of a “lady”. As I walked down the hall of the house where Mazzini resided, he, he said, saw me through the slightly opened door of a room, and when he was sure that I was the visitor announced by the telegram from Milan, he signalled his man to take me to the salon and then rushed to meet me himself.⁷

Slobodan Jovanović emphasized that his father Vladimir had already been a nationalist, but it was owing to Mazzini that he embraced nationalist ideology, lending an entirely new, liberal note to his traditional patriotism. He was a “liberal patriot” exactly in the Mazzinian sense. In 1864 Vladimir Jovanović proposed Giuseppe Garibaldi for membership of the Society of Serbian Letters, the precursor of the Serbian Learned Society, the Royal Serbian Academy and the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. In his history of Serbia Slobodan Jovanović analyses the reasons for proposing Garibaldi and Alexander Ivanovich Herzen’s son, Alexander A. Herzen, for membership of the Society in 1864.⁸ Since the proposals were seen as a demonstration against the government, the activity of the Society was suspended and Vladimir Jovanović was dismissed as professor of political economy at the Great School in Belgrade. There is a hypothesis that Vladimir Jovanović allegedly had ulterior motives for proposing Garibaldi for membership of the Society. The affair linked to these motives was

⁷ V. Jovanović, *Uspomene, 176–175*.

⁸ “In fact, they wanted these names to provoke a manifestation in favour of rebellious nationalism, which was represented by Garibaldi, and political liberalism, represented, if not by young Herzen than by his father.” See S. Jovanović, *Druga vlada Miloša i Mihaila* [1922; 1933], vol. 3 of his collected works: *Sabrana dela* [hereafter *SD*], 12 vols., ed. R. Samardžić and Ž. Stojković (Belgrade: BIGZ, Jugoslavijapublik and SKZ, 1990–91), 388. Cf. S. Jovanović, “Vladimir Jovanović” [1948; 1961], *SD* 11, 92.

probably a set-up, and it was linked to the arrest of the alleged conspirators against the life of Napoleon III in January 1864.⁹

Sharing the household with his father for some fifty years, Slobodan Jovanović had the opportunity to hear first-hand the impressions and accounts of an actor in historical events.¹⁰ This proved useful when he was writing a history of nineteenth-century Serbia, where he explained in detail the connection between the Serbian and Italian national movements. He was practically growing up with historical “Italian themes”, with the issue of Serbian-Italian relations in which his father was actively involved. We shall dwell here on his interpretation of Serbian-Italian relations in the 1860s laid out in his book *Druga vlada Miloša i Mihaila* (The second reign of Miloš and Michael [Obrenović]) published in 1922, the year Vladimir Jovanović died.

Slobodan Jovanović explains that Mazzini disagreed with the politics of Victor Emmanuel II and the Count of Cavour, which counted on the help of France to achieve Italian unification.¹¹ Namely, Mazzini believed that Italy had to free herself from Austrian rule on her own, because Austrian rule would otherwise simply be replaced by French rule. France waged a war with Austria over the Italian question in 1859. Jovanović points out that she “stopped half

⁹ See G. Stokes, *Legitimacy Through Liberalism: Vladimir Jovanović and the Transformation of Serbian Politics* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1975), 64–65. The text Stokes drew the information from – B. Miljković, “Društvo srpske slovesnosti od 1841 do 1864”, in *Članci i prilozi o srpskoj književnosti prve polovine XIX veka* (Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 1914), 79, n. 1 – cites as its source “oral communication of Mr Vladimir Jovanović”, but it is unclear if it was given to the author in person; V. Jovanović, *Uspomene*, 174–176, 180, 182–183; V. Đ. Krestić and M. Stanić, eds., *Zapisnici sednica Društva srpske slovesnosti 1841–1863* (Belgrade: SANU, Izdanja arhiva 2/II, 2011); B. Milosavljević, “Vladimir Jovanović. Filozofija, nauka, politika”, *Theoria* 59/2 (2016), 113–149.

¹⁰ Vladimir Jovanović translated H. G. Ollendorff’s textbook for learning foreign languages (published in 1875 and 1877), which could be used for learning Italian as well. In the foreign languages field of Slobodan Jovanović’s employee record card German, French and English are listed but, judging by the books he read and drew on in his work, he was fluent in or was able to use Italian and the classical languages (Latin and Greek). In 1871 Vladimir Jovanović and his wife concluded a life insurance contract with the Trieste-based (Austria-Hungary at the time) Assicurazioni Generali worth 12,000 francs. He paid the premiums regularly for 42 (i.e. 43) years, until 1914. Under the contract terms, the policy was scheduled to mature when he reached the age of 85 and the maturity value was to be paid out (in gold). His correspondence with the company shows his surprise and bitterness over its “insatiable greed” because it used all sorts of ways to evade its obligation (Istorijski arhiv Beograda [Historical Archives of Belgrade], Lični fond Vladimira Jovanovića (LFVJ), K-1/I, 12, 2).

¹¹ S. Jovanović, *Druga vlada Miloša i Mihaila*, SD 3, 466. Cf. *Italijansko javno pravo s naročitim pogledom na korporativno pravo*. Predavanja g. dr. Slobodana Jovanovića, profesora Univerziteta u Beogradu, držana na doktorskom kursu 1935/36 godine [mimeographed doctoral course lectures, Belgrade 1936], SD 8, 520.

way” in that war.¹² She liberated Lombardy, but left Venice under the Austrians: “her price for this incomplete help to the Italian people was the annexation of Nice and Savoy.”¹³ Therefore, Mazzini’s advice to the Italians was an alliance not with France but with the South Slavs because Austria was the archenemy of both. Mazzini believed that war should begin with uprisings in Venice and in the Balkans, which, in turn, would stir the Hungarians to rebellion, who “would get even with the Austrians for 1848”: “set on fire from all sides, the Austrian empire would collapse within twenty days. Turkey would collapse with it too, because the two despotic states supported one another.”¹⁴ As pointed out by Jovanović, Mazzini believed that an alliance with the Italians was in the interest of the South Slavs. If they did not liberate themselves in a joint chain action, they would have to wait for Russia to liberate them, and “the liberation given by the Russians, Mazzini believed, would be even more dangerous than the liberation given to the Italians by France”. If the South Slavs joined forces with the Italians in their struggle, the Italians would help Serbia in her struggle against the Ottoman empire. According to Slobodan Jovanović, Mazzini promised his father “an incursion of Garibaldi and his volunteers into Bosnia”:

As Mazzini saw it, Serbia should not make war with Austria; she should deploy her armies against Turkey. It would be enough that her units infiltrate into Austria, which would incite the South Slavic population there to rebellion and thus encourage the Hungarians to rise up. Vladimir Jovanović accepted Mazzini’s ideas and passed them on to the government in Belgrade. When he was in Pest with [Svetozar] Miletić, he received Mazzini’s last letter and warning: “We shall make war,” Mazzini wrote, “but if your compatriots wait for the success or arrival of our volunteers, some kind of peace... or whatever... this convenient opportunity will be gone. The time has come for the Serbs and South Slavs. If they work, they will be helped.”¹⁵

Svetozar Miletić and Vladimir Jovanović embraced Mazzini’s ideas and advocated an alliance with Italy and Prussia. They believed, as pointed out by Slobodan Jovanović, that making a link between Serbian unification and Italian and German unifications would remove all diplomatic obstacles “because all the powers that supported Italian and German unification – England, France and Russia – would have to accept a third, Serbian, unification.”¹⁶ They believed that the time was right for it because Austria was at war: “In the event of Austria’s defeat, which is certain, it is in the Balkans that she will have to look for com-

¹² S. Jovanović, *Druga vlada Miloša i Mihaila*, 467.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 467–468.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 468.

compensation for the loss of Venice and her lost position in the German union.”¹⁷ Miletić and Jovanović learned that Bismarck and Italy had been trying to draw Serbia into the events, but Prince Michael [Obrenović] took no action. The Austro-Prussian War ended in Austria’s defeat: “Austrian court and military circles promptly began to think about compensations that might be taken in Bosnia. Little by little, Austria shifted from west to east, and in her ambition to become a Balkan state, became a danger to our national unification.”¹⁸ The liberals were convinced that Prince Michael was to be blamed for the future tragedy because he had lacked the courage to act in a decisive moment.

Slobodan Jovanović does not depict these political developments only from the perspective of his father, Vladimir Jovanović, and the liberal opposition, but also from the perspective of the then Serbian government. Although Prince Michael refrained from involvement under the diplomatic pressure of Russia and France, there were negotiations with Italy and Prussia. The problem was that Italy was unwilling to conclude a treaty with Serbia: “she called on us to fight a war at our own risk.”¹⁹ Ilija Garašanin argued in a letter that Serbs were called to fight a war like bashibozuks [Ottoman irregular soldiers] who would be disbanded after the war just as Garibaldi’s volunteers. He wrote that the Serbian government’s proposals were “rejected and practically scorned by the Italian government.”²⁰ Nor could the Serbian government support Prussia’s plan for aiding the Hungarian legion recruited from prisoners of war: “We are called, Garašanin reasoned, to Hungarian aid, but there is no treaty whatsoever between Serbs and Hungarians. The Hungarians, in principle, won’t give up any piece of their land, even a single village.”²¹ The Serbian government needed to know whether Prussia and Italy planned to divide Austria between them after their victory or whether they would let it survive as a smaller country. They believed that Serbia would be able to join in if Prussia and Italy intended to partition Austria. If, on the other hand, they planned to let it survive, though smaller, she would take revenge on the Serbs:

Michael and his government had the impression that the division of Austria was not seriously taken into account and that Serbs were called to take part in a Hungarian uprising in which our gains were not assured in advance and which might well end with an Austro-Hungarian compromise, whereas we would bring Austria’s hatred on ourselves. On the other hand, in 1866 the liberals decided that nothing could be expected from Prince Michael and founded the

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., 470.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

United Serbian Youth with the intention to encourage the independent liberation and unification of the Serbian people.²²

To understand Slobodan Jovanović's multiple connections with Italy, we should take into account his frequent stays in Italy and Italian-populated areas, the fact that some of his closest relatives resided in Italy during the First World War, that his friends travelled with him to Italy or regularly sent him letters and picture postcards while sojourning in Italy (Milan Ćurčin, Rastko Petrović etc.). Jovanović's close personal connection with Italy is important for understanding his understanding of Italian scholarship, history, politics, culture and art.

A Renaissance spirit, he especially appreciates the Renaissance; in its entirety: literature, sculpture, architecture and, especially, painting [...] Renaissance universalism and Da Vinci in particular are his great loves. [...] He is fond of the "golden mean". [...] And it goes from Plato, Cicero, Seneca, all the way to Dante... Mr Slobodan Jovanović is a "globetrotter". A tourist travelling the world in search of anything from the past that has been a success. Regardless of time and place, religions and systems, races, peoples and classes, national and international, "Latin", "Greek", "Nordic", "Anglo-Saxon", "Russian"; regardless of all of that and much more, he singles out only that which is of highest value and represents the spiritual gold standard of the history of humanity.²³

The surviving picture postcards Slobodan Jovanović sent to his family members, mostly his father Vladimir, sister Pravda, nephew Andrija (Andra), and brother-in-law Mihailo Ristić, a diplomat and minister plenipotentiary to Italy (1914–17), and his passport (1935–42), make it possible to partly reconstruct his stays in Italy between 1905 and 1939.²⁴ As some postmarks have faded it is not always possible to know if his own dates followed the Julian or the Gregorian calendar, although he generally used the calendar which was in official use in the country he was staying in. A picture postcard of 29 August 1905 suggests that he was in Venice. Another surviving picture postcard, of 22 August 1907, was sent from Paradiso on the shore of Lake Lugano, Switzerland, in which he arrived from Luzern, from where he had written to his sister in Abbazia (Opatica), Austria-Hungary (in Italy from 1920). He planned to travel to the Italian Lakes and Milan. It is possible that he made a stay at Hotel Baviera on the very lakefront of Lake Garda the same year (the letter is not dated). His picture postcards to his father in Belgrade (8 August 1908) and sister in Abbazia (19 August 1908) show that in August 1908 he was in Bologna, then in Florence (24 August), Naples (29 and 30 August) and Genoa (13 September; addressed to

²² Ibid., 471.

²³ B. Lazarević, "Lik Slobodana Jovanovića", *Letopis Matice srpske* 114, 353/3–4 (1940), 161–169.

²⁴ ASANU, Slobodan Jovanović Papers, 14891/4, S. Jovanović's passport issued by the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, in Belgrade, 4 July 1935.

his father but specified that it was for Pravda). The following year he wrote to his sister from Venice (8 March 1909) and the year after that from Riva (3 August 1910). On 8 July 1911 he wrote to his father from Milan (where he stayed for a day and then set off for the Italian Lakes), and to his sister Pravda and nephew Andra Ristić from Rome (8 August), Riva (12 August), Rome again (30 August) and Naples (8 September). It seems that he was also in Brescia the same year (15 August 1911).²⁵

During the First World War Slobodan Jovanović's brother-in-law Mihailo Ristić served as minister plenipotentiary in Rome (1914–17). Slobodan Jovanović, as head of the press bureau of the High Command, was retreating with the army. He sent letters from Kragujevac to his sister in Rome (one through Major Radoje Janković), telling her about the tragic toll of a typhus epidemic in Serbia:

The disease has spread across Serbia and a prophecy we heard this winter is sure to come true, that there will be mass death after the war. I hear every day that someone I know died.²⁶

Jovanović retreated with the army across Albania and was evacuated to Corfu, and then he went to Thessaloniki. He wrote from Thessaloniki to Mihailo Ristić in Rome. His parents, Vladimir and Jelena, remained in Serbia but left Belgrade for Niš and then for Vrnjačka Banja. Vladimir Jovanović maintained correspondence with his daughter, who was in Rome and Paris with her son. They corresponded through the Red Cross in Switzerland (Pravda wrote some of these letters in German). On the letterhead of the Legation of Serbia to Italy (Légation de Serbie) dated 2 September 1915, Pravda's son Andra wrote to his grandfather:

We returned to Rome on 29 August after a month in Rocca di Papa. We had quite a good time there but Anzio was much better. The weather in Rome is quite nice now but nights are fresh and we have to keep the windows in our sleeping rooms closed at night. In your letter to Maka [mother Pravda] you say that the Uncle [Slobodan Jovanović] has been called to London. Thinking about it, it occurred to me that in that case you and Babutina [grandmother Jelena] might come with him to Rome and stay with us because it will be quite unsafe in Serbia if the Bulgarians attack, which could very well happen.²⁷

²⁵ During the summer of the following year, 1912, he travelled to the north of Europe (Rü-
gen, Helsinki, Klampenborg, Copenhagen, Kronborg Castle, Antwerp, Uppsala and, as it
seems, Stockholm, Hamburg etc.).

²⁶ Arhiva Kulturnog centra Dom porodice Pavlović (AKCDPP), Slobodan Jovanović to
Pravda Ristić (in Rome), Kragujevac, 9 Feb. 1915. Mentions the death of the Dr Selimir
Djordjević, director of the Town Hospital of Valjevo.

²⁷ AKCDPP, Andra Ristić to Vladimir Jovanović (grandfather), Rome, 29 Aug. 1915.

From 1917 Jovanović was in Corfu again. Some of the letters he sent and received while there have survived. In 1922 a letter he had sent to Mrs Richards in England in 1917 was included in the book she edited, *Mazzini's Letters to an English Family*.²⁸

Then he went to France, first to Beaulieu and then to Paris, where he took part in the Peace Conference in 1919 as a legal expert and president of the Section for International Law of the Delegation of the Kingdom of Serbia and then the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. He was also one of the technical delegates authorized to represent the Delegation in some bodies of the Peace Conference. He was appointed as Serbia's representative to the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties. The central problem for the new state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes that arose at the conference was that the great powers demanded the right to protect minorities in smaller states. At the government session of 21 September 1919 held in Belgrade Slobodan Jovanović pointed out that the idea of minority protection had come from President Woodrow Wilson, but that the Italians demanded the same kind of protection for Macedonia (South Serbia), part of the Kingdom of Serbia before the First World War.²⁹

The available archival material does not allow to say when exactly Jovanović first visited Italy after the war; perhaps it was the second half of the 1920s. His passport and picture postcards allow us more precision for the second half of the 1930s. He travelled by train from Belgrade to Rijeka/Fiume via Zagreb. He crossed the border at Sušak on 17 August 1935 and embarked on the steamship *Kumanovo* to Venice, entering Italy the following day, 18 August. The picture postcards he sent show that he was in Florence on 24 August. A surviving photograph shows him with Milan Žujović and Dragiša, Nataša and Tatjana Vasić in front of the Florentine Basilica di Santa Croce. He wrote to his nephew Andra from Florence, Siena (30 August), Pisa and Venice (4 September). He left Italy in Venice on 6 September, taking a ship back home. He entered the country in Split on 7 September. Two years later, on 18 August 1937, he travelled to Venice via Sušak again (steamship *Crown Prince Peter*). He sent picture post-

²⁸ Slobodan Iovanovitch to Mrs E. F. Richards, Corfu, 5 Apr. 1917, in Richards, ed., *Mazzini's Letters*, 67–68.

²⁹ In early September 1919 the text appeared of a convention on minority protection specifying the obligations of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. It did not exempt from international guarantees the territory of Serbia as it had been before 1912, i.e. before the Balkan Wars, but as it was in 1914. See the minutes of 3 September 1919 and the minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of 21 September 1919, in *Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS na Mirovnoj konferenciji u Parizu 1919–1920*, ed. Bogdan Krizman and Bogumil Hrabak (Belgrade: Institut društvenih nauka, Odeljenje za istorijske nauke and Kultura, 1960), 180, 374, 376.

cards from Venice (21 and 22 August), Pisa (27 August), Florence (30 August), a letter to his nephew (1 September) and a picture postcard (4 September). He planned to travel from Florence to Bologna and Venice, from which he sent another picture postcard on 8 September. He left Venice aboard the steamship *King Alexander I* two days later and arrived in Yugoslavia, in Sušak, the following day, 11 September 1937. The Swiss visa he was issued in Belgrade in 1939 states “tourism” as the reason for travel. He crossed the border at Rakek–Postojna (Postumia–Ferrovia, today in Slovenia) on 18 August. He left Italy the same day at the Domodossola railway station (Domodossola Ferrovia) and proceeded to Switzerland, arriving in Lausanne on 19 August. A few days later he took the train back to Italy (via Domodossola again). He wrote to his nephew Andra from Venice on 24 August, leaving Italy the following day for Yugoslavia. A few days later the Second World War broke out and Slobodan Jovanović stopped travelling abroad.

* * *

“Italian themes” recur in Slobodan Jovanović’s writings over a long span of about fifty years. They include Italian political history and its influence on Serbian history, research into and interpretation of the activity of Italian politicians, statesmen and theorists, above all Machiavelli, and all references in his work to Italy and Italian politics, including his memoiristic writings.

Jovanović’s first text which analyses Italian foreign policy is his review of the book *The Adriatic Balance of Power* by Charles Loiseau.³⁰ It was published in the “Literary review (Foreign Literature)” section of the *Srpski književni glasnik* in 1901.³¹ Jovanović discusses Loiseau’s view that it is in Italian interest to leave the Triple Alliance. Italy’s motives for joining the Alliance was the establishment of French protectorate over Tunisia in 1881, which has disturbed the balance of power in the Mediterranean to the detriment of Italy: “established in Tunisia, she [France] came so close to Sicily that Italy was no longer sure of being able to defend the island against her.”³² Bismarck assured Italian statesmen that it was only with the support of Germany and Austria-Hungary that they would be able to resist the French expansionist ambitions in the Mediterranean and encouraged them to follow the example of French colonial policy in Africa. Having failed in Africa, Italy shifted her attention to the Adriatic Sea:

³⁰ C. Loiseau, *L'Équilibre adriatique (L'Italie et la question d'Orient)* (Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1901).

³¹ S. Jovanović, “Ravnoteža na Jadranskom moru, od Šarla Loazoa, 1901”, *Srpski književni glasnik (SKG)* III/1 (1901), 61–67.

³² Ibid.

The new school of Italian politicians seem to be less ambitious and, consequently, more pragmatic. They do not believe that today's Italy can continue the politics of ancient Rome. It will be enough if they manage to continue the politics of the old Venetians, who are closer to them in every respect.³³

If Italy's future is tied to the Adriatic rather than to North Africa, then her main adversary is not France but Austria-Hungary with which she is in alliance. Based on these arguments, Loiseau advises Italy to cooperate with "whoever has reasons to resist German expansion to the East", France, Russia and the Slavic states in the Balkans. Jovanović's critical analysis of Loiseau's ideas points to the logical contradiction of his line of argument. Namely, Loiseau, convinced that Italy will inevitably enter into conflict with Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, advocates Italy's rapprochement to the Slavic states. On the other hand, he overlooks Italy's role as protector of the Albanians, which is why "her rapprochement to the Serbian states is out of question" given that Albanians have been occupying Serbian parts and putting the Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohija under pressure.³⁴

The same year Slobodan Jovanović wrote an obituary of the Italian statesman Francesco Crispi, emphasizing two periods of his political activity and analysing the consequences of his politics:

Once the passions inflamed by his bellicose and turbulent life calm down, the judgement about him will depend on whether it concerns Crispi the revolutionary or Crispi the minister of united Italy. And just as the Crispi who worked for the unification of Italy deserves sympathies so the Crispi who exhausted and disgraced her deserves some sternness in judgement. But what both Crispis had in common is the same temperament – the temperament of a condottiere.³⁵

About ten years later the same journal published his text about Crispi's inheritance, i.e. about the archival material (documents, letters, parts of his diary) published in Berlin. The material mostly concerns foreign policy up to the fall of Crispi's first government in 1891.³⁶ The book begins with Crispi's visit to Bismarck in 1877. Jovanović's review gives a succinct overview of the political situation in which Italy was at the time.³⁷ He points out that Bismarck "only

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Bruno [S. Jovanović], "Frančesko Krispi", *SKG* III/4 (1901), 317–318. Crispi (1818–1901) was a friend and associate of Mazzini and Garibaldi and served as prime minister of Italy. He was born in Sicily to a family of Albanian Christian Orthodox origin.

³⁶ S. Jovanović, "Krispijeva spoljašna politika (*Memoari Frančeska Krispija* – uspomene i dokumenti – izdani od T. Palamengi-Krispija [Tommaso Palamenghi-Crispi, German translation published in Berlin 1912]", *SKG* XXVIII (1912), no. 9, 662–667; no. 10, 751–757.

³⁷ Ibid.

partially” accepted Crispi’s offer of an alliance, agreeing to conclude an alliance against France but not against Austria-Hungary, counting on the latter as Germany’s future ally. He made it plain to Italy that she had to make peace with Austria-Hungary if she wanted a firmer alliance with Germany: “He did not think that Austrian expansion into the Balkans should be curbed; if Italy believes that the entry of Austria-Hungary into Bosnia and Herzegovina would be harmful to her interests, there’s Albania – let her take her as a compensation.”³⁸ Italy fared quite badly at the Congress of Berlin. Austria-Hungary was given a mandate to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, and France to occupy Tunisia, of which nothing was said in the Berlin Treaty, but which was arranged behind the scenes. “France, until then popular with the Italian people, suddenly became detested...”³⁹ Under such circumstances, Italy in 1882 joined the German-Austro-Hungarian Alliance (concluded back in 1879). She was not content with it, however, and upon the expiration of the five-year treaty in 1887, it was renewed under modified terms. Basically, Jovanović points out, Germany and Austria-Hungary were not able to help Italy in a naval war with France. Bismarck suggested that the treaty be supplemented with an Anglo-Italian alliance. He negotiated with the British in person. Jovanović finds this to be “one of the most interesting places” in the book:

Bismarck resorted to threats. If England does not join the Triple Alliance in some way, Germany may well be forced to work out whatever sort of agreement with France and Russia. In that case, she will have to support the French demands as regards the Egyptian question and, possibly, let Russia take the Bosphorus and Dardanelles [...] A less able diplomat in Bismarck’s place would have simply been puzzled by Italy’s political ambitions in the Mediterranean which, at first glance, seemed to be nothing but a burden to her allies. But Bismarck tried to draw some benefit even from them for his plans against France.”⁴⁰

When Crispi took the helm of Italian foreign policy (1887) the Triple Alliance was seen as a “marriage of convenience” in which Italy had entered out of political necessity and with little enthusiasm: “The Italian people began to feel resentment about that alliance which, unnaturally, made Italy a friend of Austria.”⁴¹ Crispi took a different stance, as Jovanović suggests. He believed that the alliance had to operate on a daily basis and consult about all foreign policy issues so that it could be obvious that Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy supported

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

one another.⁴² Jovanović emphasizes that initially the intentions of the Triple Alliance, the only alliance in Europe at the time, were not understood: “allied Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy stood opposite unallied France, England and Russia.”⁴³ The material published in the book on Crispi, Jovanović argues, shows that the Italian government seriously believed for a while (in the summer of 1889) that France would attack her militarily. He asks if the intention of Crispi’s attacks on France was to provoke a war against the will of Germany and Austria: “Bismarck was not Napoleon III and he would not let himself be drawn into a war.”⁴⁴ Be that as it may, Jovanović concludes, Crispi was “one of the strongest pillars of the Triple Alliance whose personal courage and strength considerably contributed to the consolidation and preservation of the alliance which was so fateful not only for Italy but for all of Europe.”⁴⁵

Machiavelli was certainly the most important of Jovanović’s “Italian themes” and he analysed his personality and his work in several studies. In the first chapter of his capital book on the state (*Država*), which had four editions (1906, 1914, 1922, 1936), he draws attention to Machiavelli’s importance: “It is interesting that the word *Stato* began to be used to denote the state in the fifteenth and sixteenth century, when the first modern states were created, and that it was introduced into political science by Machiavelli, who is considered to be the father of the modern science of the state.”⁴⁶ Jovanović’s separate study of Machiavelli was published in 1907, at first in the *Srpski književni glasnik*, and then by the publisher Geca Kon. It had two more revised and supplemented editions (1912 and 1935).⁴⁷ He also wrote about Machiavelli in his reviews of

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ It may be interesting to note that A. Pavković (*Slobodan Jovanović*, 86), in his interpretation of Jovanović’s *Država*, refers the reader to the book *The State: its nature, development and prospects* by the Italian scholar Gianfranco Poggi (b. 1934), who has taught at several universities in Europe, the USA and Australia. He finds it pertinent to draw a comparison between the two books because Poggi does not neglect the contribution of the *Staatslehre* approach to the study of the concept and phenomenon of the state, and, just like Jovanović, “considers the state to be an object of systematic, multidisciplinary study”.

⁴⁷ ASANU, S. B. Cvijanović Papers, 10864/7, Corrections and additions to the study of Machiavelli. S. Jovanović, *Makiaveli* (Belgrade: Knjižarnica Gece Kona, 1907; Offprint from SKG XVIII (1907); *Makiaveli*, 2nd rev. ed. (Belgrade: Knjižarnica S. B. Cvijanovića, 1912); *Iz istorije političkih doktrina. Platon. Makiaveli. Berk. Marks* (Belgrade: Izdavačko i knjižarsko preduzeće Geca Kon A. D., 1935); SD 9, 85–147.

Giuseppe Protigliotti's book on the Borgias (1927)⁴⁸ and Maria Marchesini's on Machiavelli (1934),⁴⁹ and in his book on totalitarianism published in emigration (*O totalitarizmu*, Paris: Savez srpskih zadruga "Oslobodjenje", 1952). In his study of Machiavelli, Jovanović focuses especially on his *Discourses on Livy* (*Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio*) and *The Prince* (*Il Principe*), which "created modern political science".⁵⁰ Jovanović portrays Machiavelli's times and milieu, and the importance and influence of Girolamo Savonarola, Cesare Borgia and other figures of the period. In Jovanović's view, Machiavelli in his *Discourses* "seeks to draw from Roman history all political experience and all political wisdom it contains".⁵¹ Especially important is Jovanović's analysis of the different meanings of the concept of "Machiavellianism".⁵² He points out Machiavelli's view that the state is not a part of a whole but a whole in its own right; and every whole must be an end in itself: "The basic idea of that politics is that the state is an end in itself. It does not have to serve religious ends as the medieval Christian state was supposed to."⁵³ Consequently, no internal factors prevent a modern state from moving towards the achievement of its interests until it runs into an external obstacle. To Machiavelli, the ruler is a military organizer and diplomat, which is why his monarchy is not truly modern, absolute monarchy but merely "a dictatorship for an indefinite period". Although aware of the main principles of the modern state, Machiavelli "was unable to rise to the true idea of monarchy, the monarchy founded on the principle of state sovereignty or on divine right, of which would speak a Bodin, a Bossuet, a Hobbes."⁵⁴

Jovanović makes a distinction between a narrower and a broader understanding of the concept of "Machiavellianism". In the narrower sense, the state is not limited by any moral rules in its relations with its citizens and with other states. In the broader, and prevailing understanding, moral rules do not apply to certain groups of politicians who contend for power within the state and can use any means in that struggle. Jovanović shows that the two different interpreta-

⁴⁸ G. Portigliotti, *I Borgia: Alessandro VI, Cesare, Lucrezia* (Milan: Fratelli Treves, 1921 [1925, 1927, 1940]), 344; S. Jovanović, "Bordžije", SKG n.s. XXI/7 (1927), 556–557.

⁴⁹ M. Marchesini, *Saggio su Machiavelli*, preface by Natalino Sapegno (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1934); S. Jovanović, "Jedna nova knjiga o Makiaveliju (Maria Marchesini, Saggio su Machiavelli, Firenze, 1934)", SKG n.s. XLII/7 (1934), 564–566.

⁵⁰ S. Jovanović, "Makiaveli", SKG XVIII (1907), 14.

⁵¹ S. Jovanović, "Makiaveli", SD 9, 108.

⁵² Cf. K. Čavoški, *Makijaveli*, 2nd supp. ed. (Novi Sad: Orpheus, Kapitalna izdanja Series, 2012).

⁵³ S. Jovanović, "Makiaveli", SKG XVIII (1907), 276.

⁵⁴ S. Jovanović, "Makiaveli", SD 9, 124–125.

tions of Machiavellianism stand in mutual opposition.⁵⁵ The broader one, which allows politicians and political parties to do whatever necessary to succeed, implies that one can do in politics what is unacceptable in private life. Jovanović gives the following examples: deceiving the electorate by false promises, imputing motives and intentions to the opponents which they are known not to have, tolerating fellow party members one would not even shake hands with in private life, promoting the ideas that are contrary to one's intimate beliefs because they are currently popular and attacking other ideas because they are currently unpopular.⁵⁶ Jovanović points out that the broader interpretation contradicts Machiavelli's teaching on the state: "broader Machiavellianism is a fallacious doctrine, and fallacious from the perspective of Machiavellianism itself."⁵⁷ Namely, Machiavellianism puts the interest of the state above any other interest, including moral considerations. But exactly because this interest of the state, or reason of state, is paramount, it is of the utmost interest to the state itself who is at its head. It is because of that highest interest of the state that the use of immoral means in the political struggle within a state must not be allowed. He argues that we cannot know whether Machiavelli envisioned, let alone approved, Machiavellianism in the broader sense, because he could not take into account the factor of modern political parties:

Machiavellianism in the narrow sense unquestionably is a faithful expression of Machiavelli's ideas. That is true Machiavellianism, the Machiavellianism that Machiavelli himself invented and that, consequently, he is responsible for.⁵⁸

In the review of Portigliotti's book on the Borgias which portrays the pope Alexander IV, his son Cesare Borgia and daughter Lucrezia, Jovanović finds the part devoted to Cesare to be the most creative.⁵⁹ "That man whom Machiavelli saw as one of the greatest politicians of his time and whom Friedrich Nietzsche glorified almost as a superhuman figure seems in Portigliotti a perverse young man who only excelled in crime."⁶⁰ Contrary to Portigliotti, Machiavelli ("who not only knew him personally but was also associated with him in political affairs") described Cesare Borgia as a "very calculated and energetic politician who, it is true, had little scruples but operated very methodically."⁶¹ He finds that Machiavelli did have the imagination of an artist but "it is hard

⁵⁵ S. Jovanović, "Makiaveli", *SKG XVIII* (1907), 665.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 666.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 667–668, 669.

⁵⁹ Portigliotti, *I Borgia*; S. Jovanović, "Bordžije", 556–557.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 557.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

to believe that he was so misled as to see a great political master in an ordinary spoiled papal bastard".⁶²

At the very beginning of his review of Marchesini's book on Machiavelli, Jovanović points out that "she should be given credit for not trying to transpose Machiavelli to the present time and interpret him as a precursor of fascism":

It is in vogue these days in Italy to refer to Machiavelli as a forefather of the "black shirts", but Maria Marchesini in her essay makes no mention whatsoever of the fascists and their leader, Mussolini. She held, and with good reason, that Machiavelli would best be understood if placed in his own times and milieu.⁶³

Unlike the students of Machiavelli who believe that he had a "potential to become a great statesman, but the circumstances prevented him from developing and demonstrating his statesmanship abilities", Jovanović argues, Marchesini believes "that Machiavelli was a man of thought rather than action and that all his writings about current politics show that he had little sense of practical possibilities". Namely, Machiavelli's suggestions were right on the mark but "unfeasible in the Italy of his time".⁶⁴

Jovanović's study of Machiavelli was published twice in 1935: in his book *Iz istorije političkih doktrina* (From the history of political doctrines) and in volume XV of his *Sabrana dela* (Collected Works).⁶⁵ In the first of the two and in volume XVI of the second he also published an exhaustive study of Marx.⁶⁶ The chapter on anti-Marxists contains a subchapter devoted to the Italian sociologist Vifredo Pareto. Jovanović discusses the critique of Marxism in Pareto's book on the socialist systems.⁶⁷ Apart from the contradiction of Marx's theory of value, which he seeks to prove to be identical to the earlier thesis of John Stuart Mill, Pareto points out that the theory of class struggle is scientifically ungrounded:

In popular interpretation, the theory of class struggle amounts to the following. There are only two classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The two classes carry on a fight to the death. The fight will end in the destruction of the bour-

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ S. Jovanović, "Jedna nova knjiga o Makiaveliju", 564.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ S. Jovanović, *Iz istorije političkih doktrina*. Platon. Makiaveli. Berk. Marks (Belgrade: Izdavačko i knjižarsko preduzeće Geca Kon A. D., 1935); *Iz istorije političkih doktrina*. Knjiga prva. *Sabrana dela Slobodana Jovanovića XV: Platon, Makiaveli, Berk* (Belgrade: Izdavačko i knjižarsko preduzeće Geca Kon A. D., 1935).

⁶⁶ S. Jovanović, *Iz istorije političkih doktrina*. Platon. Makiaveli. Berk. Marks (Belgrade: Izdavačko i knjižarsko preduzeće Geca Kon A. D., 1935); *Iz istorije političkih doktrina*. Knjiga druga. *Sabrana dela Slobodana Jovanovića XVI: Marks* (Belgrade: Izdavačko i knjižarsko preduzeće Geca Kon A. D., 1935).

⁶⁷ V. Pareto, *Les Systèmes Socialistes* (Paris: V. Giard & E. Brière, 1902).

geoisie. This is scientifically unacceptable. That classes exist is unquestionable, but not only two. It is also unquestionable that there is a struggle between classes – class struggle is just another name for social competition – but class struggle is not always and solely a war to extermination: it has other, more civilized and compromise-prone forms. [...] From the Marxist point of view, in class struggle the use of force is forbidden to the bourgeoisie and permitted to the proletariat. This is a peculiar ethics according to which the workers do not have to honour the contract with the employer and the employer has to honour it. The workers are permitted to strike, the employer is not permitted to fire them. The strikers are permitted to use violence; the state is not permitted to use its means of enforcement against them.⁶⁸

Jovanović finds Pareto to be more “concrete” than most sociologists because, rather than discussing “grand abstractions” (division of labour, class struggle etc.), he studies and interprets the “nature of the groups that rule in real life.”⁶⁹

In the academic year 1935/6 Jovanović taught a doctoral course on Italian public law at the Law School of the University of Belgrade. His lectures were published (mimeographed) in 1936 under the title *Italian public law with particular reference to corporate law*.⁷⁰ The introductory section contains a concise and clear account of Italian history in the nineteenth and twentieth century.⁷¹ Jovanović also gives an account of the unstable political situation after the First World War and the circumstances in which the “socialists, fully under the influence of Bolsheviks, staged anti-nationalist actions (e.g. public displays of disrespect for the national flag), which hurt the feelings of former soldiers”. On the other hand, “Mussolini appealed above all to former soldiers, but since there were many workers among them, even the first edition of the fascist programme was a mixture of socialism and nationalism.”⁷²

In his analysis of the Italian constitution, Jovanović argues that Italian jurists were of the view that Italy is an old state because the Constitution of the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont was extended to all annexed states and regions, i.e. the legal system remained unchanged, “only its territorial scope increased”. He analyses step by step and in detail the constitutional position of the king and the government:⁷³

The law of 24 December 1925 [...] restores to the crown the direction of government which had been taken from it by the parliament. The head of government is not accountable to the parliament but to the crown. [...] The political

⁶⁸ S. Jovanović, “Marks” [1935], *SD* 9, 327.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 328.

⁷⁰ S. Jovanović, *Italijansko javno pravo*, 517–604.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 532.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 535.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 541.

direction of the government, previously set by the council of ministers, is now the exclusive prerogative of the head of government. The other ministers are limited to managing administrative affairs.⁷⁴

Consequently, the head of government is accountable directly, personally and exclusively to the king, and the ministers are accountable both to the king and to the head of government. Jovanović also analyses various Italian legal interpretations of the form of government introduced by the law of 1925. Apart from the royal government, another constitutional body was the Grand Council of Fascism which had been established in 1922 and whose president was head of government by law. With this body, the Fascist Party and its organization was, as Jovanović puts it, “wedged” into the state. The Council had an advisory role (e.g. making lists of candidates for the offices of head of government, ministers and state undersecretaries). He analyses the Senate (upper chamber) and the Chamber of Deputies. In the next chapter he interprets “the attributes of the constitutional bodies” – A. Legislative bodies (law-making, approving the budget, overseeing the government); B. Senate as the state court; C. King as head of the executive branch (1. the power of issuing decrees; 2. diplomatic power; 3. judicial power). “Justice is dispensed in the king’s name,” but “everything that concerns the organization and jurisdiction of the judicial branch is regulated by law”.⁷⁵ Jovanović proceeds to describe the administrative system (individual rights, active administration, central active administration, advisory administration, local administration and self-government). The interpretation of the administration is followed by an analysis of corporate law. The idea of the corporate state is to coordinate the economy by establishing a link among major fields of production from the “standpoint of the national whole”:

Associations of a particular type are needed where the economic actors would be grouped not as they are in the syndicates, according to their place in the production process, but according to the field of production in which they operate either as employers or as employees.⁷⁶

So, corporations became state bodies, whereas syndicates were reduced to public legal bodies. Jovanović describes corporate organization – professional categories (entrepreneurs, workers and independent professions; professional associations – employers only or employees only); federations and confederations of employers’ and workers’ associations; syndical (syndical associations, syndical finances, oversight of syndicates). There follows a description of corporate bodies: “By decrees of the head of government twenty-two corporations were established in the course of 1934. They can be grouped into three groups

⁷⁴ Ibid., 546–547.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 565.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 577.

like three circles of production of unequal complexity.”⁷⁷ The first group encompasses the widest production circle (from agriculture to industry and trade – grains, fruit, vine growing, oil etc.). The second group encompasses corporations whose production circle is limited to industry and trade without agriculture (e.g. construction industry, metallurgy, mining, chemical production). The third group encompasses personal service and non-profit corporations (independent professions and the arts, domestic transportation, the sea and the air, hospitality, the theatre).⁷⁸ The corporate system was organized by the state through the ministry of corporations. Jovanović describes the activity of corporations in the chapter titled “Corporate action”, discussing the collective labour contract, its elements, conclusion, significance and legal effect, collective labour disputes, collective discipline of labour relations, safeguards of the corporate system under criminal law. He offers an interpretation of contemporary Italian public law in the chapter “The Post-war State” (England, France, Italy, Germany, Russia) of his book *Država (The State)* published in 1936.⁷⁹ In this chapter he analyses the views of, among others, Giovanni Gentile and provides a bibliography of the Italian authors he drew on.⁸⁰

In the works Jovanović published in the 1950s, while in emigration in London, he draws analogies between the Italian corporate system and Tito’s constitutional changes of 1952 and 1954.⁸¹ He also finds some similarities in

⁷⁷ Ibid., 593.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ S. Jovanović, *Država*. Book Two: *Državna organizacija. Poratna država*, vol. XIV of *Sabrana dela Slobodana Jovanovića* (Belgrade: Izdavačko i knjižarsko preduzeće Geca Kon A.D., 1936); *Poratna država*, offprint from the book *Država*, Part 4 (Belgrade; Izdavačko i knjižarsko preduzeće Geca Kon A.D., 1936).

⁸⁰ S. Romano, “Ordinamento giuridico”, *Annali delle Università toscane* (1918); A. Rocco, *La Dottrina politica del Fascismo* (Milan: La periodica lombarda, 1925); A. Rocco, *La Trasformazione dello Stato* (Rome: “La Voce”, Anonima Editrice, 1927); C. Costamagna, *Lo Stato corporativo quale Stato di diritto* (Rome 1928); G. Gentile, *Origini e Dottrina del Fascismo* (Rome: Libreria del Littorio, 1929); G. Bortolotto, *Lo Stato e la dottrina corporativa*, vol. I–II (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1931); B. Mussolini, “Fascismo”, in *Enciclopedia italiana* (La Treccani), vol. XIV (Rome 1932); G. Bottai, *Le corporazioni* (Milan: A. Mondadori, 1933); E. Ranalletti, *Corso di diritto sindacale e corporativo* (Milan: A. Giuffrè, 1933); G. Bottai, *Esperienza corporativa (1929–1934)* (Florence: Vallecchi, 1934); A. Volpicelli, *Corporativismo e Scienza del Diritto* (Florence: G. C. Sansoni, 1934); W. Cesarini-Sforza, *Corso di Diritto corporativo* (Milan: Giuffrè, 1935); E. Ranalletti, *Istituzioni di Diritto Pubblico* (Padua: Cedam, 1935); G. Zanobini, *Corso di Diritto corporativo* (Milan: Giuffrè, 1935).

⁸¹ “Another institution presented by the Titoists as their own invention is the Council of Producers. This body, which is supposed to deal with economic issues, exists side by side with the political parliament as a sort of economic parliament. What benefit this body brings, with its poor administration of which *Borba* wrote recently (see the issue of 4 November), is hard

outward manifestations (acclamations to the leader etc.), and in the international political circumstances of Tito's and Mussolini's rule.⁸²

Slobodan Jovanović published two texts on Guglielmo Ferrero, one in 1939 in *Letopis Matice srpske* (Novi Sad), the other in 1940 in *Politika* (Belgrade).⁸³ The earlier one is a review of the selection of Ferrero's works published by his son-in-law Bogdan Radica (1903–1993), a Yugoslav diplomat, writer and translator born in Split. The selection included Radica's conversations with Ferrero.⁸⁴ Jovanović points out that making the selection was not an easy job because Ferrero is "such a versatile writer – and historian, and sociologist, and storyteller".⁸⁵ Even so, Ferrero "has a basic thought which he elaborates to a lesser or greater extent in all of his writings".⁸⁶ Jovanović points to Ferrero's critique of contemporary culture, which has become more quantitative than qualitative:

Ferrero believes that quality should again be put above quantity, that we should become aware again that there are higher values than mere strength and that only the strength in the service of these values can be justified. Ferrero returns to Plato's old ideas of eternal truth, eternal beauty and eternal good.⁸⁷

Jovanović expresses a high opinion of Ferrero's insight into the epoch, "a particular kind of sensibility which enables us to feel a cultural epoch as a whole with its inner coherence and its distinctive style".⁸⁸

The holyday issue of the daily *Politika* in April 1940 published Jovanović's article "The Congress of Vienna in the light of Guglielmo Ferrero", pointing to Ferrero's view that "one of the bad consequences of the French Revolution was that it imposed the reign of force not only in the life of France but also in the life

to say. But what can be said is that the Council of Producers does not deserve to be described as an invention of the Titoists and a proof of their constructive socialism. A similar economic parliament, called the Council of Corporations, could be seen in fascist Italy, in Mussolini's times. And even before that, whenever a dictatorship was established in a country, people were told to forget about 'fruitless politics' and focus all of their attention to economic issues on which their welfare depends." See S. Jovanović, "O komunama", *Poruka* 25 (16 Dec. 1954), 11–13.

⁸² S. Jovanović, "Tito iznad blokova", *Poruka* 30–31 (1 Aug. – 16 Sept. 1955), 2–5.

⁸³ S. Jovanović, "Jedan izbor iz Guljelma Ferera" [*Letopis Matice srpske* 113/352/1–2, (1939), 21–25], *SD* 12, 459–463.

⁸⁴ B. Raditza, *Colloqui con Guglielmo Ferrero, sequiti dalle Grandi Pagine* (Lugano: Nuove Edizioni Capalago, 1939).

⁸⁵ S. Jovanović, "Jedan izbor iz Guljelma Ferera", 459.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 460.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 462–463.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 463.

of Europe.” He links Ferrero’s interpretations to the difficult historical moment in which Europe is (1940):

We should admit, together with Ferrero, that the Congress of Vienna, contrary to usual understanding, did not serve only the goals of political reaction; indeed, it was guided by a much higher idea, the idea of re-establishing international relations on a legal basis. No one has shed such a clear light on the work of the Congress of Vienna from that perspective as Ferrero did. Finally, one can agree with him that there are similarities between the present time and the time of the Congress of Vienna. As we have been told, and believed, for decades, that the politics of force is the only “realpolitik”, everything else being barren idealism, we have had too many opportunities to see that force indeed can achieve unexpected success but cannot create anything lasting alone, without the aid of law. It has brought about this state of temporariness and insecurity that we do not know how to get out of.⁸⁹

Slobodan Jovanović was invited to join the government after the coup of 27 March 1941, which he accepted “out of duty”.⁹⁰ It should be noted that he made a note about a planned trip to Italy after the formation of the government, in which he was given the office of second deputy prime minister (the first deputy prime minister was Vlatko Maček, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party). Namely, after the coup the Italian minister in Belgrade “informed Simović, on the instruction of his government, that Mussolini would be glad to act as an intermediary between our government and Hitler so that an armed conflict between German and our troops might be avoided”. Rome extended an invitation to the prime minister, Simović, or, if he was otherwise engaged, the foreign minister, Ninčić:

Both [Dušan] Simović and [Momčilo] Ninčić took this initiative of Mussolini’s seriously, assuming that it was in his own interest to eliminate the possibility of an armed conflict between us and the Germans because the Italian troops in Albania might get caught between our troops, who would attack them from the rear, and Greek troops, who had already been attacking them from the front.⁹¹

Since Simović and Ninčić could not leave the country in the new government’s first days in office, they offered the Italian minister to accept Slobodan Jovanović in their stead. Jovanović did not attend the entire meeting between Simović, Ninčić and the Italian minister: “he had the impression that the purpo-

⁸⁹ S. Jovanović, “Bečki kongres u svetlosti Guljelma Ferera. ‘Avantura’ i ‘Rekonstrukcija’”, *Politika* no. 37/11461 (27–30 Apr. 1940), p. 4.

⁹⁰ For more, see Milosavljević, *The World and Times of Slobodan Jovanović*.

⁹¹ S. Jovanović, *Zapisi o problemima i ljudima 1941–1944* [London: Udruženje pisaca i umetnika u inostranstvu, 1976], SD 12, 585. Cf. *Zapisnici sa sednica Ministarskog saveta Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941–1945*, ed. K. Pijevac and D. Jončić, preface Lj. Dimić (Belgrade: Službeni list SCG and Arhiv Srbije i Crne Gore, 2004).

se of his mission to Rome would be to hear Mussolini's suggestions first hand". Rome promptly agreed to Jovanović, but "the nature of Mussolini's proposal was radically changed":

Mussolini now said he would be willing to intervene with Hitler *at our request*, but needed to hear our proposals first. So, Jovanović was to go to Rome with those proposals. Both Simović and Ninčić, as well as Jovanović himself, held that talks with Rome should not even start on such a basis – and the whole thing failed at the very beginning.⁹²

Jovanović also comments on subsequent interpretations of these "negotiations with Italy": "Communist propaganda kept spreading the rumour that 6 April [1941] found Jovanović and Ninčić at the airport, ready to fly, the former to Rome, the latter to Berlin. As it follows from all the above, the idea of Jovanović's trip to Rome had already been completely abandoned a few days before 6 April."⁹³

In the journal *Poruka* (Message) he founded in London, Jovanović published his foreign affairs analyses. In the article "The international position of Yugoslavia" published in 1953 he discusses the possible future of relations between Yugoslavia and Italy:

It is to be wished, however, that relations between Yugoslavia and Italy may be friendlier in the future. From the military point of view, the Adriatic is a whole: its security requires that both of its coastal states cooperate – the one that holds its eastern coast and the one that holds its western coast. To be added to these military reasons are political ones. It is better for Italy to have free Balkan peoples than satellites of either German or Soviet imperialism in her neighbourhood. Also, Balkan peoples, with the support of Italy, will even more effectively defend their freedom. Mussolini's big mistake was that he wanted to act as a conqueror in the Balkans. Before the world wars, Italy had defended the freedom of the Balkans. For example, she had opposed Austria-Hungary when she wanted to attack Serbia in 1913.⁹⁴

Jovanović devoted the greatest attention to Machiavelli and Machiavellianism, writing about it in his book on totalitarianism published in Paris in 1952. His separate study of Machiavelli had several revised and supplemented editions. He wondered over and over again whether the readers would understand the nuances of his interpretation. "Italian themes" also occur in his posthumously published writings about his father, Vladimir Jovanović, and in the notes he made during his membership of the Yugoslav government. Apart from "Italian themes", which belong to the scholarly, cultural and artistic heritage of

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ S. Jovanović, "Medjunarodni položaj Jugoslavije", *Poruka* 12 (1 May 1953), 3–4.

the world, Jovanović, as a historian, dealt with Serbian-Italian relations in which his father had played an important role in the 1860s because of his contacts with Mazzini.

Slobodan Jovanović, twice prime minister and deputy prime minister during the Second World War, died as an émigré in London in 1958. As though the first steps he made in life in such an unusual place as Pompeii had presaged the tragic end of the main character, of his philosophical theory of the state and the very state he responsibly served all his life. After such a cataclysmic event as the revolutionary takeover, they were buried so deep and overlaid with so many historiographical and propagandistic layers that their scattered genuine traces are not only painfully difficult to gather but, sadly, are placed again into misleading and anachronistic contexts.

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Yugoslav-Italian Foreign Trade Relations 1919–1939 and the Yugoslav Industry: the Import of Textile Products from Italy

Abstract: Yugoslav-Italian relations between two world wars, besides the diplomatic-political, also had a very significant economic aspect. Italy was one of the most important foreign trade partners of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and this paper will explore the trade exchange between the two countries, especially the import of materials necessary for the textile industry, which substantially contributed to the positive balance of trade. Beside a quantitative analysis of statistical data regarding foreign trade, the paper also looks at the impact of political and economic events on the trade relations between the two countries, as well as the relation between the industrialization of Yugoslavia and changes in foreign trade.

Keywords: Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Italy, foreign trade, industry

Economic relations between Kingdom of SCS/Yugoslavia and Italy were very dynamic, with notable rises and falls, not lagging behind the events in the turbulent diplomatic-political arena. In the relations between the two countries, trade exchange, very significant for the economy of the nascent Kingdom, is a particularly noteworthy aspect because Italy was Yugoslavia's primary foreign trade partner for many years. There are other works that examine the economic relations between the two countries¹ and elaborate upon their political and/or

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¹ E. Milak, *Italija i Jugoslavija 1931–1937* (Italy and Yugoslavia 1931–1937) (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1987); Г. Латиновић, "Југословенско-италијански економски односи (1934–1936)" (Yugoslav-Italian economic relations (1934–1936)), *Глас CDXXVIII САНУ, Одељење историјских наука* 18 (2018); G. Latinović, "Yugoslav-Italian Economic Relations (1918-1929): Main Aspects," *Balcanica* XLVI (2015); G. Latinović, "Југословенско-италијанско поморско rivalstvo na Јадранском мору 1919-1929," (Yugoslav-Italian naval rivalry in the Adriatic Sea 1919-1929), *Istorija 20. века* 35, 2 (2017); Г. Латиновић, "Трст у југословенско-италијанским економским односима између два свјетска рата," (Trieste in Yugoslav-Italian economic relations between the two world wars) *Зборник Матице српске за историју* 96 (2017); V. Vinaver, "Svetska ekonomska kriza i jugoslovensko-italijanska trgovina (1930-1934)," (World economic crisis and Yugoslav-Italian trade (1930-1934)) *Časopis za savremenu povijest* 8 1 (1976); V. Vinaver, "Svetska ekonomska kriza i jugoslovensko-italijanska trgovina (1930–1934)," (The Great Depression of 1929 and its effects on commerce be-

economic relations, but this paper will specifically focus on an analysis of the import of products for the textile industry.

The two main import-export items, in the industrial sector, were materials for the textile industry, imported from Italy, and forestry products, which Yugoslavia exported to Italy. These two categories, along with agricultural products, represented the basis of the two countries' trade exchange and, in view of their share in overall import and export, were relevant factors for maintaining the positive foreign trade balance of Yugoslavia. This paper introduces three levels of research: a quantitative analysis of foreign trade statistical data according to values in current prices; the interplay of political and economic events, and their influence on trade relations between the two countries, such as the consequences of the First World War on trade, the Great Depression, the economic sanctions imposed on Italy and the shift in foreign trade relations in Central Europe; and finally, the relation between the development of industry in Yugoslavia and foreign trade.

Foreign trade relations between Yugoslavia and Italy

Two fundamental economic factors influenced the intense trade exchange between Yugoslavia and Italy, in addition to the fact that they were neighboring countries. The first was the economic structure of these two countries, namely the necessity and potentials of Yugoslav and Italian import and export. Yugoslavia was a notable exporter of agricultural products and timber, which Italy imported, and an importer of industrial raw materials and goods, which were exported by Italy. The export of livestock, animal products, grain and wood, along with the import of textiles, composed more than two thirds of the value of overall trade exchange with Italy. The second factor was the very nature of Yugoslavian foreign trade, which hadn't faced more stringent bans and limitations in its export and import of goods until the outbreak of the economic crisis.²

tween Yugoslavia and Italy) *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 8, 1 (1976); V. Vinaver, *Svetska ekonomska kriza u Podunavlju i nemački prodor 1929–1934* (The Effects of the Great Depression on the Danubian Basin and the breakthrough of Germany) (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1987); I. Becić, "Statistika i karakter spoljne trgovine Kraljevine SHS 1919–1929.," (The Statistics and characteristics of the Kingdom of the SCS's Foreign Trade) *Istorija 20. veka* 33, 2 (2015) et al.

² Milak, *Italija i Jugoslavija 1931–1937*, 33; J. Lakatoš, *Jugoslovenska privreda. Jubilarno izdanje "Jugosl. Lloyd"* (The Yugoslav economy. The Jubilee Edition of the Yugoslav Lloyd) (Zagreb: Jugoslovenski Lloyd, 1933), 132–134; Becić, "Statistika i karakter spoljne trgovine Kraljevine SHS 1919–1929.," 68–69.

Economic relations between Italy and Yugoslavia³ were established immediately after the Great War and lasted, without significant problems, until the outbreak of the Great Depression. Although in the first years trade exchange was in the shadow of the unresolved border issues⁴ between the two countries and the challenges brought on by Yugoslavia's unification, such as the absence of customs offices along the border, smuggling, a decentralized customs system and transition to a peacetime economy, it was recorded, as early as 1920, that the trade exchange with Italy composed about 36.6% of overall import and 27.1% of all exports of the Kingdom of SCS.⁵

To normalize foreign trade, the pre-war trade treaties that Serbia had with Allies and neutral countries from the First World War were extended to the whole Kingdom, which was the case with Italy, as well. "The Trade and Navigation Agreement", concluded in 1907 between the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of Serbia,⁶ covered the territory of the whole country from March 1919. However, the first trade contract, broader and without limitations, on the pre-war liberal principles of trade, was concluded on 14th July 1924.⁷ Although it came into force just four years later, it was the first of its kind in Yugoslavia, representing the basis of all further trade contracts.

The trade agreement with Italy was preceded by the resolution of political issues. After the Treaty of Rome was signed on 27th January 1924⁸ to settle the border and demarcation issues, negotiations about a trade agreement commenced in February and ultimately led to the mentioned trade agreement

³ Latinović, "Yugoslav-Italian Economic Relations (1918-1929)", 173–175.

⁴ Milak, *Italija i Jugoslavija 1931–1937*, 31–32.

⁵ *Statistički godišnjak 1929*, I, (Beograd: Opšta državna statistika Kraljevina Jugoslavija, 1932), 264–269.

⁶ "Закон о Уговору о трговини и пловидби између Србије и Италије". (The Law on Trade and Shipping between Serbia and Italy). In *Краљевина Србија и Краљевина Италија: документа*, ed. Мирослав Перишић, Јелица Рељић, Александар Марковић (Београд: Архив Србије, 2019), 341–358.

⁷ "Закон о уговору о трговини и пловидби и Конвенцији о сточним заразним болестима између Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца и Краљевине Италије," (The Law on Trade and Shipping and the Convention on veterinary diseases between the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Kingdom of Italy). *Службене новине Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца* (Official newspaper of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) (Београд), 14. 11. 1928, 266.

⁸ E. Milak, "Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca i Rimski sporazum (1922–1924)", (The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Rome Agreement (1922–1924) *Istorija 20. veka: zbornik radova* (1982), 14–15.

from July 1924.⁹ It should be noted that value of the exchange between the two countries in 1924 was the biggest in the whole interwar period.¹⁰ The value of Yugoslavia's exports to Italy was 2.757 million dinars and for the value of its imports reached 1.688 million dinars, which made Italy its primary trade partner in that year, with 28.9% of export and 20% of import.

The Trade and Navigation Agreement of 1924 was based upon "complete freedom of trade and navigation", with a preamble that introduced some import and export restrictions for both parties, except in some situations.¹¹ It was based on the principle of the broadest unconditional privileges regarding customs tariffs and other formalities. It was also the first treaty made on the basis of general customs tariff, so the Kingdom added 166 paragraphs and Italy 14 paragraphs of import tariffs, including paragraphs on the export of wood, coal, and railway sleepers. The mentioned paragraphs began to be applied when the general customs tariff came into effect in 1925. In fact, this addition of numerous articles for customs tariffs represented the least favorable part of the contract, because it influenced the signing of trade agreements with other countries. The agreement wasn't too popular, which is why four years passed from its signing to its ratification, as there was an opinion in economic circles that the concessions given to Italians were too big and that this would lead to Italian economic hegemony.¹² However, the balance sheet of the trade exchange was on the side of Yugoslavia, which ultimately exported more to Italy than imported from it.

The balance of trade exchange between two countries was, in most of the years under review, positive for the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and a negative

⁹ The Treaty was concluded and signed in Belgrade on 14th July 1924, voted for in National Assembly on 9th June 1926, and after the exchange of instruments of ratification, put into effect on 14th November 1928. (B. Đorđević, *Pregled ugovorne trgovinske politike od osnivanja države Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca do rata 1941. godine* (The Overview of the Policy of Trade Agreements from the creation of the State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes until 1941) (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1960), 4–5; Latinović, "Yugoslav-Italian Economic Relations (1918-1929)," 182–185.)


¹⁰ *Статистика спољне трговине Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца за 1924. годину* (Foreign trade statistics of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes for 1924) (Београд: Генерална дирекција царина Министарство финансија, 1925).1925).

¹¹ These concerned items and goods concerned military equipment, public security, state monopolies, sanitary or veterinary security, and foreign goods, the export of which was limited or forbidden because of internal regulations. "Закон о уговору о трговини и пловидби и Конвенцији о сточним заразним болестима између Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца и Краљевине Италије" (Law on the Agreement on Trade and Navigation and the Convention on Infectious Livestock Diseases between the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Kingdom of Italy), article 7, 1592.

¹² Đorđević, *Pregled ugovorne trgovinske politike*, 5–9; Becić, "Statistika i karakter spoljne trgovine Kraljevine SHS 1919–1929.," 60.

balance was recorded only in 1920, 1921 and 1938. In 1920–1929, the average annual import from Italy was 1.1 billion dinars in total, while the export was 1.674 billion dinars; in the following 10 years, import was 455 million dinars and export 765 million (Graph No. 1)¹³ Italy tried to address its passive trade balance with Yugoslavia with a series of economic moves, but to no avail. It's been mentioned that Italy was one of the most important foreign trade partners for Yugoslavia, being its primary export partner in 11 years, but the Yugoslav share in overall Italian trade was small and composed 2.99% of import and 1.79% of export in 1929.¹⁴ Just for comparison, in the same year, the Italian share in Yugoslavia's foreign trade was 11% of import and 25% of export¹⁵. As Ivo Belin presented in an article published in the *Nova Evropa* journal: "Regarding our total export to Italy, Italy is the main market for the distribution of our products, whereas we are an almost *quantité négligeable* for the Italian market."¹⁶

Graph No. 1. Foreign trade of Yugoslavia with Italy
1920–1939 in current prices (000.000')



Resources: *Statistički godišnjak 1929*, 264–269; *Statistički godišnjak 1933*, V, (Beograd: Opšta državna statistika Kraljevina Jugoslavija, 1935), 188–191; *Statistički godišnjak 1934–1935*, VI, (Beograd: Opšta državna statistika Kraljevina Jugoslavija, 1937), 178–179; *Statistički godišnjak 1940*, 234–235.

[увоз = Import; извоз = Export]

¹³ *Statistički godišnjak 1929* (The Annual Review of Statistics for 1929), 264–269; *Statistički godišnjak 1940*, (The Annual Review of Statistics for 1940) X, (Beograd: Opšta državna statistika Kraljevina Jugoslavija, 1941), 234–235.

¹⁴ Vinaver, "Svetska ekonomska kriza i jugoslovensko-italijanska trgovina (1930–1934)," 41.

¹⁵ *Statistički godišnjak 1929*, 264–269.

¹⁶ И. Белин, "Ита̀ло-југословенски привредни односи" (Italo-Yugoslav economic relations), *Нова Европа* XXII, 4 (1930), 251.

Although Italy was a significant trade partner, there was a trend of decrease of Italian export and import from the mid-1920s onward, but just before and during the economic crisis, it was additionally intensified. (Graph No. 1) There were several reasons of an economic and political nature. Political changes and the coming of the Fascist Party to power in Italy was also reflected in its economic policies. Economic dirigisme, Italy's new economic direction¹⁷ in foreign trade, led to customs protectionism, abandonment of the laissez-faire system, and an attempt of to channel export and import through the newly established National Institute for Exportation (1926), all with the aim of controlling the country's foreign trade.¹⁸ Political relations consistently towered over economic ones, and the extremely strained and contentious relations during 1927 influenced trade exchange,¹⁹ which was immediately reflected in the decrease of exchange in 1925, the year that saw 100 million dinars of export and 400 million dinars of import.²⁰

The great economic crisis deeply shook trade exchange in 1931, so as early as next year, in April, "Additional Provisions to The Trade and Navigation Agreement of 14th July 1924" was concluded in Rome. Import customs were revised in this additional arrangement because Italy demanded an increase of its import duties on livestock, meat and other products to increase internal prices in Italy, while Yugoslavia increased its import duties for agricultural products, textiles and leather goods as a protective measure.²¹ Although made with the aim of intensifying trade, alleviating the consequences of the crisis in Yugoslavia

¹⁷ Berend defines a special type of economy and names it economic dirigisme, based upon a regulated trade system, protectionism, state interventionism, and it appears along with "oppressive, non-parliamentary, single-party, dictatorial-military-political systems" I. T. Berend, *Ekonomska istorija Evrope u XX veku: ekonomski modeli od laissez-faire do globalizacije* (An Economic History of Twentieth-Century Europe. Economic Regimes from Laissez-Faire to Globalization) (Beograd: Arhipelag, 2009), 110.

¹⁸ Milak, *Italija i Jugoslavija 1931–1937*, 35; P. Knight, *Mussolini and Fascism* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 64.

¹⁹ Milak, *Italija i Jugoslavija 1931–1937*, 37–38; Latinović, "Yugoslav-Italian Economic Relations (1918-1929)," 191.

²⁰ *Статистика спољне трговине Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца за 1926. годину* (The Statistics of the Foreign Trade of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes for 1926) (Београд: Генерална дирекција царина Министарство финансија, 1927); *Статистика спољне трговине Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца за 1927. годину* (The Statistics of the Foreign Trade of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes for 1927) (Београд: Генерална дирекција царина Министарство финансија, 1928).

²¹ "Допунски споразум уз трговински уговор са Италијом" (Supplementary agreement to the trade agreement with Italy), *Glasnik Zavoda za unapređenje spoljne trgovine Ministarstva trgovine i industrije*, 1932, 93–95; Đorđević, *Pregled ugovorne trgovinske politike*, 93–95.

and decreasing the passive balance of Italy, the contract didn't have a notable effect on the trade relations.²²

In the same year, on 22nd October 1932, "The Agreement on the Payment Arrangement in Trade Exchange between Italy and Yugoslavia" was also signed,²³ which regulated the clearing relations between the two countries. The agreement meant that there was partial compensation, so that 85% of payments of Italian importers of Yugoslav goods represented payment for the counter-value of goods exported to Yugoslavia, while 15% of this amount was paid into the account of the Yugoslav National Bank in Italian lire.²⁴ The clearing agreement was revised in 1936, and then Yugoslavia claimed from Italy more than 50 million liras²⁵, although during the first two years (until the end of 1934), the clearing account was passive for the Kingdom because of its previous debts.²⁶

During 1932 and 1933, the goods exchange between the two countries fell to the lowest level ever (export averaged 715 million dinars and import 410 million dinars).²⁷ Besides the economic crisis, which limited overall import, trade-political measures for activating trade balance and protectionist measures for compensating exports with the country's own production, there was another factor – Italy's tendency to redirect its trade towards other countries of Central and Southeast Europe.²⁸

²² Milak, *Italija i Jugoslavija 1931–1937*, 95.

²³ "Допунски споразум уз трговински уговор са Италијом" (Supplementary agreement to the trade agreement with Italy), *Glasnik Zavoda za unapređenje spoljne trgovine Ministarstva trgovine i industrije*, 1932, 93–95; Đorđević, *Pregled ugovorne trgovinske politike*, 93–95.

²⁴ The clearing agreement didn't resolve economic problems, but created new ones, like calculating the exchange rate between the dinar and the lira, because the exchange rate of lira in Belgrade wasn't the same as on the Zürich stock market. Milak, *Italija i Jugoslavija 1931–1937*, 96.

²⁵ The clearing contracts had tendency of alignment on the lower level, which represented Yugoslav import from Italy, which meant that the value of exchange of Yugoslav products towards Italy decreased by one third. That meant that the value of the exported one metric ton from 1929 decreased related to 1933 for 28%, while the value of the imported one metric ton from Italy decreased for 10%. "Неколико разматрања о нашим трговинским односима са Италијом," (Several Thoughts on our Trade Relations with Italy), *Glasnik Zavoda za unapređivanje spoljne trgovine Ministarstva trgovine i industrije*, 15. 11. 1933., 1933, 665.

²⁶ Đorđević, *Pregled ugovorne trgovinske politike*, 95–96; Milak, *Italija i Jugoslavija 1931–1937*, 96.

²⁷ *Статистика спољне трговине Краљевине Југославије за 1932 годину* (The Statistics of the Foreign Trade of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes for 1932) (Београд: Одељење царина Министарство финансија, 1933); *Ibid.*, 1934.

²⁸ "Неколико разматрања о нашим трговинским односима са Италијом," 665; "Наши трговински односи са Италијом," (Our Trade relations with Italy) *Glasnik Zavoda za unapređivanje spoljne trgovine Ministarstva trgovine i industrije*, 1932, 1.

1934 was one of the key years in the economic relations between the two countries. That year in January, the *Additional agreement to the agreement of 25th April 1932, added to the The trade and navigation agreement between the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, and Italy from 14th July 1924*, was concluded,²⁹ increasing Italian duties on livestock and animal products, with some other changes to the agreement.³⁰ However, earlier that year, in February, Italy introduced in its foreign trade a system of contingency and import permissions;³¹ then, in March, it signed trade agreements³² with Austria, granting it privileges for selling wood to Italy, and with Hungary, which gained privileges for exporting agricultural products. In these economic and political circumstances, Yugoslavia signed a trade agreement and a tourist convention with Germany on 1st May.³³ In the context of international changes and Germany's growing importance in the economy of Southeast Europe, the objectives of these trade agreements are also clear. Enes Milak considers the agreement between Yugoslavia and Germany as "a turning point in Yugoslav-Italian trade relations"³⁴ because the agreement guaranteed major privileges in the exchange of goods, navigation and transfer of citizens, as well as benefits for the Yugoslav export of agricultural products to Germany and the import of industrial products from Germany to Yugoslavia.³⁵

The economic sanctions against Italy, as a result of the Abyssinia Crisis, marked the following two years. As a member of the League of Nations, the

²⁹ "Допунски споразум уз споразум од 25 априла 1932 додат уговору о трговини и пловидби између Краљевина Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца и Краљевине Италије од 14 јула 1924," (Supplementary agreement to the agreement of April 25, 1932 added to the agreement on trade and navigation between the Kingdoms of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Kingdom of Italy of July 14, 1924), *Службене новине Краљевине Југославије* (Београд), 12.03. 1934, бр. 58.

³⁰ Đorđević, *Pregled ugovorne trgovinske politike*, 96–97.

³¹ Đorđević, *Pregled ugovorne trgovinske politike*, 98.

³² Within necessary regional cooperation, in 1931, Italy founded economic relations with Austria and Hungary on basis of Broki's system, which allowed hidden mutual decrease of duty tariffs. Further step was the agreement of triple system agreed upon in autumn 1933, and put into effect in March 1934, so called Rome protocols, which had its protocol on economic cooperation as well. Berend, *Ekonomaska istorija Evrope u XX veku*, 146.

³³ More details about diplomatic relations during 1934: М. Ристовић, "Предговор," (Foreword) In *Извештаји Министарства иностраних послова Краљевине Југославије*. Књ. 5, За 1934. годину, (Reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. book 5, for the year 1934) ed. Јелена Ђуришић Нада Петровић (Београд: Архив Југославије, 2010).

³⁴ Milak, *Italija i Jugoslavija 1931–1937*, 98.

³⁵ Лагиновић, "Југословенско-италијански економски односи (1934–1936)," 502–503; Milak, *Italija i Jugoslavija 1931–1937*, 103–106.

Kingdom of Yugoslavia respected the sanctions,³⁶ from November 1935 until July 1936,³⁷ which was reflected in the trade exchange between the two countries (Graph No. 1). V. Bajkić and V. Predavec published a text in the *Narodno blagostanje* stating that “Yugoslavia, among all the countries in the world, suffered the heaviest damage from the sanctions” and that “the sanctions became absolutely ridiculous and absurd in Central Europe. On one hand, Dr. Milan Hodža is negotiating an economic rapprochement of the Little Entente with the countries of the Roman Triangle, and on the other hand, we are applying sanctions against Italy.”³⁸

They also stated that “there was no trade-political possibility of redirecting the export of our products that we had previously sold in Italy.” The negative effects of the sanctions were the frozen clearing balance of 250 million dinars³⁹ and the decreased trade exchange with Italy in 1935–1936. The export of goods was at its lowest in the interwar period, amounting to 137 million dinars, whereas import fell to 101 million dinars.⁴⁰ Besides financial losses, there was the problem of redirecting the export of certain items previously exported the Italian market, especially timber⁴¹ and textiles. In 1935, the timber industry ex-

³⁶ On the session held on 15th November 1935 the Council of Ministers, at the suggestion of the Minister of Finance, came to a solution for the ban on importing into Kingdom of Yugoslavia all goods produced in Italy, with the exception of: gold and silver bars or money; books, newspapers, periodicals, maps and cartography works, musicalia, printed or engraved; goods that are due to be delivered, paid until 19th October of the current year; goods on their way, under condition that they arrived to the Kingdom no later than 18th December; baggage of passengers coming from Italy. “The ban of import in Yugoslavia of goods originally from Italy and its colonies, as well as ban of direct and indirect export from Yugoslavia to Italy, or its colonies.” *Службене новине* (Београд), 16.11 1935, br. 266, 3.

³⁷ Б. Симић, *Милан Стојадиновић и Италија: између дипломатије и пропаганде* (Milan Stojadinović and Italy: between Diplomacy and Propaganda) (Београд: Институт за новију историју Србије 2019), 39–40, 50–51.

³⁸ В. Бајкић & В. Предавец, “Економске санкције према Италији,” (Economic sanctions towards Italy) *Народно благостање*, 28. 03. 1936, 205.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Statistički godišnjak 1940*, 234–35.

⁴¹ The most important products were firewood, timber (round unprocessed), cut off, sawed (half processed), railway sleepers and wood products, which made 90% of all forestry exports, and timber made 60% to 75%. *Statistika izvoza i uvoza proizvod šumarstva Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1926–1935*, (The Statistics of Export Trade of Forest Industry of Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1926–1934) (Beograd: Ministarstvo šuma i rudnika, 1937), 18–25; M. Marinović, *Prilog proučavanju izvoza i uvoza šumskih produkata u kraljevini SHS za god. 1919. – 1924/5* (Study of Export Trade of Forest Industry in the Kingdom of SCS for years 1919–1924/5) (Beograd: Ministarstvo šuma i rudnika. Generalne direkcije šuma, 1926), XIX.

ported to Italy for 408 million dinars and in 1936, for 39 million dinars⁴² – it was a significant loss, especially if we consider that soft wood of lower quality was exported to Italy, which Yugoslavia, besides Italy, exported only to England. Besides, Italy paid 15% in foreign currency, which was presented as a very favorable relation.⁴³

In the second half of the 1930s, during the premiership of Milan Stojadinović,⁴⁴ the shaken trade between the two countries gradually began to recuperate, but Germany and its presence were crucially significant. The economic rivalry between Germany and Italy intensified from 1937, and Germany won this competition with its beneficial clearings and better industrial offer, i.e., with high quality and moderately priced goods.⁴⁵

To improve their relations, Italy and Yugoslavia signed amendments to the existing trade agreement in September 1936 and March 1937, and then also series of Protocols⁴⁶ on the Permanent Italo-Yugoslav Economic Committee, which signaled a “new” stage in the economic cooperation of the two countries. There was an agreement on beneficial duty tariffs and concessions, the range of contingents of products increased, and on the decrease of duties for certain

⁴² *Statistika izvoza i uvoza proizvod šumarstva Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1926–1935*, XII.

⁴³ В. Бајкић & В. Предавец, “Економске санкције према Италији,” 205.

⁴⁴ About Milan Stojadinović and Italy note: Симић, *Милан Стојадиновић и Италија: између дипломатије и пропаганде* (Milan Stojadinovic and Italy: Between Diplomacy and Propaganda).

⁴⁵ On the economic relations between Germany and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia see: Milan Ristović, *Nemački “novi poredak” i Juгоistočna Evropa: 1940/41 – 1944/45. Planovi o budućnosti i praksa* (The German New Order and the South Eastern Europe) (Beograd: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1991), 10–21; Vinaver, *Svetska ekonomska kriza u Podunavlju i nemački prodor 1929–1934*; А. Митровић, “Нацистичка идеја великог привредног простора и југоисточна Европа: (1940),” (The Nazi idea of a large economic area and Southeastern Europe: (1940), *Зборник Филозофског факултета* 11, 1 (1970); А. Митровић, “Трећи рајх и италијанска привредна конкуренција у Југославији на почетку Другог светског рата: (1. септембар 1939 - 6. април 1941),” (The Third Reich and Italian economic competition in Yugoslavia at the beginning of the Second World War: September 1, 1939 – April 6, 1941), *Зборник Филозофског факултета* 14, 1 (1979); Р. Hadži-Jovančić, “Ergänzungswirtschaft, Grosswirtschaftsraum and Yugoslavia’s responses to German economic theories and plans for the Balkans in the 1930s,” *Годишњак за друштвену историју* 24, 2 (2017).

⁴⁶ On these agreements: Additional protocols of 26th September 1936 and the Additional agreement of 25th March 1937, afterwards there were adopted “Protocols of session of Italo-Yugoslav permanent economic board”: 8th July 1937, 17th January 1938 in Belgrade, 17th November 1938 in Rome, 10th June 1939 (confidential protocol about military acquisition), 3rd August 1939 in Rome, 24th October 1939 in Belgrade. The agreement on regulation of the trade exchange and payment was reestablished on 26th September 1936, and then on 7th January 1938. Đorđević, *Pregled ugovorne trgovinske politike*, 102–113.

Italian products, now competing with German products.⁴⁷ However, these new relations didn't have a significant impact on the trade range and exchange, which, after the sanctions, couldn't reach the exchange level from the 1920s (Graph No. 1). They were more a solution of current issues in the context of the changes on the European political scene, which spilled over onto the economic scene.

Import of textile products from Italy

The issue of textile products in Italian-Yugoslav trade relations had a special place in Italian export and Yugoslav import. The question of the import of textile goods, mainly cotton and cotton products, is important for several reasons. The import of textile products made up the bulk of the import in the Kingdom – until 1935, 30% of the all import was composed of textile products, and until the economic crisis 40% on average, because of which the balance of foreign currency exchange, maintaining its positive balance and surplus directly depended on the range of import of textile products. Because of this, it was in the interest of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to decrease the import of textile products, whereas the interest of Italy was to increase it.

In the 1920s, the products of the Italian textile industry were the most widespread in the territory of the Kingdom. Although Yugoslavia, as a buyer of Italian goods, had an insignificant place in its total exports, certain products, such as cotton products, were imported in great amounts and reached up to 1/4 of Italian total exports of those products.⁴⁸

It has already been mentioned that Yugoslavia imported from Italy mostly textiles and textile products, and they made about 60% of imports during the whole interwar period. The highest amount was reached in 1920 and 1934 – 75%, and the lowest in 1929, 46%. In this type of export, the export of cotton and processed cotton products led the way with 75–80%. As for the total import of goods to the Kingdom from Italy, there was a supply of about 30%, which made it, together with Czechoslovakia and Austria, the main importer of textile goods.

Chart 1: Import of textile goods from Italy according to values in current prices, percentage share in the import total of textile goods, economic growth

Year	Import	%	Ec. Gr.
1920	957463.5	56.09%	
1921	558719	31.84%	-42%

⁴⁷ Milak, *Italija i Jugoslavija 1931–1937*, 154–158.

⁴⁸ Milak, *Italija i Jugoslavija 1931–1937*, 37–38.

1922	642129	26.91%	15%
1923	1015881	28.60%	58%
1924	1047496	31.85%	3%
1925	911277	27.46%	-13%
1926	561207	20.24%	-38%
1927	496584	18.93%	-12%
1928	505831	21.14%	2%
1929	381433	16.76%	-25%
1930	429065	20.14%	12%
1931	248962	17.55%	-42%
1932	164139	20.10%	-34%
1933	310706	32.68%	89%
1934	416656	36.29%	34%
1935	253052	22.51%	-39%
1936	59531	5.33%	-76%
1937	305629	21.39%	413%
1938	261001	23.82%	-15%
1939	341463	31.94%	31%

Resources:

Статистика спољне трговине Краљевине Југославије за 1920. годину, (Београд: Генерална дирекција царина Министарство финансија, 1921), 89–90;

за 1921. годину, (1922), 124–125; за 1922. годину, (1923), 120–121; за 1923. годину, (1924), 150–151; за 1924. годину, (1925), 135–136; за 1925. годину, (1926), 248–249; за 1926. годину, (1927), 391–393; за 1927. годину, (1928), 422–424; за 1928. годину, (1929), 555–557;

Статистика спољне трговине Краљевине Југославије за 1929. годину, (Београд: Одељење царина Министарство финансија, 1930), 511–513; за 1930. годину, (1931), 512–514; за 1931. годину, (1932), 528–532; за 1932. годину, (1933), 489–493; за 1933. годину, (1934), 478–483; за 1934. годину, (1935), 503–508; 1935. годину, (1936), 511–516; за 1936. годину, (1937), 495–497; за 1937. годину, (1938), 487–491; за 1938. годину, (1939), 474–477.


In 1920, the Kingdom imported textile goods from Italy amounting to 957 million dinars, which made 56% of the total textile import, 30% of import total of the Kingdom, and 75% of Italian exports to the Kingdom. As early as the following year, this import fell by about 40%.⁴⁹ Until 1924, when import of

⁴⁹ *Статистика спољне трговине Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца за 1920. годину*, 89–90 (Foreign trade statistics of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes for 1920, 89–90); *Статистика спољне трговине Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца за 1921. годину*,

textile goods was on its peak, reaching more than 1 billion dinars, a constant growth of import is notable, and later its constant fall. From 1920 up to 1924, the average import of textile goods amounted to approximately 844 million dinars, and from 1925 up to 1928, 618 million dinars.⁵⁰

Although, there were fluctuations until 1929, the import of Italian goods to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia remained more or less stable. The average annual import of textile goods from Italy from 1920–1928 was 744 million dinars and 288 million dinars from 1929–1939. The decrease of almost 40% was a result of not only the mentioned political and economic factors, but also a consequence of the general decrease in the import of textile goods of about 50% during the same period. (Chart 1)

Graph No. 2 Import of textile goods from Italy according to values in current prices



Extensive import of textile goods was, on one hand, a consequence of the general need for goods in the first years after the war, as a brief exogenous influence, and on the other hand, it was a need of underdeveloped textile industry, i.e. the need of a developing industry for high-quality raw materials and semi-finished products. The poor quality of locally made raw materials or their unavailability, like cotton, but also the need for processed cotton products, e.g.,

124–125 (Foreign trade statistics of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes for 1921, 124–125).

⁵⁰ Статистика спољне трговине Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца за 1920. годину, 89–90; за 1921. годину, 124–125; за 1922. годину, 120–121; за 1923. годину, 150–151; за 1924. годину, 135–136; за 1925. годину, 248–249; за 1926. годину, 391–393; за 1927. годину, 422–424; за 1928. годину, 555–557 (Foreign trade statistics of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes for 1920, 89–90; for 1921, 124–125; for 1922, 120–121; for 1923, 150–151; for 1924, 135–136; for 1925, 248–249; for 1926, 391–393; for 1927, 422–424; for 1928, 555–557).

cotton yarn, constantly plagued the textile industry of the Kingdom due to its underdeveloped agricultural sector and the lack of textile spinning mills and technically advanced factories.⁵¹

The economic crisis led to a decrease in Italian exports to Yugoslavia. The problems and consequences of the crisis, quickly reflected in trade, strict limitations of imports and exports, strong state interventionism, foreign currency restrictions and other measures implemented to protect the national economy led to a drastic decrease of trade exchange. In 1931, Italian import decreased by 37% compared to 1930, and the import of textile goods by 42%.⁵²

The trade agreements from 1934 and the sanctions against Italy in 1935–1936 additionally affected in a negative way the import trend, so in 1936, the import of textile goods from Italy amounted only to 59 million dinars.⁵³ It was the sanctions and the strengthening of autarchy in Italy⁵⁴ that made the import of cotton yarn, the main import item, a huge problem for the entire textile industry. While the sanctions were in place, the import of cotton yarn from Italy to Yugoslavia was banned, which meant that the textile industry lost its most favorable market for import. Italy was replaced by Czechoslovakia, with somewhat higher prices and expenses, for certain kind of goods even 50% higher. However, Czechoslovakia soon limited and redirected its export of yarn to clearing countries, which practically left Yugoslavia unable to procure cotton. As a result, the textile industry struggled to procure cotton until the war.⁵⁵

Although the import of textile goods recorded a positive increase 1937–1939 (represents 30% of total textile imports), the change in foreign trade with Germany was undeniable. We shall mention one example: on the sessions of the Permanent Economic Committees of the two countries, the Italians often demanded a decrease of duties for their goods, like certain kinds of artificial woolen yarns, fiocco yarns, silk cloths..., because Italy was the main exporter of them, until the crisis, but in the pre-war years, Germany gave substantial privileges for import of the mentioned goods, which resulted in a decrease of import from Italy.⁵⁶

⁵¹ J. Рафаиловић, *Развој индустрије на Балкану: текстилна индустрија у Краљевини Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца и Бузарској 1919–1929* (Development of industry in the Balkans: textile industry in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Bulgaria 1919-1929) (Београд: Институт за новију историју Србије), 2018.

⁵² *Статистика спољне трговине Краљевине Југославије за 1931. годину*, 512–532; *Статистика спољне трговине Краљевине Југославије за 1930. годину*, 512–514.

⁵³ *Статистика спољне трговине Краљевине Југославије за 1931. годину*, 511–516.

⁵⁴ Look for more: Berend, *Економска историја Европе и XX века*, 129–146.

⁵⁵ Бајкић & Предавец, “Економске санкције према Италији,” 205.

⁵⁶ Архив Југославије, фонд 76 Centralna industrijska korporacija, f – 58, Savez tekstilnih industrija Kraljevine Jugoslavije, Referat po pitanju uvoza fiocco – Zellwolle i lanitala, 2.11.1938

It is clear from all of the above that the Italian role in foreign trade declined from year to year, as a reflection of the German domination and the political-economic decisions of Italian authorities. This analysis indicates a decline of import of Italian products in the Kingdom: the cumulative rate of import from Italy was negative and decreasing by 4%, while Italy's share in import compared to other countries fell by 6%. The export of goods to Italy followed a similar scenario; the value of goods increased by 3%, while the share decreased by 4%. Annual export and import rates varied – the most significant decrease and increase were recorded at the end of the 1930s – a 330% increase between 1936 and 1937 and a decrease of 70–80% during 1935–1937, the years when the sanctions were enforced. The cumulative and aggregate annual rate of export increases of textile goods from Italy reflected the general trends and also fell by 5%.

This hypothesis – that the decrease of import from Italy was a consequence of the German presence and the Italian foreign policy – are certainly important for understanding the context in which all foreign trade unfolded. However, the analysis and comparison of the import trends from Italy and import of textile goods, should take into account that the Yugoslav industry made some advances, as Ivo Belin predicted in 1930: "...a notable decrease of Italian exports to Yugoslavia should be attributed to the fact that Italy exported to Yugoslavia primarily textile goods, while Yugoslavia made the most significant advances in the textile industry of all industry branches..."⁵⁷ The falling import trend of textile goods from Italy (except for 1935–1936) suggests a similarity and correlation of 0.8. The mentioned analysis also indicates that the export decrease of textile goods from Italy, in terms of its value, wasn't only a consequence of the German presence and, to an extent, other political events, but also a result of Yugoslavia's changing import structure.

The change in the country's import structure was primarily reflected in the import of cotton, with import of raw cheap cotton increasing and the import of expensive semi-finished products falling. Vladimir Pertot argues that this was a result of the substitutive function and decrease of cotton prices on the world market between the two wars.⁵⁸ We shall mention the example of the import of semi-finished products and the increase of raw cotton import from Italy. The

(The Alliance of Textile industries of Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Study on import of fiocco – Zellwolle i lanitala 2 November 1938); AJ, 76, 58, Savez tekstilnih industrija Kraljevine Jugoslavije, Uvoz i prerada veštačkog predivnog materijala Fiocco i Zellvolle, 21.10.1937 (The Alliance of Textile industries of Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Import and fabrication of artificial yarn Fiocco i Zellvolle 21 October 1937); Milak, *Italija i Jugoslavija 1931–1937*, 158.

⁵⁷ И. Белин, "Итало-југословенски привредни односи", 252.

⁵⁸ V. Pertot, *Ekonomika međunarodne razmjene Jugoslavije. Knj. 1, Analiza razdoblja između 1919. i 1968. godine* (The International Trade of Yugoslavia, vol. I, The Study of the period from 1918 to 1968) (Zagreb: Informator, 1971), 88–93.

value of import of cotton yarn (raw cotton) was 38.6 million dinars in 1923 (4% of the total imports of textile materials from Italy), 58.7 million dinars in 1929 (15%), 106 million dinars in 1937 (35%);⁵⁹ while the value of cotton fabrics (semi-finished products)⁶⁰ amounted to 590 million dinars in 1923 (58%), 118 million dinars in 1929 (31%) and 34 million dinars in 1937 (11%).⁶¹

All of the above suggests that the decrease of imports from Italy wasn't just a consequence of the politics and economy of the great powers, but also of the changing needs of the Yugoslavian industry that is, the country's gradual industrialization and part of the wider question of whether and to what extent the industrialization of Yugoslavia could replace the import of finished products with its own production.⁶²

Conclusion

Yugoslav-Italian economic relations were more than just ordinary trade and economic relations. Their evolution in the interwar period wasn't influenced only by their respective trade needs but also by political issues, such as demarcation, coming of the fascists to power and their policy towards Yugoslavia, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the founding of the Axis Alliance, the role of Germany in the economy of Southeastern Europe..., but also economic factors like post-war rebuilding and inflation, the Great Depression, sanctions against Italy, clearing agreements... A third factor was also at play: the economic development of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia thus changing import and export needs. The example of import of textile goods quantitatively demonstrated that these three factors shaped the Yugoslav-Italian economic cooperation.

⁵⁹ The customs paragraphs 274,2a concern cotton yarns single stringed over No. 12–29 and 274,1a Cotton yarns single stringed No. 12

⁶⁰ The customs paragraphs 277a and 277b covered smooth cotton cloths.

⁶¹ *Статистика спољне трговине Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца за 1923. годину*, 50–51; *Статистика спољне трговине Краљевине Југославије за 1929. годину*, 511–512; *Статистика спољне трговине Краљевине Југославије за 1937. годину*, 488–489.

⁶² М. -Ж. Чалић, *Социјална историја Србије 1815–1941: успорени напредак у индустријализацији* (Social history of Serbia 1815–1941: slow progress in industrialization) (Београд: Слио, 2004), 408–409.

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Creation of an Alternate Reality: The Organization and Propaganda Activities of the Government of National Salvation from 1941 until 1944

Abstract: The complexity and rise of the awareness of the importance of propaganda in the Second World War, alongside improvements in the means of mass communication, influenced the emergence of institutional propaganda actions of the wartime collaborationist regime in the territory of occupied Serbia. The paper is primarily based on archive material from the Military Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Serbia. It also includes an analysis of the methods and models of the propaganda collaborationist administration and its representatives in the period of the Council of Commissars, as well as the "Government of National Salvation" during the entire period of occupation. It describes the formation and work of the Section for State Propaganda and its connection with the German propaganda machine, in addition to highlighting some peculiarities of the propaganda placed in the public of the occupied Serbia.

Keywords: Second World War, Serbia, collaboration, Council of Commissars, "Government of National Salvation", propaganda

Introduction

The forms and methods of propaganda in the Second World War¹ were considerably modified and made more complex compared to the First

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¹ The most comprehensive monographs on the Second World War include: P. Kalvokarezi, G. Vint, *Totalni rat*, [Summary: Total War] (Belgrade: RAD, 1987); G. P. Megargee, *War of Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front 1941* (Plymouth: Roman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007); R. Holmes, *The World at War; The Landmark Oral History from Previously Unpublished Archives* (Dunfermline: Ebury Press, 2007); A. Roberts, *The Storm of War* (London: Penguin Books, 2009); A. Beevor, *The Second World War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2012); M. Hastings, *All Hell Let Loose: World at War 1939–1945* (Harper Collins, 2011).

World War and the interwar period.² Alongside improvements in the methods of mass communication, there was a noticeable rise in the awareness of the importance of organized propaganda,³ as well as the fact that a propaganda war, or rather a propaganda-psychological war, from that moment on, required the use of all available resources of a given country.⁴ The distinctive feature of propaganda during the Second World War was reflected in its absolute subservience to the principles of war and the needs of warfare and strategy. Closed societies saw their ability to force people to make judgment calls without an appropriate assessment of reality as their greatest success.⁵ “During the rise of Fascists and Nazis in the interwar period and the Second World War, propaganda became a powerful and irreplaceable tool in the battle for supremacy and hegemony, equalization of thought, stirring religious intolerance, intoxication by doctrines

² The modern use of the term “war propaganda” often implies two different meanings, which in time developed in the military terminology of USA and Europe. The criterion for determining the meaning of the term military propaganda is warfare as a type of activity. In European terminology, war propaganda is defined as “political propaganda contrary to pacifist propaganda, namely propaganda led by those social forces or countries that see war as the best way of solving international issues and whose goal is to impose their will, way of thinking and interests onto others through violent military action”. *Enciklopedijski leksikon*, T.27 [Summary: Encyclopedic Lexicon, Vol.27] (Belgrade: Interpress, 1969), 371. Among American authors, the content of war propaganda is always determined by military goals and means, while most of their European colleagues start from the fact that the meaning of military propaganda is always political, and its goal a political goal; J. Ellul, *Propaganda, Formation of Men's Attitudes* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 8.; N. J. Cull, D. Culbert & D. Welch, *Propaganda and mass persuasion, A historical encyclopedia, 1500 to present* (Santa Barbara, 2003), 322; J. Garth, V. O' Donnell, *Propaganda and persuasion* (London, New Delhi: Newbery Park, 1992).

³ Most theorists of communication agree that propaganda as a form of human communication differs from other forms of the spoken or written word in that it is always a premeditated act, associated with the social system as a pre-defined controversy, namely a conflicting situation in principle, a given fact. D. H. Laswell, D. Lerner & H. Speier, *Propaganda and Communication in World History*, vol. I-III (USA: East-West Center by University Press of Hawaii, 1979).

⁴ M. Mraović, *Od surove stvarnosti do alternativne realnosti. Propaganda vlade Milana Nedića 1941–1944* [Summary: From reality of war to alternative reality. Propaganda of Milan Nedić's government (1941–1944)] (Belgrade: Media Center “Odbrana”, 2019), 48–49; M. Mraović, “Propaganda vlade Milana Nedića 1941–1944”, doktorska disertacija [Summary: Propaganda of Milan Nedić's government (1941–1944)] (Doctoral Dissertation, Belgrade: University of Belgrade, History Department, 2015), 57–58.

⁵ K. Nikolić, *Nemački ratni plakati u Srbiji 1941–1944*. [Summary: German War Posters in Serbia 1941–1944] (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2012), 89.

and spreading ideological single-mindedness.”⁶ The Axis Powers entered the Second World War with a complex propaganda machine and significant experience from the interwar period and the First World War. At the beginning of the war, the enemies of the Axis Powers didn't have a coordinated propaganda system suitable for wartime use. However, the new needs led to a change in the previous views and interpretations of the role of the propaganda machine and propaganda as a phenomenon, resulting in the formation of new half-military, official and unofficial, propaganda institutions.⁷ General Eisenhower wrote, at the end of the European operations, that psychological warfare had developed as a specific and effective weapon of war.⁸ The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was one of the countries in the epicenter of these dramatic developments as a target of the political-propaganda machinery of the Third Reich.⁹

Propaganda in the Second World War was planned, conceived and organized, on one hand, but, on the other hand, historical sources offer numerous examples of spontaneous propaganda reflecting the developments on the frontlines and its dissemination via rumors and hearsay.¹⁰ The importance assigned to it is attested by the fact that the Germans called it the Third Front and the Americans the fourth branch of the military.¹¹ In the propaganda war, the opposing forces employed different means of psychological warfare, one of them being sharp criticism of enemy propaganda.¹² Interestingly, propaganda warfare was the last theater to “go quiet”.

⁶ A. Mitrović, “Drugi svetski rat. Istorijisko mesto i značaj” [Summary: World War II. Historical meaning and significance] *Marksistička misao*, I 3 (1975), 105–127.

⁷ The leading powers in the anti-Axis coalition created various institutions for maximizing the effectiveness of their propaganda towards the enemy, but also towards other, neutral or allied.

⁸ P. M. A. Lineberger, *Psychological Warfare*, (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948), 56.

⁹ At a conference held in Vienna on 24th April 1941, it was decided that Serbia, as the main culprit for the policy pursued by the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, should “stay as small as possible and that all measures should be undertaken in order to forever disenable a repeat of the recent betrayal of the conspirator clique”. *Zbornik dokumenata o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu*, vol XII, num. 1 (Belgrade: Military History Institute of the Yugoslav People's Army, 1973), 72.

¹⁰ “Wartime propaganda is rough, direct, full of preconceptions; it does not strive for the truth and cares even less about accurate wording; its judgments are arbitrary and its language vulgar.” B. Petranović, *Istoričar i savremena epoha* [Summary: The Historian and the Modern Era] (Belgrade: Stručna knjiga, 1997), 88.

¹¹ V. Mihailović, *Propaganda i rat* [Summary: Propaganda and War] (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1984), 24.

¹² Military Archive, Group of funds Nedić's Archive (later in the text MA, Group of funds Nda), K 10, num. of register 4/1–2.

Organization of propaganda actions of the collaborationist government in the territory of occupied Serbia during the Council of Commissars (April - August 1941)

Collaboration with the occupying forces in Serbia in the Second World War had two institutional phases: the Council of Commissars and the "Government of National Salvation". Alongside the formation of the German occupational apparatus in Serbia, a commissar regime was set up to provide mostly technical and administrative support to the occupiers.¹³ In the paper *Novo vreme* the commissars were presented to the public as "the elite recruited from the ranks of the most prestigious bureaucrats and politicians".¹⁴ At the beginning of the occupation, there was no official ministry or department of propaganda. A press bureau was formed with Đorđe Perić as its head as a temporary department in charge of propaganda during the Council of Commissars,¹⁵ with its first assignment being to "bolster and maintain the premise of the continuity of the commissar regime with the prewar organs of the state".¹⁶

Besides propaganda, the ministries headed by commissars worked on the gradual stabilization of the situation, first in Belgrade and then in other cities in occupied Serbia. At first, the Ministry of Internal Affairs had a decisive role in the organization of life and work and the direction of propaganda activities.¹⁷ The majority of newspapers published in the first occupation months included news about the normalization of the situation and appeals for social solidarity. The commissar of the City of Belgrade, Dragi Jovanović, called on the citizens to participate in the government's efforts to normalize the living conditions in the country.¹⁸ Similarly, in an official statement, the commissar of the Ministry of the Post, Telegraph and Telephone, Dr. Dušan Pantić, stressed that it was

¹³ MA, Group of funds Nda, K 53, num. of register 15/2-12., MA, Microfilmed structure of the archive from the National archive Washington, NAV-N- T-75, 69/1012-271. Proclamation of the appointment of the commissars to previous ministries was announced in the Belgrade paper *Opštinske novine* (at the time the only daily paper) on 2nd May 1941. The same text was published in the Collection of Orders and Laws from the German and local government for the period of April-May 1941 in an edition of the Economic register., B. Božović, *Beograd pod komesarskom upravom 1941* [Summary: Belgrade under the Council of Commissars] (Belgrade: Institute for Contemporary History, 1988), 89.

¹⁴ *Novo vreme*, 16th May 1941.

¹⁵ MA, Group of funds Nda, K 3, num. of register 1/3-1.

¹⁶ MA, Group of funds Nda, K 3, num. of register 1/3-2.

¹⁷ R. Ristanović, *Akcije komunističkih ilegalaca u Beogradu 1941-1942* [Summary: Actions of communist undercover agents in Belgrade 1941-1944] (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2013), 48-49; MA, Group of funds Nda, K 59, num. of register 2/7-2.

¹⁸ "Apel Beograđanima izvanrednog komesara grada Beograda", *Zbirka naredaba i uputstava* 1, History Archive of Belgrade, Б-4, II-1/29, inv. num. 998.

necessary to work with the German authorities on restoring the country.¹⁹ The report of Milan Aćimović for the Military Command in Serbia for May of 1941 is important for understanding the effectiveness of the propaganda efforts of the Council of Commissars.²⁰ During the commissar regime, the emphasis was on the ability of the people to actively participate in the renewal of the country and internal affairs.²¹ At a conference of the Department of State Security of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on 18th June 1941, it was estimated that there was intense communist activity in the country, especially rural areas, leading to an initiative to arrest communists with the goal of imprisoning dangerous communist actors and disabling any form of organized propaganda. Regardless of new reprisals, the propaganda work of the Council of Commissars and new retaliations, acts of sabotage were increasingly common and were followed by the first armed operations of members of the resistance. Assessments of the effectiveness of propaganda efforts were initially based on the reports of the *Abwehr* and Gestapo analyses, according to which “German propaganda isn’t well adjusted for the mentality of Serbs and isn’t accomplishing the desired effect”. Local government institutions were presented as centers of enemy “whisper propaganda”, in which German supporters were supposedly being fired from duty.

After the explosion of an ammunition depot in Smederevo on 5th June 1941, which caused many civilian casualties and significant material damage,²² the Rudnik news agency reported that the German administration had rapidly responded to alleviate the effects of the explosion and stressed their readiness to help the citizens of Smederevo, especially the families of the deceased.²³ A

¹⁹ “The Serbian nation is aware that only with persistent labor and wholehearted collaboration with German war authorities can they raise the country out of the rubble”, *Novo vreme*, 30th June 1941, “The railroad bridge over Sava has been fixed after 37 days and with traffic allowed on 31st of May”, *Novo vreme*, 1st June 1941, 1.

²⁰ MA, Group of funds Nda, K 19, num. of register 6/1–12.

²¹ M. Mraović, “Nova Srbija u Novoj Evropi” na stranicama kolaboracionističke štampe Vlade narodnog spasa”. In *Društvene nauke pred izazovima savremenog društva*, [Summary: “New Serbia in New Europe” on the pages of the Collaborationist Press of the Government of National Salvation] (Niš: University of Niš, 2017), 127–150.

²² D. Milošević, *Izbrisani grad*, [Summary: Erased city], (Smederevo: Historical Archive of Smederevo, 2021), 16.

²³ After the ammunition explosion in the Smederevo fort, the Rudnik agency informed the public about the explosion, emphasizing that it happened “...at 14:20 due to self-ignition caused by the great heat”. It was stated in the news that the executive general Ludwig von Schröder was transferred by plane to Smederevo where he recruited the German army, the Red Cross, National Socialist action for social care, as well as active Serbian authorities in order to provide aid. “Explosion in Smederevo”, *Novo vreme*, 7th June 1941, 2, “Proclamation from the commissioner of the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone Mr. Dr. Dušan Pantić, The Serbian people are aware that only with persistent labor and wholehearted col-

letter of gratitude from Milan Aćimović to the German army for helping the suffering Smederevo was also published.²⁴ The role of the Council of Commissars in the action to restore Smederevo was used as a local propaganda motif and also became a general symbol of the campaign to rebuild the entire occupied territory.²⁵ The Council of Commissars and later Milan Nedić's "Government of National Salvation" dedicated a lot of attention to organizing the care and employment of Serbian refugees, with regular reports to the public regarding the successes of the local administration in resolving the refugee issue.²⁶ To solve the position of refugees and repair the damage of the explosion in Smederevo, they established the Central committee for Serbian refugee care,²⁷ and Irregular commissariat for the renewal of Smederevo. An article titled "The Serbian Press" stressed that the goal of the local governments was to find jobs for all refugees, or rather, ensure "the[ir] right to work, allow them to share in the responsibility and pleasure of having an opportunity to participate in the renewal of a ravaged country".²⁸

It was at this time that Milan Aćimović, after receiving instructions from the German administrative apparatus, established the Committee for investigating the events that had led the country into the war. After a thorough examination, the committee published on 5th September 1941 its final report, in which it accused those who had caused the coup.²⁹ The German authorities used the aforementioned results for propaganda purposes to accuse and degrade the royal government and General Simović. One of the German experts for Southeastern Europe created a study on the causes that had led to the incidents of 27th March.³⁰ Considering that the "main culprits for dragging the country into the

laboration with German war authorities, they can raise the country out of the rubble", *Novo vreme*, 30th June 1941, 1, 3.

²⁴ *Novo vreme*, 25th June 1941.

²⁵ "The very first day of charity drive for refugees and renewal of Smederevo gave excellent results", *Novo vreme*, 27th June 1941, 1, "Actions from Obrenovac to help refugees and for the rebuilding of Smederevo", *ibid.*, 3, "Charity drive for refugees and the rebuilding of Smederevo", *Novo vreme*, 27th June 1941, 3, "Yesterday 100.000 people from Belgrade gave donations for Serbian refugees", *Novo vreme*, 29th June 1941, 1, 3.

²⁶ MA, Group of funds Nda, K 19, num. of register 8/1.

²⁷ Ђ. С., "There are around 40,000 refugees in Serbia from all regions of former Yugoslavia", *Novo vreme*, 18th June 1941, p. 2.; Ђ. С., Central committee for refugee care and the rebuilding of Smederevo is formed in Belgrade", *Novo vreme*, 19th June 1941, 1, 3.

²⁸ *Obnova*, 15th July 1941.

²⁹ Historical archive of Belgrade, Administration of the city of Belgrade, K 588, Ф. 7.

³⁰ MA, Group of funds Nda, K 3, num. of register 34/4-7.

war” were no longer on Serbian soil, the “results of the investigation” were later used by the “Government of National Salvation” in propaganda campaigns.³¹

The German occupation authorities, during the period of the Council of Commissars, launched a security-intelligence analysis of the activities of the Serbian Orthodox Church, whose actions were treated as a political problem, given its influence on the citizens and its role in the events of 27th March. The governor of Belgrade instructed the Special Police Department to solve the “case of Patriarch Gavriilo”.³² Based on a surviving “Action Note” by Karl Kraus, it’s possible to determine the actions taken by the security services and propaganda machine of the Council of Commissars. In the aforementioned note, Kraus emphasized that “Patriarch Gavriilo should not be made into a martyr” and that the measures against him “had to be very well-prepared through propaganda”, so that the widest Serbian public would declare him guilty.³³ Under the pressure of the occupation regime and the local administration, the remaining church dignitaries were forced to “continue their holy mission without interruptions” and acknowledge the occupational regime, which was announced in a Proclamation by the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church on 9th July 1941.³⁴ That was followed by their official visit to the Command of the Head Military Commander and a meeting with General von Schröder and state counselor Dr. Turner.³⁵

In the first occupation months, the local press regularly wrote about the socio-political situation in the Independent State of Croatia, the activities of the Croatian national leadership and its relations with Germany and Italy. Many of those reports were reprinted from the German press.³⁶ For example, less than a

³¹ B. Petranović, *Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939–1945*, [Summary: Serbia in WWII] (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1992), 134.

³² Historical Archive of Belgrade, Source documents from dossier of the archive from SLA Belgrade and Section of Special Police from the Government of city of Belgrade referring to the monitoring of the activities of the Serbian Orthodox Church.

³³ Božović, Belgrade, 144. Department for external politics of the Nazi party lead by the party ideologist Alfred Rosenberg analyzed the activity of the Serbian Orthodox Church from an ideological standpoint.

³⁴ *Novo vreme*, 9th July 1941.

³⁵ *Novo vreme*, 10th July 1941.

³⁶ M. Mraović, “Pisanje kolaboracionističkog lista *Novo vreme* o vojnoj i političkoj situaciji u NDH 1941–1944. godine”, [Summary: Writings of the Collaborationist Paper *Novo vreme* about the military and political situation in the Independent State of Croatia 1941–1944] *Vojno-istorijski glasnik*, 2 (2017), 131–146; M. Mraović, Z. Vignjević, “Značaj i uloga propagande u zločinima ustaških i u odnosu klerikalnih vlasti prema srpskom stanovništvu u NDH” [Summary: Importance and role of propaganda in the crimes of the Ustasha and in the attitude of the church authorities towards the Serbian population in the Independent State of Croatia] *Zapisi* 7 (2018), 221–233.

month after the proclamation of ISC, *Novo vreme* published an article about the establishment of the new Croatian state, including a speech by General Slavko Kvaternik, a statement from Poglavnik Pavelić about the political orientation of the new Croatian polity and Hitler's telegram to the Croatian leadership.³⁷ The first article in the capital's press regarding the race laws promulgated in ISC was published in mid-May 1941.³⁸ In this article, the responsibility for the racial measures was ascribed to the Ustasha.³⁹ Immediately after the establishment of the Council of Commissars, Milan Aćimović sent a request to the German authorities to stop the prosecution and killing of Serbs in ISC, as well as in Bačka, and then, in early June 1941, a memorandum to General Schröder asking him to protect the local Serbian population from Croatian, Bulgarian, Hungarian and Albanian terror. The Serbian Orthodox Church submitted an exposé on the suffering of the clergy and laity in ISC to General Schröder on 9th July 1941. The exposé mentioned that 100,000 Serbs had been killed in ISC since its foundation. The propagandists saw the questions regarding the attitude of ISC towards the local Serbian population, its persecution, suffering and forced catholicization exclusively in the context of Croatian blame, while any public remarks about German culpability were interpreted as malicious propaganda and slander.⁴⁰ News and articles about the situation in the Croatian territory contained a certain amount of hope in the all-powerful German supervising authorities and their readiness to help the Serbian population.⁴¹ The memorandum of the Serbian Orthodox Church submitted in late August of 1941 to General Danckelmann contains data about 180,000 killed Serbs up until that moment.⁴² Amidst the obvious increase of violence and atrocities in Croatia, all of the above could not yield the expected results and foster a climate of reconciliation. Testimonies of those who had managed to survive, fleeing for their lives, shattered every propaganda attempt to prove the opposite or dilute the truth.⁴³

³⁷ "How the Croatian country was formed. Poglavnik Dr. Ante Pavelić on the missions and program for Croatia," *Novo vreme*, 20th May 1941, 3.

³⁸ *Novo vreme*, 17th May 1941, 5.

³⁹ *Novo vreme*, 28th June 1941, 1., Text of the "Law on the protection of state and people" named "extraordinary measures for reduction of violence in Croatia", 3.

⁴⁰ MA, Group of funds Nda, K 19, num. of register 28/1.

⁴¹ MA, Group of funds Nda, K 19, num. of register 30/1.

⁴² S. Kerkez, *Društvo Srbije u Drugom svetskom ratu* [Summary: Society of Serbia during WWII] (Niš: Center for Balkan Studies, 2004), 238; R. Radić, *Država i verske zajednice 1945–1970, I* [Summary: The State and Religious Communities] (Belgrade: Institute for Recent History of Serbia, 2002), 59.

⁴³ *Zbornik odabranih dokumenata Zločini Nezavisne države Hrvatske 1941–1942. godine*, [Summary: Collection of documents Crimes of the Independent State of Croatia 1941–

During the Council of Commissars regime, one of the first complex propaganda actions was launched: the “Appeal to the Serbian People”, published via the press and radio on 13th August 1941.⁴⁴ The text of the appeal, condemning the communist movement as the cause of German retaliations and calling on the citizens to stop supporting the movement, was offered to intellectuals from political, educational, cultural, business, religious and other circles to be signed. A certain number of signatures were collected. The “Appeal” claimed that the communist movement was isolated from the people and that it was necessary to maintain order and peace, alongside cooperation with the German authorities, so the great feat of national renewal could be achieved.⁴⁵ The echo of the “Appeal”, according to an assessment of the commissar and gendarmerie authorities, didn’t accomplish the desired effect in the public.⁴⁶ On the contrary, it became a propaganda weapon in the hands of the communists. In a report submitted to Milan Aćimović after a tour, the acting commander of the gendarmerie, Colonel Jovan Tršić, stated that the “...communists are using the very same appeal to convince the people that it was signed by ministers, generals, bank directors, action groups and that they all sold their souls to the Germans in order to keep their wealth”.

The uprising that spread to a large part of the occupied Serbian territory in August 1941 led to further oppressive measures of the German authorities. The command of the military commander in Belgrade considered organized oppressive measures, as well as planned use of retaliation, alongside constant propaganda directed at the population in order to make the resistance cease. The ruthlessness and cruelty of the German authorities, especially in the field, caused a deep crisis among the commissars. Especially cruel retaliations were carried out in the village of Skela and in Terazije Square in Belgrade on 15th and 17th of August 1941.⁴⁷ General Danckelmann was convinced that the repression was going to seem frightening to the citizens of Belgrade and the rest of occu-

1942] (Novi Sad: Historical archive of the City of Novi Sad & Military Archive of Serbia, vol 1, 2020).

⁴⁴ A list of those who had signed the appeal was published in *Novo vreme* on 13th and 14th of August 1941. “Miloš Đurić, Ivo Andrić, Isidora Sekulić, Milivoje Kostić and other distinguished individuals refused to sign the Appeal.

⁴⁵ *Novo vreme* published an article on 16th August 1941 named “Echo of the Appeal among Serbian people. In Belgrade the Appeal was received with utmost understanding and resolution to keeping peace in the country”.

⁴⁶ MA, Group of funds Chetnik Archive, K 269, num. of register. 3–17.

⁴⁷ “Proclamation: Village Skela burned to the ground”, Rudnik Agency, *Novo vreme*, 16th August 1941, Collection of NOR, vol I, num. 1, 365., “Proclamation: Public execution of communist terrorists in Belgrade”, *Novo vreme*, 17th August 1941, article “Public execution at Terazije”, *Ponedeljak*, 18th August 1941.

pied Serbia, but as an air force general and a “man from the sidelines”, as German officers from the land forces called him, he misjudged the mentality and history of the Serbian people. The German reports from the field mentioned an increase of revanchism and resistance among the population after the reprisals in Skela and Terazije. The police reports from that time attest to a generally negative response of the population and local government.

The replacement of the Council of Commissars was popularized by promoting the need to establish a stable system of internal government in Serbia, worthy of the new German order.⁴⁸ In a memorandum addressed by Dimitrije Ljotić to Heinrich Danckelmann on 20th of August 1941, it was suggested to appoint a more authoritative person than Milan Aćimović to the position of prime minister, in addition to securing a more autonomous position and broader powers for the new government. Three days later, Ljotić’s representatives in the Council of Commissars handed in their resignations.⁴⁹ The resigning commissars indicated that there was a need to form a new government which would have more autonomy in its administration of the country, while respecting the legitimate and political rights and economic interests of the Reich.⁵⁰ The combination of the military-political environment, the inability of the commissar regime to solve the issues important to the German occupation administration, primarily economical difficulties and the problems caused by the uprising in Serbia in August of 1941, led to the solving of the crisis of the Council of Commissars through its disbandment on 29th August 1941.

Representatives of the “Government of National Salvation” as the bearers of propaganda

The formation of the “Government of National Salvation”⁵¹ represented an attempt of the German occupation administration, due to its inability to engage additional German troops through the local administration, to disable the spreading of the uprising in the latter half of 1941.⁵² In the moment of the

⁴⁸ M. S. Jovanović, “Serbia land of logic”, *Obnova*, 7th July 1941, 5.; P. I., “Against chaos for the new order!”, *Obnova*, 7th July 1941, 5.

⁴⁹ MA, Group of funds Nda, K 1 A, num. of register 2/3–1., MA, Group of funds Nda K 27, num. of register 3/5, Records of the hearing of dr. Georg Kisel from 25th October 1946.

⁵⁰ MA, Group of funds Nda, K 1 A, num. of register 2/3.

⁵¹ Formation of the “Government of National Salvation” was approved by a decree of General Danckelmann on 28th August 1941.

⁵² On the beginnings of the civil war in Serbia: Petranović, 264–265; K. Nikolić, “O uzrocima izbijanja građanskog rata u Srbiji 1941”, 307–323. For a bibliography of the civil war in Serbia see: M. Bjelajac, “Istoriografija o građanskom ratu u Jugoslaviji 1941–1945”, *Istorija 20. veka*, 1/1997, 129–144; M. Bjelajac, “Istoriografija o građanskom ratu u Jugoslaviji

formation of the Government, General Milan Nedić⁵³ had an organized local and occupation propaganda machine, but faced a mass of displeased citizens burdened by the war situation, drastic German repression, the activities of the resistance movement, and a sea of refugees that arrived in Serbia in waves.⁵⁴ The formation of the Government was presented to the people as an event of far-reaching importance, a historical necessity, and the only logical and possible solution.⁵⁵

The “Government of National Salvation” was not politically homogeneous.⁵⁶ The original composition of the “Government of National Salvation” during the occupation changed several times, with the replacement of several ministers or its reconstruction.⁵⁷ The name “Government of National Salvation”

1941–1945 – komparativna istraživanja”, *Suočavanje sa prošlošću – put ka budućnosti: istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1991*, 283–296.

⁵³ MA, Group of funds Army of the Yugoslav Kingdom, Personnel files of the officers, non-commissioned officers and military personnel of the Army of the Yugoslav Kingdom, Milan Dj. Nedić’s personal file, K 1187, num. 332. For more details on General Nedić’s military career see M. Bjelajac: *Generals and admirals of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1918–1941*, Belgrade 2004, 224–225.

⁵⁴ A day after Nedić’s appointment, *Obnova* published a speech by General Harald Turner, in which he stated the following: “When people stood up against the occupation forces, following directions from Lenin about an armed rebellion... it will be followed by the collective annihilation of Serbian people if Serbian executives don’t manage to destroy the communists in the entire country”, unsigned article: “The task of the new Serbian government. Speech from the state councilor Mr. Dr. Turner.”, *Obnova*, 30th August 1941, 5.

⁵⁵ The *Novo vreme* paper published several articles on the formation of the “government, which will, in the best interests of its homeland and out of its own volition, keep peace, order and safety” and about General Nedić, who was “willing to form a government in this dire moment and take responsibility for maintaining public order, peace and safety.” Unauthorized article, “A new Serbian government is formed”, “Reception of the new Serbian government at the military commander”, *Novo vreme*, 30th August 1941, 1, “Reception of the new Serbian government by the military commander in Serbia”, “Biographies of the new Ministers”, “The speech of Mr. Milan Nedić”, 3,4. *Obnova* wrote about the big turnaround in Serbia’s internal political life and about the priority tasks of the new Government. Of course, there was a photograph and the speech of General Danckelmann on the front page, unauthorized article, “Great turnaround in our internal political life. Serbian government is formed with Army General Mr. Milan Nedić at its head. The new government has a duty to gather all constructive forces, bring order and peace and lead the country toward improvement and progress”, *Obnova*, 30th August 1941, 1, The new Serbian government assumes duty. Speech from the military commander of Serbia, Air Force General Mr. Danckelmann.”, *Obnova*, 30th August 1941, 3.

⁵⁶ B. Božović, *Specijalna policija u Beogradu 1941–1944* [Summary: Special Police in Belgrade 1941–1944] (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2014).

⁵⁷ About the work and projects of the “Government of National Salvation” see also: A. Stojanović, “Planning a Social Transformation: a Contribution to the Research of WWII

was supposed to instill confidence in the newly formed institution as a vassal alternative that wanted to stop the bleeding of the Serbian people and provide for them a better resolution in “New Europe”.⁵⁸ Influencing the propaganda work of the representatives of the central and local government, in the form of speeches and lectures and holding assemblies and conferences were some of the ways in which the German authorities tried to popularize their political and economic goals.⁵⁹ In-person conversations were surely the most appropriate channel for exerting propaganda influence on the wider masses, many of whom were illiterate and receptive only to audio-visual content. Based on the way in which the members of the Government presented their ideological and political beliefs and views, we can conclude that they were, to a certain extent, instructed by the German authorities. At the same time, there was a certain propaganda component directed towards the Germans themselves, which was supposed to convince the occupiers that nothing could be said without their approval or done outside the established propaganda framework. Propaganda was not devised only in the German center and the Department of State Propaganda but was also, to a cer-

Collaboration in Serbia”, *Tokovi istorije*, 1/2013, 135–152; A. Stojanović, “*Ideje, politički projekti i praksa vlade Milana Nedića 1941–1944*”, (doctoral dissertation, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy, History Department), 2014; A. Stojanović, *Ideje, politički projekti i praksa vlade Milana Nedića*, Beograd, 2015.

⁵⁸ The Declaration of the Government of National Salvation to the Serbian people was published in *Novo vreme* on 2nd September 1941. The Rulebook of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers was also passed, with special regulations for managing the operations of every single ministry. Declaration of the Government of National Salvation to the Serbian people, 2nd September 1941, Speeches of General Milan Nedić-Prime Minister of the Government of National Salvation, Belgrade 2006, 4,5. During the hearings, Nedić proclaimed that the primary goals of the Government in the Declaration referred to: pacifying the country, preventing a civil war and stabilization of the order: “On 1st September, on radio, I told the people in the form of a declaration that a new government was formed. That declaration was printed, if I remember correctly, in *Novo Vreme*, *Službeni list*, and was also plastered all over Belgrade and the interior in many places”, MA, Group of funds Chetnik Archive, K 269, num. of register 38/1–19.

⁵⁹ Speeches from the prime minister, ministers and other “noteworthy people” were announced via radio and press, and their contents were published without fail, Dr. M. M., “Painful reality”, *Novo vreme*, 4th October 1941. The author of the article states that the people “seduced by Moscow and London radio-propaganda, paid agents and misled sons” didn’t understand that they were going in the wrong direction until “the first warnings of the sober public, when the words were heard from our most notable people, the words of Milan Aćimović, Milan Nedić and our other sensible sons, who in the most difficult moment of our fateful history took upon themselves the greatest responsibility to the people, when those words were heard and when the people understood their difficult existence, a great change came forth in the soul of our man.”

tain extent, the result of the actions of the ideologues and members of the *Zbor* movement amongst the youth and the people.

The prime minister was aware of the importance of organized propaganda and his own role in the popularization of the domestic regime and pacification of the population.⁶⁰ In his propaganda activities, in most cases, he did not change the form or substance of the speeches he held⁶¹ if what he stated reflected the balance of power in theaters and the concrete needs conditioned by the requests of the occupying administration.⁶² He pursued anticommunist propaganda from the moment he became prime minister until his last days in power, even after leaving the country.⁶³ The double standards he used to propagate the protection of Serbdom and the Serbian nation were, in his view, completely justified in order to “remove communist chaff from the Serbian wheat”. His attitude to the government in exile and the Ravna Gora movement varied depending on the situation on the frontlines and the relations of the western Allies with General Mihailović, and so since the latter half of 1943 he turned to anticommunist propaganda and criticizing the western Allies after the bombings.⁶⁴ He appealed

⁶⁰ The Prime Minister in his speeches asserted the motto “building a future for the Serbian people in loyal cooperation with the German Reich and its representatives in Serbia.” Govor predsednika srpske vlade generala g. Milana Đ. Nedića: ‘Srpski narod neće nikada zaboraviti da se nemački vojnici i ako pobedilac, po svršenim ratnim operacijama nikome nije svetio i korektno se ponašao prema srpskom narodu.’, photo: “Predsednik vlade g. Nedić, za vreme govora, juče u dvorani Narodne skupštine”, *Obnova*, 30th August 1941, 3.

⁶¹ By analyzing Nedić’s influence on the “political scene” of occupied Serbia, Branko Petrović emphasized the importance of his public performances, describing the prime minister’s speeches to the average Serbian citizen as “simplified political and national philosophy”: “He presented himself as the ‘father of Serbia’, the man who enabled the Serbian people to survive the cataclysm it was facing. His simple, curt, military appeals echoed theatrically in the country where nobody had a say, but they stuck to average people. Serbs were a small people who needed to survive... Order, peace and ensuring food supply were the real messages that reached the common man, who was tired, scared and starving”, Petranović, *Srbija*, 223.

⁶² The post-war Communist authorities were aware of the great importance of the Nedić administration’s propaganda, and so the Indictment against Milan Nedić from 1946 (point 3) included his propaganda work immediately after the formation of the Government of National Salvation. MA, Group of funds Nda, K 1, num. of register 26/1-5.

⁶³ Speech of the Prime Minister, General Mr. Nedić, to the regional officers: “Today is a historic day in the life of our country. Reforms that must be undertaken must come from the root; a new era must come, with new people who will replace the old, because things cannot go back to the way they were. Communism in Serbia has been rooted out!”, *Obnova*, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th January 1942, p. 6.

⁶⁴ One of the most characteristic brochures about the Allied bombing was published with the title: “Bloody Easter in Belgrade, documents on the Anglo-American Air Strike Terror”, with an afterword by M. Spaljković, “Beograd opet u crno zavijen. Srpska vlada u ime celog našeg naroda protestuje zbog varvarskog bombardovanja srpskih gradova.”, “Moramo stegnuti svoja

to the leaders of civil parties to “stop interfering in politics and form a unified national Serbian bloc” in order to confront the armed communist movement and ideology.⁶⁵ An appeal was directed toward the wider population too, especially educational institutions and Serbian intellectuals, who were informed that they should work on weeding out every ideology that did not conform to the idea of creating Greater Serbia and the traditions of the Serbian people. During his hearings in the post-war investigation, Nedić claimed that the fundamental goals of the “Government of National Salvation” stated in the Declaration were: pacification of the country, stopping the civil war and stabilization of the order.⁶⁶ Nedić had a particular way of speaking to the masses, which in a certain way differentiated him from the other representatives of the national government and made it possible for him to influence the masses. He was exceedingly suggestive and capable of conveying the desired message in an extremely simplified, appealing way. He spoke in a “popular” way.⁶⁷ The reality of war caused great difficulties in the channels for disseminating propaganda materials.⁶⁸ Propaganda aimed

srca radi života i budućnosti srpskog naroda”, “Neka niko ne naseda lažnim glasovima”, “Proglaš vlade Narodnog spasa srpskom narodu”, “Saučešće Vojnog zapovednika Srbije”, “Beograd posle bombardovanja”, “Proglaš vladinog komesara” by Dragi Lj. Jovanović, 20th April 1944, p. 1., “Prva izjava Dragog Lj. Jovanovića posle bombardovanja 16 aprila”, *Obnova*, 20th April 1944, p. 2. Nedić’s “Poslanica Srpskom narodu na Vaskrs 1944 godine”: “Juče je izvršen četvrti najteži teroristički napad na Niš”, “Uskršnja “jaja saveznika” mirnom gradu Nikšiću”, *Novo vreme*, 16th and 17th April 1944, pg. 1., Nedić’s speech via radio: “Ove uskršnje žrtve biće osvećene jer za to vapije božija pravda.”, “Dižem glas protivu onih prosvećenih vandala što su za ovak zločin izabrali najveći hrišćanski praznik u godini”, *Novo vreme, Obnova*, 25th April 1944, pg. 1.

⁶⁵ The Communist authorities were aware of the great importance of the Nedić administration’s propaganda, and so the Indictment against Milan Nedić from 1946 (point 3) includes his propaganda work immediately after the formation of the Government of National Salvation. MA, Group of funds Nda, K 1, num. of register 26/1–5.

⁶⁶ MA, Group of funds Chetnik Archive, K 269, num. of register 38/1–19.

⁶⁷ “Danas govori preko radija predsednik Vlade g. Milan Nedić”, *Novo vreme*, 12th October 1941, 1., “Govor predsednika vlade generala g. Nedića. Ustaj i brani svoje ognjište od komunističkih pljačkaša, razbojnika i odmetnika. Znaj da je ovo sveta borba za odbranu Srbije i srpstva”, *Ponedeljak*, 13th October 1941, 1. Speech of the Serbian Prime Minister Nedić via radio: “Kroz rad i bratsku slogu, krenimo u novu, srećniju Srbiju”, *Novo vreme*, 11th February 1943, 1. The speech that Nedić delivered on 10th of February was broadcast again via radio as part of a program for farmers on 11th February. “Ja hoću da preporodim naše selo, jer kad je selo zdravo, pošteno i radno, srećan je narod, srećna je država”, *Obnova*, 18th April 1943; “Seljak je snova i snaga srpskog naroda”, *Srpsko selo*, 29th May 1943; “Preporođeno selo biće temelj nove države i nove Srbije” a nova Srbija zvaće se ‘Srpska seljačka zadrudna država’ rekao je general Nedić našim omladincima”, *Srpsko selo*, 5th June 1943.

⁶⁸ At the end of 1941, the Department of State Propaganda published Nedić’s speeches in the publication titled “Osnovi pravog srpskog rodoljublja” in the series Nacionalni spisi., MA, Group of funds Nda, K 49, num. of register 4/1–2.

at the peasantry, the largest social group in occupied Serbia, was an important segment of Nedić's political-ideological work. Based on the intensity and frequency of Nedić's public appearances, we can conclude that, in the segment of propaganda geared toward the peasantry, he accomplished considerable success despite the German Reich's excessive demands to deliver agricultural products and the taxes on selling grain.⁶⁹

The Minister of Education, Velibor Jonić, was one of the most productive ministers when it came to political-educational propaganda, especially holding speeches, lectures, assemblies, and conferences, as well as writing articles.⁷⁰ He supported the government's policy of renewal and rebirth, and, in accordance with the established goals, he launched and edited the paper *Srpski narod*. He accused the Allied forces of using and sacrificing Serbian people, while praising the role of Milan Nedić. He often portrayed the ministers of the "Government of National Salvation" as people who endured the greatest burden of suffering of their people and condemned everyone who did not cooperate with the government.⁷¹ From the beginning of his propaganda activities, Jonić had a carefully prepared method for presenting his speeches and their content. Also, every time he held a speech, after the end of the gathering, he got into the practice of sending a telegram of support to the prime minister (a so-called greetings telegram). He devoted a lot of attention to "educating" other members of the government about the goals that were supposed to be achieved using certain means of propaganda, placing great emphasis on the personal responsibility of every bearer of propaganda. He offered suggestions to the prime minister about the means of realizing certain German directives. He made blueprints for field work, which he passed on to the chief of the Department of State Propaganda, Đorđe Perić, to be finalized and implemented. Similarly, during a conference of the central authorities with regional governors in February 1942, he stressed the importance of implementing propaganda at all times and the use of every means available: "We cannot stop at assemblies and those propaganda brochures and flyers; every

⁶⁹ In 1943, one of Nedić's leading propagandists, Dr. Miroslav Spaljoković, published a book titled *The Speeches of Milan Nedić, Prime Minister of the Serbian Government – Savior of Serbia in the 20th century* ("Govori generala Milana Nedića, predsednika srpske vlade—Spasilac Srbije u XX veku"). The book was published in Belgrade without stating its publisher.

⁷⁰ Jonić's lectures were published in the form of brochures and in the press. As the Minister of Education, he was simultaneously the publisher of *Prosvetni glasnik* (1942–1944), editor-in-chief of the paper *Srpski narod* (1942–1944) and a contributor to the paper *Naša borba* (1941–1942). During the occupation, Jonić published 54 articles in *Novo vreme* and 42 articles in *Srpski narod*.

⁷¹ V. Jonić, "Zašto smo optimisti", text from an article in *Srpski narod, Novo vreme*, 4th April 1943, 3.

gesture is propaganda.”⁷² According to Jonić’s testimony (during the post-war hearings), his speeches and statements were not published in their original form by the Department of State Propaganda, his statements and elaborations on collaboration with Germany were especially embellished, along with his thoughts on how the Serbian people were supposed to fight for a place in the “new order”. Based on the sources available now, we cannot determine whether his claims were true or reflected the historical moment in which he was interrogated. Jonić mentioned during the hearings that, in his original speeches, the chief premise was the need of the Serbian nation to find itself and choose its own place in the world.⁷³ We can assess Jonić’s public statements, speeches and appearances through the prism of his work in the government propaganda campaign for the people and in the framework of the cultural-educational propaganda efforts of the Ministry of Education and Faith (directed at the cultural and educational elite, with a part of the campaign involving work with students and their parents). Within the propaganda campaign directed at counties, organized by the Department of State Propaganda, Jonić held a series of speeches at meetings and conferences.⁷⁴ He assigned great importance to educational propaganda and insisted on unifying the educational system and raising children in the national spirit. Together with Milan Aćimović, after his suggestion to get the youth imprisoned in camps out and save them from German reprisals, with the excuse of placing them in correctional facilities, he managed to bring about the establishment of the Institution for the Forced Education of Youth in Smederevska

⁷² MA, Group of funds Nda, K 1, num. of register 21/2–130.

⁷³ MA, Group of funds Chetnik Archive, K 269, num. of register 3–17.

⁷⁴ The subject of the speeches was popularizing the government’s social and economic policies, as well as “elaborating” the socio-political situation in the world, the events on the frontlines and the harmful influence of propaganda of London and Moscow on common people, unsigned article, “Ministri u narodu”, *Novo vreme*, 17th February 1942, 1; “We serve our people,” asserted minister Mr. Velibor Jonić at a large national assembly in Čačak, *Novo vreme*, 24th February 1942, 3. “Ministar prosvete g. Velibor Jonić u Šapcu i Loznicu: “Nestaće nas sa lica zemlje ako poremetimo red i mir!”, *Novo vreme*, 10th March 1942, 3., “Strana propaganda sigurno neće hraniti Srbiju! rekao je ministar prosvete V. Jonić”, Assembly in Mladenovac and in Kragujevac, *Novo vreme*, 21st April 1942, 3., “Narodni zbor u Aranđelovcu: “Iz ovoga rata izaći ćemo preporođeni” rekao je ministar prosvete Velibor Jonić”, *Novo vreme*, 28th April 1942, 3., “Jonić je u Jagodini održao veliki narodni zbor zajedno sa ministrom socijalne politike i narodnog zdravlja. Sumirao je rezultate rada Vlade tokom protekle godine uz upozorenje narodu na agitaciju koju vrše ljudi Draže Mihailovića i ‘londonska jugoslovenska vlada”, *Novo vreme*, 8th December 1942, 4., “Velika narodna manifestacija u Nišu. Titova paklena namera-uništenje srpskog naroda. Ministar Velibor Jonić govorio je pred 10. 000 građana”, *Novo vreme*, 29th December 1943, 3.

Palanka.⁷⁵ As part of the propaganda activities of the Ministry of Education and Faith, with his assistant Vladimir Velmar-Janković, he held a series of speeches and lectures for professors, teachers and youth at the Kolarac University, as well as in cities and towns in the interior of the country.⁷⁶

The governor of the City of Belgrade, Dragi Jovanović, was one of the leading advocates of the anticommunist struggle. During his post-war hearings, he said that he “both with speeches and proclamations tried to mobilize the masses in the fight against the communists and prevent sabotage”. He popularized the role of the “Government of National Salvation” in governing the country and the “responsibility and ability of the Serbian people to govern itself in all branches of state and county administration”,⁷⁷ which he regarded as “proof of the Serbs’ racial capabilities”. He also contributed to the propaganda campaign of the Government of National Salvation in western Serbia. He also took part in organizing the reception of war prisoners and held speeches for groups of returnees.

Mihailo Olčan, Minister of the Economy and later Minister without Portfolio, was one of the leading representatives of the home administration in the field of propaganda for economic renewal.⁷⁸ He became more involved in propaganda work after he assumed duty. The topics tackled in his public appearances reflected the main propaganda line of the domestic government, directed

⁷⁵ For more details on the Institution for the Forced Education of Youth in Smederevska Palanka in: A. Stojanović, *Ideje, politički projekti i praksa vlade Milana Nedića*, Beograd, 2015, 378–389.

⁷⁶ A lecture delivered by Velibor Jonić at the Kolarac University on 20th September 1942 on the “Problems of our spiritual orientation” caught the attention of the Belgrade public. The said lecture, which will be discussed in more detail later, was the introduction into an anticommunist course for teachers at Belgrade high schools. He approved of getting educators involved in the efforts of the Department of Propaganda, and there were times when he ordered particular teachers to cooperate with the said department. As part of the efforts to implement educational reforms, he held a series of speeches to professors and teachers about the purpose of educational work, to the parents about raising children and to school pupils about the importance of the struggle for the national being. He delivered to the school principals lists of subjects that should be covered in these anticommunist courses and brochures with titles such as *Our Peasantry and Communism*, *Patriarch Varnava against Communism*, *The Soviet Union Is Not Russia* and *The Bloody List of Communist Atrocities*.

⁷⁷ The speech by the president of the city council of Belgrade: “Beograd je bio i ostao najmirniji grad!”, “Sami ćemo sebe sopstvenim snagama odbraniti”- Govor Dragog Jovanovića radnicima, službenicima i činovnicima Direkcije tramvaja i osvetljenja o potrebi”, *Novo vreme*, 3rd March 1942, 3. “Predsednik beogradske opštine obilazi gradske ustanove: “Moramo obezbediti sebi mesto u Novoj Evropi” izjavio je g. Dragi Jovanović”, *Novo vreme*, 4th March 1942, 3.

⁷⁸ For more details see: M. Mraović, “Kolaboracionistička štampa ‘Vlade narodnog spasa’ o ciljevima nove privredne politike”, *Vojno-istorijski glasnik*, 2 (2016), 126–155.

at the general population and the peasantry as the dominant social group. In his numerous analyses of the country's economic situation, he instructed the people to follow the German leadership in their renewal efforts. Anticommunism, anti-Semitism, assigning blame for dragging the Kingdom of Yugoslavia into the war, glorification of the Government of National Salvation and German aid to the Serbian people, and the encouragement of agricultural production made up the bulk propaganda work in most of Olčan's public speeches and proclamations published in the press. Minister Olčan was particularly active in national meetings, together with the Minister of National Economy, Dr. Milorad Nedeljković.

Formation and work of the Department for State Propaganda and its relationship with the German propaganda apparatus in occupied Serbia

The Department of State Propaganda was formed after the "Government of National Salvation" within the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.⁷⁹ There was some continuity with the prewar Central Press Bureau, from which it inherited its organization, operational methods and some of the capable personnel. Since a part of the Central Press Bureau continued to operate during the war in emigration, as part of the exiled government, we cannot confirm the existence of complete continuity.

Organization and funding


The Department of State Propaganda undergo any major organizational changes in the entire occupation period, excluding the expansion of the jurisdiction and office of certain departments in accordance with the needs of the Department and German instructions. The prime minister headed the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.⁸⁰ Organizational sections within the Presidency were:

⁷⁹ Dr. Lazar Prokić, chief of the Department of General Propaganda, in a report to the Extraordinary Commissar for Personnel regarding problems in the work of the Department of Propaganda, stated the motives of the Government behind its establishment: "...The need for such a department, under the direct command of the Prime Minister, showed the psychological state of the Serbian people after the recent events. Namely, it showed the need for a well thought-out, professionally executed and efficiently implemented propaganda behind the operational actions of the armed squads in the field in order to firstly make Serbian people come back to their senses, and later, to push it in the direction best suited for the contemporary geopolitical state of Serbia and its occupational status." MA, Group of funds Nda, K 72, num. of register 1/2-1, 2,3,4, Report of Dr. Lazar Prokić to the Extraordinary Commissar for Personnel regarding problems in the work of the Department of Propaganda, 1st January 1942.

⁸⁰ The rulebook about the jurisdiction and workings of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, *Službene novine*, Vol. 90 of 16th November 1943. The rulebook was passed based

the Presidential Cabinet, State Secretariat and three departments: the General, Legal and the Department of State Propaganda.⁸¹

*Diagram showing the organization
of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers in 1943*



In the autumn of 1941, the Department of State Propaganda⁸² was composed of: the General Secretariat, Administrative Section, Section for General (Field) Propaganda, Section for Press, Radio and Film and the Section for Theater and Performances.⁸³ At the end of 1941, preparations were made for the formation of the institution “Zemlja i rad” intended to popularize the policies of the “Government of National Salvation” and Prime Minister Nedić among the peasantry. The mentioned institution was organizationally a part of the Section for General (Field) Propaganda. After the establishment of the Montenegro Section at the end of 1943, there were no further large-scale expansions of jurisdictions and offices of the individual sections.

on Article 14 of the Regulation regarding the organization of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers M. s. num. 1009 from 15th April 1943.

⁸¹ According to Article 19 of the rulebook about the jurisdiction and workings within the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, the head of the Department of Propaganda signed all acts and resolutions as “Chief of State Propaganda”, and the decisions he passed on the special orders or authorization of the President of the Council of Ministers with: “On the orders (authorization) of the President of the Council of Ministers – Chief of State Propaganda”.

⁸² Mraović, *Propaganda*, A. Stojanović, M. Mraović, “Uvodna studija” In *Kolaboracionistička štampa u Srbiji 1941–1944* [Summary: Collaborationist press in Serbia 1941–1944] (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2015), 10–84.

⁸³ By the decision of the Council of Commissioners of 16th August 1941, the Department of Propaganda was assigned tasks related to the press, radio, film, theater and sports. The Section for Physical Education was briefly within the jurisdiction of the Department of Propaganda in the beginning of the occupation, after which it was incorporated into the Ministry of Social Policy and Public Health, and from January 1942 it was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education.

*Diagram showing the organization of the Section for State Propaganda
(with section duties) in 1943*

Section for State Propaganda	
General secretariat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Implementation of internal work organization of all sections. -Collection of documents concerning the national issue. -Collection of documents and data concerning the position of the Serbian population. -Maintaining a relationship with distinguished experts from all areas of national life.
Administrative Section	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Directing the entire administration. -Records of staff from the Department of State Propaganda and handling personnel matters. -Managing the library that included books, magazines, papers and other materials used for propaganda purposes. -Control of supplies and expenses for the special needs of the Department of State Propaganda.
Section for General (Field), Social and Rural Propaganda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Oral propaganda via public lectures and their organization in the country. -Maintaining a relationship with county and district educational institutions. -Dissemination of propaganda materials among the population. -Gathering information about potential foreign propaganda within the population and its suppression. -Giving instructions to correspondents from the Department of State Propaganda in county principalities and to correspondents abroad and receiving their reports about important events. -Economic-collective, hygienic and national propaganda in rural areas. -Informing the peasantry about all important issues regarding public life, organizing courses and educational lectures for agricultural workers – the institution “Zemlja i rad”.
Section for Press, Radio and Film	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Monitoring the domestic and foreign press -Creating and publishing the “Foreign Press Review”. -Preparing materials for the domestic press. -Working on creating journalistic materials: printing books, brochures, posters and other materials. -Preparing the necessary materials and managing all tasks related to national and cultural propaganda via radio and film.
Section for Theater and Peagantry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Implementing national and cultural propaganda through theater. -Keeping records of the entire staff of the National theater in Belgrade and local theaters in the country. -Supervising the work of public and private theaters. -Reviewing and selecting theater literature. -Monitoring the holding and organizing of all public functions and concerts of artistic nature.
Montenegro Section	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Organizing lectures, popularizing the Government of National Salvation and implementing anticommunist propaganda in Montenegro.

The Ministry of Finance, with the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, made decisions on making changes to the state budget and adoption of projects.⁸⁴ Loans for the Section were approved by the president of the Council of Ministers at the suggestion of the chief of State Propaganda.⁸⁵ Traces of all loans were burned on the written order of the Prime Minister on 3rd October 1944, under the control of the chief of staff, General Damjanović, acting chief of propaganda Ljubomir Todorović and propaganda officer Dr. Tihomir Marković.

Personnel policy and the legal and material status of public servants

In the beginning of the occupation, the German authorities were faced with the existence of an extensive apparatus of state administration, which was not well suited to the newly established situation and shrunken Serbian territory. Passing legal regulations to manage the status of state officials and systematize the state apparatus were high on the German priority list, in order to reduce expenses and legally regulate the new system. Loyalty toward the official government was propagated and any form of activity directed against state interests was condemned. The Directive for the Systematization of Jobs in State and Self-Government Administration and the Directive for Removing Nationally Unreliable Employees from Public Service were announced in August 1941. The Council of Ministers made the final decision to lay off some public servants, with the consent of the German authorities. The first in line were the public servants that the committees formed for this purpose found to be members, helpers or sympathizers of the communists and masons. The ones who spread fake news and, by word or deed, caused confusion were also punished, followed by public servants prone to corruption, saboteurs and “those who didn’t care about healing and renewing Serbia as soon as possible”. Other vulnerable categories of public servants included pensioners, on-call public servants and the family members of interned war prisoners, and everyone could lose their monthly income if proven to have a connection to masons and communists or having transmitted mis-

⁸⁴ Regulation regarding administrative division of land, article 20, *Službene novine*, number 136–A, 26th December 1941.

⁸⁵ The Council of Commissars approved the loan for the Section. For the needs of implementing particular projects, funding was secured from so-called “open loans”, while for the need of paying out and rewarding individuals “loans for oral propaganda” were brought in. The first loan for the institution “Zemlja i rad” of five million dinars was approved by the government at the end of 1941. The Prime Minister at the end of February 1942 formed the Commission for Purchases in the said institution, which would control spending. During its entire operational time, according to the statements from the report of the Section for State Propaganda, the institution was approved loans amounting to 21 million dinars.

information.⁸⁶ During the occupation, the domestic government passed many decrees dismissing “nationally unreliable officials” from public service.⁸⁷ Systematization was a form of constant pressure that the German authorities exerted on ministry departments and public servants, who could lose their jobs at any time and, consequently, their family’s livelihood. In August 1941, the Directive on Amending the Decisions on Regulating the Personal Relations of State and Self-Government Public Servants was passed.⁸⁸ In the autumn of 1941, all public servants had to fill out forms stating their racial identity (they were supposed to declare whether they were “Arian”) and the racial identity of their ancestors of the first and second degree (in other words, they were asked whether any of their ancestors had been Romani or Jewish). They had to provide the same information for the parents of the spouses of public servants, while the second half of the form concerned membership in Masonic lodges. Submitting these statements was related to giving out passes. Department chiefs were required to confirm the statements of their public servants, which further increased the pressure on the managing staff.

The public servants employed in the Department of State Propaganda were also subject to personnel changes. The employees of the mentioned section were categorized into decree-appointed, full-time, and part-time workers. Also, there was an unofficial division into public servants from the prewar period, which retained their positions in the new Department of Propaganda, and their newly appointed colleagues. Thanks to a preserved report by Svetislav Šumarević (chief of the Administrative Section for propaganda from prewar CPB and chief of the Administrative Section from February 1942 until the liberation), we can form a clear picture of how difficult the position of prewar civil servants who stayed in service during the occupation was. Svetislav Šumarević stated that the vast majority of civil servants “behaved properly and didn’t receive any benefits from the German authorities”. The above suggests that most civil servants, who sorely needed their jobs to secure a livelihood in the wartime situation showed passive resistance, masked by disinterest, slacking, and avoiding contacts with German authorities.

An excellent example of the regime’s attitude toward “old” and “new” civil servants cites the aforementioned report by the chief of the Section for Active

⁸⁶ *Službene novine*, num. 95, 6th August 1941.

⁸⁷ Some of the cited decrees were published in *Službene novine*: 12th December 1941, 16th January 1942, 23rd January 1942, 3rd February 1942, 27th February 1942, 27th March 1942, 9th February 1943, 9th March 1943, 4th May 1943, 27th July 1943, 28th September 1943, 12th October 1943, 12th October 1943 and 16th June 1944. According to the estimates by Tanasije Dimić, around 10.000 public servants lost their jobs.

⁸⁸ *Službene novine*, num. 95, 6th August 1941.

(General) Propaganda, Dr. Lazar Prokić.⁸⁹ According to Prokić's explanation for the Special Commissar for personnel issues, the need to hire new employees revealed the Government's intention to "purge" the entire administrative apparatus: removing unwanted and unusable elements, employing a sufficient number of unemployed intellectuals, civil workers and journalists "worthy of attention", and removing saboteur elements.

In early 1942, the *Regulation for ending contracts in extraordinary circumstances*⁹⁰ was passed, which allowed employers to end their employees' contracts on account of the extraordinary situation. The authorities also passed the *Regulation for appointing of civil servants that had served as volunteers or in Chetnik detachments of the Serbian government*, ensuring a more favorable position for those civil servants, thereby encouraging them to enlist in these units.⁹¹ Based on the surviving "List of staff of the Department of State Propaganda of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers" from the first half of 1942, we can see to what extent the Government's systematization measures impacted the number, composition and financial position of the Department's employees.⁹² We can conclude that the Government trusted the newly appointed civil servants more than to the prewar officials, which allowed them to have a better standard of living during the war. In the spirit of creating a new profile of civil servants and the "new order", the Government issued another directive, demanding "unity of thought among civil servants for renewal of Serbia in the spirit of the intentions, decisions and orders of the Government of National Salvation".⁹³ This was followed by in the Prime Minister's orders of February and March of 1943 to reduce the number of civil servants and lay off those who were not of Serbian nationality.

⁸⁹ MA, Group of funds Nda, K 72, num. of register 1/2-1, 2,3,4, Report by Dr. Lazar Prokić to the Extraordinary Commisar for Personnel regarding problems in the work of the Department of Propaganda, 1st September 1942. Analyzing the reasons for the inefficiency of the Department, a few months after its establishment, Prokić came to the conclusion that "the personnel of the Department of Propaganda were not up to par. Namely, the current personnel of the Department are 100% composed of employees of the previous Press Bureau. That meant that, with a few exceptions /4-5 new people and 2-3 imprisoned civil servants/ its staff was completely unchanged: in personnel, their habits, mentality, work ethics, etc. The democrat and leftist elements in it, Anglophiles, bureaucrats, slackers and saboteurs continue their activities, often with the knowledge of the department chief."

⁹⁰ *Službene novine*, num. 17, 27th February 1942, p.1.

⁹¹ *Službene novine*, 12th March 1943.

⁹² MA, Group of funds Nda, K 72, num. of register 29/2-10,11,12., MA, Group of funds Nda, K 1, num. of register 23/2-1, A letter by an unnamed civil servant of the Department of Propaganda for the President of the Council of Ministers from 10th April 1942.

⁹³ *Službene novine*, 27th November 1942.

The “Government of National Salvation” didn’t manage to completely reform and adjust the administrative apparatus to its needs until the end of the occupation, even though the Prime Minister personally sent appeals to the ministers on multiple occasions. In addition to repressive measures against civil servants, the Government also applied motivational measures, especially during 1944.⁹⁴ The Government professed itself to be in favor of the German demands in order to gain German trust, but also to ease the position of many civil servants who would have otherwise lost their jobs, so they wouldn’t join resistance movements.

“Propaganda teams” and collaboration with representatives of the German propaganda apparatus

The organizational sections of the Department of State Propaganda were a type of “propaganda team” headed by section chiefs. It’s evident that the differences in the structure of these teams and the status of prewar and wartime civil servants impacted the quality of their work and their propaganda results. The head of the Department was Đorđe Perić, who was active during the entire occupation period until September 1944, when he was replaced by Ljubomir Todorović. Perić’s credibility was brought into question only a few months after he came into office. The board of the Anticommunist League filed a complaint to the Department of Special Police, stating that it doubted the ability of Dr. Đorđe Perić to support the realization of the loans from the Anticommunist League and implement the anticommunist program in the field, also accusing him of abetting the obstruction of the league. These allegations must have originated from Ljotić’s supporters and been motivated by prewar clashes between Perić and Ljotić, after the members of the Yugoslav Action (Jugoslovenska akcija) left the Zbor movement. The fact that the complaint, filed on 26th January, wasn’t taken into consideration until 4th June 1942 testifies to the importance that the Department of Special Police attached to these allegations; however, the German Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei) insisted on this.⁹⁵

At first, a key figure in the Department was Perić’s Chief of Staff, Jovan Popović, who was replaced by Slobodan Katić. Katić would stay in this office until he was killed in the Allied bombing on 18th May 1944.

Throughout the occupation, the General Secretariat was in charge of organizing the operations of all sections, gathering data about the position of the Serbian population and maintaining relations with prominent experts from all areas of national life. Miloš Milošević served as Secretary General from Oc-

⁹⁴ MA, Group of funds Nda, K 90, num. of register 43/1-1.

⁹⁵ MA, Group of funds Nda, K 131, Φ 1, num. of register 19/1-2.

tober 1941 until the autumn of 1942.⁹⁶ The duty of the secretary general was later performed by Ljubomir Todorović for some time (appointed at the end of 1943). Rudolf Pečnik, a Slovene, was the secretary of the Department. Most civil servants in the Department were prewar employees. Miloš Milošević began propaganda work as secretary general. In the spring of 1942, he set up the editorial office of the *Srpski narod* newspaper.⁹⁷ He presented himself as the deputy editor-in-chief, even though he single-handedly edited and published the paper with an independent editorial office consisting of part-time propaganda officers and freelance and temporary associates. The Administrative Section performed administrative duties, carried out all orders and directives issued by the Prime Minister and the Chief of the Department of State Propaganda and delivered them to the people in charge, handed office supplies and other needs via office administrators, and organized the library inherited from the CPB. These administrative duties were carried out by Dušan Milojević (retired after three months), Dr. Danilo Pavlović and Svetislav Šumarević from February of 1942 until the end of the occupation. Most civil servants in the section were prewar staff. The Section for General (Field), Social and Rural Propaganda was, with the Section for Press, Radio and Film, the most productive during the entire occupation period. In the first occupation, Dr. Lazar Prokić served as the chief of the Section for General Propaganda.⁹⁸ Dr. Lazar Prokić was one of the most active members of the Department of State Propaganda in 1941 and 1942. He wrote newspaper articles signed without an alias and published daily texts with anticommunist, anti-Masonic, and anti-Semitic contents.⁹⁹ In the autumn of 1941, he handled preparations and organization of an anti-mason exhibit in col-

⁹⁶ In the autumn of 1942, Miloš Milošević was appointed Chief of Section for Press.

⁹⁷ MA, Group of funds Nda, K 1, num. of register 27/2–5. Miloš Milošević in a letter to the chief of the Section for Propaganda of 25th September 1942 mentions his duties as chief secretary and deputy editor-in-chief of *Srpski narod*.

⁹⁸ This section was also called the Section for Journalism and the Section for Field and Active Propaganda.

⁹⁹ AJ, 110, Φ.num. 1706. Indictment against Lazar Prokić. It read: "Dr. Lazar Prokić - chief of propaganda in the Prime Ministry – organized and gave directives to his subordinates for greatest possible success in the fight against NLM; in Valjevo he held on 23th May 1942 the lecture "Tri rata u Srbiji"; "Dr. Lazar Prokić was the most prominent collaborator with German occupiers and was directly under their command. Even before the fall of Yugoslavia, he was a member of the Anti-Comintern movement, member of NSDAP, and a Gestapo secret agent, so he systematically undermined the foundations of Yugoslavia in preparation for its downfall. When Yugoslavia's surrender was complete, Dr. Lazar Prokić was already a prominent figure in the fascist bloc. Not only did he direct others towards those actions, he also, through many articles in the contemporary papers *Obnova*, *Novo vreme*, *Ponedeljnik* and other publications, stated clearly and unambiguously his sympathy and love for the Germans, and hatred and antagonism for the national movement and the United Nations".

laboration with Đorđe Perić, Steva Klujčić and German propaganda authorities. He chose and published brochures, printed various flyers and posters, and made deals with the press. According to the mentioned Svetislav Šumarević's report, the original idea of forming a center for farmers in Belgrade where he would occasionally bring householders from various parts of Serbia to get to know the president and members of the government, their politics and the entire newly formed situation originated from Prokić. Prokić was taken down from his position right before finishing preparations for the new anti-mason exhibit in summer of 1942. He was soon dismissed from the Section for General Propaganda in autumn of 1942. Svetislav Šumarević suggests that he was taken down likely due to Klujčić's complaints to the German authorities.¹⁰⁰

After the dismissal of Prokić, Živojin Ranković briefly served as the chief of the Section for General Propaganda, and was later replaced by Ljubomir Todorović. Todorović continued publishing brochures and dispersing flyers. He organized many lectures in the interior of the country, especially agricultural courses in villages and small towns in February and March 1943. During the summer of 1943, he moved the Belgrade anticommunist exhibition to Kragujevac and Požarevac. At the end of the same year, Vojin Drvendžija was appointed the chief of the Department of General Propaganda.¹⁰¹ Together with Dr. Tihomir Marković, a propaganda officer, he organized a Serbian anticommunist exhibition as part of a larger exhibition organized by the Germans in Belgrade. After the bombings of Belgrade on 16th and 17th April 1944, the management of field propaganda installed a small printing press in the village of Jajinci for printing flyers and shorter publications in case of a new bombardment. Vojin Drvendžija oversaw its installation and managed the printing operations.

The Section for Field Propaganda was regularly instructed to collaborate with German propaganda institutions. Besides the attaché Otto Mitterhammer,¹⁰² a regular visitor of the section was the German officer Hengster, an associate of *Novo vreme*. In every county in Serbia, the propaganda section had a correspondent attached to the county authorities, who received direc-

¹⁰⁰ Soon after his dismissal, Prokić regained influence with the German administration. He spent some time in Berlin editing a Serbian paper together with Boža Z. Marković. After Nedić's visit to Hitler, he regained his monthly paycheck and monthly support for the paper. In the middle of November of 1943, he brought to Belgrade John Emery, who held lectures against Churchill's England.

¹⁰¹ Vojin Drvendžija served as the chief of the Section for General Propaganda up until September 1944, when he left the country. He was replaced by Velibor Protić, a correspondent from Užice. Protić remained in that position for less than a month.

¹⁰² Otto Mitterhammer, the press attaché of the German embassy in Belgrade stayed for the entire duration of the occupation at the position of an attaché and left Serbia a few days before the liberation.

tives from the chief of general or field propaganda. The number of prewar civil servants employed in the Section for General Propaganda, proportional to the number of employees during the occupation, was quite low compared to other sections. This shows that the local authorities tended to trust more the civil servants they had hired themselves and how much importance they assigned to propaganda fieldwork and propaganda activities in rural areas .

The institution “Zemlja i rad”, as part of the Section for General (Field), Social and Rural propaganda, was very active during the entire period of the occupation. According to the already mentioned report by Svetislav Šumarević, it was Otto Mitterhammer who suggested to Dr. Lazar Prokić to create a center for the peasantry. “Mitterhammer’s exponent Stevo Klujčić was appointed the director of this center, but that didn’t reduce the scope of Prokić’s involvement in this organization.¹⁰³ The institution “Zemlja i rad” compiled files with data about all persons who visited Belgrade, and the files, besides personal information, included photographs of the visits at the time of arrival, departure, walking in the city, any audiences with the Prime Minister and so on. Some of these photographs were published in the press.¹⁰⁴ Stevan Klujčić was also in charge of a special segment of implementing propaganda among the rural youth and sending groups of young men from the countryside to agricultural courses in Germany from the autumn of 1942. Keeping in mind that the institution “Zemlja i rad”, in accordance with its duties, had great expenses because it had to pay for the accommodation of these visiting groups of farmers, organize propaganda programs and print propaganda material, the Commission for purchases in this institution constantly struggled to control loan spending.¹⁰⁵ Problems in the Commission’s work and its unsolved relations with the managing staff led to the need request more financial recourses to fund the elaborate propaganda network of “Zemlja i rad”.

¹⁰³ The selection of farmers was done, in agreement with the presidents of rural municipalities and district authorities, by an officer from the organization “Zemlja i rad” called Aleksandar Dačić. The first group of “guests of the Prime Minister” was brought to Belgrade on 25th March 1942, on the anniversary of the signing of the Tripartite Pact. Around 80 farmers were selected, one from every village in one district in Mačva. After this first group, Prokić held lectures for every other arriving group in a small hall at the Kolarac University. The lectures were deemed very important, as attested by the fact that the lecturing duties were taken over by none other than Đorđe Perić after the dismissal of Prokić. Also, it was mandatory to show movies of cultural and economic content and visit certain institutions in Belgrade, including the cinema and the National Theater. MA, Group of funds Nda, K 3, num. of register 1/3–8.

¹⁰⁴ MA, Group of funds Chetnic Archive, K 269, num. of register 38/1–28.

¹⁰⁵ The board consisted of three members: Svetislav Šumarević, Dr. Alojz Berce and Dr. Dušan Lekić.

The Section for Press, Radio and Film

The regime invested significant resources in propaganda via the press, radio and film, reflecting the needs of the German propaganda apparatus. The Section for press was in regular contact with the German authorities and received instructions and assignments from them. The first chief of the Section for press was Miloš Mladenović, who served quite briefly before becoming the editor of the *Novo vreme* newspaper. He was replaced by Dr. Velimir Dimić.¹⁰⁶ Velimir Dimić's assistant was Naum Simić. The press section prepared the printing notifications from the Prime Minister's Cabinet, various ministries and the offices of public institutions, in addition to preparing articles and other materials.¹⁰⁷ The Chief of the Press Section kept a correspondence with the institutions and personnel who worked with the Department of State Propaganda. Besides his regular duties, he visited the *Rudnik* agency to gather more detailed news, the press department at the German embassy and, sometimes, the editorial offices of the papers to which the propaganda material was delivered every day.¹⁰⁸ He had an everyday obligation, at noon, to attend press conferences together with the representatives of German authorities.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ Dr. Vladimir Dimić was, in addition to being the chief of the Section for Press, a member of the High Education Council of the Ministry of Education, High Sports Council and Administration of the Kolarac Foundation. He occasionally visited the meetings of the Administration and held propaganda lectures at the Kolarac Public University. He also attended conferences dedicated to propaganda in the press and in certain institutions. He regularly contributed to *Novo vreme* and *Srpski narod*, publishing articles under his full name. MA, Group of funds Nda, K 1, num. of register 28/2-1, Letter from Dr. Vladimir Dimić to the chief of the Section for State Propaganda of 25th September 1942.

¹⁰⁷ News from the German organization *DNB* and overviews of German papers were published in: *Das Reich*, *Berliner Börsenzeitung*, *Südost-Echo*, *Völkischer Beobachter*, *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Zeitung*, *Tagepost* from Graz, *Pariser Zeitung*, *Deutsches Volksblatt* from Novi Sad, *Der Neue Tag* from Prague, weekly paper *Deutschland Post*, reviews *Die Woche*, *Deutsche Zeitung in Croatien*, *Neue Ordnung* from Zagreb, *Gernzwacht* from Osijek and Belgrade *Donnauzeitung*. News from the Italian agencies "Steffani" and "La Corrispondenza" were published and overviews from papers: *Il Popolo d'Italia*, *Resto Del Carlino*, *Corriere Della Sera*, *Il Giornale d'Italia* and *Piccolo* from Trieste. Overviews from Slovenian *Jympa*, Bulgarian *Вечеру* and *Нове вечеру*, French paper *Echo d'Nansi*, Turkish *Tasviri Efkar*, papers from Czech protectors: *Народна политика*, *Чешке слово*, *Лудове новини*, Hungarian papers: *Magyar Nemzet*, *Regeli Magyarssag*, *Magyarorzag*, *Esti Usjag*, *Regeli Usjag* and *Figet Lenseg* were regularly published.

¹⁰⁸ Original articles were published with the full signatures of their authors, as were the articles translated from German newspapers.

¹⁰⁹ The press conferences were held in the National Assembly building until 1944. The conferences were led by a special officer – the Sonderführer from the German propaganda division, and they were often attended by officer Tangel, president of the German organization "DNB", and Hengster, the Sonderführer for theater.

The German authorities banned the work of independent journalists and news agencies and started publishing strictly censored papers and publications. The main pillar of the pro-German propaganda policy was the Serbian Association of Journalists (“Srpsko novinarsko udruženje”). One needed permission of the Military Commander for printing any kind of product with words or pictures, like brochures, posters, flyers, and cards. New editions of books of any kind (novels, academic writings, and schoolbooks) were submitted to the military commander for approval; the authorization to proceed with publishing could be valid for a limited time and could also be rescinded at any moment. People of Jewish or Romani nationality and their spouses were banned from publishing and printing propaganda books and texts.

After the promotion of Velimir Dimić into the head of the Legal Department of the government, in autumn of 1942, Miloš Milošević was appointed as chief of the Press Section. During that period, Naum Simić attended the press conferences with the representatives of the German authorities as a representative of the section. He transmitted the directives and notifications that he received at these conferences to the chief of the Section for Propaganda and the chief for the Press Section.

The Section for Radio, headed by Omer Kajmaković, worked independently in the initial period of the occupation. At the beginning of 1942, Aleksandar Stojković, a part-time propaganda associate, publisher of a few pro-German brochures before the occupation and previously the secretary of the editorial office of the *Novo vreme*, was appointed the Section chief. The Press section was expanded in the autumn of 1942 with the sections for film and radio, or rather, it continued doing the work of the previous Section for radio. As the chief of the radio service and the connection between the Section for State Propaganda and the radio station of Belgrade, Aleksandar Stojković, from the beginning of 1942 until May 1944 and during the entire time of service in Belgrade, oversaw radio lectures in the Serbian language which he procured from various people, mainly civil servants. The general order for all lectures was issued by Velibor Jonić on behalf of the prime minister on 10th July 1942, who invited all civil servants from Belgrade who he thought should hold lectures to a meeting in the hall of the Kolarac Foundation and gave them specific guidelines for work. Many of those lectures Stojković published in press. It's interesting to note that most civil servants in the Section for press and radio were prewar employees and had been hired in the period between 1937 and 1940.

The Section for Film monitored and organized cinematographic work as part of the Section for Press, Radio and Film.¹¹⁰ In mid-March 1943, the

¹¹⁰ The country's cultural life, primarily theater and film, were placed under the full control of the German and domestic government on 16th August 1941, by transferring the jurisdiction

section began cooperating with the Section for Spiritual Culture of the Section for Higher education and National Culture of the Ministry of Education and Faith on the censorship of movies intended for students. Propaganda in the realm of movie production, distribution and screening was regulated and followed by a few German occupation institutions: a substation of the Main Administration for Film of the National Socialist Party branch in Belgrade, the Section for Propaganda Jugoistok and the Propaganda Department (Section) Serbia.¹¹¹ The Propaganda Section of Serbia with its headquarters in Belgrade had subdivisions for: radio, press, theater, night bars and active propaganda. The Subdivision IIIc of the Third Department of the Security Police Commander and the Security Service did intelligence work in the fields of culture, education and publishing. Its purview included: high and vocational schools, theater, art and film, museums, libraries, press and radio, general publications and other.¹¹²

Section for Theater and Public Events

Given that the occupiers put a premium on reviving theater life in Serbia, jurisdiction over the National Theater and other theaters in Serbia was transferred from the Ministry of Education to the Department of State Propaganda at the end of 1941 and absorbed into the Section for Theater and Public Events. Jovan Popović, who was also the director of the National Theater, was the head of the said section. The Ministry of Education lost a great deal of influence on cultural life in such a move, having only the final word in appointing the director of drama and opera, choosing the theater repertoire and the evaluation of the

over the National Theater from the Ministry of Education and Faith to the Department of State Propaganda.

¹¹¹ The Propaganda Department (Section) Serbia later became an independent institution under the Section for Propaganda of the High Command of the Armed Forces. The section was managed by Captain Julius Lippert, who answered to the military commander in Serbia. He received professional advice and orders about enforcing propaganda from the Ministry of Propaganda in the Reich or the Section for Propaganda of the High Command of the Armed Forces, MA, microfilmed archive of the structure of the National archive in, NAV-N-T-501, 264/196–420.

¹¹² SD was led by the deputy chief of the central command, Colonel Ludwig Teichmann. The head of the Third Section was SS Major Hans Rexeisen, who was replaced in July 1943 by Josef Heintschel. The Subdivision IIIc was handled by Second Lieutenant and later Lieutenant Heinz Schröter. The activities of SD in the National Theater consisted of following its operations and certain individuals, as well as interfering with career politics in the management of the National Theater.

artistic value of the chosen pieces.¹¹³ The Department for theater and artistry of the German Section for propaganda Jugoistok was in charge of regulating, organizing and following theater life in occupied Serbia. On behalf of the German authorities, control over the National Theater and its work was done by Dr. Hans Krämer as the head of the Propaganda Section "S". The Subdivision IIIc of the Third Department of the Security Police Commander and Security Service were also involved in controlling theater life.

Montenegro Section

The Montenegro Section was formed at the end of 1943 as part of the Department of State Propaganda. At the time, more precisely in September of 1943, after the arrival of the German authorities, preparations were made to expand the authority of the "Government of National Salvation" to include Montenegro.¹¹⁴ Veliša Domazetović was appointed as the section chief and given Mirko Vlahović as an associate because the latter was an experienced propagandist who had held lectures about Montenegro in various towns in Serbia. There is a surviving order from the Prime Minister authorizing Mirko Vlahović to be paid 40.000 dinars for holding twenty lectures on "Montenegro from Occupation until Today" in thirteen towns in Serbia.¹¹⁵ The staff of the section consisted of freelance associates of the Department of State Propaganda, from which they received instructions. The editor of *Cetinjski vjesnik*, Miroslav Dubok, was also hired as an associate. Šumarević stresses the connection between this section and the followers of Ljotić, and states that Domazetović and Vlahović were directed to work with Mihajlo Olčan and that the followers of Ljotić bought from the section all photo and text material concerning the campaign against the communists. That material was used for setting up an anticommunist exhibition, opened in Belgrade on 22nd June 1944, which was organized by the Department of State Propaganda. Ratko Parežanin, an official in the volunteer staff, was paid more than half a million dinars for their actions in Sandžak.

¹¹³ AC, Г-3, ф. 62, 35-186-41.

¹¹⁴ MA, Group of funds Chetnic Archive, K 146, Ф 2, Д 50/1; K 146, Ф 3, Д 2; Reports from the command of YViH, Gorska headquarters number 148 from 24th and 27th September 1943.

¹¹⁵ According to the cited receipt from 25th February 1944, Mirko Vlahović's compensation was determined "on the suggestion of the Chief of State Propaganda, and also based on the evident need to explain to the people of Serbia the political situation in Montenegro, as well as the suffering endured by those Serbian people at the hands of the communists". MA, Group of funds Nda, K 90, num. of register 8/1-1.

Anticommunist League

“To supplement its anticommunist fieldwork, the Department of State Propaganda formed a league of “experienced anticommunist fighters” known as the Anticommunist League.¹¹⁶ The Anticommunist League was given the special task of mobilizing educators in the anticommunist struggle.¹¹⁷ The means of propaganda that the Anticommunist League used in its work varied. Its members regularly expressed their views on communism in the press. In addition to “firsthand” portrayals of the life of Partisans by members of the movement, they also published testimonies of surviving members of the volunteer squads¹¹⁸ and the citizens who had survived torture in Partisan camps. These efforts to “expose” the ideology and organization of the communist movement were supplemented with recruiting members of the volunteer command and league members from the interior of the country.¹¹⁹ The Anticommunist League played a vital role in preparing the exhibition dedicated to the struggle against communism. The opening of the anticommunist exhibition took place on the anniversary of the “Government of National Salvation” on 1st September 1942 in Belgrade, in order to refute, primarily in the capital, the claims of communist propaganda that the communists were fighters for the national cause.¹²⁰ The anticommunist exhibi-

¹¹⁶ M. Babić, “Osnivačka skupština Antikomunističke lige u Beogradu”, *Novo vreme*, 2nd December 1941, 5. The founding assembly held on 30th of November was attended by: the vice-chancellor of the University Dr. Nikola Popović, Mr. Bogdanović, assistant to the Minister of Education in retirement, Dr. Dimitrije Najdanović, editor of *Naša Borba*, Dr. Miloš Mladenović, editor of *Novo vreme* and Dr. Nikola Marinović, editor of *Obnova*. The members of the Assembly were selected, and the secretary to the assistant of the Minister of Education, Sava Milutinović, was appointed its head. Telegrams were sent to Nedić and the Volunteer Command. The management of the League was chosen, led by Milovan Popović, as well as members of administrative committee: legal intern Hrvoje Magazinović, Sava Milutinović, Dr. Tihomir Marković, journalist Mladen Babić, student Veselin Kesić, Dr. Đoko Slijepčević – assistant professor at the University, Al. Andrić – senate councilor, student Vladan Bijelić, officer of the National Bank Obrad Radičević and officer of the county administration Ljuba Marković. The supervising board consisted of Đorđe Perić, Boško Bogdanović, Dr. Miloš Mladenović, Dr. Najdanović, Dr. N. Marinković and Branimir Maleš, officer of the Ministry of Education.

¹¹⁷ M. Đ. Popović, “Povodom zbora prosvetnih radnika”, “Pitanje mobilisanja prosvetnih radnika i rad na borbi protiv komunizma”, *Novo vreme*, 19th December 1941, 3.

¹¹⁸ “Dobrovoljci osuđeni na streljanje pobjegli ispred komunističkih mitraljeza”, *Novo vreme*, 7th December 1941, 3.

¹¹⁹ *Novo vreme*, 10th February 1942, 3.

¹²⁰ “Otvaranje Antikomunističke izložbe: “Još jednom je životna snaga srpskog naroda došla do svog punog izražaja”, *Novo vreme*, 2nd September 1942, 3. The opening was attended by a representative of the Military Commander of Serbia, representatives of the Administrative Command of the Section for Propaganda SO, representatives of the German police and the

tion remained in Belgrade until the end of November 1942, and then the exhibition committee decided to move it into the interior of the country to reach wide national masses. The plan was to, in all bigger towns, organize group visits of peasants and citizens from the surrounding areas: in Niš, Leskovac, Kragujevac and Užice, and in all bigger counties and districts in Serbia. At the closing of the exhibition, the chief of the Department of State Propaganda received journalists to explain to them the success of the exhibition and the benefits of its tour in the towns in the interior for informing the population.¹²¹

Work environment of the Department of State Propaganda

The first problem the management of the Department faced was finding adequate premises and sorting out the archives of the Central Press Bureau from the prewar period and the archives compiled during the work of the Press Bureau during the Council of Commissars. At the beginning of September 1941, the German authorities gave the Department of State Propaganda the former offices of the Central Press Bureau in the building of the Ministry of Agriculture (14–16 Kneza Miloša Velikog Street), which included a library, file archive and photo archive. On the orders of Đorđe Perić, the Department's staff gathered and sorted out the material that had remained scattered and in disorder after the German raid: books, negatives from the photo archive, an extensive document collection, clippings from foreign and domestic papers, and the bulletins of various intelligence agencies.¹²² Immediately after assuming duty, Đorđe Perić moved his office of the Invalids' Center to the premises of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was followed by organized constant relocations and finding offices for the civil servants. After it was organized, the entire archive was moved in November 1941 into the building of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The offices of the institution of "Zemlja i rad" were at 34 Knjeginja Ljubica Street.¹²³

German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, most leaders of the Government of National Salvation and the chiefs of the editorial offices of domestic papers.

¹²¹ "Zatvaranje Antikomunističke izložbe u Beogradu. Komunisti nisu bili nacionalni borci. Izložba odlazi u unutrašnjost zemlje." *Novo vreme*, 29th November 1942, 3.

¹²² Svetislav Šumarević, Đorđe Đorđević and Anton Tiran handled the collection and organization of the Archive.

¹²³ The director of the institution rented these premises from the German authorities, which managed confiscated Jewish real estate.

Cooperation of the Department of State Propaganda with other institutions in the domestic government system and with German institutions

The Department of State Propaganda cooperated most closely with the Ministry of Education and Faith. The joint propaganda efforts of these two institutions and the realization of the established ideological-political goals were sometimes difficult due to the overlapping jurisdictions and powers in some areas of cultural-educational life. Oftentimes the implementation of “educational” goals boiled down to indoctrination. Occasional conflicts impeded the Government’s effective operation and also had an impact on the struggle to secure some privileges and prerogatives from the German authorities. In propagating the fight against communism, the Department of State Propaganda and the Ministry of Education and Faith collaborated with the Special Police of the Administration of the City of Belgrade, as well as with the Serbian State Guard.

An obligatory factor in the propaganda activity of Nedić’s administration was the Ministry of Economy subordinated to the Office of the High Representative for Economy in Serbia. Based on the German example, the National Renewal Service was established; efforts were made to devise a national economy plan, favoring the agricultural cooperative concept, return to the countryside and the creation of a state rooted in farmers’ co-ops. The dissemination of economic propaganda was coordinated with the German plans for the economic exploitation of Serbian resources. Great importance was given to economic policies and propagating investments in economic development, as well as establishing cooperative organizations.¹²⁴

The propaganda section of Jugoistok worked directly with the Department of State Propaganda, checked and censored all materials intended for further distribution, redacted and censored articles and speeches intended for the representatives of domestic government and propaganda officers. The publishing company of A.D. “Jugoistok” prepared printed materials: brochures, publications, and posters and passed them on to the Department of State Propaganda for further use. The occupation propaganda network also worked with other government departments and individuals hired, as needed, for various propaganda jobs. According to the preserved data from the “Jugoistok” propaganda section of the Serbian Command from 1943, there were 117 collaborators from

¹²⁴ For more details see: M. Ristović, “Izopačeni grad u ideologiji srpskih kolaboracionista, 1941–1945” [Summary: A perverted city in the ideology of Serbian collaborators] *Nova srpska politička misao*, XI, 1–4, (2005); Z. Janjetović, *U skladu sa nastalom potrebom...Prinudni rad u okupiranoj Srbiji* [Summary: In accordance with the emerging need...Forced Labor in Occupied Serbia 1941–1944] (Belgrade: Institute for Recent History of Serbia, 2012), Mraović, *Collaborationist press*, 126–155.

the German Group for Active Propaganda.¹²⁵ The compensation paid out to those individuals from the Jugoistok propaganda section of the Serbian Command were high compared to others, especially compared to the salaries of the public servants employed at the Department of State Propaganda. Their duties were diverse: translation and proofreading propaganda materials, delivering confidential reports to German authorities, creation of school curricula and book censorship, writing and composing political articles, flyers and brochures, printing, implementing field propaganda by holding lectures in various places in Serbia and radio propaganda, pasting posters, etc.

Members of Zbor who influenced the creation propaganda contents and their distribution

Even though the occupiers officially banned all political parties and movements in the territory of occupied Serbia, the *Zbor* movement was excluded from this rule. Besides Dimitrije Ljotić, other *Zbor* ideologues involved in propaganda efforts included engineer Milosav Vasiljević, Dr. Dimitrije Najdanović and Dr. Đoko Slijepčević. Members of *Zbor* assigned great importance to propaganda amongst the people. General points in their ideology were negation of parliamentary democracy, liberal politics and economic doctrines from the West, individualism, and glorifying traditional values, the way of Saint Sava, Serbian farmer, collectivism and the cult of the leader. Dimitrije Ljotić, as the main ideologist and spiritual leader of *Zbor*, led a well-built propaganda campaign through his organization and the Department of State Propaganda. In most domestic papers, as well as in the foreign press, he was often portrayed as a pillar of support to the prime minister and his advisor. “Beli orlovi”, an educational-propaganda unit within *Zbor*, also spread propaganda through oral and written word, disseminated propaganda brochures and through articles by the youth or citizens who were not members.¹²⁶ Ljotić saw the “European duty” of safeguarding the German state as a Serbian duty.¹²⁷ At the same time, in the battle against the “tough and very

¹²⁵ MA, Group of funds German Archive, K 60, Φ 5, num. of register 2/1–52. Description of work done for the German government was given for everyone, as well as the monetary compensation they were paid after having completed their tasks. Listed as special associates were Dr. Vladimir Vujić (his file included a transcript of the flyer titled “Srbi”), Dr. Đoko Slijepčević (listing the brochures he had written on the orders of the section) and Eugen Mesner, professor from Belgrade (he did translation work and led the Russian editorial, reported on the sessions in Vienna, and made propaganda brochures).

¹²⁶ MA, Group of funds Nda, K 3, num. of register 8/3–1, “Raspis br. 17 mesnim organizacijama i povereništvima Belih orlova u zemlji”.

¹²⁷ MA, Group of funds Nda, K 50 A, num. of register 19/4–1 Memoir of Dimitrije Ljotić to the Military Commander in Serbia.

aggressive communist organization” in, Serbian territory he popularized helping the German state in its struggle against “barbaric bolshevism”. In one of the interviews he gave to László Hory, a correspondent for the Budapest-based paper of *Esti Kurir*, the leader of *Zbor* was depicted as a “mysterious man, a friend of Nedić’s and a man for the Serbian future”, and his party as a “solid foundation for Prime Minister Nedić”.¹²⁸ As the special commissar for the rebuilding of Smederevo, Ljotić held a series of ideologically colored speeches in this capacity and in his propaganda work with Serbian volunteer squads and the youth.¹²⁹ During the occupation, the *Naša borba* paper published the greatest number of Ljotić’s speeches and also promoted his writings and books, with the usual anti-Semitic, anti-Masonic, anticommunist and pro-German contents of most of the published contributions (which was also the case with the paper *Zapisi*).

Engineer Milosav Vasiljević, commissar for the Ministry of Economy, wrote numerous propaganda texts and brochures in the interwar period and during the occupation, criticizing Yugoslavia’s interwar policies, democracy and international Judaism.¹³⁰ He was also a contributor to the *Prosvetni glasnik* paper. In the first months of the occupation, he also published a brochure titled “How our nation was informed about Soviet rule and communism”.¹³¹ Vasiljević’s book “*Truth about the USSR*” was serialized in *Novo vreme*.¹³² He argued for a com-

¹²⁸ MA, Group of funds Nda, K 50 A, num. of register 10/4–1. Ljotić’s interview to the correspondent of the Budapest *Esti Kurir* paper László Hory on 16th May 1942.

¹²⁹ Dimitrije Ljotić never had an official function in the domestic government during the occupation, except serving as the extraordinary commissar for the rebuilding of Smederevo. During the entire occupation, he was an *éminence grise* and used his influence on the *Zbor* members “who worked in domestic institutions, as well as his personal contacts with some functionaries in the occupation administration. Ljotić’s followers in the refugee camp in Ebola began collecting and publishing his papers and works after his death. In emigration, they edited his texts for publication by the Munich publishing house Iskra. The first volume of Ljotić’s writings, *Govori i članci*, was published in April 1948. The published collections of Ljotić’s texts or excerpts include: *Svetska revolucija* (1949), *Iz moga života. Govori i članci* (1952), *U revoluciji i ratu* (1961), *Zakoni života* (1963), *Videlo u tami. Odabrana dela* Vol. 1 (1976), and *Odabrana dela* Vol. 2 in multiple editions. The publisher Nova iskra from New Belgrade published in 2003 Dimitrije Ljotić’s *Sabrana dela* (Collected Works) in 8 volumes, with 701 titles in total, including Ljotić’s personal writings, published columns and texts in the press, lectures, memorandums, dispatches and brochures.

¹³⁰ At a public gathering in Valjevo on 10th May 1942, Vasiljević spoke to the crowd about the role of international Judaism in world politics. MA, Group of funds Nda, K 50, num. of register 19/1–1.

¹³¹ MA, Group of funds Nda, K 50, num. of register 13/1.

¹³² At the end of June 1941, to publicize the book with the same name written by Vasiljević, an excerpt from the Afterword by Dimitrije Ljotić was published: “Istina o Sovjetskoj Rusiji”, *Novo vreme*, 24th June 1941, 3. After that, excerpts were published about external politics,

plete change of the work habits and views of the entire people, calling for a “new spirit which must permeate the people and their life”.¹³³ In Miloslav Vasiljević’s correspondence with Adam Lazarević, a professor at the University of Belgrade, in May of 1943, his analysis of the ideology of the Ravna Gora movement has survived.¹³⁴ Miloslav Vasiljević, as an exceptionally active member of *Zbor*, held a series of lectures for at the inmates of the Institution for Forced Education in Smederevska Palanka.¹³⁵ The management of the Institution saw the support of prominent Serbian public figures crucial for exerting “deeper political pressure” on their charges.¹³⁶

One of the *Zbor* ideologists, Dr. Đoko Slijepčević, a contributor to the *Naša borba* paper and member of the Board of Directors of the Anticommunist League, was one of the “special” associates of the German Group for Active Propaganda of the “Jugoistok” propaganda section.¹³⁷ In one of his articles, Slijepčević analyzed the importance of propaganda and the prerequisites that domestic government had to fulfill to be as effective as possible – talent for propaganda, life and ideological conviction in the truth of what is being propagated, openness, or rather, non-anonymity of the propaganda. Also, behind every pro-

industry and work, life in Moscow and the organization of Jews in Moscow: “Spoljna politika SSSR”, excerpts of passages from: M. Vasiljević, *Novo vreme*, 25th June 1941, 3; Continuation of publishing of excerpts from Vasiljević’s book, published chapters: “Život u Moskvi” and “Jevreji drže najbolje plaćene položaje u Moskvi”, *Novo vreme*, 26th June 1941, 2.; “Industrija i radništvo u SSSR”, *Novo vreme*, 27th June 1941, 2.

¹³³ “Govor g. Milosava Vasiljevića komesara za privredu. Nov duh mora da prožme naš narod i njegov život. ‘Da bismo mogli da organizujemo rad za sve, a to moramo, neophodno je da izmenimo izvesna svoja shvatanja’”, *Novo vreme*, 29th May 1941, 1.

¹³⁴ In this period, the support of this *Zbor* ideologist for the Chetnik movement was apparent, especially after the gradual shift of the Allied policy and the Allies’ turn to Tito. This movement, according to Vasiljević, could have become a unified Serbian national movement if it resisted the attacks of foreign and internal enemies. MA, Group of funds Nda, K 50, num. of register 4/2–5, Letter from Miroslav Vasiljević to Adam Lazarević, 30th May 1943.

¹³⁵ Miroslav Vasiljević’s book *Istina o SSSR* (The Truth about the USSR) was mandatory reading, regularly read and interpreted in class. MA, Group of funds Nda, K 169, Φ 3, num. of register 3–2. State commission for determining the crimes of the occupiers and their helpers, Record from the hearing of the former inmate Vesna Butijer, 8th February 1945.

¹³⁶ During the entire work of the Institution, regular surveys were done to determine the effectiveness of the lectures. Every inmate was asked to state his or her opinion on controversial issues to gauge whether their feelings about the communist ideology had changed. All inmates wrote a report on the subject “My thoughts on the lectures from the Ministry of Education” regarding the lectures held by Velibor Jonić at the Institution on “Materialist and idealist understanding of the world and life”. MA, Group of funds Nda, K 155, Φ 2, num. of register 1–18.

¹³⁷ MA, Group of funds German Archive, K 60, Φ 5, num. of register 2/1–52.

paganda campaign, a person of authority had to stand as a guarantor of the truthfulness of what was being propagated. Slijepčević points out the organic development of propaganda as the last prerequisite.¹³⁸ He saw Serbia as the key for conquering the Balkans, or rather the “heart of the Balkans”, without which Tito’s attempts to launch a total revolution on the Balkan Peninsula would be pointless.¹³⁹

Peculiarities of the content of propaganda

When analyzing the segments of the propaganda of Nedić’s regime, it can be difficult to distinguish between German propaganda and the local administration’s propaganda because the Department of State Propaganda received guidelines and instructions from the Germans. German propaganda played an important role in the creation of an alternate image of the war reality in Serbia, which was molded to suit the mentality, views and psychological profile of the average Serbian citizen by limiting the propaganda recipients’ possibilities to be informed and creating a distorted image of the ongoing events. The primary goal of all propaganda about the situation in the war theaters was to shift the population’s focus from their everyday problems and the horrors of war in their own backyard. Moving the objects of propaganda away from the reality of war in the occupied Serbia resulted in their susceptibility to influences from other quarters. Those reports were launched when the citizens had to be distracted from the behavior of the occupying army. Obscuring the reality of war decreased the possibility of the citizens joining the resistance movements en masse.

Analyzing the creation of the war image by the domestic propagandists, we mustn’t ignore the fact that most of the population in the occupied Serbia was illiterate and that the literate part of the citizenship was usually concentrated in cities and small towns. This meant that this category of the population had to be reached through radio-propaganda, lectures, assemblies, conferences, posters, and other propaganda methods available to the Department of State Propaganda.

The territory of occupied Serbia, ravaged by the war, a popular uprising and civil war, were painted in a very different light in propaganda. The period of occupation was described as “with the post-war period when the enemies of the new order had to be dealt with”. The premise that the war ended for Serbia in 1941 and that peace, prosperity and the time for the implementation of the so-

¹³⁸ *Obnova*, 27th April 1942,7.

¹³⁹ Article by Dr. Đoko Slijepčević: “Poruka dobrovoljaca”, *Novo vreme, Obnova*, 6th May 1944, 2.

cial program had come was popularized by the prime minister. The only threats to the living space of New Serbia were the supporters of the “Anglo-American plutocracy” and the “Judeo-Masonic international”. The successes of the Serbian armed forces in joint operations with the German army to destroy communist elements and Partisan units were highlighted. It was also claimed that Germany had won on the Eastern Front and Japan in the Far East. There were reports that the end of the war was near. The Serbian nation was being prepared to enter into New Europe, with the everyday glorification of the German army and the idea of National Socialism. News that could possibly undermine this fabricated image were either not published or conveyed in changed form.

In the eyes of the bearers of propaganda, the war landscape gradually gained a completely different form compared to the original, real situation. Their primary task and final goal was to transmit the vision that they had, or that was imposed upon them, as well as images they had been creating during the entire period of occupation, onto as many recipients of propaganda content as possible, to as many citizens of occupied Serbia as possible. The style of propaganda messages, their language and content were susceptible to change depending on the developments of the war situation.

The image of of this landscape was supplemented with images of the friends and foes of the Serbian people. The support of the Third Reich for Serbia, justification of their allies’ fight for the Lebensraum and attempts to get the people to believe that the victory of the Tripartite Pact was inevitable, writing about everyday progress by the German troops and losses of the Allies were an inevitable part of the front and opening pages in most Belgrade-based papers. To add nuance to the image of the space, there were reports of the work done by the “Government of National Salvation” and its representatives, writings about the actions of the Serbian State Guard against members of the Partisan movement, Kosta Pećinac’s Chetniks, followers of Ljotić, holding meetings, conferences, offering aid to the refugees and the poor, solving economic problems and showing cultural events in Belgrade and Serbia. A certain amount of space was dedicated to the happenings in ISC, mainly in the context of analyzing the politics of the new Ustasha government and their relations with Germany, as well as solving the refugee problem. Providing help to Germany by mobilizing the work services in Serbia and sending workers to Germany was highlighted. In stark contrast to the regular praises of the policies of the German and domestic government and the tendentious portrayal of the situation in the theaters of war, a Crime & Courts section was regularly published in a local newspaper allowing us to track the effects of wartime everyday life on a regular person, who often-times couldn’t cope with the gravity of the situation. At the same time, these crime reports provided evidence to the readers that “life went on as normal”.

The prime minister tried to emphasize cooperation with the Germans to secure as much autonomy as possible for the "Government of National Salvation". The Government professed to be in favor of the German demands in order to gain German trust and to ease the position of public servants as potential members of the resistance movement. Mihailo Olćan also actively participated in the propaganda of the domestic government directed at Germany, especially because his statements carried a genuine conviction in the connection between the German and the Serbian people.

Conclusion

The local administration's propaganda efforts were largely dependent on the direction of German propaganda and the German political apparatus, which to a certain extent diminished its role in society and its creative possibilities and impacted the results of the set goals. The characteristics of propaganda activities were mostly a product of the interwar ideological-political underpinnings that the main ideological postulates used by the government rested on. Keeping in mind that part of the political right wing and Serbian intellectual elite of a national orientation had also been involved in politics and culture in the interwar period, including during the beginning of the occupation cooperation with the German authorities, we can conclude that their prewar dissemination of certain opinions directly affected the political division and contradiction within the later Council of Commissars and the "Government of National Salvation". The propaganda results were heavily dependent on the relations between the members of the Government, who, notwithstanding German directives, often slipped out of control. In this case, propaganda and its effects depended on several factors, but mostly came down to the ability of propaganda agents to justify their view of the socio-political situation and the position of some social categories, as well as the way in which the recipients of propaganda could best be influenced if it was not harmful to German interests. Propaganda contents were censored on a daily basis. All written content intended for publishing in the press or radio-speeches, lectures, national meetings, and various cultural and political events were all tightly controlled.

The local administration's propaganda can be seen as a directed, planned and synchronized activity, partially original and flexible, depending on the circumstances. Some originality can be seen in its direction toward German authorities when there was a need to convince them that some "political maneuvers of the government" were justified or assure them in the Government's unwavering loyalty. Adjustments of propaganda postulates to the given historical circumstances were to an extent successful. Even though the road of Nedić's propaganda was outlined at the beginning of the war, there were occasional di-

vergences from the main direction or changes in opinions, and so some military and political moves of the participants in the war in the Yugoslavian territory that were previously criticized became justified. This doesn't take away from the fact that German influence on the main propaganda streams was constant during the entire period of occupation.

The "Government of National Salvation" continued its propaganda even in the decisive and uncertain moments when its survival was at stake. When it comes to the propaganda of the "Government of National Salvation", it bears repeating that, in the entire period of occupation, the Department of State Propaganda, as well as the entire propaganda activity of the local administration, was dependent on German direction, dictate and censorship.

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The Venice Biennale and Art in Belgrade in the 1950s. A Contribution to the Study of the Artistic Dialogue between Italy and Serbia¹

Abstract: Throughout the twentieth century the International Art Exhibition Venice Biennale was seen as a major event by the art world of Belgrade and, more broadly, of Serbia and Yugoslavia. After the Second World War this biggest and most important international show of contemporary art provided Belgrade's artists and art critics with an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the latest developments on the international art scene. At the same time, it was used as a platform for the leading figures of Belgrade's artistic and cultural-policy establishment to create, through the exhibitions mounted in the national pavilion, an image of the country's artistic contemporaneity aimed at achieving its desired standing in the West. The attitude of Belgrade's art scene to the Venice Biennale went through a particularly interesting phase in the 1950s. Its transformations offer an opportunity to observe, analyse and expand the knowledge about the changes that marked that turbulent decade in the history of Serbian art, which went a long way from dogmatically exclusive socialist realism to the institutionalization of a high-modernist language as the dominant model. Based on the reconstruction of Yugoslavia's sustained participation in the Venice Biennale (1950–60), this paper analyses the models of the representation of Serbian art in the international context of the Biennale within a broader context of the intensification of Serbian-Italian artistic contacts during the period under study.

Keywords: Venice Biennale, twentieth-century Serbian art, exhibition history, cultural diplomacy, post-war modernism

During the 1950s Belgrade's art scene was undergoing an intensive process of internationalization in line with the liberalization of the country's foreign policy. Among the exhibitions staged in Belgrade were: *Contemporary French Art* (1952), *Le Corbusier* (1953), *A Selection of Dutch Painting* (1953), *Belgian Printmaking* (1954), *Henry Moore – Sculptures and Drawings* (1955), *Contemporary Art in the USA* (1956), *Contemporary Italian Art* (1956), *Contemporary French*

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¹ The paper was presented at the International Scientific Conference *140 years of establishment of diplomatic relations between Italy and Serbia* held at the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in Belgrade, May 31–June 1, 2019.

Art (1958) etc.² At the same time, Yugoslav artists used the opportunity to show their work at various artistic events abroad, among which the International Art Exhibition of the Venice Biennale stood out as the largest and most important overview of current artistic trends on a global scale. From 1950 the Yugoslav state sent its artists to the Venice Biennale to represent their country with an exhibition in the national pavilion built in 1938.³ Its presence at the event was used as a platform for creating an image of Yugoslavia's artistic up-to-dateness for the purpose of achieving the desired position of the country in the West. A more comprehensive understanding of the attitude of Belgrade's art scene and the Yugoslav cultural policy apparatus to the Venice Biennale in the 1950s requires a brief overview of the situation surrounding the first Biennale organized after the Second World War, in 1948. Yugoslavia at first, at the recommendation of the Communist Party of Italy (CPI),⁴ officially confirmed participation in the event and carried out preparations for it,⁵ but then, less than a month before the opening of the Biennale, cancelled its participation due to – as officially stated – “unforeseen technical reasons”.⁶ Given Yugoslavia's international political situation in 1948, technical reasons probably were not the only reason for its withdrawal, but rather some other factors were also at work, such as the earlier withdrawal of the Soviet Union, which ensued after the electoral defeat of the

² For more, see L. Merenik, *Umetnost i vlast. Srpsko slikarstvo 1945–1968* (Belgrade: Filozofski fakultet/Fond Vujičić kolekcija, 2010), 64–68.

³ For more on the founding of the Yugoslav pavilion, see A. Bogdanović, “Kraljevina Jugoslavija na Bijenalu u Veneciji 1938. i 1940. godine”, *Zbornik Seminara za studije moderne umetnosti Filozofskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Beogradu* 11 (2015), 22–33. For a more detailed account the history of Yugoslav participation at the Venice Biennale, see: A. Ereš, *Jugoslavija na Venecijanskom bijenalu (1938-1990): kulturne politike i politike izložbe* (Novi Sad: Galerija Matice srpske, 2020).

⁴ Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), 314–5–21, Press attaché of the Legation of the FPRY to Italy to the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 Feb. 1948.

⁵ AJ, 314–21–83, Chief of the Department for Art of the Ministry of Education of the PR Croatia to the Committee on Culture and Art of the FPRY Government, 8 Apr. 1948.

⁶ L'Archivio Storico delle Arti Contemporanee (ASAC), Fonds *Padiglioni, Atti 1938–1968*, box 20, Letter of the FPRY Legation in Rome to Secretary General of the Biennale of 6 May 1948, states: “Con riferimento alla Sua lettera del 29 aprile a c. ho l'onore d'informarLa che questa Legazione ha inoltrato il materiale allegato alla predetta lettera alle competenti autorità jugoslave, le quali hanno risposto telegraficamente di essere dolenti che per ragioni tecniche imprevedute non sarà possibile agli artisti jugoslavi di partecipare all'Esposizione Biennale di Venezia di quest'anno con le loro opere d'arte”; AJ, 314–21–83, FPRY Legation to the Committee on Culture and Art, Confirmation that the Yugoslav decision to withdraw from participation due to “unforeseen technical difficulties” was presented to the Biennale administration, 8 May 1948.

CPI.⁷ Yugoslav officials had inquired about the Soviet stance on the Biennale and were aware that the USSR would not send its representatives to Venice.⁸ What also contributed to the withdrawal was the insufficiently organized art system in Yugoslavia itself, still in the process of post-war consolidation and lacking the resources to put on a representative exhibition of contemporary art at the international level which would be able to use a new and clearly articulated artistic language of a new Yugoslavia. The latter argument was offered only a year later, in 1949, with reference to the organization of the *Exhibition of the Medieval Art of the Peoples of Yugoslavia* in Paris. Namely, during the preparations for a representative exhibition of Yugoslav art abroad the proposal was made to organize an exhibition of contemporary rather than medieval art. The proposal was rejected by the Ministry of Culture of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) because "we still have at our disposal only a limited number of representative artworks".⁹ That the lack of a sufficiently representative art production was the reason for the withdrawal from the Biennale is supported by the assumption of Želimir Koščević that the FPRY did not participate in the 1948 Biennale because of a large exhibition of Yugoslav art in the countries of Eastern Europe.¹⁰ He probably had in mind the exhibition *The Painting and Sculpture of the Peoples of Yugoslavia of the 19th and 20th Century* which included a good part of Yugoslav post-war art production and between the beginning of 1947 and mid-1948 made a tour, visiting Moscow, Leningrad, Bratislava, Prague, Warsaw, Krakow and Budapest.¹¹

In spite of Yugoslavia's withdrawal, the Biennale did not go unnoticed by the art public at home, as evidenced by the art historian Grgo Gamulin's review

⁷ For more on the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the 1948 Biennale, see N. Jachec, *Politics and painting at the Venice Biennale 1948–1964* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 41. It is interesting to note that Czechoslovakia followed a similar pattern in 1950 and 1952. On both occasions, its participation was officially announced and then cancelled due to "technical reasons" just before the opening. This has been attributed to the country's political relations with the Soviet Union which boycotted the Biennale at the time. See V. Wolf, "Czechoslovakia at the Venice Biennale in the 1950s". In *Art beyond Borders. Artistic Exchange in Communist Europe (1945–1989)* (Budapest–New York: Central European University Press, 2016), 345–356.

⁸ AJ, 314–5–21, Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Committee on Culture and Art, 1 Apr. 1948.

⁹ B. Doknić, *Kulturna politika Jugoslavije 1946–1963* (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2013), 90.

¹⁰ Koščević only briefly mentions the Yugoslav absence from the 1948 Biennale, claiming that the reason "allegedly was the large exhibition of Yugoslav art in the 'democratic countries' of Eastern Europe", see Ž. Koščević, *Venecijanski Biennale i jugoslavenska moderna umjetnost 1895–1988* (Zagreb: Galerije grada Zagreba and Grafički zavod Hrvatske 1988), 32, n. 28.

¹¹ The list of 404 artworks shown in this exhibition is available in the catalogue *Slikarstvo i vajarstvo naroda Jugoslavije XIX i XX veka* (Belgrade, 1946).

“Spectres in the lagoons. A report from the 24th Biennale” published in *Književne novine*. This text was publicly read and discussed within the programme of ideological-political and professional edification of the members of the *Union of Visual Artists of Yugoslavia* (Savez likovnih umetnika Jugoslavije – SLUJ) held in Belgrade between April and June 1949. Gamulin’s harsh and partisan criticism of the Biennale as a symbol of the ideological (capitalist) adversary in the face of which the rightness of the doctrine of communist ideology and socialist realism should be asserted has been seen as “one of the best examples of the influence of political art criticism in the age of socialist realism”.¹²

How this text was discussed in Belgrade artistic circles is not known, but the minutes of the Second Plenum of the Board of the SLUJ held on 11 and 12 April 1949 allow us an insight into the debate that offered a few significant arguments in favour of a perception of foreign art which did not conform to the Soviet understanding of socialist realism, and pointed to the need for creating an authentically Yugoslav language for representing socialist reality as “the spirit and the will that inspire people to create a better future life”, or “poetry that guides man into the progress of socialism”, as formulated by the prominent Belgrade painter Petar Lubarda.¹³ Moving away from the Soviet model of socialist realism in art ran in parallel with the shift in Yugoslav foreign policy which, after the Resolution of the Cominform of June 1948, gradually took on a more broad-minded attitude to the influences and values of the West.¹⁴ As far as the attitude of Belgrade’s art public to the Venice Biennale is concerned, this debate is indispensable for a more thorough understanding of Yugoslavia’s participation the following year, 1950.

Yugoslavia made its first post-war appearance at the Venice Biennale in 1950, staging in its pavilion a collective exhibition of Kosta Angeli-Radovani, Gojmir Anton Kos, Antun Augustinčić, Vojin Bakić, Frano Kršinić, Petar Lubarda, Ismet Mujezinović and Vanja Radauš. The works displayed in and around the pavilion used the rhetoric of socialist realism but some nonetheless evaded a direct or unambiguous socialist-realist expression, such as Petar Lubarda’s Montenegrin landscapes painted in 1948–50. The text for the catalogue states that this selection of artworks is an introduction to the current efforts of Yugoslav artists who, “forming part of the overall socialist transformation of the country, are aware that human dignity requires that they devote attention to the

¹² L. Merenik, “1948: Bijenale u Veneciji i jedan primer recepcije izlagačke prakse modern umetnosti”, *Zbornik Seminara za studije moderne umetnosti Filozofskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Beogradu V* (2009), 252.

¹³ AJ, 317–80–113, Stenographic minutes, Second Plenum of the Board of the Union of Visual Artists of the FPRY, 11–12 Apr. 1949, pp. 29–35.

¹⁴ B. Doknić, M. F. Petrović and I. Hofman, “Kulturna politika Jugoslavije 1945–1952”. *Zbornik dokumenata*, vol. 1 (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2009), 28.

efforts of the people on their path of socialism building".¹⁵ The 1950 presentation of contemporary Yugoslav art was based on an ambivalent interpretative matrix which, in the broader context of socialist-realist rhetoric (concerning the active participation of artists in the socialist transformation of society), made room for individual artistic poetics inspired, on the one hand, by the universal humanistic spirit of post-war Europe and, on the other, by the individual artists' formative experiences in West-European centres, i.e. the practices that drew continuity from the tradition of modernist experience of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This model of representing art may be understood as part of a broader process of developing and consolidating the desired distinctly Yugoslav artistic language in the complex social and political situation of uncertainty immediately after 1948, a language which would go beyond the bounds of the strict socialist-realist rhetoric of the Soviet type. It should be noted here that the curator of the 1950 Yugoslav exhibition in Venice, the writer Petar Šegedin, was instrumental in the process of deconstructing the dogmatic position of socialist realism. His speech at the Second Congress of the Union of Writers of Yugoslavia held in Belgrade in 1949, having provoked intense reactions from the expert public, was decisive for the emergence of a different understanding of the relationship between art and social reality.¹⁶ Šegedin challenged "partyiness" as the main criterion in art evaluation, as well as the artwork conceived of as "a mere reflection of reality". Putting forth the view instead that the source of art was in "the human and natural being" and that the artwork was a fact in itself which produced new meanings and insights, he decisively contributed to the introduction of the concept of autonomy of art, reiterating it in his text for the exhibition catalogue. Yugoslavia's appearance at the 1950 Venice Biennale was, though more in intention than in accomplishment, a sign of the country's gradual moving towards the West-European artistic and cultural sphere as the primary space for the international promotion of Yugoslav art in that period.¹⁷

¹⁵ P. Šegedin, *Padiglione della R.P.F. di Jugoslavia. XXV Biennale Venezia* (Zagreb: Tipografija, 1950), n.p.

¹⁶ For more on the importance of Šegedin's speech, see Lj. Kolečnik, *Između Istoka i Zapada. Hrvatska umjetnost i likovna kritika 50-ih godina* (Zagreb: Institut za povijest umjetnosti, 2006), 70–72.

¹⁷ As far as the strategies of opening the country towards the West are concerned, it should be noted that the Council for Science and Culture of the FPRY funded the trip to Venice of students and professors of the Academy of Applied Arts in Ljubljana and the Department of Art History of the Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb. The expenditure was approved by decision of the Council no. 1647 of 6 July 1950 for the Academy in Ljubljana, and no. 3340 of 20 July for the students and professors from Zagreb (AJ, 317–92–133).

The ambivalence Šegedin pointed to when speaking about the relationship between art and politics was expressed more directly in his exhaustive report on the Yugoslav exhibition at the Biennale:

If we went to Venice to oppose frontally all those tendencies in Western artistic life, currently abundant, it is one thing and it is another thing if we wanted to be met with understanding. I am writing this report in the belief that we wanted to present our own artistic efforts so as to be met with understanding, and not only from the part of the public who look at things only in terms of subject matter and content but also from those who appreciate and evaluate artistic expression.¹⁸

Šegedin's report also offered particularly important observations about the Yugoslav exhibition in the context of Yugoslavia's positioning in relation to the Western public, problematizing the display of Augustinčić's monumental statue of Marshal Tito: it was "impossible, in these times, in Italy, to expect even the most objective of critics to separate the aspect of political content from the sculptural figural aspect", and so it "appeared political and one can only imagine how distorted in the eyes of the part of the public who is unsympathetic or barely sympathetic towards us".¹⁹ The predominant "academic-naturalistic" expression of the Yugoslav exhibition, as described by Šegedin, was a reason for the lack of understanding on the part of the critics and the absence of exhibition reviews in the international press.

The report on the work of the Department for Scientific and Cultural Links with Foreign Countries issued by the federal Council for Science and Culture in 1950, on the other hand, spoke more directly of the exhibition in a political context, paying most of its attention to the relationship between the Yugoslav exhibition and the Italian public. It emphasized that amidst the anti-Yugoslav campaign conducted in Italy, the political circumstances and the feel of the Biennale ought to have been taken into account:

Our part of the exhibition is politically inappropriate because the abovementioned specificities have not been taken into account. In the ambience of the Biennale, it appeared too obtrusive, too propagandistic (in the narrow sense) and, if one may say so, too Partisan. It is the motif of our Partisan struggle that is emphasized, and the motif of post-war construction, our cultural strivings and breadth in the selection of artistic themes are muted. It is understandable that this pronounced fighting spirit caused resentment in many Italian visitors of the exhibition, unfavourable to our country. The Italian petit bourgeois and

¹⁸ AJ, 317–92–133, P. Šegedin, *Report on our participation in the Biennale exhibition*, 7 Aug. 1950.

¹⁹ Ibid.

intellectual had a feeling that our exhibition sought to remind them of their inglorious past, and amidst the struggle over Trieste...²⁰

The central question that the experience of Yugoslavia's first post-war appearance at the Venice Biennale raised was the purpose of the exhibition in the context of the country's international representation. As a result, preparations for the next international exhibition in Venice in 1952 began much earlier, as part of a more comprehensive, planned reorganization and strategic (re)positioning of Yugoslav cultural diplomacy, which in those years was undergoing the process of transition and reorientation towards the West, in line with the broader shift in foreign policy. In 1950 a conference was held in Belgrade on the country's international propaganda in the area of culture and art. It was concluded that the presentation of Yugoslav culture in the world was very important for the promotion of the country, especially in view of the Soviet efforts to isolate Yugoslavia.²¹ The previous rhetoric decrying the "decadent art of capitalist and imperialist Western culture" was toned down: Ivo Sarajčić, the federal Assistant Minister of Science and Culture, stated in his speech that there were things in the West "in all fields of activity and art from which we can learn much" and that "decadence, and of the kind that comes through in the West, must be known to us if we want to understand its culture and art fully, and we should not fear it will have an adverse effect on us."²² Changing the image of Yugoslavia in Western eyes was the main concern in laying down the basis for cultural policy strategies, which is yet another confirmation that the perception of the West as the unavoidable corrective of exhibitionary policy and its models of representation is vital to understanding the exhibitionary activity abroad of this period. These political decisions were crucial for participation in the 1952 Venice Biennale, especially in the light of the fact that in order to carry out an effective international promotion of Yugoslav culture, with Western Europe as the primary target, the federal budget allocation for culture rose from 2.6% to 4% in 1952, and most of it was intended for travelling abroad.²³ Besides, in the early 1950s, the artists of Belgrade and Yugoslavia saw the Venice Biennale as the only big exhibition abroad worthy of participating in, which was also the official stance of the SLUJ.²⁴

²⁰ AJ, 317–86–120, Report on the work of the Department for Scientific and Cultural Links with Foreign Countries in 1950, Belgrade 1950/51.

²¹ M. Perišić, *Diplomatija i kultura. Jugoslavija: prelomna 1950. Jedno istorijsko iskustvo* (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije /Narodna biblioteka Srbije, 2013), 33.

²² After Perišić, *Diplomatija i kultura*, 34.

²³ On this in detail, Doknić, *Kulturna politika Jugoslavije*, 122–124.

²⁴ The view of the Venice Biennale as the only big and established art exhibition abroad worthy of sending national representatives to was expressed by Vinko Grdan, secretary of the

Yugoslavia's representation at the Venice Biennale in 1952 and 1954 was organized in a cultural and political atmosphere where more attention was paid to planning. Preparations for the 1952 Biennale began much earlier and the suggestion of Italian experts was taken into account that the selection should rely on a smaller number of artists who would thus be able to show more of their work.²⁵ The commission composed of prominent figures of the Yugoslav art world, set up under the auspices of the federal Council for Science and Culture,²⁶ opted for the artists whose work was marked by an intimist note: Predrag Milošavljević, Nedeljko Gvozdenović, Emanuel Vidović, Antun Motika, Gabrijel Stupica, Risto Stijović, Petar Palavičini and Zdenko Kalin.²⁷ The nature of the Yugoslav selection was considerably different from the previous one both in idea and in subject matter, which in particular goes for the fact that, apart from recent art production, it included artworks created in the 1930s. The inclusion of interwar artworks and the choice of intimism as the conceptual framework of the exhibition established a direct and clear link to the tradition of Yugoslav interwar modernism, which had been the framework for the country's representation at the Biennale in 1938 and 1940. The shift in the strategy of Yugoslavia's representation in Venice was the consequence of twofold (re)positioning. On the one hand, the intention was to be more in tune with the conception of the Biennale which in that period promoted the legacy of the modern art of the first half of the twentieth century, re-establishing continuity after the Second World War. On the other hand, this exhibition concept was part of the changes

Union of Visual Artists of Yugoslavia, on behalf of the Union, see AJ, 317–86–120, Grdan to the Council for Science and Culture of the Government of the FPRY, 7 Sept. 1951.

²⁵ Department for Scientific and Cultural Links with Foreign Countries of the Council for Science and Culture of the FPRY government was intent on paying more attention to propaganda at the 1952 Biennale, aiming at a more active presence and more favourable positioning within the conception and competition framework of the event, but due to the faulty communication with the Legation in Rome, which was supposed to pass the plans on to the ministry in Belgrade, preparations for the Yugoslav appearance in Venice did not follow the desired course. Vlada Novosel, chief of the Department, wrote quite exhaustively about that, see AJ, 317–92–133, Department for Scientific and Cultural Links with Foreign Countries to Vladimir Velebit, FPRY Minister in Rome, 8 Apr. 1952.

²⁶ Members of the commission were: Frano Kršinić, master sculptor at the Academy of Fine Arts in Zagreb, full member of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts, and one of the Yugoslav representatives at the 1940 and 1950 Biennales; Marino Tartaglia, professor of painting at the Academy of Fine Arts in Zagreb and one of the Yugoslav representatives at the 1940 Biennale; Gojmir Anton Kos, professor of painting at the Academy of Fine Arts in Ljubljana and one of the Yugoslav representatives at the 1950 Biennale; and Momčilo Stevanović, curator of the National Museum in Belgrade.

²⁷ AJ, 317–86–120, Exhaustive report, Our participation in XXXI Biennale in Venice, 4 July 1952, p. 3.

in exhibitionary practice in Serbia and Yugoslavia which was going through the process of “exculpation of interwar Yugoslav art anathematized in the post-1945 period”, with “exhibitions heralding the changes that would take place in Serbian and Yugoslav art after 1950”.²⁸ Continuity with the legacy of interwar art is also visible in the inclusion in the preparations and realization of the 1952 Biennale exhibition of artists who had represented the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Venice in 1940, such as Predrag Milosavljević, Marino Tartaglia and Frano Kršinić.

The strained Yugoslav-Italian relation over the Trieste crisis resulted in a relative lack of interest in the Yugoslav position at the Biennale as opposed to the countries which maintained stable relations with Italy. The Yugoslav representatives were aware of the fact, but they saw their presence at the opening as very important for establishing contacts with foreign colleagues and arranging for future exhibitions, hoping that the promotion in artistic circles of the exhibition mounted in the national pavilion might ensure better press coverage and, possibly, consideration for some of the awards.²⁹

The Yugoslav pavilion at the 1954 Biennale, apart from Sreten Stojanović's sculptures as the focus of the exhibition, showed a selection of recent works by thirty printmakers.³⁰ The Yugoslavs had been informed timely that the thematic focus of the Biennale would be on surrealism, but the Yugoslav concept did not reflect the Biennale Board's suggestions. Instead, the central place in the national pavilion was given to a retrospective of Sreten Stojanović's work, who expressed a distaste and lack of understanding for the dominant trend at the Biennale, considering surrealism to negate the essential qualities of sculpture or painting, and claiming that abstract art

throws many of its protagonists into a state of panic, because it is difficult to keep drawing from inside oneself something that does not produce a natural form. Hence dots here, cubes there, lines, thin or thick, paints, transparent or

²⁸ Merenik, *Umetnost i vlast*, 65.

²⁹ Šepić's report from the Biennale reveals that its officials and other Italian art experts intimated to the Yugoslav emissaries that the Yugoslav exhibition would be difficult to promote to the public on account of poor political relations between Italy and Yugoslavia, see AJ, 317–86–120, Exhaustive report, Our participation in XXXI Biennale in Venice, 4 July 1952, pp. 9–10.

³⁰ The printmakers who exhibited their works (most of which were created between 1952 and 1954) were: Petar Bibić, Vesna Borčić, Lazar Vujaklija, Vilko Gliha Selan, Zdenko Gradiš, Riko Debenjak, Božidar Jakac, Boško Karanović, Albert Kinert, Tone Kralj, France Kralj, Miha Maleš, Mario Maskareli, Mirjana Mihać, France Mihelič, Ankica Oprešnik, Mihailo Petrov, Marjan Pogačnik, Marij Pregelj, Zlatko Prica, Božidar Prodanović, Nikola Reiser, Josip Restek, Josip Roca, Vilim Svečnjak, Maksim Sedej, Mladen Srbinović, Dragoslav Stojanović Sip, Stojan Čelić, Dušan Džamonja and Aleksandar Šivert.

dense, motifs from bags, carpets, spheres, bent iron, some strange forms with or without hollows, polished or unpolished.³¹

In the context of the creation of a new image of Yugoslavia through participation in the Biennale, it is pertinent at this point to look at how the Yugoslav pavilion in 1954 was received in the West. Western art critics mostly emphasized that the display of prints showed a relative openness of the Yugoslav regime to contemporary and formally freer artistic tendencies, making this selection considerably different from what could be seen in the pavilions of the Soviet bloc countries, whereas the sculptural part of the exhibition was perceived as more traditional, naturalistic artistic expression. Expectedly enough, foreign critics were not necessarily of one mind, and prominent Italian critics wrote about the Yugoslav selection as follows: Gillo Dorfles described it as an example of the most backward type of academism, whereas Roberto Longhi found that the Yugoslav prints brought a true cultural surprise.³²

Yugoslavia's appearances at the Biennale in 1952 and 1954, although prepared in keeping with the new orientation of the state's foreign cultural policy marked by its opening to the West, should not be seen as the only and unilinear examples of pursuing this political agenda. This cultural-policy strategy is strongly reflected in the intentions and preparations of these exhibitions. Their realization and effect show, however, that a clear-cut exhibitionary strategy for the international scene was not fully defined yet, in part due to technical and organizational inconsistencies, in part to the tension in political relations between Italy and Yugoslavia, and also because of some compromises made in the selection of artists. This is why these exhibitions may in a broader art-historical sense be seen as a transitional model of post-war modernism representation in international context, its main features being: the establishment of continuity with the local and, through it, West-European modernist legacy of the interwar period, which suggested that the Serbian and Yugoslav cultural milieu shared a common, European, experience of modernity, and its policy of openness to the West.

From 1956 the organization of Yugoslav participation in the Venice Biennale became the responsibility of the Federal Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. As a body of centralized government, it oversaw the conception of the exhibitions in the Yugoslav pavilion in keeping with a

³¹ S. Stojanović, "Smotra likovne umetnosti 32 nacije", *Borba*, 4 July 1954, quoted after L. Trifunović, *Sreten Stojanović* (Belgrade: Galerija Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti, 1973), 54.

³² G. Dorfles, "La XXVII: Biennale e la crisi surrealista", *Aut aut*, 4 July 1954; R. Longhi, "Grossi premi grosse sorprese", *L'Europeo*, 4 July 1954 (after AJ, 559–92–206, FPRY Legation in Rome to Committee on Cultural Links with Foreign Countries, 21 Jan. 1955).

clearly defined foreign cultural policy, marked by openness to the world and the dynamic and systematic promotion of Yugoslav art and culture aimed at creating a positive image of the country in international context. In a thus regulated cultural and political climate, the character of the exhibitions in the Yugoslav pavilion was shaped by expert commissions composed of prominent figures of Yugoslav culture, using the principle of equal participation of artists from major art centres, primarily Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana. An important selection criterion was their previous accomplishments on the international scene, because winning one of the awards was one of the main goals of exhibiting at the Biennale. From the mid-1950s, artists from Belgrade had been taking part in other big art events in the world, such as the Sao Paulo Art Biennale, the Alexandria Biennale for Mediterranean Countries, the Tokyo Biennale and the Paris Youth Biennale, but the Venice Biennale was still seen as the key event for international artistic promotion.

In the strategies and work plan of the Commission, art exhibitions were recognized as an important instrument for presenting Yugoslav culture abroad, as clearly formulated in its work plan:

Exhibitions offer a good opportunity for systematically and continually acquainting the international public with the culture-historical and artistic traditions and values of our peoples as well as with contemporary achievements and accomplishments. They should be planned for a period of several years, and conceived as interrelated, so that they complement one another and logically expand the areas of culture in their approach.³³

Apart from being recognized as an important vehicle for pursuing Yugoslav foreign cultural policy, art exhibitions were given a clearly defined function with regard to the global geopolitical situation after the war. This was articulated with precision in 1960 by Ivo Vejvoda, a prominent diplomat serving as Yugoslav ambassador in London at the time, in his address to the Art Exhibitions Committee, a body of the federal Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries:

[...] I would ask this Committee to keep mainly these three areas in mind when making plans, which can be quite compatible politically with our interests too – these are the West, the East and the neutrals. As for the West, I believe it is no exaggeration to say that it is there that we can achieve the most at this moment. It is in the West that we are struggling to achieve some recognition as a nation which has a cultural history, which has a culture of its own that did not come into being only after this revolution and war, but which is of long standing and of which the West knows little or nothing.

³³ AJ, 559–8–20, Work plan for 1955 of the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, p. 3.

I believe that the exhibition of modern art and the exhibition of frescoes are tremendously important in the struggle for the affirmation of Yugoslavia as a nation which exists on the cultural map of the world, because – let me repeat – the West knows little or nothing about it. [...] So, this struggle for our affirmation is tremendously important and artistic events can be of tremendous help. [...] More can be achieved in the West than in the East. In the third part of the world – among the neutrals – everything is still vacillating. We ourselves don't know what would be the most suitable things to represent our country with in Asia and Africa. So, I have no doubts that at this moment these artistic events probably are of the greatest importance for us in the West in the foreign-policy, propagandistic, sense.³⁴

The Western political and cultural sphere was the most important reference point for evaluating and confirming the contemporaneity of Yugoslav art and society. In the political agenda of the country's leadership in that period this meant that the practices of cultural representation abroad, in this concrete case art exhibitions, were supposed to send forth the image of an open society which communicated with the West in the universal language of contemporaneity, while at the same time being the inheritor of a particular culture-historical legacy. The principle of international promotion of Yugoslav art based on a combination of the universal, contemporary, and the particular, local, on the re-signification and transformation of the local through a formal semantic framework of the universal (post-war international modernism), was the backbone of the modernist model of representing Yugoslav art abroad in the second half of the 1950s. This model corresponded to the ideological and conceptual framework of the Venice Biennale which operated as a platform that cultivated a particular form of experience within which the artists were supposed to represent the cultural (and national) setting they were coming from and which they, by fitting into the concept of the Biennale, transcended and, hence, acted internationally. In other words, to be recognized as an exponent of the international art scene, the artists were expected to speak a global language (of post-war modernism) in order to express the representative distinctiveness of the cultural milieu they came from.³⁵

The model of representation used at the Biennale from 1956 meant the creation of a panoramic overview of Yugoslav artistic contemporaneity based on significant individual contributions resulting from modernist artistic explorations. The model was flexible enough to be able both to reconcile the differences emerging on the Yugoslav art scene and, by showing the heterogeneity

³⁴ AJ, 559–84–189, Stenographic notes, First meeting of the Fine Arts Committee of the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, 14 Nov. 1960, pp. 31–32.

³⁵ C. A. Jones, *The Global Work of Art. World's Fairs, Biennials, and the Aesthetics of Experience* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 96.

of art production, to convey the idea of the freedom and openness of Yugoslav society. In the case of Yugoslavia's representation at the Biennale, this model resolved the dilemma laid out in Šegedin's report on the 1950 Biennale in favour of the definitive reorientation to the West as the space of primary interest for the promotion of Yugoslav art, its protagonists and institutions. Between 1956 and 1960 the Yugoslav representatives at the Biennale from the art scene of Belgrade were renowned and established artists: Miodrag B. Protić (1956), Lazar Vujaklija (1956), Olga Jevrić (1958) and Petar Lubarda (1960). The same period saw an intensified artistic exchange between Yugoslavia and Italy: the large exhibition *Contemporary Italian Art – Painting and Sculpture* was opened in Belgrade in December 1956, and young Yugoslav artists presented their work in Milan at the exhibition *Giovani artisti jugoslavi* the same year.

A particularly interesting case in the context of Italian-Serbian artistic dialogue is the inclusion of the young sculptor Olga Jevrić in the Yugoslav selection at the 1958 Venice Biennale, which was in tune with the dominant climate of art informel. The selection of a young artist such as Olga Jevrić was not the usual practice of the Art Exhibitions Committee which operated under the Federal Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and as a rule sent established artists to Venice. Olga Jevrić was selected at the suggestion the Italian art critic Gillo Dorfles made to the curator of the Yugoslav exhibition Aleksa Čelebonović. Namely, Dorfles came to Belgrade in 1956 within the programme of lectures on Italian art organized by the Yugoslav section of the International Association of Art Critics (AICA). During his stay, he visited the atelier of Olga Jevrić, who was preparing her first solo exhibition, *Spatial Compositions*, scheduled for the following year at the Gallery of the Association of Visual Artists of Serbia (Udruženje likovnih umetnika Srbije/ULUS) in Belgrade. Dorfles was pleasantly surprised with her work, and his reaction influenced Čelebonović's decision to propose her for participation at the Venice Biennale the following year.³⁶ Jevrić's appearance in Venice was met with a very positive response from foreign critics, receiving the attention never given to a Yugoslav artist before (she showed two *Compositions* created in 1956/7, three *Proposals for Monuments* from 1957, and a few smaller sculptures from 1957). Positive reviews came from, among others: Enrico Crispolti, Gillo Dorfles, Giuseppe Marchiori, Charles Delloye and Alain Jouffroy, emphasizing the authenticity of her sculptural method (Dorfles), powerful expressivity resulting from her handling the relationship between form and material (Marchiori), and ranking her among the most interesting new figures on the sculptural scene (Delloye).³⁷

³⁶ After J. Denegri, *Olga Jevrić* (Belgrade: TOPY/Vojnoizdavački zavod, 2005), 83.

³⁷ Olga Jevrić's work was reviewed in the following texts: G. Dorfles, "La scultura straniera alla Biennale", *Domus*, 1958, 347; E. Crispolti, "Per un bilancio della Biennale '58", *Il*

Her noted appearance in Venice opened the door to European artistic circles, and her work was included in a few overviews of contemporary sculpture and exhibitions abroad. Olga Jevrić's success is an exception in Yugoslavia's representation at the Venice Biennale which reveals and confirms the workings of this international art forum as regards the recognition of current art trends and the moulding of tastes. Although the advisory bodies involved in Yugoslav cultural policy sought to achieve success at the Biennale by relying on the quality criteria dictated by the domestic art scene, the appreciation coming from the actors of the European art world, especially those who held prominent positions, in this case Dorfler's suggestion to Čelebonović, was decisive for achieving visibility in Venice.

* * *

The presence of the Yugoslav state at the Venice Biennale in the 1950s allows us an insight both into rapid transformations in the art world in the country and into the changing strategy of international promotion and positioning of Yugoslav art. This period saw three successive models of Yugoslav artistic representation: 1) the socialist-realist model, presented at the 1950 Biennale; 2) the transitional modernist model characterized by a reliance on continuity with interwar art, presented in 1952 and 1954; and 3) the high-modernist model, used from 1956, which achieved the desired internationalization of Yugoslav art. Continuous participation in the Venice event and the reception by the Italian professional public of the exhibitions put on in the Yugoslav pavilion were very important for the described development of Yugoslavia's policies designed for the representation of its art abroad, which was taking place in accordance with the goals of Yugoslav foreign policy. The dialogue with the Italian artistic milieu through the presence at the Venice Biennale was especially significant for Belgrade artists as a point from which they acquainted themselves with current art trends on an international scale and also as a stepping stone to international visibility.

taccuino delle arti, 1958, 32–33; G. Marchiori, "La XXIX Biennale di Venezia", *Art International*, 1958, 6–7; A. Jouffroy, "La pavillon yougoslave", *Arts* 657, 1958; Charles Delloye, "La sculpture à la XXIX Biennale de Venise", *Aujourd'hui*, 1958, 19. A complete bibliography, including her appearance in Venice, is available in Denegri, *Olga Jevrić*, 183. The press in the country also informed about the response to her work in the foreign press, see M. P. "Odjeci Bijenala: poznati svetski kritičari o skulpturi Olge Jevrić", *NIN*, 14 Dec. 1958, p. 8.

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Relations between the PCI and the League of Communists from the Second Post-War Period to the Mid-1960s

Abstract: The relations between Tito and Togliatti and their respective parties were conditioned by the omnipresent influence that Communist party of Soviet Union had on both partners. During the period of Stalin's rule, the Italian communist were staunch Stalinists, thus Tito's split with Stalin and the issue of Trieste were the main obstacles in bilateral relations. Khrushchev's destalinization process opened new possibilities for inter party relations across the Adriatic, which however continued to be conditioned by the strategy of their Soviet comrades. Khrushchev's lessening of the control over 'sister' parties give more space for Italians to learn more about Yugoslav path to communism. Nevertheless, the PCI continued to follow the Moscow line, while PCY looked to create its own based on nonaligned movement and self-management, which continued to be closely watched but not applied by PCI during Togliatti's time in office.

Keyword: Tito, Togliatti, PCI, PCY, communism, Stalinism, bilateral relations.

Introduction

At the end of the Second World War, Togliatti and Tito led the respective communist parties of two ravaged countries. The conflict had left deep wounds, not only in terms of material and human losses but also on a social and political level. Both Italy and Yugoslavia were committed to rebuilding their institutional order and had to do so with a society torn apart by hatred and fratricidal wars that had been raging for years. The Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY, from 1952 League of Communists of Yugoslavia, LCY) had been active participants in those painful events. In Italy, the PCI enjoyed the moral high ground of having been the only anti-fascist political force to continue operating in the country during the regime. In wartime, it had been recognised as having a leading role, as demonstrated by the fact that the second Badoglio government, supported by the anti-fascist parties, had come into being after the agreement reached between Togliatti and the monarchy in April 1944. Of course, the commitment to the partisan struggle that had

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lasted for over a year and a half after 8 September 1943 had also played a role, but Togliatti had been in Russia until the spring of 1944 and Stalin had urged him to return to Italy and accept a compromise solution with the monarchy and other political forces. The Soviet diplomat Andrey Vyshinsky confirmed Stalin's decision while speaking with the representative of the Greek government in exile, stating that in Italy, the Allies were in control of the occupying forces, and it was, therefore, necessary to realistically take note of this and favour a solution of collaboration.¹ All this had taken place with the approval of the Allied forces, who had in fact granted Togliatti a pass to come to Italy via Africa.² The circles close to the Royal Palace, in turn, had every interest in reaching an agreement: Renato Prunas had discussed this with Vyshinsky in January of the same year.³

Tito, on the contrary, had remained on the ground, risking his life; he had led his country's resistance throughout the conflict, staying in contact with Moscow but also demonstrating that he knew how to move with a certain cunning and autonomy. He had not exactly done everything on his own: military aid from the western allies and money from Moscow had been decisive at certain times.⁴ Tito had also been urged by Stalin to find a *modus vivendi* with the royal government led by Ivan Šubašić, but in his case the support of Winston Churchill was crucial, as it guaranteed him legitimacy even from the Allies. Thanks to this, the Communist Party remained the political force that negotiated with the international anti-fascist coalition, getting rid of the other inconvenient actors operating in Yugoslavia, in particular Draža Mihajlović's četnik forces. It is true that Churchill's objective was not dissimilar to the one Stalin imposed on Togliatti (to accept the monarchy), but in any case communist domination in the anti-fascist struggle remained a fixed point and would have allowed Tito not to remain bound by the agreements signed during the conflict. At certain moments, he was extremely skilful in playing with the precarious balance of power taking shape between the USSR and the Allies. Just as he had exploited the latter to legitimise himself in the fight against fascism, he sought the support of the former to get rid of the ruling Karadjordjević dynasty.⁵ In the end, however, it was his interlocutors who decided: it was Stalin, at Yalta, who endorsed the continuation of the arrangement with Šubašić and the appointment of a royal

¹ The Gennadius Library, Archeia Gennadeiou Vivliothikis. Moscow, March 17th 1944.

² M. Clementi, *L'alleato Stalin. L'ombra sovietica sull'Italia di Togliatti e De Gasperi*, (Milano: Rizzoli, 2011), 37.

³ Fondazione Gramsci, carte Botteghe Oscure, sottospecie 1, UA 8, "Documenti biografici", Armadio 20 sc., Palmiro Togliatti Documenti personali e cimeli, 15 febbraio 1944-24 marzo 1944, foglio 2.

⁴ J. Pirjevec, *Tito e i suoi compagni*, Torino: Einaudi, 2005, 161, 163.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 165.

regency. On the other hand, as well as with the Italians, Stalin had made the same manoeuvre with the Greeks, pushing the communists to align themselves with the monarchists. It was clear that his primary concerns were the war and how much the USSR managed to win on the ground before its conclusion, rather than support for the sister communist parties. Contrary to what Togliatti did in Italy, however, Tito vehemently protested to the Soviets. It was the first sign that future relations would not be easy.⁶

At the close of hostilities, the two parties found themselves in very different circumstances. The CPY legitimately claimed the management of the construction of the new state, while the PCI found itself within coalition governments in which it could try to reach a compromise with the other parties in writing a new constitution. Togliatti's position was much more uncomfortable than Tito's because his manoeuvring space was limited. Stalin had already made it clear to him during the war that the USSR did not intend to commit itself to supporting a revolutionary struggle in Italy and so the PCI found itself wedged between a power that had little interest in Italy's internal dynamics and its allies in the government's, whose ideological orientation and international framework were increasingly emerging as the future antagonists of the socialist camp. In all this, the problem of the eastern border loomed large. The issue proved to be a major problem for the PCI, which was trying to juggle between displaying loyalty to the cause of socialism and not appearing internally as a party with little national reliability.⁷

In the two years following the end of the conflict, the situation remained fluid. The fate of Trieste and the surrounding area was played out on the tables of the peace negotiations in light of Stalin's desire not to provoke ruptures with the former allies on the European continent.⁸ Neither Tito nor Italy could hope of conditioning them beyond a certain limit. So, Togliatti found himself supporting Stalin, who was first in favour of annexation to Yugoslavia⁹, then annoyed by Tito's protagonism. It was at that moment that he sought a bit of manoeuvring space, suggesting that a referendum be held to allow the local population to express their will.¹⁰ Space that in fact did not exist, since when Togliatti proposed a Trieste/Gorizia exchange and Tito seemed to take it into consideration at the time, the Soviet leader at a meeting in the autumn of 1946 imposed his views

⁶ Ibid., 180.

⁷ P. Karlsen, "Il PCI, il confine orientale e il contesto internazionale. 1945-1954", *Ventunesimo secolo*, IX, 2010, 28.

⁸ S. Pons, "Stalin, Togliatti and the origins of the Cold War in Europe", *Journal of Cold War Studies*, III (2001), 21.

⁹ P. Carlsen, "Il PCI, il confine orientale", 13.

¹⁰ Ibid., 13-14.

on the two colleagues and the proposal was dropped without too much fuss.¹¹ Trieste was also a problem for Tito, who could not disregard it because of the historical significance of the eastern border from the First World War onwards, but above all because it allowed him to mobilize all nations that formed his party to a common commitment in the name of the fight against an external enemy. The facts showed, however, that neither he was able to impose his solution. The Allies had already forced him to withdraw his troops when he had unilaterally attempted an occupation of this territory in May 1945¹² and Stalin had not supported him. Thus, in the following months, his activism waned.

A Cold War

Then came 1947: the peace treaty, the Cold War. For the PCI, the Paris Agreement was the official confirmation of the lack of influence it had already demonstrated in the previous months. The official character of the Agreement was in a sense an advantage because it made it clear that the Soviet Union had also chosen the path of the international solution for the Yugoslav-Italian border and, at the same time, kept Tito quiet. It was on this occasion that Togliatti decided to set up, with Yugoslavia's consent, a Communist Party of the Free Territory of Trieste. The choice of Vittorio Vidali as its secretary was due to Togliatti's intention to control the organisation, but it also served to reassure Moscow since Vidali was staunch Stalinist.¹³ Tito did not obstruct the operation, perhaps also so as not to favour the Slovenian element, which had always hoped to gain control over the Adriatic port.

At the beginning of June, the PCI was excluded from the De Gasperi government, and Togliatti's hopes of being able to continue to influence its political decisions were dashed. A few days later, the Marshall Plan would accelerate the start of the real Cold War. The lack of a strong Soviet response to the aid plan launched by the USA was proof, according to Silvio Pons, that the USSR had no plans for continental hegemony.¹⁴ This was already true during the war¹⁵: Stalin was a realist and was well aware that, at that time, the Soviets

¹¹ As Patrick Karlsen claims, by supporting the creation of the Free Territory of Trieste, Stalin had one foot on the Adriatic, which was a better solution than Belgrade's direct annexation. Cf. P. Karlsen, *Vittorio Vidali. Vita di uno stalinista (1916-1956)*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2019), 234.

¹² J. Prijevec, *Tito e i suoi compagni*, 210.

¹³ P. Carlsen, "Il PCI, il confine orientale", 27.

¹⁴ S. Pons, "Stalin, Togliatti and the origins of the Cold War in Europe", 21.

¹⁵ V. Zubok, R. Di Castro, "La Realpolitik del Cremlino e le origini della guerra fredda", *Ventesimo secolo*, II, marzo 2003, 35-75.

would not be able to advance such impressive ambitions, given the human and material losses suffered during the conflict. Stalin's choices of the following years, in particular his attempt to arrive at a shared solution for Germany, would have shown that, at that moment, what mattered more to the USSR was stability and the implementation of a 'safety zone' to protect it rather than the global spread of socialism.

Togliatti and Tito thus found themselves on opposing sides in a world divided into blocs. Despite his departure from the government, Togliatti still had to play the Constitution game and prepare for the 1948 elections. He continued to move by observing Moscow's indications and trying to offer internally the image of a political organisation that was in any case collaborative and primarily concerned with defending the interests of the weaker social classes. As the 1948 election campaign would show, the communist leader would constantly link the idea of the realisation of socialism to the solution of the problems of the Italian proletariat. Tito was perhaps in a worse predicament: in the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia was the second most prestigious country, a position it had won on the ground with the victorious war of national liberation. However, he was still second and therefore could not think of questioning Moscow's decisions. Thus, CPY tried to show its credentials as opposed to other Communist parties, and especially at the expense of Italians. At the founding meeting of the Cominform in September 1947, the PCI was accused of having given up the revolutionary cause and accepting a compromise with the bourgeois parties.¹⁶ Counting on Yugoslavian diversity, Tito tried to gain room for manoeuvre from Moscow by demonstrating considerable activism in the Balkans. In addition to supporting the Greek partisans, he went so far as to take up old ideas of a regional federation that would include the Bulgarians and Albanians.¹⁷ Stalin's irritation was the prelude to the final break, which came, as we know, at the June 1948 Cominform meeting in Bucharest.

The Excommunication

Yugoslavia's exclusion from the socialist camp shaped Italian-Yugoslav relations. The harmony between Tito and Britain, which had never entirely disappeared, was restored, and the CPY was able to play that card on the eastern border. Not that this substantially shifted the positions of the western powers, which in any case could not excessively penalise Italy, where the April 1948 elections were touted as a decisive choice of the camp to which the country would belong. The

¹⁶ P. Carlsen, "Il PCI, il confine orientale", 27.

¹⁷ J. Prijevec, *Tito e i suoi compagni*, 229.

DC¹⁸ and even the PSI¹⁹ moved to ensure that the final agreements did not disappoint Italian expectations too much.

Admittedly, Tito did not push the issue of Trieste too much: his most pressing concern at the end of the 1940s was to become an interlocutor of the western powers. Yugoslavia was a small-medium sized country with a recovering economy, and the only card it could play internationally was that of its strategic position and, above all, of being the first country to have emerged from Soviet tutelage, an aspect that made the Adriatic state particularly attractive in the eyes of the United States and the United Kingdom. This was true in its external projection. Internally, the Soviet threat was used by the Yugoslav leader as glue to bind together the party, which was still threatened by different orientations among the national groups and the criticism of those who blamed him for the break with the USSR. Those were the years when the camps for political prisoners, primarily Goli Otok, were filled with so-called ‘cominformisti’, people considered not completely loyal to the regime. Among them were also Italians: groups of so-called ‘Monfalconesi’, the workers who had left the Monfalcone shipyards in 1946 to make their contribution to building socialism in Yugoslavia, and other Italians who had emigrated for the same reason.²⁰ The break with the USSR was more diplomatic than ideological, and, on the other hand, Tito demonstrated on several occasions that he knew how to bend ideology to the needs of the context. Thus, he launched a campaign of savage collectivisation in the late 1940s, only to withdraw it when its disastrous consequences became evident. This was also perhaps the last attempt to mend the rift with Moscow.²¹ When it became clear that this was not enough, Tito looked more decisively to the West: he accepted the aid offered by London and Washington and, at the same time, withdrew his support for the Greek communists, contributing to their defeat in the civil war that was bloodying the nation.²²

The fact that Tito had initiated a dialogue with interlocutors from the western bloc was an advantage for Togliatti. In fact, internally, he could overturn the accusation of plotting with the enemy levelled at him by the centrist political forces, accusing them of collusion with the main adversary of Italian interests

¹⁸ D. D’Amelio, “Democristiani di confine. Ascesa e declino del ‘partito italiano’ a Trieste. 1945–19790, *Contemporanea*, XVII (2014), 413–440.

¹⁹ A. Varsori, “Bevin e Nenni (ottobre 1946-gennaio 1947). Una fase nei rapporti anglo-italiani nel secondo dopoguerra”, *Il Politico*, XLIX (1984).

²⁰ A. Berrini, *Noi siamo la classe operaia. I duemila di Monfalcone*, (Milano: Baldini Castoldi Dalai, 2004); Enrico Miletto, *Gli italiani di Tito. La zona B del Territorio libero di Trieste e l’emigrazione comunista in Jugoslavia*, (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino), 2019.

²¹ J. Prijevec, *Tito e i suoi compagni*, 266–268.

²² *Ibid.*, 276.

on the Trieste question. In addition, the PCI leader found himself in dialogue with Moscow, finally free from the looming shadow of his victorious Yugoslav colleague. This did not solve all his problems, as demonstrated by the embarrassing situation in which he found himself in 1950 when Stalin offered him the leadership of the Cominform, an offer that Togliatti refused on the grounds that he did not want to abandon the party in such a delicate phase of Italian political life. As a show of goodwill towards Stalin, Togliatti tried to demonstrate his loyalty by expelling Valdo Magnani and Aldo Cucchi from the party, guilty of calling for dialogue with Yugoslavia. Magnani was a personal friend of Togliatti's and a cousin of his companion, Nilde Iotti: his expulsion was probably proof of the PCI secretary's political realism, but it was also perhaps a message to his own party, at a time when some, in the wake of Moscow's offer of an international commission, had already begun to weave plots for replacing him.²³

Stalin's death

Stalin's death came suddenly in March 1953 and inevitably upset the international balance. The PCI waited to see who would succeed him and what consequences the change would have for the 'sister' parties. What happened was perhaps beyond the expectations of the party secretariat: the minutes of the meetings in those months reveal all the disorientation and internal confusion, in a desperate attempt to understand which way Moscow would move before taking any position. It was Togliatti who dictated the course, showing himself to be cautious in a delicate moment when, at an international level, the Trieste question was being prepared to be closed almost definitively. In those months, the Communist press accentuated its critical tones towards Yugoslavia²⁴, both to claim for itself the role of authentic defender of the interests of the local community and to weaken the DC at a difficult time for the Christian Democrats, who were grappling with the task of replacing De Gasperi. Tracing the London Memorandum of 1954 (which assigned zone A of the FTT to Italy and zone B to Yugoslavia) to the plots of the 'strange couple' Tito-Churchill, the PCI denounced the inability of the Italian government to influence the terms of the agreement, considered 'the worst possible result'. The Pella government, in fact, had no way of influencing the negotiations and, as a result, underlined the na-

²³ F. Tenza Montini, *La Jugoslavia e la questione di Trieste, 1945-1954*, (Bologna: il Mulino, 2020), 198.

²⁴ M. Zuccari, *Il dito sulla piaga. Togliatti e il PCI nella rottura tra Stalin e Tito 1944-1957*, (Milano: Mursia, 2008), 267.

tionalistic tones²⁵, refusing to recognise the contents of the Memorandum²⁶ as definitive.

As the Trieste question came to a close, the two leaders closed ranks within their respective parties. Togliatti, in 1954, marginalised Secchia, whose image had been compromised after the escape of his collaborator Guido Seniga with the party treasury and some documents.²⁷ Tito, for his part, made far more prominent victims, dismissing Milovan Djilas after he criticised the party's centralism.²⁸ Shortly afterwards, it would be Edvard Kardelj's turn.²⁹ In the case of Togliatti, this was probably just a fortunate circumstance, which the PCI secretary took advantage of to get rid of an old adversary. But the attempt to settle the scores within the LCY was something more: Tito wanted to eliminate his potential adversaries and, above all, those who could weaken the centralist line, opening up space for dissent.³⁰

While Togliatti was still accusing Tito of betraying the cause of socialism, the rapprochement between the Soviets and Yugoslavia was already underway, and the secretary of PCI was aware of it, but chose to ignore it. When the Soviet rehabilitation of Yugoslavia became public in February 1955, the Italian communists were forced to revise their line. At that time, Khrushchev was consolidating his power, and the discontinuity with Stalinism was becoming evident in foreign policy, with the start of the small *détente*, the convening of the Geneva Conference and the reopening of a dialogue with Yugoslavia. Togliatti moved, as always, following the indications that came from Moscow. Thus, on 1 May 1955, at the stadium in Trieste, he gave the speech that the Soviets expected from him, not going so far as to rehabilitate Tito, but presenting the rapprochement between the USSR and Yugoslavia as a way to wrench the latter away from the imperialist camp.³¹ The alignment with the USSR also had, once again, an internal implication. The PCI was under pressure since the Eisenhower administration, through its ambassador in Rome, Clare Boothe Luce, was pushing the DC to issue legislative measures limiting the PCI's freedom of action. In fact, the US was aware of the change in the relations between the PCI and other communist movements and of the fact that Moscow had chosen the path of de-Stalinisa-

²⁵ M. Del Pero, "Pressures and Restrictions Exercised by America in Italy During the Mandate of Ambassador Clara Boothe Luce. 1953–1956", *Diplomatic History*, XXVIII (2004), 422.

²⁶ D. D'Amelio, "Democristiani di confine", 422.

²⁷ M. Zuccari, *Il dito sulla piaga*, 297.

²⁸ J. Prijevec, *Tito e i suoi compagni*, 327–334.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 334–336.

³⁰ M. Zuccari, *Il dito sulla piaga*, 277.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 301.

tion, although it had been warned by Togliatti and Maurice Thorez (the then secretary of the French Communist Party) that this would harm them.³² US diplomacy had, therefore, called for taking advantage of this difficult moment to weaken the satellite parties. The DC did not follow US directives to the letter, but the Communists felt they were in trouble anyway.³³ In the months following the Trieste speech, the secretary was busy managing the internal confusion within his party: every meeting of the secretariat turned out to be an occasion for members to raise doubts or ask for interpretations of what was happening.³⁴ The sharpest criticism, especially because it was pronounced publicly (in an article in the Trieste-based periodical *‘Il lavoratore’*) came from Vittorio Vidali, who, as a Stalinist, could not accept the rapprochement with Yugoslavia. Togliatti criticised him bitterly, proving once again that Soviet directives could not be ignored, even when they imposed tactical twists.

Togliatti's arguments about the need to wrest Tito from the blandishments of the western bloc were the same as Khrushchev's. The new Soviet leader questioned the Stalinist policy that had insisted on the compactness of the bloc, its internal homogeneity and perfect alignment with the USSR, and preferred a more flexible approach, with the aim of attracting countries that were not included in the system of military and economic alliances but could nevertheless become strategic allies. Yugoslavia, from this point of view, was of particular interest, since reintegrating it into the socialist system would have meant, on the one hand, distancing the new leadership from Stalin and, on the other, removing from the adversary camp the insidious weapon of having co-opted a socialist country. At the time, the rapprochement resulted more in a victory for Tito than for Khrushchev. The visit of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) secretary to Belgrade in May 1955 was portrayed as the *‘Soviet Canossa’*³⁵, and the Yugoslav leader claimed it was proof of the mistake the Soviets had made in 1948. The Tito success, in terms of his image, was considerable but should not be exaggerated. Returning into the arms of the USSR for his country meant losing the quality that had made it internationally relevant. The Yugoslav leader knew this and, in fact, not only did not go through with it, but simultaneously sought a diversion. Shortly before welcoming the CPSU secretary at Zemun airport, he had made his move in Bandung, becoming one of the leaders of the

³² General CIA records, CIA-RDP-00915R000400380002-4. <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-00915r000400380002-4> (Last accessed January 6th 2020).

³³ M. Del Pero, *‘Pressures and Restrictions Exercised by America in Italy’*, 435.

³⁴ Fondazione Gramsci, Archivio Partito Comunista Italiano, Fondo Direzione verbali, riunione della direzione del PCI, 10 giugno 1955; 26 giugno 1955.

³⁵ M. Galeazzi, *Togliatti e Tito. Tra identità nazionale e internazionalismo*, (Roma: Carocci, 2005), 38.

Non-Aligned Movement. The message, also to the USSR, was clear: Yugoslavia remained outside the blocs.

Destalinisation

The 20th CPSU Congress was one of the most ambiguity-laden events in the history of the Soviet bloc. Khrushchev's denunciation of the deviations of Stalinism triggered a series of undesirable effects in the satellite countries and took the other communist parties by surprise. Admittedly, there had been signs of discontinuity with the past already in 1953: the accusations levelled against Beria had also concerned part of Stalinist policy.³⁶ The figure of Stalin had never been questioned, however, and his body continued to rest beside Lenin's in Red Square. The leaders of world communism probably expected an adjustment of the course without a public 'patricide'.

The effects were more disruptive inside the bloc than outside, but they also had repercussions for the communist parties of the capitalist world. Khrushchev's message was clear: the Stalinist model of centralised co-ordination of the political strategies of communist movements had to come to an end, and, in April 1956, the Cominform was dissolved. Togliatti had to realise that an epoch was ending and that it was necessary to find a way to redefine the role of his party, in Italy and in the socialist world. On the domestic front, Khrushchev's acceptance of the parliamentary path to the realisation of socialism³⁷ offered him the possibility of solving the old problem of legitimisation to become a government force, something the PCI had always pursued. On the international front, the PCI had to reposition itself and find an identity, as it could no longer be the western outpost of Stalinism. It was then that Togliatti intensified his efforts toward Yugoslavia. In May, he officially visited Belgrade.

The meeting with Tito had a very different character from the one the Yugoslav leader had had a year earlier with Khrushchev. There was no 'Walk of Canossa' although the very gesture of the visit had the value of rectifying a move made eight years earlier. Rather, there were signs that a marriage of interests was about to take place. The Yugoslavs offered the PCI meetings, official visits to learn more about self-management, coveted holidays on the coast for members of the secretariat, but they also asked for a commitment of the Italian gov-

³⁶ A. Graziosi, *L'Urss dal trionfo al degrado. Storia dell'Unione Sovietica, 1945–1991*, (Bologna: il Mulino, 2008), 15.

³⁷ N. Werth, *Storia dell'Unione Sovietica. Dall'impero russo alla Comunità degli Stati Indipendenti*, (Bologna: il Mulino, 1997), 468.

ernment to definitively recognise the 1954 agreements on the eastern border.³⁸ Togliatti, on the other hand, demanded, as a gesture of détente, the release of the Italian ‘cominformisti’ imprisoned in 1948. Tito did not declare this unacceptable, but stated that the liberation of the Italians had to take place gradually. In the end, Togliatti negotiated the return of seven prisoners. The balance was not negative for the PCI because, although dozens of prisoners still remained in Yugoslavia, the party had qualified as the main interlocutor of the LCY. This was demonstrated by an objection of the Italian government, which accused the Yugoslav regime of not having responded to official requests, but of having acquiesced to those of an opposition party.³⁹

But what exactly was Togliatti’s objective? David Sassoon, and more recently Alexander Höbel, have insisted that Togliatti had the ambition to make his party the reference point for communist organisations in the capitalist world.⁴⁰ Over time, this project matured, but it is difficult to understand how clear the idea was in the secretary’s mind in the aftermath of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, not least because it was not yet clear how far it could go. Before the Hungarian crisis, Togliatti personally experienced that things were not simple and the problems were far from trifling. In the late spring of 1956, in an interview with ‘Nuovi argomenti’, the secretary went so far as to envisage a socialist world without a single leader. He was immediately recalled by the Soviets and forced to correct his statement.⁴¹ The Hungarian crisis did the rest and, at the cost of a split in the Italian left and in his own party, Togliatti kept the PCI strictly on the side of the USSR. On that occasion, it became clear that the prospect of coordination between the communist parties of the western world was anything but easy. The leader of the French Communist Party accused the PCI of not being completely loyal to the USSR, having judged the first Soviet intervention ‘an error’ and the second ‘a necessity’.⁴²

The Hungarian crisis, however, created even more difficulties for the Yugoslavs, because the way events unfolded saw them involved in spite of them-

³⁸ S. Mišić, “Yugoslav Communists and the Communist Party of Italy 1945–1956,” In *Italy’s Balkan Strategies (19–20 century)*, ed. Vojislav Pavlović, (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2014), 291.

³⁹ S. Mišić, “Obnavljanje odnosa između Saveza komunista Jugoslavije i Komunističke partije Italije 1955–1956. godine,” (“The restoration of relations between the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Communist Party of Italy 1955–1956”), *Tokovi istorije* 2, (2013), 121–145.

⁴⁰ D. Sassoon, *Togliatti e la via italiana al socialismo. Dal 1944 al 1964*, (Torino: Einaudi, 1980); A. Höbel, “Il Pci nella crisi del movimento comunista internazionale tra Pcus e Pcc (1960–1964),” *Studi Storici*, XLVI (2005).

⁴¹ A. Höbel, “Il Pci nella crisi del movimento comunista,” 517–518.

⁴² M. Galeazzi, *Togliatti e Tito*, 175.

selves. Tito had supported the Red Army's intervention but had also chosen to receive Imre Nagy, who expected political asylum, in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. The Yugoslavian leader was convinced that he could guarantee him safety and perhaps even a quiet life, albeit far from politics, and made requests to this effect to Khrushchev, who, however, flatly refused. Despite the safe conduct granted to him, Nagy was captured by the Soviet armed forces and later taken to Romania, where he was to be imprisoned. Tito watched in irritation and helplessness as the Soviet action irreparably undermined the on-going dialogue. The lack of delicacy with which Khrushchev had treated him probably showed that the Soviet leader had realised that the ambition to bring Yugoslavia back under Moscow's wing was doomed to failure. There would be no return to 1948, and a new phase of coldness began. Tito found himself isolated: on the one hand, he could no longer expect any flattery from Moscow, and on the other hand, his involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement had led him in those same days to challenge the capitalist powers at Suez, eliciting criticism from the West.⁴³ In the following two years, there were spats and rapprochements, provocations and dialogue, but at least relations at the state level never completely broke down. It would be the crisis in relations between the USSR and China that would be the 'lucky' circumstance that would make Tito a legitimate actor again.

Togliatti viewed the new round of coldness between Moscow and Belgrade with extreme caution. He did not, of course, disavow Khrushchev, but neither did he interrupt relations with the LCY; he continued to send delegations on visits to Yugoslavia and disregarded the voices of those who, like Pietro Ingrao or Mauro Scoccimarro, warned of the risks of maintaining good relations with the neighbouring country.⁴⁴ Admittedly, only Alfredo Reichlin was sent to the 1958 Congress of the League of Communists, after a long internal discussion⁴⁵, but in time, relations with Yugoslavia continued to consolidate⁴⁶, as demonstrated by the presence of a party delegation at an official visit of the Yugoslav Minister of Agriculture to Italy.⁴⁷ Togliatti kept a low profile during the official events. The developments in Hungary and the different positions taken in the socialist world did not prevent the continuation of the dialogue with Yugoslavia. After all, the PCI was becoming increasingly isolated within the Italian left and, after

⁴³ J. Prijevec, *Tito e i suoi compagni*, 352.

⁴⁴ Fondazione Gramsci, Archivio Partito Comunista Italiano, Fondo Direzione verbali, 25 ottobre 1956.

⁴⁵ Fondazione Gramsci, Archivio Partito Comunista Italiano, Fondo Direzione verbali, 8 aprile 1958.

⁴⁶ M. Galeazzi, *Togliatti e Tito*, 191.

⁴⁷ Fondazione Gramsci, Archivio Partito Comunista Italiano, Fondo Anni – Estero, telegramma 25 marzo 1959.

the crisis of 1956, when many intellectuals left the party condoned the action of the Soviet tanks, the idea of incorporating some aspects of the Yugoslav model seemed to allow it to argue more emphatically for an autonomous path to socialism. In 1959, the secretary went so far as to speak of the need to overcome the 'current split that rests on the division into two military and opposing blocs'.⁴⁸

The 1960s

At the turn of the decade, as mentioned, the breakdown in relations between the Soviet Union and China caused a chain reaction that had repercussions on Moscow's relations with Belgrade, which in turn paved the way for changes in the PCI's actions. The rupture, which took place between 1960 and 1961, had more to do with Mao's rigidity and Khrushchev's foreign policy improvisations⁴⁹ in that phase than with a real theoretical clash about the foundations of socialism, although later the disagreement was presented as the confrontation between a de-Stalinised country and one anchored in Stalinist orthodoxy. In any case, China claimed its 'ideological purity', accusing the USSR of revisionism. The Chinese question exploded at a time when Tito was particularly active within the Non-Aligned world. After a long tour of Africa, he convened the first conference of the Third Bloc in Belgrade, which followed the already mentioned Bandung Conference, with the ambition of being recognised as the leader of a group of countries whose economic and military potential could not be compared to that of the two superpowers, but whose demographic and territorial dimensions were so vast that they could not be considered irrelevant, if only because of the availability of strategic natural resources in some of the member states. At the same time, Tito was rebuilding his relations with the USSR: the new friendship was sealed by a visit of the Yugoslav president in 1962. In the same months, a fierce power struggle was taking place within the League, which led first to a new marginalisation of the reformist (and anti-Soviet) Kardelj, then to a return of the party to positions more inclined to reform and to the torpedoing of the orthodox (and pro-Soviet) Ranković. Tito's seemingly schizophrenic oscillations were probably the result of his difficulties in moving in a rapidly changing international context (these were the years of the transition from Eisenhower to Kennedy, of the Berlin crisis, of the Cuba crisis) and of the simultaneous need to strengthen his control over the party while the most prominent exponents (Kardelj and Ranković) were trying to ensure they would succeed him.⁵⁰ The

⁴⁸ Fondazione Gramsci, Archivio Partito Comunista Italiano, Fondo Anni – Estero, telegramma 25 marzo 1959.

⁴⁹ A. Graziosi, *L'Urss dal trionfo al degrado*, 241–242.

⁵⁰ J. Prijavec, *Tito e i suoi compagni*, 377–379.

acceptance of the Moscow rapprochement was the result of both processes: in part, it facilitated the marginalisation of the reformists within, and in part it seemed useful at a time when the USA appeared active and threatening on the international stage, ready to intervene whenever they perceived a threat.

The fact that Tito moved between non-alignment and rapprochement with Moscow made him the perfect interlocutor for Togliatti, who in those years increasingly explicitly expressed the idea of 'doing as in Yugoslavia.' The PCI secretary needed a more reassuring model than the Soviet one to use as an identity card in Italy, where the centre-left was emerging and his party was in danger of being increasingly marginalised. That is why he emphatically endorsed the accusations against the Chinese,⁵¹ responsible for still espousing Stalinism; he declared admiration and interest in the Non-Aligned Movement; he lost no opportunity to celebrate the peaceful outcome of conflicts. In his later years, Togliatti's trips to Belgrade were frequent, so much so that the foreign press even spoke of an alleged desire on the part of the PCI to 'bypass Moscow'. This was probably not the case: simply because Moscow allowed him to do so, Togliatti could afford to show himself a friend of Tito and a supporter of his model of socialism.⁵²

Concluding remarks

When Togliatti died in August 1964, almost twenty years had passed since the end of the Second World War. Many things had changed: Italy was at the height of its economic boom and was led by a government that included the PCI's former allies, the socialists; Yugoslavia had become the leading country of the Non-Aligned Movement; it was not an economic power, but was experiencing a decade of cultural flourishing; the Soviet Union was no longer Stalinist, even though Stalin's successor, Khrushchev, was to be deposed a few months later.

Italy and Yugoslavia, however, remained two peripheral countries. The former had always remained in the western bloc. The second had made a complicated journey from the Soviet sphere of influence to equidistance from the superpowers to non-alignment, but by the 1960s, its international political gravitas was waning, while internal disputes were coming to a head.

⁵¹ Archives of Yugoslavia, 507 Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Tito's letter to Togliatti, November 25th 1962.

⁵² "The Times", 16 gennaio 1964, in Fondazione Gramsci, Archivio Partito Comunista Italiano, fondo Anni – Estero, Comunicazione delle delegazioni dei Comitati Centrali del PCI e della LCJ sugli incontri del 15–21 gennaio 1964; "The Guardian", 16 gennaio 1964, in Fondazione Gramsci, Archivio Partito Comunista Italiano, fondo Anni – Estero, Comunicazione delle delegazioni dei Comitati Centrali del PCI e della LCJ sugli incontri del 15–21 gennaio 1964.

In these two decades, the PCI had gone from participating in the government to being the only left-wing political organisation to remain outside the executive. Despite this, its ideological profile, at least officially, had become increasingly detached from orthodox Stalinism. Tito's LCY was under the control of its secretary, who, however, had spent those years trying to keep the balance between the different national and ideological orientations within it, and when necessary to exclude representatives of these currents.

It was all these complex dynamics, international, within the socialist bloc, within Italy and Yugoslavia, and within the PCI and LCY, that shaped the relations between Togliatti and Tito. The position of the USSR, undoubtedly, was important. Togliatti was never in a position to disregard it and even when he seemed freer to follow his 'national path', it was because Moscow allowed him to do so. Tito had to reckon with the Soviets, whose hostility drove him to seek space and support elsewhere: with the West first and later as leader of a new bloc. The two leaders thus often found themselves sharing the same limitations and concerns. Nevertheless, their profiles appear very different.

Togliatti had firmly adhered to Stalinism, even though he was aware that, in the post-war context, his party could only seek legitimacy and space within the institutions if it did not want to be excluded and become an anti-system force. Stalin, on the other hand, did not want this and consequently did not prevent the secretary from continuing dialogue with the other political parties. Togliatti, in any case, adapted to Moscow's line trying to make it appear as his own, sometimes with more embarrassment (as in the case of the Trieste question), sometimes seizing opportunities (as in the early 1960s). At that time, political spaces opened up that Togliatti took advantage of to push more explicitly in the direction of the national path to socialism.

Tito played his game on two levels: the internal and the international. Internally he had much more serious problems than his Italian counterpart, having to hold together a heterogeneous state in which the national components did not always move in tune with the centre and having to deal in the secretariat with adversaries of the highest calibre, such as Djilas, or very deeply rooted in one part of the territory, such as Kardelj. Internationally, he was committed to preventing his country from becoming isolated. Stalin's excommunication and Tito's long-standing friendship with the British had made things easier for him, but when Khrushchev initiated the phase of peaceful coexistence, he sought new ways not to condemn Yugoslavia to irrelevance. He found a way out in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement. Tito was probably aware that this 'third bloc' could not aspire to compete with the other two, and perhaps this was not even his goal. His aspiration was rather to have a 'resource package' with which to negotiate with the Soviets and possibly with the West. Until the national

question exploded within his country and shortly afterwards the phase of real détente began, he played a winning hand.

Relations between the leaders of the two most important communist parties in the Adriatic were mainly conditioned by the changing international and domestic framework, and the phases of rapprochement and coolness depended more on this than on any real interest in collaborating or convinced ideological opposition.

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Belgrade 1969–1972. The Uncertainties and Hardships of the Yugoslav Experiment in the Eyes of a Newly Graduated Italian Scholarship Holder

Abstract: Half a century ago, the author of this paper, a recent graduate, received an exchange scholarship from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a research visit to Belgrade on the subject of self-management and the theory of the state. At that time, the central, and by no means merely theoretical, problem of Yugoslavian society was how to respond to the impact of the market on the system of self-management. In addition to the production structure, this question also affected the relations between the republics and the political centre of the state. Two serious crises were to be decided by the decisive intervention of the charismatic leader, who put an authoritarian model from another era back into force. The young scholar observed and did not understand much, but in return became familiar with a lively and hospitable city. Critical reflections would come in the years to follow.

Keywords: Yugoslavia, communism, self-management, Tito, Belgrade

In three to four years in the 1960s and 1970s, Yugoslavia experienced an impetuous economic transformation, a profound institutional reorganisation and at least two political crises, probably the most serious in the thirty years between the Cominform and Tito's death. Serbia's part in these events has been conspicuous, though not spectacular. In addition to being the capital of Serbia and the Federation, Belgrade was, at that time, a prestigious observatory and centre of international initiative, far above the importance that a developing country, or a city that anthropologists described as the scene of hasty and unfinished urbanisation, could have.¹ I was lucky enough to live in that lively and experimental environment for ten months in 1969 and 1970, and then to return for shorter periods in the following years. I did not necessarily understand much of what

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¹ A. Simić, "Urbanization and Cultural Process in Yugoslavia," *Anthropological Quarterly*, 47 2 (1974) interprets the process of urbanization in Yugoslavia, and especially in Belgrade, in the sense of simultaneous modernization of the peasantry, and peasantization of the city" (p. 217). This concept is taken from Stevan K. Pavlović, who writes precisely about the "rurbanization" of Belgrade in Serbia. *La storia al di là del nome* (Trieste: Beit, 2010), 236.

I was seeing because I was young and saw the world the lens of ideology rather than the other way around.

In 1969, I was a student at the University of Padua, majoring in law. The year before, I had spent six months at the student protests, and now I was poring over my books and preparing to take my last exams, graduate and leave a college I unjustly detested. The topic of my thesis, in Philosophy of Law, was nothing less than "The Theory of the Extinction of the State in Contemporary Marxist Thought". It dealt with some insights found in the writings of Marx, and even Lenin, according to which (if I may be allowed to grossly oversimplify the matter), the state, as a structure of constraint based on class domination, once this domination is overthrown and socialism grows and matures, the state itself is destined to gradually become extinct. This is the theory of the extinction of the state, the withering away of the state, *odumiranje države*. However, my dissertation also bore a fatal subtitle: "with special reference to the Yugoslav experience of self-management". One should not think that the Marxist theme of my thesis was unusual or surprising: if the University was conservative, my thesis advisor was a remarkably distinguished and open-minded scholar. Rather, I realise today, surprising was the tolerance for that subtitle, which claimed to subsume an ongoing historical experience into a theoretical framework – and claimed to do so by using a very meagre and highly ideological documentary basis, namely, primarily, the Yugoslav propaganda materials in Italian published and disseminated to legitimise the 1948 turnaround with the "discovery" of the theoretical foundations of self-management in 1949–50.²

Meanwhile, in my daily routine between home and the library, I was reading Franco Petrone's correspondence from Belgrade in *L'Unità*, the PCI daily. For some years now, a special, asymmetrical relationship existed between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, a party-regime in a shifting balance between the East and the West, and the Italian Communist Party (PCI), a mass party of constitutional opposition in a NATO member country. The special attention that *L'Unità* and the PCI accorded Yugoslavia was conveyed by themes such as (alleged) anti-dogmatism, economic experimentation, and criticism of

² On the emergence of self-management (workers' councils) as the second (after the partisan war) myth on which the legitimacy of the regime is based, see D. Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974*, (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1977), 51–61. In 1958, the "Action Program of the League of Yugoslav Communists" (adopted at the 7th Congress of the LCJ) still maintained the principle of the "historic law on the death of the state"; and Tito commented that "by transferring factories and companies into the hands of the workers" the first and main act on the way to the death of the state occurs: R. Gati "Marxismo e politica nell'ideologia e nella prassi del socialismo yugoslavo". In *Lenigma yugoslavo. Le ragioni della crisi*, ed. S. Bianchini, (Milan: Angeli, 1989), 323–345. Then the official doctrine shifted the emphasis from the demise of the state to the necessary regulatory functions that the "transitional state" would have to maintain or assume in the new situation.

bloc politics in Europe. Naturally, the Czechoslovak question could only feed the trend of mutual interest and sympathy.³

I eagerly awaited and eventually received a letter from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informing me that I had been granted a scholarship to that mythical place. After receiving it, I kept a photocopy of the letter on me for personal comfort. And so it was that, having graduated only a week before, after a night on the train, I arrived in Belgrade on 29 November 1969. The city was covered in 20 cm of snow and the offices were closed, because I had been so clueless as not to take into account that that day was Republic Day. Over the next few days, I was assigned Prof. Najdan Pašić as my supervisor, an expert on the theoretical relationship between the state and self-government, a very kind but very busy person, who hurriedly gave me appointments at the Faculty of Political Science at 6am. I was enrolled at the *Institut za strane jezike*, an excellent school of Serbo-Croatian for foreign students, and began attending the Svetozar Marković University Library, although I was still unable to read Serbo-Croatian. I found a room to rent with a family in a large building belonging to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 27. Marta Street. The name on the doorbell showed that Franco Petrone lived a few floors up. A few years ago, a fellow historian, writing about another and more famous journalist from *L'Unità*, Renzo Foa, described Franco Petrone as “an awkward character, fascinating for his sharp wit and culture”.⁴ For me, he was to become a kind of temporary older brother. He was more experienced, but I had the “theoretical background”.

At that time, in the winter of 1969–70, we were on the eve of the 9th Congress of the LCJ, the first congress to be held after the economic reform of 1965, Ranković's dismissal in 1966, and the student demonstrations of June 1968. The dominant theme in the public debates was, and would remain for some years, the impact of the market on the self-management system. The positive effects on the production units were obvious, as they stimulated an interest of workers' collectives in product quality, work-dependent wages, and prudent disposition of the accumulation fund. But the market action also generated new,

³ In the context of increasingly close relations between the two parties, since 1963 the salary and expenses of the correspondent of the daily magazine *Unità* in Belgrade were covered by the Yugoslav side: P. Dragišić, *Šta smo znali o Italiji? Pogledi iz Beograda na Italiju 1955–1978*, (What did we know about Italy? Views from Belgrade to Italy 1955–1978), (Belgrade: Institute for Recent History of Serbia, 2019), 231. This interesting and very useful historical essay by Dragišić, mainly from a political and diplomatic angle, can be read alongside the text by F. Rolandi, *Con ventiquattromila baci. The influence of Italian mass culture in Yugoslavia (1955–1965)*, (Bologna: Bononia U. P., 2015); which is instead focused on customs and consumption.

⁴ L. Scaraffia, “Introduction to Renzo Foa's”, *Ho visto morire il comunismo*, (Venezia: Marsilio, 2010), 10.

dramatic macroeconomic problems: inequalities, strikes, unemployment, and emigration. In 1969–71, emigration to Germany reached its peak, and workers' remittances fuelled the dispute over who, as an institution, was entitled to control and manage the valuable foreign currency (in addition to that brought by tourism). Moreover, the world of economic emigration provided manpower for the terrorist enterprises of the Ustaša emigration against Yugoslav agencies abroad.

Under these conditions, the extinction of the state, which had never been erased from the League's programmes, remained in the background and the distant future while the leadership preferred to speak of a "transitional state" and offered one justification after another in its support: from the classic Leninist ones concerning the defence against the enemies of socialism and the still incomplete workers' control of society to the more up-to-date ones denouncing the unequal development produced by spontaneous market forces and indicating the need to intervene with corrective measures and coordination: concretely, it was a matter of effectively managing the so-called compensation fund in favour of the of underdeveloped regions.

A distinctive Yugoslavian characteristic of the "transition state" was its federal structure, which was by then acquiring confederal connotations in the whirlwind of reforms triggered by the urgent need to adapt and to reconcile the institutional system with the economic one. In 1970–71, the Serbian party was explicitly and very clearly in favour of a broad devolution of competences to the republics and assigning to the federal government those few and well-defined powers that characterised sovereignty. I dare say that there was broad consensus in Yugoslavia on the balancing function that an authoritative collective presidency (in terms of including representatives from all over the country), capable of mediating between the potentially conflicting interests of the republics and also capable of handling the succession to Tito, should have assumed.

However, the country had a hierarchy of power superior to the state hierarchy, that of the party, and there could be no discussion, not even in abstractly theoretical terms, of its possible extinction or its prospective obsolescence in favour of the expansion of self-management. They spoke of the party as an ideological guide, expressed their good intentions of moving from the method of command to that of persuasion. But in the meantime, the League had to be unified, disciplined, kept in order by democratic centralism, and the more the republics became autonomous, the more the party centre had to be strengthened to support the ultimate and supreme power of the charismatic leader.

There were thus two presidencies in Yugoslavia, and Tito was at the head of both. The first was the presidency of the semi-federalised state, undermined by local bureaucracies, technocrats and nationalists, whom Tito left on a long leash in order to concentrate – understandably from his point of view – on

international relations from which he hoped to reap some prestigious results before the end of his days. The other was the presidency of the party, in which he seemed not to have absolute control, given that the old leader introduced an Executive Bureau of 14+1 members, reduced to 8+1 in 1972, on the eve of the showdown with the Serbian leadership. In 1972, the 8+1 concentration of power was equal to that of the 1949 Politburo. And Tito was its master, no longer its arbiter.

Perhaps the reader has guessed by now that the preceding pages are a loose summary of what *L'Unità* correspondent Franco Petrone was writing at the time. Petrone had conversations with leading actors in Yugoslav politics, such as Krste Crvenkovski and Miko Tripalo, both members of the Executive Bureau and, therefore, often in Belgrade. In truth, Tripalo was not one "example" among many. He was omnipresent, almost monopolistic, in the work of "translating" not so much the linguistic as the conceptual terminology of the Yugoslav communists, which was laden with ideology and normativism. And if problems arose, they could take recourse to Edvard Kardelj's authentic interpretations. Very boring stuff.

As I have mentioned, Tito considered foreign policy to be his prerogative, and this could give rise to some friction with the foreign minister, like when Marko Nikezić challenged Tito over the unbalanced pro-Arab line he had taken in the Middle East crisis.⁵ To anyone who read the newspapers at the time, the global situation appeared rather turbulent. In Northern Ireland, people were being killed every day. In the Indian subcontinent, the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan was taking place amidst mass slaughter. In Indochina, American bombing was expanding from Vietnam to Cambodia. There were border clashes on the Ussuri River between China and the USSR. The Non-Aligned Movement was split between the moderates and the militant anti-imperialists, and Tito's mediation did not make the Lusaka Conference a success. Tito was often on the road, but when he was in the country, illustrious guests visited him in Belgrade or Brioni: Richard Nixon, Walter Scheel, the architect of Ostpolitik, with Willy Brandt, Leonid Brezhnev in 1971. The last visit was reciprocated by Tito, who was given a state reception in Moscow: the old Bolshevik's self-respect thus got the better of three years of polemics, mistrust and caution generated by the Czechoslovak question.

Italy's importance in Yugoslavian foreign policy (and vice versa) was confirmed by the number and level of visits to Belgrade made by high Italian officials: Foreign Minister Nenni, the President of the Republic Saragat, the head of the PCI delegation to the 9th League Congress, Napolitano, the PCI Secretary

⁵ D. Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, 214; J. R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a country*, (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1996), 304.

Berlinguer. In the autumn of 1970, Tito's visit to Italy was scheduled for 10 December. At the last moment it was postponed with a joint communiqué from the two diplomacies, apparently because of nine words uttered by the then Foreign Minister Aldo Moro during a parliamentary question: "Italy does not renounce its legitimate national interests".⁶ Of course, he was referring to the 1954 London Memorandum of Understanding; the Belgrade newspapers reacted by keeping their tones low; not so those of the two north-western republics. Instead, the visit took place in March (1971), with little rhetoric and a lot of business.

At the beginning of October 1969, when I had not yet left for Belgrade and was still in Padua, preparing to defend my thesis before a graduation committee, *L'Unità* published an unusual six-column article by Franco Petrone on the Belgrade "micro-riots".⁷ It was about the ongoing public discussion on the new general urban plan, which would invest considerable resources in the redevelopment and urbanisation of the area at the confluence of the two rivers. Ventilation and oxygenation effects were expected in the central parts of the city. Furthermore, a new "Friendship Park" would have divided and at the same time connected the old and the new part of the city, much the same - I observe today - as the "green garland" in the Proposal formulated by Emilijan Josimović back in 1867.⁸ Franco Petrone was an intellectually curious person. Obviously this excursion of Petrone from the field of politics was guided by his conversation with an expert mentioned in the article, Dr Kovačević from the Institute of Urban Planning at the University of Belgrade. But I am reasonably confident that I can attribute that interview to the intermediation of a young researcher from that Institute, Danilo Udovički.

Today Danilo Udovički teaches the history and theory of architectural design at the University of Texas, Austin. In January or February 1970, I met him at Franco Petrone's house. About three years older than me, he was also a student at the Faculty of Philosophy. At that time, thanks to the presence of some prominent figures among the teaching staff, the Sociology and Philosophy

⁶ This event and its historical background was carefully reconstructed by S. Mišić, *Reconciliation on the Adriatic. Yugoslavia and Italy on the Road to the Osimo Agreements of 1975*, (Belgrade: University of Belgrade, Faculty of Political Sciences, 2018), chapter II ("In the Vortex of Internal Instability"), 135–166.

⁷ October 3rd 1969.

⁸ E. Josimović, "Objasnenje predloga za regulisanje onog dela varoši Beograda što leži u Šancu" (Explanation of the proposal for the regulation of that part of the city of Belgrade that lies in Šanac); see Lj. Blagojević, "La regolazione urbana di Belgrado nel 1867: traccia contro cancellazione", 166–170. In *Città dei Balcani, città d'Europa. Studi sullo sviluppo urbano delle capitali post-ottomane*, a cura di Marco Dogo e Armando Pitassio, (Lecce: Argo, 2008), now also available in the Serbian edition: M. Dogo & A. Pitassio, *Градови Балкана, градови Европе*, (Београд: Клио, 2008).

departments in Belgrade were the strongholds of critical and humanist Marxism. After a few years of theoretical incubation between Zagreb and Belgrade, Critical Marxism had acquired a public resonance with the student protests in early June 1968 at the University of Belgrade. The unifying theme of the movement had been the struggle against social inequality – and it is worth remembering that even the party and the institutions, at that time, were discovering the damage caused by the free action of the market and were agonising over the remedies to be adopted. After a week of unrest, the situation was resolved by Tito with a televised speech that was greeted by the students and newspapers as a jolt of loyalty to ideals on the part of the old revolutionary, who had proved the demonstrators right.

A few years ago, Danilo Udovički published a small book in Novi Sad entitled *Treći juni 1968*, with the intriguing subtitle “Od kritike svega postojećeg do uništenja svega postignutog”,⁹ a sort of generational stocktaking between the young Marx and Yugoslavia in the early 1970s. His retrospective assessment of Tito’s intervention is different. The substance of Tito’s speech on 10 June, Udovički writes, boils down to the following: “We ‘up here’ understand the restlessness of the students caused by the difficulties in implementing the economic reform, and, in fact, we started discussing all of this many months before the student protests. So, rest assured, go back to your studies, and we will take care of everything. Of course, a minority among the students supports the enemies of our self-management socialism, and we will also deal with that”.¹⁰

Later, Tito’s hostility towards the intellectuals and professors of the Sociology and Philosophy departments in Belgrade became explicit: “We can no longer tolerate that the same elements who have proved to be opponents of socialist society continue to educate and train Yugoslav cadres and youth!”¹¹ Those intellectuals and professors remained in their posts as long as the “liberal” leadership in power in Serbia was able to offer them some protection, even though they did not share their worldview. Then they were all swept away by the old leader’s return to authoritarianism. Danilo Udovički received two years in prison and on his release did several jobs until he eventually left the country. And yet, writing forty years after the events, he believes that “we did not have a totalitarian dictatorship... there was not an important intellectual achievement in the

⁹ D. Udovički, *Treći juni 1968. Od kritike svega postojećeg do uništenja svega postignutog* (June 3rd 1968. The critics of everything that does exist to negation of everything achieve), (Novi Sad: Kiša, 2014).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 24–25.

¹¹ F. Petrone, *Rilancio dell’attività dei comunisti jugoslavi, l’Unità*, 17th December 1969.

world, a book, a magazine, that we did not publish and discuss.¹² We travelled freely wherever and whenever we wanted or had the money to do so. This did not change even after the elimination of the Liberals”.¹³

I spoke with Danilo Udovički two or three times at Petrone’s house, without any results. He was not interested in proselytising, and I had seen enough disasters in Padua to be interested in the student movement in Belgrade. Living in Belgrade was quite pleasant. The scholarship was largely eaten up by the room rent, but the cost of living was low. A *burek* with yoghurt cost next to nothing, as did a meal in the university cafeteria (where the food was good but your clothes would soak up its smell), and a plate of *ćevapčići* in a *kafana* was very cheap; a secret resource was the restaurant at *Klub novinara*, to which Petrone had introduced me, and sometimes I even managed to go to the old bohemian quarter of Skadarlija. For cultural contacts, I occasionally frequented the Department of Italian Studies led by Eros Sequi and characterised by the presence of the “three Sergi”: Sergio Turconi, Sergej Šlenc and Srđan, and also the Italian Cultural Institute directed by Giovanni Mafera. I vaguely remember a collective visit to Danilo Kiš’s house, of which I was only impressed by the beauty of his wife, Mirjana Miočinović.¹⁴ And the concert of Duke Ellington’s orchestra at Dom Sindikata, on 14 July 1970, which I recently discovered, to my surprise, was covered in a chapter of a PhD thesis (discussed at the University of Trieste) on US cultural diplomacy/propaganda in socialist Yugoslavia.¹⁵

¹² Udovički is right. On the shelves of Belgrade bookstores (and I assume it is the same in other capital cities in Yugoslavia) you could find everything from all over the world. Thirty years before D. Ugrešić (*Muzej bezuvjetne predaje*, Belgrade, Zagreb: Samizdat B92, Konzor, 2002, ed. it. *Il museo della resa incondizionata*, (Milano: Bompiani, 2002) showed that most of the titles in an average Croatian family library (at the time when this author was a girl, that is, in the fifties and sixties) was almost identical to the titles in the library of one such Italian family. A researcher from Poland once admitted, at a summer seminar of Slavic studies in Zadar and Zagreb, that while traveling through Belgrade, he entered a bookstore and realized that “Serbs translate books equally from the East and the West.” (...) I noticed Steinbeck, Kafka, Faulkner, Kenan, Fromm and Mandelstam. There were also some books by authors such as Gray, Baum, Pearl Buck, Jules Verne ... and Karl May ... and Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, *How Steel Was Tempered* by Ostrovsky, as well as Zygmunt Bauman”: M. J. Kryński, “Yugoslavia 1970: The Country, the Slavic Seminar and Some Polonica”, *The Polish Review*, 16 2 (1971), 91–92.

¹³ D. Udovički, *Treći juni 1968*, 16.

¹⁴ Danilo Kiš’s biography on the socio-political-literary foundations of Yugoslavia at the time: M. Thompson, *Birth Certificate. The Story of Danilo Kish*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell U.P., 2013).

¹⁵ C. Konta, *Waging Public Diplomacy: The United States and the Yugoslav Experiment (1950–1972)*, Doctoral thesis. (University of Trieste: Department of Humanities, A. A. 2014/2015). Chapter 4 (“Between Art and Sound Diplomacy: The Cultural Presentation Program and

In October of that year, I was called up for military service in Italy. In August 1971, I was granted, like everyone else, the so-called ordinary leave of ten days. In theory, I was supposed to wear my uniform all the time, and going abroad was grounds for court-martial. But my friend and mentor, Franco Petrone, was about to finish his term in Belgrade, and I wanted to say goodbye to him before leaving. And so I did, without a passport, using my identity card to enter Austria at Villach and go from there to Yugoslavia. And then I left the other way round.

The new correspondent, Arturo Barioli, began writing his first articles in September 1971. Perhaps the handover had been too quick because, faced with the Croatian crisis that had begun on 29 November with the “currency strike”,¹⁶ Barioli seemed a little disoriented. The affair unfolded swiftly, with the killer role entrusted to Stane Dolanc, secretary of the Presidency’s Executive Office. The final formulation is quite memorable: “Communists, and in particular members of the party leadership who are not prepared to fight for the line we have adopted, are offered the opportunity to leave their leadership posts in a democratic manner. If they do not do so, the bodies that elected them are obliged to revoke their mandates.”¹⁷ It took Barioli a few weeks to arrive at the comment that Croatian nationalism had a moderately sized base and that an agreement had to be found with this.¹⁸

In 1972, having finished my military service, I was starting to work as a teaching assistant at the Faculty of Political Science in Padua. I needed material on Yugoslav economic emigration for a research group on international workers in Europe.¹⁹ Arriving in Belgrade in mid-March, I was to find the city blocked by a smallpox epidemic, possibly spread - these were the rumours - by a pilgrim returning from Mecca. In Belgrade alone, 200,000 vaccinations a day were being administered.²⁰ Doctors recommended against drinking alcohol, and the *kafanas* were desolately empty. I could not return home without a vaccina-

the Yugoslav Voice of America”), among other things, includes a photo of Duke Ellington signing autographs during a concert.

¹⁶ A mass strike organized by students in Croatia in order to establish the right of Croatian companies to keep (and not hand over to state institutions) foreign currency earned in tourism and foreign trade: S. P. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias. State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005*, (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana U.P., 2006), 256–259.

¹⁷ A. Barioli, “Indetta la seconda conference dei comunisti jugoslavi”, *L’Unità*, December 11th 1971.

¹⁸ A. Barioli, “Prosegue la lotta contro il nazionalismo”, *L’Unità*, December 27th 1971.

¹⁹ M. Dogo, “Jugoslavia, un paese d’emigrazione”. In *L’operaio multinazionale in Europa*, ed. A. Serafini, (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1974), 181–195.

²⁰ *L’Unità*, March 25th 1972.

tion certificate, and obtaining it was not so easy because I had recently had my military vaccinations, and my antibodies were still alive and strong.

In June, Tito achieved his personal triumph in Moscow, and at the end of September, Dolanc announced the imminent release of a document by the President and the Executive Office on unity of action and democratic centralism in the party. When the letter was made public, it was seen to trace back to the 6th Congress, held in 1952, the origin of the party's gradual abandonment of its "leading role" under pressure from "liberal theories" that had encouraged the federalisation of the party and the rise of the technocratic-managerial elite.²¹ No names were mentioned, but Tito was referring to the leaders of the Serbian party, those whom the American historian John Lampe, in his now classic *Yugoslavia as History*, characterises by their five objectives: market economy; a modern Serbia; abandonment of the ballast of Serbian Yugoslavism; support for technocrats; and cooperation with the other republics.²² This time, Tito personally launched an attack in the Presidency and discovered, for the first time in the post-war period, that he was in the minority; he then reconvened the body, manipulated its composition to his taste and reopened the proceedings, declaring, like a good Bolshevik, that "when the line, achievements and weaknesses of a Party are under discussion, the number of interventions for or against a certain point of view is not the decisive factor in the revolutionary choice and in the evaluation of which path to take and what should be done..."²³ The resignation of Serbian party leaders followed, and some notable victims were also recorded in Macedonia and Slovenia.

The comment of the correspondent of *L'Unità* was that "some of the resigning leaders are people of great repute, especially in Yugoslav intellectual circles, but with no ties to the party base and the popular masses... and they all subscribe to the so-called liberal or "anarcho-liberal" line of Marko Nikezić... who in the last 5–6 years has been the theorist of the most comprehensive liberalisation of the Yugoslav market... which has not promoted the development of democracy and self-management, but neither has it benefited the economy..." In short: "Nietzschean theories demonstrate their inadequacy in the Yugoslav reality".²⁴ Such a comment, while Dolanc was attacking "liberal tendencies" around Yugoslavia, amounted to an apologia of a coup d'état.

As for me, I did not understand much and was inclined to think that "if Tito and the LCJ act like this, they must have good reasons to do so". Luckily for

²¹ D. Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, 318.

²² J. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 303.

²³ D. Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, 324.

²⁴ A. Barioli, "I problemi dell'economia jugoslava alle radici dello scontro politico, *L'Unità*, November 4th 1972.

me, I had moved on to study Svetozar Marković and the Russian populists, who were far more interesting than the extinction of the state.

A few years later, when Tito was admitted to a clinic in Ljubljana, the editorial staff of *Rinascita*, the PCI weekly, asked me to write a short biography of him to have ready for publication when he died. I wrote it and ended with a quotation from Chapter XXIV of *The Prince*: “In this way there accrues to him a twofold glory, in having laid the foundations of the new Principedom, and in having strengthened and adorned it with good laws and good arms, with faithful friends and great deeds”. When Tito died, my piece was published in full, but the quotation from Machiavelli had disappeared.²⁵ At the time, it bothered me, but I did not try to discover the reasons for its removal. Then it was lost to oblivion. Today, that editorial intervention has my full posthumous approval, although for reasons probably different from those of the editors of *Rinascita*.

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The Two Last Encounters between Broz and Berlinguer – the Epilogue of an Alliance

Abstract: Based on unpublished historical sources from the archives of the communist parties of Yugoslavia and Italy (Archives of Yugoslavia, Belgrade; Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Archivio del Partito comunista Italiano, Rome), this paper analyzes the two last meetings of the leaders of the two parties, Josip Broz Tito and Enrico Berlinguer. The topics are Berlinguer's two visits to Yugoslavia, in October 1977 and October 1978, which took place at the height of the inter-party alliance, after the Berlin Conference of the Communist Parties of Europe held in June 1976. The aforementioned two visits are viewed in this paper as case studies that testify to the nature of the alliance between the two parties, and illuminate the key similarities and differences between these two political actors.

Keywords: Josip Broz Tito, Enrico Berlinguer, Yugoslavia, Communist Party of Italy (Partito comunista italiano), Eurocommunism, Cold War

Writing about Josip Broz Tito's activities at the conference of the Non-Aligned Movement held in Havana in 1979, historian Vladimir Petrović characterized Broz's diplomatic successes at that gathering as the "swan song" of Tito's personal diplomacy.¹ Petrović used this term as a metaphor to describe the Yugoslav foreign policy successes from the end of the 1970s, which were not a prelude to the further growth of the country's power, influence and prestige, but, paradoxically, an introduction to its collapse and ruin, which inevitably came at the beginning of the 1980s. In fact, it was an ideologically and generationally worn out system, politically ossified and non-innovative, which was best shown by the dogmatic ideological innovations of Edward Kardelj from the 1970s, who could not count on the future. Therefore, the late 1970s were largely the "swan song" of Yugoslav socialism. What is particularly important for our topic is that this period was also the "swan song" of Italian communism. As far as the Com-

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¹ V. Petrović, "Havana 1979: Labudova pesma Titove lične diplomatije". In *Tito – viđenja i tumačenja*, ed. O. Manojlović Pintar (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2011), 416–436.

munist Party of Italy (PCI) is concerned, the second half of the 1970s was a period of great growth, electoral growth and international strengthening, which made the party more politically relevant than ever in its history (except, perhaps, for a brief period after the Second World War, when the PCI was part of the national government). Unlike the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), PCI was far more ideologically innovative and, through the never clearly and precisely defined strategy of Eurocommunism,² it expanded its political horizons, opportunities and influence, both within Italy and on the international scene. However, structural limitations, primarily related to the bipolar division of Europe during the Cold War, limited the growth potential of the PCI. Therefore, after an apparent strengthening at the end of the 1970s, this party spent the entire following decade in political stagnation, disappearing from the scene with the end of the bipolar division in Europe. Finally, the cooperation between the LCY and the PCI went through its “swan song” at the end of the 1970s. At that time, the two parties were extremely close and had allied relations. Their cooperation was stronger and closer than ever in the ten-year history of mutual relations, but this did not lead to more significant or larger political achievements in the following period. Nevertheless, given that the end of the 1970s undoubtedly saw the peak of the alliance between the Yugoslav and Italian communists, it is an important historical phenomenon worth investigating and analyzing in more detail. Focusing, primarily, on the two most important events which took place in inter-party cooperation at the end of the decade – the two visits of the Secretary General of the PCI, Enrico Berlinguer, to Yugoslavia in 1977 and 1978, this paper intends to shed more light on the period that was the peak of LCY–PCI relations and offer a deeper insight into the nature of the alliance between the two most autonomous communist parties in Europe by analyzing those years.

Introduction

The history of the relationship between the Yugoslav and Italian communists has not been sufficiently explored in Italian and (post)Yugoslav historiography.³

² The alliance of communist parties of Italy, France and Spain, active since the mid-1970s, was called Eurocommunism by the international public at the time. This was an ambivalent political strategy, in which the three mentioned parties, at least symbolically, remained communist, but significantly modified their policies to be far more moderate. Eurocommunism involved, above all, the acceptance of political pluralism, closer cooperation with the non-communist left and criticism of the socialist system in Eastern Europe. S. Pons, “The rise and fall of Eurocommunism”. In *The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume III Endings*, ed. M. P. Leffler, O. A. Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 45–65.

³ On the relations between CPY and PCI see: S. Mišić, “Yugoslav Communists and the Communist Party of Italy, 1945–1956”. In *Italy’s Balkan Strategies (19th – 20th Century)*, ed. V.

The relations between the two parties in the interwar period were far from stable and intense, and apart from the fact that the secretary general of the PCI, Palmiro Togliatti, was a delegate of the Comintern at the Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) in Dresden in 1928,⁴ historiography and the available historical sources do not record more important moments in their inter-party relations. The outbreak of World War II significantly intensified the relations between the Yugoslav and Italian communists. Paradoxically, the war at the same time brought strong impulses that led the two parties to close cooperation, as well as to sharp conflicts. On the one hand, the Slovenian and Croatian national question gradually divided the CPY and PCI, because the solution to that question inevitably led to the Yugoslav-Italian territorial dispute.⁵ Nevertheless, the territorial issue was not the sole or even the decisive cause of the conflict between the two parties. In this respect, their different ideological conceptions were far more significant. While the PCI advocated cooperation with non-communist Allied states, the CPY dogmatically propagated conflict with the capitalist West, and tried to impose these radical views on the Italian communists.⁶ On the other hand, during the war, PCI became very dependent on its Yugoslav counterpart. This dependence was also ideological, due to a large number of Italian communists who admired the Yugoslav revolutionary model and wished for that kind of a more radical anti-fascist struggle,⁷ as well as material,

Pavlović (Beograd: Balkanološki institut SANU, 2015), 281–292; С. Мишић, “Обнављање односа између Савеза комуниста Југославије и Комунистичке партије Италије 1955–1956. године”, (Renewal of relations between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Communist Party of Italy 1955–1956), *Токови историје* 2/2013 (2013), 121–145; M. Galeazzi, *Togliatti e Tito. Tra identità nazionale e internazionalismo* (Rome: Carocci editore, 2005); P. Karlsen, *Frontiera rossa. Il PCI, il confine orientale e il contesto internazionale 1941–1955* (Gorica: Libreria Editrice Goriziana, 2010); M. Zuccari, *Il dito sulla piaga. Togliatti e il Pci nella rottura fra Stalin e Tito 1944–1957* (Milano: Mursia, 2008). The author of these lines explored the relationship between LCY and PCI in the 1960s and 1970s in his doctoral dissertation, defended at the Sapienza University of Rome (Sapienza Università di Roma) in 2020, and published several academic articles on the subject.

⁴ B. Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988, Prva knjiga* (Beograd: Nolit, 1988), 160, 261; S. Gužvica, *Before Tito. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia During the Great Purge (1936–1940)* (Tallinn: Tallinn University Press 2020), 41, 50.

⁵ On the role of the territorial dispute between Belgrade and Rome in PCI relations, see: Karlsen, *Frontiera rossa*.

⁶ S. Pons, *L'impossibile egemonia. L'URSS, il PCI e le origini della guerra fredda (1943–1948)* (Rome: Carocci editore, 1999).

⁷ Galeazzi, *Togliatti e Tito*, 59–60, 106; E. Aga-Rossi, V. Zaslavsky, *Togliatti e Stalin. Il Pci e la politica estera staliniana negli archivi di Mosca* (Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino, 2007), 106; A. Agosti, *Palmiro Togliatti. A Biography* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2008), 162; In-

because during and immediately after the war, the Italian party received financial and various other types of aid through Belgrade.⁸

The Yugoslav attempts to dominate were frustrating to the leaders of the PCI. Therefore, when the Yugoslav-Soviet split occurred in 1948, the PCI and its leader, Palmiro Togliatti, had a prominent position in the communist movement's attacks on Yugoslavia.⁹ After the Cominform resolution that expelled Yugoslavia from the group, the two parties were in conflict, and there are no official records of any mutual relations until 1956.¹⁰ Nevertheless, LCY and PCI were brought closer together by the changes in the policies of LCY/CPY after 1948, because from that period onward, the Yugoslav party followed a much more pragmatic policy, far from the revolutionary dogmatism of the first post-war years. The short-term cooperation between the two parties from 1956 to 1958¹¹, interrupted by the second Yugoslav-Soviet conflict in 1958, clearly indicated the enormous potential of inter-party cooperation.

Namely, since then, LCY and PCI stood together on the "right" wing of the International Communist Movement, propagating a more flexible policy, greater autonomy of national communist parties, as well as weakening Moscow's hegemony in the movement. On those ideological bases, the two parties managed to strengthen their relations in the early 1960s, forming a strategic alliance and laying the ground for future fruitful inter-party cooperation.¹² With the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the alliance of the two parties gained additional strength, as a result of joint and coordinated resistance to the Soviet policy, and since the mid-1970s, inter-party relations developed even further, primarily due to the stronger distancing of the PCI from Moscow,

terview of historian Paolo Spriano. In B. Valli, *Gli eurocomunisti* (Milan: Bompiani, 1976), 98; Zuccari, *Il ditto sula piaga*, 55–56.

⁸ Aga-Rossi, Zaslavsky, *Togliatti e Stalin*, 320; Mišić, "Yugoslav Communists and the Communist Party of Italy, 1945–1956", 285–286. In an interview, Josip Kopinič stated that he was responsible for the radio connection between the PCI and Moscow during the war. He allegedly had a meeting with Gian Carlo Pajetta regarding that issue, 1940. in Ljubljana – M. Marić, *Deca komunizma. Knjiga I* (Beograd: Laguna, 2014), 233.

⁹ Pons, *L'impossibile egemonia*, 125–132, 204, 225; Galeazzi, *Togliatti e Tito*, 102–104.

¹⁰ Galeazzi, *Togliatti e Tito*, 104–147; Mišić, "Yugoslav Communists and the Communist Party of Italy, 1945–1956", 286–291.

¹¹ С. Мишић, "Обнављање односа између Савеза комуниста Југославије и Комунистичке партије Италије 1955–1956. године", 121–154; Galeazzi, *Togliatti e Tito*, 147–181.

¹² Б. Живковић, "Од новог помирења до стратешког савеза: односи југословенских и италијанских комуниста од 1962. до Тољатијеве посете јануара 1964. године", (From a new reconciliation to a strategic alliance: relations between the Yugoslav and of the Italian Communists from 1962 until Togliatti's visit in January 1964), *Историјски записи* 3–4/2020 (2021), 121–146.

which was the main result of the policies pursued by the new leader of the Italian party, Enrico Berlinguer. The crown of that inter-party cooperation was the Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe, held in the summer of 1976 in Berlin, where Broz and Berlinguer worked together and managed to get the Soviets to sign a written confirmation of the key principle that the two parties propagated – the autonomy of national communist parties.¹³

However, it was only an apparent diplomatic success, which largely remained on paper. Shortly after the Berlin Conference, Moscow launched a political counterattack to maintain its hegemony in the communist movement. The main target of that coup was the Eurocommunist alliance in Western Europe, i.e. the alliance of the communist parties of Spain, Italy and France. Becoming increasingly isolated, the leader of the strongest Eurocommunist party, the Communist Party of Italy, in the late 1970s, decided to further strengthen his ties with the only reliable communist ally – the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Therefore, in just one year, Enrico Berlinguer made two official visits to Yugoslavia, having extremely meaningful conversations with Josip Broz Tito.

Soviet attack on Eurocommunism – prelude to Berlinguer's visits in October 1977

Only a few months after the Berlin Conference, Moscow gradually began to confront the Eurocommunist challenge. Already at the end of 1976, at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact, Leonid Brezhnev pointed out that the Western "reaction" was trying to separate the Western European communist parties from the socialist states. This statement was a clear prelude to an organized Soviet campaign against Eurocommunism. The motives for the Soviet attack were multiple and different, such as the Carter administration's initial openness to Western European communists. However, as the Italian historian Silvio Pons notes, the key reason was the Soviet fear of "centrifugal, pluralist and critical messages spread by the Eurocommunists". Soviet pressure led to reactions, and the communist parties of Italy, France and Spain organized a meeting in Madrid in March 1977, symbolically providing strong resistance to the criticism coming from Moscow. This meeting, which is considered the peak of Eurocommunism¹⁴, only led to further conflict with Moscow. Nevertheless, these gestures did not lead to the long-term strengthening of Eurocommunism, a movement that soon began to dissipate more noticeably, due to the structural problems of the three parties. While the Communist Party of France quickly returned to its more dogmatic

¹³ M. Marović, *Tri izazova staljinizmu* (Opatija: Otokar Keršovani, 1983), 397–412.

¹⁴ During this meeting, the leaders of the three parties, Enrico Berlinguer, Marchais and Santiago Carrillo, used the term Eurocommunism for the first time in their lives.

positions, strengthening its relations with the USSR, the PCI and the CP of Spain experienced a drop in electoral support.¹⁵ An additional cause of their failure lay in the fact that the Eurocommunist movement never managed to establish more permanent relations with the non-communist left in Europe, with the exception of the successful cooperation between the PCI and the West German Social Democrats, therefore being left with little maneuvering space.¹⁶

In such circumstances, there was a re-intensification of relations between LCY and PCI, which had been less intense in the previous months. During the summer of 1977, there were three important visits, which were a prelude to Berlinguer's arrival in Belgrade in October. The first one was on June 10, 1977, when Antonio Rubbi, a key figure in the foreign policy of the PCI at that time, visited Belgrade. In the first meeting, with Aleksandar Grličkov¹⁷, Rubbi focused on the conflict between the Eurocommunist parties and Moscow. Namely, the PCI official pointed out that the Soviet Union had launched its attack on Eurocommunism at the meetings of the editorial board of the international communist journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (Проблемы мира и социализма). Rubbi emphasized the unity of the three parties in resisting such pressures, and to Grličkov's implicit advice that a clash with Moscow should not be avoided, the Italian communist replied that the PCI would certainly not remain silent in the face of any further criticism.¹⁸

On the same day, Rubbi also met with Vladislav Obradović¹⁹, another LCY official who was in charge of contacts with PCI in those years. In addition to the Soviet attack on Eurocommunism, the two officials also discussed other international topics. The most important issue was the action of the Socialist International. While Rubbi emphasized the good relations between the West German Social Democrat leader, Willy Brandt, and Berlinguer, and the results of their recent friendly meeting, Obradović emphasized the problem of the International's activities in the Third World. Namely, the Yugoslav assessment was that the Socialist International was undermining the unity of the Non-Aligned Movement, and the LCY was strongly opposed to this. Therefore, this topic was often mentioned in the following meetings of the officials of the two parties, and

¹⁵ Especially the Spanish party, which achieved only ten percent of support in the first elections after the fall of Franco's regime.

¹⁶ Pons, "The Rise and Fall of Eurocommunism", 57–60.

¹⁷ Aleksandar Grličkov, who at that time served as the secretary of the Executive Committee of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the CPY, had an extremely important role in the party's foreign policy in the second half of the 1970s.

¹⁸ Archive of Yugoslavia (later on: AY), CPY – International Committee (507/IX) – 48/I-565.

¹⁹ At that time, Vladislav Obradović was the head of the Department of International Relations and Relations of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the CPY.

as Obradović noted in his report on this conversation, the Yugoslav side was not satisfied with the attitude of the PCI towards this problem, considering that the Italian communists did not understand the situation and the harmfulness of the activities of the Socialist International.²⁰

A month later, on July 12 and 13, 1977, Aleksandar Grličkov, on behalf of the LCY, visited Rome and spoke with high-ranking PCI officials in charge of the party's foreign policy - Sergio Segre, Gian Carlo Pajetta and Rubbi. The main topic of these talks was the recent visit of the PCI delegation to Moscow, i.e. the smoldering conflict between the Eurocommunist parties and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). As Pajetta stated, the goal of the Italian communists was to discuss with Soviet officials the increasingly obvious and strong efforts of Moscow to revise the decisions of the Berlin Conference, a process that Pajetta characterized as scandalous in his conversation with the Yugoslav interlocutor.

In other words, the visit came at a time when the conflict between Western European communists and Moscow intensified after the publication of the book by the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Spain, Santiago Carrillo, *Eurocommunism and the State* (*Eurocomunismo y Estado*), and the review of this book in the Soviet magazine *Novoye vremja* (New times).²¹ The position of the PCI, according to Carrillo's book, and the debate between the CPSU and the PCE was, to some extent, ambivalent. That is to say, as Pajeta explained, the Italian communists did not want to develop a Eurocommunist doctrine, and they did not approve of the content of Carrillo's writings. Nevertheless, in the

²⁰ AY, 507/IX – 48/I-565. During the meeting, the internal crisis in the CP of Spain was also discussed. Obradović was interested in whether the rumors about the conflict between Secretary General Carrillo and the famous revolutionary Dolores Ibárruri, better known as Pasionaria, were true. Rubbi confirmed those rumors, pointing out that the root of that conflict lay in Ibaruri's pro-Soviet views but added that Carrillo's position was stable due to his compromise action on strengthening democracy in Spain.

²¹ As noted earlier, it was already clear by the end of 1976 that Moscow was preparing an attack on the Eurocommunist movement. In this regard, Carrillo's book served as a *casus belli*. Carrillo's work criticized socialism in Eastern Europe, and Moscow was particularly irritated by Carrillo's claims that "the success of democratic socialism in the Western European communist parties will have a significant impact on the Eastern Bloc, and lead to numerous Prague springs." Carrillo's book was published at the end of May 1977, but thanks to KGB collaborators within the Spanish party, Moscow received a copy of the manuscript a few months earlier, and had a review prepared in advance. P. Preston, *The Last Stalinist. The Life of Santiago Carrillo* (London: HarperCollins, 2015), 225–226. According to Silvio Pons, such threats from Carrillo scared Moscow especially because the United States of America at that time was thinking about the political assimilation of Eurocommunism, as a way to promote "greater diversity" in Eastern Europe [i.e. undermining the socialist system and Soviet hegemony in the Eastern European bloc – BZ]. S. Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo* (Torino: Einaudi, 2006), 69.

aforementioned debate, the PCI was sharply opposed to Moscow, because they did not see the activities of Soviet propaganda as an attack on a single book, but an attempt to ban free debate within the communist movement and, most importantly, Moscow's attempt to re-impose its dominant position. Aleksandar Grlićkov fully shared the Italians' views, and the LCY and the PCI were in agreement on this issue.²²

The discussion that took place in Moscow between the officials of the CPSU and PCI was of great interest to Belgrade, and most of the conversation was devoted to that topic. Pajetta reported that the talks were taking a disappointing course for the PCI, in which the Soviet side refused to reveal its political intentions and plans. The conversation between Grlićkov, Pajetta and Segre clearly showed two important phenomena that united LCY and PCI. On the one hand, neither the Yugoslav nor the Italian parties were able to gauge Moscow's policy regarding the autonomy of the national communist parties and whether the Soviets would try harder to revise the decisions of the Berlin Conference. On the other hand, both parties feared that this was precisely Moscow's intention, and that a period of more intense Soviet pressure on this matter would follow. Both Grlićkov and Pajetta strongly criticized Soviet attempts to incite internal divisions and split certain parties, primarily the Communist Party of Spain (PCE). In addition, Segre emphasized that relations with Western governments were more important to Moscow at that time than with communist parties, and Pajetta spoke about the numerous ideological pressures Moscow exerted on the PCI, primarily regarding their stance on the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. At the end of the visit, however, Grlićkov called for caution and toned down the anti-Soviet rhetoric that had dominated the discussions until then. The Yugoslav official emphasized how important it was to be patient, to fight against anti-Sovietism, and to support every positive step in international relations. In addition, he fully agreed with Pajetta's assessment, which he specifically underlined in his report, that it was necessary to allow an "honorable exit" for Moscow in the aforementioned debate.²³

At the end of the same month, July 1977, Pajetta returned the visit, meeting Grlićkov in Belgrade. The main goal of this visit was to convey to the Yugoslav side a letter in which the leader of the PCI, Enrico Berlinguer, asked Josip Broz Tito to help restore the relations between the PCI and the Communist Party of China during his upcoming visit to Beijing.²⁴ For the Yugoslav side,

²² AY, 507/IX – 48/I-566.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Along with the letter, Pajetta clearly stated in his conversation with Grlićkov the strong interest of the PCI to restore relations with the Chinese communists, after the changes that had occurred in that party with the death of its decade-long leader, Mao Zedong. AY, 507/

the most important topic was the conflict between the CPSU and the PCE, especially given that the visit of the Yugoslav president to Moscow was to follow. Grličkov and Pajetta, in fact, only repeated the principled positions that the two parties had shared on this issue before. Although both LCY and PCI objected to certain parts of Carrillo's book and thought that it could have been critically discussed, both parties agreed that the Soviet attack was excessive and unacceptable. For the Yugoslav and Italian communists, Moscow's attack on the PCE was, in fact, an attempt to excommunicate and split the Spanish party, revealing the Soviet desire to revise the decisions of the Berlin Conference and limit the autonomy of the national communist parties. Grličkov even believed that the PCE had to defend itself more strongly against Soviet attacks. Discussing this topic, Pajetta also informed Grličkov about his brother Giuliano's impressions from his recent visit to Spain. During the visit, Giuliano Pajetta received strong expressions of gratitude from Carrillo for the support that the PCI provided him, and Pajetta's impression was that the power of the general secretary of the PCI, as well as the degree of his influence on Spanish society, was extremely strong.²⁵

Along with the key topics of the PCI's relationship with Beijing and the conflict between the Soviet and Spanish communists, Pajetta informed Grličkov about several foreign policy activities of the PCI. First of all, the Italian communist assured him that PCI was distancing itself from Moscow. In this regard, he pointed out that Berlinguer had canceled his planned vacation in the Soviet Union so as not to create the impression that he supported the USSR in the conflict with the PCE. Pajetta added that there was a mysterious visit of a member of the Politburo of the French party to Moscow, about which neither the CPSU nor the PCF wanted to inform the PCI, thus indicating the re-alignment of this party with the USSR. Finally, Pajetta especially wanted to talk about Libya, which he had recently visited, meeting with Muammar al-Gaddafi. Pajetta visited Libya in light of the conflict between Tripoli and Cairo, and his impressions were surprisingly positive. Namely, the Italian communist said that the Libyan

IX – 48/I-567; 568: Fondazione Istituto Gramsci, Archivio del Partito comunista (henceforth FG APCI), Esteri, MF 298, 1167. With this letter and Pajetta's visit, the two-year process of the Yugoslav mediation in restoring the relations between PCI and Beijing began. The mentioned process was successful, and the Yugoslav contribution was significant, culminating in Berlinguer's visit to the Chinese capital in 1980. S. Pons, *The Global Revolution. A History of International Communism 1917–1991*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 292. This was a very important topic in the relations between CPY and PCI in the late 1970s, which will be briefly discussed in this paper. For more details see: B. Živković, "In Quest of a New International Communist Alliance: The Yugoslav Mediation in the Renewal of Relations Between the Communist Parties of Italy and China (1977–1979)". In *Iconografie europee*, ed. W. Montanari, S. Zakeri (Rome: Edizioni Nuova Cultura, 2021), 285–306.

²⁵ AY, 507/IX – 48/I-567.

leader left an extremely good impression on him. The aforementioned meeting changed the perception of Libya in the eyes of the PCI, and the Italian party began to support Tripoli and was very critical of Egypt and Anwar el Sadat. The Italian communists lamented the Arab division, saying that such a situation only worked to the advantage of Israel and the United States of America, and begged for Yugoslav diplomatic help to alleviate the problem. According to Pajetta, the main negative influences were the actions of Saudi Arabia and Sadat, while he especially praised the positive influences of the leaders of Algeria and Palestine, Houari Boumédiène and Yasser Arafat.²⁶

The previously mentioned visits, which took place in the summer of 1977, reflected the high level of inter-party relations, which was explicitly said by Pajetta in his interview with the Skopje-based paper *Večera*. Pajetta told the Macedonian newspaper that the relations between the two parties were an example of good cooperation, in which there was a constant and intensive exchange of opinions.²⁷ Therefore, in September 1977, at the top of the PCI, the idea of organizing an inter-party meeting at the highest level matured, and Pajetta was chosen to contact Belgrade on this issue. Pajetta spoke with Obradović, who reached President Broz through Stane Dolanc, the secretary of the LCY Central Committee Presidency, and conveyed the proposal of the Italian communists²⁸, to which a positive response was soon received.

The penultimate meeting between Broz and Berlinguer – October 1977

At the beginning of October 1977, with his close associate Anselmo Gouthier, Enrico Berlinguer visited Yugoslavia and had a meaningful conversation with Josip Broz Tito. A few years later, it will turn out that this was the penultimate in a series of meetings that the two communist leaders had during the 1970s. Although, without a doubt, the meeting between Broz and Berlinguer in 1975 was extremely significant²⁹, this meeting in 1977 can be called their most important one. This assessment is based not only on the fact that this period saw the peak of inter-party cooperation and alliance, but above all on the fact that the talks held in 1977 in Karadorđevo strongly illustrated good mutual relations, similarities, respect and importance but also certain differences that determined the scope of cooperation between LCY and PCI.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ FG APCI, Esteri, MF 298, 1169.

²⁸ FG APCI, Esteri, MF 304, 1976–1977.

²⁹ Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*, 46; M. Galeazzi, *Il Pci e il movimento dei paesi non allineati 1955–1975* (Milan: Franco Agnelli, 2011), 246–247; Pons, *The Global Revolution*, 286.

The visit came at a time when the inter-party relations were better than they had ever been. Yugoslav reports emphasized this fact, and according to the Yugoslav party, the main cause of such good relations was that LCY and PCI viewed the situation in the International Communist Movement similarly, as well as the principle of autonomy of national communist parties.³⁰ On the other hand, with the collapse of Eurocommunism, which was significantly threatened by the détente crisis and weak results in spreading diplomatic influence outside the communist movement, at that time, Yugoslavia was one of the most important partners for PCI. The main goal of Berlinguer's visits to Belgrade and Budapest was to strengthen the alliance with the "moderate" states in the East in order to defend the principles adopted at the Berlin Conference.³¹

The three main topics of conversation were the situation in Italy, Eurocommunism and the results of Broz's recent visits to Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang. Discussing the situation in Italy, the secretaries-general of the PCI and LCY focused, above all, on the issues of terrorism³² and the strength and role of the PCI. Terrorism was the central topic, and the Yugoslav president was interested to find out whether the culprits were mostly neo-fascist groups and whether there were any connections between those groups and West Germany.³³ Without denying that there were also left-wing terrorist organizations, Enrico Berlinguer confirmed the Yugoslav suspicions that they were primarily neo-fascists, adding that the PCI also had similar information about the influence of Franz Josef Strauss and West Germany, which was not ruled out by Willy Brandt in a recent meeting with the PCI leader. To Broz's questions about the strength of the PCI, Berlinguer replied that his party was getting stronger and that the PCI, despite heavy resistance and the fact that the conditions for

³⁰ AY, Cabinet of the President of the Republic (KPR (837), I-3-a/44-61, Information about the Communist Party of Italy in the light of the current situation and relations between the CPY and the CP of Italy.

³¹ Pons, "The Rise and Fall of Eurocommunism", 60. Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*, 78. According to Pons's research, the LCY only strengthened its importance and influence with the PCI after this visit, and upon his return to Rome, Berlinguer considered the LCY to be his main foreign policy ally. – Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*, 79.

³² More on the rise of political terrorism in Italy at that time in: U. Gentiloni Silveri, *Storia dell'Italia contemporanea 1943–2019* (Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino, 2019), 155–165.

³³ Yugoslav diplomatic and security services closely followed the emergence and growth of terrorism in Italy. After the initial assessments of the influences from Washington, i.e. primarily by the CIA, during 1977 Yugoslav information pointed to West German influence, especially the conservative politician Franz Josef Strauss. П. Драгишић, *Шта смо знали о Италији? Погледи из Београда на Италију 1955–1978* (What did we know about Italy? Views from Belgrade on Italy 1955–1978) (Београд: Институт за новију историју Србије, 2019), 258–263.

his party to come to power were not ripe, became an indispensable interlocutor and actor in solving all key national issues.³⁴

After this introductory part of the meeting, they moved on to the key topic – Eurocommunism. While Josip Broz defended Eurocommunism and the PCI at his meeting with Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow³⁵, in the conversation with Berlinguer, the Yugoslav president was critical of this term. Moreover, he was mildly critical of Berlinguer’s policies, advising him to avoid unnecessary conflicts with Moscow and expressing his opposition to any idea of regional communism.

The Yugoslav leader started the conversation on this topic by suggesting that the term Eurocommunism should not be used because it had been invented by the “bourgeoisie”, while communism is one and the same for the whole

³⁴ АУ, КРР (837), I-3-a/44-61, Забелешка о разговору Председника Републике и Председника СКЈ Јосипа Броза Тита са генералним секретаром Комунистичке партије Италије Енрико Берлингуером, 4. октобра 1977. године у Карађорђеву. (Note on the conversation between the President of the Republic and the President of the CPY, Josip Broz Tito, with the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Italy, Enrico Berlinguer, on October 4, 1977, in Karadordevo).

³⁵ At the meeting with Brezhnev in August 1977, great attention was paid to the issue of Eurocommunism, i.e. Western European communist parties. The leader of the USSR claimed that Moscow was satisfied with the growth of the power of the PCI and the CPE, on which it did not want to impose its views. The only thing that bothered the Soviets was a certain conflictual tendency in the relationship between Western and Eastern communists, visible above all in Carillo’s writings and positions, which Moscow assessed as “anti-Sovietism”. The Yugoslav report on the visit stressed that Moscow was most irritated by the public criticism of the USSR that came from the West European communist parties. Broz responded to the Soviet allegations by emphasizing the principles of the Berlin Conference and defending the Western parties, which he claimed were only autonomously carrying out their struggle for socialism, opening up to other progressive and democratic forces, which Yugoslavia fully supported. His only criticism concerned the “inadequacy” of the term Eurocommunism, but this remark did not detract from the general tone of support for the movement in Broz’s addresses to top Soviet leaders. In addition, the Yugoslav president also criticized the Soviet attack on Carrilo, calling for a peaceful and constructive debate, from equal positions. The Yugoslav visit report claimed that the USSR had abandoned the principles of the Berlin Conference precisely because of the conflict with the Eurocommunist parties, adding that Moscow’s attitude towards Belgrade was “softer” because the USSR wanted to use its good relations with Yugoslavia to counterbalance the problems caused by its conflicts with Western European parties. “Report on the visit of the President of the SFRY and the President of the CPY J. B. Tito to the USSR, 16–24. August 1977,” In *Југославија–СССР. Сусрети и разговори на највишем нивоу руководилица Југославије и СССР 1965–1980* (Yugoslavia–USSR. Meetings and discussions at the highest level to the level of managers of Yugoslavia and the USSR 1965–1980), Том 2, ур. Љ. Димић и др. (Београд: Архив Југославије), 2016), 799–805.

world.³⁶ Broz was particularly irritated by the use of that term because, in his opinion, it obscured the essence of the problem – the implementation of the principles of the Berlin Conference. Berlinguer defended himself by saying that the PCI did not know who came up with the term, adding that the Italian communists had always used it, albeit with some reservations. Nevertheless, in his view, the crux of the matter was the policy of the Western European communist parties, different but united by economic and traditional ties and similarities, and determined to act together, although not as a regional center of the movement. Broz responded to that by pointing out that he, despite his reservations about the term itself, had defended the essence of the policy of the Western European communists in his meetings with Brezhnev. The Yugoslav president saw that policy as the implementation of the Berlin principles and a good understanding of the local (i.e. national and regional) conditions of the political struggle. After Broz pointed out that he had defended the principles of Berlin in the meeting with the leaders of the CPSU, Berlinguer replied that Moscow was trying to challenge and limit the autonomy of the national communist parties, adding that Yugoslavia defended Eurocommunism although it did not agree with the term itself. At that moment, Broz referred again to the principles of the Berlin Conference and, in addition, profusely praised the cooperation of PCI and other West European communist parties with “progressive” forces in their countries.³⁷

³⁶ Similar were the remarks of the Hungarian leader Kadar, who suggested to Berlinguer that it was important to give up any pretensions about the universality of Eurocommunism, i.e. to be consistent in renouncing the validity of the idea of different models of socialism. As noted by the Italian historian Silvio Pons, Kadar’s and Broz’s criticisms showed a crucial difference in the policies of the Western and Eastern Communist Parties. While political pluralism was a fundamental idea of Eurocommunism, based on the inapplicability of the Soviet model in the highly developed societies of the West, the idea of political pluralism did not resonate well with Eastern European communist leaders, even the more “moderate” ones. Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*, 78.

³⁷ АУ, КРР (837), I-3-a/44-61, Забелешка о разговору Председника Републике и Председника СКЈ Јосипа Броза Тита са генералним секретаром Комунистичке партије Италије Енрико Берлингуером, 4. октобра 1977. године у Карађорђеву. (Note on the conversation between the President of the Republic and the President of the CPY, Josip Broz Tito, with the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Italy, Enrico Berlinguer, on October 4, 1977, in Karađorđevo).

At this point, it is important to mention that a few months later, in March 1978, the Yugoslav president publicly said what he thought of Eurocommunism. Namely, in an interview with *The New York Times*, Broz emphasized positions that were very similar to what he had said in the meeting with Berlinguer. For him, Eurocommunism meant taking responsibility and acting according to local conditions. He did not see the close cooperation of Western European communist parties as a regional model, which would be imposed on someone, but as a natural consequence of their independence and desire to cooperate. In addition, the Yugoslav

In the continuation of the conversation, Broz demonstrated a certain tolerance and understanding for Moscow's positions, suggesting to Berlinguer how to improve his relations with the CPSU. Firstly, the Yugoslav president emphasized the indignation of the Soviets with Carrillo's views. Defending himself by claiming not to have read the book, Broz added that it would be bad if Carrillo presented a one-dimensional criticism of the socialist system in certain countries of Eastern Europe, stressing that such a thing should not be presented in public discussion. According to the Yugoslav president, it was unrealistic to expect that such a powerful country could accept being criticized publicly. His goal during his visit to Moscow was precisely to calm that conflict. Berlinguer replied that the polemic moved away from the content of Carrillo's file to the issue of the defense of the Spanish party. Broz ended the discussion on this issue by giving a piece of explicit advice to Berlinguer. Emphasizing that no other party had such a meaningful experience of relations with Moscow as the LCY, the Yugoslav president said that he had learned one key lesson from his extensive experience. Namely, that lesson was that patience and avoiding unnecessary public conflicts are crucial in relations with Moscow, factors that successfully lead to the resolution of all problems with the USSR.³⁸

At the end of the meeting, the Yugoslav president informed the secretary general of the PCI about his impressions from his visits to Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang, which were very positive. Broz emphasized that Brezhnev had received him very respectfully and praised the Soviet leader as a positive force at the top of the CPSU, as opposed to "bureaucratized ideologues" such as Mikhail Suslov (Mikhail Andreevich Suslov) and Boris Ponomaryev (Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev) (Berlinguer especially agreed with the criticism of Ponomaryev).

leader emphasized that Eurocommunism and the Non-Aligned Movement were united by a common desire to overcome the bloc division in the world. Unlike Broz, the main Yugoslav ideologist, Edvard Kardelj, had more fundamental objections to Eurocommunism. For the Slovenian communist, the problem was the Eurocommunist abandonment of the *dictatorship of the proletariat*, as well as, in his opinion, the excessive focus on parliamentary politics. Although this criticism testifies to the political differences between the CPY and the PCI, which primarily concerned the issue of political pluralism, the fact that Belgrade strongly supported the Eurocommunist movement cannot be questioned. Public declarations of support were frequent, and Eurocommunism was seen in Yugoslavia as a continuation of 1948 and a strengthening of the autonomy of national communist parties, based on Yugoslav resistance to Moscow. Marović, *Tri izazova staljinizmu*, 448–452.

³⁸ АУ, КРР (837), I-3-a/44-61, Забелешка о разговору Председника Републике и Председника СКЈ Јосипа Броза Тита са генералним секретаром Комунистичке партије Италије Енрико Берлингуером, 4. октобра 1977. године у Карађорђеву. (Note on the conversation between the President of the Republic and the President of the CPY, Josip Broz Tito, with the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Italy, Enrico Berlinguer, on October 4, 1977.)

The Yugoslav leader especially emphasized that there were no criticisms of the fact that he was visiting both countries either in Moscow or in Beijing. In both meetings, he advocated the reconciliation of the USSR and China, stressing that this would significantly weaken the position of the USA. Berlinguer was extremely interested in the reactions of the two sides to Broz's allegations, but the Yugoslav president's response was discouraging. Based on his impressions from the talks in Moscow and Beijing, Broz concluded that at that moment there were no conditions for improving the relations between the two largest communist states. As far as the visit to Beijing was concerned, the Yugoslav leader also commented positively on it, pointing out that he noticed slow yet tangible signs of China's opening to the world, and the reduction of radical rhetoric. He also informed Berlinguer about the fact that in Beijing he defended the Eurocommunist parties, propagating the restoration of relations between the Communist Party of China and the PCI. Although Chinese officials did not respond to those suggestions, the Yugoslav president assured the Italian guest that PCI would succeed in restoring its relations with Beijing.³⁹

1978 – the year of strong inter-party cooperation

The first inter-party contact that occurred in 1978 happened at the beginning of January, when Yugoslavia was visited by a delegation from the PCI led by Adalberto Minucci, a member of the parties' secretariat and the director of the party newspaper, the *Rinascita*. The intention of this delegation was to come to grips with the new policies of the LCY promoted just before the upcoming 11th Party Congress. These were, in fact, Kardelj's theoretical innovations, labeled "pluralism of self-governing interests", which were meant to mask the political monopoly and the absence of real democracy in Yugoslavia, portraying the LCY as not just a party but as a wider democratical organ.⁴⁰ Even though these ideological "novelties" were a product of the rigid socialist system and therefore doomed to stay on paper without more significant influence on socio-political life in Yugoslavia, the guests from the PCI viewed them as positive, perhaps due to their mutual sympathy and good relations. They welcomed changes in the Yugoslav party and considered it one of the more innovative and original parties in all of Eastern Europe.⁴¹

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ I. Banac, "Yugoslav Communism and the Yugoslav State". In *The Cambridge History of Communism, Volume II, The Socialist Camp and World Power 1941–1960s*, ed. N. Naimark et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 592.

⁴¹ AY, 507/IX – 48/I-572. In the following months, the party newspaper *Unità*, and especially the correspondent from Belgrade, Silvano Goruppi, published a series of extremely

Apart from the main topic of the meeting, the two sides discussed a number of international questions. Dobrivoje Vidić, a member of the presidential committee of LCY, who led the host delegation, complained once again about the actions of the Socialist International in the Third World and its attempts to undermine the unity of the Non-Aligned Movement. Just like in the previous negotiations, the view of the PCI was not well received in Belgrade. In fact, just like his colleagues before him, Minucci considered this question less pressing and less important, thinking that the Socialist International didn't have the power to make major ripples among those in the Non-Aligned Movement.

Vidić also had complaints about the Albanian misgivings about the warming of Yugoslav-Chinese relations, but had words of praise for the new administration in Washington, believing that President Jimmy Carter and his associates had significantly more understanding for Yugoslavia than their predecessors. Minucci agreed with such an assessment of the Carter administration, adding that Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to President Carter, was more tolerant towards Moscow than his predecessor Henry Kissinger.⁴² At the end of the talks, Grljičikov called for a renewal of dialogue between the communist parties, concluding, rather optimistically, that it seemed like the attacks on the autonomy and principles of the party were waning.⁴³

positive articles about the internal reforms in Yugoslavia: FG APCI, Esteri, MF 322, p. 2083; MF 330, p. 1967–1975.

⁴² Minucci's view of Brzezinski was informed by the fact that Henry Kissinger was one of the biggest political opponents of the PCI in the international arena. Namely, fearing a domino effect in southern Europe in the mid-1970s, especially after the changes in Portugal, Kissinger strongly and publicly opposed the possibility of the PCI coming to power in Italy. To arguments that the PCI had emancipated itself from the CPSU, Kissinger once replied: "Tito is not under the control of Moscow, yet his influence is felt all over the world." However, despite PCI's initial openness to Carter and Brzezinski, Washington's policy did not change much. Precisely in the days when Minucci was in Yugoslavia, the United States of America publicly took the position that it was not acceptable for them to include communist parties in Western European governments. Pons, "The Rise and Fall of Eurocommunism", 52, 60. Yugoslavia strongly objected to such statements, and the Yugoslav press interpreted the said statement as "Washington's direct interference" in Italy's internal affairs. Драгишић, *Шта смо знали о Италији?*, 251. Therefore, the PCI quickly dispelled the illusions it had harbored towards Brzezinski at the time of the conversation with Vidić. A year later, in February 1979, at a meeting of the party directorate, Giancarlo Pajetta had a completely different attitude from Minucci. In his judgment, which was extremely close to Moscow's position on the matter, Brzezinski was actually a greater threat to world peace because he was an idealistic politician, as opposed to the realpolitik-minded Kissinger. Although Berlinguer did not fully share this view, it was clear that at the top of the Italian party the attitude towards Brzezinski became extremely negative in a short period of time. Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*, 98–99.

⁴³ AY, 507/IX – 48/I-572.

What most vividly paints the picture of the close relations between LCY and PCI at the end of the 1970s is the intense dynamics of their meetings and consultations about critical international topics.⁴⁴ The next significant inter-party meeting took place in March 1978, when Gian Carlo Pajetta and Aleksandar Grlićkov⁴⁵ met again. Pajetta and Grlićkov talked about a number of important international topics. Apart from the LCY once again lamenting the actions of the Socialist International in Africa, the conversation showed that, at the time, PCI and LCY shared the illusion that their relations with the eastern European parties were very good, an illusion that would be shattered in the coming months.

Apart from the already mentioned topics, there were conversations about the political state of Italy (Pajetta complained about the relationship between the Christian Democrats and the Socialists with his party), while Grlićkov revealed that the LCY and the Chinese Communist Party had renewed relations. However, the talks focused on the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia.⁴⁶ Pajetta spoke about the contacts the PCI had with the Somali president Siad Barre, who the Italian communists advised to be more moderate in relations with Moscow.⁴⁷ The Italian communist pointed out that the expectations of the PCI were for the LCY and CPSU to influence Ethiopia to accept a more peace-

⁴⁴ In addition to the aforementioned meetings, it is important to note that explicit and public support for Eurocommunism came from Yugoslavia. Thus, for example, *Borba* entered into a public polemic with the Soviet paper *Novoje vremja* on this issue, in which the Yugoslav paper strongly defended Eurocommunism and criticized the Soviet clash with Western European parties. This polemic met with a very positive response at the top of the PCI, which closely followed *Borba's* positions. FG APCI, Esteri, MF 317, 1036.

⁴⁵ The meeting happened on the Yugoslav suggestion, sent out at the end of February. FG APCI, Esteri, MF 317, 1038.

⁴⁶ That conflict, in which Moscow sided with Ethiopia in 1977 and 1978, was defined by historian Vladislav Zubok as a "proxy" war between the USSR and the USA. Namely, seeing the geopolitical power vacuum created in certain parts of Africa, the Soviet Union intensified its presence on the continent in the second half of the 1970s. As in the case of Angola, in the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, Moscow achieved success, but paid for that victory with the collapse of détente. V. Zubok, *A Failed Empire. The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 229, 249–252.

⁴⁷ The Somali leader Barre was, in fact, a longtime ally of Moscow. When Ethiopia, with which Somalia was in conflict for many years, made a big turn in its foreign policy, becoming pro-Soviet after its partnership with Washington, Barre, reciprocally, distanced himself from the USSR and moved closer to the USA. Therefore, in November 1977, he expelled all Soviet personnel from Somalia and severed diplomatic relations with Cuba. N. Mitchell, "The Cold War and Jimmy Carter". In *The Cambridge History of The Cold War, Volume III*, 75–80.

ful resolution to the conflict, which Grličkov promised to do to the best of the Non-Aligned Movement's abilities.⁴⁸

A mere month later, a delegation from the LCY, led by Dušan Popović, a member of the Executive Committee of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCY, visited Rome and spoke with the highest-ranking members of the PCI. The main topic of these talks was the turbulent political situation in Italy, which became even more dramatic following the kidnapping of Aldo Moro, a prominent Christian Democrat politician inclined to cooperate with the PCI. The representatives of the PCI spoke about a recently signed reform program endorsed by six political parties from both sides of the political spectrum, as well as about Moro's kidnapping.

The PCI program was judged as positive, even though it was believed that the government was too weak to put it into action. Therefore, initiatives for the PCI to join the national government started appearing. However, Pajetta admitted to his Yugoslav colleagues this was merely a political maneuver to strengthen the position of the PCI, which knew that the Christian Democrats would not be willing to make such a concession.⁴⁹ As for Moro's abduction, Pajetta saw it as an attack on the democratic system in the country, particularly in light of Moro's conciliatory policy toward the communists. The perpetrators of this crime, the *Brigate Rosse*, or the Red Brigades, were, at least according to the PCI, heavily influenced by local and foreign agents who wanted to destabilize the Italian democracy. Among these, Pajetta mentioned the mafia, the international "reaction", as well as the German terrorist organization *Rote Armee Fraktion* (Red Army Fraction).⁵⁰

During the meeting dominated by Italian topics, a few international issues were also raised, primarily the situation within the international communist movement. Members of the PCI were pushing for a renewal of dialogue within the movement. In this view, they were encouraged by their belief that

⁴⁸ AY, 507/IX – 48/I-574.

⁴⁹ At the time, the PCI enjoyed an unprecedented degree of political credibility in Italy. The Italian communists' legitimacy was the result of three factors: their support for unpopular economic measures, their strong opposition to terrorism and their critical attitude towards Moscow. Therefore, the scenario of PCI entering the government seemed more realistic than ever in the period after 1947. Nevertheless, this was the maximum strength that the communists could achieve, but it still failed to yield significant political successes in the following period. Although the PCI influenced the government's program, and even voted for it, such closeness to the PCI government was a result of the sensitive political moment, i.e., the abduction of Moro, which led to the need for a broader national consensus. Moro's death created a new political reality in which the PCI no longer had its place, and the idea of a historical compromise between the communists and Christian Democrats, which Berlinguer had promoted since 1973, collapsed. Silveri, *Storia dell'Italia contemporanea*, 149, 183.

⁵⁰ AY, 507/IX – 48/I-576.

the Soviet attack on the CPE had been just a reaction to some internal issues within the USSR and the recent visits of the Hungarian and Polish leaders János Kádár and Edward Gierek to Rome and their interest in Eurocommunism. On the other hand, the PCI was worried about the waning cooperation within the Eurocommunist bloc, i.e., the distancing of the French Communist Party.⁵¹ When the talks continued, the Yugoslav side once again complained about the actions of the Socialist International in Africa, for which they received support from the PCI for the first time ever. However, the Italian communists warned the Yugoslav delegation that many of the liberation movements on the African continent were happy with the attention they were being accorded from the International and urged Belgrade to work with the socialists and social-democrats, particularly with the Swedish social democrat Olof Palme. At the end of the visit on 29th of March 1978, the LCY delegation was received by the secretary general of the PCI. Berlinguer spoke about the Italian crisis, repeating Pajetta's sentiments. According to him, the reaction of all parties and the general public to Moro's kidnapping was positive, and he was particularly happy that the Christian Democrats and communists had come to rely on each other in the defense of the constitutional system in the country.⁵²

A series of very significant inter-party meetings, which demonstrated the closeness and alliance between the LCY and PCI, ended with a meeting in Madrid on the 21st of April 1978. Sergio Segre and Aleksandar Grlićkov were the participants. These two party officials were delegates at the congress of the Spanish communists and took this the opportunity to consult each other on a number of important international issues. Grlićkov yet again criticized the actions of the Socialist International in Africa and its efforts to undermine the Non-Aligned Movement. Serge, more forcefully than his colleagues before him, supported the Yugoslav position, adding that his party had been worried about the growing presence of Washington and Moscow on the same continent. In that light, the PCI criticized the Cuban presence in Africa, arguing that it legitimized the increasing interference of the two superpowers in the internal

⁵¹ The positive reactions of Gierek and Kádár were an encouragement to the PCI, which until then had been under the impression of a visit to Moscow in November 1977, when Leonid Brezhnev strongly criticized Berlinguer. The Soviet leader criticized the PCI's for not being committed enough to the struggle against the NATO alliance and even implicitly threatened Berlinguer with an internal party rebellion. Faced with such attacks, Berlinguer wanted to strengthen the Eurocommunist bloc, but he did not receive support from the French party. In a broader perspective, it was clear that the collapse of the détente and the strengthening of bloc tensions had narrowed the maneuvering space of the Eurocommunist idea, a dissident movement that propagated overcoming the bloc division, heralding its imminent collapse. Pons, "The Rise and Fall of Eurocommunism", 59–60.

⁵² AY, 507/IX – 48/I-576.

affairs of the African continent.⁵³ Serge also mentioned that Israel was requesting mediation from Yugoslav and Italian communists in the country's relations with Moscow. In his opinion, this appeal emerged from some advances in Israel's policy, as well as the awareness of the local elites that the support of Washington couldn't provide enough political backing. Therefore, the PCI was ready to act as the mediator between Israel and the USSR.⁵⁴

In the final part of the meeting, Segre and Grličkov discussed the relations of the PCI with Czechoslovakia, where the Italian communist informed his Yugoslav colleague of very significant and relevant facts. Segre informed Grličkov about the attempts of the Czechoslovakian party to renew its relations with the PCI, which had deteriorated following the Soviet intervention in 1968. The Italian party was preparing the tenth anniversary of this event at the Gramsci Institute, which was meant to be critical towards the Soviet aggression. The Czechoslovakian communists wanted to be part of this event, but the PCI, disappointed with the policies of this party, refused.⁵⁵ At that moment, Segre switched to a more important topic regarding Czechoslovakia, which Grličkov reported to his party in a separate, strictly confidential document. Namely, Segre informed them that the PCI had evidence that confirmed an earlier claim, launched by the right-leaning press, about a link between Prague and the Red Brigades. The Italian communists found out that some members of the Brigades, and high-ranking ones too, had paid two 15-day visits to Czechoslovakia. The Czechs denied this information, but this didn't convince the Italians. Segre stressed that it was very likely that the Red Brigades had Czech weapons in their possession. Finally, the Italian communist finished by saying: "This doesn't end with Czechoslovakia."⁵⁶

⁵³ Silvio Pons attributed this stance of PCI to the influence of Belgrade on the Italian communists: Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*, 88.

⁵⁴ AY, 507/IX – 48/I-577.

⁵⁵ Frequent attacks on the PCI came from Prague, which significantly intensified at the end of 1977. The Yugoslav side closely followed that clash, especially through the Tanjug correspondent from Prague, Miodrag Đukić. One of Đukić's texts on the subject from the end of 1977, in which there is clear sympathy for the PCI, was preserved in the archives of the Italian party, testifying to the attention that the party leadership paid to the Yugoslav journalist's report. FG APCI, Esteri, MF 310, 1124–1128.

⁵⁶ AY, 507/IX – 48/I-577. In the sea of different information that the Yugoslav diplomatic service received on the international background of the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro, Segre was not the only one to point to influences from Eastern Europe. Thus, for example, Yugoslavia also received information from an Italian diplomat from Lisbon about the responsibility of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc, whose alleged goal was to discredit the PCI and Eurocommunism. Драгишић, *Шта смо знали о Италији?*, 264–268.

This meeting was followed by a few uneventful months in inter-party relationships, mostly because the LCY was busy preparing its 11th party congress. However, this did not signify any deterioration in the relationship between the two parties. In fact, the very next meeting of high-ranking members proved just the opposite. In late July 1978, Stane Dolanc, secretary of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCY, met Giovanni Cervetti, a member of the Directorate of the Central Committee of the CPI, in Korčula. At the meeting, it was decided that the LCY would provide financial aid to the Italian party. The motive behind this request was distancing the Italian communists from Moscow and its material aid.⁵⁷ The scenario was similar in 1969, when the CPI ran into financial trouble after distancing itself from Moscow and also required Yugoslav financial support,⁵⁸ and Belgrade was more than willing to help. Besides an agreement about indirect aid, which would come through economic cooperation, Dolanc also promised to provide direct financial support.⁵⁹ Dolanc and Cervetti also commented briefly on the situation in Moscow,⁶⁰ and the Italian communist asked the LCY to inform them of the results of the impending visit of Hua Guofeng, the Chinese leader, to Belgrade.⁶¹

As Dolanc and Cervetti had agreed, this meeting occurred in September 1978, with Pajetta and Grličkov representing the two sides. However, Guofeng's visit to Yugoslavia was overshadowed by another matter, the Soviet Union's invitation to Berlinguer to visit Moscow. It was a very uncomfortable invitation for the PCI. As Pajetta put it, his party was facing accusations of not being truly autonomous, meaning that the meeting could have negative repercussions in the public opinion. On the other hand, refusing such an invitation could hardly be justified to the party members, especially given the PCI's communication with Washington. On top of all that, the PCI did not want to jeopardize the possibility of improving its relations with Beijing again. Taking all of this into account, the head of the PCI came up with a Solomonian solution. The Italian communists thought that, if Berlinguer visited Belgrade, a country whose autonomy

⁵⁷ PCI decided to stop receiving financial aid from the USSR in 1978, and at the end of 1979, the decision was finalized. Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*, 114.

⁵⁸ AY, 507/IX – 48/I-430.

⁵⁹ Finally, on October 9, 1978, the CPY Presidency made a decision on the matter, leaving it to Dolanc to determine the exact amount. On the decision of the Slovenian communist, in December 1978, Cervetti was given 200,000 dollars. AY, 507/IX – 48/I-585. In addition, cooperation agreements were signed with several companies under PCI influence. AY, 507/IX – 48/I-588.

⁶⁰ According to the information that the PCI had, the political situation in the Soviet Union was unstable, and the secretary general of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev, was in very poor health.

⁶¹ AY, 507/IX – 48/I-579.

from Moscow wasn't being questioned by the public, any adverse effects in the eyes of the Italian public would be lessened, and the visit to Moscow counterbalanced. Therefore, Pajetta asked for an official invitation to be sent to Berlinguer to visit Belgrade as soon as possible. Grličkov agreed with this and promised to pass on the request to Josip Broz.⁶²

Thus, an agreement was struck for the final meeting between Broz and Berlinguer, which would come a month later in Igalo. It's worth mentioning that Pajetta and Grličkov, apart from setting up the meeting, also used their encounter to touch on a number of international subjects. Between them, the most important was the idea of the Romanian leader, Nicolae Ceaușescu, about a new European conference of communist parties. Grličkov and Pajetta were both strongly and unequivocally against this idea, because they were in principle against organizing such meetings in the future. Pajetta added that he was surprised that this idea came about, noting that "[they] had sworn in Berlin that this was the last time".

Apart from this topic, they spoke about the tensions between Vietnam and China, the dramatic falling out between Western European communist parties, the situation in the Horn of Africa, where Pajetta once again showed sympathy for the Somali president, Barre, and hoped that Moscow wouldn't totally isolate him.⁶³ Along with discussing international topics, Pajetta added that his party had found out that the Italian socialists were organizing a seminar on Yugoslav self-governance and wanted to organize something similar. Even though Grličkov did not show his displeasure in front of Pajetta, records of the meeting show he was disappointed. According to Grličkov, Yugoslavia would once again face the "French scenario", where the communists weren't genuinely interested in the experiences of the Yugoslav system and only showed interest in this topic to compete with the socialists, who were truly intrigued by and attracted to the principles of Yugoslav self-governing socialism.⁶⁴

⁶² AY, 507/IX – 48/I-581.

⁶³ Such hopes were soon dashed because Ethiopia was too important to Moscow. Namely, as Odd Arne Westad noted, the most significant Marxist transformation in Africa took place in Ethiopia. O. A. Westad, *The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 251

⁶⁴ AY, 507/IX – 48/I-581.

^{At} the end of October 1978, the PCI sent a delegation to Yugoslavia to study self-management. In the report of the Yugoslav side, it was noted that this was the first time that the PCI had sent a delegation on its own initiative to investigate this matter. AY, 507/IX – 48/I-583. The visit led to a seminar on Yugoslav self-government held in December 1979 at the Gramsci Institute in Rome, as part of a series of seminars on systems in socialist states. AY, 507/IX – 48/I-602.

Berlinguer and Broz's last meeting – Igalo, October 1978

Reflecting the close alliance between LCY and PCI,⁶⁵ Pajetta's requests were granted. Belgrade sent Berlinguer an invitation, which eased his political position and allowed him to come to Yugoslavia following his visits to France and the USSR. On 9 October 1978, leader of the PCI came to Yugoslavia from Moscow to meet the Yugoslav president for the last time. The meeting took place on the Montenegrin coast, in Igalo, at a rehabilitation facility where the aging leader of the LCY spent most of his days, and the mood of the encounter reflected the symbolism of the place where it was held. The meeting mostly came down to Berlinguer's impressions from Moscow and curt remarks from Josip Broz, which was the polar opposite of the lively and dynamic exchange of ideas during their last meeting.

Berlinguer filled Josip Broz in on all the details of the conversations he had in Moscow. In many matters, these discussions would often escalate into conflict.⁶⁶ The first conversation, with Mikhail Suslov, was very tense. Berlinguer criticized the limitations on freedom of expression in the USSR, as well as the lack of democracy, which negatively affected the development of the communist movement in West Europe. In that sense, he presented a negative paradigmatic example – that of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, adding that the process of democratization of the communist party, started at the 20th Congress of the CPSS in 1956, hadn't been developed or implemented further. On the other hand, Suslov spoke distinctly negatively about Eurocommunism, considering it an invention of the bourgeoisie against the communist movement, which led the western European parties into revisionism and conflict with socialist countries. On top of that, the high Soviet official criticized China, claiming that Beijing wanted an alliance with imperialism, reminding Berlinguer that

⁶⁵ A Yugoslav report written in preparation for this visit clearly demonstrates Belgrade's high degree of sympathy for the PCI. In the perception of the CPY, the Italian communists were under the influence of strong and unscrupulous attacks by several actors, from different sides, who questioned the autonomy of the PCI and its commitment to democracy. According to the court in Belgrade, the European and Italian right used all available means to attack the PCI, even terrorism. In this regard, the PCI looked negatively at the activity of the Italian socialists and their new leader Benedetto "Bettino" Craxi, who was characterized as another tool in the attack on the PCI. As far as the activities of the great powers were concerned, the Yugoslav party believed that they were directed not only against the Italian communists, but also against the development of Italian democracy and sovereignty as a whole. AY, KPR (837), I-3a/44–62, Information on the position of the CP of Italy and current political relations in Italy. The sympathies were mutual, because Josip Broz Tito was a "special partner and invaluable support" for Berlinguer. – Pons, *Berlinguer e la fine del comunismo*, 92.

⁶⁶ As historian Silvio Pons noted, it was a "dialogue of the deaf". Pons, *The Global Revolution*, 290.

the Communist Party of China had, until recently, attacked the LCY and PCI. Both the tone and content of Suslov's statements deeply disappointed the leader of the Italian communists.⁶⁷

The following day, Berlinguer met with Leonid Brezhnev, who had similar views, although the secretary general of the PCI pointed out that Brezhnev expressed his criticism in a much more moderate tone than Suslov. The leader of the USSR referred, above all, to the issue of human rights, which Berlinguer had raised at the previous meeting.⁶⁸ In his opinion, the cases that attracted international attention did not concern human rights but individuals who broke the law or were foreign agents. Brezhnev also criticized Beijing and the PCI's desire to restore relations with the Chinese Communist Party, recalling the major ideological differences between the two parties. Like Suslov, the leader of the USSR spoke of external influences that wanted to divide the communist movement. Although he did not deny the right to different paths to socialism, he considered criticism of socialist states unacceptable. Berlinguer defended Eurocommunism, emphasizing that it was not the creation of a regional center in the movement but merely the desire of Western European parties to cooperate more closely, due to the similar conditions of their respective political struggles. Regarding human rights, he added that this issue was not only important for Western European parties, but also for the prestige of Moscow itself. Finally, he addressed China's criticisms, admitting that the negative aspects of Beijing's foreign policy were still stronger than the positives, primarily its willingness to cooperate with "reactionary" forces. Nevertheless, the PCI leader believed that there were clear positive developments in that country, especially in internal politics.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ AY, KPR (837), I-3-a/44-62.

⁶⁸ Berlinguer's choice of this question was not accidental. Namely, human rights became a central topic in the international relations of that era, and the main issue on which the USSR and other countries of the Eastern Bloc were delegitimized. Pons, *The Global Revolution*, 300. Such a prominent position of the human rights issue followed from the decisions of the CSCE. Namely, along with the acceptance of the principle of immutability of borders, which was adopted at Moscow's request, the other side requested that the principle of human rights be included in the official document. With the arrival of the Carter administration, after the electoral victory in the summer of 1976, human rights became the main point of the American attack on Moscow. Such an approach surprised Soviet leaders, accustomed to the pragmatic views and activities of the former National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger. S. Savranskaya, W. Taubman, "Soviet foreign policy, 1962-1975". In *The Cambridge History of The Cold War, Volume II, Crises and Détente*, ur. M. Leffler, O. A. Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 155; Mitchell, "The Cold War and Jimmy Carter", 71-73; Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 234-234, 254-257.

⁶⁹ AY, KPR (837), I-3-a/44-62; FG APCI, Direzione, MF 365, 40. Speaking about the results of his visit to Moscow, Paris and Belgrade at the meeting of the party directorate, held on October 19, 1978, Enrico Berlinguer considered the Soviet criticism of the attempts to

To Berlinguer's detailed presentation of the talks in Moscow, Broz replied briefly, in the spirit of the advice he had given a year earlier, that it was better to have a visit and in-person talks than a debate in the press. The Yugoslav president spoke most extensively about China. First of all, he believed that the Soviet press went too far in its negative reactions to Hua Guofeng's statements about the USSR during his visit to Belgrade, while strongly denying allegations that Yugoslavia was selling weapons to China. The Soviet resistance to the Yugoslav-Chinese rapprochement surprised the Yugoslav president, given that he strongly advocated the reconciliation of Moscow and Beijing. Broz saw the Chinese policy in a positive light. He believed that great changes were taking place in that country, even in foreign policy, and that this was a process that should be supported. Along with that, he pleaded for reasonable decision-making from Beijing, and for them to first establish relations with governments in the West, not with communist parties, because there was an economic need for this.⁷⁰

With these statements, the official part of the conversation ended, and at the luncheon held afterwards, the two communist leaders talked more casually. In line with his interest in issues of human rights and freedoms, Berlinguer asked Broz what was happening with Milovan Đilas.⁷¹ The reaction of the Yugoslav president showed that this was an extremely uncomfortable topic for him. Josip Broz emphasized his disappointment with Đilas' character and actions, which he characterized as a violation of the law and the constitution. In this regard, Broz added that Đilas had been extremely radical during the war but later presented himself as a moderate and democratic dissident. As the Yugoslav president explicitly stated, the intention of the Yugoslav regime was to force Đilas to leave the country and to prevent him from presenting himself as a martyr.⁷²

restore relations between the PCI and Beijing to be unfounded. The key argument he cited was the fact that both Yugoslavia and Romania, two countries committed to concessions in international relations, renewed relations with China, and there was no reason why PCI should not do the same. FG APCI, Direzione, MF 365, 37–39.

⁷⁰ AY, KPR (837), I-3-a/44-62; FG APCI, Direzione, MF 365, 40–42, 83–89.

⁷¹ Due to the good inter-party relations, the issue of dissidents in Yugoslavia was not specifically raised either in the PCI press or in conversations between officials of the two parties. Therefore, Berlinguer did not use a critical tone when talking to Broz. Nevertheless, the minutes from an earlier meeting of the PCI directorate, held on February 16, 1977, clearly show that the top of the Italian party had certain objections to the state of human rights in Yugoslavia. Giancarlo Pajetta's words from that meeting clearly reveal those objections, which primarily concerned former members of the regime who later fell out of favor. At the end of the discussion about the poor state of human rights in socialist countries, Pajetta added the following: "Yugoslavs are not kidding either. They put Đilas and the Ustasha, Ranković and priests in the same basket. I told them that they are worse than *Rudé právo* [official newspaper of the CP of Czechoslovakia - BŽ]". FG APCI, Direzione, MF 288, 127.

⁷² AY, KPR (837), I-3-a/44-62.

In a little more than a year of inter-party relations between LCY and PCI, analyzed in this paper, three striking phases can be distinguished. In the first period, Moscow's attack on Eurocommunism brought the two parties closer and led to Berlinguer's visit to Yugoslavia in October 1977. In those few months, both parties feared a stronger Soviet attack on the autonomy of the national communist parties. In the second phase, from the beginning of 1978, the intense relations between the two parties were imbued with the hope that a period of lull in the International Communist Movement had come and that it was possible to significantly improve relations with Moscow. Such hopes were visible in the statements of the Yugoslav president even during Berlinguer's visit in October 1977. However, from the fall of 1978, both parties did away with the illusion that the relations with Moscow could be improved. For the Italian communists, this became clear during Berlinguer's visit to the Soviet Union, and the Soviet negative reactions to the improvement of Yugoslav-Chinese relations dispelled Belgrade's illusions as well. All this was a prelude to the intensification of the tensions in the communist movement, which reached their peak at the end of 1979, with the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.

Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the cornerstone of the extremely close and allied relations between the two parties was resistance to Moscow's hegemony in the International Communist Movement. Based on that alliance, the two parties expressed mutual sympathies on other issues as well, such as the position of the PCI in Italian politics or internal reforms in Yugoslavia. However, the material analyzed in this paper also reveals certain fundamental differences. They are, above all, reflected in a certain distancing of Yugoslavia from the fundamental ideas of Eurocommunism, i.e. multi-party pluralism. On the other hand, the lack of interest of the Italian communists in the Yugoslav system of self-governance, as well as their implicit criticism of the state of human rights in the country, reflect the fact that Belgrade was primarily a foreign policy partner for PCI, but not an ideological role model. Both parties had reservations about each other's internal policies, finding common elements primarily in foreign policy. The alliance of LCY and PCI was, above all, based on foreign policy, and it was crucially focused on the issues of international communism. The *détente* was a process that gave their alliance considerable space and importance, and with the growth of Soviet expansionism in Africa and Asia and a new

American administration focused on a tighter ideological conflict with Moscow, the preconditions for the détente were disappearing. With the collapse of the détente, the LCY and PCI alliance irreversibly lost its strength and importance, disappearing from the international scene in the last decade of the “short twentieth century”.

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The Yugoslav Perspective on Italian Eurocommunism in the Second Half of the 1970s¹

Abstract: The article outlines the key elements of the Yugoslav perceptions of the Italian Communist Party's (PCI) ideological and political orientation during its Eurocommunist phase. In addition, it investigates the relationship between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and PCI in the latter half of the 1970s. The article is primarily based on an analysis of Yugoslav archival sources and press materials.

Keywords: LCY, Tito, Berlinguer, Italian Communist Party, Eurocommunism

Throughout the history of socialist Yugoslavia, Italy has played an enormously significant role. The Yugoslav interaction with its Adriatic neighbour remained solid and unfolded on multiple levels. Although the territorial dispute over Trieste, which ensued in the last days of the Second World War, tended to disrupt the two neighbours' rapport, the Trieste issue could not annul the excellent potential for the development of a bilateral relationship. The Trieste dispute was tentatively settled with the London memorandum, with the issue of territorial contentions between Belgrade and Rome being finally settled in Osimo in 1975.²

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² The issue of Trieste as part of the relations between socialist Yugoslavia and Italy has been discussed by numerous Yugoslav and Italian researchers, allowing us to conclude that it is the most thoroughly explored aspect of the Yugo-Italian relationship after the Second World War. For previous research on the aforementioned issue, see M. Cattaruzza, *L'Italia e il confine orientale 1866–2006* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007); M. Milkić, *Tršćanska kriza u vojno-političkim odnosima* (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2013); B. Novak, *Trieste 1941–1954* (Milano: Mursia, 2013); B. Dimitrijević, D. Bogetić, *Tršćanska kriza 1945–1954. Vojno-politički aspekti* (The military and politic aspects of the Trieste crisis) (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2009); S. Mišić, *Pomirenje na Jadranu: Jugoslavija i Italija na putu ka Osimskim sporazumima iz 1975* (The Reconciliation on the Adriatic: Yugoslavia and Italy on the Road to Ossimo Agreements of 1975) (Beograd: Fakultet političkih nauka, 2018); G. Valdevit, *Il dilemma Trieste. Guerra e dopoguerra in uno scenario europeo* (Gorizia:

Besides the question of Trieste, the non-complementary foreign policy orientations of Rome and Belgrade during the Cold War also had an adverse effect on the Yugo-Italian relations. Whilst Italy adamantly retained a pro-Western, Atlantic stance from the very beginning of the Cold War divide, remaining a powerful pillar of NATO's southern wing, Yugoslavia, from the mid-1950s, set out on a path towards a neutral, non-aligned position in global relations.

Nevertheless, not even these divergences or the aforementioned territorial dispute were successful in meaningfully disrupting the rapprochement of Rome and Belgrade. Bilateral relations between the two states were being established on various levels – economics, politics, and culture. The interaction between Yugoslavia and Italy was, however, strikingly asymmetric, meaning that Italy retained a much greater significance for Yugoslavia than vice versa. Italy's impact on Yugoslav economics and culture was particularly apparent.³

Another special bond between the two countries was the relationship between their respective communist parties. The positions of the two communist parties, however, were not comparable. In Yugoslavia, Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) (that is from 1952, League of Communists of Yugoslavia -LCY) had an unquestionable political monopoly. The Italian communists, on the other hand, apart from the initial post-war years, had no access to the “zone of power” in Rome. Nevertheless, it was a forceful, very large Italian party, which closely followed the ruling Christian Democrats throughout the Cold War phase, incessantly feeding the fears of a “communist danger”.

The communist elites in Rome and Belgrade maintained a close partnership for the greater part of the Cold War. Still, the exchanges between the two

Libreria Editrice Goriziana, 1999); P. Dragišić, “Tito's War after the War: Yugoslav Territorial Claims against Austria and Italy, 1945–1949”. In *The Alps-Adriatic Region 1945–1955. International and Transnational Perspectives on a Conflicted European Region*, eds. Wolfgang Mueller, Karlo Ruzicic Kessler, Philipp Greilinger, (Wien: New Academic Press, 2018), 31–51; R. Wörsdörfer, *Il confine orientale. Italia e Jugoslavia dal 1915 al 1955* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2009).

³ For various aspects of the Yugo-Italian relations during the Cold War era, see F. Rolandi, *Con ventiquattromila baci. L'influenza della cultura di massa italiana in Jugoslavia (1955–1965)* (Bologna: Bononia University Press, 2015); L. Monzali, “La questione jugoslava nella politica estera italiana dalla prima guerra mondiale ai trattati di Osimo (1914–1975)”. In *Europa adriatica. Storia, relazioni, economia*, a cura di Fanco Botta e Italo Garzia, (Bari: Editori Laterza 2005), 15–72; M. Bucarelli, *La “questione jugoslava” nella politica estera dell'Italia repubblicana (1945–1999)* (Roma: Aracne editrice, 2008); M. Capriati, “Gli scambi commerciali tra Italia e Jugoslavia dal dopoguerra al 1991”. In *Europa adriatica. Storia, relazioni, economia*, a cura di Fanco Botta e Italo Garzia, (Bari: Editori Laterza, 2005), 157–165; П. Драгишић, *Шта смо знали о Италији?: погледи из Београда на Италију 1955–1978* (What did we know about Italy? Views from Belgrade), (Београд: Институт за новију историју Србије, 2019).

parties were not without hiccups, caused equally by the bilateral Yugo-Italian tensions and by the dynamics between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.⁴

These bilateral tensions in the relationship between the Italian and Yugoslav Communist Parties were fuelled by the aforementioned Trieste issue, which, in the immediate post-war period, contaminated the association of not only Belgrade and Rome but both countries' communist parties. According to Yugoslav sources, the majority of the PCI leadership, including Palmiro Togliatti, its leader at the time, perceived the Yugo-Italian Trieste dispute as a "sentimental question" for the Italian people.⁵ Besides, the Italian communists' leader disapproved of the pro-Yugoslav orientation of the PCI's Julian Venetia faction.⁶ The indicator of a certain remoteness in the relations of the two communist parties was also Kardelj's criticism of PCI's course during the September 1947 Cominform conference in Sklarska Poremba. Namely, Kardelj attacked PCI's tactic in the struggle for coming to office in the Italian socio-political system. The most influential Slovenian communist did not approve of the Italian communists' participation in the civic, non-communist cabinets during the initial post-war period.⁷

The conflict between the communist elites in Belgrade and Rome escalated the following year. The Cominform Resolution, adopted in June 1948, dra-

⁴ The relationship between the Yugoslav communists and the Italian Communist Party (Partito comunista italiano – PCI) was investigated in numerous works by Italian and Yugoslav authors. See S. Mišić, "Yugoslav Communists and the Communist Party of Italy 1945–1956". In *Italy's Balkan Strategies (19th – 20th Century)*, ed. Vojislav Pavlović, (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan History SASA, 2015), 281–291; P. Dragišić, S. Mišić, "I Partiti comunisti italiano e jugoslavo durante il conflitto jugoslavo-sovietico del 1948–1949 nelle fonti diplomatiche jugoslave", *Qualestoria* 1 (2017), 89–101; M. Galeazzi, *Togliatti e Tito. Tra identità nazionale e internazionalismo*, (Roma: Carocci editore S.p.A. 2005); M. Zuccari, *Il dito sulla piaga. Togliatti e il Pci nella rottura fra Stalin e Tito 1944–1957* (Milano: Mursia, 2008); P. Karlsen, *Frontiera rossa. Il Pci, il confine orientale e il contesto internazionale 1941–1955*, Prefazione di E. Aga-Rossi, Leg. (Gorizia: Leg Edizioni, 2010).

⁵ Archives of Yugoslavia (AY), League of Communists of Yugoslavia (507), Commission for International Relations (IX), 48/I-39, KPI - About the political line/About the leaders of the PCI (1946).

⁶ AY, Office of the Marshal of Yugoslavia (836), I-3-b/322, Confidential reports of the MP of the SFRY in Rome, Mladen Iveković, to the Marshal of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, on the conversation with the General Secretary of the CP of Italy, Palmiro Togliatti, Rome, August 10, 1947.

⁷ *Совештания Коминформа. 1947, 1948, 1949. Документы и материалы*, (Москва, 1998), 196. (Soveshtaniya Kominforma). According to Kardelj, this coalition-forming policy orientation of PCI was not in accordance with the People's Democracies principles of government formation, which involved an alliance of the working class with "the other working masses" and under the guidance of the communist party, which would hold the commanding posts in the state. That was not the case in Italy, Kardelj concluded.

matically soured the relationship between Belgrade and Moscow, in turn leading to a sudden and pronounced break of the previously tight bond between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. This split had its ideological, political, and security aspects. This phenomenon has been exhaustively discussed in both Yugoslav and international historical scholarship, and hence this well-researched question shall not be further investigated here. For the purposes of this paper, suffice it to say that it was a dramatic turning point that severely affected the relationship between the communist parties of Yugoslavia and Italy. The fact that PCI backed the Cominform Resolution led to a complete rupture of the ties between the two parties. The connections between the Yugoslav and Italian communists were restored following the normalisation of the relations between Belgrade and Moscow in the mid-1950s.⁸

Nevertheless, even after the “reconciliation” of the party elites in Rome and Belgrade, the relationship of the two parties was not entirely independent of the Soviet-Yugoslav interrelation.

This would become apparent already at the end of the 1950s, when the program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, adopted at the LCY’s Seventh Congress in 1958, led to a new cooling of the ties between Belgrade and Moscow. Namely, to an extent, PCI partook in the camp’s criticism of Yugoslav “revisionism”. Still, this crisis in the relations between the two communist parties was far from the intensity of the conflict between the communist elites of Yugoslavia and Italy in the aftermath of the Cominform Resolution. What is more, even this crisis in the relationship between the two parties was soon overcome, following the new Yugoslav-Soviet reconciliation in the early 1960s.⁹

The good relations between the two communist parties in the 1960s led to frequent contacts between LCY and PCI officials, as well as various forms of Yugoslav material support for their Italian “comrades”. The Yugoslav regime financially supported the PCI’s officials’ annual vacations in Yugoslavia and covered the Italian communists’ medical expenses in Yugoslavia, with Belgrade also financing the living expenses of the PCI’s newspaper “Unità” correspondent in Yugoslavia. According to Yugoslav sources, the Yugoslav regime donated 100 million lira to the Italian communist party in 1969.¹⁰

The key political and ideological principles that the PCI advocated in the second half of the 1970s were grouped into a complex concept dubbed Eurocommunism and then promoted by the three leading communist parties of Western Eu-

⁸ See footnote 4.

⁹ П. Драгишић, *Шта смо знали о Италији?*, 177–178.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 230–231.

rope – the communist parties of Italy, France and Spain. The proximity of their views, in addition to the intensive communication of these communist parties, led in the second half of the 1970s to the formation of an informal Eurocommunist bloc of Western European countries. The close ties of the Yugoslav and Italian communists, discussed in the previous paragraphs, bring us to an analysis of the relationship of the Yugoslav regime towards the Eurocommunist orientation of the PCI.

The concept of Eurocommunism is most precisely outlined in the unofficial manifesto of this Marxist experiment – *Eurocommunism and the State* by Santiago Carrillo, the leader of the Communist Party of Spain. At the end of 1977, Carrillo summarized his Eurocommunist views in an interview for the *Komunist*, the LCY's newspaper. He emphasized the commitment of Western European communists to a non-violent struggle for socialism, in alliance with non-communist social actors. Besides, Carrillo further accentuated, Eurocommunists argued for the independent development paths of communist parties, clearly implying the emancipation of the Western European communists from Moscow (Carrillo never mentioned this explicitly, but it can be easily inferred).¹¹

Contesting the strategy of the dictatorship of the proletariat, that is, ignoring the Soviet experience in constructing socialism, immanent in the Eurocommunist course, significantly shaped the orientation of the PCI in the second half of the 1970s. The outcome was a strategy of a "historic compromise", that is, CP's entry into the "zone of power" in alliance with the Socialists and the Christian Democracy (Democrazia Cristiana, DC).

Given the aforementioned close ties between the Italian and Yugoslav communists, Belgrade carefully followed this evolution of the PCI, analyzing

¹¹ "Шпањолски комунисти у демократском преображају своје земље", (Spanish Communists on democratic change of their country) *Комунист* (Komunist), November 14th 1977. "Keeping in mind the development of modern day weaponry, the communists of Western Europe – the Spanish ones included – are not of the opinion that turning an imperialist war into a civil one would be a feasible path towards the socialist perspective. That is because a world war would be the suicide of all social classes. On the other hand, we consider the development of the global socialist forces as heading towards the proletarian vanguard and other wider social forces attaining an ever increasing desire for participation in the struggle for socialism. That is a pretty broad alliance of urban and rural workers, cultural forces, mid-layer anti-monopolistic actors who make up the greater part of the society. This allows for a wider, more democratic, and, in turn, relatively more peaceful road to socialism, which does not involve the usurpation of power through an armed resurrection and understands the protection of power through democratic forms, with respecting political and philosophical pluralism (...) Every workers' party should integrate into the interests of its own people and should become the staunchest representative of its interests. This renders the independence of every party and every state necessary for the expression of their own domestic and foreign policy (...)"

the roots of its commitment to a historic compromise and trying to predict the scope of this ambitious strategy.

In the report of the LCY delegation that attended the 14th PCI Congress in 1975, Berlinguer's idea of a historic compromise with the socialists and Catholics (Christian Democracy) was at the same time described as novel and as a project that had, albeit in different forms, already featured in the earlier history of PCI. In the same report, it was noted that Antonio Gramsci pleaded for the cooperation of communists and Catholics, which was supposed to become an "obstacle to fascism", and it was also underlined that in 1944 Togliatti emphasized the need for Italian national unity, that is, "the historic meeting of communists and Catholics on the Italian road to socialism". It was further remarked that Enrico Berlinguer, PCI's leader, elaborated the idea of a historic compromise in the Central Committee and the main Controlling Commission meeting in December 1974. According to the same Yugoslav analysis, the latter two parties of the Cold War Italian political triangle – the Christian Democracy and the Socialists – did not take well to the aforementioned communists' initiative: "It can be said, without a doubt, that no other move made by the Left in Italy after the war has caused as much interest and at the same time confused its adversaries (Christian Democrats), while putting their semi-ally (Socialists) into an uncomfortable position."¹²

The Christian Democrats' resistance to the idea of a historic compromise with the communists was in the same report interpreted as a corollary of the Catholics' fear that an alliance with the Communists would severely threaten the position of the Christian Democracy in the Italian political system: "DC (Democrazia Cristiana - P.D.) considers the Italian communists' proposal primarily as a shrewd tactical move to get the communists into the orbit of power and start introducing the policy of a totalitarian regime and state capitalism. The DC is further convinced that the PCI's intention is to isolate the DC and discredit it amongst the electorate and the Italian society in general (...) The negative attitude of the DC and civic parties is conditioned by their class interest, that is, by their awareness of the radical changes that a coalition with the PCI would have on Italian society on all levels, primarily economic, social and in foreign policy. The DC is also aware that accepting the historic compromise would mark the end of its monopoly over political and economic life in Italy, which has lasted for three decades and which the DC does not intend to relinquish for as long as possible."¹³

¹² AY, CPY, IX, S/a-277, Report of the delegation of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia from the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Italy, June 1975.

¹³ Ibid.

The Socialists' (PSI) resistance to the idea of a historic compromise was, in the Yugoslav view, a corollary of their fear of marginalisation in a potential coalition of Communists and Catholics. However, there was some outside resistance, too. Thus, the report of the LCY delegation that attended the 14th PCI Congress underlined that the West, namely Washington, had strong reservations about the possibility of PCI's rise to power. Such a development would have further endangered Rome's pro-Western course: "Lastly, there is fierce resistance from external forces, primarily the US and NATO, which, due to Italy's geostrategic position, have a vital interest in preserving its class composition and pro-Atlantic orientation. Both the Italian establishment and external factors (the US) agree that the realisation of a historic compromise would irrevocably call into question these two main options of contemporary Italy."¹⁴

The Yugoslav side looked favourably on the Communist strategy of a historic compromise. The Yugoslav press clearly pointed to this conclusion in relation to the Italian Communists' orientation. It is further corroborated by the reactions in Yugoslavia to the murder of Aldo Moro, a Christian Democratic leader who played a prominent role in bringing the Christian Democracy and Communists closer in the late 1970s. Belgrade claimed that this assassination of a proponent of the idea of bringing together Catholics and Communists was an outcome of "the dark forces meddling from below". Moro's aspiration for the Communists to join his party "at the helm of the country" was lauded as an act of political realism.¹⁵

The *Komunist* newspaper referred to Moro as "a protagonist of a policy of bringing together Italian democratic parties". It concluded that his murder reflected the fact that "the process of democratic opening and political cooperation on a wide national base" was opposed not only by "a handful of adventurers" but also by "a well-oiled machinery of powerful forces of the dark and reaction". It emphasised that Moro believed that the way out of the political and economic crisis that Italy was facing was to "bring together all the democratically-oriented forces".¹⁶

Besides the fact that the Belgrade press lamented the murder of a Christian Democratic protagonist of the Communist-Catholic rapprochement, the Yugoslav regime's positive stance towards the idea of a historic compromise was unequivocally confirmed during the official visit of Enrico Berlinguer to Yugoslavia in 1975 and his conversation with the leader of the Yugoslav CP and head

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ "Italija posle ubistva Alda Mora", (Italy after the assassination of Aldo Moro) *Borba*, 11th May 1978.

¹⁶ "Ubistvo Alda Mora – Tragično upozorenje", (The Assassination of Aldo Moro - Tragic warning) *Komunist*, 15th May 1978.

of state, Josip Broz Tito. In his conversation with the secretary general of PCI in March 1975, after the aforementioned 14th Congress of PCI, Broz touched upon the question of PCI's position on the historic compromise. Berlinguer reminded Broz that the PCI's congress had been concerned with the party's orientation towards "the widest possible opening towards all the progressive democratic forces, Catholics included".¹⁷ In his toast at the luncheon with Berlinguer, Broz explicitly supported this course of the Italian Communists. Namely, he wished the secretary general of PCI and other Italian communists to "keep moving forward to bring together all the progressive forces" in Italy. He added that he considered PCI's stance on drawing together "as many progressive people as possible" to be "quite right".¹⁸

Along with its positive assessment of the Italian Communists' efforts to come closer to the Catholic segment on the Italian political spectrum, the Yugoslav regime was supportive of the Italian Communists' efforts, as well as those of the communists in France and Spain, to break away from Moscow, in accordance with the principles of Eurocommunism, and to build their own path to socialism.

In an outright clash of two conceptions of the socialist development – the Soviet one, which pleaded for the leading role of CPSU in the international communist movement, and the Eurocommunist one, which insisted on individual roads to socialism, or to put it differently, opposed replicating the Soviet model – the Yugoslav communists sided with the biggest CPs of Western Europe (those of Italy, Spain and France). The Yugoslav side publicly took its stance at the conference of European Communist Parties, which took place in June 1976 in East Berlin. The Yugoslav party leader's speech at this pan-European meeting of Communists showed a clear commitment to pluralism in terms of attaining socialism. He thus lent direct support to the Eurocommunist distancing from the political and ideological monopoly of Moscow in the international communist movement: "There is a shift in political atmosphere happening on that basis, which directs wide strata of working people towards advanced social transformation. Under such pressure, all the societal forces have a duty to reconsider their views and values and seek proper solutions. As for the praxis of socialism, there are likewise no permanent solutions, given once and for all and applicable to all circumstances. It is likewise followed by difficulties and contradictions. The passage of time brings about new demands, in accordance with the development of productive forces and social consciousness – hence the neces-

¹⁷ AY, Cabinet of the President of the Republic (CPR), I-3-a/44-59, Note on the conversation between the President of the CPY, Josip Broz Tito, and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Italy, Enrico Berlinguer, on March 29th 1975.

¹⁸ AY, Cabinet of the President of the Republic (CPR), I-3-a/44-59, President Tito's toast at a luncheon in honor of Enrico Berlinguer.

sity of different paths in the struggle for socialism and its further development. What matters is that the solutions offered by the progressive forces today arise from the real interests of the working class and working people.”¹⁹

Eurocommunist forces, which were, as already mentioned, supported by the Yugoslav side, took the upper hand at the conference. The final report from the Berlin conference highlighted the autonomy of communist parties in seeking their path towards a socialist society. Thus, a formal line of demarcation was drawn between, on the one hand, the Berlin conference, and on the other, the policy of Comintern (and, later, Cominform). The report stated that European communist parties that attended the conference “will develop their internationalist, comradely and voluntary cooperation and solidarity, on the basis of the great ideals of Marx, Engels and Lenin, with unwavering respect for equality and sovereign independence of each and every party, non-interference in their internal affairs, and acknowledgement of freedom of choice with regard to different paths of the struggle for progressive social transformation and socialism.”²⁰ A few days later, despite the Eastern European CPs (especially the Bulgarian Communist Party) showing no enthusiasm for the quoted passage in the final report from the Berlin conference, it was characterised by the *Politika* newspaper as “a significant set of principles of permanent value and relevance.”²¹

To understand the position of the Yugoslav regime on the concept of Eurocommunism, or the Eurocommunist course of PCI, it is not of particular importance to grasp the impact of the Berlin conference. Much more significant was the fact that LCY publicly and vocally supported the aspirations of the Italian communists, as well as the communists of France and Spain, to break away from Moscow. That stance was not affected by the fact that neither PCI

¹⁹ “Tito: Uvek smo se suprotstavljali i suprotstavljamo se svim oblicima mešanja u unutrašnje stvari drugih”, (We have always been opposed and will continue to do so, to any form of interference in the internal affairs of the others), *Politika*, 1st July 1976.

²⁰ “Završni dokument Konferencije evropskih komunističkih i radničkih partija o miru, bezbednosti, saradnji i društvenom napretku u Evropi”, (The Final document of the Conference of Communist and Labour Parties on Peace, Security, Cooperation and Social Progress in Europe), *Politika*, 3rd July 1976.

²¹ “Korak napred u Berlinu”, (A Step Forward in Berlin) *Politika*, 4th July 1976. An analysis of the Department of International Relations of the Presidium of CC LCY (Odeljenje za međunarodne odnose i veze Predsedništva CK SKJ) underscored that the speeches of the Eastern European party representatives deviated from the aforementioned theses on the need for a greater autonomy of communist parties, i.e. their independence from Moscow. AY, CPY, IX, S/a-297, Department for International Relations and Relations of the Presidency of the CC LCY, Analysis of internal reactions and assessments of socialist and other progressive parties and movements, as well as some ruling circles and structures in the world, to the holding of the Conference of European Communist and of workers’ parties in Berlin, November 23rd 1976.

nor the French Communist Party pleaded to withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty during their Eurocommunist phase, although this contradicted the Yugoslav non-bloc orientation.²² I believe that Belgrade, through its support for the Eurocommunist programme of PCI and the other two big Western European Communist parties, wanted to affirm and corroborate its own aspirations to search for an individual path to socialism, independently from Moscow and other Eastern European parties. In defending the right of Eurocommunists to their autonomous socialist development, the Yugoslav regime also defended its own socialist course, albeit different from the one the Eurocommunists took. Thus a 1977 report of the Presidium of LCY underlined that the principle of the autonomy of communist parties, which dominated the Berlin conference, was an idea that the Yugoslav Communists had championed ever since their confrontation with the Cominform in 1948.²³

The Yugoslav Communists continued to express their sympathies towards the Eurocommunists and to distance themselves from Moscow even after the conference of European communist parties in East Berlin. The Yugoslav regime's position came to the fore during the clashes between Moscow and Eurocommunist parties in 1977 and 1978. Namely, in June 1977, at a congress of Czechoslovak journalists, Vasil Bilak, a member of the Presidium of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, fiercely attacked the Eurocommunist parties. He defined Eurocommunism as "a buzzword and a product of anti-Communism and bourgeois ideology". The orientation of the communist parties of Italy, France and Spain was, in Bilak's view, a mixture of "petty-bourgeois reformism and national communism", or "an old revisionist product in new packaging".²⁴

Not long after Bilak's condemnation of the Eurocommunist course, an assault on Eurocommunism came from an even "higher-powered" place. Namely, the *Novoye Vremya* (The New Times) magazine, a Moscow-based foreign policy journal, sharply criticised Santiago Carrillo (the secretary general of the Spanish CP), "the apostle of Eurocommunism", and his book "Eurocommunism and the State". *Novoye Vremya* emphasised that Carrillo propagated anti-Sovi-

²² AY, CPY, IX, S/a-297, Department for International Relations of the Presidium of CC LCY, Analysis of internal reactions and assessments of socialist and other progressive parties and movements, as well as some ruling circles and structures in the world, to the holding of the Conference of European Communist and of workers' parties in Berlin, November 23rd 1976.

²³ AY, CPY, IX, S/a-311, Department for International Relations and Connections of the Presidency of the Central Committee of CPY, Report on the International Activity of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between the 10th and 11th Congresses, September 22nd 1977.

²⁴ "Bilakov napad na evrokomunizam", (Bilak's attack on Eurocommunism) *Politika*, 19th June 1977.

etism, was openly in favour of a split in the international workers' movement and advocated a version of socialism detached from the theory of Marxism-Leninism. Moreover, the Soviet magazine identified Eurocommunism as "Western Atlanticism".²⁵

The Yugoslav side openly condemned the attacks on Eurocommunism coming from Moscow and Prague. In an article published in the *Politika* newspaper on June 28th 1977, the Soviet campaign against Eurocommunists was characterised as "a rejection of autonomy and authenticity" of Western European communist parties. The author of the article in the Belgrade daily newspaper added that these attacks were reminiscent of "certain precedents in the past, when enemies of communism were constantly being discovered in the so-called world communist movement".²⁶ Although *Politika's* journalist made no explicit reference to Cominform's confrontation with Yugoslavia in 1948, it is clear that the sentence quoted above alluded, either primarily or among other things, to that episode in the history of the international communist movement.²⁷

Yugoslavia lent its support to the Eurocommunist parties again half a year later, at the beginning of 1978, when the Soviets stroke again. This time, the *Novoye Vremya* magazine criticised Manuel Azcárate, a member of the Executive Committee of CC of the Communist Party of Spain. An article in *Politika* unequivocally supported the right of Eurocommunist parties to an individual road to socialism and at the same time criticised Moscow's insistence on the Soviet monopoly in the international communist movement.²⁸

²⁵ "Kariljo optužen za antisovjetizam", (Carillo accused of anti-Soviet attitude) *Borba*, 24th June 1977.

²⁶ "Pravo na autentičnost", (The Right to be Authentic) *Politika*, 28th June 1977.

²⁷ The aforementioned article from the *Politika* newspaper was coincidentally published on the anniversary of the Cominform's passing of the Resolution on Yugoslavia.

²⁸ "Smisao napada na evrokomunizam", (The essence of the Attacks on Eurocommunism) *Borba*, 23 January 1978. "(...) it is absurd to oppose 'pluralism' in choosing the path of socialist development, i.e. to imagine the variety of paths to socialism as an 'anti-socialist ideology', which is directed by the imperialist powers in order to undermine 'genuine', that is, 'real' socialism in one or more countries. It is indisputable that both the reaction and imperialism are attempting to undermine our movement, or even to confront Communist Parties where possible. However, that does not mean that an effective weapon against them is homogeneity, embankment, or an absolutisation of one particular (Soviet – P.D.) experience; the least of which would be some sort of institutionalisation of unity. On the contrary, it is the autonomy of communist parties, that is, their emancipation from the ruling centre and turn towards their own peoples and the working class that represents the best way to weaken the reaction and imperialism. (...) The bottom line is to allow communist parties to be autonomous and independent in formulating their own political strategy and tactic, in order to transform their societies and build socialism. 'Eurocommunism' in that sense represents a new socialist alternative which is suitable not only for the contemporary national but also international

The Yugoslav president and party leader publicly supported the Eurocommunist road to socialism as well. As articulated in a joint statement released after a meeting with Enrico Berlinguer, the Italian Communists' leader, in October 1977, Broz supported the right of the Eurocommunist parties, including the Italian Communist Party, to choose their own path to socialism.²⁹

The Yugoslavs assessed that the Communist Party of Italy had some reservations about certain parts of Carrillo's book, as well as his public appearances, irrespective of the fact that it too condemned the aforementioned article published in *Novoye Vremya*. Belgrade noted that PCI favoured a less offensive policy towards Moscow: "CP of Italy is demonstrating a deep understanding of CPSU's anxiety, which is seen as being on the defensive and should not be forced to kneel down further."³⁰

Although the joint statement released after Tito's meeting with Berlinguer suggests unequivocal support of the Yugoslav leader for the Eurocommunists and PCI on their path to socialism, the available minutes of the meeting reveal that Broz made some critical remarks concerning the Eurocommunist course. While he was critical of the very term "Eurocommunism", his main gripe had to do with the Eurocommunists' public and harsh attacks on Moscow. Tito implicitly suggested to Berlinguer to opt for dialogue instead of an open and public confrontation with Moscow. At the same time, he assured Berlinguer that he had already condemned the Soviets for their attacks against the Eurocommunist course. These stances of the Yugoslav leader were entirely in accordance with the then-policy of Yugoslavia towards the USSR. Contrary to its enduring insistence on autonomous existence within the international communist movement, Yugoslavia was not ready for a decisive break with Moscow. Thus Broz showed understanding for both sides' arguments in the dispute between the Eurocom-

circumstances and conditions. Anything other than that means meddling into the internal affairs of particular communist parties and particular countries. That is true whether it concerns communists joining the government, or their alignment and identification with one or more socialist countries, whose ideological and political conceptions they must accept as absolute."

²⁹ "Susret Tito-Berlinguer", (Tito meets Berlinguer) *Politika*, 5th October 1977. "Comrades Tito and Berlinguer reasserted their respective parties' (LCY and PCI) full solidarity and support for all the forces which advocate the natural and inalienable right of every party and movement to choose, freely and independently, ways and methods of struggle for socialism and its development (...) They emphasised the vital importance of strict adherence (in practice) to the principle of non-interference, and the right of every party to decide autonomously its path of development, taking into account their countries' particular features and the interests of their own working class and people."

³⁰ AY, Cabinet of the President of the Republic (CPR), I-3a/44-61, Service for Foreign Policy Affairs, Information on the Communist Party of Italy in the light of the current situation and relations between the CPY and the PCI, October 1st 1977.

munists and the USSR. His wish to deescalate this conflict can also be detected: "President Tito asked [Berlinguer] why the term "Eurocommunism", which was coined by the bourgeoisie, is being utilised. It breeds confusion, since there is only one communism for the whole world. (...) President Tito confirms this is an issue, adding that it has been discussed in China, as well as during his recent visit to Moscow. We said the term is inadequate and wrong, but at the heart of the matter is the relationship of communist parties towards the notions of the Berlin conference, i.e. to what extent they accede to the particular forms of partisan behaviour. In conclusion, "Eurocommunism" is not a good term. President Tito added that in Moscow there were also talks about CPSU's departures from the principles of the Berlin conference. We openly told them they were not good. (...) There was not much talk, Tito added, about Carrillo's book, though it was visible that the Soviets were bitter about it. We explicitly told them that we disagree with the way the open polemic with CP of Spain was carried out. President Tito then said that he had not read Carrillo's book. However, if the book interferes in any internal affairs, if it provides one-sided criticisms of other countries' domestic systems, we cannot agree with that either. Such issues should not be discussed publicly, regardless of systemic failures. One should be realistic, for such a large state can hardly be expected to accept public criticism (underlined by P.D.). We told them that we disapproved of the attacks in the first article published in *Novoye Vremya* (...) On the whole, we wanted to calm the situation down (underlined by P.D.) (...) President Tito further said that no other CP in Europe, apart from LCY, had that much experience or such experiences at all with CPSU, whether in 1948 or later. But even then, we insisted on dealing with the issues calmly and through a dialogue; we wanted to keep them within the inner circle, avoiding unnecessary publicity, and that turned out to be a good decision."³¹

The Yugoslav regime's desire to alleviate the tension between the Eurocommunists and Moscow was reflected in a sentence uttered by Aleksandar Grličkov, secretary of the Executive Committee of the Presidium of CC LCY, taken from his conversation with PCI's high officials, Giancarlo Pajetta, Sergio

³¹ AY, Cabinet of the President of the Republic (CPR), I-3-a/44-61, Note on the conversation between the President of the Republic and the President of the CPY Josip Broz Tito with the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Italy Enrico Berlinguer, October 4th 1977, in Karadorđevo. From the quoted passage, we see that Broz was critical of the concept of "Eurocommunism" at a meeting in Karadorđevo. It was a Yugoslav citizen, however, who is thought to have coined the term. His name was Frane Barbieri, and he claimed to have invented the term; by his own account, the term was coined in 1976. F. Barbieri, *Ljjeva i desna skretanja* (Zagreb, 1987), 82.

Segre and Antonio Rubbi in July 1977 in Rome. Among other things, Grličkov told his Italian interlocutors that they have to “curb their anti-Sovietism”.³²

The dramatic developments in Afghanistan at the very end of the 1970s once again brought to the fore the concord between the Yugoslav Communists and the Communist Party of Italy. Both parties condemned, in their respective ways, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Merely several days after the Soviets began their offensive in Afghanistan, the Yugoslav Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs underscored that “foreign intervention in any form, or imposing foreign will upon sovereign states, is unacceptable”.³³

A few weeks after the Soviets began their intervention in Afghanistan, Belgrade hosted a high-level delegation of PCI headed by Paolo Bufalini. At a meeting with the LCY delegation, led by Aleksandar Grličkov, the Italian guests strongly condemned USSR’s campaign in Afghanistan. Bufalini emphasised that it was “an open and mass invasion that employs disgraceful methods”. Furthermore, he claimed that PCI’s assessment that Belgrade’s position on the question of Afghanistan was more cautious than the Yugoslav standpoint on the Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea. Grličkov replied, however, that LCY’s stance is in accord with PCI’s position on the question of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. To corroborate his point, Grličkov added that Yugoslavia had condemned the Soviet actions in Afghanistan at the UN, requesting an immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops.³⁴

* * *

The proximity of the viewpoints of the regime in Belgrade and the Communist Party of Italy in the second half of the 1970s, during the short-lived rise of the Eurocommunist concept, enabled a phase of fairly close cooperation between the Yugoslav and Italian Communists. The good relations between the two parties are attested by frequent meetings of high party officials (Tito and Berlinguer met three times from the mid-1970s), public demonstrations of positive attitudes towards one another. The close relationship between LCY and PCI was substantiated by the material support provided by the Yugoslav regime to the

³² AY, CPY, IX, 48/I–566, Report of the Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Presidium of the Central Committee Aleksandar Grličkov, on the conversation with representatives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Italy in Rome, July 12th and 13th 1977.

³³ “Nedopustiva je svaka strana intervencija ili nametanje svoje volje suverenim državama”, (All foreign intervention or interference in the affairs of a sovereign state is inadmissible) *Politika*, 31st December 1979; 1st & 2nd January 1980.

³⁴ AY, CPY, IX, 48/I–603, Information on talks between representatives of CPY and PCI, 12–14. January 1980 in Belgrade.

Italian Communists. According to the Yugoslav source materials, LCY donated 200,000 dollars to the Communist Party of Italy at the end of 1978. At its October 1978 meeting in Brdo Castle near Kranj, the Presidium of CC LCY decided to act on PCI's request for financial support. Stane Dolanc, the then-secretary of the Presidium of CC LCY, suggested a sum of 200,000 dollars in aid.³⁵

Indicative of a high level of trust that the Italian Communists confided in their sister party in Yugoslavia was the intention of a number of PCI's high-ranking officials to defect to Yugoslavia in case of a right-wing coup in Italy (which was speculated upon during the so-called Strategy of Tension period in the 1970s). This plan of escaping potential repressive measures in Italy is attested in Yugoslav intelligence sources.³⁶

Summary

The relationship between the Yugoslav Communists and the Communist Party of Italy in the Cold War era was characterised by multiple ups and downs, which were caused, on the one hand, by processes in the international communist movement, and on the other, by bilateral issues between Yugoslavia and Italy. However, cooperation between the two parties from the early 1960s was close and multilayered. Communication between the Yugoslav and Italian Communists in the second half of the 1970s was intense. During that time, the Communist Party of Italy, along with the communists in Spain and France, espoused a Eurocommunist orientation, which implied a departure from the idea of revolutionary conquest of power, as well as distancing from Moscow. Yugoslavia openly supported the Eurocommunist orientation of the Communist Party of Italy and other Eurocommunist parties. Hence there was close cooperation between the communists in Yugoslavia and Italy in the second half of the 1970s. During this period, Yugoslav media reported sympathetically about the CP of

³⁵ AY, CPY, IX, 48/I-585, Presidency of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Italy, Information on the request of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Italy that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Italy grant them financial aid, December 5th 1978; AY, CPY, IX, 48/I-585, Presidency of the Central Committee of the CPY, Information on the handing over of aid by the CPY to the Communist Party of Italy, December 18th 1978.

³⁶ AY, CPY, I-5-b/44-18, Service for Foreign Policy Affairs, Internal Affairs in Italy, 7th February 1975. In addition to this, PCI considered the possibility of transferring its archives and financial resources (up to that point deposited in Switzerland) to Yugoslavia. In his conversation with a member of the PCI's main office, Giovanni Cervetti, Stane Dolanc accepted this proposal. AY, CPY, IX, 48/I-579, Note on the conversation between the secretary of the CPY Central Committee Presidency, Stane Dolanc, and the member of the PCI Directorate, Giovanni Cerveti, July 27th 1978

Italy, while the highest-ranking Yugoslav officials publicly supported the Italian communists.

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
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IN MEMORIAM



Đorđe S. Kostić
(1947–2022)

Đorđe S. Kostić, our long-tenured and cherished colleague at the Institute for Balkan Studies SASA and a retired research fellow, passed away in Belgrade in May of 2022. During his long and fruitful time spent at the Institute for Balkan Studies SASA, Đorđe S. Kostić delved into literary history and the culture of Balkan societies.

Đorđe S. Kostić was born in Sombor in the year 1947. He completed his elementary and high-school education in Zemun. He graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad with a diploma in Yugoslav literature and an average grade of 10. His post-graduate work was done at the University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy, where he got his master's degree with the topic "Lukijan Mušicki's Bibliography". His doctor's thesis was titled "Pavle J. Šafarik and new Serbian literature", which he defended at the University of Philosophy in Novi Sad in February of 1986. During his post-graduate studies Đorđe S. Kostić also took on the role of assistant to the Commission for literary history SASA. From 1980 onwards, he was employed by the Institute for Balkan Studies SASA as a junior research assistant.

In 1986, he was promoted to research assistant as part of the “Linguistic and literary connections of the Balkan peoples through the centuries” seminar. Kostić received the calling of senior research associate in 1994, while he became a research fellow in 2004. From 2001 onwards, Kostić handled two projects as part of the Institute for Balkan Studies - “Europe and the Balkans in the modern age: mutual observations and political musings” (2001–2014) and “The Danube and the Balkans: Historical and Cultural Heritage” (Paris, Belgrade (2015–2019)). He retired from the same position in 2013.

With a scholarship from the Alexander Von Humboldt Foundation, Đorđe S. Kostić spent time in München, Bohn, Berlin, and Jena from 1983–1994, and then in 1997 as well. From October 1990 until October 1992, Kostić also taught Yugoslav literature and ran the lectorate for the Serbo-Croatian language as part of the Baltic-Slav seminar. At the behest of the Friedrich Schiller Institute for Slavistics, he held blocs of seminars about his travelogues detailing his adventures all over South-Eastern Europe during June and November of 2001. He also held seminars about Serbo-German cultural relations in the same insititute in Jena.

From 2001–2003, Đorđe S. Kostić taught the History of European Civilization as part of the sector for Western Europe at the Geo-economical Faculty of the Megatrend University in Belgrade.

Mr. Kostić made a significant contribution to the study of Serbian literary terminology in 1987, when he published “*Književni pojmovnik Vuka Karadžića*”, (the literary term-book of Vuk Karadžić). His book “*Rečnik književnih naziva u Novina srpskim*” (The dictionary of literary names in “Novine Srbske”) also came from the same field, and was published as part of “Literary History” in order to study the terminological problematics in stylistic formations. Kostić published the findings from his doctor’s thesis about Pavle J. Šafarik in his monograph titled “*Pavle J. Šafarik o novijoj srpskoj književnosti*” (Pavle J. Šafarik about more recent Serbian literature) (1988). In it, he explains the diversity and complexity of Šafarik’s work. While studying the Dositej Obradović and Vuk Karadžić eras, he wrote hundreds of essays, texts and excerpts, some of which were even broadcast by Radio Belgrade. He spared no effort searching for signs of Serbian literature in the German tongue. Kostić discussed Jernej Kopitar and his contemporaries often and with vigor as well.

Cultural relations between Serbian and European peoples were analyzed in travelogues of Western-European authors which dwelt in Serbia and the Balkans between the 16th and the 20th centuries by Đorđe S. Kostić. From this research stemmed numerous scientific works, several monographs and a collection of essays whose author and editor was Đorđe S. Kostić. Travelogue fragments which pertain to certain cities were published in books such as “*O gradu, gospodstva mi Kruševcu*” (About the city and foundation in Krusevac) (1997), “*Preston-*

ica Knjaza, Gospodara” (The Prince’s Capital) (1998) and “*U Stalaću, na Moravi gradu*” (In Stalać, on the Morava river) (1998). Among the collections which were created under the leadership of Kostić these works stand out: “Belgrade in European travelogues” (2002), “With Bedeker in South-Eastern Europe” (2005), “European pictures of a Balkan woman” (2009), “Pictures from the Balkans by Felix Kunitz” (2011) and “Danube from Bezdan to Belgrade” (2012).

Kostić also spent a number of years doing comparative research through which he gathered differing perspectives from different angles for his travelogue data. From this research were born monographs such as “*Dobro došli u Srbiju: Kraljevina Srbija u nemačkim vodičima za putnike*” (Welcome to Serbia: The Kingdom of Serbia in German guides for travellers, 1892–1914) (2006), “*Dunavski limes Feliksa Kanica*” (The Danube Limesse of Felix Kunitz) (2012), and “*Trpeza za umorne putnike: evropski putopisi o ishrani u Srbiji u 19. Veku*» (The dining table for weary travellers: European travelogues about food in Serbia in the 19th Century) (2019).

Mr. Kostić also published two books in English and Serbian - “*Zaljubiti se u jedan grad: Evropski putnici u Beogradu 1814–1915*» (“Falling in love with a City: European travellers in Belgrade 1814–1915) (Belgrade, 2007), and “*Na bregu iznad reka: Beograd u vodičima za putnike*” (On the hill above the rivers: Belgrade in scientific guides 1800–1945), (Belgrade, 2009).

The desire of Kostić to bring great travellers like Felix Kunitz closer to the Serbian reading audience resulted in the book “*Znakovi i senke*” (Signs and Shadows) (2015). In fictional travels and dialogues with Kunitz, Kostić takes his readers into the 19th century and through the Kingdom of Serbia.

Along with the precious results of Kostić’s research of foreign travelogues come a number of exhibitions which were wildly successful and shown to the public of many of Serbia’s cities, as well as abroad. Exhibitions such as “Falling in love with a city” (2007, 2009, 2010), “With Kunitz around Serbia” (Vienna, Graz, Leipzig, Budapest, Szegedin, Belgrade, Smederevo, Kladovo, Nis, Vranje, Kraljevo, Kragujevac, Valjevo, 2010–2012), and “The Danube: Artist, traveler, witness” were resounding successes and caught the attention of both an expert and wider audience at large.

All those from the Institute for Balkan Studies SASA and all of his collaborators and colleagues will forever remember Đorđe S. Kostić as a charismatic, jovial, optimistic and hard working man. His dedication will live on both through his work and through the younger generation which he so caringly helped nurture at the Institute.

Ljubodrag P. Ristić

IN MEMORIAM



Spyridon Sfetas
(1960—2021)

Spyridon Sfetas was a university professor, historian, and one of the most distinguished Balkanologists of our time, who unfortunately left us too soon. He was born in 1960 near Larissa in Greece. After completing his bachelor's degree at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, he continued his education at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. As a scholarship holder, first of the Greek and then the German government, he completed his M.A. and Ph.D. studies at the mentioned university. In his doctoral dissertation entitled "Die Makedonische Frage im Rahmen der interbalkanischen Beziehungen 1920—1924," defended in 1991, he focused on the then burning Macedonian Question, which he continued to explore in his later research. Upon his return to Greece, he became a research fellow at the Institute for Balkan Studies (IMXA) in Thessaloniki in 1993. A few years later, he began his academic career as a lecturer at the Department of Modern and Contemporary Balkan History at the School of History and Archeology of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, first working as a lecturer (1999), then as an assistant professor (2004), and finally an associate professor (2009). The Department has acquired a prestigious reputation in Greece and the Balkans in the recent

decades, which can be largely attributed to Sfetas' efforts. He participated in many international conferences in the country and abroad, and his research has immensely contributed to our knowledge of the history of the Balkans. He collaborated with several academic journals and was also a member of the editorial board of the *Balcanica* journal. Sfetas was fluent in English, German, French, Russian, Serbian, and other Balkan languages. He left us at the age of 61 after a short illness, leaving many pages of Balkan history unwritten.

What was Sfetas like? As a scholarship holder of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, I had the opportunity to attend an M.A. program at the School of History and Archeology and the honor of meeting the late professor. He always talked while walking hurriedly down the hallways towards his office, which housed a pile of books and papers he had collected for new research. I had to quicken my pace to keep up with him as he talked to me in his native language and fluent Serbian. Our conversations may have seemed strange to a passer-by; in the middle of a sentence, the professor would effortlessly switch to a language in which he could better express his thoughts at that moment while inserting some phrases in other foreign languages – the mark of a true polyglot. Sometimes it was not easy to follow his train of thought; in his desire to impart knowledge to his students, due to the vast amount of information, he could not always keep his stream of consciousness in check. Sentences came rushing one after another, opening up a wide range of topics. In that way, he encouraged his students to consider a problem in more depth. “I will show you the way, and you should make your way to the boulevard”, the professor would say in his lectures, wanting to awaken a creative impulse in his students for a new deep dive into history. Professor knew that *mining* was difficult but necessary work for good historians, encouraging his students to shed light on unexplored topics and to work with archival materials that had yet to see the light of day.

“As a historian, I try to examine the past, because without the past one cannot understand the present and predict the future without being a prophet”, he used to say. Sfetas tried to write Balkan history from a broader perspective than that of Greek traditional historiography.¹ He used historical sources written in several languages, as well as in Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Slovenian, and Romanian. As the professor used to say, he first heard the Romanian language while traveling by train across the Balkans. Then he thought that he would be “ashamed to call himself a Balkanologist” if he did not know such

¹ He even consulted the historical sources in Yugoslav and Bulgarian state archives to broaden his point of view when researching the history of the Greek civil war and the Cyprus problem, see *The Civil War. Documents of Yugoslav and Bulgarian Archives* (Εμφύλιος πόλεμος. Έγγραφα από τα Γιουγκοσλαβικά και βουλγαρικά αρχεία, 1999); Cyprus and *Yugoslavia. Documents of Yugoslav Archives, 1967—1974* (Κύπρος και Γιουγκοσλαβία. Έγγραφα από τα Γιουγκοσλαβικά αρχεία, 1967—1974, 2016).

an important language for the study of this region. After returning to Greece, Sfetas started learning Romanian. In his work, he paid a lot of attention to Greek bilateral relations with other Balkan countries, always keeping in mind the circumstances that prevailed on the world-historical stage. The professor was aware of the impact that the Great Powers had—and still have—on the future of small countries such as those in the Balkans. He was especially interested in the Macedonian Question, which became relevant again with the breakup of Yugoslavia. Sfetas was one of the members of the mixed academic commission formed by scholars from Greece and Northern Macedonia, which dealt with historical, cultural, and educational aspects. Supporting the Prespa Agreement, he made great efforts as the president of the commission for school textbooks and contributed immeasurably to the correct use of the term *Ancient Macedonia* in the neighboring country.

Sfetas has also left his mark in other neighboring countries, contributing invaluable to the study of certain topics related to Balkan history. We will list only some of the publications that are of great importance for the study of the Balkans. First of all, we should mention Sfetas' *Introduction to Balkan History* (*Εισαγωγή στη Βαλκανική Ιστορία. Τόμος Α' και Β'*, 2009 and 2011) in two volumes, where he retraces historical processes in the Balkans, keeping in mind all the countries separately, in a timeframe spanning from the period of the Ottoman conquests to the fall of the Berlin Wall. The book is mandatory reading for all history students, for whom it is mostly intended. His main research interest—the Macedonian Question—was the subject of many publications, where he explored the development of the Question during the 20th century (*Όψεις του Μακεδονικού ζητήματος στον 20ό αιώνα*, 2001), the problems of the Albanian population and its rising nationalism in North Macedonia (*Οι Αλβανοί των Σκοπίων. Θέματα εθνοτικής συνύπαρξης*, 1995), the construction of the Macedonian identity (*Η διαμόρφωση της σλαβομακεδονικής ταυτότητας. Μια επώδυνη διαδικασία*, 2003), as well as the repercussions of the Question on Serbian/Yugoslav-Greek and Bulgarian-Greek relations (*Στη σκιά του Μακεδονικού. Η κρίση Αθήνας – Βελιγραδίου στη δεκαετία του 1960*, 2007; *Η Βουλγαρία και το Μακεδονικό ζήτημα 1950—1967. Πλήρη τα απόρρητα βουλγαρικά έγγραφα*, 2009; *Ο ανακήρυκτος πόλεμος για το Μακεδονικό. Βουλγαρία – Γιουγκοσλαβία*, 1968—1989, 2010), while he also used historical sources written in Serbian, Macedonian, Bulgarian, and other languages.

Probably even more interesting—at least from the Serbian point of view—are the studies concerning the relations between Belgrade and Athens, where he dealt with some aspects of Tito's Yugoslavia and the Regime of the Colonels that ruled in Greece (*Η Τιτοϊκή Γιουγκοσλαβία και η δικτατορία των Συνταγματαρχών* (1967—1974), 2016), as well as the period that followed when Karamanlis came to power (*Η Τιτοϊκή Γιουγκοσλαβία και η Μεταπολιτευτική*

Ελλάδα του Καραμανλή (1974–1979). Έγγραφα από τα γιουγκοσλαβικά αρχεία, 2012). The Professor also closely followed the policy of the neighboring country during the subsequent period. He supported Serbia's stance on Kosovo and Metohija and openly criticized the policy of Albania and the position of European countries in the media whenever he had an opportunity. He was a great and sincere friend of the Serbs in hard times, at a moment when Serbia could hardly boast to have many sympathizers in other countries. Recognizing the value of Professor Sfetas' lasting contribution to historical science, the least that Serbia could do is to support a translation of his studies into Serbian and so allow his work to endure.

Jasmina Tomašević

REVIEWS

DAN DANA, *ONOMASTICON THRACICUM. RÉPERTOIRE DES NOMS INDIGÈNES DE THRACE, MACÉDOINE ORIENTALE, MÉSIES, DACIE ET BITHYNIE*. ATHENS, MÉLÉTÈMATA 70, 2014. CLVIII+ 459 p.

Review by Danilo Savić*

Dan Dana's *Onomasticon Thracicum* is intended to provide a reliable and exhaustive corpus of Thracian anthroponymy, up to date with recent developments in the study of the Thracian language. Dana endeavoured to assemble a much needed, although partial, replacement of Dimităr Dečev's outdated collection of Thracian linguistic remains¹. The book's catalogue of names counts over 700 entries and over 1500 forms, many of which were unknown in Dečev's time. Unlike in the previous corpus, the entries in *Onomasticon Thracicum* follow the order of the Latin alphabet. The presentation of the data is clearer overall. The catalogue itself is preceded by four chapters, which provide insight into a number of relevant issues, such as the history of research, epigraphical

and literary sources, classification of Thracian names, characteristics of the Thracian language. These chapters could have probably been published as an introduction into various aspects of Thracian studies – one benefits from reading them before consulting the catalogue. Although the aim of the book primarily concerns onomastics, a fair amount of introductory discussion has been dedicated to various linguistic questions. The author emphasises early on the crucial role of onomastics in the study of the Thracian language, particularly in view of our poor understanding of indigenous Thracian texts (p. XI).

The chapters preceding the catalogue are 1. "Historiographie de l'onomastique thrace" (p. XII–XLV), 2. "Sources : données anciennes et nouvelles" (p. XLVI–LXII), 3. "L'onomastique thrace" (p. LXIII–CXII),

¹ D. Detschew, "Die thrakischen Sprachreste" (Vienna: R. M. Rohrer, 1957). Note that Dečev's book is not limited to anthroponymy, but includes glosses and toponymy, as well as the Ezerovo inscription.

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and 4. “Principes” (p. CXIII—CXX). They are followed by a list bibliographical abbreviations (p. CXXI—CLIV), and by a list of symbols, abbreviations and orthographical conventions used by the author (CLV—CLVIII). The catalogue takes up the main part of the book (p. 1–413). Following the catalogue are various supplements (p. 415–432), annexes (p. 433–458), and a table of maps (p. 459). The following pages will discuss the four mentioned chapters, while the material from the catalogue will be used throughout the review.

The first chapter is an outline of the history of Thracian studies. Special attention is given to the pioneering contributions of D. Dečev and his predecessors (p. XIV—XX). Dečev’s compendium of the Thracian language is proclaimed “unusable” due to its numerous methodological shortcomings (XX). Most notably, two thirds of the names listed by Dečev are not at all Thracian. Other authors are grouped according to their country of origin in the following order: Bulgaria (p. XX—XXVII), Romania (p. XXVII—XXX), former Yugoslavia (p. XXX—XXXII), Greece (p. XXXII—XXXIII), Hungary and Russia (p. XXXIV), and the “West” (p. XXXIV—XL). The last group, however, mainly covers the contributions of French scholars Louis Robert, Oliver Masson, and Claude Brixhe, while others are mentioned in passing (Edgar Polomé, Augusto Ancillotti, Heikki Solin, etc.). The division of authors into the “Western” and “non-Western” groups is further emphasised by the generally negative evaluation of Eastern European scholarship, as opposed to the more than positive view of its Western counterpart. Dana particularly criticises linguists from the Balkans, including Dečev, for their excessive reliance on speculative etymologies (p. XXIV, XXVI—XXVIII), for their disregard of the historical and epigraphical realia (p. XXV—XXVI), as well as for their ideological and nationalistic biases (p. XXXII—XXXIII, XLI). In contrast, the Western scholars are praised

for their balanced approach (p. XXXIV, XXXVII, XXXIX). While the criticism is far from misplaced in many cases, it may strike the reader as excessive or unbalanced in certain points. For example, the criticism of Vladimir Georgiev does not take into account the positive reception of some elements of his work in “Western” scholarship². Furthermore, a reader acquainted with Palaeo-Balkan linguistics may note the absence of Radoslav Katičić, Günter Reichenkron, or Georg Rensus Solta in this section³. Although the manuals of Katičić and Solta deal with the Palaeo-Balkan languages in general, they do offer a balanced presentation of various problems in Thracian linguistics, while Reichenkron’s comprehensive study of the Dacian substrate in Romanian is yet to be replaced. Dana is curiously silent on the topic of the Dacian (or Thracian) substrate in modern languages, although he seems familiar with it (p. LVIII). Along with the omission of Reichenkron, one may remark that the fairly detailed list of Ioan Iosif Russu’s bibliography (p. XVIII, note

² See, for example, F. Kortlandt, “The Thracian-Armenian consonant shift”, *Linguistique balkanique* 3 (1988), 71–74, and E. Polomé, “The Balkan Languages (Illyrian, Thracian and Daco-Moesian)”, *The Cambridge Ancient History*, ed. J. Boardman et al. (Cambridge: University Press, 1988), 868–898. Kortlandt partly accepts Georgiev’s consonant shift in Thracian, while Polomé accepts a number of Georgiev’s relatively reliable etymologies.

³ R. Katičić, “Ancient languages of the Balkans” (The Hague/Paris: Mouton, 1976); G. Reichenkron, “Das Dakische: rekonstruiert aus dem Rumänischen” (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1966); G. R. Solta, “Einführung in die Balkanlinguistik mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Substrats und des Balkanlateinischen” (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1980).

100) does not include his work on the substrate in Romanian.⁴

The second chapter deals with the sources, mainly those used in assembling the catalogue of names. Indigenous Thracian texts are summarised here rather briefly, due to their limited input⁵. Dana distinguishes between a “Thracian alphabet” and a “Greek alphabet”, attributing the latter to the Ezerovo inscription only. The terminological distinction is confusing, since all of these texts are written in derivatives of the Greek alphabet; Dana himself says as much about the alphabets from Zone (p. XLVII) and Samothrace (p. XLVIII). Greek and Latin literary sources are not given much attention either since they contain a small number of aristocratic names, some of which may have been corrupted during the centuries of manuscript transmission. On the other hand, Greek and Latin inscriptions are set in a geographical and chronological framework. In a detailed overview, Dana outlines the evolving visibility of Thracians in Greece and Rome, most notably by highlighting their participation in Hellenistic and Roman imperial armies (p. LII–LIII; p. LIV–LVI). For this reason, the book encompasses various parts of the Roman Empire, extending beyond the Thracian “core” mentioned in the subtitle, i.e. Thrace, Western Macedonia, Upper and Lower Moesia, Dacia, and Bithynia. The high concentration of Thracian names in the papyri and ostraca from Egypt, mostly from the Ptolemaic period, is particularly notable in this regard (p. LVIII–LIX). Apart from the Egyptian texts, the majority of the documentation comes from the 2nd and 3rd centuries (p. XLIX), although Thracian anthroponymy survives into the 6th century (p. LVII).

⁴ I. I. Russu, “Elemente autohtone în limba română: substratul comun româno-albanez” (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1970).

⁵ On Thracian indigenous texts, see S. Yanakieva, “The Thracian Language”, *Orpheus* 25 (2018), 32–34 with further references.

With the end of Antiquity, Thracian names disappear from historical record⁶.

Dana discards earlier attempts to identify Thracian elements in Bulgarian and Romanian anthroponymy, but does not counter them directly. Instead, based on the fact that even Greek names were replaced by Slavic ones in 10th–14th century Eastern Macedonia, and since no Thracian element is found there, he asserts that “aucune continuité onomastique ne semble dépasser la période « sombre » de la crise iconoclaste” (p. LVII). Yet, the data invoked here pertains to a limited area, and does not necessarily reflect the unknown state of affairs in other Thracian regions. Moreover, there is good evidence that Thracian was still spoken in the Balkans at the time of the Slavic migration to the extent that some linguistic contact between the two populations may be expected⁷. An example of such contact would be Bulgarian *karpa* ‘rock’, allegedly borrowed from the Thracian noun **karpa* ‘id.’, attested indirectly by the Greek form Καρπάτης (ὄρος) ‘Carpathian mountains’, and further related to Albanian *karpë* ‘rock, cliff’⁸. Furthermore, Ivan Duridanov, whose works are cited by Dana, compiled a list of 45 Bulgarian names of possible Thracian origin⁹. A particularly instructive case is

⁶ The language was also extinct around the same time, see R. Katičić, “Ancient languages of the Balkans”, 136 and S. Yanakieva, “The Thracian Language”, 59–61.

⁷ See the references in the previous note, and R. Katičić, “Ancient languages of the Balkans”, 152–153.

⁸ V. Georgiev (ed.), “Bălgarski etimologičen rečnik” (Sofia: Bălgarska akademija na naukite, 2012), 252. The toponym Καρπάτης is either Thracian or Dacian, if one considers the latter to be a separate language. On the Albanian form, see B. Demiraj, “Albanische Etymologien” (Amsterdam/Atlanta: Rodopi, 1997), 213.

⁹ I. Duridanov, “Der thrakische Einfluss auf die bulgarische Anthroponymie”, *Linguistique Balkanique* 2 (1960), 69–86.

the Bulg. name *Buzo* (m.)/*Buza* (f.) which would, according to Duridanov, derive from Thrac. Βουζης/Βουζας. The Thracian forms in Βουζ-, along with their proposed Bulgarian continuants, are sometimes connected to Avestan *būza-* 'goat', and to Armenian *buc* 'lamb' (from Indo-European **bhuǵ-o-*)¹⁰. However, the Bulgarian name may also derive from Bulg. *buză* 'cheek', further related to Albanian *buzë* 'lip, edge' and Romanian *buză* 'id.' whose etymology is disputed¹¹. In any case, the Palaeo-Balkan origin of Bulg. *Buzo*, *Buza* seems probable. These and other proposed correspondences between Thracian and modern Balkan onomastics could have been problematised at this point in the book. The question of (Daco-)Thracian linguistic and onomastic heritage in Albanian and Romanian is also addressed, perhaps too briefly in view of the complexity of the issue (p. LVII–LVIII). Dana rightfully points out that the evidence for both Illyrian and Thracian origin of Albanian is rather thin, but without citing any relevant references¹². In his opinion, Albanians probably descend from an unknown central Balkan

population whose traces in Albanian onomastics have been erased by various external influences.

The third chapter deals with various questions of Thracian anthroponymy, such as the geographical distribution of Thracian names, the problem of the Dacian language and onomastics, or the phonological and orthographic phenomena observed in the onomastic material. Arguably the most important point of this chapter is the classification of Thracian names into "territoires onomastiques" (p. LXV–LXXXII). The principles of this classification are drawn from a similar classification of Illyrian anthroponymy developed by Radoslav Katičić¹³. What is called a "territoire onomastique" by Dana, or a "Namengebiet" by Katičić, essentially represents an area with a characteristic stock of indigenous names that do not regularly appear elsewhere, i.e. an anthroponymic region. In the areas traditionally inhabited by Thracians, Dana identifies four anthroponymic regions: 1. Thracian and "pan-Thracian" (Thrace proper and most other Thracian regions), 2. Dacian or Daco-Moesian (Dacia, Lower Moesia, Northeastern Upper Moesia), 3. Western Thracian (Western Thrace, Eastern Macedonia, Southern Upper Moesia, Thasos), and 4. Bithynian (Bithynia, i.e. Northwestern Asia Minor).

The list of pan-Thracian names is short and consists of simple names: *Bithus*, *Cotys*, *Teres*, Σαδαλας/Σεδαλας, *Seuthes* (p. LXV, LXVII). They are found in Thracian and Western Thracian regions, and to a lesser extent in Bithynia, but not in Dacia. The

¹⁰ V. Georgiev, "Trakite i tehnijat ezik" (Sofia: Bălgarska akademija na naukite, 1977), 46.

¹¹ See the discussions in B. Demiraj "Albanische Etymologien", 114–115 and in V. Orel "Albanian Etymological Dictionary" (Leiden/Boston/Köln: Brill, 1998), 43–44.

¹² Both points of view are presented by R. Katičić, "Ancient languages of the Balkans", 184–188. A different approach has recently been undertaken by Joachim Matzinger who is skeptical towards both Illyrian and Thracian hypotheses. See, for example, J. Matzinger, "Illyrisch und Albanisch – Erkenntnisse und Desiderata", *h2nr. Festschrift für Heiner Eichner*, ed. R. Nedoma & D. Stifter (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010), 98–106, as well as J. Matzinger, "Zur Herkunft des Albanischen: Argumente gegen die thrakische Hypothese", *Studime për nder të Rexhep Ismajlit: me rastin e 65-vjetorit të lindjes*, ed. B. Rugova (Pristina: Koha, 2012), 635–649.

¹³ Dana seems to incorrectly attribute the development of all Illyrian anthroponymic areas to Duje Rendić-Miočević (p. LXIV–LXV). Rendić-Miočević established the Liburnian anthroponymic area, separating it from the rest of Illyricum, while Katičić further developed Rendić-Miočević's method and applied it to Illyrian anthroponymy. See R. Katičić, "Ancient Languages of the Balkans", 178–184 for a detailed discussion.

lack of documentation in Bithynia and Dacia may have influenced the distribution. Some elements of names also have a similar extent: the first element *Muca-* is present everywhere except in Dacia, while the second element *-por* is found in all four regions. Curiously, the simple name *Bithus* is currently absent from Bithynia (p. LXXX). The list of Thracian proper names includes those with well-known first elements such as *Aulu-*, *Dia-*, *Diza-*, *Epta-*, *Roime-* (etc.), or second elements such as *-centhus*, *-tocus*, *-tralis*, *-zenus* (etc.). The presence of *-zenus* in the Dacian anthroponymic region is noted as well (p. LXVII). However, all of the examples seem to be from Lower Moesia where Thracian names are also common, and none of them comes in a markedly Dacian context (*Amazenus*, *Derzizenus*, *Dituzenus*, *Δριζενις*, etc.), which is not taken into account here. Many of these “Dacian” examples in *-zenus* could probably be attributed to immigrants from Thrace. The classification of first and second elements of Thracian compound names is useful, since it gives visibility to certain regional trends. For example, names with the first element *Roime-* (Ροιμηταλκις, Ροιμηζενις) belong to the Thracian proper region, while the simple name Ροιμος seems to have a Western Thracian distribution. The Western Thracian region also develops simple names such as *Κενθος*, *Πορις*, and *Τραλις*, all of which are usually second elements of compound names elsewhere (p. LXXVIII). Some other Western Thracian characteristics include the first elements such as *Cetri-*, *Mest-*, *Paib-*, *Torc-*, *Zec-* (etc.), and the second elements *-βρης*, *-δελθης*. These do not regularly occur in other anthroponymic regions. Dana, however, brings to light some interesting parallels between the Western Thracian and Bithynian regions (p. LXXXI–LXXXII). Names in *Κοζι-*/*Κοσι-* are particularly frequent in both regions, while the Western Thracian names in *Βαστ-* are compared to the Bithynian hapax *Οαστοζις*. The Bithynian name *Πηροβρης* is identified as a variant

of the Western Thracian *Πυροβρης* (names in *Πυρ-/Pyr-/Pir-* are frequent in the Western Thracian region). Various names in both regions use the suffix *-la-* and the second element *-βρης*. These parallels lead Dana to affirm Herodotus’ claim (Hdt. 7.75) that the Bithynians originate from the valley of the river Strymon. This idea seems attractive and merits further study, as the material is extremely difficult to handle with precision. Namely, Bithynia brings the smallest number of Thracian names out of all four regions. Apart from these similarities, the Bithynian region shows a number of unique characteristics, such as the names in *Βιο*, *Ζηνο-*, *Ζιβ-*, or the presence *Lallnamen* (Λαλα, Ττθα) whose appurtenance may be questioned (p. LXXX).

The material from the Dacian or Daco-Moesian anthroponymic region in large part comes from Lower Moesia and only to lesser extent from Dacia and Upper Moesia. The term “Daco-Moesian” is used here to denote the territorial extent of this anthroponymic region, and not to single out Moesian anthroponymy as a component distinct from Dacian (p. LXXI). According to Dana, the presence of toponyms with the typical Dacian element *-dava* in Lower Moesia indicates that the Dacians were part of the indigenous population there (p. LXX). Several typical elements of Dacian anthroponymy are known (p. LXXXIII): names in *Deci-*, *Diurpa-*, *Nat-*, *Pueri-* (etc.), or in *-blasa*, *-gissa*, *-pier* (etc.). The pan-Thracian second element *-por* comes in combination with typical Dacian names, such as *Natopor*. At the same time, the most frequent Thracian names do not occur in the Dacian region. The differences between Thracian and Dacian anthroponymy and toponymy are, according to Dana, “trop grandes pour qu’on puisse considérer les Thraces et les Daces comme parlant la même langue” (p. LXXI). In this, Dana broadly agrees with the hypotheses of V. Georgiev, who established the distribution of toponymic elements *-bria*, *-para* (Thracian), and *-dava/-deva* (Dacian) as one

of the main arguments in favour of Dacian as a language separate from Thracian. Yet, this distribution of toponyms has recently been described as an inadequate criterion by Svetlana Yanakieva, who points out that the toponyms *Pulpudeva* and *Desudaba* sit well outside of Dacia¹⁴. Furthermore, the phonological differences between Dacian and Thracian that Dana attempts to establish are either trivial or questionable (p. LXXII–LXXIII). For example, what he sees as Dacian *a* for Thracian *e* (e.g. in *Apta-/Epta-, -dava/-deva*) should be regarded in the context of orthographical fluctuations between *a* and *e* that are unrelated to the question of Daco-Thracian linguistic unity¹⁵. What is described as the diphthongisation of Indo-European **ē* into *ie* is based on dubious etymologies of Dacian plant names (unexpectedly so, in view of the book's critical attitude towards etymological speculations). Indeed, some phonological differences between Dacian and Thracian forms exist, but these are better sought elsewhere.¹⁶

The onomastic status of some areas is described as ambiguous (p. LXXXII–LXXXIV). These are Dardania, Paeonia, Mysia, and Phrygia. There is, however, nothing ambiguous in the case of Phrygia, whose language and onomastics are distinct from Thracian, as Dana correctly points out (p. LXXXIV). In the case of Paeonia and Mysia, the label is quite appropriate. Limited signs of Thracian presence are attested in both regions, but a general picture of indigenous onomastics remains unclear due to a lack of documentation. In this sense, Dana is probably correct in doubting that the Mysians (*Μυσοί/Mysii*)

of Asia Minor are related to the Moesians (*Μοισοί/Moesi*) of Europe, although the two ethnonyms may very well share the same Thracian origin. Finally, Dardania may be understood as ambiguous in terms of its diverse onomastic material: the south-western parts are predominantly Illyrian, while the eastern parts are predominantly Thracian¹⁷. Dana, however, writes that “le caractère illyrien de l’onomastique dardannienne est indubitable et il convient d’écarter de manière définitive l’idée d’une origine ou d’une participation thrace (du moins considérable) à leur ethnogénèse” (p. LXXXII). To be sure, the Illyrian element in Dardania is not negligible, but Thracian input should not be downplayed. Indeed, some literary sources consider the population of the future Dardanian kingdom to be Illyrian, but the name Dardania appears only towards the end of the 3rd century BCE, at which point the Dardanian population could have been mixed¹⁸. Moreover, there are good reasons to believe that the name Dardania and related onomastic items are of (Daco-)Thracian origin. Some anthroponyms in *Dard-/Derd-* are assigned to the Dacian anthroponymic region, such

¹⁷ See R. Katičić, “Ancient languages of the Balkans”, 181; F. Papazoglu, “Central Balkan Tribes in Pre-Roman Times: Triballi, Autariatae, Dardanians, Scordisci and Moesians”, (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1978), 221–245, and S. Loma, “Domorodačko stanovništvo Kosova i Metohije u rimsko doba u svetlu antroponimije”, *Kosovo i Metohija u civilizacijskim tokovima*, Knjiga 3, Istorija, istorija umetnosti, ed. M. Atlagić, (Kosovska Mitrovica, 2010), 19–40. Loma convincingly refutes Papazoglu’s claim that there existed a separate Dardanian (i.e. non-Illyrian, non-Thracian) group of names. Dana criticises Papazoglu on this point as well (p. XXXI–XXXII).

¹⁸ On the sources see F. Papazoglu, “Central Balkan Tribes”, 210–218. On the borders of Dardania, which included lands inhabited by Thracians, see F. Papazoglu, “Central Balkan Tribes”, 187–209, 224–225.

¹⁴ S. Yanakieva, “The Thracian Language”, 56–59.

¹⁵ S. Yanakieva, “The Thracian Language”, 41.

¹⁶ For example, see E. Polomé, “The Balkan Languages (Illyrian, Thracian and Daco-Moesian)”, 885–898 for a concise overview of possible Dacian phonological traits.

as Δαρδιολα and *Derdipilus* (p. 112, 124), while *Dardisanus* and its graphical variants surface in a Thracian context (p. 112). The toponym Δαρδάρα, with a typical Thracian second element *-παρα* 'river (?)' is attested in Dardania¹⁹. It has also been suggested that the names in *Derz-*, attested primarily in Thrace and Lower Moesia, such as *Derzizenus*, *Derzitrallis*, or *Derzō* (p. 124–125), are in fact palatalised variants of *Dard-/Derd-*²⁰. This is admittedly uncertain, since the names in *Derz-* may also constitute a separate group, related to the theonyms in *Derz-* (Δερζις, Δερζέλας, etc.), as Dana suggests (p. 124)²¹. In any case, the onomastic items in *Dard-/Derd-* are often found in a Thracian context or territories, but never in a clearly Illyrian milieu²². Dardanian onomastics is inherently complex and diverse, and even its Illyrian component “bears witness to a superimposing of ethnic strata as a consequence of

successive migrations over many centuries”, as recently concluded by Svetlana Loma²³.

The remainder of the third chapter deals with many smaller topics of Thracian anthroponymy. It includes a useful presentation of regional forms of the genitive singular (p. XCII–XCIV) and of several graphical fluctuations found in Thracian names (p. XCV), a discussion on the “noms d’assonance” (p. CII–CVI), on theophoric and mythological names (p. CVI–CVIII), as well as on phantom names (p. CVIII–CIX). Unfortunately, the list of phantom names omits the unattested Βριαζενις, which is in fact an unwarranted reading of Βριζενις. It is beyond regrettable that the uncritical mention of Βριαζενις and its comparison to Gk. Αστυγηνης persists in recent surveys of Thracian, since it is an explicit conjecture on Dečev’s part²⁴. The short presentation of the glosses is practically limited to obscure Dacian plant names and could have been omitted (p. CIX–CX). Finally, some remarks found in these short discussions are, however, confusing. For example, it is unclear why exactly is *-l-* in the names *Didalsa* and *Τυρελσης* described as a result of an epenthesis (p. XCVIII).

The fourth chapter discusses some methodological difficulties and explains the structure of the catalogue of names. As already mentioned, the order of entries in the catalogue follows that of the Latin alphabet. Graphical variants of the same name are given separate entries that point the reader

¹⁹ On Δαρδάρα see D. Detschew, “Die thrakischen Sprachreste”, 118–119. On the element *-para/-παρα* see V. Georgiev, “Trakite i tehniat ezik”, 187. Δαρδάρα occurs twice in Procopius (*Aed.* 4.4) once in Dardania, and once near Remesiana (therefore, again in Dardania). The two occurrences may refer to one and the same settlement as suggested by S. Yanakieva, “Thracian toponymy until the end of the first millennium BC”, *Orpheus* 22 (2015), 22.

²⁰ D. Savić, “Some Illyrian ethnonyms and their supposed Albanian cognates: Taulantii, Delmatae, Dardani”, *BeLiDa 1: Thematic Collection of Papers*, ed. Natalija Panić-Cerovski et al. (Belgrade, 2022), 457. In Thracian, *d* becomes a palatal *z* in front of *i*, cf. the pair Βενδις ~ Βενζις ‘a goddess’. The palatalised form *Derzizenus* could then correspond to *Dardisanus*.

²¹ The same was suggested by V. Georgiev, “Trakite i tehniat ezik”, 73.

²² Cf. the material in D. Savić, “Some Illyrian ethnonyms”, 457–458.

²³ S. Loma, “Domorodačko stanovništvo Kosova i Metohije u rimsko doba u svetlu antroponimije”, 40.

²⁴ W. Sowa, “Thracian”, *Palaeohispanica: Revista sobre lenguas y culturas de la Hispania antigua* 20/2 (2020), 787–817; C. Brixhe, “Thracian”, *Handbook of Comparative and Historical Indo-European linguistics* 3, ed. Klein J. et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018) 1852; D. Detschew, “Die thrakischen Sprachreste”, 87–88. Dana only mentions that Βριαζενις is a phantom name on p. XXIV, note 78.

to the main entry containing all occurrences: e.g. the occurrences of *Bitus* and Βειθυς are listed under the entry *Bithus*. The names are further grouped according to their province and toponym of origin. Other important details are provided when possible for each attestation, such as the type of document, the number of occurrences within the same document, complete onomastic formulae, or the anthroponymic region of the name. The result is a well-structured and thorough corpus, yet one unencumbered by digressions.

Onomasticon Thracicum in many ways surpasses Dečev's corpus and supplants it as the main point of reference for Thracian anthroponymy. The updated repertoire of Thracian names and their classification into anthroponymic areas are probably its most important contributions. Data in some older corpora which relied on Dečev to identify Thracian names, such as *Inscriptions de la*

Mésie supérieure, should now be compared with the results of Dana's work. The book does not address interactions between Thracian and neighbouring anthroponymies in great detail, but it provides excellent grounds for such a study. Finally, while *Onomasticon Thracicum* does not recommend itself as a manual of the Thracian language, researchers of Palaeo-Balkan languages stand to gain from consulting not only the catalogue, but also the chapters dealing with non-linguistic issues. Dana's calls for caution and his mistrust towards the etymological method's application in Thracian studies may seem exaggerated, but they are a necessary reminder of the not infrequent disregard of historical and epigraphical circumstances in the study of Palaeo-Balkan languages, embodied by the unfortunate appearance of the phantom name Βραζενις in recent outlines of Thracian grammar.

EUGENIA BEU-DACHIN, *THE LATIN LANGUAGE IN THE INSCRIPTIONS OF ROMAN DACIA*, MEGA PUBLISHING HOUSE, CLUJ-NAPOCA, 2014, 276 p.

*Reviewed by Jelena Vukojević**

The great importance of the inscriptions for the study of spoken Latin and its linguistic tendencies has long been recognised. The language of epigraphy is the most important source for the study of the degree of Romanization and acculturation in the provinces, especially when there are no literary sources from the province, as in the case of Dacia. The growing number of inscriptions, their study, as well as the revision of previously published texts, contribute greatly to the study of Vulgar Latin and also make it possible to identify the characteristics of the language of epigraphy in a province in comparison with the rest of the Empire. We expect this book to provide a systematic approach to linguistic phenomena in inscriptions from Dacia, as it is based on the richest

and most comprehensive corpus of inscriptions from Dacia to date. The carefully studied, critiqued, and described epigraphic habit and language of the inscriptions may be a suitable tool for further research on the Latin language in general and for numerous comparative studies.

The book under review was originally written as a doctoral thesis, submitted and presented in 2011 at the Faculty of History and Philosophy of Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca. The present version has been thoroughly and carefully revised by Eugenia Beu-Dachin, a scholar primarily of

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Latin epigraphy, classical archaeology and history with a focus on the ancient history of Romania. The central theme of this book is the linguistic study of Latin inscriptions from Roman Dacia. The author analyzes and presents in a well-structured manner various linguistic aspects of about 4500 inscriptions to illustrate general features of the language of the inscriptions originating in Dacia.

At the beginning of the book there is a preface by Ioan Piso, the coordinator of the said dissertation (pp. 5–6), followed by a list of bibliographic abbreviations (pp. 19–22) and a list of ancient settlements in Dacia (p. 23). As for the structure of the book, it consists of an introduction, four main chapters, and concluding remarks. In the introduction, a brief overview of the history of the study of the Latin language in the Roman Empire is given. The author briefly presents the main findings and studies on Vulgar Latin in general, with special focus on the spread of Latin throughout the Roman Empire and the varying degrees of its assimilation in the provinces. This is reflected in the more detailed discussion of works devoted to the language of Gaul¹, Hispania², and Pannonia³, as well as of earlier studies of the language of Dacia⁴. All of these studies

share a common research base: the complete corpus (available to date) of inscriptions from the entire province in question and the fact that they place data on phonetics at the centre of their work, which is especially true of A. Carnoy. The only exception would be the work of B. Fehér, whose findings are based on epigraphic and literary sources (the works of the third century bishop of Poetovio). Also B. Fehér shifts the focus of the study to syntax, and then moves on to morphology and phonetics. In the introductory chapter, E. Beu-Dachin also lists the epigraphic sources used for the present study (p. 37) and describes the approach to the epigraphic texts in the study as descriptive (p. 25). When we compare the present book with the studies mentioned above, we note that it is also based on the entire available corpus of inscriptions from Dacia, which gives the study a considerable advantage over previous works focusing on Dacia in terms of the number and types of inscriptions examined. However, a purely descriptive approach to the data, noting and presenting only the features of the inscriptions, is drastically different from analyzing general language issues and linguistic features found on the inscriptions and viewing these issues in light of Vulgar Latin. Beu-Dachin emphasizes that the goal of this work is not to highlight the spoken aspect of Latin in Dacia or to prove its vulgar or colloquial character. The goal of the book is to analyze the language as it appears in the extant (epigraphic) texts (pp. 39–40). The method to achieve this goal is to identify linguistic deviations and unusual formulations in the texts, to classify them according to the type of deviation (phonetic, syntactic, etc.), and to analyze and explain these phenomena in terms of standard norms. In accordance with the descriptive method, the author also adds examples that conform to the grammatical rules, as this completes the picture of the language of the inscriptions.

The main part of the book is divided into four chapters named after the linguistic

¹ J. Pirson, *La langue des inscriptions latines de la Gaule*, Bruxelles 1901 (1967).

² A. Carnoy, *Le latin d'Espagne d'après les inscriptions. Étude linguistique*, Bruxelles 1906.

³ B. Fehér, *Pannonia latin nyelvtörténete*, Budapest 2007 [The History of the Latin Language from Pannonia].

⁴ P. Drăgoiescu, *Limba latină pe inscripțiile din Dacia. Contribuții epigrafice*, Râmnicul Vâlci 1930 (1931) [The Latin Language of the Inscriptions from Dacia. Epigraphic Contributions], S. Stati, *Limba latină în inscripțiile din Dacia și Scythia Minor*, București 1961 [The Latin Language of the Inscriptions from Dacia and Scythia Minor], H. Mihăescu, *La langue latine dans le Sud-Est de l'Europe*, București – Paris 1978.

topics treated: Phonetics, Morphology, Syntax and Lexicon. The chapter on phonetics is the most exhaustive, which is not surprising considering that the author emphasizes that the linguistic variations found in the inscriptions are mostly phonetic in nature. It begins with a definition of the terms: phonetics, phoneme, and sound, followed by a structured presentation of phonetic variations, organized by phoneme category. The author provides a detailed analysis of the changes that affected vowels, diphthongs, and consonants in Latin, beginning with Indo-European and concluding with their deviations from the literary norm (as found in inscriptions). Occasionally, the author presents the findings about similar phenomena in other provinces (e.g. Gaul, Hispania, Pannonia) or conclusions and notes of the authors who previously worked on Dacian inscriptions (mainly Mihăescu). For such phenomena, at least one example is provided from the epigraphic corpora. Some examples are provided with alternative interpretations, such that they are simply due to scribal errors and contradict the phenomena described earlier. In these cases, the author lacks a decision as to which of the possibilities is more likely and why. It appears that in such cases an additional contextualization, considering the inscription as a whole and as part of the corpus, would have been beneficial to make such a decision (which is even necessary from the point of view of the aims of this book). A critical approach to the variations at hand and the distinction between a mere scribal error and a change in pronunciation, morphology, or declension seems to be the only way to obtain a comprehensive picture of epigraphic habits in Dacia and in general. A systematic comparison of the phenomena in the Dacian corpus with the variations found in other corpora would have provided much necessary material for a discussion of the overall situation of the epigraphic use of Latin. This chapter concludes with examples of common spelling problems in inscriptions.

In the following chapter, morphological features are arranged according to parts of speech and their grammatical categories. Phenomena involving names are treated by further subdivision into declensions. Other parts of speech covered are adjectives, pronouns, numerals, and verbs. As in the previous chapter, each morphological variation is supplemented by epigraphic examples from Dacia and other provinces. The author points out that some of these variations may also be due to changes in pronunciation, (e.g., the accusative without the desinence *-m*) or to abbreviations due to lack of space. Contaminations between declensions, epigraphic formulae and their hypercorrect forms are good indicators of morphological variations. Although general explanations and correlations are lacking for some of them, good examples are provided for the following formulae: *bene merentis, ex iusso, ex viso*⁵, *ex votu, ex votum, pro merita, pro salutem, pro se et suorum*. The author briefly discusses the comparison of adjectives and presents us with data on the frequency of *piissimus* and *pientissimus* in Dacia⁶. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the syncopated form of the perfect stem.

The third chapter begins by noting that the texts of the inscriptions have very simple syntactic structures and contain mostly formulaic language. Therefore, the major part of the chapter relates to the analysis of syntactic structures that deviate from the

⁵ For a detailed analysis of this and similar formulae (such as *ex votu* and *ex iusso*) see V. Nedeljković, “Ex viso. Tragovi jedne strukturne dihotomije u jeziku latinskih natpisa” [Traces of a structural dichotomy in the language of Latin inscriptions], *Lucida intervalla* 43 (2014), 91-98. (The title and text of the article are originally written in Cyrillic.

⁶ For more details on these superlatives and their relation to each other see S. Tantimonaco, “Piissimus and pientissimus: two non-existent superlatives of pius?”, *Journal of Latin Linguistics* 19(2) (2020), 281–307.

norms of classical Latin. These deviations include, mainly, the agreement in number, case, gender, and person, the syntax of cases, the broader use of prepositions with modified functions, and sometimes case following them (compared to the classical norm). Other examples include the predominant use of the demonstrative pronouns *iste, ista, istud, ille, illa, illud* and *ipse, ipsa, ipsum*, the omission of the relative pronoun in funerary inscriptions before the verb *vixit*, and other various types of ellipsis. The use and characteristics of two common formulas (*Dis Manibus* and *tribunicia potestate*) are also examined in detail.

The following chapter — the lexicon — is not very extensive due to the formulaic and stereotypical character of the inscriptions, as already mentioned. Nevertheless, the inscriptions can provide words whose sense deviates from the classical norm, and previously unattested words i.e. ἄπαξ λεγόμενα. In addition, the lexicon contains words of foreign (mostly Greek) origin, new words, terms that have changed declension, folk terms for names of persons and places, etc. The words are arranged alphabetically, indexed under lemmas, and provided with an explanation. The author also refers to the works of other scholars (Drăgoiescu and Mihăescu, op. cit. respectively) who include the same word in the vocabulary lists. These authors organized the lexical items by semantic fields (e.g., family relations, army, religion, kinship, etc.) and carefully examined the particular usage of some terms. A thematic approach to the organisation of the lexicon seems more appropriate to illustrate the features of the language of the inscriptions. The alphabetical organisation of the lexicon is easier to survey when the user is looking for information about a particular word, but no clear picture emerges for a word in the context of Dacian inscriptions. Some of the explanations of the words that are part of the lexicon are quite detailed with extensive sources and arguments, but for many examples there are very few

explanations and elaborations, sometimes consisting only of the inscription in which they were documented. The author also cites the nouns *familiaricum, legulus,* and *pegmarius* as examples of hapaxes, but only the last example is provided with a fairly in-depth explanation and analysis. This seems to be a shortcoming, since the lexicon is one area where the language of the inscriptions could stand out more clearly, showcasing its uniqueness and distinguishing characteristics from the language of other regions. This could be achieved most efficiently by a detailed analysis and presentation of the terms with very atypical and specific epigraphic usage, in the first line ἄπαξ λεγόμενα, but also of prominent words such as *compar, alumnus,* etc.

The final chapter of the book contains concluding remarks that relate to the content of the preceding chapters, although one might have expected a more pointed, detailed, and critical synthesis given the wealth of data and issues presented in the preceding chapters. The author notes that the linguistic variations in the inscriptions generally affect the phonetic register and occur throughout the Roman Empire. It is also noted that the spoken language, local idiosyncrasies, and writing style of Latin cannot be identified, since Dacia was a Roman province for only a very short time and most dedicators are not of Dacian origin. But that was not the aim of this book anyway. The main goal, to sketch the picture of the Latin language in the inscriptions of Roman Dacia, has been successfully achieved. Besides concluding remarks, the author also deals with the non-Latin substratum whose influence on the Latin language spoken in Dacia can be seen in the phonetic field, in onomastics and in toponyms.

This book is a well-written and documented study focusing on Latin epigraphy from Dacia. The careful analysis and explanation, as well as the organization of the individual chapters and the book as a whole, make it accessible and useful to both

experienced and less experienced linguists and epigraphers. It provides much important data on language of epigraphy in Dacia and can be useful for assessing the degree of acculturation in that province. This publication has the potential to serve as a source for further research on the topic of the language

of Dacia, but also to stimulate similar research on other provinces. Moreover, it lends itself to various comparisons and can help provide a clearer picture of the Latin language in the Danubian provinces and the lives of their citizens.

TUDOR DINU, *REVOLUȚIA GREACĂ DE LA 1821 PE TERITORIUL MOLDOVEI ȘI ȚĂRII ROMÂNEȘTI*, BUCUREȘTI: HUMANITAS, 2022, 368 p.

Reviewed by Marija Milinković*

Tudor Dinu, professor at the Faculty of Foreign Languages and Literatures at the University of Bucharest, marked the two-hundredth anniversary of the Greek Revolution and the revolutionary movement in the Romanian lands with the book *Revoluția Greacă de la 1821 pe teritoriul Moldovei și Țării Românești*. In the foreword of this book, which, in addition to the introduction and conclusion, contains 14 chapters, the author states the reasons why this topic has not been extensively researched either in Greek or Romanian historiography. For Greek historians, he assumes that the main obstacles are the numerous sources in the Romanian language that testify about the actions of the Greeks in the territory of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, whereas for many Romanian historians, the execution of Tudor Vladimirescu, the Romanian national hero, committed by the Eteria, is an obstacle for an objective judgment of the actions and the importance of the Filiki Heteria movement in the Romanian territories. Tudor Vladimirescu's movement was a central topic in Romanian historiography for a long time. In contrast, Romanian historical scholarship tended to marginalize the movement of Filiki Eteria, although its consequences for Wallachia and Moldavia were significant. Using numerous

written sources in Romanian and Greek (many of them presented for the first time), Dinu comprehensively approached this complex topic, trying to reveal the goals of both movements and break down the background of their conflicts without dividing the characters into good and bad. In his account, Dinu scrupulously adheres to this principle, often citing several sources about the same event.

As the title of the book suggests, the main plot concerns the eterist movement in the Danube principalities, military actions and internal problems, while the author writes in passing about the echoes of these events on the international level, in Russia or the Ottoman Empire, to the extent that it is necessary for understanding the broader context. In that regard, with a precise and concrete account, the author covers all necessary aspects of the interplay between Russian and Ottoman politics regarding the events of 1821.

Dinu begins with a brief overview of the relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, as well as the position of the Greek people since the fall of Constantinople, citing the key events and turning points, such as the

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appointment of the Phanariots to the thrones of Bucharest and Iași, and the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji. In the following, the author lists the ideas that inspired the Greek Revolution – primarily the French Revolution of 1789, as well as the Greek hope that Russia, which aspired to be the protector of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire, would provide military aid to free the Greeks from Turkish rule and restore the Byzantine Empire. Since the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812 and the move of Russia to the Danube, extensive preparations for mounting a revolution in Wallachia and Moldavia began, not so much pragmatic as idealistic in their nature, as the author shrewdly points out.

In addition to describing the founding of Filiki Eteria, its organization and the political beginnings of Alexander Ypsilantis, Dinu introduces the readers to the revolutionary preparations in Moldavia, whose ruler, Michael Soutzos, significantly helped the Eterists to organize their army and prepare the ground for future anti-Turkish actions. At the same time, preparations began in Wallachia too, with Ypsilantis's order to oust Alexandros Soutzos from the Wallachian throne because he remained loyal to the Ottomans, refusing to support the eterists. While the campaign to oust the Wallachian ruler was underway, Filiki Eteria made an agreement on cooperation with Tudor Vladimirescu, who had gained war experience and a good reputation during the Russo-Turkish war (1806-1812). Vladimirescu and the Eterists reached an agreement that, in the future uprising, both sides would work for the common good and that all the Balkan peoples would cooperate in the struggle for the liberation of the Balkans from the Turks. However, given that the Serbs and Bulgarians were not ready for a revolution, Ypsilantis's initial plan to raise the entire Balkan Peninsula to arms failed. He then decided to start the uprising in the Danube principalities (where he did not have enough troops and supporters), and from there, he planned to free from Ottoman rule one Balkan country at a time. Thus begins the trouble for Ypsilantis and his eterists. Ypsilantis persuaded the Moldavians to join his army in large numbers, claiming that Russian Emperor Alexander I would send his troops to

help the insurgents. However, shortly thereafter, a condemnation of the revolution and a refusal to provide any assistance to the eterists came from the Russian Emperor. Realizing that he did not have enough soldiers, Ypsilantis undertook an extensive recruitment campaign, promising ammunition, weapons, and monetary compensation after the liberation of Greece from Ottoman rule, thereby recruiting various hooligans into his army. In the following, the author vividly describes the numerous inconveniences that the population of Moldavia experienced from the eterist army. This demeanor of the army caused fear among the Romanian population and less and less sympathy for the liberation of the Greeks from Turkish rule. Dinu even quotes Romanian sources that claim that even the Turks were not as cruel to the locals.

On the other hand, the author also introduces the readers to the actions of Tudor Vladimirescu and his army. For the majority of Wallachians, the main problems were the arbitrariness of the boyars and high taxes, not the presence of the Turkish government. Their primary goal was not to overthrow the Ottoman government, but to improve their social position, which attracted a large number of Wallachians to Vladimirescu's side. Although the movements of Vladimirescu and Ypsilantis did not have the same priorities, initially, they persisted in their cooperation agreement. However, the failure to attract the Serbs and Bulgarians to their cause and the absence of Russian aid significantly limited their military and political successes in Wallachia and Moldavia. Knowing that he did not have enough troops to cross the Danube, Ypsilantis rejected the proposal of Mladen Milovanović, a veteran of the First Serbian Uprising, to start a rebellion in Bulgaria. Focusing on military actions against the Turks in Moldavia and Wallachia, Ypsilanti's distrust of Vladimirescu, who was gaining more and more popularity, was growing, and a rift between the two was inevitable. The conflict between Vladimirescu and Ypsilantis, as well as the preparations for the decisive battle against the Turks, represents the culmination of this monograph. The author, in an almost literary fashion, leads the readers to the outcome of the plot, dispelling myths

and legends about the battles of the eterists and Romanians against the Turks based on historical sources. The advance of the Turkish army into the Danube principalities and its banishment of the eterists were dynamically conveyed by the author, making the reader uneasy in anticipation of the outcome of these events. This is especially noticeable in the last chapter of the book, where the author describes how the rebels under the command of Mladen Milovanović, Iordache Olimpiotul, Iane Farmache and others used churches and monasteries as headquarters in their battles against the Turks after Ypsilantis escaped to the Austrian Empire.

The author enriched this book with his reconstruction of the route of Vladimirescu's and Ypsilantis's armies and photographs of more than 80 locations through which they passed, bringing the atmosphere of these events, which took place two centuries ago, closer to the readers. Dinu has painted colourful and three-dimensional portraits of not only Alexander Ypsilantis and Tudor Vladimirescu, the most famous participants of these events, but also other prominent individuals, such as Michael Soutzos, Iordache Olimpiotul, Gheorghe Cantacuzino, Sava Fochiano, etc. Dinu also manages to intertwine heroism, tragedy and, at times, humour, delivering a book that is well-researched and easy to follow.

PAUL MILLER-MELAMED, *MISFIRE: THE SARAJEVO ASSASSINATION AND THE WINDING ROAD TO WORLD WAR I*, NEW YORK: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2022, 280 p.

Reviewed by John Zametica*

In the introduction to his book, Paul Miller-Melamed makes the point, almost casually, that the debate over the origins of the First World War "will never be settled." Quite. And this is not necessarily because the subject is so large, or because the available evidence is insufficient. Rather, given in retrospect the gravity of the events of 1914, and given also the tendency to conduct investigations into so-called "war guilt", no narrative can hold pre-eminence for very long when robustly challenged by a contrasting one. This is not a subject that can even remotely be done to death: historians can pull it every which way. But there is another matter to be considered here. Mingling with, and often overshadowing contesting scholarly interpretations, popular and textbook accounts have presented a series of straightforward explanations for the war of 1914, especially with respect to its immediate, ostensible source in the Balkans: "secret" nationalist societies, "fanatic" Serb terrorists, Balkan "powder keg", etc. The beauty of such brevity, writes

Miller-Melamed, "is that it is uncomplicated and reassuring, the very opposite of actual history." Trouble is, many scholars have themselves strayed onto this easy path of simplicity and clarity. Thus, a significant part of the historical narrative about 1914 is actually taken for granted.

The real story of 1914, according to Miller-Melamed, is "highly ironic and hopelessly unsettling." He makes the Sarajevo assassination the focal point of his relentless assault on the myriad of false but attractive constructs that are now part and parcel of the story regarding the outbreak of the war a few weeks later. This is what he calls the "Sarajevo myth", a myth that looms large over the twentieth century and reverberates universally.

"By what means and to what effect", he asks, "have Princip's pistol shots become so fabled in the first place?" He blasts the

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notion that those shots on 28 June 1914 represent modern history's defining "flashbulb" moment. In fact, the international impact of the assassination was short-lived and began to fade as issues such as the Ulster crisis in Britain or the Caillaux affair in France claimed much greater attention. At the same time financial markets stayed calm and "hardly anybody blinked." Sarajevo, Miller-Melamed writes, "was more like a sad headline than a heart-stopping preview of the upcoming era."

What the political murder did produce, however, was a diplomatic crisis that diplomats and statesmen failed to resolve peacefully. They were the real culprits in 1914; not the people from the "blood-soaked" Balkans, but rather the gentlemen who were the decision-makers in "civilized" Europe, in Vienna, Berlin, St Petersburg, Paris and London. The real "flashbulb" event was not what happened in Sarajevo on 28 June – it took place on 23 July when Austria-Hungary presented its ultimatum to Serbia. In emphasizing the vast disproportionality between the Sarajevo assassination ("this isolated incident") and its global ramifications, Miller-Melamed does not ignore the destabilizing capacity of the southeast of Europe pre-1914. On the contrary. He points out the parallel processes of the decay of the Ottoman Empire and the growth of nationalism in the Balkans, accompanied by Great Power rivalries in the region. This, he suggests, was a "crucial, medium-term factor" for the origins of the World War. Yet again, however, the decisive input on the road to Armageddon came not so much from instability in the Balkans, but from the interested parties looking at the region – and also beyond it. Miller-Melamed is spot on when he draws attention to the fact "the Balkans was where imperialism played out on the compact continent itself."

As regards the Sarajevo assassination, Miller-Melamed is keen to "recalibrate" this act which has given rise to countless renderings – many of which are in fact

misrepresentations or oversimplifications. Hence *Misfire* as the title of the book. Take the location of the act to begin with. The author takes a dim view of the regularly stated, derogatory conceptions of Bosnia as some kind of dusty, oriental backwater of Austria-Hungary. After all, he reminds, the place had long been a rather important part of the Eastern Question. The Bosnian annexation episode of 1908-1909, moreover, gave rise to a first-class diplomatic upheaval in Europe. Nevertheless, there was nothing inevitable about the Sarajevo assassination leading to a war that was to produce so much carnage and carry such momentous, long-term consequences. The political murder did, inadvertently, trigger the July crisis, but it was the statesmen of Europe "who lit the illustrious powder keg."

The irony of it, and indeed that which has made the assassination so mythical, is the "sickening" fact that it happened at all. Miller-Melamed skilfully paints a picture of 28 June 1914 which, looking back, makes its end result seem utterly incredible. For Franz Ferdinand fell victim not only to a hopelessly amateurish conspiracy against him, but also to what were criminally sloppy security arrangements for his visit. What is more, he had received warnings against making the trip to Bosnia and only went there reluctantly; towards midnight on 27 June he was on the verge of cancelling next morning's visit to Sarajevo altogether; on 28 June having survived unscathed the first assassination attempt when a bomb was thrown at his car, he was persuaded to continue with the visit – albeit by an alternative route; but the alternative route suddenly became the old route when the driver took the famous "wrong turn"; Princip, the successful assassin, was not even aiming as he fired his shots; etc., etc. All of which represents great stuff for historians since it is grounded in historical fact, yet it mutates into mythology when accompanied by the counterfactual urge to imply "if only, if only ...". Yes, Miller-Melamed agrees that the

assassination was an exceedingly close call. On the other hand, he notes, so too were many of the battles that could have led to a different outcome of the war.

But where did the impetus for the conspiracy come from, and what was its political aim in the first place? There is a sense in which Miller-Melamed considers such questions superfluous. Thus he argues that Vienna was hell-bent on destroying Serbia already in early July, an attitude it maintained even after its own investigator declared that there was no evidence to link the Serbian government with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. Is it really that important, he asks, to get to the bottom of this “basically criminal question”? To him, however, this political murder is not just “intrinsically interesting”, it is also “terrifically distorted”. There are two main schools of thought with regard to the roots of the conspiracy, and Miller-Melamed identifies some serious flaws in both of them. Those historians who support the view that it was instigated “from below”, i.e., by the Young Bosnians themselves, tend to romanticize the Sarajevo assassination as “tyrannicide”, a “desperate act” of an oppressed people. On the other hand, those who see it as having been organized “from above”, i.e., by the notorious “Black Hand” nationalist society, proceed on flimsy evidence as they explain the political murder in terms of the society’s Great Serbian aspirations to be pursued at the expense of Austria-Hungary.

Miller-Melamed actually comes down on the side of those who see *Young Bosnia* as the begetter of the conspiracy – as opposed to the majority of historians who ascribe it to the “secret” Black Hand crew that “recruited” young students and made them into “tools” of some Great Serbian plot. Nevertheless, he makes the important observation that the assassination was most plausibly “an egregious act of ordinary human recklessness.” In that light, both the “tyrannicide” and the “sinister” Black Hand theories look less persuasive. Herein lies the whole

purpose of his book: to discredit standard explanations, of whatever variety, by challenging the smug assumptions behind them. And while tactfully stating that his book is not meant to censure historians, *Misfire* is really a systematic onslaught on all those interpretations of the assassination that unnecessarily mix facts with fiction in order to additionally dramatize an already dramatic event. He draws attention, for example, to the assassin Gavrilo Princip who is often presented as “the pivotal figure in world history” when in fact others played more direct roles in the events leading to war. Princip has also been variously portrayed as murderous terrorist, heroic freedom fighter, degenerate criminal, pop cultural icon, and what not. One might add that the most common description of Princip, in popular and serious accounts alike, is “Serb nationalist”, which could not be further from the truth. Miller-Melamed appropriately brings into focus the Yugoslav ideology of the *Young Bosnia* adherents, commenting that this is simply ignored by scholars given their “teleological tendency to Serbianize them”, something particularly apparent in the wake of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s. But then, it is far easier and indeed more attractive to present the political murder as the work of “fanatic” Serbian terrorists controlled by some “nefarious” nationalist secret society than to look closely at the complex historical background to the whole event. Nothing beats a straightforward, compelling narrative.

The author notes that the trend to attribute the planning and organization of the assassination to Black Hand was in significant measure set by Luigi Albertini and Sidney Fay, two of the giants of the historiography concerning the origins of the Great War. Recently, those historians who have embraced this approach have also spiced it up by imagining modern parallels. Thus Miller-Melamed points out that Margaret MacMillan compares the Young Bosnians with “extreme groups” of Islamic fundamentalists such as Al Qaeda. Similarly, Christopher Clark detects in them what he calls “raw modernity” in that they formed a “squad of suicide

bombers" directed by "an avowedly terrorist organization". Miller-Melamed rightly dismisses such balderdash by calling attention to the "acute difference" between a targeted political murder and indiscriminate mass murder. Now, Macmillan and Clark are highly respected historians in this domain. Macmillan's 2013 book on the war's origins is already standard reading, while Clark's best-selling *Sleepwalkers* (2012) has arguably become the most influential work in the field since Fritz Fischer's *Griff nach der Weltmacht* (1961).¹ If the leading historians can peddle this kind of "loaded rhetoric", as Miller-Melamed puts it, what can be expected of non-specialists?

Construing the Sarajevo assassination as "a ready analogy for present-day woes" is typical of the way interpretations of this event have turned it into a myth and thus hampered our historical understanding. Not to mention what Miller-Melamed calls "counterfactual fixations" that have overwhelmed the Sarajevo narratives. But most of all he draws special attention in his Sarajevo mythology catalogue to the "overinterpretation" of the supposedly "epic" conspiracy and its alleged "flashbulb" impact that epitomize the absence of complication characteristic of mythology. And then there are all those extravagant depictions ("the most critical moment in modern history"), banal explanations ("fate", "chance") and downright fabrications ("fanatic Serb terrorists"). Miller-Melamed's favourite, as it were, Sarajevo 1914 "enticing invention" is the one which has Princip eating a "sandwich" just moments before firing his shots. "Today", he writes, "my students regularly ask about it".

Just as the broad debate about how and why the war broke out in 1914 "will never be settled", neither will, it seems, the discussion about the exact nature of the involvement

in the Sarajevo assassination of the Black Hand organization and particularly its unofficial leader Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis. Miller-Melamed has unavoidably jumped into the murky depths of this controversy. Although he accepts that the conspiracy originated with the Young Bosnians, he allows - ever so guardedly - for the possibility that Apis had subsequently played a role in it. In this context, he speculates that Apis's motive in arming the assassins may have been to create a crisis in Austro-Serb relations in order to "topple" the hated prime minister Nikola Pašić during the May 1914 governmental crisis. He also cautiously suggests that, aware of the danger that a successful assassination could provoke a war with Austria-Hungary, Apis sent some dilettante but eager young assassins merely to attempt something and thereby create a "diplomatic scandal".

This, of course, is not a new hypothesis. Without going into the fine detail, this reviewer wishes to point out one glaring inconsistency in all such conjecture. It has to do with dates. The news that Franz Ferdinand was to attend military manoeuvres in Bosnia was first announced on 16 March in *Bosnische Post*, the Sarajevo German-language daily. *The paper gave the time of the visit as the end of June. This news was then carried in other papers of the Monarchy. If Apis had intended to utilize the Young Bosnians he only had the end of June as the date after which he could hope to topple Pašić because the assassins could simply not act before then. And yet, as is well-documented, throughout May and early June Apis was busy organizing a military coup against the Pašić government. He actually sent instructions to his fellow officers in Macedonia to start the coup, but they replied on 10 June that they would do no such thing. Nevertheless, this shows that he had acted to get rid of Pašić well before the date he knew Franz Ferdinand would set foot in Bosnia. If he thought that he would control Serbia by mid-June, did he need a "diplomatic scandal" with the mighty*

¹ M. MacMillan, *The War That Ended Peace: How Europe Abandoned Peace for the First World War* (London: Profile Books, 2013); C. Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (London: Allen Lane, 2012).

Austria-Hungary already in early July? The fact, moreover, that in the course of June he repeatedly attempted to stop the assassins hardly supports this theory linking 28 June to Serbia's internal struggles.

One might differ from Miller-Melamed on a number of other points. He writes, for example, that before Sarajevo most Habsburg leaders displayed little readiness for war with Serbia. Vienna's mobilization effort from Autumn 1912 to Spring 1913 alone suggests otherwise. This effort, incidentally, was meant to thwart Serbian ambitions in Albania, having thus nothing to do with any "self-interested overreach" by Belgrade in the direction of Austria-Hungary. One of the Habsburg leaders advocating a war with Serbia during this period was no less a person than Franz Ferdinand. And when Miller-Melamed contends that Austro-Serb relations were reaching "grave proportions" over "the increasingly independence-minded" South Slavs of the Monarchy he does not persuade. Serious tensions in those relations certainly existed, although with the sole exception of the Bosnian annexation crisis which had already ended in 1909 they did not relate to any specifically South Slav issues. Besides, not one South Slav nation ruled by the Habsburgs was advocating independence. As for Miller-Melamed's claim that Franz Ferdinand intended to realign his empire with Russia, this was true for a long time, but there is credible evidence that it was no longer the case by 1914. One could also question his endorsement of the old idea of Franz Ferdinand as a supposedly reform-minded future emperor. Or his view that the Matscheko Memorandum was "pragmatic and pacific". Or his blithe certainty that the Konopischt meeting between Franz Ferdinand and Wilhelm II was "prosaic and humdrum". It goes without saying, however, that all these subjects can be legitimately debated.

So what happened in 1914? Why did "civilized" Europe opt for a brutal, barbaric conflict that did so much to destroy its

civilization? Certainly, as Miller-Melamed observes, the war was not waged in order to avenge Franz Ferdinand. "Monarchies", Karl Marx wrote in 1854, "never or seldom go to war for principles, or even to avert distant or contingent dangers; but they do it for immediate interests and for immediate advantages."² The assassination in Sarajevo merely created a situation in which the Great Powers could entertain the war option. Several such situations had arisen before 1914, and even had Franz Ferdinand lived there is no reason to suppose that major crises would not pop up again. In that sense, the "Sarajevo myth" has clouded the broader historical setting for 1914. Sarajevo was really "nothing" – as Miller-Melamed is keen to emphasize, employing the term that was ironically uttered by a dying Franz Ferdinand to describe his pistol wound.

Misfire is without doubt a tremendously important addition to the 1914 literature. It is also, it has to be said, a stylishly written, absolutely entrancing work. In it, Miller-Melamed combines his agnosticism with massive erudition to demonstrate how the explanatory constructs in the narratives about the Sarajevo assassination in fact turn out to be, on closer inspection, no more than "neat explanatory fiction". This makes his book uniquely original in a sea of studies detailing the road to war. Despite its subtitle, therefore, *Misfire is certainly not just yet another account of how the war began.* It is *much, much more* appealing and engaging than that: in showing how history can be so easily misconstrued and then widely transmitted, it is a striking reminder, and something of a reprimand, about how we end up processing the past through a mythological prism.

² K. Marx, *The Eastern Question* (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1897), 356.

SERBIA AND THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND:
 THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND A NEW ECUMENISM, EDs., MARK D. CHAPMAN AND
 BOGDAN LUBARDIĆ. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN: CHAM, 2022, 228 p.

Review by Aleksandra Djurić Milovanović*

The edited volume *Serbia and the Church of England: The First World War and a New Ecumenism*, published within the Palgrave Macmillan series *Pathways for Ecumenical and Interreligious Dialogue*, is the first comprehensive account of the ecumenical relationships between Britain and Serbia. Edited by two scholars, Mark D. Chapman, Professor of the History of Modern Theology at the University of Oxford and Bogdan Lubardić, Professor at the Faculty of Orthodox Theology of the University of Belgrade, Serbia, the book gathers prominent scholars, experts on the history of British-Serbian relations and religious studies scholars, whose interest lies in the research of the relations between the Orthodox Church and the Church of England. In the ten chapters of the volume, chronologically capturing the period from the middle of the nineteenth century until World War II, the authors focus on various aspects of the dynamic relationship between the Church of England and Serbia and its Orthodox Church. The initial idea behind the volume comes from the international conference entitled *Theological Refugees in Oxford*, held in 2018 in Oxford to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the settlement of Serbian theologians in and around Oxford towards the end of the First World War. The conference was jointly organised by the Oxford Theological Seminary and the Faculty of Orthodox Theology from Belgrade. The main aim of the conference and later the edited volume was to provide a detailed account of the relations between the two churches, but also to analyse the contribution of the leading religious figures from the period, especially Nikolaj Velimirović, Justin Popović and Anglican theologians. The period these

theologians spent in Oxford had a significant impact on their relationship with the Church of England. However, it also led to some changes within the Serbian Orthodox Church brought by new perspectives from the religious leaders who had been educated or had spent some time in Oxford with Anglican theologians.

The volume starts with an introductory chapter written by the two co-editors, Chapman and Lubardić, entitled *Introduction: Theological Refugees in Oxford During the Great War — Ecumenical Dimensions of Christian Solidarity*. It provides the historical background and context after the outbreak of the First World War, when the Serbian Orthodox Church, in co-operation with the government of the Kingdom of Serbia (led by Prime Minister Nikola Pašić), decided that the seminarians from St Sava's Theological Seminary in Belgrade should leave for fear of Austro-Hungarian troops, but also to protect the seminarians from the typhoid epidemic which had hit Serbia toward the end of 1914 (p. 2). A group of 50 seminarians first fled to France and then to Russia. However, due to the revolutionary turmoil in Imperial Russia, they were forced to leave. Most of them gathered in Corfu before departing for the United Kingdom, arriving in three groups in 1916, 1917 and 1918. Some 55 theology students accompanied by their

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professors took refuge at the theological colleges in Cuddesdon and the missionary college in Dorchester-on-Thames, as well as at another theological college, St Stephen's House in Oxford. The Serbian refugees had the full support of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Randall Thomas Davidson, and many other church leaders and scholars at that time. Chapman and Lubardić emphasise that although "many returned to Serbia in 1919, some of them stayed until 1921 and later, many of the seminarians and professors went on to become outstanding spiritual, theological and pastoral leaders in the Serbian Orthodox Church. Most notably Justin Popović and Nikolaj Velimirović were later introduced into the dyptichon of saints and gained pan-Orthodox acclamation as theologians, spiritual fathers and outspoken critics of the Communist regime. Others became bishops (Josif Cvijović, Damaskin Grdanicki and Irinej Djordjević), religious philosophers (Dušan Stojanović and Pavle Jevtić) and state officials in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (minister of faiths, Vojislav Janić)" (p. 4). The chapters in the volume contribute to a better understanding of the Anglican-Orthodox Christian dialogue and their unique relationship which marked the beginning of the twentieth century.

The first chapter, written by Slobodan G. Markovich, *British-Serbian Church Relations from the mid-nineteenth century to 1878*, focuses on the work of William Denton and Metropolitan and Archbishop Michael/Mihailo during the time of the Eastern Crisis, from 1875 to 1878. The chapter provides a valuable basis for understanding the contribution of Denton and Metropolitan and Archbishop Michael to establishing official relations between the Church of England and the Serbian Orthodox Church. It also provides an overview of the role of Anglo-Catholics and nonconformists during the Eastern Crisis and their approach to supporting Balkan Christians. *Henry Liddon and Serbia: Ecumenism and Politics in the late nineteenth century* is the second chapter

written by Antony Dutton. The chapter focuses on Henry Parry Liddon, an ecumenist who supported Eastern Christians in Serbia in 1876 and during the "Bulgarian Agitation", asking the British Government to lend its support to the persecuted Christians. The chapter contributes to understanding Liddon's contribution to the relations between the two countries during a tumultuous period in Serbian history. Angela Berlis's chapter *Serbian Orthodox Presence in Switzerland in the Early Twentieth Century: Nikolaj Velimirović and his Doctoral Theses at the University of Bern* provides a very rich and insightful introduction to the early life of one of the most prominent leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Nikolaj Velimirović (1881-1956), i.e. the period when he wrote his two doctoral theses at the University of Bern, Switzerland. For both theses, the first one at the Old Catholic Faculty (1908) and the second at the Philosophical Faculty (1909), Velimirović had supervisors who were Old Catholics. The chapter shows the importance of this period, as well as the influence and education that shaped Velimirović as an ecumenical leader and someone close to the Old Catholic Church of Switzerland. Berlis provides analyses of his correspondence with Bishop Eduard Herzog, who was his theological supervisor, and with Dr Adolf Kury, a vicar in Basel and editor-in-chief of the *Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift*. The latter collaborated with Velimirović and might have even invited him to join the journal's editorial board at one point, although this idea was never confirmed. Berlis writes: "His letters are marked by the current political interests of the church, such as Modernism and his assessment of Newman. They also discuss his understanding of the role of the Old Catholic Church and his relationship to his own Serbian Orthodox Church which he observes in a critical way" (p. 70). Continuing the discussion of the work and life of Nikolaj Velimirović, the fifth chapter of Mark D. Chapman, *From Kosovo to Oxford:*

Nikolaj Velimirović and the Serbian Orthodox Church in England, 1916-1919, focuses on the period from mid-1916 until the end of the First World War. It highlights the role of two figures: Henry Joy Fynes-Clinton, who was a secretary of the Anglican and Eastern Association and Nikolaj Velimirović. Chapman shows the important role Nikolaj Velimirović had as one of the leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the relationship with the Church of England and a strong promoter of Serbia and its church in England. The time Velimirović spent in Oxford and Cuddesdon shaped his path in the ecumenical dialogue in the following decades. Chapman includes an insightful remark by the Serbian diplomat Čedomilj Mijatović, who stated “that Fr Nikolaj was ‘a true Serb’: ‘to hear him was to hear Serbia speaking. Serving his country, he had served also higher ideals. There could be no true League of Nations without a League of Churches’ (p. 110).

The chapter dedicated to the perception of Serbia as a British and Entente ally in the First World War was written by James Pettifer under the title *Beyond ‘Holy Serbia’: Anglican Christianity and Nationalism in the First World War*. Pettifer showcases the role of different public figures such as Admiral Sir Ernest Troubridge, an officer in the Royal Navy and commander of the British detachment troops defending Belgrade from the Habsburg forces, and Prof. John Holland Rose, an English historian and the Vere Harmsworth Chair of Royal Naval History at the University of Cambridge.

In the chapter *St Justin Popović and Anglican Theologians: Reflections on a Complex and Multifaced Encounter*, Bogdan Lubardić gives a detailed account of the life and work of Fr Justin Popović, one of the most influential Orthodox theologians, after his arrival to Oxford. During his time in Oxford, Fr Justin Popović wrote his doctoral thesis “The Religion of Dostoevsky”. However, it was the only thesis among those written by Serbian theologians at Oxford which did not

earn its author a degree from the University exam committee. Therefore, Lubardić tries to analyse why this was the case and what shaped Popović’s mainly negative reflections and attitudes towards Western Christianity. However, Lubardić argues that a “more positive estimate is revealed in the discrete yet telling positive references to Anglican authors, English literature and British natural science. Within this hitherto unobserved web of cross-references and remarks (including the Anglican theological part of his library), we find a surprising openness, if not a congeniality, of Fr Justin with regard to some Christians of the West, most notably, Anglicans.” (p. 156).

The contribution of Vladan Tatalović, *Toward the History of Serbian New Testament Scholarship: The Cuddesdon Episode (1917-1919)*, brings new analyses to the field of Serbian biblical studies, focusing on the contribution to Serbian New Testament scholarship during the time Serbian theologians spent at Oxford and Cuddesdon during WWI. The main focus is on the introduction to the New Testament written by Fr Vojislav Janić. Tatalović aims to reconstruct the motives of Janić for writing the textbook, as well as the dynamics of change of Serbian New Testament scholarship under his influence.

In the chapter of Ivica Čairović, *The Role of Pavle Popović in the Development of Anglo-Serbian Relations (1916–1933)*, the focus is on the activity of Pavle Popović, who was the first inspector of the Ministry of Education of Serbia in Great Britain during WWI and rector of the University of Belgrade. The chapter brings relevant insights into the activities of Popović in the interwar period related to advancing Anglican-Serbian relations, but especially his scholarly and propagandist role in England.

The last chapter, *Anglican-Serbian Encounters in the Era of the Two World Wars*, by Andrew Chandler, examines the ecumenical character of the Church of England since the time of the issuing the ‘Appeal to

All Christian People' by the Lambeth Conference in 1920. English theologian Arthur Cayley Headlam, who became the Bishop of Gloucester in 1923, had a significant role in this process. The chapter gives a detailed account of the development of Anglican-Serbian relations during the interwar period, but in the conclusion it also sheds light on the events that occurred during WWII and after the war. Chandler writes: "The victory of the communists provoked an exodus of monarchists from the country, significant numbers of whom came to Britain. Soon diasporic communities could be found across the country, in Halifax, in parts of London, in Bradford, in Derby, and in Birmingham. Where they settled the Serbs acquired or even built churches: in 1952 Bishop Velimirović visited London to consecrate the church of St Sava in Notting Hill, London, a church originally built for Anglican worship in 1903; in the same year a redundant Methodist chapel in Boothtown, Halifax, was bought by the Serbian community. Arguably most striking was the building of the Lazarica Church on land owned by Quakers in Bournville, Birmingham, in 1968. It became a favorite church of Archbishop Michael Ramsey. In such ways did the history of Anglican-Serbian Orthodox

relations find a new meaning, not in a Yugoslavia which now found an uncomfortable place in the new Eastern Bloc, but in the unfolding history of religious diversity in Britain itself." (p. 221).

This edited volume is a significant contribution to the history of Anglican-Serbian relations but also to religious studies and in-depth understanding of influences and transfer of knowledge between the two churches during the challenging years of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Although Serbian theology students in Oxford and Cuddesdon gained completely new knowledge and practices, Anglican theologians learned more about the Serbian Orthodox Church as well. Thus, in this two-way process of enhancing knowledge, stronger and deeper ties between the two countries and two churches were created. Aiming to commemorate the centenary of the arrival of Serbian theological refugees to Oxford in 1918, this volume contains high-quality case studies and in-depth perspectives on some of the key personalities and historical events of the time. Therefore, it represents an exceptional contribution to the enriched understanding of Anglican-Serbian relations past and present.

FREEMASONRY IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE FROM THE 19TH TO THE 21ST CENTURIES,
ED., SLOBODAN G. MARKOVICH. BELGRADE: INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN STUDIES AND
ZEPTER BOOK WORLD, 2020, 315 p.

Reviewed by Petar S. Ćurčić*

It is a well-known fact that over the past two centuries, Freemasonry has become a very provocative topic in intellectual circles and the general public. Due to its powerful adversaries (especially the Roman Catholic Church, totalitarian regimes, conservative critics and conspiracy theorists), it was stigmatized as an intolerable activity deserving

of suspicion or even a ban. Besides the opponents of Freemasonry, the clandestine nature of freemasonic activities, both inside and outside its lodges, has generated an

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anti-masonic discourse over time. Although dozens of books on Freemasonry had been published, until now there was no detailed scholarly research about the history of this phenomenon in Serbia and the neighbouring countries.

Since the grand jubilee of 2017, the three-hundredth anniversary of the United Grand Lodge of England and the centenary of the official establishment of the Grand Lodge of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes "Yugoslavia" in 2019, significant effort has been made by scholars in the region to rewrite the history of the freemasons. Studying the history of freemasonries in the wider context was, and still is, a particularly important element of understanding their activity in order to debunk centennial stereotypes. This desire motivated Prof. Slobodan G. Markovich (University of Belgrade and the Institute for European Studies) to organise a conference about the history of Freemasonry in Southeast Europe from the 19th to the 21st century, attended by twelve panelists from seven countries (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Italy, Hungary, USA and Costa Rica). The organisation of the conference and the publication of its proceedings were supported by the Institute of European Studies from Belgrade and several private sponsors (companies and individuals).

Eleven articles were systematized into four parts that explore specific topics. As a result of the idea to place Freemasonry in a broader geographical and phenomenological context, the papers were not organised in chronological order. In the first part (Freemasonry in Interwar Europe), Prof. Wolfgang Schmale (University of Vienna) and Dr Eric Beckett Weaver (University of Debrecen) examined the French and Hungarian Freemasonry, their activities, dilemmas and problems. In post-WWI Hungary, Freemasonry was officially banned and faced widespread anti-masonic activities conducted both by left- and right-wing extremists, while in France they demonstrated

unwavering commitment to pacifist and cosmopolitan causes.

After an analysis of the momentous processes in interwar Freemasonry, three authors from Italy, Hungary and Croatia portrayed how Hungarian and Italian masonic influences had circulated across Southeastern Europe (especially Serbia and Croatia) from the 18th to the 21th centuries. Individually, Prof. Fulvio Conti (University of Florence) and Prof. Attila Pok (Institute of History at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest) described how, in the late 19th century, Hungarian and Italian freemasons developed a network of lodges in Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Croatia, which operated under the protection of the Grand Orient of Italy and the Symbolic Grand Lodge of Hungary, as well as the enduring rivalry between these two grand lodges. In her brief case study, Dr Ljubinka Toševa Karpowicz presented the history of Freemasonry in Rijeka (Fiume in Italian) from the period of the French occupation under Napoleon to the present day.

After the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the previous jurisdictions of several grand lodges suddenly disappeared. A new masonic framework had to be constructed and recognised by the highest masonic bodies (grand lodges and supreme councils) in continental Europe. Also, the political context could not be excluded. Dr Stanislav Sretenović (Institute of Contemporary History in Belgrade) explains how political factors influenced the disputes between the Italian and Yugoslav Freemasonry during the Great War (particularly the territorial dispute between the two countries) and how the Italian fascist regime overestimated importance of Freemasonry in Yugoslavia.

Similarly to Freemasonry abroad, Yugoslav Freemasonry had to face several internal intellectual currents that deeply divided the whole organisation. Both Prof. Slobodan G. Markovich (Faculty of Political Science of the University of Belgrade) and Dr

Nemanja Radulović (Faculty of Philology of the University of Belgrade) followed two major trajectories in Yugoslav Freemasonry. On the one hand, there was significant enthusiasm for creating a secular religion as a unifying constituent element in the Yugoslav nation-building case. As Professor Markovich revealed, the idea of a Yugoslav civil religion, supported by freemasons, was an obvious case of an integrationist endeavour which proved unsuccessful due to political and social differences that overpowered these freemasonic attempts. On the other hand, Dr Radulović demonstrated that the division of the Yugoslav freemasons into two groups, esoteric-oriented and rational-based freemasons, had an important effect during the interwar period both regionally and conceptually. For practical purposes, Mihailo Milinković (Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Belgrade) sketched an intellectual profile of Mihailo Valtrović, a prominent Serbian archaeologist, politician and founder of Freemasonry in the Kingdom of Serbia. As an epilogue, Dr Matevž Košir (Archives of Slovenia) depicted the persecution of Freemasonry in Yugoslavia in the period 1940–46 by different totalitarian regimes, showing how it was officially banned and describing its fate after WW2. Finally, Dr Misha Djurkovich (Institute for European Studies) analysed the relations between the Roman Catholic Church and freemasons from the 18th century to the present day, abstracting the principle of confrontation and rapprochement between Rome and freemasons, particularly its Anglo-American incarnation.

What is the most important contribution of this book? First of all, the principal idea of the authors was to approach this complex topic in a scholarly and documented manner by using the available primary sources. Apart from its methodological credibility, a very distinctive mode of identifying the diversity and complexity of successive freemasonic organisations in Southeastern Europe is an important accomplishment of

this book. Secondly, freemasons have been identified as a heterogeneous association that operated within civil societies of particular states and was divided into various groups and subgroups. Alienated by various reasons (especially after the Great War), freemasons had been restricted in their activities by nationalistic interests of their countries. But, in some cases after WW2, freemasons made steps toward a rapprochement with their old enemies, such as the Roman Catholic Church, due to the circumstances of the period.

The fate of freemasons was similar to other elite organisations. They faced criticism and persecution in both types of totalitarian states (communist and fascist) but were also challenged and criticised in democratic societies. Numerous conceptual differences that emerged after 1918 tended to create deep divisions in European freemasonic lodges. Offering such examples, Slobodan G. Markovich, Nemanja Radulović and Wolfgang Schmale pointed out how different intellectual currents (such as the rationalistic, esoteric, liberal, conservative and European integrationist) prevailed and contravened in the interwar period. Finally, all authors debunked some classic centennial myths about a masonic conspiracy, which proved to be a mere myth of the fraternity's dedication to achieving global domination. On the contrary, freemasons, similarly to other organizations, were deeply involved in local and regional contexts, and these contexts were successfully presented by all authors of this monograph.

BATTLING OVER THE BALKANS:
HISTORIOGRAPHICAL QUESTIONS AND CONTROVERSIES,
 EDS., JOHN R. LAMPE AND CONSTANTIN IORDACHI.
 CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY PRESS, BUDAPEST 2020, 331 p.

*Reviewed by Anđelija Miladinović**

Battling over the Balkans, Historiographical Questions and Controversies, edited by John R. Lampe, Professor Emeritus at the Department of History at the University of Maryland, College Park, and a Global Senior Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. and Constantin Iordachi, Professor at the History Department of the Central European University and President of the International Association for Comparative Fascist Studies, assembles 37 excerpts from representative works of Balkan scholars. These passages were translated into English from Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian, Croatian, and Albanian, and were arranged thematically into five chapters.

The fundamental idea of this volume is to offer an English-speaking audience interested in Southeast European academic production an overview of contemporary historiographic controversies in regional historiography while overcoming the often stereotyped image of the Balkans. The focus is on a set of specific but controversial questions from the precommunist period. The editors emphasize the significance of Balkan historians' publications about the Balkans as a counterpoint to the dominance of Anglo-American publications. Given how these contentious issues either inspire Western assumptions of endemic ethnic strife requiring intervention or regional assumptions of hegemonic foreign intervention, this volume tries to present a different approach, from the Balkan historians themselves, free of preconceptions that cast the Balkans as the continent's abnormality. This methodology encourages the new transnational emphasis on recognizing common patterns and

impacts over traditional comparative historical distinctions.

The book is divided into five chapters that explore five contested issues: The pre-1914 Ottoman and Eastern Christian Orthodox legacies; the post-1918 struggles for state-building; the range of European economic and cultural influence across the interwar period, as opposed to diplomatic or political intervention; the role of violence and paramilitary forces in challenging the interwar political regimes in the region; and the fate of ethnic minorities into and after World War II. The chapters are introduced by a team of historians functioning as subeditors with brief explanatory essays that either outline the discussion's main points or provide insight into the broader historiographic landscape on the topic matter. Thus, the relevant chapter introductions provide a good inventory of accessible literature as well as insights into the various institutional research structures.

The first chapter (*The Ottoman Balkans and Nation-Building*) examines the political legacy of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, its various aspects, and how it interacted with Balkan nation-building in the 19th century. Roumiana Preshlenova starts the chapter with discussions in Bulgarian historiography concerning Ottoman political legacy, followed by Nadya Danova's excerpt where she analyses religious and historical texts to retrace the usage of terms and images of the Ottoman time, such as

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Ottoman slavery from the end of the medieval Bulgarian state to the present, arguing for a more neutral approach to that period. Roumen Daskalov and Aleksandăr Vezenkov debate their slightly different methods of researching and problematizing the *Bulgarian Revival* and its interconnections with the Tanzimat period in the Ottoman Empire, as well as the concept of *revival periods* in Balkan historiography. Iliya Todev contributes to this debate with his thesis on the Bulgarian Exarchate. The second part of this chapter contains excerpts from Greek historians and their points of view when it comes to the Ottoman political legacy and the role of the Orthodox Church. Vangelis Kechriotis provides an important piece concerning Greek historiography and the role of the Greek Orthodox Church in ensuring the nation's continuity, whereas Eleni Gara offers an overview of recent developments in Balkan historiographies while also questioning the nature of the Ottoman rule, the *Ottoman yoke* metaphor. Elli Skopetea, through literature, diplomatic correspondence, and the press, traces the stereotypes that imbue Western discourses on the East and also the Eastern discourse in the West. Sia Anagnostopoulou addresses the issue of the real aims of the Young Turks and Paraskevas Konortas discusses the perception of the Patriarchate by the Ottoman authorities using royal decrees (*firmans* and *berats*) in his research. This chapter is concluded by an interesting case study by Andreas Lyberatos of the multiethnic town of Plovdiv where he analyses the social and economic preconditions in the emergence of Bulgarian nationalism by tracing the particular circumstances that, within a few decades in the post-Tanzimat era from the 1860s to the 1880s, led to the emergence of opposing camps in the town. Although this chapter covers the majority of the excerpts in this volume, the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans is a topic that demands approaches not only from Greek and Bulgarian historians but historians from every Balkan country. This

broad and informative chapter provides insight into many key works, but sadly lacks works by Serbian, Romanian, and Albanian scholars.

The second chapter (*Struggling with State-Building in Interwar Yugoslavia*) begins with an overview by Vjeran Pavlaković concerning recent Croatian historiography on the interwar period followed by excerpts from Mira Kolar-Dimitrijević and Ivo Goldstein. They both explore the interwar experience of Croatian economy in adjusting to this new framework and the loss of the Austro-Hungarian customs union and currency and the continued predominance of an agricultural economy and population. However, Mira Kolar-Dimitrijević finds only the disadvantages for Croatia in the new framework, while Goldstein sees some advantages, particularly for Zagreb. One cannot help but notice the consistent tendency in these two excerpts to place the blame on Belgrade by selectively choosing the sources. The following excerpt from Aleksandar Jakir is no exception; he draws attention to Dalmatia's experience with Yugoslavism, but rather than providing an objective essay on the subject, he goes out of his way to assign blame for the failed concept of Yugoslavism, in Dalmatia and in general, to the centralizing pressure of the Serb-dominated civic apparatus. The second part of this chapter begins with Vladan Jovanović's overview of recent Serbian historiography on the interwar period, noting that at present, it still pays attention to interwar Yugoslavia which was neglected until the 1980s for various reasons. This part of the chapter was written by Serbian historians and shows a contrasting image compared to the first part. It comprises the excerpts written by Ivana Dobrivojević on regime repression during King Alexander's Dictatorship and Zoran Janjetović, who offered the first thorough synthesis of all Yugoslav national minorities between 1918 and 1941. He discusses strategies for the non-Slavic minorities' political and social integration as well as

some omitted non-Slavic minority data. His method took into account their polyglot ancestry from two powerful empires, the Ottoman and the Habsburg. The chapter ends with Sofija Božić's excerpt about the Serbian community in the town of Osijek during the years 1918-1924 where she emphasizes the feeling of discrimination and intolerance, the violence that they experienced, and concludes that the sources she examined shed a very different light on the thesis of the exploitation of Croats by the oppressing Serbs. She underlines that those claims are works of propaganda rather than a reflection of real circumstances.

In historical accounts of the Balkans, the phenomenon of irregular, or paramilitary, violence has long played a significant role. The following chapter (*Irregular Violence: Bandits, Guerrillas, and Militias*) analyses this phenomenon that has been recognized by both historians from the West and the Balkans. The first part of this chapter consists of four excerpts by Tasos Kostopoulos, Dmitar Tasić, Vladan Jovanović, and Veselin Yanchev. These passages are organized to provide insight into case studies involving paramilitaries in Greece, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, as well as a comparison between the three. The second section of this chapter, which examines fascism in the interwar Balkans, is made up of multiple excerpts, such as the one by Mario Jareb, who analyzes the Ustaša-Homeguard movement and pinpoints the key characteristics such as the lack of a strong domestic Ustaša organization, close ties between individuals and groups and the Ustaše abroad, the unauthorized transfer of personnel, weapons, explosives, propaganda material, and assassinations. Ivo Goldstein in his excerpt, however, provides a detailed description of the emergence of the Ustaša movement, and how it appealed to the *common man*, but only to support his initial claim that it was the brutal suppression of national freedoms and identities by the Yugoslav government that provoked an extremist reaction embodied in the Ustaša

movement, thus failing to observe the gravity and the consequences of this problem. Nikolai Poppetrov's contribution to this chapter is his analysis of the development of fascism in Bulgaria, and Constantin Iordachi provides very thorough research concerning fascism in interwar Romania, personified in the Legion of the Archangel Michael (Iron Guard).

The fourth chapter (*European Influence and Reaction: Economics and Culture*) seeks to shed a light on topics that have only received limited attention: foreign economic and cultural influence. Ivan M. Becić examines the initial years of the new Yugoslav economy, how access to extensive French credit from Serbia's wartime ally was not forthcoming, and how its absence made the challenge of establishing a single financial framework across previously unconnected territories more difficult. Two very extensive analyses of Bulgaria's twentieth-century economy were provided in excerpts by Roumen Avramov and Dimitar Dimitrov. The course of the dinar and foreign exchange policy in the kingdom of Yugoslavia is the title of the excerpt by Goran Nikolić where he explains the trials of the Yugoslav National Bank in Belgrade to maintain the international stability of the dinar. When it comes to cultural influences, Roumaina Preshlenova and John R. Lampe lay the groundwork for the following sections on cultural influences. Additionally, they reference some of the most significant works of literature concerning this topic. This mixture of external influences is explored in the following excerpts. The first excerpt by Ranka Gašić compares the set of British and German influences that joined the major French presence; the Russian anti-Bolshevik influence on the high culture of both Belgrade and Sofia is presented in the excerpt by Miroslav Jovanović, and German cultural influence in Sofia is tracked by Milcho Lalkov. Roumaina Preshlenova and John R. Lampe speculate how these influences were a kind of promise of integration into the

wider European community. However, this conclusion can be viewed as partial because cultural influences on the Balkans cannot be interpreted without a complete understanding of complex and elaborate processes intertwined with Balkan history.

The final chapter (*The Jews and Other Minorities during World War II*) examines the treatment of ethnoreligious minorities and the topic of the Holocaust during World War II. The question of the Holocaust was primarily discussed in Yugoslavia in the context of the history of World War II and the country's diplomatic relations with Nazi Germany; later, the discussion shifted to the history of interethnic relations, which was closely related to the Yugoslav wars of succession. Constantin Iordachi and James Frusetta provide a summary of current historiographical developments in the history of minority issues in the Balkans during World War II, with a focus on the Jewish question and the Holocaust. During the communist period, local discussions regarding the nature of the region's interwar and wartime administrations overshadowed the study of minority policies during World War II in Southeastern European historiography. This introduction is followed by the report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, highlighting the dangers of "comparative trivialization," i.e., abusing comparisons to minimize the gravity of the Holocaust or condition the memory of this tragedy. This chapter contains significant research on the subject, including an excerpt by Lya Benjamin, who contends that Antonescu's anti-Semitism was not an unorganized response to a particular international scenario but rather a broad political program based on both traditional and contemporary anti-Semitic clichés, refuting the claims of the academic literature that it was a result of outside pressure or the strategic imperatives of the war. Notable contributions to this chapter are also excerpts by Yosif Ilel about Jews in Bulgaria during World War II and their rescue and

by Mikhail Gruev about Bulgarian Muslims and the political regime after World War II. The last two parts of this chapter are contributions of Albanian historians. Artan Pluto discusses the plans for the emigration of Jews in Albania when the Italian Fascist state pressured the Albanian government to adopt discriminatory policies against Jews, where the Albanian government complied formally with the Italian request but never actually implemented it; and Valentina Duka who summarizes the debates in Albanian historiography on the contribution of the Albanians to saving the Jews in Albania during World War II.

In summary, the goal of this collection is to elucidate controversial Balkan issues by translating the writings of renowned Balkan historians and creating a window into significant Balkan literary works. Most of the excerpts in this book have been published in the past and are well-known to most Balkan historians, so it is evident that this volume is published with Western readers in mind. Furthermore, despite the initial concept's aspirations to be „The Balkans from the Balkan perspective,“ the selection process reveals a somewhat constrained approach to these topics. Even though the editors provided a few conflicted perspectives, rather than multifaceted chapters, since these important topics demand that kind of approach, many chapters only offer a few viewpoints. However, we may anticipate that this type of publication will serve as a foundation for future volumes compiled from even more works by Balkan historians on these complicated issues, with a broader perspective, as well as a counterbalance to the dominance of Anglo-Saxon publications and one-sided nationalistic publications.

SLOBODAN VUKOVIĆ, *KORENI VELIKOG RATA I NACIZMA*,
SREMSKI KARLOVCI-NOVI SAD: IZDAVAČKA KNJIŽARNICA ZORANA STOJANOVIĆA, 2022.

Reviewed by Bogdan Živković*

The centenary of the First World War was a rather important event in Serbia. The anniversary did not only attract the attention of the nation's historians. Particularly due to the popularity of Christopher Clark's (in) famous *The Sleepwalkers*, the causes of the war also became a burning topic in public debates. Hence, in Serbia, the years 2014–2018 were marked by a reaffirmation of the anti-revisionist discourse on the triggers and causes that led to the outbreak of the war. While the works of Fritz Fischer were quoted as the principal counterargument to Clark's viewpoints, the interest in WWI also revived the Serbian historiographical contribution to the topic of the causes of the global conflict. Many were reminded of the works by authors like Andrej Mitrović, and the Institute for Balkan Studies published an English translation of Vladimir Ćorović's seminal book on this topic – *The Relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary in the 20th Century*.

In 2022, the Serbian anti-revisionist school of thought became richer with the latest publication of sociologist Slobodan Vuković. Vuković's study deals with the root causes of German expansionism in WWI and the genocidal policies during the era of Nazism, viewing the two as inextricable parts of the same historical process. What makes this book particularly interesting and relevant in the Serbian context is its methodological approach. Namely, as the author is a sociologist, this book was written as historical sociology. It is a methodological approach that was lacking in Serbia, as the leading authors on the topic were historians, who mostly used the classic methodology of diplomatic history. In contrast to them, Vuković approaches the issue of German

responsibility for the war by highlighting various social phenomena. The author writes about class, intellectuals, universities, civil society, racism, anti-Semitism, colonialism. Among various phenomena addressed, Vuković highlights two – the tradition of Prussian militarism and the rise of social Darwinism in Germany. In his opinion, these two ideas were embedded into the fabric of German nationalism, the pillars of the national unification, and ultimately led the German national ideology towards expansionism and genocide. And according to Vuković, the German intelligentsia was the crucial actor in articulating and disseminating such ideas.

The author analysed the topic by using an extensive list of publications. In fact, the most impressive feature of this study is its bibliography. At the end of the book, Vuković lists the monographs and articles he used on more than 50 pages. But the sheer quantity of its references is not the only quality of this scholarly endeavour. More importantly, the author used the most relevant works in English and German a far more modest group of seminal works in French and Serbian. Thus, the book gives not only the author's viewpoints, which are clearly expressed, but also an overview of the most relevant international scholarly works on this topic and the author's analyses of them.

To highlight the continuities that go beyond 1914, Vuković dedicates the first chapter of the book to the Herero and

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Nama genocide perpetrated by the German colonial forces in Southwest Africa. This case study serves as an example of the German Empire's early genocidal policies, but Vuković also uses it to describe the racist views of the German elites which fuelled and legitimized the genocidal intents. Particular attention is dedicated to the activities of social Darwinist scholars, who legitimized the ideas of extermination of the *Other* and created a "genocidal mentality".

The second chapter of the book returns to 19th-century Germany, describing the expansionist ideas present in the time of the German national unification. In the term *Mitteleuropa*, seemingly modest in its ambitions, Vuković sees the enormous territorial appetites of the elites even in the initial era of German expansionism. The third and fourth chapters describe how, with the growth of the German state, those expansionist ideas gained more ground and became dominant. Besides highlighting the *Lebensraum* concept, in these two chapters, Vuković also emphasises racism as the main ideological fuel of the expansionist worldview in Germany.

The fifth chapter has a more specific focus than the others, as it narrates the history of anti-Semitism in Germany. The author strives to prove two points: firstly, that the genocidal anti-Semitic ideology of Nazism was not an exception in German history, but a reflection of lasting national traditions. Secondly, Vuković argues that anti-Semitism became an integral part of the German national idea, serving as the negation of the imagined essential values of the German identity. In Vuković's view, the anti-Semitism of Martin Luther was the initial point of that process, which gained momentum in the 1870s and eventually shaped Hitler's policies, ending with the Holocaust.

Chapters six, seven and eight focus on the years prior to and shortly after 1914. In these chapters, the author tries to demonstrate how and why Germany initiated the war and to what extent the national elites

participated in that process. The eighth chapter discusses German expansionism towards South-eastern Europe. Finally, the last chapter deals with revisionist views in German and international historiography. From a strong antirevisionist position, the author thoroughly and critically analyses the works of scholars who sought to minimize German culpability for WWI and/or de-contextualise Nazism as an isolated episode in German history.

Vuković's book is a valuable addition to the vast body of Serbian anti-revisionist historiography which focuses on German imperialism in the twentieth century. It is important primarily as a methodological innovation. The impressive bibliography the author used for writing this book provides an opportunity for Serbian scholars to get acquainted with the most relevant publications on this topic. But, more broadly speaking, this study demonstrates, once more, that the issue of responsibility for the global conflicts in the twentieth century remains an important topic in Serbia. Noteworthy publications, like this one, continue to be published and illuminate this topic from various viewpoints.

ALBERTO BASCIANI, EGIDIO IVETIC, *ITALIA E BALCANI. STORIA DI UNA PROSSIMITÀ*, BOLOGNA: IL MULLINO, 2021.

Reviewed by Bogdan Živković*

In 2021, the Italian public was presented with a new publication by Alberto Basciani and Egidio Ivetic. The two authors belong to the select few Italian scholars who are the national authorities on the history of the Balkans. Therefore, Basciani and Ivetic joined forces to write a book on the Balkans. The product of their efforts is not a classic voluminous history of the Balkans or Italian-Balkan entanglements. In fact, it is a 180 pages breviary, a prelude that can help students and scholars in their quest to study and understand the Balkans and the Italian policies in the Balkans.

The Introduction and Chapters One and Two were written by Ivetic. In the Introduction, he manages to convincingly explain the methodological framework of the book. The outlook of the authors was crucially determined by the perception of Italy and the Balkans as two historical regions in Europe. More broadly speaking, Basciani and Ivetic intended to write a history of Europe by writing the history of its two regions. Inspired by the German approach of *Geschichtsregion*, i.e., history of regions, the two authors focused on a comparative approach. In the Introduction, Ivetic underlines a few of notions crucial for understanding the two neighbouring regions and their entangled histories. The first is the role of the Adriatic up to the mid-18th century. In that period, the Adriatic Sea was the crucial connection between the two peninsulas and the main factor of their proximity. It was not a barrier but a space that brought them closer. The second notion Ivetic underlines in the Introduction and expands on later on is the political passivity of the Balkans. Namely, the Balkan Peninsula was the battleground of imperial ambitions, incapable of exporting its dominance. Hence, the history of the

Balkan connections with Italy was marked by a similar dynamic. With the irrelevant exception of Ottoman conquests in Southern Italy, the millennial history of contacts between Italy and the Balkans was exclusively marked by Italian expansion (political, economic or cultural) towards the Balkans.

Ivetic uses the first chapter of the book to expand on some of the concepts presented in the Introduction. Thus, the title of the first chapter is: Historical Regions of Europe (*Regioni storiche d'Europa*). In this chapter, the author offers various interpretative guidelines for understanding the history of the Balkans. For instance, Ivetic extensively quotes Jovan Cvijić, whose anthropological studies remain seminal for understanding the region, or uses the history of the Balkans as a case study for the surviving relevance of the national idea. But among various ideas entertained by the author in this chapter, the most important is his focus on the notion of regions. This is, in fact, the crucial methodological notion on which the book rests. Ivetic states that a region should be understood as “subcontinental” and “supranational”. In this interpretative key, he connects the three peninsulas that form Southern Europe – the Iberian, Apennine and Balkan peninsulas. The book, as a short comparative history of the latter two, was devised as a contribution to the broader regional history of Southern Europe.

Chapter Two, also by Ivetic, opens the chronological narration of the book. Here the author gives a brief summary of the millennial history of Italian-Balkan contacts, from the early Venetian and Byzantine times

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up to the unification of Italy. Ivetic underlines the Byzantine impact on the creation of the Balkans as a separate cultural, political, and civilizational entity. On the other hand, he focuses on the Venetian Republic as the main Italian actor on the Balkan Peninsula, which connected the two regions through its dominance in the Adriatic.

The subsequent three chapters, written by Basciani, are a chronological continuation of the account offered by Ivetic in Chapter Two. Chapter Three, *The Kingdom of Italy and the Balkans*, deals with the second half of the 19th century. In this chapter, Basciani demonstrates how, with the Italian unification, the Balkan Peninsula became one of the foreign policy priorities of the new state. The newly founded kingdom wanted to assert itself internationally as a great power that should have a say in the future of Europe. The crisis of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans presented itself as the ideal opportunity for Italy to accomplish such a role. However, a stronger Italian impact in the Balkans was not seen in this period. The reasons for that was the stronger focus of Rome on Africa and the Italian inability to match the resources and impact of Austria-Hungary.

In Chapter Four, Basciani covers the period from 1914 to 1945, describing the impact of World War I, fascist foreign policy and World War II on the relations between the Italian and the Balkan Peninsula. Despite the initial pro-Serb sentiments in Italy during 1914, Basciani underlines how, primarily due to their conflicting interests in Albania, Italy and Serbia, the new Balkan hegemon, became geopolitical enemies. The ending of World War I put Serbia on the side of the pro-status quo victors, while Italy found itself in the group of revisionist countries, aiming to dramatically change the international order. Thus, the fascist Italy had a strong and active policy in the Balkans aimed at increasing the Italian political, economic and cultural impact. While such policies were somewhat successful and

somewhat overshadowed by Berlin's advance in the Balkans, the end of World War II shattered their future.

As Basciani shows in the final chapter, 1945 was a historical watershed in Italian-Balkan relations. It was the year that put an end to Italian territorial aspirations in the Balkan Peninsula. During the Cold War and the post-1989 era, the Italian political influence in the Balkans waned. The author still highlights some political activities – like the actions of Gianni De Michelis and Giulio Andreotti aimed at preserving the status quo in Yugoslavia, or the interests of the Holy See and the industry in Northern Italy to facilitate Slovenian and Croatian aspirations towards national independence. However, such actions were not decisive like the ones that came from Berlin or Washington. Hence, the post-1945 connections between Italy and the Balkans should be identified elsewhere. As Basciani successfully underlines, such connections were present in the influence of Italian mass culture in the Balkans and in the large-scale migrations from the Balkans to Italy, particularly from Romania to Italy.

The importance of the volume by Ivetic and Basciani is not merely that it gives a brief, concise and comprehensive history of the relations between the Italy and the Balkans although writing a millennial history in only 180 pages and doing so in such a convincing manner is a rather impressive feat. However, a more important characteristic of this book is the ability of its authors to offer methodological and interpretative guidelines to the reader. Hence, this book offers an outlook on the Italian-Balkan history, a pathway for the reader to explore other historiographical works on this topic, comprehend them and put them in a broader context. Basciani and Ivetic have not written a brief history of the contacts between the two peninsulas, but an intellectually provoking text that challenges old interpretations and offers new ones, vastly enriching historical scholarship on Italian-Balkan topics.

LUCIANO MONZALI, FEDERICO IMPERATO, ROSARIO MILANO, GIUSEPPE SPAGNULO,
STORIA DELLE RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI (1919-2021),
Tra Stati Nazionali, Potenze Continentali e Organizzazioni Sovranazionali,
MILANO: MONDADORI, 2022.

*Reviewed by Bogdan Živković**

The Department of the History of International Relations at the University in Bari, headed by Prof. Luciano Monzali, has made itself known, in Italy and internationally, for its interest in various global topics. On one hand, the faculty of this department devoted a large part of their carriers to investigating Balkan history and Italian policies towards this region. On the other hand, they also dedicated substantial attention and research to Middle Eastern topics. Hence, one can safely say that this department is committed to researching various global topics. Thus, it is no wonder that, as a joint endeavour of several members of the department, Prof. Monzali and his colleagues have published a two-volume history of international relations. The first volume covers the period from 1942 to 1918 and the second one, which is being reviewed here, deals with the period from 1919 to 2021.

The 848-page volume, written in the classic methodological approach of diplomatic history, is structured into three parts, with numerous chapters in each. The first part covers the period from 1919 to 1947; the second part depicts global relations from 1948 to 1988; and the final part discusses the methodologically most challenging period, from 1989 to 2021. A volume so rich, not merely in its bulk but also in the variety of the content it offers, cannot be fully and comprehensively reviewed in a couple of pages. However, the intention of this review is to offer a brief analysis of the volume, focusing on certain predominant methodological aspects and aspirations of the authors.

While many issues, methodological and topical, can be underlined in reviewing this book, it seems that three aspects of the volume deserve to be particularly addressed:

firstly, the delicate balance between the global and national perspective in this volume; secondly, the question of agency; and thirdly, the broader public influence this book aims to achieve.

Regarding the first issue, it should be underlined that this volume is by no means strictly national in its outlook. On the contrary, the chapters of this book are global in their perspective, and the authors clearly tried to avoid espousing a Eurocentric perspective. The subchapters on the Middle East, the Far East, or Latin America (an area most often neglected in similar overviews of global history) strongly demonstrate the globality of the account offered by Professor Monzali and his colleagues. However, this volume navigates global history with a delicate sense of the national, be it the Italian place in the history of international relations or the heritage of Italian scholarship on this topic and its methodological principles (the authors clearly state that their methodology is indebted to the legacy of Mario Toscano and Pietro Pastorelli). Hence, this book is an example of the authors' belief that national identity and history can be best understood as a part of wider global processes.

The second question that needs to be particularly addressed is the one of agency. While this notion has become a scholarly buzzword, theoretically preached but rarely used in practice, the authors of this volume have offered a convincing and empirical demonstration of the importance of agency

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in history. While structural factors are present in the analyses, the authors successfully reaffirm the importance of individual actors in history. In this volume, we can see the agency of three different actors. Firstly, there are the individuals: the outstanding politicians, capable statesmen who managed to modify, if not the course of history in its entirety, at least in the way it unfolded. The depiction of Jean Monnet's role in European integrations is one of the best examples of the authors' methodological approach. Secondly, various social groups are also present in this volume as individual actors who influence history. On one hand, the authors underlined the ruling classes who guide the political processes but also dedicated space to the public opinion that limits the manoeuvring space of the ruling classes. And lastly, particularly in the chapters dedicated to the Cold War, the authors chose to underline the agency of small countries and middle powers. Their account is not a story of a world completely dominated by Washington and Moscow but of a world where small and medium-sized actors tried to undermine or at least limit the hegemony of the superpowers and have a say in their own destiny. The Italian perspective, one of a middle power, was apparently crucial here as an impetus to write a different kind of global history.

The third point that needs to be addressed is the broader reception a book like this aims to achieve. A comprehensive history of international relations like this one was, obviously, not written solely for historians. It is, in fact, an endeavour a historian undertakes when he or she wants to step outside of the ivory tower and spread historiographical knowledge to others. As the authors underlined, one of their main goals was to offer these volumes as textbooks for future diplomats, as the best instructive literature for young people who would entertain such a carrier. However, the list of potential readers is probably broader. These volumes will be read not only by (future)

diplomats, but also by students, scholars, politicians, activists and a broad range of the interested public. In order to have such broad appeal, the authors managed to significantly modify their style of writing, eschewing purely academic jargon and managing to be appealing and comprehensible to non-historians. However, at the same time, the authors took nothing away from the complexity of the topic.

Hence, in that regard, this volume is an undeniable success – not only in the aesthetic aspect of the writing but, more importantly, in the way it analyzes complex events and processes. The authors did not stifle the text with excessive information and instead gave sound, convincing and comprehensive explanations of why and how certain events unfolded. The two volumes produced by the professors at the University of Bari thus make an authoritative and appealing textbook on the history of international relations, which will have an impactful future in Italy.

ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN RENEWAL MOVEMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE,
 EDS., ALEKSANDRA DJURIĆ MILOVANOVIĆ & RADMILA RADIĆ,
 CHARIS: CHRISTIAN & RENEWAL INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES, 2017, 345 p.

Reviewed by Marko Galić*

The edited volume *Orthodox Christian Renewal Movements in Eastern Europe* represents a unique contribution to both regional and Eastern European academic literature in the field of religious studies. The first reason for that is the topic to which the volume is dedicated: Orthodox Christian renewal movements in Eastern Europe, a research field that has generally received very little attention in the past, which certainly led to the widespread opinion that religious reforms took place only in the Western part of the continent. Another reason is the structure of the papers, their methodology and authors, which represent a unique combination of different approaches and methods – sociological, anthropological, historical, philosophical and others, written by authors from different countries, analyzing not only different movements, but also different aspects of the same movements, with the aim of providing a detailed insight into how, why, and under what conditions and historical circumstances these movements began to emerge, what their characteristics and differences were in relation to the established religious orthodoxy, to what extent their members were different from other believers, and, ultimately, how they disappeared or transformed into something else.

The introductory part presents a fairly general historiographical overview of the unfavorable situation in which the Orthodox churches in the East found themselves under the occupation of foreign powers, primarily the Ottoman Empire (the Balkans) and the Mongol Empire (Russia), which led to a sense of “moral superiority” among their members, who, unlike Christians in the West, suffered for their faith.

These churches managed to avoid liberalization for a long time but, when in

the second half of the 19th century, various Protestant missionaries from a very diverse range of Protestant denominations began arriving in Eastern Europe and doing missionary work, traditional Orthodox churches faced a very different way of professing the faith, to which each of them reacted differently. From this encounter with reformist-inspired religious communities, on the one hand, and traditional Orthodox churches, on the other, various reformist movements began to emerge within the Orthodox world with the goal of changing the things they were not happy with.

The papers are divided into three categories. The first category includes works on the renewal movements that appeared in Russia, the Soviet Union and Ukraine. Here we get an insight into some key renewal movements that emerged within the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). One of them is, of course, the movement of the “Old Believers”, which arose as a reaction to the reforms introduced by Patriarch Nikon in 1650, which brought changes in performing rituals, using three instead of two fingers, pronouncing the name of Jesus, and some other things. As James White notes, inspired by the teachings of the Old Believers, Russian theologian Ian Verkovsky emerged as one of many critics of the ROC during the 19th century, proposing necessary reforms to the church’s episcopal governance, a greater role of believers in decision-making, strict decentralization and greater freedom in performing rituals. Thanks to Svetlana Inkova’s text, we see that criticism

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often came from the intelligentsia, as was the case with the so-called “Tolstoyans”, a group of authors and thinkers centered on Leo Tolstoy, who spread their ideas among previously established religious communities including the spiritualists, Molokans, Stundists, and Baptists, sought to realize their idea of fundamental change in both ROC as a religious community and Russia as a state. From the intense contact between Tolstoy’s supporters and some groups of Russian spiritualists emerged a new syncretistic-religious renewal movement, called the “Christian Community of Universal Brotherhood”. Various renewal movements that began to appear in Russia, both as a product of foreign missions and as a reaction of the local population, also began to spread to the surrounding territories. Thus, a peculiar form of the Stundist evangelical movement emerged among Ukrainian pious people, later influencing the teachings of the reformer Kondrat Maliovanyi and his millennial movement.

In the second part of the volume, we are introduced to the renewal movements that emerged in Serbia. Here the focus is on two movements, namely “The Nazarenes” and “The God Worshipper Movement”. From the paper of Bojan Aleksov, we learn that the Nazarene communities during the second half of the 19th century began to spread throughout Hungary, the Habsburg Monarchy and the Kingdom of Serbia – especially Vojvodina. Although there were no conflicts between the Serbian clergy and the Nazarenes in the beginning, tensions began to arise after religious conversion became common. These tensions rarely came from church leaders, but from parish priests who cited the domestic intelligentsia and Western influence as the key reasons for frequent conversions and very rarely referred to perhaps more objective factors such as the low level of education among priests, their tendency to charge the locals for officiating baptisms, weddings, burials, as well as the general decline of the people

accompanied by the shameful religious life of the “believers”, empty churches, unattractive services, inebriation among the clergy and immorality. Radmila Radić and Aleksandra Djurić-Milovanović seem to be continuing the story that Aleksov started. As a reaction to the mentioned “external” and “internal” problems that the Serbian Orthodox Church was facing, as well as various wars, religious crises, modernity, materialism, liberalism, socialism and current trends, a local religious movement was formed among the pious rural population, the so-called God Worshipper Movement, to which the Serbian Orthodox Church had a rather ambivalent attitude, but it is indisputable that, as Dragana Radisavljević-Čiparizović writes, this movement was a kind of renewal movement that influenced the very form of confession of faith among the people.

In the third and final part of the volume, the authors deal with the renewal movements that emerged within the Romanian, Greek and Bulgarian Orthodox Churches. In the first part of this section, we encounter a paper by Corneliu Constantineanu on the movement called the “Lord’s Army”, which, in a parallel with a number of neo-Protestant communities such as Pentecostals, Baptists and the Brethren appeared in Romania in the early 20th century in response to the absence of the Gospel in the everyday lives of believers. We can further see how the semi-monastic movement “Zoe” appeared as a product of a series of 19th-century movements that emerged in Greece with the aim of church renewal, at the beginning of the 20th century, more precisely in 1907. Amaryllyis Logotheti describes how this movement, which emerged in a very turbulent period in Greek history and which some considered to be deeply inspired by Protestant reformist ideas, was in many ways similar to the movements presented by the other authors, especially when it comes to spiritual growth in accordance with the Orthodox faith, as well as the spread of Orthodoxy through missionary activities, humanitarian

work and religious instruction in a historical context marked by urbanization, secularization, Marxism and major social crises.

Thanks to the last paper, we get an insight into the way in which the Bulgarian Orthodox Church sought to expand its influence in society after the World War I. This key role was primarily played by the people from the magazine *Christiyanka*, around which various organizations were concentrated, with the White Cross probably the most notable one among them. Although the contents of the magazine and its editorial board changed during its existence, the texts it published and the work of organizations close to it reveal an insistence on so-called "pactical religiosity," which means fostering charity, good deeds, and generally making a contribution to the community, as well as condemning post-war modernism by calling for a return to Bulgaria's glorious past and traditional religious values.

Although the works presented in this volume are quite diverse, in the sense that they deal with either different movements or different elements of the same one, we can see several common characteristics of all the renewal movements described. It should certainly be noted that they almost always appeared in difficult times, most often during wars or social crises. Second, these movements usually arose during times when the church was facing some "threats," such as modernism, missionary activities of other religious communities, communism, atheism, secularism, liberalism or a decline of religiosity, so as such they could be characterized as movements that emerged as a response to internal and external threatening factors. Thirdly, we see that these movements were somehow always trying to change the current state of the church, which is why they are called renewal movements.

Finally, it is important to note that this volume is a very good source of information concerning Orthodox renewal movements, and the papers presented in it offer plenty of references useful for upcoming research.

As such, this volume is intended for a fairly wide range of researchers from various disciplines, but also for the Orthodox believers and members of different religious communities who would like to get acquainted with the different currents that emerged throughout history within their communities. From all of the above, it can be concluded that this volume is a notable contribution to our knowledge of a topic that, at least in Eastern Europe, tends to attract relatively little attention.

THE ROMANCE-SPEAKING BALKANS: LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY,
EDS., ANNEMARIE SORESCU-MARINKOVIĆ, MIHAI DRAGNEA, THEDE KAHL, BLAGOVEST
NJAGULOV, DONALD L. DYER AND ANGELO COSTANZO
BRILL'S STUDIES IN LANGUAGE, COGNITION AND CULTURE 29.
LEIDEN/BOSTON: BRILL, 2021, XXIV+260, p.

*Reviewed by Panagiotis G. Krimpas**

A very interesting volume was published last year that deserves more attention. *The Romance-Speaking Balkans: Language and the Politics of Identity*, edited by six scholars with benchmark work in various areas of Balkan studies, namely Annemarie Sorescu-Marinković, Mihai Dragnea, Thede Kahl, Blagovest Njagulov, Donald L. Dyer, and Angelo Costanzo is the research outcome of a project conceived and implemented by the Balkan History Association (Bucharest, Romania), as stated in the Preface. The names of the editors and the contributors guarantee the high quality of the nine contributions contained in the volume, which became the research meeting point of linguists, sociolinguists, anthropologists, ethnographers, ethnic studies theorists, historians, and political scientists. In other words, the volume is a genuinely interdisciplinary work, which can shed light on less studied aspects of South-East European cultural heritage as an integral part of the overall European cultural space. The volume traces back the history of such Romance-speaking groups in South-eastern Europe and discusses cultural and (geo-)political challenges they have faced from time to time in the context of their co-existence with non Romance speakers in the various Balkan states. By discussing both the construction and deconstruction of individual and group identities in their engagement with nationhood, the contributors to the volume explore the ways in which the identity of the Romance-speaking communities has been interpreted and performed in the Balkans. The nine chapters of this volume discuss the role of language for

identity construction in modern states and how it is instrumentalised by various actors such as religious authorities, political parties and their ilk in their attempt to exploit it as a sign of loyalty to national states and their geopolitical goals.

One of the co-editors of the volume, Mihai Dragnea, who is an Associate researcher of the University of South-Eastern Norway, Chair of Balkan History Association and Editor-in-Chief of *Hiperborea* Journal, is the author of the Preface (pp. VII–VIII), where he describes the origins and the general research context that unites the nine contributions under the general topic of the book. There follow some notes on the contributors and an Introduction (pp. I–II) by the co-editors of the volume, where they briefly introduce the reader to the basics of each chapter.

The first chapter, titled *From Rashi to Cyrillic: Bulgarian Judeo-Spanish (Judezmo) Texts in Cyrillic* (pp. 12–37) has been written by the psycholinguist, Romance linguist and Jewish Studies scholar Michael Studemund-Halévy (Prix Alberto Benveniste), a research associate at the Centre for the Study of Manuscript Studies, University of Hamburg. Studemund-Halévy's main foci are, on the one hand, the history of writing Judeo-Spanish in a particular alphabet, namely the Cyrillic and, on the other hand, the use of Judeo-Spanish in Bulgaria during

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the 20th century. The author starts his contribution by pointing out that choices of scripts and languages are conscious acts and orthographical conventions are 'culturemes' in Oksaar's terminology, i.e. external signs of collective belonging to specific religious or cultural communities. He then briefly discusses the historical use of various scripts in languages of the Balkans, including Judeo-Spanish. Studemund-Halévy accompanies his contribution with lots of commented examples of Judeo-Spanish texts written in different scripts. His corpus (pp. 22–71) consists of printed sources produced at the turn of the 20th century and published in Sofia, Ruse, Varna and represents different varieties of Judezmo as spoken and written in Bulgaria. As he explains (p. 22), the sources exemplify diatopic, diastratic, diaphasic, and diamesic elements and are a so far neglected source of information about the history of the Bulgarian Judezmo writing system, which was an orthography in transition. An interesting point is that Rabbi Pipanos' dictionary, which reflects popular local Judezmo, shows a strong Italo-Gallic relexification, which suggest Westernisation and modernisation to the detriment of the local language (p. 23). Some typos obviously due to some software incompatibility (namely Анишатитийотеръмулчо instead of Ани шатити йотеръ мидай, and Ененишотеодъ instead of Енени шоте одъ, see p. 26) could have been avoided, but this by no means diminish the high quality and value of the chapter. The author concludes that the Cyrillic alphabet may be used as a convenient reference in transliteration of Judezmo texts from *Rashi* into Latin letters and reminds that any script can be applied to any number of languages, no matter their genetic and/or typological proximity, with no change in the structural textual features; at the same time, he underlines the interesting fact that script multiplicity in languages once spoken in various countries, as is the case of Judezmo, may often reveal phonetic traits of local variation, which would else

remain hidden if the same script was applied throughout the Judezmo-speaking territory (p. 31).

Independent scholar and identity rhetorics specialist Cătălin Mamali, PhD (University of Bucharest) and former Fulbright scholar at the University of Iowa, where he is currently associated with Project on Rhetoric of Inquiry is the author of the second chapter, titled *Political Terror and Repressed Aromanian Core Identity: Ways to Re-assert and Develop Ethnolinguistic Identity* (pp. 38–76). Setting off to explore Aromanian identity, Cătălin Mamali points out that, although disaffiliation from political, military, social and religious institutions is possible, separation of individuals and communities from their internalised cultural matrix is impracticable. By citing other scholars' previous work, he underlines that the persistence of mother tongues within communities are signs of ethnolinguistic vitality, which in its turn is essential for the construction of ethnolinguistic identity. The author thus reaffirms the interdependence between language and identity, a much-discussed connection that has been proven to be true or false under different historical and sociopolitical circumstances. He also reminds the importance of Sir F. C. Bartlett's 'constructive memory' in identity construction and includes a very interesting graphic illustration (p. 45) of what he calls the holistic and dynamic nature of individual identity and collective identity rooted in the related questions "Who am I?" and "Who are We?" The author extensively discusses theoretical, empirical, political, and moral challenges posed by Aromanian identity, based on previous research by T. Kahl and others; Mamali there suggests that Aromanian identity is virtually neglected (or even concealed) by both Romania and Greece in relevant discussions and research and recalls Kahl's justified view that 'Aromanians engaged in trade and agriculture followed a clear path of assimilation, while those engaged in pastoral activities tended to retain

their Aromanian-ness'. He is right in asserting that 'If the Aromanians, as most other minorities (either autochthons or newcomers), pose challenging questions to the host/majority nation about its identity, in turn the majority poses difficult questions to the minorities by resorting to policies of forced assimilation.' In discussing Islamisation of some East Romance-speaking groups, the author recalls a very real fact usually downplayed in politically 'correct' speech: that historical data clearly suggest that Islamisation process under the Ottoman Empire was more often than not violent (pp. 55-56). An interesting view extensively discussed by the author is that collaboration of various Aromanian groups with fascism and Nazism was the reaction to the extreme oppression of Aromanians by communist regimes and groups in the Balkans and the ex-Soviet Union, which points to a totalitarian vicious circle. Mamali concludes that linguistic, cultural and financial measures are to be taken in order to repair the damages done to the Aromanian identity.

The title of the third chapter is *Sociolinguistic Relations and Return Migration: Italian in the Republic of Moldova* (pp. 77-115) and its author is the linguist Anna-Christine Weirich, PhD, currently a research assistant at the Goethe-University in Frankfurt am Main. A very innovative piece of research, this contribution explores for the first time the relationship between language change and migration in Moldova in the light of findings related to the migration of many Moldovans to Italy and the presence of an Italian minority in Moldova. Anna-Christine Weirich reports (p. 80) that contact phenomena involving Italian have become subject to normative and purist discourses on language use in Moldova, as well as that almost no research has been previously undertaken with respect to the contribution of migration to language change in that country. By summarising the various historical and present roles of Italian in Moldova, she proceeds to discussing the topic in the light

of linguistics of migration, sociolinguistics of globalisation and linguistic relations, drawing mostly on T. Krefeld, J. Blommaert, U. Maas, and K. Bochmann's works and on her own previous research. She accurately describes the linguistic situation in post-Soviet Moldova by updating previous information about the issue, while her table one the 'Differentiation of registers in several languages in the contemporary Republic of Moldova' (p. 86), originating in her previous work is very useful. Weirich then explores the Ligurian origins of the almost unknown Italian community of the Republic of Moldova back to 1880, which proves that Moldova was itself chosen as a place of migration even by 'Western' Europeans. She uses examples from genuine language usage by Moldovan immigrants to Italy who return to Moldova with their speech influenced by the speech of the host country and recalls L. Zeevaert & J. D. ten Thije's concept of receptive multilingualism. She gives interesting lexical, syntactic and phonetic examples (pp. 100-107) of Romanian (Moldovan) ~ Italian code-switching such as *appuntamento* (< It. *appuntamento*), a *soggiorna* (< It. *soggiornare*), overlengthening of stressed vowels etc, as well as of Russian ~ Italian code-switching such as *stranierov* (< *stranieri*). Her information about Moldovan immigrants to Italy turning the Italian suffix *-mento* into *-ment* (p. 102) or substituting *quale* for *care* in one idiom-like expression (pp. 104-105) suggests, in my opinion, that awareness of similarities between Moldovan (Romanian) and Italian, being both Romance languages, facilitates the process.

Ewa Nowicka, who is *inter alia* a social anthropologist and sociologist, as well as founder of the Department of Social Anthropology at the Institute of Sociology in the University of Warsaw is the author of the fourth chapter, titled *Between Ethnicity, Regionalism, and Familial Memory: Identity Dilemmas among the Eastern Romance Communities of the Balkan Peninsula* (pp. 116-145). She opens her contribution by

reminding that “the responsibility of a social scientist is to perceive vanishing, endangered cultures, and to warn about their disappearance by shining light on the significance, as well as the consequences of a shrinking cultural pluralism in the world.” To corroborate her argument, she cites G. Marghescu’s comparison of this task to the actions of ecologists who “warn us of the risks of the diminishing of the biological diversity.” Importantly, Nowicka’s contribution is the outcome of on-site anthropological fieldwork conducted from 2010 to 2019. Throughout her chapter, she knowingly uses the conventional names of non-Romanian Eastern Romance-speaking groups of the Balkans, namely *Vlach*, *Aromanian*, *Meglen Vlach*, and *Istro-Romanian*, although she admits their rather arbitrary and at times exonymic character. She points out that Romance-speaking groups in the Balkans have almost never had ambitions to some distinctive political entity of their own with the exception of the fascist, ephemeral “Principality of the Pindus,” about which she cites (p. 117 footnote 4) Nitsiakos *et al.* Although Eastern Romance-speakers are to be found in almost any Balkan country, Nowicka limits her discussion to current Greece, Serbia, and Croatia (namely the Istrian Peninsula) because, in her opinion, it is there where various situations and types of identity strategies are most clearly manifested by Eastern Romance-speaking minorities (p. 118). Her discussion about the status and perceptions of Vlachs in Greece (pp. 118–123), home to the biggest part of Vlach-speakers is more than accurate, and I am sure the same is true of her remarks on the other two countries. Nowicka reports that, as they themselves mentioned in interviews, Aromanians were, in many ways, similar to the Jews (p. 128). Istriots, on the other hand, speak a critically endangered language and are rather reserved towards openly stating their identity, which is now only a linguistic one (p. 139) due to their being perceived as the Other by Slavic, German or Italian-speaking majorities. The

author repeatedly stresses the resistance of the groups under discussion to adopt a Romanian identity (pp. 117, 129–130, 140) and explains that the maintenance of Eastern Romance identities is too difficult under the present conditions of territorial dispersion and relatively low numbers, while it is directed towards models and archetypes connected with the past, which leads to a generation gap. She concludes *inter alia* that Eastern Romance populations have made choices of identity under the influence of both external and internal factors.

The fifth chapter is about *Identity Constructions among the Members of the Aromanian Community in the Korçë Area* (pp. 146–170), written by Daniela-Carmen Stoica, a lecturer at the Department of Foreign Languages of “Fan S. Noli” University of Korçë (Albania), founder of the Romanian Language Lectorate at the same University of Korçë, and teacher of Romanian at the Faculty of Foreign Languages, University of Tirana. Her contribution is the product of on-site research conducted from 2010 to 2015 and deals with various recorded oral histories from the sociolinguists’ perspective. The author, a Romanian, views Aromanian (including its Frasherot variety spoken in Korçë) and all Eastern Romance varieties as Romanian dialects (p. 146). Stoica’s method of research combines the sociolinguistic interview with the ethnographic qualitative research and discourse analysis, focusing mainly on indexicality, local occasioning, positioning and dialogism as relational processes, as the author explains (p. 154). In terms of transcription, she follows the Romanian school of linguistics and dialectology and, in particular the Romanian Linguistic Atlas. In pp. 1–9 Stoica explains why, in her opinion, Aromanian and Daco-Romanian cannot be linguistically separated, since both descend from Vulgar Latin; but, since Vulgar Latin is the basis of all Romance languages (p. 148), I find no reason to view all Eastern Romance varieties as dialects of Romanian despite their close relationship with

the latter; otherwise e.g. Provençal would be a dialect of Catalan rather than its closest relative. In this respect, Stoica's view echoes the Romanian State's position on minority identity governed by Romanian Law No. 299/2007 (cf. Vrzić 2021, pp. 197–200 in the same volume). Besides, she takes for granted that words such as *budzã* 'lip', *baltã* 'swamp' or *bardzu* 'fair haired with spots', which have their counterparts in Romanian, are due to some Geto-Dacian substratum, which cannot be proven; after all, the fact that all of them have direct cognates in Albanian further complicates the picture. However, despite these two questionable points (which are marginal to the main topic, after all), Stoica's contribution is very interesting and well-documented in terms of description of Korçë Aromanian. Another important aspect of her contribution is the confirmation of older views about the crucial role of women as mothers and housewives with respect to the long-lasting retention and transmission of linguistic traits now lost in city dwellers' speech (p. 157). The author constructively discusses issues of cultural borrowing, code-switching, Aromanian-speakers' endonyms, exonyms, social positioning of Aromanian and highlights the advantages of using oral history recordings for the description of regional dialects and varieties, given that in sociolinguistics the primary focus of analysis is the original speech, which calls for accurate and consistent methods of transcription, as well as that in dialectology the creation of digital archives of local varieties is very important. The two Annexes to the chapter (pp. 164–167) are very useful to the reader, as they clearly depict the phonological system of Farashot Aromanian and provide an example of oral dialectal text.

Mircea Măran, a historian who is a specialist of the study of culture, religion, migrations and identity of the Romanians in Vojvodina in the 19th and 20th centuries and currently Head of the Department for Philosophy and Social Sciences of the College for Preschool Education in Vršac

(Serbia) has contributed the sixth chapter of the volume, titled *Megleno-Romanians in the Serbian Banat: Colonization and Assimilation* (pp. 171–185). He starts by reporting that Megleno-Romanians, the only native Romance-speakers to include Islamised groups as well (originating in Nânti or Nótia village, Greece, but transported to Turkey under the population exchange), do not use an endonym deriving from Latin *Romanus*, but call themselves Vlachs, as well as that Megleno-Romanian is regarded as a dialect of the Romanian language, as a dialect of Aromanian, as an intermediary between Romanian and Aromanian, or as a separate Romance language. Măran gives a rich historical record of Megleno-Romanians in Serbian Banat, especially in the village of Gudurica (pp. 173–179), by providing useful and new information about this Romance-speaking group that got finally assimilated to the majority. He has interviewed the last Megleno-Romanians of Gudurica to confirm that they have been entirely Serbianised and do not anymore transmit their 'weird' language to new generations (p. 183). The author concludes that the migration of Megleno-Romanians to Gudurica and to other villages in Serbian Banat as a result of colonisations from Yugoslav Macedonia after the Second World War further expanded the already rich ethnic and cultural mosaic that has characterised the Banat area throughout its existence. He observes that Megleno-Romanians, being already a minority population when they settled in Serbian Banat, finally became also a hidden minority, speaking a language that was not officially recognised and was even despised and derided by the Serbian majority, due to the negative stereotypes associated with the Vlach population. Such an adverse situation left no chance for Megleno-Romanians to survive as an ethnicity, which is why they have finally been assimilated. This is obvious in the fact that already the second generation adopted Serbian or Macedonian in order to identify in all aspects with Serbs or

Macedonians. As with all Eastern Romance groups, Megleno-Romanians did not adopt the Romanian identity, despite the strong presence of Romanians in Serbian Banat, a group rejoicing official recognition as a national minority in matters linguistic, cultural and educational. In Măran's opinion, association with Romanians could have saved their Romance identity, given that Romania promoted education and religion in standard Romanian within this community (pp. 183–184) in line with the aforementioned Romanian Law No. 299/2007. However, I think that this would be just another option for assimilation, even though by a closely related Romance-speaking people. Something similar (although in intra-state context) has happened e.g. with the Tsakonian language, which is called just a 'dialect' of Greek despite its very low mutual intelligibility with Standard Modern Greek and has ended up to be virtually extinct; Tsakonian is, of course, Greek, but only in the sense of Hellenic as currency in Greece the term 'Greek' is understood as Attic-based Modern Greek, while Tsakonian is Doric-based. In any event, I agree with the author (p. 184) that Megleno-Romanians living in Banat were neither strong enough nor numerous enough to support their existence; this led to their being forgotten for decades, even by historians, ethnologists and linguists, who managed to interview their last descendants in the very last moment.

Zvezdana Vrzić, who teaches socio-linguistics at the University of Rijeka and New York University and was the first director of the Centre for Language Research at the University of Rijeka between 2015 and 2019 is the author of the seventh chapter of the volume, titled *Nation-State Ideology and Identity and Language Rights of Linguistic Minorities: Prospects for the Vlashki/Zheyanski-Speaking Communities* (pp. 186). As the author puts it, this contribution "examines the conflict between a minoritised group's multidimensional self-identification and a more simplistic identity ascription by

outsiders, in this case, two interested nation-states." Like part of Nowicka's chapter, the one by Vrzić focuses on the Istro-Romanian communities of Croatia and their language, but this one sheds light to another aspect of the topic, namely the role Romania and Croatia in Istro-Romanians' current linguistic and ethnic minority status. She gives background information about the endangered Vlashki/Zheyanski (Istro-Romanian) language and its speakers, discusses internal and external identity perceptions and analyses legislation that is relevant to the topic. The author recalls (p. 200) D. Stjepanović's view, according to whom non-state groups not aligning with a kin-state but are subject to political claims and pressures by the latter can be labelled 'claimed co-ethnics', which can be seen as a further category besides 'stateless nations,' 'minorities without a kin-state,' and 'minorities with a kin state.' She carefully analyses Romanian Law No. 299/2007 and the European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages (pp.), both of them have impact on the fate of Istro-Romanians as well. In particular, to Romania they are just part of Romanian diaspora, regardless of their self-identification, while to Croatia they are just the Vlashki/Zheyanski-speaking *de facto* linguistic minority with no officially recognised status. Both stances do not contribute to the protection of Istro-Romanians and their endangered language. Identity statistics gathered by the Vrzić in her very useful table (p. 192) clearly illustrates the decline in Istro-Romanian identity among the population's choices in Šušnjevića area and Žejane according to the population censuses of 1945, 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011. The author concludes that this national 'pigeonholing' – as she calls it (p. 203) – of Istro-Romanians by Romania and Croatia hampers any prospect for their language's preservation or even revitalisation and undermines their minority language rights. Despite this adverse context and the language shift to Croatian, the members of the Istro-Romanian language community

demonstrate some kind of ‘language loyalty’ and view their East Romance language as an important symbol of their culture. According to Vrzić, this positive stance of the community could serve as a means to help the language regain some strength and viability, especially if younger community members become involved.

“*What Language Do We Speak?*” *The Bayash in the Balkans and Mother Tongue Education* (pp. 207–232) is the title of the eighth chapter of the volume, a contribution by the Romance linguist and anthropologist Annemarie Sorescu-Marinković, a Senior Research Associate of the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (Belgrade). The author discusses about the Bayash (also known as Boyash), probably one of the less visible East Romance-speaking community in the Balkans and Central Europe. She introduces them to the reader by highlighting (p. 207) their puzzling nature for researchers since 19th century (when the first attestations for their existence appear) considered to be Roma, but they do not speak Romani, they are marginalised by Romanians, they are said to link their history to the Dacians, and they are known under more than two dozen names; they were slaves in Wallachia and Moldova until the middle of the 19th century and they preserve archaic Romanian customs and rituals that have long been forgotten in Romania. Her contribution is very important, as it is the product of more than two decades long fieldwork. Sorescu-Marinković explores the various Bayash communities living in multiple states, namely Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, Slovakia, and Ukraine and discusses how the initiatives to introduce their mother tongue in the educational system presuppose an ideological clarification. As she explains (pp. 117–118, 210) by citing other scholars, this Roma caste, apart from the self-appellation Bayash (and its language variants Baiesi, Bajaši/Bejaši, Beás, Banjaši; let

me add also Băieși and Bojași) uses various self-appellations such as Karavlası, Rudari/Ludari, Lingurari, Ursari, Kopanari, Fusari, Kaşikçi etc, depending on country and internal regional divisions, while community leaders estimate their number at between 220,000 and 500,000. The author informs us (p. 208–209) that almost a century ago, ethnographer Ion Chelcea was the first to study this ethnic group in Romania and called them “an ethnographic enigma”, an old people, situated at an equal distance from Roma as they are from Romanians. As to their self-perception, some have opted for a Romanian identity, others for a Roma one, while several groups developed a separate, Bayash identity, often linking their history to important moments or figures in the history of the country they live in, the author reports (p. 210) by citing works of other scholars. By citing her previous work she explains that Bayash follow either the Catholic or the Orthodox Christian denomination and have various differences as to the extent of preservation of their original customs (p. 210–211, footnote 12). Sorescu-Marinković studies language ideology in combination with language standardisation practices and tries to shed light on the self-perceptions of Bayash communities in matters cultural and historical. She also explores eventual opportunities for those communities to be educated in their native language. As she points out (p. 227), “Apart from maintaining linguistic biodiversity, the introduction of their mother tongue in more schools would make Bayash pupils proud and aware of their cultural and linguistic heritage, and at the same time remove the stigma of a non-standardised language, unfit for writing, teaching or official communication.”

The ninth (and last) chapter has been written by the linguist Monica Huțanu, an Assistant Professor at the Romanian Studies Department at the West University of Timișoara (Romania) and lecturer of the Romanian language at the University of Belgrade (Serbia) is the author of the ninth

and last chapter of the volume, which is titled *Performing Vlach-ness Online: The Enregisterment of Vlach Romanian on Facebook*. As the author explains (pp. 236–237), she focuses on an East Romance-speaking ethnic group living in a region south of the Danube, in the eastern part of Serbia, along the rivers Timok, Mlava, Morava and Pek, called Vlasi in Serbian, *rumîni* – as well as *vla(h)* – In their own vernacular, *români timoceni* or *români din Serbia* or *vlahi* in the Romanian public and academic discourse, and *Vlachs* or *Dacoromanian Vlachs* in English-language academic discourse. In particular, she studies the Vlach identity as it appears in a Facebook page called “Vlasi na kvadrat”. After briefly tracing their origins in Wallachia and Banat (Romania), Huțanu enters in more sociolinguistic and demographic details about the group. In p. 239 she illustrates on a table the main ideological factions in the Vlach community of Eastern Serbia, which she distinguishes into reintegrationists or pro-Romanian and independentists or pro-Vlach. By citing rich sources, the author mentions that, especially the latter group has taken several language planning measures in the last 20 years, aiming at the codification and revitalisation of the vernacular (corpus planning), the introduction of Vlach Romanian in education (acquisition planning) and toward the standardisation of Vlach Romanian as a distinct, Ausbau language (status planning); she further writes on the writing systems used so far in Vlach Romanian and lists the text types available (fairy tales, nursery rhymes, children’s books, textbooks, grammars etc.) – both translated and original (pp. 239–240). As we learn from Huțanu’s chapter, in September 2015 the Vlach National Council passed a resolution on the standardisation of the Vlach language, which was then published in the Official Gazette of Serbia a month later but, despite its promulgated standardisation, Vlach still has no official status in Serbia. Huțanu provides numerous examples of discourse and even memes

in Vlach Romanian (pp. 243–246) on this page, adding that the speakers’ pragmatic interactions are of crucial importance to the development and preservation of their identity through the use of their language. The author utilises the concept of enregisterment, which comprises processes and practices through which a linguistic repertoire of forms becomes socially recognisable to a population of language users and comes to index speaker attributes; such markers of Vlach-ness online are e.g. the suffix *-eșće* or the lack of distinction between the Serbian phonemes /tʃ/ and /tɕ/. Huțanu concludes (p. 250) that the administrator and the users of the Facebook page under discussion construct and perform an identity that is at the same time local (Vlach), Serbian and gastarbajter, through metapragmatic practices such as talking explicitly about forms and making the indexical link obvious or using stylised performances of features typifying the local variety.

As a general evaluation, I would say that the volume is of high academic and scholarly quality, as it brings together specialists from the social sciences and the humanities with manifold backgrounds and approaches, a choice that aspires to provide readers with global, objective and valuable information about the multifaceted relationship between the Romance languages spoken in the Balkans and the intra- and inter-group perception of their identity. There is no doubt that not only specialists, but also any reader interested in such topics will be benefited by the new information and the new insights included in the book.

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