SERBIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND ARTS INSTITUTE FOR BALKAN STUDIES

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2020

BALCANICA

P. COUNILLON, L'Istros dans la Géographie de Strabon · M. VASILJEVIĆ, Translations of Saints' Relics in the Late Medieval Central Balkans · V. SIMIĆ, Popular Piety and the Paper Icons of Zaharija Orfelin · A. SORESCU-MARINKOVIĆ & M. MIRIĆ & S. ĆIRKOVIĆ, Assessing Linguistic Vulnerability and Endangerment in Serbia: A Critical Survey of Methodologies and Outcomes · A. LOUPAS. Interethnic Rivalries and Bilateral Cooperation: Aspects of Greek-Serbian Relations from the Assassination of Alexander Obrenović to the Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1903–1908) · V. G. PAVLOVIĆ, Le révolutionnaire professionnel 1934–1936 Tito à Moscou · S. G. MARKOVICH, History of Hellenic-Serbian (Yugoslav) Alliances from Karageorge to the Balkan Pact 1817-1954 · D. GNJATOVIĆ, Evolution of Economic Thought on Monetary Reform in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after the Great War · G. LATINOVIĆ & N. OŽEGOVIĆ, "St. Bartholomew's Night" of Banja Luka: The Ustasha Crime against the Serbs in the Banja Luka Area on 7 February 1942 · I. VUKADINOVIĆ, The Shift in Yugoslav-Albanian Relations: The Establishment of Ties between Albania and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija (1966-1969) · M. RISTOVIĆ, Yugoslav-Greek Relations from the End of the Second World War to 1990: Chronology, Phases, Problems and Achievements 🛷

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The origin of the Institute goes back to the Institut des Études balkaniques founded in Belgrade in 1934 as the only of the kind in the Balkans. The initiative came from King Alexander I Karadjordjević, while the Institute's scholarly profile was created by Ratko Parežanin and Svetozar Spanaćević. The Institute published *Revue internationale des Études balkaniques*, which assembled most prominent European experts on the Balkans in various disciplines. Its work was banned by the Nazi occupation authorities in 1941.

The Institute was not re-established until 1969, under its present-day name and under the auspices of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. It assembled a team of scholars to cover the Balkans from prehistory to the modern age and in a range of different fields of study, such as archaeology, ethnography, anthropology, history, culture, art, literature, law. This multidisciplinary approach remains its

long-term orientation.

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CONTENTS

ARTICLES

| CLASSICAL STUDIES | |
|---|-----|
| Patrick Counillon, L'Istros dans la Géographie de Strabon | 7 |
| MEDIEVAL STUDIES | |
| <i>Marija Vasiljević,</i> Translations of Saints' Relics in the Late Medieval Central Balkans | 23 |
| ART HISTORY | |
| <i>Vladimir Simić,</i> Popular Piety and the Paper Icons of Zaharija Orfelin | 45 |
| LINGUISTICS | |
| Annemarie Sorescu-Marinković & Mirjana Mirić & Svetlana Ćirković, Assessing Linguistic Vulnerability and Endangerment in Serbia: A Critical Survey of Methodologies and Outcomes | 65 |
| MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY HISTORY | |
| Athanasios Loupas, Interethnic Rivalries and Bilateral Cooperation: Aspects of Greek-Serbian Relations from the Assassination of Alexander Obrenović to the Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1903–1908) | 105 |
| <i>Vojislav G. Pavlović,</i> Le révolutionnaire professionel: Tito à Moscou 1935–1936 | 121 |
| Slobodan G. Markovich, History of Hellenic-Serbian (Yugoslav) Alliances from Karageorge to the Balkan Pact 1817–1954 | 143 |
| <i>Dragana</i> G <i>njatović</i> , Evolution of Economic Thought on Monetary Reform in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after the Great War | 183 |
| Goran Latinović & Nikola Ožegović, "St. Bartholomew's Night" of Banja Luka: The Ustasha Crime against the Serbs in the Banja Luka Area on 7 February 1942 | 207 |
| Igor Vukadinović, The Shift in Yugoslav-Albanian Relations: The Establishment of Ties between Albania and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija (1966–1969) | 235 |
| Milan Ristović, Yugoslav-Greek Relations from the End of the Second World War to 1990: Chronology, Phases, Problems and Achievements | |
| | 257 |

IN MEMORIAM

| Ljiljana N. Stošić: In memoriam, Dinko Davidov (1930–2019) | 283 |
|---|-----|
| Boris Milosavljević: In memoriam, Veselin A. Djuretić (1933–2020) | 286 |
| Darko Todorović, In memoriam, Miodrag Mića Stojanović (1934–2020) | 289 |

REVIEWS

| Anja Nikolić: Benno Gammerl, Subjects, Citizens and Others. Administering Ethnic Heterogeneity in the British and Habsburg Empires, 1867–1918 3 Konstantin Dragaš: Andrea Ungari, La Guerra del Re. Monarchia, Sistema politico e Forze armate nella Grande Guerra | ier Delamarre, Dictionnaire de la langue gauloise. pproche linguistique du vieux celtique continental |
|---|--|
| Ethnic Heterogeneity in the British and Habsburg Empires, 1867–1918 3 Konstantin Dragaš: Andrea Ungari, La Guerra del Re. Monarchia, Sistema politico e Forze armate nella Grande Guerra | |
| politico e Forze armate nella Grande Guerra3Rastko Lompar: Stefan Gužvica, Before Tito. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia during the Great Purge (1936–1940)3Andjelija Miladinović Radonjić: Catherine Horel, L'amiral Horthy. Régent de Hongrie3Igor Vukadinović: Ethem Çeku, Kosovo and Diplomacy Since World War II: Yugoslavia, Albania and the Path to Kosovan Independence.3Dušan Fundić: Thanos Veremis, A Modern History of the Balkans. Nationalism and Identity in Southeast Europe.3Annemarie Sorescu-Marinković: Thede Kahl and Ioana Nechiti, The Boyash in Hungary. A Comparative Study among the Arĝeleni and Munĉeni Communities3Mirjana Mirić & Svetlana Ćirković: Yaron Matras and Anton Tenser, eds., The Palgrave Handbook of Romani Language and Linguistics3Vojisalv G. Pavlović: Boris Milosavljević, Beogradski rodoslovi3 | |
| during the Great Purge (1936–1940) 3 Andjelija Miladinović Radonjić: Catherine Horel, L'amiral Horthy. 3 Régent de Hongrie 3 Igor Vukadinović: Ethem Çeku, Kosovo and Diplomacy Since World War II: 3 Yugoslavia, Albania and the Path to Kosovan Independence. 3 Dušan Fundić: Thanos Veremis, A Modern History of the Balkans. Nationalism 3 Annemarie Sorescu-Marinković: Thede Kahl and Ioana Nechiti, The Boyash in 3 Hungary. A Comparative Study among the Arĝeleni and Munĉeni 3 Mirjana Mirić & Svetlana Ćirković: Yaron Matras and Anton Tenser, eds., 3 Vojisalv G. Pavlović: Boris Milosavljević, Beogradski rodoslovi 3 | |
| Régent de Hongrie | |
| Yugoslavia, Albania and the Path to Kosovan Independence. 3 Dušan Fundić: Thanos Veremis, A Modern History of the Balkans. Nationalism and Identity in Southeast Europe. 3 Annemarie Sorescu-Marinković: Thede Kahl and Ioana Nechiti, The Boyash in Hungary. A Comparative Study among the Arĝeleni and Munĉeni Communities 3 Mirjana Mirić & Svetlana Ćirković: Yaron Matras and Anton Tenser, eds., The Palgrave Handbook of Romani Language and Linguistics 3 Vojisalv G. Pavlović: Boris Milosavljević, Beogradski rodoslovi 3 | |
| and Identity in Southeast Europe | |
| Hungary. A Comparative Study among the Arĝeleni and Munĉeni Communities3Mirjana Mirić & Svetlana Ćirković: Yaron Matras and Anton Tenser, eds., The Palgrave Handbook of Romani Language and Linguistics3Vojisalv G. Pavlović: Boris Milosavljević, Beogradski rodoslovi3 | |
| Mirjana Mirić & Svetlana Ćirković: Yaron Matras and Anton Tenser, eds., The Palgrave Handbook of Romani Language and Linguistics 3 Vojisalv G. Pavlović: Boris Milosavljević, Beogradski rodoslovi 3 | ary. A Comparative Study among the Arĝeleni and Munĉeni |
| Vojisalv G. Pavlović: Boris Milosavljević, Beogradski rodoslovi 3 | Svetlana Ćirković: Yaron Matras and Anton Tenser, eds., |
| Instructions for authors | |
| | uthors |

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L'Istros dans la Géographie de Strabon

Résumé : La description de l'Istros-Danube par Strabon dans sa *Géographie* (4. 6. 10 ; 7. 5) actualise à l'époque augustéenne la tradition géographique de la description de ce fleuve. Les contradictions entre les nécessités de la schématisation géographique et celles de l'intégration de sources nouvelles expliquent une partie des erreurs géographiques de cette partie de l'œuvre.

Mots clés : Strabon, Danube, Pannonie, Géographie antique

L'une des particularités de la géographie antique est sa difficulté à apprécier la pertinence des informations qui lui sont parvenues, c'est à dire à vérifier et confronter entre elles des données provenant de sources diverses (militaires ou commerciales ; astronomiques ou géodésiques) ce qui lui rend difficile le rejet de celles-ci sur d'autres bases que l'autorité accordée à la personne du témoin. I Une conséquence en est, par exemple, la coexistence d'un nombre considérable de doublons toponymiques ou ethnonymiques. De plus, comme la géographie antique n'est pas une science constituée au sens où nous le concevons, elle fait ses délices de questions qui relèveraient aujourd'hui de la littérature, comme la géographie homérique. L'Istros, tel qu'il apparaît dans la *Géographie* de Strabon, en présente un exemple intéressant.

Il est tout d'abord impliqué dans la légende des Argonautes, légende si importante pour les Grecs de la colonisation qu'elle ne pouvait manquer d'obscurcir les questions historiques ou géographiques qu'elle paraissait soulever. D'un autre côté, l'Istros a vivement intéressé les historiens à partir du moment où les Grecs ont pénétré en mer Noire, et fondé les villes côtières de l'ouest du Pont : point de repère incontournable sur les rives du Pont, objet de curiosité par la puissance de son débit et la longueur de son cours, l'Istros est entré, avec les autres grands fleuves de la région, le Borysthène (le Dniepr) ou le Tanaïs (le Don), dans les récits des historiens et dans les tentatives de description territoriale des premiers géographes.

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¹ Avec le paradoxe à nos yeux que le statut social de la source donnera plus d'autorité au roi ou au prince qu'au marin ou au commerçant, par exemple à Auguste dans le cas de l'Istros, voir *infra*.

Comme les grands fleuves de la terre habitée, l'Istros tient enfin une place importante dans la *Géographie* de Strabon pour des raisons proprement géographiques car, comme ailleurs d'autres grands fleuves comme le Nil ou l'Euphrate, il permet de structurer la description de l'Europe orientale, en concurrence avec la ligne des côtes et les massifs montagneux.

Les contradictions entre ces différentes perspectives sont particulièrement sensibles dans un passage très discuté de la *Géographie*, la description de la région de Ségestiké en Pannonie, sur laquelle je m'arrêterai plus particulièrement.

1. L'histoire de la découverte du cours de l'Istros et sa place dans la Géographie de Strabon

1.1. L'Istros apparaît dans la poésie grecque avec la Théogonie d'Hésiode, dans un catalogue d'enfants d'Océan et Téthys, comme le Nil et l'Éridan.² Il est alors un fleuve mythique et il est invraisemblable qu'il corresponde au fleuve qui a pris son nom.³ Même l'Istros des Argonautes n'est pas initialement attaché à ce qui est devenu le Danube, puisque la légende des Argonautes est antérieure à la pénétration des Grecs dans le Pont, où elle s'installe avec la colonisation. L'Istros n'a pu devenir le fleuve remonté par Jason qu'après le VIIe siècle av. J.-C., mais une fois la légende installée dans le Pont, c'est par l'Istros que les Argonautes échappent aux Colques lancés à leur poursuite, en remontant le cours jusqu'au grand lac qui prendrait sa source au centre de l'Europe et dont ils ressortiraient par l'Éridan tantôt assimilé au Rhône et tantôt au Pô, ou même par un bras particulier de l'Istros qui se déverserait dans l'Adriatique, dans l'Istrie à laquelle il a laissé son nom. Cette légende est suffisamment populaire (en particulier auprès des Grecs du Pont), et a fait l'objet d'œuvres littéraires si importantes qu'il était impossible à un géographe de n'en pas rendre compte, ne fût-ce que pour en apprécier la vraisemblance (et trouver le moyen, si possible de « sauver » la tradition).⁴ La question de l'identification des sources de l'Istros est donc tout à la fois une question littéraire et une question géographique, comme l'explique

² Hes. *Th.*, 337-339, « Tèthys enfanta d'Océan des fleuves tourbillonnants, le Nil, l'Alphée, l'Éridan au profond tourbillon, le Strymon, le Méandre et l'Istros au beau cours »...

³ La date de composition de la *Théogonie* est discutée, mais elle est antérieure, au moins pour sa plus grande partie à la pénétration des Grecs dans le Pont.

⁴ Str. 1. 2. 39 : « Enfin, suivant certains auteurs, Jason aurait remonté la plus grande partie du cours de l'Istros ; mais d'autres se bornent à le faire pénétrer par cette voie jusqu'à l'Adriatique, et, si les premiers ont montré qu'ils ignoraient complètement la géographie de ces contrées, ceux-ci, du moins, en supposant l'existence d'un second fleuve Istros, qui sortirait du grand Istros pour aller se jeter dans l'Adriatique, n'ont pas avancé quelque chose de tout à fait invraisemblable et absurde », trad. G. Aujac, éd., *Strabon*, Géographie, *Tome I*, 1^e *partie* (livre I) (Paris : Les Belles Lettres (CUF), 1969).

fort bien Strabon : même les meilleurs géographes ou les plus vétilleux ont pu s'y laisser prendre, comme Hipparque.⁵

1.2. Le moment géographique fondamental, pour l'Istros, est la description qu'en donne Hérodote au Ve siècle av. J.-C., qui en fait le plus grand fleuve d'Europe et l'utilise pour organiser sa description de la côte occidentale du Pont : ce rôle lui est définitivement acquis.⁶

Bien qu'Hérodote se targue de profiter des progrès apportés à la connaissance de la région par l'expédition de Darius (progrès réels, transmis à Hérodote par les Ioniens qui formaient le contingent naval d'accompagnement), et qu'il ait pu profiter des informations indirectes dont disposaient les cités grecques désormais bien implantées dans la région, il n'a qu'une connaissance très approximative du haut cours de l'Istros auquel il fait traverser toute l'Europe depuis le mont Pyrènè, en Celtique.⁷ De plus, les connaissances que rassemble Hérodote sont plaquées sur une représentation fautive et approximative de l'Europe du nord. L'une de ses composantes est la représentation associée d'un massif montagneux (les monts Rhipées pour l'Istros) et d'un grand lac (symétrique du lac Tritônis au centre de la Libye), qui servirait de réservoir général à tous les fleuves d'Europe – le Rhin peut-être, le Rhône ou le Pô (l'Éridan), et l'Istros : cette représentation, qui associe un massif montagneux, un grand lac qui sert de réservoir à de grands fleuves continentaux, est théorisée par Aristote, popularisée par les poètes (Apollonios de Rhodes l'intègre dans ses Argonautiques à l'époque hellénistique),⁸ et reste suffisamment prégnante pour continuer à survivre dans les représentations géographiques des siècles suivants : revenant à plusieurs re-

⁵ Str. 1. 3. 15 : « Mais d'abord, l'Istros n'a pas sa source dans la région pontique, il part d'un point tout opposé situé dans les montagnes au-dessus de l'Adriatique ; en second lieu, il ne se déverse pas à la fois dans l'une et dans l'autre mer, mais seulement dans le Pont, et il ne se bifurque qu'à son embouchure même. Hipparque a donc reproduit là une erreur commune à quelques-uns de ses prédécesseurs, lesquels supposaient l'existence d'un fleuve, portant ce même nom d'Istros, qui se serait jeté dans l'Adriatique après s'être séparé de l'autre Istros, qui aurait même donné à toute cette partie de son bassin la dénomination d'Istrie et que Jason aurait descendu tout entier lors de son retour de Colchide », trad. G. Aujac *ibid*.

⁶ Hdt. 1. 33-34 : « L'Istros vient du pays des Celtes et de la ville de Pyréné, et partage l'Europe en deux (les Celtes habitent au-delà des Colonnes d'Héraclès et sont les voisins des Cynésiens, le plus occidental des peuples de l'Europe). L'Istros traverse donc toute l'Europe et se jette dans le Pont-Euxin à l'endroit où les colons de Milet ont fondé Istria. Mais si l'Istros est bien connu, puisqu'il coule à travers des régions habitées, personne ne peut rien dire des sources de Nil ».

⁷ Hdt. 4. 47-49. Il mentionne toutefois des affluents venus d'Illyrie et apparemment d'Ombrie, ce qui ne peut guère s'expliquer que par l'écho lointain de liens commerciaux plus ou moins directs avec les cités grecques du Pont.

⁸ Voir E. Delage & F. Vian, éd., *Apollonios de Rhodes*, Les Argonautiques, *Tome III (chant IV)* (Paris : Les Belles Lettres (CUF), 1981), Notice, 16-20.

prises sur la découverte des sources de l'Istros et du Rhin par Tibère, Strabon souligne la part de vérité que contenaient les hypothèses fautives de ses prédécesseurs, puisque l'on trouve dans la proximité des sources de l'Istros et du Rhin le grand lac qu'évoquaient les légendes, tandis que la répartition des fleuves des Alpes aux sources voisines, comme affluents, soit de l'Istros, soit du Pô, justifie la croyance en une double embouchure du même fleuve, l'une adriatique, l'autre en mer Noire : la tradition n'est donc pas abolie, mais expliquée et justifiée.⁹

Hérodote présente l'Istros en deux temps : le premier en décrit le système fluvial (4. 47, l'Istros dans sa région ; 4. 48-49, affluents, de la rive gauche, puis de la rive droite (jusqu'à des fleuves venus d'Illyrie et d'Ombrie) ; dans un second temps, l'Istros est présenté comme l'axe fondamental qui permet d'organiser l'Europe en régions cis- et transdanubienne, séparant l'Europe du Nord de celle du Sud, au même titre que le Nil en Égypte, ou, plus tard, le Taurus en Asie.¹⁰

Les contemporains d'Hérodote ou sa postérité adoptent sa représentation, et tentent d'en améliorer la précision : Thucydide, donne deux mesures itinéraires ; Aristote met sa source au Pyrénées, et le voit lui aussi bifide ; Polybe, qui admet qu'un émissaire de l'Istros se jette dans l'Adriatique, traite de son hydrologie dans une réflexion sur le comblement du Pont par les alluvions des fleuves qui s'y déversent.¹¹ L'image de l'Istros ne change pas sensiblement ensuite, et Ératosthène imagine toujours un Istros bifide,¹² et, surtout, son rôle de frontière et d'organisateur des territoires reste établi une fois pour toutes dans les descriptions géographiques.

1.3. L'adéquation entre cette utilisation et une description efficace des territoires se heurte cependant à de grandes difficultés. La première est que l'Istros n'est pas la frontière naturelle que voudraient y trouver les géographes et les historiens. L'est de la région, en particulier, est un boulevard pour des peuples venus tant de l'ouest (Germains), du sud (Thraces) que du nord (Scythes et Sarmates), qui se disputent ou se partagent les territoires, ce qui fait désespérer Strabon de la tentative d'identification des groupes ethniques qui les occupent.¹³

⁹ En particulier Str. 7. 1.5, description du lac de Constance : « Un massif de montagnes, cercle immense [...] qu'avoisinent les sources de l'Istros et du Rhin, le lac situé entre deux et les marais formés par les débordements du Rhin », trad. R. Baladié, éd., *Strabon*, Géographie, *Tome IV* (*livre VII*) (Paris : Les Belles Lettres (CUF), 1989). Sur ces questions, et la place des fleuves dans la *Géographie* de Strabon en général, voir P. Counillon, « Strabon et les fleuves », in A. Dan & St. Lebreton, éd. : *Étude des Fleuves d'Asie Mineure dans l'Antiquité*, T. I (Arras : Artois Presses Université, 2018), 125–144, part. 137–138 sur la route d'Aquilée au Danube par l'Ocra.

¹⁰ Hdt. 4. 99-101.

¹¹ Th. 2. 97 ; Arist. Mete. 1. 13. 19 (350 b) ; H A 1. 8. 15 (598 b) ; Plb. 4. 2. 41-42.

¹² Str. 1. 3. 15.

¹³ Par ex. Str. 7. 3.13 ; 7. 3.17 ; 7. 5.2. La difficulté n'est pas moindre pour les historiens contemporains, comme le montrent, pour les Balkans, les travaux de F. Papazoglou, *The Cen*-

La suivante est, jusqu'à l'époque de Tibère, la méconnaissance des régions du haut Istros et de l'identification de ses sources : la confusion des cours du Rhône et du Pô sous le nom d'Éridan, leur connexion éventuelle avec l'Istros, l'existence d'un émissaire de l'Istros dans l'Adriatique, reflètent, certes, des pratiques commerciales de l'Europe centrale, route de l'ambre et autres produits nordiques.¹⁴ Mais les Grecs seront incapables d'arriver à une description cohérente avant que les armées de Tibère n'en découvrent les sources (en 35 av. J.-C.) : ce sont précisément les progrès que tente d'intégrer la *Géographie* de Strabon.¹⁵ Toutefois, les régions riveraines du Danube ne seront pas vraiment connues avant que les conquêtes de Trajan aient fait de l'Istros une frontière de l'Empire et y aient annexé les provinces contigües, et cette ignorance aussi transparaît dans les descriptions de Strabon.

2. L'Istros et la structuration de la description géographique

La réflexion cartographique à laquelle se sont attelés les géographes de l'époque hellénistique implique la schématisation de la surface terrestre et de ses accidents naturels pour en obtenir une représentation graphique. Les fleuves sont naturellement l'un des éléments de cette schématisation.¹⁶ Comme Hérodote, Strabon utilise donc l'Istros pour la structuration de sa description de l'Europe septentrionale. La notice introductive du livre II est reprise au début du livre VII pour la description détaillée, donc elle structure la disposition en chapitres.¹⁷

tral Balkan Tribes in Pre-Roman Times, Triballi, Autariatae, Dardanians, Scordisci and Moesians, tr. M. Stansfield-Popović (Amsterdam : Hakkert, 1978), voir infra.

¹⁴ La tentative de prouver l'existence de connexions physiques entre des régions lointaines par les trouvailles de produits manufacturés est déjà pratiquée par Anciens, par exemple par Théopompe à propos de l'Istros d'Illyrie, *ap*. Str. 7. 5. 9.

¹⁵ Str. 1. 3. 15 : « Mais d'abord, l'Istros n'a pas sa source dans la région pontique, il part d'un point tout opposé situé dans les montagnes au-dessus de l'Adriatique ; en second lieu, il ne se déverse pas à la fois dans l'une et dans l'autre mer, mais seulement dans le Pont, et il ne se bifurque qu'à son embouchure même », trad. Aujac, *ibid*.

¹⁶ Str. 2. 5. 17 : « C'est la mer au premier chef qui décrit la terre et lui donne sa forme, formant les golfes, la haute mer et les détroits, comme les isthmes, les chersonèses et les caps ; il faut y ajouter les fleuves et les montagnes. Tels sont les éléments qui permettent de distinguer les continents, les peuples, les sites favorables pour les villes et toutes les caractéristiques dont est pleine une carte régionale », trad. G. Aujac, éd., *Strabon*, Géographie, *Tome I*, 2^e partie (*livre II*) (Paris : Les Belles Lettres (CUF), 1969).

¹⁷ Str. 2. 5.30 repris (détaillé) en 7.1.1 : « Ce fleuve [...] prend sa source à la pointe ou extrémité occidentale de la Germanie, assez près même du fond de l'Adriatique, [...] forme donc, on le voit, la limite méridionale des pays situés au delà du Rhin et de la Celtique, c'est-à-dire des populations galatiques et germaniques qui s'étendent jusqu'aux Bastarnes, aux Tyrégètes et au fleuve Borysthène, et de ces autres populations qui vont du Borysthène au Tamaïs et à

Le début du livre VII (7. 1. 1-2) décrit la Germanie, jusqu'à arriver aux régions voisines de l'Istros dans les parties les plus méridionales (et montagneuses) de la Germanie qui jouxtent le nord des Alpes (7. 3. 1).

Strabon arrive aux parties contigües à l'Istros, mais avoue son ignorance générale de la région : il y substitue une longue digression antiquisante sur les Gètes, Homère, Éphore, Posidonius (7. 3. 2-10), avant d'en venir à l'histoire contemporaine des Gètes (7. 3. 11. Byrebistas, et ses incursions au sud du Danube), puis (7. 3. 12-13) d'établir certaines distinctions entre Daces (ouest) et Gètes (est), entre Istros et Danube (7. 3. 13). Il en arrive alors (7. 3. 14-15) à la région côtière et transdanubienne : il suit la côte vers vers le nord jusqu'au golfe de Carcinitis, au-delà du Borysthène-Dniepr, en énumérant les embouchures de fleuves qu'il rencontre dans ce paraplous, en remontant le cours (anaplous) pour en mentionner les élements remarquables (cités, peuples, quelques éléments d'histoire), avant de terminer (7. 4) par la Chersonèse Taurique (la Crimée). Il revient alors à son point de départ, pour les régions situées entre l'Istros et les montagnes d'Illyrie, de Paeonie et de Thrace.¹⁸ Lorsqu'il reviendra au Pont-Euxin (7. 5. 10), il se détournera vers le sud pour la description de la côte jusqu'à l'embouchure du Bosphore. Après quoi, viendra une description de la Grèce du nord et de la Macédoine (7.7).

L'organisation du livre VII confirme donc la place de l'Istros dans la Géographie comme axe d'organisation cartographique ou chorographique de l'Europe. Mais cette utilisation entraîne avec elle une collection d'erreurs qui en rend difficile la compréhension au regard de la réalité géographique de la région. La première difficulté vient de l'ignorance par Strabon des détails du cours du Danube et en particulier de ses changements successifs d'ori entation. Il admet simplement que le Danube, après avoir coulé vers le sud pour sortir des Alpes, s'oriente à l'ouest, et continue son cours tout droit jusqu'à son embouchure (ou

l'embouchure du Palus Maeotis [...] en même temps qu'il sert de limite septentrionale aux populations Illyriennes et Thraces, qui, avec un certain nombre de tribus étrangères, celtiques et autres, occupent tout le pays jusqu'à la Grèce », trad. Aujac *ibid*.

¹⁸ Str. 7.5.1, trad. Baladié *ibid.* : « Il nous reste à présent, pour compléter la description de l'Europe, à parcourir cette autre contrée qui, située en deçà du même fleuve [...] Or, il convient de commencer à partir de l'Istros et de décrire en premier les pays qui font suite immédiatement à ceux que nous venons de parcourir, autrement dit les pays qui confinent à l'Italie, aux Alpes et aux possessions des Germains, des Daces et des Gètes. On pourrait, du reste, partager aussi cette contrée en deux régions distinctes, car, les montagnes de l'Illyrie, de la Paeonie et de la Thrace étant à peu près parallèles au cours de 1'Istros et formant en quelque sorte une seule et même ligne de l'Adriatique au Pont, on se trouve avoir au nord de cette ligne tout le pays compris entre l'Istros et les montagnes, et au midi toute la Grèce avec les pays barbares qui s'étendent depuis ses frontières jusqu'au pied de la même chaîne. »

à peu près, puisqu'il se détournerait alors vers le nord).¹⁹ Cette ignorance des réalités géographiques est renforcée par le désir de donner à la région une forme géométrique compréhensible, et intégrable dans une carte de l'Europe. La cartographie implique la schématisation, et la recherche des lignes d'appui, des $\gamma \rho \alpha \mu \mu \alpha i$, qui la permettent. Ainsi Strabon définit-il deux lignes parallèles, l'une au nord, déterminée par le Danube et l'autre au sud, formée par la ligne ouestest des montagnes d'Illyrie (avec le passage de l'Ocra), de Péonie et de Thrace, qui lui permettent de construire un rectangle dans lequel il inscrit la Pannonie, encadrée par la Dalmatie, la Moesie et la Dacie.²⁰

Cette schématisation a pour conséquence une déformation générale non seulement du cours du Danube (dont le grand coude dans lequel s'inscrit en réalité la Pannonie est ignoré), mais également des rivières qui en sont les affluents, en particulier ceux de la rive droite, dont les cours sont dès lors orientés du sud vers le nord.²¹

L'orientation ouest-est du Danube a pour conséquence qu'elle situe les Daces directement au nord de la Pannonie, et rend particulièrement confuses les explications de Strabon sur leurs guerres avec les Boïens et les Taurisques et l'identification du fleuve Parisos.²² Les mêmes problèmes d'orientation du Danube expliquent au moins en partie le fait que Strabon situe Ségestiké au nordest de la Pannonie.²³

¹⁹ Str. 2.5.30 ; 7.1.1 : ... ρέων προς νότον κατ' ἀρχάς, εἶτ' ἐπιστρέφων εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῆς δύσεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνατολὴν καὶ τὸν Πόντον [...] τελευτῷ δ' εἰς τὸν Πόντον [...] ἐκκλίνων πως προς ἄρκτους.

²⁰ Str. 7. 5. I. Ces questions ont déjà été abordées et illustrées par Y. Marion, « Strabon et l'Illyrie. Essai de cartographie », in S. Čače, A. Kurilić & F. Tassaux, éd, Les routes de l'Adriatique antique = Putovi antičkog Jadrana : géographie et économie :actes de la Table ronde du 18 au 22 septembre 2001, Zadar : geografija i gospodarstvo : radovi s Okruglog stola održanog u Zadru od 18. do 22. rujna 2001 (Bordeaux-Zadar : Ausonius, 2006), 31-38, en particulier Fig. 4, p. 34.

²¹ Str. 7.5.2 : ὁ δὲ πλοῦς τὰ πολλὰ τοῖς ποταμοῖς ἐπὶ τὰς ἄρκτους ἐστίν.

²² Str. 7. 5. 2. situe un « désert des Boïens » dans le nord de la Pannonie, que mentionne également Pline l'Ancien, N.H. 3. 146, témoin de la fondation de Savaria et de Scarabantia Iulia sous le règne de Claude, voir *ad loc*. H. Zehnacker, éd. *Pline l'Ancien*, Histoire Naturelle, *Livre III*, 2^e éd. revue et augmentée (Paris : Les Belles Lettres (CUF), 2004). Nous sommes au nord de la Drava, et bien loin de Ségestiké, quoiqu'au sud de l'Istros : les contradictions de Strabon sont insolubles.

²³ Str. 7.5.2, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἔχουσι Παννόνιοι μέχρι Σεγεστικῆς καὶ «Ιστρου πρὸς ἄρκτον καὶ ἕω. Πρὸς ἄρκτον καὶ ἕω indique le nord-est, comme πρὸς ἄρκτον καὶ δύσιν εἰσίν indique le nord-ouest, 3. 2.9, et non le nord pour Ségestiké, et l'est pour l'Istros. D'ailleurs, l'Istros coulant droit vers l'est et le Pont à la sortie des Alpes ne pourrait former l'est de la Pannonie dans la logique de Strabo, même s'il la dessine effectivement dans la réalité. Mais dans quelle direction peut bien s'étendre le reste de la Pannonie (πρὸς δὲ τάλλα μέρη ἐπὶ πλέον διατείνουσιν)?

3. Fleuves et itinéraires, la route d'Aquilée à l'Istros

Dans les passages où Strabon traite de l'Istros, la Pannonie et la région de Ségestiké présentent un intérêt particulier, à cause de la difficulté qu'éprouve Strabon à les intégrer dans le schéma général de l'Europe du nord. Au livre VII, nous sommes au moment où Strabon décrit la frange septentionale de l'Europe cisdanubienne, qui confine à l'Italie et aux Alpes à l'ouest et, au nord, aux Germains, aux Daces et aux Gètes, et où il arrive à la chorographie de la Pannonie elle-même.²⁴

C'est une région charnière, et comme en d'autres régions similaires dans la Géographie, un doublon apparent de ce passage figure à la fin du livre IV, alors que se termine la description de la Gaule par celle des Alpes, et celle des Alpes par la Iapodie, avant le début de la description de l'Italie.²⁵

3. 1. Strabon 4. 6. 10

La fin des livres, ici celle du livre IV, est pour Strabon l'occasion de mentionner les « choses remarquables » qu'il n'a pu intégrer dans le contexte des chorographies qui ont précédé. Il s'arrête ici à la route qui permet de passer d'Aquilée à la vallée du Danube par Nauportos, Ségestiskè et la vallée de la Sava, dépassant, ce faisant, les limites de la Iapodie qu'il est en train de décrire. Immédiatement après, une notule sur les animaux alpins (empruntée à Polybe) sera suivie d'un excursus de la même veine sur les routes qui traversent les Alpes, puis sur l'or des Taurisques. Si Polybe est mentionné deux fois, l'utilisation au moins complémentaire de sources romaines est rendue évidente par la mention des guerres contre les Daces, celle des campagnes d'Auguste contre les Iapodes, et la mention d'Agrippa à propos des routes alpines.²⁶ Quelles que soient les sources anciennes, l'actualité des guerres de Dalmatie, des révoltes de Pannonie, et la réorganisation de la région en vue de contenir la pression des Daces ont amené Strabon à les corriger.

Plus loin, dans la plaine, est la ville de Segestica, dont les murs sont baignés par le Saos affluent de l'Istros : cette ville est très favorablement située pour servir

²⁴ Zehnacker Pline III, ad 3. 147, p. 278 : « Par la conquête de Tibère (12-9 av. J.-C.), la frontière de l'Illyricum fut avancée jusqu'au Danube : la province se divisait entre Illyricum superius et inferius, c'est à dire en Dalmatie et Pannonie (Aug. Res gestae 30 ; D. C. 54. 31). Révoltés en 6 ap. J. -C, les Pannoniens furent à nouveau soumis par Tibère [...] ; la Pannonie fut alors séparée de la Dalmatie et érigée en province distincte [...] Siscia fut érigée au rang de colonie par Vespasien en 71, déduction de soldats de la flotte. Pline tient compte de ce nouveau statut ».

²⁵ 4. 6. 9, trad. F. Lasserre, éd., Strabon, Géographie, Tome II (livres III-IV (Paris, les Belles Lettres (CUF), 1966) : « Une première chaîne [des Alpes] ou arête, encore assez peu élevée, commence au-delà du Rhin et du lac formé par ce fleuve et court droit à l'E. : or, c'est là, dans le voisinage des Suèves et de la forêt Hercynienne, que l'Istros a ses sources. »

²⁶ Sur les premières guerres de Pannonie, vers 146 av. J.-C., Papazoglou, *Tribes*, 284-285.

de base d'opération contre les Daces ; le mont Ocra est le point le plus bas de la partie des Alpes attenante au territoire des Carnes et sert de passage ordinaire aux marchandises venant d'Aquilée : de lourds chariots amènent ces marchandises à Nauportus, c'est-à-dire à une distance d'Aquilée qui n'excède guère 400 stades, puis elles descendent de là par les rivières jusqu'à l'Istros et aux différents pays qui bordent ce fleuve. Comme Nauportus est en effet bâtie sur une rivière navigable, qui vient d'Illyrie et se jette dans le Saos, lesdites marchandises peuvent aisément descendre jusqu'à Segestica et être amenées de la sorte au cœur de la Pannonie et du pays des Taurisques. Le Saos reçoit encore près de la même ville un autre affluent navigable, le Colapis, qui, comme lui, descend des Alpes.²⁷

L'itinéraire qui mène de l'Adriatique au Danube est bien identifié par toutes les sources tant historiques ou archéologiques que littéraires, et ne demande pas un long commentaire. Par contre, par rapport au passage correspondant du livre VII, le manuscrit présente certaines originalités que les éditeurs ont parfois gommées pour arriver à une vulgate strabonienne qui occulte les différences entre les deux passages. Les corrections proposées sont généralement raisonnables : ainsi, la première mention du Saos est-elle ici une proposition d'éditeur pour Ῥῆνος αὐτός, à partir de la seconde mention du Saos à la fin du passage : Casaubon restituait ὁ Νόαρος, à partir du livre VII, ce qui serait plus proche de la leçon des manuscrits, mais intolérable pour la cohérence du passage. Il est plus gênant, on va le voir, que le fleuve de Nauportos (pour ce toponyme, Radt adopte la leçon des manuscrits, Πάμπορτον), fleuve anonyme dans le manuscrit, et que Pline (3. 126) nomme *Nauportus*, soit parfois dénommé Corcoras à partir du passage correspondant du livre VII, ce qui est injustifié.

La description du livre IV apparaît donc comme un excursus de même nature que celui qui, dans les lignes suivantes, décrit les routes qui traversent les Alpes, en donne les principaux points de passage et les destinations, et où les cours d'eau sont les segments d'un itinéraire.

3.2. Strabon, 7. 5

Les manuscrits sont plus sûrs pour ce passage, mais son contenu a plongé les éditeurs dans la perplexité.

²⁷ Str. 4. 6. 10, trad. Lasserre *ibid.* : ... μεθ' οὐς ἡ Σεγεστικὴ πόλις ἐν πεδίω, παρ' ἡν ὁ Σάος παραρρεῖ ποταμὸς ἐκδιδοὺς εἰς τὸν Ἱστρον. κεῖται δὲ ἡ πόλις εὐφυῶς πρὸς τὸν κατὰ τῶν Δακῶν πόλεμον. ἡ δ' Ὅκρα τὸ ταπεινότατον μέρος τῶν Ἄλπεών ἐστι καθ' ὃ συνάπτουσι τοῖς Κάρνοις, καὶ δι' οὖ τὰ ἐκ τῆς Ἀκυληίας φορτία κομίζουσιν ἀρμαμάξαις εἰς τὸν καλούμενον Ναύπορτον, σταδίων ὁδὸν οὐ πολὺ πλειόνων ἢ τετρακοσίων. ἐκεῖθεν δὲ τοῖς ποταμος ἐκτάγεται μέχρι τοῦ Ἱστρου καὶ τῶν ταύτῃ χωρίων. Παραρρεῖ γὰρ δὴ τὸν Ναύπορτον [ποταμὸς ἐκ τῆς Ἐλυρίδος φερόμενος πλωτός, ἐκβάλλει δ' εἰς τὸν Σάον, ὥστ' εὐμαρῶς εἰς τὴν Σεγεστικὴν κατάγεται καὶ τοὺς Παννονίους καὶ Ταυρίσκους. Συμβάλλει δ' εἰς τὸν Σάον κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ ὁ Κόλαπις. ἀμφότεροι δ' εἰσὶ πλωτοί, ῥέουσι δ' ἀπὸ τῶν Ἄλπεων.

Le reste du pays est occupé par les Pannoniens. Ségestiké et l'Istros en marquent la limite vers le nord et l'est, mais il s'étend davantage dans les autres directions. La ville pannonienne de Ségestiké se trouve au confluent de plusieurs fleuves tous navigables ; elle est admirablement située pour servir de base dans la guerre contre les Daces, car elle se trouve au pied de la partie des Alpes qui va jusqu'au peuple des Iapodes, une peuplade à la fois celtique et illyrienne. De là viennent aussi des cours d'eau qui portent jusqu'à elle des quantités de marchandises provenant en particulier d'Italie. En effet, on compte 350 stades pour se rendre, en franchissant l'Ocra, d'Aquilée à Nauportos, agglomération habitée par les Taurisques ; les grands chars couverts descendent jusque là. Certains évaluent la distance à 500 stades. L'Ocra correspond à la partie la plus basse des Alpes qui vont du pays des Rhètes à celui des Iapodes. À partir de là l'altitude des montagnes croît à nouveau et culmine chez les Iapodes ; ce sont les monts Albia.

Ce premier paragraphe paraît une redite du passage correspondant du livre IV : position favorable de Ségestiké par sa situation au confluent de fleuves navigables, en particulier pour la guerre contre les Daces, et description de l'itinéraire depuis Aquilée par Nauportos. Il est en fait le symétrique du premier, qui donnait Ségestiké, les Pannoniens et les Taurisques pour terme à la route depuis Aquilée, de même qu'ici la Pannonie « se trouve au pied des Alpes qui va jusqu'à la Iapodie ».

Toutefois, il n'en est pas la copie, mais montre l'utilisation (quelle qu'en soit la forme initiale) d'une même « fiche » : l'insistance sur les fleuves navigables, la précision sur l'identité taurisque de Nauportos (sans parler des divergences des manuscrits, entre Πάμπορτον pour l'un et Ναύποντον pour l'autre), et surtout le désaccord des sources (350 ou 500 stades) au livre VII, au regard de ce qui pourrait être une moyenne (400) au livre IV, ainsi que les compléments dans la description de l'Ocra (les monts Ἄλβια de Iapodie, déjà mentionnés à la de 6.6.1) montrent une utilisation plus complète de la source (ou une fiche identique) peut être exploitée de façon différente selon les nécessités du contexte.²⁸

Quoi qu'il en soit, Strabon change alors de source :

De même, venant de la bourgade carnique de Tergeste, une route franchit l'Ocra et conduit dans une dépression appelée Lougéon. Près de Nauportos coule le Corcoras qu'emprunte le transport des marchandises. Il se jette dans le Sabos et celui-ci dans le Drabos qui à son tour porte ses eaux au Noaros près de Ségestiké. A partir de là, le Noaros est également grossi de

²⁸ Comme il le fait pour l'Euphrate, cf. Counillon, Strabon, 141-142. L'autre possibilité serait de voir dans l'excursus du livre IV un abrégé du passage correspondant du livre VII, ce qui est assez compliqué à reconstruire, et correspond mal à la communis opinio sur la composition de Géographie, cf. D. Dueck, Strabo of Amasia : A Greek Man of Letters in Augustan Rome (Londres et New York : Routledge, 2000), 145–152.

l'apport du Colapis qui prend naissance dans les monts Albia et traverse le pays des Iapodes. Le Noaros se jette dans le Danube sur les territoires des Scordisques. Ces rivières, le plus souvent navigables, permettent aux bateaux d'aller vers le nord. La route de Tergeste au Danube a une longueur de 1200 stades environ. On trouve près de Ségéstiké la forteresse de Siskia et Sirmium qui sont situées sur la route conduisant à l'Italie.²⁹

A l'itinéraire depuis Aquilée, Strabon ajoute donc ici un itinéraire nouveau depuis Tergeste, dont la distance au Danube est donnée à la fin du chapitre (1200 stades, soit, comme le remarque Baladié *ad loc.*, 225 km au lieu des 600 qu'il devrait comporter).³⁰ Cet itinéraire introduit des noms nouveaux ou différents : le $\Sigma \acute{a} \circ \varsigma$ est devenu le $\Sigma \acute{a} \beta \circ \varsigma$, ce qui pourrait être une transcription du latin, et se jette dans le Danube (au lieu de l'Istros au livre IV), ce qui va également dans le sens de l'exploitation directe d'une source latine. L'itinéraire donne des distances fantaisistes, on vient de le voir, et il situe, pour finir, Ségestiké près de Siscia et de Sirmium :³¹ cette dernière formule qui énumère les trois toponymes d'ouest en est, tout en les situant pourtant sur « la route qui mène en Italie » (ἐν $\delta \delta \tilde{\varphi}$ κείμεναι τῆ εiς Ἰταλίαν) est en contradiction avec l'ordre attendu d'énonciation.³² Enfin cet itinéraire invente des confluents nouveaux, ou imaginaires : le

²⁹ Str. 7. 5. 2, trad. Baladié ibid : Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἔχουσι Παννόνιοι μέχρι Σεγεστικῆς καὶ Ἱστρου πρός ἄρκτον καὶ ἕω· πρός δὲ τἆλλα μέρη ἐπὶ πλέον διατείνουσιν. Ἡ δὲ Σεγεστικὴ πόλις ἐστὶ Παννονίων ἐν συμβολῆ ποταμῶν πλειόνων, ἁπάντων πλωτῶν, εὐφυὲς ὁρμητήριον τῷ πρὸς Δακούς πολέμω· ὑποπέπτωκε γὰρ ταῖς Ἄλπεσιν, αι διατείνουσι μέχρι τῶν Ἰαπόδων, Κελτικοῦ τε ἅμα καὶ Ἰλλυρικοῦ ἔθνους· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ ποταμοὶ ῥέουσι πολλοὶ καταφέροντες εἰς αὐτὴν τόν τε άλλον καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας φόρτον. Εἰς γὰρ Ναύπορτον ἐξ Ἀκυληίας ὑπερτιθεῖσι τὴν Ὅκραν είσι στάδιοι τριακόσιοι πεντήκοντα, είς ήν αι άρμάμαξαι κατάγονται, τῶν Ταυρίσκων οὖσαν κατοικίαν. ένιοι δὲ πεντακοσίους φασίν. Ἡ δ' Ὀκρα ταπεινότατον μέρος τῶν Ἄλπεών ἐστι τῶν διατεινουσῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Ῥαιτικῆς μέχρι Ἰαπόδων· ἐντεῦθεν δ' ἐξαίρεται τὰ ὄρη πάλιν ἐν τοῖς Ἰάποσι καὶ καλεῖται Ἄλβια. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐκ Τεργέστε κώμης Καρνικῆς ὑπέρθεσίς ἐστι διὰ τῆς Ὅκρας εἰς έλος Λούγεον καλούμενον. Πλησίον δὲ τοῦ Ναυπόρτου ποταμός ἐστι Κορκόρας ὁ δεχόμενος τὰ φορτία· οὖτος μὲν οὖν εἰς τὸν Σάβον ἐμβάλλει, ἐκεῖνος δ' εἰς τὸν Δράβον, ὁ δὲ εἰς τὸν Νόαρον κατὰ τὴν Σεγεστικήν. Ἐντεῦθεν δ' ἤδη ὁ Νόαρος πλήθει προσλαβὼν τὸν διὰ τῶν Ἰαπόδων ῥέοντα ἐκ τοῦ Ἀλβίου ὄρους Κόλαπιν συμβάλλει τῷ Δανουίω κατὰ τοὺς Σκορδίσκους. Ὁ δὲ πλοῦς τὰ πολλὰ τοῖς ποταμοῖς ἐπὶ τὰς ἄρκτους ἐστίν· ὁδὸς δ' ἀπὸ Τεργέστε ἐπὶ τὸν Δανούιον σταδίων ὅσον χιλίων καὶ διακοσίων. Ἐγγὺς δὲ τῆς Σεγεστικῆς ἐστι καὶ ἡ Σισκία φρούριον καὶ Σίρμιον ἐν ὁδῷ κείμεναι τῆ εἰς Ἰταλίαν.

³⁰ Ce qui correspondrait, pour Baladié, *ibid. ad loc.*, à une confusion avec la distance jusqu'à l'une des ruptures de charge. La mention du Drabos serait pour lui une note de copiste introduite dans le texte.

³¹ Ségestiké se trouve sur la Sava, à 260 km de Sirmium, St. Radt, éd., *Strabons Geographika, Band 5, Buch I-IV : Kommentar* (Göttingen : Vandenhoeck et Ruprecht, 2006), *ad loc*, p. 292.

³² La source de notre passage comprend donc un itinéraire de l'Italie à Sirmium, dont les étapes initiales sont brouillées, mais qui passe par Ségestiké et Siscia et dont le terme est Sirmium.

Corcoras est inconnu par ailleurs, comme le Noaros ; le $\Delta \rho \alpha \beta \sigma \varsigma$,³³ s'il s'agit de la Drava, est un affluent direct du Danube ; le Colapis est en réalité un affluent de la Sava, et ils ont leur confluent à Ségestiké, loin du Danube.

Toutes les tentatives des éditeurs pour arriver à un texte géographiquement cohérent sont contradictoires parce qu'elles tentent de justifier le texte en allant à la pêche aux cours d'eau dans les cartes modernes ou en jouant sur l'interchangeabilité des toponymes.³⁴

Or, la question géographique se double de multiples questions historiques, car elle interfère avec l'histoire de la conquête de la Pannonie par les Romains, et en particulier la prise de Ségestiké par Octavien en personne, rapportée à la fois par Cassius Dion et Appien : les historiens, dans une perspective différente, se sont donc eux aussi attachés à l'analyse et à l'interprétation du texte de Strabon. On renverra à la synthèse de F. Papazoglou, qui en fait le catalogue et l'analyse lucide dans l'étude historique qu'elle a consacrée au territoire des Scordisques (dont, selon Strabon, le Noaros borde le territoire)³⁵ et l'on devra inévitablement partager sa conclusion que « the Noarus remains an insoluble riddle ».

Sans se rallier au détail des solutions proposées, on doit pour autant souligner un certain nombre de points acquis grâce aux recherches des érudits qui se sont penchés sur la question.

Tout d'abord il est clair que Strabon utilise ici des sources différentes, dont l'une est celle qui a servi au livre IV. Pour les sources grecques, on a reconnu Polybe peut être cité à travers Posidonius. Mais pour la Pannonie, les sources essentielles ne peuvent être que Romaines pour des raisons de chronologie. Comme l'écrit J.-M. Roddaz à propos de la prise de Ségestiké par Octavien, les *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* étaient la source première, sinon unique des historiens et géographes de la région,³⁶ et il est indubitable que Strabon lui aussi les a utili-

³³ Le Drabos est mentionné par Pline, N.H. 3. 3. 28 (147). Cf. Zehnacker *ibid, ad loc.,* p. 278 : « La rivière Draus ou Drauus, mod. Drava, prend sa source dans les Alpes carniques [...] elle ne se prête à la navigation que sur 100 km sur 700 (*violentior*). La Saus, mod. Sava, prend sa source dans les Alpes slovènes. Elle est navigable sur près de 600 km/940 (*placidior*) ».

³⁴ Radt, *ibid*, *ad loc.*, en fait le catalogue ; voir surtout Papazoglou, *Tribes*, 359–362.

³⁵ Celui des Grands Scordisques, 7. 5.12.

³⁶ M.-L. Freyburger & J.-M. Roddaz, éd., *Dion Cassius*, Histoire Romaine, *Livres 48 et 49*, (Paris : Les Belles Lettres (CUF), 1994), 183–184 : (Campagnes d'Octavien en Illyrie) « Octavien paraît avoir été la principale source d'informations sur les opérations menées en 35-33 av. J.-C. dans l'espace illyro-dalmate et les historiens postérieurs, comme Velléius Paterculus (2. 78. 2), Appien (*Illyr.* 14-28) ou Dion Cassius (*Hist. Rom.,* 49. 36-37) se sont inspirés du récit présenté dans son autobiographie [...] La restauration de la tranquillité, souvent perturbée par les Illyriens et autres peuples barbares en Italie du nord (selon App., *Illyr.,* 16. 46, Aquilée et Tergeste avaient été pillées), pouvait servir de prétexte à une intervention qui se situe dans la continuation de l'œuvre de César [...] Le point le plus avancé fut Siscia sur la Sava. »

sées.³⁷ Mais si la prise de Ségestiké et de Siscia (dont il n'est pas sûr que Strabon voie le rapport avec Ségestiké) sont imputables à Auguste, la mention de Sirmium sur un itinéraire implique la conquête finale de la Pannonie par Tibère et donc une source postérieure aux années 6–9 ap. J.-C.³⁸ Ce passage en tout cas, rapporte quelques-uns des évènements datables les plus tardifs de l'œuvre.³⁹ On sait que la Géographie est une œuvre de vieillesse, et on pense d'ordinaire qu'elle a été achevée par Strabon à un âge avancé, après son retour à Amasée du Pont sa patrie.⁴⁰ La date tardive de cet itinéraire de Tergeste au Danube, si même il s'agit d'un itinéraire et non du résultat de l'analyse d'une expédition militaire en Pannonie, peut expliquer qu'il n'ait pas bénéficié des corrections qu'il aurait manifestement méritées : l'impossibilité pour Strabon de contrôler la véracité de ses sources, sinon d'en comprendre la nature, explique assez bien les confusions de cours, de confluents, et d'orientation. Sa valeur géographique est sans doute nulle : quiconque s'est attaché à suivre les itinéraires de Xénophon dans l'Anabase a pu mesurer que les déplacements stratégiques d'une armée en campagne suivent des itinéraires qui ne prennent que très accessoirement en compte l'exploration géographique ; les déplacements de l'armée romaine en Pannonie n'étaient pas forcément plus limpides.

A cela s'ajoute le point mis en évidence par Polaschek dès 1936 : les erreurs d'appréciation de Strabon sont dues à une représentation fautive de la région, et sa tentative d'intégrer des éléments contradictoires empruntés à des itinéraires ou des récits historiques différents dans une représentation cartographique globale où l'Istros coule droit vers l'est à sa sortie des Alpes et où des fleuves venus des montagnes du sud coulent tous vers le nord.⁴¹ Lorsqu'on y

³⁷ Dueck, Strabo of Amasia, 97.

³⁸ M. Mirković, « Sirmium, its History from the First Century AD to 582 AD », in Sirmium I, éd. V. Popović (Belgrade : Archaeological Institute, 1971), 12.

³⁹ D. W. Roller, *The Geography of Strabo* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2014), 14–15: « In fact, several items in the *Geography* that relate to the first decade of Tiberius, such as the German campaigns of that era (7.1-4), or the death of Archelaos of Kappadokia (12.1.4) around AD 17 or 18. This suggest that much of the final shaping of the *Geography* was done during those years [...] The last certain date of the *Geography* is the death of Juba II of Mauretania, a long-time associate, in AD 23 or 24. » Un passage du livre IV (4.6.9) fait référence aux tribus alpines vaincues par Tibère et Drusus en 15 av. J.-C., « il y a trente-trois ans », ce qui permet de dater le moment de l'écriture du passage en 19 ap. J.-C.

⁴⁰ D. Dueck, « The Date and Method of Composition of Strabo's 'Geography' », Hermes 127
(4) (1999) 467–478, qui fixe la date de rédaction aux années 18–24 ap. J.-C.; et Dueck, Strabo of Amasia, 146–150.

⁴¹ E. Polaschek, s. Noaros, *RE* 17.1, 1936, *col.* 783-785 : Polaschek pensait que Strabon avait disposé d'une source cartographique sommaire, où les routes terrestres et fluviales étaient confondues, mais ne réussissait pas à intégrer le Drabos dans son système. Voir aussi Papazoglou, *Tribes*, 363 : « The network of rivers in that region, the Drave and the Mura, on the

ajoute l'erreur qu'il fait dans sa représentation de l'étendue de la Pannonie, il n'y a rien de surprenant à ce que tous ces fleuves finissent par se jeter les uns dans les autres avant d'arriver à l'Istros !

De nombreuses questions restent donc à résoudre, et les réponses ne viendront assurément pas du texte de Strabon : comme souvent, avec les textes géographiques de l'Antiquité, les réponses viendront des découvertes des archéologues et des historiens, qui détiennent, pour interpréter le texte, des clés dont le philologue ne dispose pas. Le texte géographique n'est pas une autorité, il est une source de questions : on doit le lire dans son contexte historique, et l'apprécier à la mesure de ce qu'il sait, et de ce qu'il ignore.

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one hand, the Save and its tributaries, on the other, must have been so drawn on the map Strabo's source used that it gave rise to a wrong conception of the meeting of the two systems at Segestica. It is noticeable that there is no mention of any of the great tributaries of the Save after the Kupa (Colapis), which enters the Save just after Segestica.»

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Translations of Saints' Relics in the Late Medieval Central Balkans

- Abstract: The paper discusses the character of the translations of saints' relics in the late medieval central Balkans, as they increasingly gained prominence as an encouragement to the veneration of saints. The fact that translations grew much more frequent provides the opportunity to analyse the motivations behind this practice, the ways in which relics were acquired, the types of translation processions and their symbolic significance. The relic translations in the central Balkans in the period under study fitted the Christian translation pattern in every respect and stood halfway between history and cult and, frequently, between politics and cult.
- Keywords: translations of saints' relics, Late Middle Ages, central Balkans, St Petka, Empress Theophano, Constantine the Great, St Luke the Evangelist, John of Rila, King Stefan Uroš II Milutin

The saints were venerated in a variety of ways: by liturgical commemoration, by painting their holy images, offering personal prayers, making pilgrimages to and translating their relics. Since miracles as a rule involved contact with or proximity to the saints' relics or substances associated with them,¹ the centre of every cult was the shrine in which they were kept.² The emphasis on the saints' bodily remains provides an explanation for the importance of their translations – every relocation of relics meant the relocation of the centre of the cult.

Translations could have a variety of causes. The first, and most important, translation took place in the earliest phase of the formation of a saintly cult,

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¹ A.-M. Talbot, "Pilgrimage to Healing Shrines: The Evidence of Miracle Accounts", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 56 (2002), 159–161; M. Kaplan, "Le miracle est-il nécessaire au saint byzantin?", *Pouvoirs, Église et sainteté. Essais sur la société byzantine* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2011), 100–101. By touching a relic, the faithful came into contact with the holy, with divine power, and believed that some of the holiness was transferred to them. S. Marjanović-Dušanić, Sveto i propadljivo. Telo u srpskoj hagiografskoj književnosti (Belgrade: Clio and Institute for Balkan Studies, 2017), 207–228.

² P. J. Geary, "The Saint and the Shrine: The Pilgrim's Goal in the Middle Ages", *Living with the Dead in the Middle Ages* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), 170–171.

usually as a result of the first miracles occurring at the saint's tomb.³ The body of the saint was usually moved from the grave into a church and laid in front of the altar. In the Eastern Orthodox Churches, that act may be considered to be official recognition of sanctity.⁴ There usually followed the writing of an office and a hagiography (either synaxarial or extensive).⁵

All further translations were undertaken in response to a community's need to secure the saint's protection. These further translations are the focus of my analysis. They involved the transfer either of the whole body or of its parts.⁶ Apart from the fundamental need for the presence of a heavenly protector, the relocation of the saint's relics could be motivated by four more factors.

The need for the saint's presence could be made more urgent by particular historical circumstances. Sometimes a new political community wanted to invoke God's patronage. Or a community in crisis – such as natural disasters or wars – wanted to secure additional help. Sometimes a community wanted to obtain the relics that it saw as being particularly important to it.

The reason for the translation of a saint's relics could also be the decline of his/her cult. A cult could begin to decline because the church in which the relics were enshrined had suffered damage or destruction, or because the surrounding area had become depopulated. A cult could also begin to decline because the saint was not a miracle-worker⁷ or because the faith in the power of his/her miracles waned. A cult could also be overshadowed by the veneration of another saint. But a cult declining in one environment could flourish again in another.

³ Miracles were the most important, if not indispensable, proof of sanctity. Persons do not become saints because they perform miracles, but become able to perform miracles, in their lifetime or after death, because they have attained divine grace and sanctity through their efforts, see Kaplan, "Le miracle est-il nécessaire au saint byzantin?"

⁴ Until the thirteenth century the translation of a saint's relics was equivalent to canonization in the Roman Catholic Church as well. After that the canonization process came under papal control, see A. Vauchez, *Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

⁵ The office is a combination of different poetic forms read on the saint's feast day. The synaxarial vita is in fact a short hagiography read as part of the office. It could be followed by an extensive hagiography whose place in the liturgy, as that of many other texts, is not clear.

⁶ This did by no means undermine the power of God that revealed itself through the relics, see E. D. Hunt, "The Traffic in Relics. Some Late Roman Evidence", in *The Byzantine Saint*, ed. Sergei Hackel (London: Fellowship of St. Alban & St. Sergius, 1981), 175–179; A. Angenendt, *Heilige und Reliquien. Die Geschichte ihres Kultes vom frühen Christendum bis zu Gegenwart* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1997), 152–155. On the dismemberment of saints' bodies, see also Marjanović-Dušanić, *Sveto i propadljivo*, 81, 207–209.

⁷ A saint's cult did not necessarily develop as a result of his or her miracles but, at some point, they could come to be expected of him or her.

An important mechanism of the transfer of sacred objects was also relic policy/diplomacy. The Byzantine emperor and the pope led the way in relic diplomacy: gifts of relics were used as a sign of superiority over the recipients since they could hardly be repaid.⁸ Despite the symbolism underlying such a way of obtaining a relic, the recipients acquired spiritual and political authority in their communities.

Finally, relics could be moved because of wars. The invaders tended to seize the valuables they found, including saints' relics.⁹ Or the community threatened with raids or invasion could choose to move their holy possessions to a safe place. Sometimes the relocation was only temporary, but it could also mean the beginning of a new phase of the cult.

Every translation involved a few stages: the *profectio*, or the departure of the relics; their journey; the *adventus* (one or more), or the arrival at a particular boundary; and the *occursus*, or the reception of the relics.¹⁰ Relics, as any other goods, could be acquired by purchase, gift or even theft.¹¹ Although particular ways of acquisition usually went with particular circumstances – in relic diplomacy they were usually received as a gift, and in the case of a strong need for the presence of a saint, they were usually purchased or stolen – there were no rules. Sometimes a purchase was disguised as a counter-gift.¹² An awareness of the value of relics was there even if the parties involved were of different religions.¹³

After the translation, the saint had to be presented to the new community as its intercessor and patron. This could be done by means of translation

⁸ The attitudes towards relics and the ways in which they reached the West from Byzantium have been discussed by H. A. Klein, "Eastern Objects and Western Desires: Relics and Reliquaries between Byzantium and the West", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 58 (2004), 283–314. On the patron–client relationship established by that act and the pope's role in that practice, see Geary, "Sacred Commodities. The Circulation of Medieval Relics", *Living with the Dead*, 208–210.

⁹ The most striking example were the transfers of relics from Constantinople after 1204. For the sources and literature on the relics taken to the West, see D. Popović, "Sacrae reliquiae Spasove crkve u Žiči", Pod okriljem svetosti. Kult svetih vladara i relikvija u srednjovekovnoj Srbiji (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2006), 211, n. 18.

¹⁰ The occursus also involved the susceptio, or the handover of relics, and the ingressus, or the deposition of relics in the church. M. Heinzelmann, *Translationsberichte und Andere Quellen des Reliquienkultes* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1979), 72–75.

¹¹ Geary, "Sacred Commodities", 208–213.

¹² The trade in relics, in the guise of gift-giving, became widespread after the fall of Constantinople in 1204, and saw a revival in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, see Klein, "Eastern Objects and Western Desires", 306–312.

¹³ This was the case in the exchange of relics between the Muslim and Christian worlds, A. Cutler, "Gifts and Gift Exchange as Aspects of the Byzantine, Arab, and Related Economies", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 55 (2001), 252.

accounts (*translatio*), which were either incorporated into the hagiography or written as separate texts. This hagiographical subgenre usually had three parts.¹⁴ The first one was a narrative of the origin and acquisition of the relics, the central and most important part described the ceremony of translation, and was followed by an account of the miracles announcing the saint's wish to remain in that particular place. These texts participated in the reconstruction of the relic's value and marked the church as a notable sacred place.¹⁵ Also, the already existing office for the saint was usually supplemented with verses supplicating the saint to intercede for the new community. If the saint was a particularly important one, then the anniversary of the translation became a new feast day.

Not that such adaptations were always made. If they were, it usually meant that ecclesiastical and/or secular authorities were involved in the act of translation. Consequently, translations, both physical and literary, tend to reveal connections between churches, monasteries, individuals, patrons, states... They tend to reflect historical and, frequently, political realities.

Political changes that took place in the central Balkans between the Battle of Maritsa in 1371 and the fall of Vidin in 1396¹⁶ – the Serbian territorial lords of the Mrnjavčević, Dragaš, Lazarević, Balšić and Branković families, and the Bulgarian empires lost independence, and later on some disappeared from the map – led to a changed attitude towards the saints. The fact that relic translations became more frequent was a sign of the stronger need for the presence of a holy patron. The Serbian Prince, then Despot, Stefan Lazarević (prince 1389–1402, despot 1402–27) and his successor, Despot Djuradj Branković (1427–56) had relics translated from different parts of the Balkans.

In the late 1390s the remains of the Balkan hermitess Petka (Paraskevi) and the Byzantine Empress Theophano were translated to the Principality of Serbia. Both cults were Byzantine in origin: Petka was an anchoritess who lived in the second half of the tenth century, and Empress Theophano was the first wife of Leo VI the Wise (866–912) and she died in 895/6.¹⁷ Petka's cult began to spread from Kallikrateia, where her relics were translated after their ritual

¹⁴ Heinzelmann, *Translationsberichte*, 56–57; P. J. Geary, *Furta Sacra*. *Thefts of Relics in the Central Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 12–13.

¹⁵ Heinzelmann, *Translationsberichte*, 63–66; Geary, "Sacred Commodities", 213–214.

¹⁶ For an overview of developments in those decades, see S. Ćirković *The Serbs* (Malden; Oxford; Carlton: Blackwell Pub., 2004), 77–87.

¹⁷ On the two cults before the translations to the Serbian Principality/Despotate, see D. Popović, "Relikvije svete Petke: Gloria Bulgariae – Gloria Serviae", Pod okriljem svetosti, 271– 286; M. Petrova-Taneva, "Pomoshtnitsa na tsarete": sveta imperatritsa Teofana v iuozhnoslavianskata traditsiia (Sofia: Boian Penev Pub., 2018), 31–61, with earlier literature.

discovery (*inventio*). The Constantinopolitan cult of Empress Theophano at first was politicized and linked to the Macedonian dynasty, but it later spread due to her miracles.

Both cults marked the religious life of Tŭrnovo, the capital of the Bulgarian Empire. St Petka's relics were translated from Kallikrateia to Tŭrnovo after 1230, under Emperor Ivan Asen II of Bulgaria (1218–41).¹⁸ They sacralised the capital, the centre of political and spiritual power of the restored Bulgarian Empire.¹⁹ The translation of a part of Empress Theophano's relics from Constantinople, which probably took place in the mid-fourteenth century, under Emperor Ivan Alexander (1331–71), had the same purpose, and the extensive version of her hagiography was translated from Greek.²⁰ In the last decades of the fourteenth century the Bulgarian Patriarch Euthymius (1375–93) promoted both cults: he wrote an extensive vita and office for St Petka, and an office, and probably a paraklesis, for Empress Theophano.²¹

An account of the translation of the hermitess Petka to the Serbian Principality can be found in the Oration on the Translation written by Euthymius's disciple Gregory Camblak/Tsamblak and envisaged as an appendix to the saint's extensive hagiography.²² The Oration contains a history of Petka's relics from their arrival in Tŭrnovo to their adventus in the Serbian Principality. The author describes the fall of Tŭrnovo (1393), the request of the Emperor of Vidin to the

¹⁸ The relics were translated after Ivan Asen II's victory over the ruler of Epirus Theodore Komnenos Doukas at the Battle of Klokotnitsa in 1230, which made Bulgaria the leading power in the Balkans.

¹⁹ Constantinople was sanctified by enshrining saints' relics in city churches as guarantees of protection and stability, which earned it the epithet of "New Jerusalem". Tŭrnovo was sanctified by the relics of John of Rila, Tsar Kaloian, St Philotea, Gabriel of Lesnovo etc. On the sacralization of the capital cities, from Constantinople to Tŭrnovo, see J. Erdeljan, *Chosen Places. Constructing New Jerusalems in Slavia Orthodoxa* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2017).

²⁰ Between the 1340s and '90s Nicholas the Deacon composed the Extensive Life of Empress Theophano, a reworked and stylistically modernized version of her earlier hagiography. On Nicholas's Extensive Life and his translations, see Petrova-Taneva, *"Pomoshtnitsa na tsarete"*, 89–175.

²¹ For the works of Patriarch Euthymius, see *Werke des Patriarchen von Bulgarien Euthymius* (1375–1393). *Nach den besten Handschriften*, ed. von E. Kałuźniacki (Vienna: C. Gerold, 1901). *Paraklesis* was a special type of service usually held once a week in times of trouble, which, in this case, was the Ottoman threat. On the Paraklesis to Empress Theophano, see S. Kozhukharov, "Patriarkh Evtimii. Paraklis za tsaritsa Teofana", *Problemi na starobŭlgarskata poeziia* (Sofia: Boian Penev Pub., 2004), 140–145.

²² On Camblak/Tsamblak and his work, see Istoriia na bŭlgarskata srednovekovna literatura, ed. A. Miltenova (Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2008), 544–546 (M. Ĭovcheva), 588–597 (A. Angusheva). His account of the translation: G. Camblak, "Slovo o prenosu moštiju Svete Petke", in Primeri iz stare srpske književnosti. Od Grigorija Dijaka do Gavrila Stefanovića Venclovića, ed. Dj. Trifunović (Belgrade: Slovo ljubve, 1975), 90–93.

Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I (1389–1402) to be given the saint's relics, their translation to Vidin, the Battle of Nicopolis, and the fall and sack of Vidin (1396).

Camblak then proceeds to describe the arrival of some members of the Lazarević family at the sultan's court. Without stating the exact reason for their visit, he simply says that they went to "be seen by the emperor". The reason for the visit could therefore have been a vassal's regular re-affirmation of fidelity to the overlord. Camblak describes their request for the saint's relics, the sultan's decision to give them the "dry bones", the wrapping of the relics in golden robes²³ and translation. There follows a praise to the saint and to the Serbian lands.

The Oration does not fully fit the *translatio* genre, but rather it depicts the circumstances in which Petka became the patron saint of the Serbian lands. The translation to Vidin is not described, and the translation to Serbia is said to have been performed with "many honours" and that the Lazarevićs rejoiced at having obtained such a treasure. There is no reference to concrete miracles, but they are foreshadowed: it is said that now the saint protects against the impending attacks.

Camblak's narrative about the journey of St Petka's relics in fact describes the political realities of that time. It depicts the fall of two Bulgarian capitals and the status of the Lazarević family in relation to the Ottoman ruler. In both cases, the relics were acquired in the same way: by requesting them earnestly from the sultan himself. Also, the absence of a translation account may mean that the relics were carried to their new destination in humble processions. Perhaps that is why miracles were missing.

It is generally accepted that the Lazarevićs acquired the relics at the time of the rebellion of two of their magnates in 1398.²⁴ It was then that, accused of allying with Hungary, Prince Stefan Lazarević of Serbia was compelled to appear before the sultan to justify himself, without knowing how his visit would end. These events are described in Constantine the Philosopher's Extensive Life of Despot Stefan.²⁵ His account of this visit, however, significantly differs from

²³ This act should be interpreted in the context of the need to clad the saint's relics in sumptuous textiles because they had been stolen, but also in the context of the ritual reclothing of relics. On the reclothing of relics, see D. Popović, "God dwelt even in spiritual wise' – Relics and Their Reliquaries in Medieval Serbia", in *Sacral Art of the Serbian Lands in the Middle Ages*, vol. II: *Byzantine Heritage and Serbian Art* (Belgrade: Serbian National Committee of Byzantine Studies; Službeni glasnik; Institute for Byzantine Studies SASA 2016), 142.

²⁴ The rebellion was raised by Nikola Zojić and Novak Belocrkvić; D. Popović, "Relikvije svete Petke", 287–288; S. Marjanović-Dušanić, "Dinastija i svetost u doba porodice Lazarević: stari uzori i novi modeli", Zbornik radova Vizantološkog instituta 43 (2006), 90.

²⁵ V. Jagić, "Konstantin Filosof i njegov Život Stefana Lazarevića despota srpskoga, po dvama srpsko-slovenskim rukopisima", Glasnik Srpskog učenog društva 42 (1875), 266–269.

the tranquil visit to the sultan as described by Camblak.²⁶ It seems therefore that the obtainment of Petka's remains and Prince Stefan's reconciliation with the sultan should not be attributed to the same occasion. The translation certainly took place after the fall of Vidin in 1396 and before 1402, when Bayezid was captured at the Battle of Angora.

The relics were probably laid to rest in Lazarica, Prince Stefan's court church in Kruševac, his capital at the time.²⁷ This seems to be supported by the fact that Petka was seen as a heavenly protectress of the ruling family and the capital city, Tŭrnovo. When the capital city of the Serbian Despotate was moved from Kruševac to Belgrade in 1403/4, Petka's relics were moved with it.²⁸ This second translation is not mentioned in the Oration.

The importance attached to the presence of St Petka's relics in the Serbian capitals is evidenced by the reworked titles of her hagiography which emphasize her role as the patron saint of both the Serbian and Bulgarian lands.²⁹ Also, Gregory Camblak's verses exalting St Petka as protectress of the "Serbian city" were added to the office used in the liturgy of the Serbian Church from the mid-thirteenth century.³⁰

Researchers have assumed that a part of the relics of Empress Theophano was translated to Serbia at the same time - in 1398.³¹ This hypothesis cannot be substantiated from the known sources. Prince Stefan probably obtained it from Bayezid - the conqueror of Tŭrnovo - but we do not know exactly when.

If Theophano's relics were obtained from Bayezid, then they were in Kruševac before 1403/4. After that they were transferred to Belgrade together with the relics of the hermitess Petka. Theophano's veneration in the reign of

²⁶ Also, Camblak claims that the sultan was visited by the prince's younger brother, Vuk, in company with Milica (their mother), Jefimija/Euphemia (wife of the late Serbian King Vukašin Mrnjavčević who had become a nun) and Stefan, whereas Constantine the Philosopher mentions the visit of Princess Milica and Euphemia, claiming that Stefan went only later, and that he went alone.

²⁷ Popović, "Relikvije svete Petke", 289.

²⁸ The presence of the relics in Belgrade is evidenced by a 1509 letter of the Metropolitan of Belgrade Theophan, which states that the relics of hermitess Petka and Empress Theophano are kept in the metropolitan church of the Dormition of the Virgin, see S. Dimitrijević, "Dokumenti koji se tiču odnosa između srpske crkve i Rusije u XVI veku", *Spomenik Srpske kraljevske akademije* 39 (1903), 17.

²⁹ Patriarch Euthymius, "Leben der hl. Petka", Werke des Patriarchen von Bulgarien Euthymius, 59, 74.

³⁰ Dj. Trifunović, "Camblakove stihire prenosu moštiju svete Petke", in *Zbornik Vladimira Mošina*, eds. D. Bogdanović, B. Jovanović-Stipčević and Dj. Trifunović (Belgrade: Savez bibliotečkih radnika Srbije, 1977), 199–204. It is likely that the old Office for St Petka was also used for a paraklesis.

³¹ See n. 25 above.

Stefan Lazarević is evidenced by a new translation of her Extensive Life included in a manuscript dating from 1425–35.³² Even more than this new translation, it is three reworked versions of Patriarch Euthymius's Office for St Theophano making mention of Despot Stefan that confirm that her remains were transferred in his reign.³³ These rewritten versions show that her cult retained its earlier political importance, as was usual in the case of sainted empresses.³⁴

Among the cults promoted by saints' translations was the cult of Emperor Constantine the Great. The presence of Constantine's right arm in Serbia is known from its reliquary inscribed with Old Slavic verses from the Office for Emperor Constantine and Empress Helena for 21 May.³⁵ There are three hypotheses about how and when this relic came to Serbia.³⁶ The most plausible seems to be the one that Prince Stefan received it as a gift during his visit to Constantinople in 1402, after the Battle of Angora, when the title of despot(es) was conferred on him by John VII Palaiologos (emperor 1390, regent 1399– 1403). It is also possible that he was given the relic during his second visit to Constantinople in 1410, when his title of despot was confirmed by Emperor Manuel II (1391–1425).³⁷

³² See the edition of the translation of the Extensive Life in Petrova-Taneva, "*Pomoshtnitsa na tsarete*", 228–293.

³³ Two reworked versions of the Office have been published: K. Ivanova, "Sŭrbska redaktsiia na sluzhbata za imperatritsa Teofana", *Arheografski prilozi* 10–11 (1988–1989), 83–106; T. Subotin-Golubović, "Beogradski prepis Jevtimijeve službe carici Teofano", in *Slovensko srednjovekovno nasledje. Zbornik posvećen profesoru Djordju Trifunoviću* (Belgrade: Čigoja, 2001), 617–635.

³⁴ N. Delierneux, "The Literary Portrait of Byzantine Female Saint", in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Byzantine Hagiography*, vol. 2: Genres and Contexts, ed. S. Efthymiadis (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), 376–378.

³⁵ E. A. Morshakova, "33. Kovcheg dlia desnitsy sviatogo tsaria Konstantina", in *Khristianskie relikvii v moskovskom Kremle*, ed. A. Lidov (Moscow: Radunitsa, 2000), 126–128. Cf. the Office, T. Subotin-Golubović, "Praznovanje sv. Konstantina i Jelene u srednjovekovnoj Srbiji", *Arheografski prilozi* 35 (2013), 31, 38. The arm and Belgrade's other relics (of Sts Petka and Theophano) were taken to Istanbul, probably after the Ottoman conquest of Belgrade in 1521. In 1588 Ecumenical Patriarch Jeremiah II presented it as a gift to the Russian Emperor Feodor I. It is now kept in Moscow.

³⁶ One links it to the reconciliation between the Serbian and Byzantine churches in 1375, one to the marriage between Jelena, daughter of Konstantin Dejanović (Dragaš) and the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos, and one to Stefan Lazarević's visit to Constantinople in 1402, on which occasion the title of despot(es) was conferred upon him. A. A. Turilov, "Serbskii kovcheg-relikvarii sv. tsaria Konstantina iz Blagoveshtsenskogo sobora Moskovskogo Kremlia: datirovka i gipotezy o proishozhdenii", *Crkvene studije* 10 (2013), 125–133.

³⁷ After all, on his travels to the West, Emperor Manuel used relics in his attempt to obtain support from western rulers.

In both cases the acquisition of the right arm was part of the Byzantine emperor's relic policy, and in both cases the circumstances probably prevented their solemn translation. In 1402 Despot Stefan was returning from the battlefield using a coastal route, through Zeta, and in 1410 he sailed home across the Black Sea and along the Danube.³⁸ If it came in 1402, it probably was first enshrined in Kruševac. If it came in 1410, then its destination probably was Belgrade.

It seems that it was the acquisition of Constantine's arm that inspired genealogies to depict the emperor as an ancestor of the Serbian rulers.³⁹ According to them, Despot Stefan was a descendant of Constantine's sister, Constantia. Also, in the Extensive Life of Despot Stefan, which contains such a genealogy, Constantine is Stefan's prefiguration. Constantine is depicted as the builder of the "imperial and seven-hill city". Belgrade is likened to Constantinople and Despot Stefan to the "equal-to-the-apostles" emperor. This reveals the paramount importance attached to Constantine the Great as an ancestral figure.

The relics of the anchoritess Petka and Empress Theophano, possibly also of Constantine the Great, participated in the sacralization of Kruševac and Belgrade, and, consequently, of the whole state.⁴⁰ The motive behind their translations was the Serbian ruler's wish to have his state protected by the saints. Their acquisition was made possible by historical circumstances – the fall of Tŭrnovo and Vidin, and Stefan's visits to the sultan's court and Constantinople. Although only the translation of St Petka is testified to by a separate text, they all seem to have been acquired as gifts as part of the relic diplomacy of the Ottoman sultan and the Byzantine emperor. It is unlikely that the translations were ceremonial, but that did not affect the importance attached to the presence of the relics in the political centre of the Serbian state: they emphasized the ruler's connection with God, which was the basis of his political authority and spiritual prestige, and were a guarantee of victory in battle and an element of court ceremonial.⁴¹

The next known translation took place in the early 1450s under Despot Djuradj Branković. Seeking to fortify the new capital of the Serbian Despotate,

³⁸ On the situation in 1402 and 1410, see M. Purković, Knez i despot Stefan Lazarević (Belgrade: Sveti arhijerejski sinod Srpske pravoslavne crkve, 1978), 56–63, 91–94; Istorija srpskog naroda, vol. 2: Doba borbi za očuvanje i obnovu države: 1371–1537 (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1982), 64–68, 81–84.

³⁹ On imaginative memory and (secular) genealogies, the role of Constantine the Great in them and in the Extensive Life of Despot Stefan, see M. Vasiljević, "Imagining the Ruler's Genealogy in Medieval Serbia", *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes* 55 (2017), 79–86.

⁴⁰ An *acheiropoietos* icon of the Virgin was there for a few centuries. On the icon, see M. Tatić-Djurić, "Ikona Bogorodice Beogradske", Godišnjak grada Beograda 25 (1978), 147–161.

⁴¹ S. Mergiali-Sahas, "Byzantine Emperors and Holy Relics. Use, and Misuse, of Sanctity and Authority", *Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik* 51 (2001), 41–60.

Smederevo, he had the relics of St Luke the Evangelist translated to the city, where they arrived on 12 January 1453.

In Eastern Orthodox tradition, Luke was venerated as a physician, a companion of the apostle Paul, the painter of the famous Constantinopolitan icon of the Virgin Hodegetria, the author of a Gospel and the Acts of the Apostles.⁴² The travels made by his relics reflect the history of the Byzantine Empire. In 357 – a period of collecting the most highly revered Christian relics in Constantinople – they were translated from Thebes in Boeotia to the Constantinopolitan church of the Holy Apostles. After the Latin conquest of Constantinople in 1204, a crusader knight set off for home taking the saint's relics with him. According to a Serbian manuscript, the knight's ship was wrecked off the island of Lefkada and he was compelled to sell them to a local lord.

Two writings on the translation of St Luke's relics have survived. One is the Story of the Translation read on 12 January, the newly-established feast of the translation.⁴³ The other is the manuscript, now kept in the National Library in Paris, which contains six prose texts devoted to the apostle Luke, of which three are devoted to the translations of his relics (the third describes their arrival in Smederevo).⁴⁴ This manuscript may in fact be said to be devoted to the history of Luke's relics. The use of the vernacular seems to suggest that the texts were not intended for liturgical use.⁴⁵

Both writings are exemplary representatives of the *translatio* genre: both present the relics to the reader, both describe their acquisition, and in both their translation is the central event accompanied by miracles. They differ in that the Story interprets the events as part of Sacred History, whereas the Third Translation was intended for the contemporary reader and therefore is more informative.⁴⁶

⁴² V. Milanović, "Kult i ikonografija Svetog Luke u pravoslavlju do sredine XV veka", in Crkva svetog Luke kroz vjekove: zbornik radova. Naučni skup povodom 800-godišnjice Crkve Svetog Luke u Kotoru, Kotor 20–22. oktobar 1995, ed. V. Korać (Kotor: Srpska pravoslavna crkvena opština, 1997), 75–81.

⁴³ This text is published by T. Subotin-Golubović, "Sveti apostol Luka – poslednji zaštitnik srpske Despotovine", in *Čudo u slovenskim kulturama*, ed. D. Ajdačić (Belgrade: Naučno društvo za slovenske umetnosti i kulture; Novi Sad: Apis, 2000), 167–178.

⁴⁴ Its call number is: Slave 46. The texts were published by I. Pavlović, "O Sv. Luci i prenašanju njegovog tela. Rukopis druge polovine XV veka", *Glasnik Srpskog učenog društva 51* (1882), 70–100.

⁴⁵ L. Pavlović, Prozni i pesnički spisi nastali u Smederevu 1453–1456. godine (Smederevo: Muzej, 1983), 35.

⁴⁶ Also, the two writers accord different roles in the concluding rites to members of the ruling family. Both texts have been analysed in detail by D. Popović, "Mošti svetog Luke – srpska epizoda", *Pod okriljem svetosti*, 295–317.

According to both, Despot Djuradj learnt about the relics while being in Bosnia. In fact, they were miraculously discovered: an "old man" (according to the Story, the apostle himself, according to the Third Translation, an angel) told the despot about the evangelist's remains being kept in Rogoi and advised him to beseech Sultan Mehmed II (1444–46, 1451–81) for them. Then the authors describe the request to the sultan for permission to translate the relics and the sending of gifts. The Story claims that the city officials refused to hand over the relics despite the sultan's order, and took them to the city tower instead. Serbs managed to enter the tower surreptitiously and escape with St Luke's relics.

There follows a brief description of the translation and miracles. Despot Djuradj and his heir, Lazar, set out to meet the relics, followed by the rest of the ruling family. They were accompanied by nobles, church dignitaries and a crowd of people. The translation ended with a vigil in the church of the despot's castle, the processions carrying the relics through the city and around its walls (to render them unassailable) and into the church of the Annunciation, the cathedral of the Metropolitan of Smederevo. During these processions, members of the ruling family, including the despot's daughter Mara, who had returned from the harem of Sultan Murad II (1421–44, 1446–51), offered gifts to the relics.⁴⁷

Then the Story describes the miracles with which the saint showed that he took the new community under his protection. This is the first medieval Serbian cultic text where we find the motif of disbelief in miracles: at first when the relics began to grow, and then when they began to give off various fragrances, when those in attendance suspected that in fact aromatics had been placed in the reliquary. Finally, the text ends with a description of pilgrimages to Smederevo, the holy place visited not only by Orthodox but also by other Christians: Hungarians, Germans and Italians.

The Third Translation mentions the growth of the apostle's body, but makes no mention of the doubts of the "low-spirited". This text is followed by an account of eight miracles, three of which are associated with the translation, and the rest are mostly healings. One of the miracles is negative. Luke caused the ailment of the eye of a priest who doubted the authenticity of the relics, but then he healed it after the priest offered a prayer and placed his eye on the saint's hand.

The two translation accounts show that it was an event of paramount state interest and that it revived the practice of solemn processions. The saint's arrival in Smederevo was an event that symbolized the hierarchy of power and brought together the ruling family, the clergy and the townspeople.⁴⁸ Translation

⁴⁷ On Mara Branković, see M. St. Popović, *Mara Branković*. Žena između hrišćanskog i islamskog kulturnog kruga u 15. veku (Novi Sad: Akademska knjiga, 2014).

⁴⁸ S. Marjanović-Dušanić, "Se souvenir de Byzance. Les reliques au service de la mémoire en Serbie (XV^e-XIX^e s.)", in Héritages de Byzance en Europe du Sud-Est à l'epoque moderne et contemporaine. Actes du colloque "La présence de Byzance dans l'Europe du Sud-Est aux époques

accounts were always an element of the ruler's display of power, either through references to his participation in the discovery of the saint's bodily remains or to his meeting the procession carrying the relics, when he as a rule laid down his regalia and proceeded back bareheaded and barefoot, sometimes even as a coffin bearer.⁴⁹ Furthermore, the texts reveal historical realities: the necessity of having the sultan's permission and the purchase of relics. The absence of a description of the journey from Rogoi to Smederevo may suggest that the procession was not solemnly escorted, that it travelled fast because of general insecurity, or that the authors attended only the ceremonies in Smederevo.⁵⁰

Also, the texts provide a testimony to the urban mentality of the time. They recorded doubts about the saint's miracle-working, i.e., about the authenticity of the relics. Perhaps the major cause of such doubts was the very historical moment in which the translation of St Luke's relics took place: tthe frequent movement of relics meant more opportunities for forgery. And yet, the scene of the events is similar to the one that gave rise to this hagiographic *topos*.⁵¹

Over the next six years the cult of St Luke underwent adaptations to the local environment. As one of the major Christian cults, it had already been present in liturgical practice. Its "Smederevo phase" was marked by the institution of the feast of the translation celebrated on 12 January, for which the Office and the Story of the Translation were written. Also, two parakleses to the saint were written, supplicating for the salvation of Smederevo, the despot and the Serbian people.⁵²

⁵⁰ As proposed by Pavlović, *Prozni i pesnički spisi*, 44.

⁵¹ The more complex religious landscape of late-antique cities gave rise to the hagiographic *topos* of doubt about miracles in a period when miracles had a very important role in conversion to Christianity. The imagery of doubts and dispelling of doubts later became a hagiographic device intended for those who might be sceptical about the content of hagiographies. In the Serbian case the scene is also the city – the capital city at that – in a society undergoing the laicization of culture which could make it feel closer to the culture of late antiquity. For examples, see A. Kaldellis, "The Hagiography of Doubt and Scepticism", in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Byzantine Hagiography*, vol. 2: *Genres and Contexts*, ed. S. Efthymiadis (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), 453–477 (with sources and literature).

⁵² All these texts, along with a composition about Luke's life and an encomium on the evangelist were assembled in a manuscript, Anthology, kept in the Patriarchal Library in Belgrade under no. 165. Apart from the Story of the Translation, the following texts have been published: the Paraklesis by T. Subotin-Golubović, "Paraklis Svetom Luki", in *Pad Srpske despotovine 1459. godine. Zbornik radova sa naučnog skupa održanog 12–14. novembra 2009. godine*, ed. M. Spremić (Belgrade: SANU, 2011), 99–116; and the Office for 12 January by T. Subotin-

moderne et contemporaine", Athènes, 22-24 septembre 2008, ed. O. Delouis, A. Couderc & P. Guran (Athens: École française d'Athènes, 2013), 104.

⁴⁹ E. Bozócky, *La politique des reliques de Constantin à Saint-Louis* (Paris: Beauchesne, 2006), 224–254.

The ceremony of translation and the earnest attention paid to the cult of St Luke show how important the event was for the Serbian Despotate. Perhaps Despot Djuradj planned for the church of the Annunciation where the saint's relics were enshrined to become a third seat of the Serbian Church.⁵³ The events that followed, however, brought an end to all plans, and St Luke's relics were transferred to Jajce in the Bosnian Kingdom, and then to Venice, which was their last translation.

The translation of the relics of St Luke was motivated by the Serbian despot's wish to fortify his capital, as his predecessor had. He was able to do that after the Ottoman conquest of a part of Epirus in 1449. The sultan gave permission for the translation, but the despot also paid a handsome sum for it. Since the relics were translated from Epirus, and not obtained at the sultan's court, the translation took a slightly different form. Although it may be seen as part of relic policy, it did not have the significance it had in the previous cases. This is why the relics were both discovered miraculously and purchased.⁵⁴ It has been assumed that Mara Branković had some influence in the sultan's decision to grant permission for the translation.⁵⁵ According to the Story of the Translation, the departure of the relics for Serbia eventually was made possible by holy theft, ⁵⁶ but the Third Translation makes no mention of such an undertaking, so perhaps it was just a hagiographic *topos*.

The translation in 1469 of a part of the relics of the hermit John of Rila to his own foundation, the Rila Monastery, is the last known translation described in a separate composition. His ascetic pursuits should be dated to the first half of the tenth century.⁵⁷ The growing veneration of the ascetic led to the

Golubović, "Smederevska služba prenosu moštiju svetog apostola Luke", in Srpska književnost u doba despotovine. Naučni skup Despotovac 22–23. 8. 1997, ed. R. Marinković, J. Redjep & G. Jovanović (Despotovac: Narodna biblioteka Resavska škola, 1998), 133–157.

⁵³ The Branković family had in their possession the right arm of St John the Baptist, see D. Popović, "The Siena relic of St John the Baptist's right arm," *Zograf* 41 (2017), 89. It is possible therefore that this relic too was in Smederevo. The Serbian Church had two parallel seats at the time, at Žiča and at Peć, see D. Popović, M. Čanak-Medić & D. Vojvodić, *Manastir Žiča* (Belgrade: Zavod za zaštitu spomenika kulture, 2014), 395–403. On the importance of the church in Smederevo in the Serbian Despotate, see M. Ubiparip and V. Trijić, "Zbornici paraklisa u srpskoslovenskoj tradiciji", *Arheografski prilozi 37* (2015), 79–80.

⁵⁴ The amount paid for the relics is referred to in other sources, see Popović, "Mošti svetog Luke – srpska epizoda", 300–302.

⁵⁵ Ibid. 301.

⁵⁶ On thefts of relics, see Geary, Furta Sacra.

⁵⁷ According to I. Ivanov, Sv. Ivan Rilski i negoviiat monastir (Sofia: BAN, 1917), 3, John of Rila lived between 876 and 946.

translation of his remains from the Rila Monastery to Sofia.⁵⁸ Their transfer to the Hungarian city of Esztergom took place in 1183, after the Hungarian conquest of Sofia. Four years later the relics were returned to Sofia.⁵⁹ Following his extensive conquests, the Bulgarian Emperor Ivan I Asen (1189–96) had them translated to the capital, Tŭrnovo, in 1195 to sanctify the city and emphasize the claim to continuity of the Bulgarian state. He had a church dedicated to John of Rila built for his relics in Trapezitsa fortress, the first residence of the Asen dynasty, and the feast of the translation was instituted.

The translations of John of Rila reflected the political history of the Balkans. This was why his cult produced several extensive and short vitae, offices and translation accounts. The prose texts were used by the Bulgarian Patriarch Euthymius to compose a new extensive vita.⁶⁰

The next phase of the cult was marked by the saint's translation from Tŭrnovo to the Rila Monastery in 1469. Vladislav the Grammarian wrote the Story of Rila as an appendage to Patriarch Euthymius's Extensive Life of St John. Drawing on these two texts, Dimitrije Kantakuzin, a Serbian writer of Greek origin, composed John's Life and the Office for the new feast of the translation of his relics to the Rila Monastery commemorated on 1 July.⁶¹

In his Story of Rila, Vladislav the Grammarian first describes the restoration of the monastery by three brothers and the second *revelatio* of the saint. The news of the saint's relics came from the presbyter Jakov of Philippopolis, who paid honours to them personally and was given a fragment by the locals.

⁵⁸ This took place either in the late 960s or early 970s, or in the late 1060s or early 1070s. According to the earliest vitae, the translation to Sofia was arranged by the Bulgarian Emperor Peter (927–966), whereas later writings say that it "took place after a long while". The view that the translation took place as early as the tenth century was held by I. Duīchev, *Rilskiiat svetets i negovata obitel* (Sofia: Interpres; Viara i kultura, 1947), 191. The other hypothesis is that it took place in the reign of the Byzantine Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes (1068–1071), G. Podskalski, *Srednjovekovna teološka književnost u Bugarskoj i Srbiji (865–1459)* (Belgrade: Pravoslavni bogoslovski fakultet; Institut za teološka istraživanja, 2010), 133.

⁵⁹ The relics were taken as a war trophy after the victory of King Bela III of Hungary (1172– 1196) over the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos (1183–1185), following the same pattern as the one practised by the Ottomans. Emperor Isaac II Angelos (1185–1195) married Bela's daughter who brought these territories as her dowry.

⁶⁰ Ĭ. Ivanov, "Zhitie na sv. Ivan Rilski ot patriarkh Evtimiī Tŭrnovski", *Bŭlgarski starini iz* Makedoniia (Sofia: BAN, 1970), 369–383.

⁶¹ Analysis will therefore be focused on the Story of Rila, V. Gramatik, "O obnovi Rilskog manastira i o prenosu moštiju svetog Jovana Rilskog", in *Primeri iz stare srpske književnosti.* Od Grigorija Dijaka do Gavrila Stefanovića Venclovića, ed. Dj. Trifunović (Belgrade: Slovo ljubve, 1975), 126–136. The works of Dimitrije Kantakuzin are published by B. St. Angelov, "Zhitie s malka pokhvala na Ivan Rilski", in *Dimitŭr Kantakuzin. Sŭbrani sŭchinenia*, eds. B. Angelov et al. (Sofia: BAN, 1989), 21–43; S. Kozhuharov, "Sluzhba na Ivan Rilski", in *Dimitŭr Kantakuzin*, 44–77.

Vladislav emphasized that the thefts of "holy and venerable objects" and their dispersal prompted the brothers to verify the trustworthiness of the news.

Then he describes the role of Mara Branković, daughter of Despot Djuradj.⁶² Asked to act as an intermediary, she visited Sultan Mehmed and was given his written order for the translation of the relics. In keeping with an expected *topos*, after their arrival in Trapezitsa, the local people refused to hand them over; they were relinquished only three days later.

It is interesting that Vladislav the Grammarian describes the route of the relics in detail, with a few advents, including those in Nicopolis and Sofia. While in Sofia, they were laid next to the body of the Serbian King Stefan Uroš II Milutin (1282–1321). Of course, the journey was accompanied by many miracles. The abbot of Rila met the procession at some distance from the monastery, assuming the role otherwise played by the ruler in the ceremony. The Story of Rila ends with an account of the night vigil, the institution of the feast of the return of the relics (1 July), and a remark about a paraklesis to the saint being sung every Thursday. After these events, the monks wrote an epistle to Mara Branković about their journey, and she responded by donating a new shroud "for the saint's glory and for her eternal memory".

The account of the 1469 translation of the relics of John of Rila shares the features of the previously discussed writings. It testifies to contemporary realities in the Ottoman Empire: the deserted city of Tŭrnovo, the fate of an important Christian monastery, the need to re-consecrate a holy place and attract pilgrims. It also testifies to the influence of Mara Branković and to the fact that the sultan's permission for the translation was needed, as in all previous cases. Finally, Mara Branković's gift calls to mind her gifts to the relics of St Luke. These writings speak of the religious climate as well. In this case, too, there were doubts about the authenticity of the relics. Also, the character of the translation ceremony remained the same, even if it was no longer of state but of local importance.

The relics were translated for two reasons. The cult of the holy hermit had declined in Tŭrnovo, and therefore stories about the saint began to spread again. The probable reason was the fact that the relics had been kept in Trapezitsa fortress in Tŭrnovo. The political centre was on the other side of the Yantra River, on the Tsarevets hill, from where the Ottomans had taken the relics of the hermitess Petka and Empress Theophano in 1393. At the same time, the restored Rila Monastery sought to obtain its founder's remains in order to attract monks and pilgrims and thus ensure its future. The text of the paraklesis remains unknown, but the fact that it existed indicates the importance of the cult of St John for the local community. It is debatable if this case can be clas-

⁶² On Mara Branković and her role in the translation of the relics in the light of her standing in the Ottoman Empire, see Popović, *Mara Branković*, 232–234.

sified as an example of the sultan's relic policy. The relics were translated by the subjects of his empire so there was no need for a symbolic assertion of his sovereign authority. There is no reference to the means of their acquisition, so they should probably be categorized as a gift.

The Story of Rila claims that the priest Jakov of Philippopolis managed to obtain a part of John of Rila's relics from clerics in Tŭrnovo. This means that not all of the saint's relics ended up in the Rila Monastery. More importantly, this shows that not all transfers of relics were described in separate accounts. Also, we do not know if the sultan gave his permission or it was not even needed in the cases where only fragments of a saint's relics were translated or where translations were not solemn.

Among the translations that were not described in separate accounts are those of King Milutin's relics. The king's body was first transferred from his foundation and mausoleum, the Monastery of Banjska, to Trepča, presumably between 1389 and 1402, when Banjska was damaged in a fire. We learn about that from a much later genealogy that mentions the translation from Trepča to Sofia.⁶³ The threat of plundering was the probable reason for transferring the remains of the Serbian king to the nearby town of Trepča, perhaps in the hope that they would soon be returned to rest in his foundation. After that, probably after the fall of the Serbian Despotate in 1459 but before 1469, they were taken to Sofia.⁶⁴

King Milutin's relics were first deposited in the church of St George, where they were at the time of the translation of John of Rila. In the mid-sixteenth century, when St George's was converted into a mosque, they were moved to the church of the Holy Archangels. Before 1570 they were moved to the church of St Marina the Great-Martyr. And that was not the last translation.⁶⁵ For the liturgical needs of the holy king's cult in Sofia, the Office was reworked to emphasize that the saint protected both the Bulgarian and the Serbian lands.⁶⁶

⁶³ Lj. Stojanović, *Stari srpski rodoslovi i letopisi* (Sremski Karlovci: Srpska manastirska štamparija, 1927), 32.

⁶⁴ I. Gergova, "Kulŭt kŭm sv. kral Milutin 'Sofiĭski' v Bŭlgariia", in *Manastir Banjska i doba* kralja Milutina. Zbornik sa naučnog skupa održanog od 22. do 24. septembra 2005. godine u Kosovskoj Mitrovici, ed. D. Bojović (Niš: Centar za crkvene studije; Kosovska Mitrovica: Filozofski fakultet; Manastir Banjska, 2007), 249.

⁶⁵ The sequence of the translations of the holy king's relics follows I. Gergeva's article cited in n. 64 above.

⁶⁶ The Office for King Milutin was composed by the Serbian Patriarch Danilo/Daniel in the late fourteenth century. Two surviving copies demonstrate the alterations made to it, see

The undescribed translations show that the Ottoman conquests and their rule in the following centuries prompted the movement of relics in yet another way. Translations could result from the fear of pillage and ravage and the wish to save sacred objects from destruction. Also, a saint's cult could die out (possibly also as a result of the conquest) or a church could be converted into a mosque, which then required that the relics be moved to a different place. These translations were no longer undertaken under the patronage of heads of state or church, but rather by local people and clergy anxious to move the relics in their possession to a safer place. As a result of such circumstances and the absence of political leadership among Orthodox populations, translations became informal and probably hasty events. The actual number of translations and their destinations cannot even be conjectured. But they nonetheless are testaments to their times.

The Ottoman presence in the central Balkans triggered a new movement of saints' relics. Translations were caused by the need to find a safe place for them ahead of the invasion and destruction of cities, churches and monasteries, by the waning of saintly cults in consequence of the changing population structure, by the Ottoman practice of collecting holy objects and using them as part of relic diplomacy, and by the need of the polities that had some degree of autonomy to secure heavenly protection for their community.

All of these reasons led to two types of translations: those that took place under the auspices of major political actors and those that did not. The former were frequently described in separate translation accounts. They usually led to the adjustment of saints' cults to their new environments by reworking or translating the already existing cultic texts, but in none of the cases was the content of the cult changed. Finally, they frequently led to the institution of a new feast day in commemoration of the translation. Such were the translations of the hermitess Petka, Empress Theophano, Emperor Constantine the Great, Luke the Evangelist and John of Rila.

The translations that were not supported by political actors frequently remained unrecorded, and we learn about them virtually in passing in other sources. They usually did not involve transformation of the cult either. Such were the translations of King Milutin, John of Rila and many others.

The described translations also show the extent to which the central Balkans became, on one level, a unified region in the period under study. The growing number of translations from the end of the fourteenth century onwards

T. Jovanović, "Služba svetom kralju Milutinu Danila Banjskog", Kosovsko-metohijski zbornik 6 (2015), 98–99, 120, 132.

shows that they retained all features of the translation processions: the reasons for the relocation of relics, the modes of acquisition and the symbolism were the same. These translations, too, were bounded by crucial historical events, shrewd diplomacy, cult practice or the everyday life of the faithful.

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Popular Piety and the Paper Icons of Zaharija Orfelin

- Abstract: The paper deals with the phenomenon of popular piety in the eighteenth century and its reflections in art media through several prints made by the Serbian engraver Zaharija Orfelin. Paper icons, the cheapest means of meeting the spiritual needs of Orthodox Serbs in Hungary in the eighteenth century, were mass produced and easy to transport to remotest places. As they were the main channels of expressing piety, it is not unexpected that some artists-entrepreneurs such as Orfelin started such a lucrative production. Orfelin shaped the iconography of those images, combining the traditional Orthodox heritage and contemporary Baroque models that had migrated from Central European religious art. His imagery included particular national saints and their patriotic cults, dogmatic and doctrinal views of the church, as well as images of the Mother of God.
- Keywords: Zaharija Orfelin (1726–1785), popular piety, paper icons, engravings, the Metropolitanate of Karlovci (Karlowitz), eighteenth century

Eighteenth-century people's religious needs were met by the production of numerous religious representations, the most widespread among them being literary illustrations and popular religious prints. Religious literature was illustrated with appropriate visual material, and the title page most often consisted of a visual and a textual part. Given the very small number of surviving popular eighteenth-century prints and the substantial level of physical decay, the question that arises is whether the printers that produced them intended them to last or created them with an awareness of their brevity and practical use.^I Of course, the exception was engraved illustrations, which were cut and then set in different contexts. It seems that the single prints of Zaharija Orfelin, the leading Serbian copper engraver of the second half of the eighteenth century,

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¹ On prints in early modern art, see D. Papastratos, *Paper Icons: Greek Orthodox religious* engravings 1665–1899, vol. I–II (Athens 1990); C. Goldstein, *Print Culture in Early Modern France: Abraham Bosse and the Purposes of Print* (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 13–17; E. L. Eisenstein, *The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1–12.

were ephemeral and should be viewed in the same discursive frameworks and practices as other similar works.²

During this period in the Habsburg Monarchy, the educational reforms of Maria Theresa raised the level of literacy among the general population, so the potential audience for Orfelin's prints was vast and diverse: from artisans and small merchants, through prominent and wealthy citizens, to city and state officials.³ That meant that prints were accessible to a variety of audiences with a variety of tastes and values, often different from those promoted by artists or scholars, which led to different reactions to the same text or image. Engravings should not be understood in terms of a single "true" reading or the author's intentions but in terms of the many and different truths seen by contemporary observers. From this perspective, engravings are recognized as a social and cultural practice dependent on reception and interpretation. Intermediaries in that process and their interpretation could unpredictably change the meaning of every single print, depending on current political and cultural circumstances.⁴

From the beginning of the eighteenth century, Serbian print consumers turned to Viennese engravers for meeting their needs. This situation, which would remain unchanged until the first decades of the nineteenth century, was partly conditioned by the fact that the successive Metropolitans of Karlovci could not obtain permission from the authorities to open a printing house, but also by the lack of skilled Serbian engravers.⁵ Not even the appearance of Hristofor Džefarović and Zaharija Orfelin could fully meet the great demand for printed icons and books. Both of them pursued several other activities besides printing and these often kept them away from the printing press for long stretches of time. Again, the Serbian clientele was in constant need for print-

² From the abundant literature on Zaharija Orfelin, the most important are D. Davidov, Zaharija Orfelin 1726–1785 (Belgrade 2001); L. Čurčić, Knjiga o Zahariji Orfelinu (Zagreb 2002); B. Čalić, Zaharija Orfelin (Novi Sad 2011), 7–22.

³ The last two groups constituted a limited audience for engravings with inscriptions in Latin, French or German. The prints with inscriptions in Latin and Greek were intended exclusively for the classically educated elite able to understand the figures and tropes. For more about the buyers of paper icons in 18th-century Hungary, see O. Gratziou, "Searching for the public of some Greek religious engravings in 18th century Hungary", *ZLUMS* 29/30 (1993/1994), 93–94; V. Simić, "Zaharija Orfelin (1726–1785)", PhD dissertation (University of Belgrade, 2013), 120–130.

⁴ J. V. Curran, "Oral Reading, Print Culture, and the German Enlightenment", *The Modern Language Review* 100/3 (2005), 695–708; C. Karpinski, "The print in thrall to its original: a historiographic perspective", in *Retaining the original: multiple originals, copies, and reproductions* (Baltimore 1985), 101–109.

⁵ R. Grujić, "Prilošci za istoriju srpskih štamparija u Ugarskoj u polovini XVIII veka", Spomenik SKA XLIX, dr. raz. 42 (1910), 145–152; N. Gavrilović, Istorija ćirilskih štamparija u habsburškoj monarhiji u XVIII veku (Novi Sad 1975), 62–67.

ers, so Thomas Mesmer's workshop in Vienna was considered as permanent engraving and printing place. It accepted not only purchase orders for new engravings but also for prints from older copperplates, which were stored in the Orthodox church of St George in Vienna. A similar status was held by Jakob Schmutzer, the most renowned Austrian engraver, both before and, especially, after his arrival in Vienna. This is evidenced by letters sent by Metropolitan Pavle Nenadović from Sremski Karlovci to Vienna, purchasing from Jakob Schmutzer the engravings *View of the Lepavina Monastery (Manastir Lepavina)* and *Presentation of the Virgin in the Temple (Vavedenje Bogorodice)*, and from Thomas Mesmer *View of the Studenica Monastery (Manastir Studenica)* and *View of St Anna's Monastery (Manastir Sveta Ana)*.⁶ One metropolitan's letter reveals that there was in the Church of St. George in Vienna a whole collection of copperplates, mostly by Viennese engravers, which were very carefully kept and occasionally printed.⁷

Especially important for the religious life of the Orthodox Serbs in Hungary was a book devoted to Serbian saints, Правила молебнаја свјатих сербских npocBemumenej, also known as "Srbljak". Zaharija Orfelin prepared in 1765 a new, illustrated edition of this book at the printing shop of the Greek Demetrios Theodosios in Venice (Fig. 1). In order to avoid problems related to censorship and importation into the Habsburg Monarchy, he marked the book con falsa data – as if it had been published in Moscow.⁸ The texts collected in Srbljak had a strong patriotic connotation, which influenced the visual design of the book. Orfelin used the frontispiece to depict a group of Serbian saints in medallions receiving the blessing from Jesus Christ, and in the largest oval in the middle of the composition he portrayed the first Serbian king, Stefan the First-Crowned (Prvovenčani), as the holy monk Simon. Following the structure of the book, Orfelin defined the order of the saints by the order of their appearance in the church calendar. Thus, St. Simon is surrounded by: the Holy Despot Stefan Štiljanović (just above), the Holy Despot Stefan Branković, and then crosswise, St. Arsenije the Syrmian, Archbishop of Serbia, the Holy King Milutin, the

⁶ D. Davidov, *Srpska grafika XVIII veka* (Belgrade 2006), 216. On Schmutzer's influence on Zaharija Orfelin, see V. Simić, "Zaharija Orfelin i Likovna akademija u Beču: prilog biografiji", *Zbornik Narodnog muzeja* 21/2 (2014), 197–203; B. Vuksan, "Ideje reforme i pojave bakroreza kod Srba u XVIII veku", *ZFF* 16 (1989), 218–221.

⁷ Davidov, Srpska grafika XVIII veka, 216; M. Kostić, "Srpski bakrorezi XVIII veka", LMS 304/2 (1925), 147–156.

⁸ It has already been noticed that the copperplate had the engraver's signature in the bottom left corner, below the line framing the composition. It was partially rubbed away before printing, luckily not quite successfully, so that there were still traces on the print. Orfelin had obviously prepared and signed the plate before it was decided that the book would be published as if it had been printed in Moscow, when Orfelin erased his signature, see Davidov, *Srpska grafika XVIII veka*, 170.

Holy King Stefan Dečanski, the Holy Emperor Uroš, the Holy Despot Jovan Branković, St. Sava the first Archbishop of Serbia, then a medallion with the figures of St. Athanasius the Great, St. Maksim (Branković) the Archbishop of Serbia and St. Cyril of Alexandria, then St. Simeon the Myrrh-Gusher (Myroblyte), titled as a former King of Serbia, and finally the Holy Prince Lazar and the Holy Mother Angelina, a Serbian despotess. A short text accompanying this image at the bottom of the page informs the reader that it depicts the holy Serbian emperors, princes, despots, and archbishops praying for their lineage and fatherland.⁹

Represented as a Serbian saintly pantheon that watches over its Orthodox people and the land they inhabit, this print develops an idea characteristic of the political program of the Metropolitanate of Karlovci. Earlier, Hristofor Džefarović had consistently implemented the same idea in several engravings commissioned by Patriarch Arsenije IV Jovanović Šakabenta.¹⁰ That such a visual conception was not so rare is evidenced by a similar example of the title page of Juraj Rattkay's book Spomen na kraljeve i banove Kraljevstava Hrvatske, Slavonije i Dalmacije (1652), engraved by Juraj Šubarić (Fig. 2). It shows a large central medallion with the image of St. Peter, and the wreath of eight smaller medallions with the images of "Illyrian saints and martyrs" arranged around it. At the top are St. Jerome, Pope Caius, who was born in Dalmatia, and St. Cyril, titled as Constantine the Philosopher, Bishop of Bulgaria, surounded by two bishops on the left and right: St. Quirinus of Siscia and St. Augustine Kažotić of Zagreb. At the bottom are the three holy Illyrian kings - St. Budimir, St. Ivan, son of King Gostumil, and Godeskalk, the legendary King of Slavonia.¹¹ The frontispiece of Stefan Yavorski's book Камень веры (The Rock of Faith), published in 1729, which was very influential in the Orthodox world, has a similar compositional form. Around the central panel the following figures are arranged in medallions: the four Evangelists, the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul, and sainted Russian bishops: Sts. Peter, Alexius, Jonah and Philip. Above them is a medallion with the scene of the Descent of the Holy Spirit, and a view of Moscow (the Kremlin) at the bottom.¹² Orfelin might have modelled this fron-

⁹ M. Timotijević, "Serbia Sacra i Serbia Sancta u baroknom versko-političkom programu Karlovačke Mitropolije", in *Međunarodni naučni skup Sveti Sava u srpskoj istoriji i tradiciji*, ed. Sima Ćirković (Belgrade 1998), 394–395.

¹⁰ K. Vasić, "Patrijarh Arsenije IV Jovanović i bakrorezna grafika na području Karlovačke mitropolije 40-tih godina XVIII veka", MA thesis (University of Belgrade, 2007), 95–100.

¹¹ M. Pelc, "Georgius Subarich sculpsit Viennae – bakrorezac Juraj Šubarić u Beču oko 1650. godine: djela i naručitelji", *Radovi Instituta za povijest umjetnosti* 39 (2015), 63–65; Z. Blažević, *Ilirizam prije ilirizma* (Zagreb 2008), 289–291.

¹² On the influence of Yavorski's work on Serbian culture in the 18th century, see V. Vukašinović, Srpska barokna teologija: biblijsko i svetotajinsko bogoslovlje u Karlovačkoj mi-

tispiece on an engraving of the Russian printer Grigorii Tepchegorskii showing an allegorical composition about Peter I with the figures of Russian saints.¹³ This visual pattern was used in icon-painting, where it proved to be very effective, encouraging the emergence of new iconographic forms aimed at strengthening piety and religious patriotism among Orthodox Serbs. It can be seen in the appearance of icons created towards the end of the eighteenth century and based on Orfelin's engraving, e.g. the icon of *Serbian Saints* from the Museum of the Serbian Orthodox Church.¹⁴

The texts of the Akathists and services collected in Srbljak reflected the patriotic appeals to Serbian saints. The saints were expected to act patriotically from heaven, as they had while still on earth, and to watch over their people, fatherland, and the Orthodox church. The Venetian edition of Orfelin's book from 1765 leaves out the offices for St. Theodore Tyron and the Translation of the Relics of St. Stephen the Protomartyr, and includes the office for Saint Arsenije the Syrmian, the immediate successor of St. Sava as archbishop of Serbia. Thus, in the final redaction of the book, old medieval cults of Serbian saints were equally represented with the cults of the saints that appeared later, among Serbs in Hungary. They were used in religious disputes in support of the claim to the antiquity of the Metropolitanate of Karlovci and to secure its legitimacy in areas north of the Danube. Of the thirteen saints, only two are associated with Serbian ecclesiastical history, whereas the others belong to the domain of political history. A few years after the appearance of the printed Srbljak, at the church assembly in Sremski Karlovci in 1769, the commemorations of these saints were established as feast days for Orthodox Serbs. Two years later, Jovan Georgijević, the Metropolitan of Karlovci, printed a church calendar listing all national saints whose offices were included in the Srbljak, and the book was therefore named the Serbian calendar.¹⁵

In the mid-1770s, Orfelin printed several small religious engravings intended for the everyday personal devotional needs of the faithful. A number of these images have found their place in manuscript books – mostly prayerbooks. Due to the expensiveness of printed books, it was common for individuals to copy prayerbooks and related literature by hand, and then decorate them with

tropoliji XVIII veka (Belgrade 2010), 61, 201; M. Timotijević, Srpsko barokno slikarstvo (Novi Sad 1996), 149–162.

¹³ Davidov, *Srpska grafika XVIII veka*, 210; for more on Tepchegorskii, see *Russkii biografich-esii slovar*', ed. A. A. Polovtsova, vol. 20 (Saint Petersburg 1912), 484–485.

¹⁴ Simić, Za ljubav otadžbine, 68–70.

¹⁵ Timotijević, "Serbia sancta i Serbia sacra", 394–395; L. Čurčić, Srpske knjige i srpski pisci 18. veka (Novi Sad 1988), 62.

drawings or small engravings which they glued into them.¹⁶ Like other engravers in the Habsburg Monarchy, Orfelin also cut and sold such small religious compositions. Tens or hundreds of these small prints, which were sold apiece at fairs and church festivals, represented a small but steady source of income. Like any art entrepreneur, Orfelin kept an eye on what his clientele expected and developed some of his activities in that direction. His prints Crucifixion (Raspeće) and Christ Praying before God the Father for the Salvation of the Sinner (Hristos pred Bogom-Ocem moli za spas grešnika) belong to this type of work. The Crucifixion bears Orfelin's signature, but is undated (Fig. 3). Based on its characteristics, Dinko Davidov has dated it to his early years, but it seems that it could easily be a later work, created after 1770, as suggested by the simple signature "Orfelin rezal" (cut by Orfelin) which is more frequent after that year.¹⁷ The basic iconographic solution was of a general type because it was part of the standard imagery intended for private piety. Orfelin certainly used some models, perhaps from printing workshops of Vienna or Augsburg, which widely circulated throughout the Monarchy. As there is no donor inscription, the engraving is believed to have been made by Orfelin for sale at the fairs.¹⁸

The iconographic concept of this composition occurs rarely in Serbian Baroque painting, and its literary source is in the Gospels: "But one of the soldiers pierced His side with a spear, and immediately blood and water came out" (John 19:34). On the right side of the crucified Christ there is a figure of a Roman horseman piercing his chest with his spear. In the background, on the left, are the Virgin and John the Theologian, as well as another equestrian figure leaving Golgotha with a flag in his hands. In the Gospels, the soldier who pierced Christ is not named, but later tradition identifies him as Longinus, who subsequently became a Christian and died as a martyr in Caesarea in Cappadocia. The cult of Longinus became important from the time of the Counter-Reformation when Protestant theologians began to challenge it. In the eighteenth century, it appeared in Serbian religious art, mostly on the iconostases of churches of the Metropolitanate of Karlovci. The basic idea of Orfelin's print is related to the baroque piety associated with the veneration of the wounds of Christ, especially the fifth wound - the pierced chest. The introduction of the Virgin and John the Theologian in the background brings a new level of complexity into the composition and can be interpreted as expressing compassion for Christ's suffering on

¹⁶ J. Černý, "Neuinterpretation eines Einblattdruckes: Die 'bernhardinische Sonne' in der Olmützer Handschrift C. O. 120", in *Practicing new editions: transformation and transfer of the early modern book*, 1450–1800, eds. Hiram Kümper and Vladimir Simić (Nordhausen 2011), 18–25.

¹⁷ Davidov, Srpska grafika XVIII veka, 189–190.

¹⁸ V. Simić, "Ime i znak: o pseudonimu Zaharije Orfelina", *PKJIF* 82 (2016), 83–86.

Golgotha, or as an allusion to a great Baroque theme – the Seven Sorrows of the Blessed Virgin.¹⁹

The other engraving, Christ Praying before God the Father for the Salvation of the Sinner, shows Christ as an intercessor between God the Father and a repentant sinner. He is holding a cross in one hand and pointing to the sinner with the other, supporting the latter's prayers to God, who blesses him and forgives sins (Fig. 4). Orfelin printed the engraving in Vienna in 1783/4 and signed it at the bottom with his initials "Z. O." As his iconographic model he probably used a painting that was in his possession, which he entrusted, together with his other belongings, to the brotherhood of the Great Remeta Monastery just before leaving for Vienna.²⁰ To emphasize the idea of Christ interceding for sinful humanity, Orfelin depicted the sinner in the bottom left corner with his head raised, looking up at the Saviour. Two angels are approaching him, one of them placing a laurel wreath on his head, the other giving him a palm branch. In the very act of repentance, the role of faith and belief in the redemptive power of Christ's blood and body were emphasized as preconditions for obtaining absolution from sin. Within the frame, below the composition itself, are written the words spoken by Christ: "Father! I want those who truly believe in me and trust in me forever, to be saved by my blood and death."21 At the top of the composition, Orfelin inscribed the reference to the Holy Scripture to which the image refers – "I John I: I, 2" – the First Epistle of the Holy Apostle John the Theologian. This engraving, by its format and content, belongs to the standard type of small religious images (Andachtsbilder) intended for encouraging personal devotion.²²

¹⁹ For more on different datings of this print, see M. Timotijević, "Zaharije Orfelin – Raspeće sa Longinom i poštovanje Hristovih rana u srpskoj umetnosti XVIII veka", *ZMSLU* 21 (1985), 223–230; Timotijević, *Srpsko barokno slikarstvo*, 343–344.

²⁰ L. Čurčić, "Ilustrovanje rukopisnih knjiga 18. veka bakrorezom i jedan takav rad Zaharija Orfelina", *Bibliotekar* XIII (1961), 67–69; B. Vuksan, "Pokajanje i ispoved kod Srba u religioznoj literaturi i grafici XVIII veka", ZFF 17 (1991), 242.

²¹ In 18th-century piety, the idea of Christ's baptismal sacrifice and the redemption of sinful humanity through his blood occupied a very important place. It is no coincidence therefore that this kind of imagery occurs as painted decoration in the prothesis of the Orthodox churches in Kikinda, Mokrin, Timisoara, Sremska Kamenica or the Monastery of Bodjani: M. Timotijević, "Hleb životni' u niši proskomidije hrama manastira Bođana", *GPSKV* 18 (1996), 151–155. Cf. G. Tüskés and É. Knapp, "Graphische Darstellungen in den Publikationen barockzeitlicher Bruderschaften", *Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte* 52/3 (1989), 368.

²² Timotijević, *Zaharija Orfelin*, 231–232. As a convenient vehicle for meditation, the print was sold for a long time. Along with similar images, it even appears around 1800 in the catalogue of the bookseller Damjan Kaulici. I. V. Veselinov, "Jedan nepoznat katalog Damjana Kaulicija iz 1800", *ZMSKJ* 21/3 (1973), 532.

It is believed that Orfelin found the model for this work in a graphic illustration by Hieronymus Wierix (1553–1619), one of the most important Flemish engravers of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. He combined the iconography of the Holy Trinity with the theme of repentance, intricately emphasizing the idea of active repentance as a condition for absolution. The image of the remorseful penitent before the heavenly Father was thus an image of the act of sacramental forgiveness of sin. At the moment when the confessor, in the figure of God the Father, makes the sign of the cross, he utters the words: "Ego te absolve a peccatis tuis, in Nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. Amen." At the bottom of the image is the prayer addressed to the Holy Trinity (Sancta Trinitas, unus Deus, miserere nobis) because the priest giving absolution does so on behalf of the one who gave him the authority to do so. The traditional representation of the Holy Trinity became, in that way, the image of the Saviour's intercession for the salvation of sinful humanity.²³

From the mid-eighteenth century, the rite of Holy Repentance and Confession in the Metropolitanate of Karlovci drew largely on Ukrainian and Russian theological literature. The rite of confession of the penitent based on Ukrainian books must have been substantially different from the one in old Serbian printed or manuscript service books. After church officials introduced it in the Russian Church during the seventeenth century, changes in the rite of Holy Repentance also made their way into the Serbian Church. The traditional belief of the Serbs was that repentance was a type of spiritual therapy supposed to heal the human soul from sin. The priest was, therefore, considered as a spiritual healer, and sinner as a sick person.²⁴ Instead of this therapeutic understanding of the confessor's role, under the influence of the Catholic Reformation, he becomes something closer to a judge. The main means by which this idea spread in other Eastern Orthodox churches was the influential book Православное исповедание вери (The Orthodox Confession of Faith) published in 1643 by Peter Mogila, the Metropolitan of Kyiv. Although it was directly influenced by Latin scholastic theology, it was accepted as the correct in doctrine and teaching.²⁵ In the Metropolitanate of Karlovci, Mogila's book was used as a school textbook, and it was so popular that Orfelin printed it twice: at first in Sremski Karlovci in 1758, and then in Venice in 1763. The frontispiece of his first edition shows the Holy Trinity in glory (Fig. 5).²⁶ He designed the image according to a

²³ Vuksan, "Pokajanje i ispoved kod Srba", 246–247.

²⁴ Vukašinović, Srpska barokna teologija, 94.

²⁵ Vuksan, "Pokajanje i ispoved kod Srba", 251; D. Ruvarac, "Arhijerejske pouke – poslanice", in *Arhiv ISPKM* IV (1914), 268–270; D. Ruvarac, "O duhovnicima", *Srpski Sion* XV (1905), 477–478.

²⁶ For the iconography and symbolism of the image of the Holy Trinity in Baroque art, with earlier literature, see Timotijević, *Srpsko barokno slikarstvo*, 294–303. Cf. Tüskés and Knapp,

Russian printed copy and added short verses at the bottom of the page: "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, Holy One / Allow me to see your face in heaven." This brief couplet belongs to the genre of prayer, and in terms of typology, it shows characteristics noticed in another work of Orfelin's – *Molitva pred smrt* (Prayer before Death).²⁷

Another work Orfelin made for popular piety was the 1770 engraving of the miraculous icon of the Mother of God of Vinča-Bezdin (Fig. 6). This icon belongs to the Eleusa iconographic type, frequent in Serbian religious art, with one of its most famous examples being the Russian icon of Our Lady of Vladimir.²⁸ Among the Serbs, the cult of this icon saw a revival in the eighteenth century, when the monk Pajsije brought to Belgrade in 1727 an older copy of the icon of Our Lady of Vladimir. A few years later, the icon was transferred to the nearby Vinča Monastery, where it remained until the Turks destroyed the monastery. Abbot Teodosije Veselinović took the icon to the Bezdin Monastery, where it became the focus of a strong cult over time. It acquired a great reputation among people when miracles started to happen in its presence, including miraculous healings. In the meantime, the Bezdin Monastery became one of the most important focuses of pilgrimage for the Eastern Orthodox population and the centre of devotion to the Mother of God north of the Sava and Danube.²⁹ To meet the needs of these pilgrims, artists made a series of painted and printed replicas: like Orfelin, the Viennese engraver Johan Winkler made a large engraving of the Mother of God of Vinča-Bezdin in 1762. However, Orfelin's engraving was smaller in size, and therefore cheaper and easier to sell. The worn-out copperplate grooves show that it was used a lot, and printed many, many copies.30

³⁰ Davidov, Srpska grafika XVIII veka, 194–195.

[&]quot;Graphische Darstellungen", 369–370.

²⁷ Borivoj Čalić has noted that Orfelin discussed problems of prayer poetics, and that he certainly did so again in Timisoara in 1762, when he wrote *Molitva roditelja* (Parent's Prayer) and included it in his manuscript of the catechism titled *Apostolsko mleko* (Apostolic Milk), which he prepared for his son Petar. This book has been lost and is not known today. B. Čalić, "O Orfelinovoj 'Molitvi pred smrt' i njenom grafičkom dvojniku", in *Ljetopis* (Zagreb 2002), 95–96.

²⁸ M. Tatić-Đurić, "Bogorodica Vladimirska", ZMSLU 21 (1985), 35–47.

²⁹ For more on the series of events related to the attempt of Patriarch Arsenije IV Jovanović Šakabenta to have the icon transferred to the Serbian Orthodox cathedral church in Sremski Karlovci and to make it the symbolic protector of the Metropolitanate of Karlovci, see M. Timotijević, "Bogorodica Bezdinska i versko-politički program patrijarha Arsenija IV Jovanovića", *Balcanica* 22–23 (2001/2002), 338–339. For more on various forms of devotion to the Virgin in the 18th century, see S. Brajović, U Bogorodičinom vrtu: Bogorodica i Boka Kotorska – barokna pobožnost zapadnog brišćanstva (Belgrade 2006), 88–106.

Throughout the eighteenth century, St. Simeon and St. Sava maintained a central place among the Serbian saints. They were particularly used by the hierarchy of the Metropolitanate of Karlovci to convey the idea of ecclesiastical continuity of the medieval Serbian Church, and as a symbolic shield in its conflicts with the Roman Catholic Church. For example, Maksim Branković, founder of the monastery, was depicted between St. Simeon and St. Sava in one of the bottom (sovereign) tier of icons of the iconostasis of the Krušedol Monastery, establishing a symbolic connection between the Patriarchate of Peć and the Metropolitanate of Karlovci.³¹ Visual programs of Serbian Baroque churches often claimed that Stefan Nemanja had been a holy king, or a holy emperor, and the founder of a secular dynasty. Having completed his worldly affairs, he renounced the insignia and authority of a ruler in favour of spiritual advancement and became a monk, thus providing an example of a most virtuous person. Hence, on church iconostases, he is more frequently depicted as a holy monk than as a holy ruler. The cults of the two Serbian saints were propagated more effectively through engravings, which were multiplied in hundreds and thousands of copies. In that way, the printed image became an efficient tool of propaganda, fostering the veneration of these saints.

Familiar with that tradition, Orfelin made in 1780 an engraving of St. Sava and St. Simeon for the community of the Hilandar Monastery (Fig. 7). The print was commissioned by a certain Andrija Mandri from the town of Šipiska and donated to the monastery in memory of the deceased monk Atanasije Terpko, as can be read from the inscription at the bottom. Andrija Mandri was probably a Tsintsar (Aromanian) from Aegean Macedonia who had business ties with his compatriots in the Habsburg Monarchy. Commemorating and celebrating the two most important saints associated with Hilandar, he sponsored the creation of the engraving for his eternal memory.³² Orfelin represented the Serbian saints as full-length figures facing the observer and holding the model of the monastery between them. St. Sava, wearing episcopal robes and a mitre, blesses with his right hand, while St. Simeon holds a cross in his left hand. Under their feet are discarded royal insignia – crowns, sceptres and orbs – and in this act of rejecting earthly power and turning to the heavenly kingdom, Jesus Christ appears and receives them into Heaven with blessings. Many verses from

³¹ M. Timotijević, "Stefan Nemanja u baroknom versko-političkom programu Srpske crkve", in *Stefan Nemanja – Simeon Mirotočivi: istorija i predanje,* ed. Jovanka Kalić (Belgrade 1996), 396–401.

³² It is almost certain that Atanasije Trpko had relatives in the Habsburg Monarchy who could help him find the right engraver – Zaharija Orfelin: a certain Hristo Trpko is mentioned as a resident of Semlin in the census of 1774/5, and a Petar Trpko as a resident of Novi Sad in 1793, see D. J. Popović, O Cincarima: prilozi pitanju postanka našeg građanskog društva (Belgrade 1998), 460.

the Service for St. Simeon, as well as from the one for St. Sava, published in Orfelin's Srbljak in 1765, could have served as a literary inspiration for this visual composition.³³ The crucial role entrusted to them was the role of representing the Serbian people before God, as underlined in the verses in Srbljak: "Like two beacons on the spiritual fort, you enlighten with faith the land of your people, and that is why we piously hold service in your memory."³⁴ Orfelin knew these verses very well because they were taught in schools and sung in churches, and was undoubtedly influenced by them when he conceived and designed that image. At the same time, he sought to respect the iconographic canon, following the already established visual patterns. Orfelin borrowed the basic compositional scheme from the central part of his work from 1770, the engraving of Sts Peter and Paul with a view of the church in Sremski Karlovci dedicated to them. The figures of the apostles are shown in a similar manner, holding the model of the church between them, while Christ blesses them from Heaven. The iconographical solution of the central part of the composition undoubtedly points to some older Baroque iconographical models. The credible representation of the urban complex surrounding the Church of Sts Peter and Paul shows that Orfelin as an engraver had mastered perspective and cartography.³⁵

Zaharija Orfelin's engravings adequately responded to the religious needs of the Serbs in the Metropolitanate of Karlovci in the eighteenth century. As a member of the Orthodox community, he knew very well what kind of religious imagery was in demand on the market, and how to give it appropriate shape, design and measure. Accordingly, he chose which saints he would depict and in what iconographic manner, giving priority to the national saints, among whom St. Simeon and St. Sava had precedence. The number of printed copies depended on the popularity of a particular icon, as was the case with the miraculous icon of the Mother of God of Vinča-Bezdin. Poor-quality prints prove that this image was in high demand and that Orfelin sometimes stretched the use of his copperplates to the limit. In their pursuit of redemption, people equally sought engravings with the themes of repentance and the Eucharist. Consequently, Orfelin's engravings depicting Christ's mediatorial role in the salvation of humankind were still in high demand, and remained so until the end of the eighteenth century, when political turmoil changed the long-standing religious and cultural models of the Baroque epoch.

³³ Sava Nemanjić, "Služba Svetom Simeonu", in *Srbljak,* vol. 1: *Službe, kanoni, akatisti,* ed. Đorđe Trifunović (Belgrade 1970), 9, 15, 141.

³⁴ Teodosije Hilandarac, "Služba Svetome Simeonu", in ibid., 209.

³⁵ Davidov, Srpska grafika XVIII veka, 194.

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Fig. 1 Zaharija Orfelin, Title page of Srbljak, engraving, Venice 1765



Fig. 2 Juraj Šubarić, Title page of Juraj Rattkay's book *Memoria Regum et Banorum Regnorum Dalmatiae*, Croatiae et Sclavoniae, engraving, Vienna 1652




Fig. 3 Zaharija Orfelin, Crucifixion, engraving, after 1770




Fig. 4 Zaharija Orfelin, Christ before God the Father prays for the salvation of the sinner, engraving, c. 1782/3



Fig. 5 Zaharija Orfelin, The Holy Trinity in Glory, title page of Peter Mogila's book The Orthodox Confession of Faith, engraving, Sremski Karlovci 1758



Fig. 6 Zaharija Orfelin, Icon of the Mother of God of Vinča-Bezdin, engraving, 1770



Fig. 7 Zaharija Orfelin, Sts Sava and Simeon, engraving, 1780

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Assessing Linguistic Vulnerability and Endangerment in Serbia A Critical Survey of Methodologies and Outcomes

- Abstract: The paper offers a critical survey of vulnerable and endangered languages and linguistic varieties in Serbia presented in three international inventories: UNESCO's Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger, Ethnologue and The Catalogue of Endangered Languages. As the inventories differ widely in terms of assessing the exact level of language endangerment and vulnerability, and lack to provide empirical support for their assessment, the paper provides thorough information from official local sources, relevant studies and the authors' own field research, when available, on the language categorized as endangered (Aromanian, Banat Bulgarian, Judezmo, Vojvodina Rusyn, Romani), but also presents additional linguistic varieties which have not been registered yet by any of the mentioned inventories (Megleno-Romanian, Bayash Romanian and Vlach Romanian).
- Keywords: sociolinguistics; language vulnerability; language endangerment; language vitality; language documentation; minority languages; Serbia

1. Introduction

A lmost half of the languages spoken today around the globe are threatened with extinction. As linguistic diversity is essential to human existence, language endangerment has become a serious concern over the last several decades. Accordingly, sociolinguists have sought to identify factors contributing to language vulnerability and endangerment, which led to the development of global evaluation scales of the state of language vitality. Based on such scales, it is today possible to work toward language documentation, maintenance and revitalization, raise awareness of the need to safeguard the linguistic heritage, and create red books and inventories of endangered languages. These inventories or data-

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bases of the world's languages are invaluable tools which contain an impressive amount of information on thousands of vulnerable or endangered languages, and are already used for several decades by policy-makers, communities and professionals trying to protect linguistic diversity across the globe.

However, when it comes to Serbia, the existing inventories differ widely in terms of assessing the exact level of language endangerment and vulnerability, and often give insufficient or inaccurate data on the varieties spoken in the country, also lacking to provide empirical support for their assessment. Our paper looks into the various factors and sociolinguistic criteria for assessing language vitality, such as intergenerational language transmission, social domains of use, number of speakers, level of literacy, members' attitudes, governmental support, etc., summarizing the most relevant methods and tools developed over the last decades for evaluating language endangerment.¹ Further, we present the international inventories of the world's languages created using these methods and vitality scales, to focus and comment on the endangered languages and linguistic varieties in Serbia included in these inventories. In the second part of the paper, we discuss each of the languages and linguistic varieties in Serbia categorized as endangered by one or more international inventories, and present several other languages or linguistic varieties that might also be considered vulnerable or endangered in Serbia, according to our own field research and linguistic assessment, but have not been included in any of the mentioned inventories. While in several cases our evaluation of the current sociolinguistic status of the linguistic varieties roughly overlaps with that offered by the databases, in others it is rather divergent. As a step towards a more precise assessment, we make use of thorough information coming from official local sources, relevant studies on the topic and our own field research, as well as the applicable legislation of the Republic of Serbia. Finally, we discuss inconsistencies and errors of the international databases, pointing to possible reasons and suggesting possible solutions.

2. How is language endangerment assessed?

Over the past few decades numerous methods and tools for assessing language vitality and endangerment have been developed.² This section attempts to summarize the most relevant methods for evaluating language vitality and endangerment, namely *Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale* (GIDS), *Extended Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale* (EGIDS), UNESCO's Language Vitality

¹ It must be mentioned that the paper deals with endangerment from a strictly sociolinguistic perspective, without any implications on the ethnicity of the speakers.

² It is noteworthy that the term 'endangerment' puts emphasis on the language loss as a possible outcome of endangerment, while 'vitality' is often used to highlight the affirmative side of the (same) concept.

Index, and *Language Endangerment Index* (LEI), and to present the international inventories of the world's languages and linguistic varieties created using these methods and vitality scales, of which the most important are UNESCO's Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger, Ethnologue and The Catalogue of Endangered Languages (ELCat).

The scales summarized below are based on various sociolinguistic criteria. However, the majority of them prioritize the criterion of the *intergenerational language transmission*, which evaluates whether children acquire a variety as their first language at home, departing from the fact that without transmitting a language to younger generations of speakers "a language will cease to exist naturally regardless of other factors" (Lee & van Way 2016, 280).

The Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale – GIDS (Fishman 1991) was one of the first scales developed to assess language endangerment. It combines two main criteria – intergenerational language transmission and social domains of language use. GIDS establishes eight levels of endangerment, ranging from the safest languages, placed at level 1, which are fully used by the majority of speakers in all social domains of use (education, media, administration, government at the national level), to the most endangered, placed at level 8, which are spoken only by the oldest generations of speakers and lack any institutional support. The use of languages at levels 1 to 5 varies across social domains and incorporates at least some use of language in the written form, whereas languages at levels 6 to 8 are used only orally and differ regarding the degree of intergenerational transmission: level 6 – the language is used by all generations of speakers and children acquire it as their first language, level 7 - the language is used by the generation of parents and older speakers in their communication, but not transmitted to children, level 8 – the language is used only by some members of the grandparent generation.

Although Fishman's scale is a valuable contribution to sociolinguistics, several shortcomings have been noticed, especially in the domain of language preservation, revitalization and development (Lewis & Simons 2010): a) GIDS focuses on the level of disruption more than on the level of maintenance, which makes it difficult for language revitalizers to strengthen the status of a language; b) GIDS does not adequately account for the directionality of language shift versus language development, which is important when taking concrete measures in changing the status of a language; c) the proposed levels do not describe all possible statuses of a language transmission as a single most important factor in language shift and therefore places the locus of revitalization efforts on the individuals in the family surroundings or local community, whereas the role of institutions should also be emphasized; e) the weaker end of GIDS, i.e. the levels which assume the highest degree of transmission disruption, are thought to lack precision and should be more elaborated (Lewis & Simons 2010, 106–107).

Having this in mind, Lewis and Simons developed the Extended Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale – EGIDS (Lewis & Simons 2010). In assessing language endangerment, EGIDS departs from the criteria of identity, vehicularity, intergenerational transmission, literacy acquisition, and a societal profile of a generational language use (Lewis & Simons 2010, 117). In comparison to GIDS, additional levels and sublevels are established, reaching a total of 13 levels of language endangerment. Level o includes international languages, which are used widely between nations, levels from I to 5 (national (I), regional (2), trade (3), educational (4), written (5)) imply the effective use of the language in both oral and written form across various domains, such as education, work, trade and mass media, addressing also the issues of language standardization and institutional support. On the other hand, levels from 6a to 10 assume only oral language use: level 6a (vigorous) - the language is used orally by all generations of speakers and transmitted to children as their first language, level 6b (threatened) - the language is used by all generations of speakers, but not transmitted to children in all families, which signals that the language is losing its speakers, level 7 (shifting) – the generation of parents is using the language among themselves, but not transmitting it to their children, level 8a (moribund) - the only active speakers are the generation of grandparents, level 8b (nearly ex*tinct*) – the only active speakers are the generation of grandparents or older and they do not use the language frequently, level 9 (dormant) – the speakers have only symbolic proficiency and the language serves as a remainder of heritage history for an ethnic community, level 10 (extinct) – the language is no longer used and no one retains a sense of ethnic identity associated with it (Lewis & Simons 2010, 110-113).

In order to assess the language level on the EGIDS scale, a set of key questions has been developed in a form of a decision tree (cf. Lewis & Simons 2010, 113–117):

- #1: What is the current identity function of the language? If historical the language is evaluated as *extinct* (level 10), if heritage the language is evaluated as *dormant* (level 9), if home the question #3 must be further answered, if vehicular the question #2 must be further answered.
- #2: What is the level of official use? If international the language is evaluated as *international* (level 0), if national the language is evaluated as *national* (level 1), if regional the language is evaluated as *regional* (level 2), if not official the language is evaluated as *trade* (level 3).
- #3: Are all parents transmitting the language to their children? If yes the question #4 must be further answered, and the language will be classified at levels 4, 5 or 6a; if no – the question #5 must be further answered and the language will be classified at levels 6b, 7, 8a or 8b.

- #4: What is the literacy status? If institutional the language is evaluated as *educational* (level 4), if incipient the language is evaluated as *written* (level 5), if none the language is evaluated as *vigorous* (level 6a).
- #5: What is the youngest generation of proficient speakers? If children the language is evaluated as *threatened* (level 6b), if parents the language is evaluated as *shifting* (level 7), if grandparents the language is evaluated as *moribund* (level 8a), if great grandparents the language is evaluated as *nearly extinct* (level 8b).

In addition, for those languages whose change is not directed towards language loss but rather revitalization (due to the natural language spread or engineered revitalization efforts), a subset of levels corresponding to levels 6a to 9 has been established: 6a – vigorous, 6b – re-established, 7 – revitalized, 8a – reawakened, 8b – reintroduced, 9 – rediscovered (Lewis/Simons 2010: 117).

UNESCO's group of experts developed a different kind of method for assessing the status of language vitality in the form of guidelines: the *Language Vitality Index* (Brenzinger et al. 2003). UNESCO's method combines 9 factors of equal importance, each rated on a scale from 0 to 5:

- 1) Intergenerational language transmission: the languages are classified as extinct, critically endangered, severely endangered, definitely endangered, unsafe, or safe;
- 2) Absolute number of speakers (real numbers should be provided), with an assumption that small speech communities are at higher risk;
- 3) The proportion of speakers within the total population: the languages are classified as extinct, critically endangered, severely endangered, definitely endangered, unsafe, safe;
- 4) Trends in existing language domains: extinct, highly limited domain, limited or formal domains, dwindling domains, multilingual parity, universal use;
- 5) Response to new domains and media: inactive, minimal, coping, receptive, robust/active, dynamic;
- 6) Materials for language education and literacy, ranging from no orthography available in the community (0) to established orthography, literacy tradition and the use of written language in the domains of education and administration (5);
- Governmental and institutional language attitudes, and policies, including official status and use: prohibition, forced assimilation, active assimilation, passive assimilation, differentiated support, equal support;
- 8) Community members' attitudes toward their own language, ranging from "no one cares if the language is lost" to "all members value their language and wish to see it promoted";

9) Amount and quality of documentation: undocumented, inadequate, fragmentary, fair, good, superlative (Brenzinger et al. 2003).

The factors from 1 to 6 should be used together and aim at assessing language vitality. The factors 7 and 8 are developed in the domain of language attitudes and policies, addressing the issue of the type of support required in language revitalization, whereas factor 9 emphasizes the urge for documentation of endangered varieties.

The Language Endangerment Index – LEI (Lee & van Way 2016) has been developed for the specific need of the Catalogue of Endangered Languages (ELCat). It is a method for the quantitative assessment of language endangerment, based on four separate factors, but with the possibility to present an overall vitality assessment for a given language, designed in such a way as to allow the overall score to be obtained even if a particular information for certain factors is missing (Lee & van Way 2016, 277–278). Each of the four factors is rated on the scale from 0 to 5. It is worth emphasizing that the estimated level of endangerment may differ among different factors:

- I) Intergenerational transmission: critically endangered languages with only a few elderly speakers, severely endangered – languages spoken by many of the grandparent generation, but not by younger generations, endangered – languages spoken by some adults in the community, but not by children, threatened – languages spoken by most adults in the community, but generally not by children, vulnerable – spoken by most adults and some children, safe – all member of the community, including children, speak the language;
- 2) Absolute number of speakers: critically endangered languages spoken by 1–9 speakers, severely endangered languages spoken by 10–99 speakers, endangered languages spoken by 100–999 speakers, threatened languages spoken by 1,000–9,999 speakers, vulnerable languages spoken by 10,000–99,999 speakers, and safe languages spoken by \geq 100,000 speakers.³
- 3) Speaker number trends (whether increasing or decreasing): critically endangered – a small percentage of the community speaks the language, and speaker numbers are decreasing very rapidly, severely endangered – less than half of the community speaks the language, and speaker numbers are decreasing at an accelerated pace, endangered – only about half of community members speak the language, and speaker numbers are decreasing steadily, threatened – the majority of community members speak the language, but speaker numbers are gradually decreasing, vulner-

³ By'speakers' LEI assumes native speakers, semi-speakers and heritage speakers (Lee & van Way 2016, 279).

able – most members of the community speak the language, but speaker numbers may be slowly decreasing, *safe* – almost all community members speak the language, and speaker numbers are stable or increasing.

4) Domains of use: critically endangered – used only in a few very specific domains, such as in ceremonies, songs, prayer, proverbs, or certain limited domestic activities, severely endangered – used mainly just in the home and/or with family, and may not be the primary language even in these domains for many community members, endangered – used mainly just in the home and/or with family, but remains the primary language of these domains for many community members, threatened – used in some non-official domains along with other languages, and remains the primary language used in the home for many community members, vulner-able – used in most domains except for official ones, such as government, mass media, education, safe – used in most domains, including official ones, such as government, mass media, education.

In order to establish the aggregate score as a percentage, LEI is based on the following formula: Level of endangerment = {[(intergenerational transmission score x 2) + absolute number of speakers score + speaker number trends score + domains of use score]/total possible score based on number of factors used} x 100 (Lee & van Way 2016, 285).

As it can be observed in the formula – the intergenerational transmission is given double weight. The output of the formula establishes the overall endangerment rating derived from the individual factors, and the level of certainty based on the number of factors known and used in the rating. Based on the formula, six discrete levels of endangerment can be determined: critically endangered, severely endangered, endangered, threatened, vulnerable, and safe languages (Lee & van Way 2016, 286).

Based on the aforementioned methods, scales and assessment criteria, several international inventories of the world's languages used today have been created, with their respective levels of endangerment. The most prominent ones are UNESCO's Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger (henceforth: UNES-CO's Atlas), Ethnologue and The Catalogue of Endangered Languages (EL-Cat). All these have electronic versions, which are regularly updated, revised and expanded. In what follows we mainly refer to the electronic versions.

The UNESCO's Atlas⁴ was developed based on the UNESCO's Language Vitality Index, although taking the factor of intergenerational language transmission as the most salient criterion in establishing the level of language endangerment (see Moseley 2010 for the print edition). UNESCO's Atlas distinguishes between six levels of endangerment: safe languages are spoken by

⁴ Available at: http://www.unesco.org/languages-atlas/. Accessed: October 25, 2020.

all generations of speakers, without disruption in intergenerational language transmission, *vulnerable languages* are acquired and spoken also by younger generations of speakers, but in a limited domain (they are usually spoken only at home), *definitely endangered languages* are spoken by parent and grandparent generations and they are not acquired as mother tongues at home, *severely endangered languages* spoken by grandparent generation, while the parent generation may understand them, they no longer use it, nor transmit it to their children, *critically endangered languages* are spoken only sporadically in a limited contexts by the oldest generations of speakers, *extinct languages* have no living speakers (Moseley 2010, UNESCO's Atlas).

Ethnologue (Lewis, Simons & Fenning 2013) is an annual reference publication in print and online that provides statistics and other information on the living languages of the world.⁵ First issued in 1951, it released its 23rd edition in 2020. Language assessment in Ethnologue is based on the EGIDS scale (Lewis & Simons 2010). The data on the interactive website are presented on a graph combining two criteria: language size and language vitality. Language size represents the estimated number of all users, including both first and second language speakers, and the languages are classified as large - if spoken by more than 1,000,000 users, mid-sized – if spoken by 10,000 to 1,000,000 users, or small - if spoken by less than 10,000 users. Based on language vitality - vitality profile, languages are classified as *institutional* (EGIDS 0-4) if used and sustained by institutions beyond the home and community, stable (EGIDS 5–6a), if not being sustained by formal institutions, but it is still the norm in the home and community that all children learn and use the language, endangered (EGIDS 6b–9) if it is no longer the norm that children learn and use this language, extinct (EGIDS 10) if the language has fallen completely out of use and no one retains a sense of ethnic identity associated with the language.

The Catalogue of Endangered Languages (ELCat) (Lee & van Way 2016) is the central part of the Google-powered Endangered Languages Project (ELP)⁶. It primarily serves as an online resource for samples and research on endangered languages, encompassing various types of data in the domains of language research and linguistics, language revitalization, language materials, language education, language advocacy and awareness, language culture and art, language and technology, and media, On the interactive language map, the languages are classified as: vitality unknown, safe, at risk, threatened, endangered, severely endangered, critically endangered, awakening, or dormant. Each language is represented with the level of vitality, the number of speakers, the number of available documents and resources, as well as the number and type of available documentation. The basic information is accompanied by description

⁵ Available at: https://www.ethnologue.com/browse/names. Accessed: October 25, 2020.

⁶ Available at: http://www.endangeredlanguages.com/. Accessed: October 25, 2020.

of the metadata (e.g. alternative names, language code), the accessible video and audio files documenting the language, reported measures in revitalization and bibliography. In addition, the data on the language available from other databases, such as Ethnologue, World Oral Literature Project or UNESCO's Atlas, are given. In what follows we will refer to ELP.

3. Language endangerment in Serbia in the international inventories

The languages spoken in Serbia have been evaluated in UNESCO's Atlas, Ethnologue and ELP. In this section, we will briefly present and comment on the endangered languages and linguistic varieties in Serbia included in these inventories.

According to the findings from the third edition of UNESCO's Atlas (2010; formerly the *Red Book of Endangered Languages*), there are six endangered languages in Serbia: Aromanian (*definitely endangered*), Banat Bulgarian (*definitely endangered*), Romani (*definitely endangered*), Vojvodina Rusyn (*definitely endangered*), Judezmo (*severely endangered*) and Torlak (*vulnerable*). ELP lists seven endangered languages in Serbia: Aromanian, Balkan Romani, Baltic Romani, Carpathian Romani, Ladino, Sinte Romani, Vlax Romani.⁷ Finally, out of the 24 languages Ethnologue (the 23rd edition) registers in Serbia, it does not assess any as being endangered.⁸ Only four languages are considered vigorous (EGIDS 6a), while all the others are either developing (EGIDS 5) or institutional (EGIDS 0-4) (Eberhard et al. 2020).

As one can clearly observe, the international inventories differ widely in terms of assessing language endangerment in Serbia as regards which languages and linguistic varieties are included and what is their level of endangerment. While UNESCO's Atlas and ELP seem to agree that Aromanian, Judezmo (Ladino) and Romani are endangered, ELP lists not less than five Romani varieties, of which at least one (Baltic Romani) is for sure not spoken in the country. Banat Bulgarian, on the other hand, considered definitely endangered by UNESCO, is not mentioned in ELP, nor in Ethnologue, while Vojvodina Rusyn, also definitely endangered according to UNESCO's assessment, is listed in Ethnologue with the assessed status 6a (vigorous). Aromanian is again considered definitely endangered by the UNESCO, threatened by ELP and vigorous by Ethnologue.

The inclusion of Torlak, a group of dialects spoken in southern and eastern parts of Serbia, western Bulgaria and northern parts of North Macedonia, among the endangered languages of Serbia, additionally points to the need to reconsider the criteria and make precise definitions regarding the varieties spoken in Serbia. In this respect, it is worth noting that UNESCO's Atlas does not

⁷ http://www.endangeredlanguages.com/lang/country/Serbia. Accessed: November 4, 2020.

⁸ https://www.ethnologue.com/country/RS. Accessed: November 4, 2020.

provide the precise definitions of the terms 'language' and 'dialect', thus provoking the erroneous classification of Torlak as a 'language'.

4. Endangered and vulnerable languages and linguistic varieties in Serbia

In order to understand the current (sociolinguistic) status of each linguistic variety in Serbia, we will first briefly introduce the relevant legislation in the Republic of Serbia, which provides the framework for recognizing a variety as a minority language and further enables its official use in various domains, such as administration, education, culture, and media.

The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (henceforth: the Charter) was ratified by the Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro in 2005 and came into force in Serbia in 2006.⁹ In accordance to the Article 2 of the Charter, in the Republic of Serbia, the particular paragraphs and sub-paragraphs of the articles 8-14 of the Charter are to be applied to the following languages: Albanian, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Romani, Romanian, Rusyn, Slovak, Ukrainian and Croatian. The articles refer to education, judicial authorities, administrative authorities and public services, media, cultural activities and facilities, economic and social life, and trans-frontier exchanges, respectively.

The right to use minority languages is regulated by two main laws: the Law on the Official Use of Languages and Scripts ("Official Gazette of the RS", no. 45/91, 53/93 – other law, 67/93 – other law, 48/94 – other law, 30/10, 101/05 – other law, 47/18 and 48/18 - correction)¹⁰ and the Law on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities ("Official Journal of the FRY", no. 11/02, "Official Gazette of Serbia and Montenegro", no. 1/03 - the Constitutional Charter and "Official Gazette of RS", no. 72/09 – other law and 97/13 – Decision of the CC and 47/2018)¹¹. In addition, according to the Law on Primary education ("Official Gazette of the RS", no. 55/2013, 101/2017, 27/2018 – other law and 10/2019)¹², when the language of education is Serbian, national minority students may attend optional classes of the language of the national minority with elements of national culture; exceptionally, bilingual education in the national minority language and Serbian can be organized, as well.

⁹ The Charter is available at: https://ljudskaprava.gov.rs/sh/node/19820. Accessed: October 27, 2020.

¹⁰ Available at: https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_sluzbenoj_upotrebi_jezika_i_ pisama.html. Accessed: October 27, 2020.

¹¹ Available at: https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_zastiti_prava_i_sloboda_nacionalnih_manjina.html. Accessed: October 27, 2020.

¹² Available at: https://zuov.gov.rs/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Zakon-o-osnovnomobrazovanju.pdf. Accessed: October 27, 2020.

The remainder of the section has two parts. In the first one, we discuss each of the languages and linguistic varieties in Serbia categorized as endangered by one or more international inventories, offering thorough information coming from official local sources, relevant studies on the topic and our own field research. While in several cases our evaluation roughly overlaps with that offered by the databases, in others it is rather divergent. The second part of this section presents several languages or language varieties that also meet criteria of inclusion among vulnerable or endangered languages in Serbia, according to our own field research and linguistic assessment, but have not been registered by any of the mentioned international inventories.

4.1. Languages and linguistic varieties in Serbia listed as vulnerable or endangered in the international inventories

Aromanian

Aromanian is an Eastern Romance language, considered by some a historic dialect of the Romanian language, and spoken in the Balkans. It has a similar morphology and syntax with modern Romanian, as well as a large common vocabulary inherited from Latin, but the important source of dissimilarity is that Aromanian has been influenced to a great extent by Greek, Albanian, Macedonian or Bulgarian, with which it has been in close contact throughout its history (Caragiu Marioțeanu 1968; Friedman 2001; Saramandu 2004; Maiden 2016). The presence of Aromanians in Serbia is mainly due to migrations in the 18th and early 19th c. These first comers were bilingual in Greek, while most members of the last wave, in the late 20th century, spoke Macedonian.

UNESCO's Atlas considers Aromanian (with the alternate names Macedo-Romanian, Vlach and Tsintsar) *definitely endangered* in Serbia. The language is also used in Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, North Macedonia and Romania, by a total number of 500,000 speakers worldwide (source: Atanasov 2002). Data regarding the number of speakers in Serbia lacks. The only country specific information is that the presence of the language here is due to "immigrant groups deriving from the eighteenth century".

Ethnologue lists Aromanian as *vigorous* (level 6a) in Serbia, with a user population of 13,000, and a total number of speakers worldwide of 191,000. The places with Aromanian language speakers in Serbia are Bor, Braničevo, Pomoravlje, and Zaječar districts.¹³ Aromanian is considered *institutional*, but it is not clear in which countries. Regarding the size and vitality, Aromanian is assessed as *mid-sized* and *institutional*.

¹³ https://www.ethnologue.com/language/rup. Accessed: October 25, 2020.

ELP lists Aromanian (Armãneashti, Armãneascã, Armãneshce) among the endangered languages in Serbia, considering it *threatened*, with the observation: "80 percent certain, based on the evidence available", with 350,000 native speakers worldwide (source: Mosely 2005). As far as the speaker number trends are concerned, Aromanian is placed at level 4, with less than half of the community speaking the language and speaker numbers decreasing at an accelerated pace. Transmission is placed at level 1, as "most adults in the community, and some children, are speakers". As for the places where the language is spoken in Serbia, the inventory lists Niš and Kladovo, but fails to provide the number of speakers.¹⁴

According to recent research, the majority of Serbian citizens of Aromanian descent do not speak Aromanian and adopt a Serbian identity (Kahl 2002; Plasković 2004). Larger Aromanian communities can be found in Belgrade and Niš, and smaller in Knjaževac, Pančevo, Smederevo (Plasković 2004). The members of the community are scattered throughout the country and do not form compact groups anywhere. However, the language is still spoken in Serbia, though by a very small number of people. Kahl's estimate in the beginning of the 21st c. was that "only a small group of migrants from what is now Macedonia declares an Aromanian identity and speaks Aromanian" (Kahl 2002, 161). Nevertheless, a sociolinguistic research conducted in Belgrade between 1994 and 1999, among 261 Aromanians, members of the Serbian-Aromanian association Lunjina (founded in 1991) and their families, goes into more detail as far as the use of language is concerned (Plasković 2004). According to the survey, Aromanian is used within the family and community as a communication means by 68% of the respondents, while 6% speak it to some extent. 73% of the older generation speaks the language, the adult -66%, while the younger -29%. The tendency of language lost is clear. 31% of the respondents use Aromanian for reading, and only 16% for writing. 66% of the respondents consider Aromanian their mother tongue, while 32% declare Serbian as their mother tongue (Plasković 2004, 152). The author of the research also mentions that there are justified reasons to think that the number of Aromanians in Belgrade is bigger than the 261 who participated in the research. It must be mentioned that the 2002 population census, used by the author, offered a number of 184 Aromanians in Belgrade, and 293 in the entire Serbia (Plasković 2004, 149).

The last, 2011 population census, registers a number of 243 Serbian citizens who identify themselves as ethnic *Cincari*, the ethnonym used in Serbian to refer to this ethnic group (Census 2011), but the number of Aromanian speakers is not mentioned. The estimates, though, put forth a bigger number, which is, however, difficult to establish, due to the well-known mimicry of the people

¹⁴ http://www.endangeredlanguages.com/lang/963. Accessed: October 25, 2020.

(Nicolau 1993) and the advanced processes of assimilation to the Serbian language and culture (Kahl 2002).

Given the small number of people declaring themselves to be *Cincari*, the Aromanian minority has no political status in Serbia. The language was not recognized as a minority language in the Charter. Legislation does not provide for teaching of Aromanian in schools. However, between 2009 and 2011, Aromanian was taught as a heritage language in Pančevo, close to the capital Belgrade, as part of an open language workshop organized by the NGO In media res. The classes have been taught two hours per week, with most of the students of Aromanian descent, aged between 40 and 60 (Janjić 2011). The Serbian-Aromanian association *Lunjina* has also offered Aromanian language courses once per week between 2014 and 2017, but discontinued it for lack of students and switched to the e-learning platform *Anveatsā armaneashti!* (Learn Aromanian) created in Romania.¹⁵ Based on our personal discussions with *Lunjina* members, there are still several families in Belgrade in which all three generations speak the language.

Banat Bulgarian

Banat Bulgarian is a South Slavic variety used in the Banat region in Serbia, as well as in Romania. The current sociolinguistic situation regarding the variety differs among the two countries, particularly in the domain of function and language use. Banat Bulgarians are the descendants of the Catholic refugees who fled from northern Bulgaria and settled in the Banat region in the 17th and 18th c. in several migratory waves (Vučković 2010, 247; Ivanova & Bečeva 2003).

According to UNESCO's Atlas, Banat Bulgarian is considered *definitely* endangered. The estimated number of speakers is 25,000 (source: Duličenko 2002), although the UNESCO's Atlas signals that the population is "possibly inflated". This linguistic variety is characterized as an outlying dialect of Bulgarian, spoken in Serbia and Romania, more precisely in the Banat region on both sides of the Romanian-Serbian border, with a resettled population in Bulgaria.

Ethnologue does not provide any information on Banat Bulgarian. The data is only given for Bulgarian in Serbia and it clearly excludes Banat Bulgarian, since the area where Bulgarian is said to be spoken is limited to Southeastern Serbia (Pčinja and Pirot districts), with 13,300 speakers (according to 2013 UNSD). The status of Bulgarian is marked as *provincial* (level 2) and *statutory provincial* in the towns of Novi Pazar, Sjenica, Tutin , again clearly not distinguishing Banat Bulgarians. Regarding the size and vitality of Bulgarian, the speakers' population is *large*, and the language is labelled *institutional*.¹⁶ This information is not applicable to the Banat Bulgarian variety.

¹⁵ http://anveatsaarmaneashti.com/invata-online. Accessed: September 17, 2020.

¹⁶ https://www.ethnologue.com/country/RS/languages. Accessed: November 4, 2020.

ELP does not provide any information on Banat Bulgarian.

In Serbia, Banat Bulgarian is spoken in the Banat region, in the towns of Pančevo, Vršac, Kovin and Zrenjanin, as well as the villages of Belo Blato, Ivanovo, Jaša Tomić, Konak, Skorenovac and Stari Lec. According to Vučković (2009, 3), the unofficial estimates suggest that there are 3,000-4,000 Banat Bulgarians in Serbia, while according to Nomachi (2016, 181) and Sikimić & Nomaći (2016, 11), the estimated number of Banat Bulgarian speakers is 1,000, although the exact figure is difficult to determine as the population censuses do not distinguish between Orthodox and Roman Catholic (Banat) Bulgarians.

The exact number of Banat Bulgarian speakers in Serbia is difficult to establish even based on the official census figures. There is no reference to Banat Bulgarians as an ethnic minority or to Banat Bulgarian speakers in the Serbian 2002 and 2011 population censuses (Census 2002, 2011). In the 2011 Census, 18,543 people declared themselves as Bulgarians (1,075 in the Banat region), while 20,497 did the same in the 2002 Census (1,259 in the Banat region). As for the speakers, the 2011 Census registered 13,337 Bulgarian speakers (429 in the Banat region), while the 2002 Census – 16,459 speakers (768 in the Banat region).¹⁷

In addition to Banat Bulgarian and Serbian as the majority and dominant language of the country, Banat Bulgarians also speak Hungarian, German and sometimes Slovak (Vučković 2009, 3; Vučković 2010, 248; Sikimić & Nomaći 2016, 11). The Banat Bulgarian variety is not transmitted to the younger generation, according to Sikimić & Nomaći (2016, 11). Furthermore, Banat Bulgarian is rarely used as a spoken language regardless of the prolific literature tradition developed since the middle of the 19th c., which significantly differs from standard Bulgarian as it uses the Latin script (Sikimić & Nomaći 2016, 12). After several periods of decline in the use of Banat Bulgarian (see Nomachi 2016, 183–187), language use has been recently revived, first in the domain of religion and additionally by publications in the local magazine Ivanovački dobošar which includes articles printed in Banat Bulgarian (Nomachi 2016, 188; Sikimić & Nomaći 2016, 12). The presence of this variety in the linguistic landscape is scarce: official public inscriptions in Banat Bulgarian exist only in the village of Ivanovo, since only there is the number of declared (Banat) Bulgarians over 15% (Sikimić & Nomaći 2016, 13).

Legislation does not provide for teaching of Banat Bulgarian in schools given the fact that it is not officially recognized as a minority language.¹⁸ However, local people's interest in the linguistic variety is noteworthy. Sikimić & Nomaći (2016, 13) mention a language workshop aimed at teaching the variety

¹⁷ The censuses register as speakers only those whose first language is the respective variety.

¹⁸ The Charter does not mention Banat Bulgarian, although Bulgarian is listed as a minority language.

to both children and adults, organized for several years (2009–2015), but closed due to financial difficulties. Prior to that, in the period 1997–2000, the local priest taught the variety in the village of Belo Blato for which purpose he wrote a manuscript textbook (Vučković 2010, 261; Ivanova & Bečeva 2003: 358).

Judezmo

Judezmo is the language of Sephardic Jews, a Romance variety which represents a historical descent of (Classical) Spanish. It was originally spoken in the Iberian Peninsula, prior to the expulsion of Sephardic Jews in the 15th c. As the Sephardim spread across the Ottoman Empire, North Africa and some Western European countries, the variety has been influenced by many different languages, such as Spanish, Hebrew, French, Italian, German, Turkish and languages of the Balkans (Vučina Simović 2016; Pons 2019). Given that it sufficiently differs from contemporary Spanish, it represents a second sub-branch of Romance, along with the Balkan Romance group of Eastern Romance (Friedman & Joseph 2014, 4).

UNESCO's Atlas lists Judezmo (also labelled Ladino, Judeo-Spanish, Sephardic, and Haketía in the inventory) as *severely endangered*. The number of speakers in Serbia is not given, but the Atlas refers to a total number of 400,000 speakers of Judezmo. In Greece and elsewhere in the Balkans, the Atlas mentions very few if any Judezmo speakers left. The inventory lists the following countries where Judezmo is used: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Morocco, Romania, Serbia, North Macedonia and Turkey.

Ethnologue does not mention Judezmo in Serbia.

ELP lists *Ladino* as one of the endangered languages in Serbia, providing the following names as alternative in their metadata: Judeo-Spanish, Sephardic, Hakitia, Haketia, Judeo Spanish, Sefardi, Dzhudezmo, Judezmo, Spanyol, Haquetiya.¹⁹ The data for Judezmo in the ELP is actually taken from various other databases and refers to this variety as spoken worldwide. According to the information available from UNESCO's Atlas, Ethnologue and World Oral Literature project, Judezmo is assessed as being *at risk*, all three assessments being "20 precent certain, based on the evidence available". The three databases provide the following numbers of speakers, respectively: 400,000, 110,310, and 110,000. However, the language is also estimated as *severely endangered*, with the estimation being "60 percent certain, based on the evidence available" (source: Salminen 2007). As far as the speaker number trends are concerned, Judezmo is placed at level 4 (*severely endangered*) as "less than half of the community speaks the language, and speaker numbers are decreasing at an accelerated pace". Transmission is placed at level 4 (*severely endangered*), as the language is spoken by

¹⁹ http://www.endangeredlanguages.com/lang/3444. Accessed: October 25, 2020.

many of the grandparent generation, but not by younger generations. As for the places where the language is used, the inventory lists: Greece, Turkey, Balkans, Morocco, United States.

Establishing an exact number of speakers of Judezmo is a complex task, as the speakers are at least bilingual, not equally competent, and scattered across the world (Pons 2019: 144). According to Pons (2019, 118), there are hardly any speaking communities of Judeo-Spanish left in the world; this applies to Serbia as well. Serbian 2002 and 2011 censuses do not explicitly mention Judezmo, but the speakers (if there were any declared) are probably placed in the category *Other languages*.

In the Balkans, Judeo-Spanish became stigmatized during the disintegration of the Ottoman empire and creation of national states in the late 19th c. and the beginning of the 20th c. As its use was perceived as a marker of unwillingness to integrate into the dominant community, negative attitudes towards the language within the community of its speakers developed (Filipović & Vučina Simović 2008, 309). The process of language shift on the territories of the former Yugoslavia was in a nascent stage between the two World Wars (Vučina Simović & Filipović 2009; Vučina Simović 2016). According to Vučina Simović (2013, 184), although Judeo-Spanish started retreating in favour of Serbian as the official and dominant language as a result of the integration of Sephardim into the majority group in the 19th c., the language was maintained until WWII by the oldest and most conservative members of the community and their families.²⁰

The language shift from Judeo-Spanish to Serbian in the Belgrade Sephardic community occurred between 1860s and 1940s (Filipović & Vučina Simović 2008, 313). Despite efforts to slow down the language shift, after the Holocaust the language was completely lost in the territories of the former Yugoslavia (Filipović & Vučina Simović 2008, 315). Only a few Sephardic families in Belgrade maintained the language as a means of communication after WWII, those who came to Belgrade from parts of the Balkans where Judeo-Spanish was better preserved (Vučina Simović 2013, 185). Given their small number, language revival was not possible. According to the Survey *My family* of the Jewish Historical Museum in Belgrade (1979–1980) (as cited in Vučina Simović 2013, 185–186, ff 94), the informants indicated Serbian or Serbo-Croatian as the only language spoken in their homes at the time of the survey, which clearly indicates the language loss.

There is no study which reports on the transmission of the variety to younger generations in Serbia, but Judezmo is rather placed in a broader sociolinguistic context applicable to all Judeo-Spanish linguistic communities. Re-

²⁰ The corpus of Jewish texts published between the two world wars, analysed in Vučina Simović & Mandić (2019) shows that all texts were written in Serbian which suggests that already at the time Serbian represented the dominant language of the Jewish authors.

lying on international research over the past twenty years (e.g. Christodoulos 2008; Romero 2011, 2012; Sarhon 2011), Neda Pons points out that most of the fluent native speakers are bilingual or multilingual, belong to the older generation, whose children's competence is limited, and grandchildren do not speak and do not understand the language (Pons 2019, 144).

It is worth mentioning that the process of revitalization of this variety is gradually taking place worldwide. As of the end of the 20th *c.*, Judezmo started being used in new domains and new media, first and foremost on the Internet.²¹ In the context of Serbia, Pons (2019) emphasizes the existence of a culturalhistorical portal which encompasses texts written about the Jewish community, history and culture, *El mundo sefarad*, dedicated to the Jews of the former Yugoslavia, with the content written mostly in the languages of the former Yugoslavia. The portal also contains an invitation to learn Ladino.²²

Vojvodina Rusyn

Rusyn is a glotonym used to refer to the language of Eastern Slavs, spoken in the Carpathian region of north-east Slovakia, south-westernmost Ukraine and adjoining areas of Poland, Romania and Hungary, as well as by the descendants of migrants from this general region to Vojvodina in Serbia (Baptie 2011, 7). The debate whether Rusyn is a separate language or whether the 'Rusyn idioms' are local varieties of Ukrainian is ongoing in contemporary linguistic studies. The concept 'modern Rusyn language' is a recent phenomenon. The varieties of 'modern Rusyn language' differ greatly from the Ukrainian dialects North and South of the Carpathians. Apart from the internal development of the dialect at all levels, the diversity of the variety 'modern Rusyn language' is the result of different language contacts throughout history (Gibson 2016; Danylenko 2016; Magosci 2016; Moser 2016, among others).

According to UNESCO's Atlas, Vojvodina Rusyn is considered *definitely endangered*. It is spoken in Serbia and Croatia, more precisely in the region of Bačka in Vojvodina and the cross-border areas in Croatia. The estimated number of speakers is 30,000 (according to Stegherr 2002, between 30,000 and 35,000).

Ethnologue locates Rusyn (alternative names: Carpathian, Carpatho-Rusyn, Rusynski, Ruthenian) on the territory of South Bačka in Vojvodina, precisely in Ruski Krstur, with an estimated number of 11,300 speakers (source: 2013 UNSD United Nations Statistic Divisions).²³ The status of Rusyn in Serbia is considered *vigorous* (level 6a^{*}), being guaranteed by the Statute of the

²¹ See Pons 2019 for the analysis of the virtual community *Ladinokomunita*.

²² http://elmundosefarad.wikidot.com/nauci-ladino. Accessed: October 20, 2020.

²³ https://www.ethnologue.com/country/RS/languages. Accessed: November 5, 2020.

Autonomous Province of Vojvodina (articles 6 and 7²⁴). Regarding the size and vitality, Rusyn is assessed as *mid-sized* and *stable*, i.e. not being sustained by formal institutions, but still the norm in the home and community that all children learn and use the language.

ELP does not list Rusyn as endangered in Serbia.

The 2011 Serbian population census registered 14,246 Rusyns and 11,340 speakers of Rusyn in Serbia (Census 2011). The data provided by the census show that the great majority of Rusyns, 12,146, inhabit the Bačka region (the West, South and North districts), which is home to 10,398 speakers of Rusyn. The Charter lists Rusyn among the minority languages in Serbia.

The Rusyn language use has a long tradition in Serbia. The Rusyns were colonised on the territory of Bačka (Austro-Hungary at the time) in the mid-18th c., the first schools being founded shortly after that in Ruski Krstur (1753) and Kucura (1765). In the period between the two world wars, the first Rusyn cultural-educational organizations were established and an intense publishing activity started. After WWII (February 1945) the first Rusyn secondary school was founded in Ruski Krstur, and weekly newspapers started being printed the same year. In 1949 the first radio program in Rusyn was broadcast, and in 1975 the Rusyn department of the Novi Sad Television established. In the beginning of the 1970s the Rusyn Language Department at the Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad was founded.²⁵ The National Council of the Rusyn National Minority was set up in 2002,²⁶ and five years later, in 2007, the Cultural Council of Vojvodina Rusyns²⁷ (Fejsa 2012).

The UNESCO's parameters for assessing language vitality and endangerment were analyzed on the example of Vojvodina Rusyn (Dražović 2018). Thus, as shown, intergenerational language transmission is directly related to the geographical, ethno-demographic and socio-economic factors. In the settlements where Rusyns represent a majority (Ruski Krstur, Đurđevo and Kucura), transmission is continuous and everyday communication in the family and the community takes place in Rusyn. In the regions with smaller number of Rusyns (e.g. Novi Sad) or in settlements outside of Vojvodina region, where Rusyns live in mixed families, the language is spoken by the older and middle generation, while the language is not transmitted to the younger ones. According to Dražović, mixed-marriages and territorial dispersion are two main factors for the disruption of intergenerational language transmission (Dražović, 89-90).

²⁴ https://www.skupstinavojvodine.gov.rs/Strana.aspx?s=statut&j=SRL. Accessed: October 25, 2020.

²⁵ http://www.ff.uns.ac.rs/sr/studijski-programi/osnovne-studije/studijski-programi/rusinski-jezik-i-knjizevnost. Accessed: November 3, 2020.

²⁶ http://rusini.rs/sr/. Accessed: November 3, 2020.

²⁷ https://zavod.rs/srb/. Accessed: November 3, 2020.

The education in the Rusyn language is organized at primary and secondary level, depending on the number of students who attend the classes (Dražović 2018, 95). Regular classes in Rusyn from first to eighth grade can be attended in Ruski Krstur, Kucura and Đurđevo. Other places where Rusyns live do not have this option, due to the small number of pupils, but they can opt for optional classes of Rusyn language with elements of national culture (Fejsa 2012). There are textbooks in Rusyn for all levels of education, and the publishing tradition of responsible institutions is long and fruitful, as well as writing and translating into Rusyn (Dražović 2018, 102).

The media of Vojvodina Rusyn exists in printed, electronic and web format in the Rusyn language. The television program is regularly broadcast in Rusyn on the Radio-television Vojvodina 2. The presence of Rusyn on the Internet depends mostly on private initiatives: apart from the website of the Provincial Secretariat for Education, Regulations, Administration and National Minorities – National Communities,²⁸ there are no official websites translated to Rusyn. Rusyn is not sufficiently used on the social networks and content sharing platforms (Dražović 2018, 101). Research on the use of Rusyn on social networks (Mudri 2012-2013), as well as for electronic communication (text messaging),²⁹ shows the predominant use of Latin over Cyrillic, the official Rusyn script in Serbia, lack of orthographic norms, and the frequent use of English words (Mudri 2012-2013; Fejsa 2013).

According to Dražović, the attitudes of the Rusyn community members towards their mother tongue are positive, as none of the members considers Rusyn as an obstacle in the social and economic development of the community (Dražović 2018, 106). The language is also preserved due to its use in unofficial domains, such as festivals of the Rusyn culture, music and theatre (Dražović 2018, 98).

There is a firm basis for Rusyn language documentation, formed of grammars, orthography textbooks and dictionaries in Rusyn, as well as fruitful and continuous scientific work (Dražović 2018, 107). Given the existence of educational and cultural institutions, it can be inferred that there are conditions of maintaining the vitality of Rusyn. Besides, census data (Census 2011) show that 79.6% Rusyns consider Rusyn their mother tongue.

Romani

Romani is an Indo-Aryan language spoken today in Europe, North and South America, and Australia by at least 3-4 million speakers. Romani linguists dis-

²⁸ http://www.puma.vojvodina.gov.rs/index.php?lang=6. Accessed: October 23, 2020.

²⁹ For the data on the use of Rusyn in the SMS communication, the author (Fejsa 2013) uses unpublished research conducted by Helena Papuga and Aleksandra Grbić, presented at a students' conference.

tinguish at least 4 large branches of Romani dialects: North (Northwestern and Northeastern), Central, Vlax, and Balkan, all of which can be further divided into subgroups of dialects and varieties (Matras 2004, 12; see also Elšík & Beníšek 2020 for a more detailed differentiation of 12 Romani dialects). As all Romani speakers are bilingual or multilingual, and their language often stigmatized, Romani has been highly susceptible to the influence of contact languages, at all levels of the linguistic structure (see Friedman 2020; Meyer 2020; Bodnárová & Wiedner 2020, among others).

According to UNESCO's Atlas, Romani (alternate names in the inventory: Sinti, Vlax, Calò) is considered *definitely endangered*. The number of Romani speakers in Serbia is not provided, while the estimated speakers' population worldwide is 3.5 million (source: Matras 2002). It is mainly spoken in East-Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the Balkans.

Ethnologue distinguishes 4 endangered Romani varieties in Serbia and provides the data separately for each of them, namely Balkan Romani,³⁰ Sinte Romani,³¹ Vlax Romani³² and Romano-Serbian.³³

Romani, Balkan (alternate names in the inventory: Roma, "Balkan Gypsy" (pej.), including the following dialects: Arli (Arlije, Kosovan Arli), Prizren (Kosovan Romani), Tinners Romani, Bugurdži Romani (Arabadži, Kovački, Rabadži), Pazardžik Kalajdži)) is said to be spoken in the area of Kosovo, with a speakers' population of 101,000 in Serbia (source: 2013 UNSD). Its endangerment is assessed at level 5* (*developing*). Regarding the size and vitality, Balkan Romani is treated as *mid-sized* and *stable*, i.e. not being sustained by formal institutions, but still at home and in the community the norm is that all children learn and use the language.

Romani, Sinte (alternate names in the inventory: Romanes, Sasítka Romá, Sinte, Sinti, including the following dialects: Abbruzzesi, Slovenian-Croatian Romani, Serbian Romani) is registered as spoken in the areas of Belgrade City, Jablanica, Nišava, Pčinja, and Pirot districts and scattered in Kosovo. Its status is assessed as *dispersed* (level 5^{*}). The estimated number of speakers in Serbia is 31,000 (30,000 Serbian, 1,000 Manouche). Regarding the size and vitality, Sinte Romani is treated as *mid-sized* and *institutional*, i.e. developed to the point that it is used and sustained by institutions beyond the home and community.

Romani, Vlax (alternate name in the inventory: Rom, including the following dialects: Lovari, Kalderash (Serbian Kalderash), Gurbet (Dzambazi,

³⁰ https://www.ethnologue.com/language/rmn. Accessed: November 4, 2020.

³¹ https://www.ethnologue.com/language/rmo. Accessed: November 4, 2020.

³² https://www.ethnologue.com/language/rmy. Accessed: November 4, 2020.

³³ https://www.ethnologue.com/language/rsb. Accessed: November 4, 2020.

Gurbetsky)) is said to be widespread in Serbia. Its status is assessed as *vigorous* (level 6a*). The number of speakers in Serbia is not provided. Regarding size and vitality, Vlax Romani is treated as *mid-sized* and *stable*.

Romano-Serbian (alternate name in the inventory: Tent Gypsy) is said to be spoken in the Srem district in Serbia by 78,000 speakers. Its status is assessed as *vigorous* (level 6a*). Regarding size and vitality, Romano-Serbian is treated as *mid-sized* and *stable*.

ELP mentions 5 Romani varieties as endangered in Serbia, namely Balkan Romani,³⁴ Baltic Romani,³⁵ Carpathian Romani,³⁶ Sinte Romani³⁷ and Vlax Romani.³⁸

For Balkan Romani (alternate names in the inventory: Romany, Gypsy, Cigány, Zigeuner, European Romany, Romani, Balkan), ELP provides information from various databases. According to Ethnologue (2016), this linguistic variety is *at risk*, the assessment being "20 precent certain, based on the evidence available". It is spoken by 611,800 people worldwide, including 101,000 speakers in Serbia (source: 2013 UNSD). According to a previous version of Ethnologue (2009), Balkan Romani is also *at risk*, with a 20% certainty, being spoken by 709,570 people worldwide, including 120,000 speakers in Serbia (100,000 of which are Arlija, 20,000 Dzambazi). According to the World Oral History Project, the status and certainty level are the same as in the previous databases, and the overall number of speakers is 523,900. More precise information can be found on the Balkan Romani variety of Ajios Athanasios spoken in Greece, which is assessed as vulnerable with 80 precent certainty.

The data concerning Baltic Romani is provided for Poland; the data on Carpathian Romani refers to the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The data on Sinte Romani is the same as reported in Ethnologue (2009); the variety is assessed as being *at risk* (with 20 percent certainty, based on the evidence available), with 318,920 speakers worldwide (31,000 in Serbia). The data for Vlax Romani is taken from Ethnologue, as well. The variety is assessed as being *at risk* with 885,970 speakers worldwide. Additional information is provided from Hancock (1995), with the variety being assessed as *safe*.

When it comes to official figures of Romani speakers in Serbia, they increased from 82,242 (Census 2002) to 100,668 speakers (Census 2011).³⁹ The

³⁴ http://www.endangeredlanguages.com/lang/5342. Accessed: October 24, 2020.

³⁵ http://www.endangeredlanguages.com/lang/5341. Accessed: October 24, 2020.

³⁶ http://www.endangeredlanguages.com/lang/3263. Accessed: October 24, 2020.

³⁷ http://www.endangeredlanguages.com/lang/5343. Accessed: October 24, 2020.

³⁸ http://www.endangeredlanguages.com/lang/5346. Accessed: October 24, 2020.

³⁹ One of the main reasons why the number of Romani speakers, as well as of people who declared as the Roma, increased between the two censuses is the process of readmission and repatriation of Roma from Western European countries during the first decade of the 21st c.

number of speakers clearly differs from the number of people who declared themselves as Roma (108,193 in the 2002 Census and 147,604 in the 2011 Census). The censuses collect data on Romani without providing information on the exact dialect which Romani speakers use.

As for the legislative framework, Romani is recognized as a minority language by the Charter and the above-mentioned laws are applicable to this language. When it comes to standardization, as Bašić points out, the Romani National Council passed the Resolution on the standardization of the Romani language in 2013 ("Official Gazette of the RS", no. 27, March 17, 2014), thus removing a burden in organizing the education in Romani and developing the literary language of the Roma (Bašić 2018, 25). However, according to Lukin Saitović (2018, 32-33) the standardization of Romani in Serbia and the region is an ongoing, long-term process which started during the period of Yugoslavia and resulted in rather divergent processes of language planning in the successor states.⁴⁰

In the domain of education, primary schools with a sufficient number of interested students organize classes of Romani. For this purpose the language textbooks for the students from the first to the fourth grade were published in 2018 by the national Institute for Textbook Publishing and Teaching Aids (authors Rajko Đurić and Ljuan Koko) and their use was approved by the the Provincial Secretariat for Education, Regulations, Administration and National Minorities – National Communities.⁴¹ Although there are numerous pupils interested in attending the classes across the country, the main problem is competent teaching staff. As for Romani teaching, a significant step forward was made by creating the department for Romani at the Faculty of Philology of the University of Belgrade, which allowed Roma and non-Roma students to learn Romani and obtain certificates necessary for them to be to employed as Romani teachers at schools (Bašić 2018, 24-25). Regrettably, the department closed due to the insufficient number of the Faculty's students interested in Romani

After signing a series of bilateral agreements with EU countries on readmission, in 2007 the Republic of Serbia passed the Law on the Confirmation the Agreement between the Republic of Serbia and the European Community on the Readmission of Persons Residing without Authorization (*Zakon o potvrđivanju Sporazuma između Republike Srbije i Evropske zajednice o readmisiji lica koja nezakonito borave*). Available at: http://www.mup.gov.rs/ wps/wcm/connect/7a5c4001-f14a-4fbf-8e6b-79212c0000e7/Zakon+0+ratifikaciji+Sp orazuma+0+readmisiji+lica+koja+nezakonito+borave+izmedu+EU+i+R+Srbije-lat. pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=mtrtvEb. Accessed: October 22, 2020.

⁴⁰ As the relevant books aimed at standardizing Romani, the author mentions the monographs on the Romani grammar, standardization and orthography written by Rajko Đurić (Đurić 2005, 2011, 2012). It is noteworthy that Đurić 2012 has served as a basis for standardization of Romani in Serbia.

⁴¹ The authors of this paper are not familiar if the textbooks are officially used only in Vojvodina or in the other parts of Serbia as well.

(Ćirković 2018, 245). In addition, Romani is being taught at the College for Preschool Education "Mihailo Pavlov" in Vršac (Ćirković 2018, 245). Furthermore, the project *Quality Education in Romani for Europe* (QUALIROM) offers teaching materials in six Romani varieties ranging from proficiency levels A1 to B2 for learners on primary, secondary and tertiary levels and the materials for the Gurbet Romani varieties are provided in Romani, English and Serbian.⁴² Important efforts to explore and maintain the culture and language of the Roma in Serbia are taken by the Board for the Study of Life and Customs of Roma of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts.

The inclusion of Romani in the electronic media has only been partly controlled and organized with institutional support, but mostly conducted without a clear plan by various NGOs and private initiatives (Lukin Saitović 2018, 33). In the domain of media worth mentioning is the Radio-television Vojvodina 2 which regularly broadcasts the program in Romani and also releases the news translated into Romani on the website of the Radio-television Vojvodina.⁴³

Regardless of the legislation and institutionalization of Romani, the linguistic situation is complicated as several dialects and their varieties are spoken on the territory of Serbia. The existing linguistic literature attests two major groups of dialects on the territory of Serbia, namely Balkan and Vlax, both of which have a major geographical distribution in the Balkans and large numbers of speakers (Matras 2004, 6–8; Elšík & Beníšek 2020, see the work cited in, especially Boretzky 1993, 1994, 1996). Of the South Balkan dialects, the Arli-type of dialects are mentioned in Serbia (Borezky 1996; Elšík & Beníšek 2020, 400), while of the North Balkan, the Drindari-Kalajdži-Bugurdži group is registered in Kosovo (Elšík & Beníšek 2020, 401, see Boretzky 1993 for Bugurdži). Of the South Vlax dialects, Gurbet is said to be spoken in Serbia and other countries of the former Yugoslavia (Elšík & Beníšek 2020, 405, see also Uhlik 1973). Of the North Vlax dialects, Kalderaš is an out-migrant variety spoken in Serbia (Boretzky 1993, 4; Elšík & Beníšek 2020, 405) and Lovari is attested in Vojvodina (Matras 2004, 8).⁴⁴

⁴² The Gurbet material is available at: http://qualirom.uni-graz.at/teaching/8/materials. html. Accessed: November 9, 2020.

⁴³ Available at: https://www.rtv.rs/rom/. Accessed November 5, 2020.

⁴⁴ According to Ćirković, the private collection of Mozes Heinschink archived in the Phonogrammarchiv of the Austrian Academy of Science encompasses audio material recorded in various Romani communities in Serbia, such as Tamara, Ali, Xoraxane, Sinte, Lovari, Gurbet, Kalderaš, Bayash in the cities of Belgrade, Mladenovac, Jagodina, Ćuprija, Novi Sad, Niš, Leskovac, Vranje and Vranjska Banja (Ćirković 2018, 232). The collection is available at: http://catalog.phonogrammarchiv.at/sessions.php?sortieren=&action=auskunft&von =projekte&id_projekte=1&vonBis=0-9&suchbegriff?projekt-id&suchwert=1. Accessed: October 22, 2020.

What makes the situation complex from a sociolinguistic perspective is the fact that it is extremely difficult to establish the exact number of speakers of particular Romani varieties. For instance, the linguistic situation in the area of the town of Knjaževac in Eastern Serbia can serve as an illustration of this complexity. In the area of Knjaževac, it was established that the three Roma groups reside, namely Arli, Gurbet and Lejash; while the latter two speak Gurbet and Lejash varieties, the former one has lost the language and shifted to Serbian (Ćirković & Mirić 2017; Sikimić 2017, 2018). Additionally, due to mixed marriages between the members of the Gurbet and Lejash community and the dominance of the Gurbet variety in the area, Lejash speakers are multilingual in both Romani varieties and Serbian (Ćirković 2018, 239). Moreover, the Gurbet variety in the area is reported as transmitted to the younger generation of speakers, with significant attempts of the local officials towards language maintenance through school classes of Romani as a minority language and language workshops organized by the local library (see more in Mirić 2019).

The vast majority of Romani speakers who have maintained their language are bilingual or multilingual. Romani is typically used within the family and local community, while in the larger community the Roma tend to speak Serbian. Unlike other minority languages spoken in Serbia, Romani has been particularly stigmatized and negative attitudes towards the language and its speakers have been reported both within the local Roma communities and the majority community (Baucal 2012; Jerončić 2016, Mirić 2019). We should also mention that Romani is completely absent in the linguistic landscape of Serbia, as there is no top-down or bottom-up signage in any Romani varieties. These circumstances additionally affect the vitality of Romani and need to be taken into account when assessing its endangerment in Serbia.

4.2. Languages and linguistic varieties not listed as vulnerable or endangered in the international inventories

Apart from the above-discussed languages and linguistic varieties, based on our field research of the last 15 years in Serbia, we estimate that there are at least three more languages and linguistic varieties which have not been included in any inventory of vulnerable languages in Serbia: Megleno-Romanian, Bayash Romanian and Vlach Romanian. The reason behind this is, most probably, exclusive reliance on older or unproven sources and insufficient familiarity with the linguistic reality of the region.

Megleno-Romanian

Megleno-Romanian is an Eastern Romance variety structurally related to Aromanian, Istro-Romanian and Romanian, originally spoken in the area where the Vardar (Axios) River crosses the North Macedonian-Greek border northwest of Salonika. Megleno-Romanian is viewed by some as a separate Romance language, a dialect of Aromanian, an intermediary between Romanian and Aromanian (Kahl 2014; Maiden 2016), but most often as a dialect of Romanian (Capidan 1925; Atanasov 2002; Saramandu 2004).

Megleno-Romanian is considered *severely endangered* by the UNESCO's Atlas and *threatened* by both Ethnologue⁴⁵ and ELP,⁴⁶ with a total number of 5,000 speakers, in Greece and North Macedonia. None of the three inventories mention that Megleno-Romanian is also spoken in Serbia.

The presence of Megleno-Romanians in Serbia, namely in Vojvodina, is the result of colonisations made by the Yugoslav Communist Party after the end of WWII. The displacement of population groups from Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Bosanska Krajina, Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia was meant to strengthen the South-Slav element present in Vojvodina, where a mainly non-Slavic population was living. Among the Macedonians colonized here there was also a small group of Aromanian and Megleno-Romanian speaking "Vlachs", who went unnoticed in the mass of Macedonian Slavs. Macedonian linguist Petar Atanasov mentions that "at the end of World War II, several Megleno-Romanian families from Huma moved to Gevgelija, and others to Vojvodina, settling in the villages of Jabuka, Kačarevo and Gudurica, where the Germans had left from" (Atanasov 2002, 11).

The exact number of Megleno-Romanians established in Vojvodina is not known, as well as the number of returnees to North Macedonia, as they have never been registered as a separate ethnicity at censuses. Nevertheless, the presence of several families of Megleno-Romanians in the village Gudurica was attested in 2014, together with an assessment of the number of speakers, status of the language and presenting first samples of speech, from two elder interlocutors, whose families arrived there in 1946 (Sorescu-Marinković & Măran 2014). Important to mention, the interlocutors emphasized that Magleno-Romanian was used only within the family and knowledge of the language was kept secret. Two years later, the authors who signalled the presence of Megleno-Romanians in Serbia and the fact that the language was still spoken by the older generation, which however consisted of a handful of individuals, detailed: "Today, there are probably a few tens of Meglen Vlachs in the Serbian Banat and probably the same number in the Romanian part of Banat as well" (Sorescu-Marinković & Măran 2016, 204). On this occasion, the authors also warned that field research in Jabuka, the other village where Megleno-Romanians were colonised, was of utmost importance for documenting this extremely vulnerable variety, on its way to extinction in Serbia (Sorescu-Marinković & Măran 2016, 206).

⁴⁵ https://www.ethnologue.com/language/ruq. Accessed: November 4, 2020.

⁴⁶ http://www.endangeredlanguages.com/lang/3382. Accessed: October 25, 2020.

Vlach Romanian

Apart from the Romanian minority living in Vojvodina, (modern) Romanian is mother tongue to two other communities in Serbia: the Vlachs of Eastern Serbia and the Bayash. While the Romanians of Vojvodina speak both standard Romanian, which is acquired in school and used in the media, church and local administration, and the dialectal, non-dominant variety (Flora 1971; Sikimić 2014), the other two communities speak only non-standard varieties (Sikimić 2014; Sikimić & Sorescu-Marinković 2013; Sorescu-Marinković 2011).

UNESCO's Atlas and ELP do not register Vlach Romanian as an endangered variety in Serbia, while *Ethnologue* erroneously mentions that Romanian (*vigorous*) is spoken in Serbia in the "South Bačka district: Timok valley", providing a number of 29,100 speakers, obviously referring to the Romanians in Vojvodina only.

The presence of Vlach Romanians on the Serbian territory is mainly due to spontaneous migrations from North to South of the Danube, in the 18th and 19th c. It is possible that the newcomers encountered and merged with a previous layer of Romanized population, but this theory lacks convincing evidence. Vlach Romanian "has developed independently from Romania Romanian, with which it had, until recently, only occasional and isolated contact" (Hutanu & Sorescu-Marinković 2018a, 241). Due to intense and prolonged contact with Serbian, it is characterized by a relative linguistic distance from standard Romanian. Lexical, grammatical and pragmatic markers clearly differentiate it from the standard variety, while the phonological markers are an indication of its dialectal origin. At the moment, this non-standard Romanian variety seems to be undergoing a process of division through Ausbau, which increases even more the distance from the standard variety, which underwent a significant process of modernization in the second half of the 19th c., manifested especially through lexical borrowing from Romance languages, meant to reduce the use of the Slavic vocabulary.

The 2011 Census lists 43,095 speakers of Vlach Romanian, located mainly in Eastern Serbia, which makes 0.59% of the total population of the country, whereas community members give much higher estimates regarding the size of the community and number of speakers, which go up to several hundred thousand. For a long time, the use of Vlach Romanian has been restricted to the family domain, due to the low prestige, both with the ingroup and with the outgroup, feelings of inferiority and significant self-stigmatization of this variety in comparison with the standard variety, but also the lack of rights of speakers and attempts at language assimilation (Huṭanu & Sorescu-Marinković 2018a, 240). This, coupled with massive migration to Western European countries taking place in the last five decades and depopulation of the villages which the Vlach Romanians originally inhabited, is also the reason why intergenerational language transmission is today seriously affected (Huțanu & Sorescu-Marinković 2015, 207).

Until recently, Vlach Romanian has been an exclusively oral language, with no written tradition. Following an isolated attempt in the 1940s to create a writing system for the variety, there have been no significant endeavours until the beginning of 2000. After this date, several actions aimed at developing orthographies for this non-standardized variety emerged, fuelled by the different ideological orientations of their creators (Huțanu & Sorescu-Marinković 2018b). In 2015, based on one of these orthographic solutions and several recent publications in the variety, the Vlach National Council passed the resolution for standardization of the Vlach language. Nevertheless, the decision has been intensely debated ever since, as the pro-Romanian faction within the fragmented Vlach community strongly opposed it, and has not triggered the expected change in the official status and use of the language. There is still no state-endorsed signage in Vlach Romanian and the language is not used in administration. However, private, bottom-up inscriptions in Vlach Romanian, using different spelling systems, started being recently noticed in the linguistic landscape of Eastern Serbia, which might indicate a change in the status of the variety (Hutanu & Sorescu-Marinković 2016).

As far as education is concerned, in 2013 Vlach Romanian was introduced as an optional subject, Vlach speech with elements of national culture, in a few schools in Eastern Serbia (Manovich 2014; Huțanu & Sorescu-Marinković 2015), following the printing of the first textbooks in this variety. At the same time, several other schools started offering, for the first time in the history of the region, optional classes in standard Romanian.

The online use of Vlach Romanian is timid and scarce, with only a handful of websites offering a partial interface in Vlach Romanian and a few forums where visitors occasionally comment in Vlach Romanian. Nevertheless, lately one can witness an increase in the use of the variety on Facebook and Instagram profiles set up by Vlach Romanians, which are rapidly gaining fans and followers (Sorescu-Marinković & Huțanu 2019, 75).

The inclusion of Vlach Romanian among the endangered linguistic varieties in Serbia was nevertheless attempted by the commission Vanishing Languages and Cultural Heritage (VLACH) of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, whose goal is to "document and analyse the vanishing linguistic and cultural diversity throughout the world".⁴⁷ One of the priorities of VLACH is to support the dialectological diversity of the Romanian language; the Romanian varieties

⁴⁷ https://www.oeaw.ac.at/vlach/mission. Accessed: October 10, 2020.

included here are: Boyash/Rudar, Timok Romanian/Vlach, Transylvanian Romanian and Moldovan Romanian.⁴⁸

Bayash Romanian

The second Romanian non-standard variety spoken in Serbia, whose status is even more vulnerable than that of Vlach Romanian, is Bayash Romanian. The Bayash, also known as Rudari or Romanian Gypsies, are spread all over Serbia and the Balkans. They originate in the Danubian Principalities of Moldova and Wallachia (nowadays Romania), where they have most probably been slaves until the mid-19th c. After the abolition of slavery, they crossed the Danube and settled along riverbanks, where they could find the soft wood needed to pursue their traditional occupation, wood carving (Sikimić 2005).

Unlike the Vlachs, the Bayash do not form anywhere in Serbia compact communities. Bayash Romanian, the mother tongue of the Bayash, who, even if considered Roma, do not speak Romani, has also developed independently from the standard variety, and has been thoroughly influenced by Serbian, the contact language. Like in the case of Vlach Romanian, lexical, grammatical and pragmatic markers clearly differentiate it from the standard variety, while phonological markers indicate not an internal development, but its dialectal origin – the Muntenia or Transylvania dialects of Romanian.

UNESCO's Atlas and ELP do not register Bayash Romanian as an endangered variety anywhere in Europe. However, Ethnologue lists Bayash among Romanian language dialects, together with Moldavian, Muntenian (Walachian), Transylvanian and Banat, with the mention that "Bayash are Roma whose dialect is based on Banat, but influenced by Balkan Romani and Hungarian".⁴⁹ Again, the information offered by Ethnologue is erroneous, as there is no evidence that Bayash Romanian has been influenced by Balkan Romani. The inventory further registers this variety only in Hungary, as Boyash Romanian, a dialect of the Romanian language, which is assessed as level 4, *educational*.

Hungary has indeed emerged as the only country in which a special spelling system was created for Bayash Romanian, based on the orthographic rules of Hungarian, and standardization efforts have been made during the last 15 years (Orsós 2015). Croatia has also witnessed the emergence of different spelling systems and printing of most diverse publications in the Bayash variety (Radosavljević 2020). In Serbia, there is no orthography available in the Bayash community and the variety lives on solely as an oral language, with a highly limited domain of use, within the family and as a secret language (Sorescu-

⁴⁸ https://www.oeaw.ac.at/vlach/projects/basic-projects-2016-2021/romanian-varieties. Accessed: October 10, 2020.

⁴⁹ https://www.ethnologue.com/language/ron. Accessed: November 4, 2020.

Marinković 2011, 20). There is great lexical and phonetic variation from settlement to settlement, due to the different dialectal basis and migration routes.

In Serbia so far there is no institutionalized instruction in Bayash Romanian or language planning, and the variety has not gained ground within school, media or administration. After World War II there was an attempt to introduce standard Romanian in the schools attended by Bayash North of the Danube, but they were short lived (Sorescu-Marinković 2011, 26), as were the optional classes in the village of Vajska, Bačka district, started in 2009, but discontinued a few years later.

In spite of the lack of governmental and institutional support for the variety, and the low prestige it has both among the outgroup and the ingroup, the intergenerational transmission seems to be satisfactory. This is probably due to the fact that the Bayash most often live in isolated, ghettoized settlements, and assimilation to the majority population is weak. However, in mixed Romanian-Bayash or Vlach-Bayash settlements, the more prestigious local non-Bayash Romanian variety is taken up especially by younger Bayash (Sikimić and Sorescu-Marinković 2013, 171). Frequent code-switching and code-mixing phenomena are the rule in the speech of the Bayash, and "among those living in a purely Serbian speaking environment, a tendency to lose proficiency in the mother tongue can be observed" (Sorescu-Marinković 2011, 24).

The Bayash have not shown up in official censuses until a decade ago, when the 2011 Serbian population census provided a number of 80 Bayash in the Bačka district (Census 2011). Nevertheless, their real number is much higher, of probably several thousand people, as anthropological and sociolinguistic field research in the beginning in the 21st c. attested that they inhabit more than 150 settlements in Serbia (Sikimić 2005, 10-12).

As mentioned before, the Boyash/Rudar variety of Romanian was included among the Romanian linguistic varieties which need documentation by the VLACH Commission. According to VLACH, "Boyash/Rudari subvarieties are today highly endangered".⁵⁰

5. Critical survey of the international inventories

In this section, we will point to the wide discrepancies between the existing inventories which list endangered languages and linguistic varieties (UNESCO's Atlas, Ethnologue and ELP) and discuss possible reasons. First, we will present the previous scholarship on this matter and continue with an evaluation of the databases departing from the data on the linguistic varieties presented above.

⁵⁰ https://www.oeaw.ac.at/vlach/collections/romanian-varieties/boyash/rudar. Accessed: October 10, 2020.

Even though the assessment provided by the inventories is widely used as a starting point for sociolinguistic research, identifying languages at risk and tailoring policies to maintain, revitalize and safeguard particular varieties, during the last two decades linguists with an expertise in minority languages in Europe voiced doubts with regard to the accuracy of data presented. Romani studies scholars were probably among the most vocal, as, in spite of its relatively high number of speakers, the UNESCO's Atlas considers Romani as definitely endangered. Halwachs (2020) suggested that the UNESCO criteria are applied in this way to Romani as a whole, while as a dispersed language, its vitality should be assessed in relation to individual dialects. Leggio and Matras (2017) suggested that the problem, both with the UNESCO criteria and EGIDS, is that they are characterised by a form of methodological nationalism, as "both indicators assume that a language must conform to the model of the nation-state and thus function in all possible domains through a standard and serve as an ideological rallying point" (Leggio & Matras 2017, 257).

Critical voices have also been heard regarding the assessment of endangered languages in Serbia. Even if the UNESCO's Atlas classifies Banat Bulgarian as definitely endangered, for example, linguists have shown that this data does not distinguish between the language situation in Serbia and Romania. In Serbia, Banat Bulgarian is much more threatened than in Romania, and has to be in fact classified either as severely or critically endangered (Sikimić & Nomaći 2016, 14).

The criticism was not directed only towards the final assessment of particular languages, but also towards the accuracy of the scientific principles applied by the inventories, in spite of their undoubtable value and exhaustiveness. Thus, Ethnologue (the 16/17/18th editions) was criticized for frequently lacking citations and failing to articulate clear propositions of language classification and identification, which is at odds with well-established scientific principles: "From a scientific perspective, there is really only one serious fault with E16/ E17/E18, namely, that the source for the information presented is not systematically indicated. Furthermore, the introduction contains a number of items where the description of the principles behind E16/E17/E18 is questionable" (Hammarström 2015, 735).

The divergent data and status of particular languages in the UNESCO's Atlas, Ethnologue and ELP indicate that the factors and criteria for language vitality assessment must be carefully evaluated, in order to determine weaker and stronger factors contributing to the vitality of each language. When it comes to particular languages and linguistic varieties whose vitality has been assessed for Serbia, these inventories require more precision with regard to the following information.

Firstly, the estimated number of speakers often refers to the larger population, not to the estimated population in a particular country, e.g. Serbia. For instance, UNESCO's estimated numbers of speakers of Aromanian (500,000), Judezmo (400,000) and Romani (3.5 million) refer to the worldwide population, while the estimated numbers for Banat Bulgarian (25,000) and Vojvodina Rusyn (30,000) probably do not distinguish between the speakers in Serbia and Romania in case of Banat Bulgarian or between Serbia and Croatia in case of Vojvodina Rusyn. Even when it comes to the worldwide population, in case of Judezmo, for example, estimates greatly differ from the figure offered by the UNESCO'S Atlas of 400,000 speakers: according to Harris (2011), in 2009 there were only 11,000 speakers of Judezmo in the world (3,000 in the USA, 8,000 in Israel and Turkey). Therefore, at least official census numbers as well as the available data from the (socio)linguistic literature ought to be included in the estimation.

Secondly, the level of endangerment in the inventories typically refers to the worldwide speaking communities, not to that in a particular country. For instance, although Judezmo is treated as severely endangered (UNESCO's Atlas) and endangered (ELP), in Serbia this variety is clearly extinct (Vučina Simović 2016). As for Vojvodina Rusyn, Ethnologue assesses it as *vigorous*, which means that "the language is used orally by all generations of speakers and transmitted to children as their first language". However, Rusyn in Vojvodina is not just an oral language, but a written language as well, used in the domains of education, culture, literature, administration, etc. (Dražović 2018). In the case of Aromanian, its assessment as institutional is clearly not applicable to Serbia, as this language is not recognized as a minority language. As for Romani, Ethnologue assesses Sinte Romani as institutional; although this might be true for some European countries, the use of this particular Romani variety is not institutionalized in Serbia; what is more, there is no data to attest the use of Sinte Romani in Serbia. Furthermore, the case of Romani in Serbia shows that the vitality of one dialect or variety may vary diatopically to a large extent, as the same dialect may be spoken within the local community and families and transmitted to younger generations in one area, while in other areas it may be subject to language shift or complete loss. In addition, the dominance of a particular variety may be influenced by the mixed-marriages of the members of different Romani communities. An accurately assessed level of endangerment in each country is crucial in order to take adequate measures towards language maintenance and revitalization.

Thirdly, varieties spoken in Serbia are sometimes inaccurately located in the databases. For instance, although Ethnologue offers the most accurate data regarding the number of speakers of Rusyn in Serbia, it also contains several errors. Ruski Krstur is indeed the place (village) with the higher numbers of Rusyn in Serbia, but Ethnologue wrongly locates it in South Bačka, not in West Bačka district. The same is true for Romanian, which is said to be spoken in the "South Bačka district: Timok valley", which are in fact two different regions of Serbia, one North, the other South of the Danube.

Further imprecisions have been observed as well. Ethnologue provides inaccurate information on Vojvodina Rusyn: the Status of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina guarantees the Rusyns, as national minority, constitutional equality through article 6, not article 7, which refers to encouraging and preserving multilingualism and the languages of national minorities in the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina.

Likewise, even if Ethnologue registers 24 languages in Serbia, on the graph showing the profile of languages in Serbia with respect to their level of vitality, there are only 17 languages presented, of which 7 are considered institutional and 10 stable. Mention is made of the fact that "each individual language that has an entry for Serbia is included in the profile", the horizontal axis representing the estimated level of vitality, and the height of each bar indicating the number of languages that are estimated to be at the given level.⁵¹ The same is true for the graph showing the profile of languages in Serbia with respect to their status of language development versus language endangerment, which again presents only 17 languages.⁵²

Besides, dialectal variation is not properly taken into account in the inventories, which most severely affects the assessment of the vitality of Romani varieties in Serbia. UNESCO's Atlas does not distinguish between Romani varieties, offering the number of speakers and the level of endangerment for Romani as a whole. On the other hand, different varieties are listed in the ELP for Serbia, however, the actual data concerning Baltic Romani are provided for Poland, whereas the data on Carpathian Romani refer to the Czech Republic and Slovakia. These two varieties are generally not said to be spoken in Serbia, so it is unknown why the ELP mentions them in Serbia. Dialectal variation must be taken into consideration when assessing the vitality of Romani, as not all varieties are equally endangered throughout Serbia or other countries. Also in the case of Judezmo, the international inventories treat all varieties under the same alternate names, not taking into account diachronic, diatopic or functional differentiation.

The lack of precise definitions of the linguistic terminology in the international inventories and the relationship between a language and a dialect is another issue which deserves careful consideration. The case of Torlak clearly points towards this fact, as it is listed as a "vulnerable language" by UNESCO's Atlas. *Torlak* is a linguonim, frequently used in Western-Europan and Russian literature to refer to a complex of balkanized West South Slavic dialects spoken on the territories of the Eastern and Southern Serbia, westernmost parts of Bul-

⁵¹ https://www.ethnologue.com/vitality/RS. Accessed: October 10, 2020.

⁵² https://www.ethnologue.com/profile/RS. Accessed: October 10, 2020.

garia and northern parts of North Macedonia.⁵³ Although this linguonim was used in the 20st century by prominent Serbian dialectologists (see Ivić 1991; Brozović & Ivić 1988; Peco 1991), the term *Prizren-Timok dialectal zone* is preferred in the current Serbian dialectological literature to refer to a Serbian part of the Torlak dialect group (Ivić 2009; Miloradović 2019).

Although the UNESCO's Atlas mentions that it follows the elastic concept of the difference between the concepts of 'language' and 'dialect' (Moseley 2010a, 19), the example of "Torlak" shows that the selection of linguistic varieties included in the Atlas must be approached very carefully. Intergenerational transmission is the main criterion the UNESCO's Atlas uses to assess the level of endangerment of a linguistic variety. In the case of "Torlak" as a dialect of Serbian, it is difficult to estimate the degree of transmission from the older to the younger generation, especially taking into account that the relation between the non-standard linguistic varieties spoken in the Prizren-Timok dialectal zone and standard Serbian in Serbia is one of diglossia, not of bilingualism. Factors such as mass-media, education, migration and depopulation, among others, play an important role in switching from dialect to standard language or to one of the transitional varieties (on a scale from dialect to standard language), even among the oldest speakers of the dialect.

Other factors included in the Language Vitality Index are also debatable. For example, it is difficult to estimate the absolute number of speakers of a particular dialect, especially under current circumstances: within one dialect, mainly non-standard, there is an entire scale of transitional varieties which are in opposition, or forming a relation of diglossia with the standard language. Furthermore, it is questionable whether a 'base dialect' still exists today, under the influence of mass-media, schooling and migration, and whether it should be used exclusively to assess its vitality or endangerment. The factor 'proportion of speakers within the total population' is particularly problematic, as in addition to the Prizren-Timok dialects there are also other Serbian dialects which do not form the base of standard language, thus it is not clear which speakers are included in the calculation and to whom they relate to. The situation is similar with other LVI factors (i.e. material for language education and literacy, governmental and institutional language attitudes and policies), which neglect the dominant use of the standard language and its prestigious status.

Finally, as we have shown on the example of Megleno-Romanian, Bayash Romanian and Vlach Romanian in Serbia, the international databases do not provide a comprehensive assessment of all (potentially) endangered linguistic varieties in Serbia, leaving them invisible to a wider sociolinguistic community.

⁵³ Additionally, this complex of dialects encompasses some insular South Slavic varieties spoken in Romania and Bulgaria (Belić 1905; Ivić 1985, 2009; Soboljev 1994, 1995; Sobolev 1998).

The inaccuracy and wide differences between these international inventories for language vitality assessment, as far as Serbia is concerned, probably have several reasons. As it has been highlighted, it is not always clear where the data regarding a particular language come from, nor what principles of language classification are used. The differences between the inventories are, definitely, also due to the partly different criteria used by each of them. However, applying all the factors encompassed by a specific scale is very demanding and resource consuming, which is why they use only a few criteria to assess language endangerment. Which is why, in case of smaller countries, like Serbia, and low-resource languages, the international databases rely mainly on external contributors and the available literature in English, which in many cases is insufficient and not accurate enough. Using only part of the sociolinguistic criteria established for determining language endangerment will definitely render the results faulty.

Furthermore, in the case of languages with several (larger) communities of speakers, the assessed level of endangerment might not be applicable to all communities and may show significant regional variation. The discrepancy between the assessments of Romani varieties in Serbia according to the three international inventories emphasizes the need for a more precise investigation of Romani as a language and its dialects and varieties spoken in Serbia.

After taking a closer look into the data regarding the endangered languages and linguistic varieties in Serbia, it seems that the information on a particular linguistic variety were often copied from the same sources, but also repeatedly emerging from one version or edition of an inventory to the other without correcting and refining the data or consulting the figures and estimates coming from particular countries.

6. Conclusion

As we have said in the beginning, these comprehensive catalogues of the world's languages are invaluable tools which contain an impressive amount of data on thousands of vulnerable or endangered languages and linguistic varieties across the globe. As it is to be expected and almost inevitable in the case projects with such a broad aim, they encompass, together with extraordinary amounts of information, a big volume of vagueness, derived from imprecise language definition, inconsistent or selective application of criteria, varying and sometimes unreliable sources, lack of local trustworthy sources. Despite the numerous shortcomings, they are today widely used by sociolinguists and communities, being the main starting point for language revitalization measures. Even if one has to pool or compare the results of different databases, as we have done, certain tendencies in language development can be deduced.

However, in case of smaller countries, like Serbia, and low-resource languages, like most of the endangered languages spoken in the country, the databases can prove particularly inaccurate, and the error margin might be much bigger than otherwise. On the other hand, it is precisely in relatively small countries where it is logistically possible to develop and consistently apply a regionspecific tool, which includes relevant sociolinguistic criteria. This, coupled with underlying knowledge of the linguistic reality on the field, could offer a clear picture of the disposition, status and vulnerability of the languages and linguistic varieties in the respective countries. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to work towards forming and financing collaborative teams of local researchers with a good knowledge of the field reality and vulnerable linguistic varieties, who would sample, document and assess the status of all languages and linguistic varieties spoken on a certain territory.

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Interethnic Rivalries and Bilateral Cooperation: Aspects of Greek-Serbian Relations from the Assassination of Alexander Obrenović to the Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1903–1908)**

Abstract: This paper seeks to summarize the main aspects of bilateral relations between the Kingdom of Greece and the Kingdom of Serbia during a turbulent period characterized by fierce guerrilla warfare in Macedonia, the efforts made by the Great Powers for the implementation of the reforms provided by the Mürzsteg Program and various domestic changes in both countries.

Keywords: Greek-Serbian relations, Macedonian Struggle, Macedonian Question

he annexation of Eastern Rumelia to the Bulgarian Principality in 1885/6 **L** was a major blow to both Greek and Serbian interests as the danger of Bulgarian expansion in Macedonia now appeared real. The case of Eastern Rumelia was seen as an unwelcome precedent that could be implemented in Macedonia as well, if circumstances permitted. The defeat in the Serbian-Bulgarian War of 1885 created an urgent need for the Serbian government to take some measures in order to promote Serbian claims in Old Serbia (i.e., the vilayet of Kosovo) and Macedonia (i.e., the vilayets of Monastir and Thessaloniki). Athens held a prominent position in Serbian plans for two reasons: firstly, because Serbian and Greek statesmen shared the same view on the division of the wider area of Macedonia into spheres of influence, as opposed to the Bulgarian perspective, according to which the contested region should be granted an autonomous status; and secondly, because several Serbian policy-makers strongly believed that their request for the appointment of Serbian bishops in Prizren and Skoplje so vital to the Serbian national interests – would be met more easily if the Greek government mediated with the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople.

During the 1890s, Greeks and Serbs attempted three times to reach an agreement. The first attempt took place in Constantinople, where the ministers of the two countries to the Ottoman Empire, Stojan Novaković and Nikolaos Mavrokordatos, held negotiations during the summer of 1890. Having failed

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to come to terms, the two countries resumed negotiations in Athens in 1892– 93, this time represented by the newly-appointed Serbian minister to Greece, Vladan Djordjević, and Stephanos Dragoumis, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Trikoupis government, but once again to no avail. One last attempt to reach an understanding on the delimitation of zones of interest was made in 1899, once again in Athens, by a special envoy of the Serbian government, Milan Milićević, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Theotokis government, Athos Romanos.¹

Additionally, the Greeks acknowledged Serbian claims to the northern regions with a majority of concentrated Slavic populations, and the Serbs acknowledged Greek claims to the southern zone. Yet, the talks revealed major differences concerning the middle zone, namely the Ohrid–Monastir–Strumica–Nevrokop line.

The Greeks saw the Serbian claims as extensive, unfounded and disproportionate to the dynamics of Serbian influence in the contested provinces. The issue of the demarcation line was directly linked to the Serbian government's request for the appointment of Serbian prelates in Macedonia. According to the rationale of Athens, had the Greek government consented to the Serbian request to appoint a Serbian bishop in Skoplje, the Serbs would have consolidated their position in the entire northern zone, without making the slightest commitment with regard to the middle and southern zones, where Greece maintained serious claims. Therefore, what the Greeks needed to do was to impede the appointment of Serbian bishops in order to gain territorial compensation in the middle and southern zones.² Besides, the Greek side remained suspicious

¹ For more on the Greek-Serbian negotiations during the 1890s, see Vladan Djordjević, Srbija i Grčka, 1891–1893: prilog za istoriju stpske diplomacije pri kraju XIX veka [Serbia and Greece 1891-1893: a contribution to the history of Serbian diplomacy in the late 19th century] (Belgrade 1923); Evangelos Kofos, "Greek-Serbian relations and the question of Macedonia 1879–1896", in Greek-Serbian Cooperation 1830-1908 (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, SASA, 1982), 93–103; Slavenko Terzić, Srbija i Grčka (1856–1903): Borba za Balkan [Serbia and Greece (1856–1903): Struggle for the Balkans] (Belgrade: Istorijski Institut, 1992), 299–306, 334–338, 362–364; Dalibor Jovanovski, "Pregovorite pomegu Srbija i Grcija od 1899 godina za podelba na Makedonija na interesni sferi" [Serbo-Greek negotiations in 1899 about dividing Macedonia into spheres of influence], Godišen zbornik 56 (2003), 47–56; Mihailo Vojvodić, "Pregovori Srbije i Grčke o Makedoniji 1890–1893" [The negotiations between Serbia and Greece on Macedonia 1890–1893], Vardarski zbornik 4 (2005), 13–32; Dušan Bataković, "The Serbian-Greek alliances 1861–1918" (21–64), in Greek-Serbian Relations in the Age of Nation Building, ed. Paschalis M. Kitromilides and Sophia Matthaiou (Athens: National Hellenic Research Foundation, Institute of Historical Research, Section of Neohellenic Research, 2016).

² Αμερικανική Σχολη Κλασικών Σπουδών στην Αθήνα, Γεννάδειος Βιβλιοθήκη, Αρχείο Στέφανου Δραγούμη Ενότητα ΙΙ, Φάκελος 10: Βαλκανική Συνεννόηση 1886–1896. Υποφάκελος 1 αρ. εγγ. 1981 εμπ., Αθήνα, 13.08.1886, Στέφανος Δραγούμης προς Πρεσβεία

about the Serbian overtures because, as the Greek consuls in the Macedonian hinterland kept reporting, Serbian propaganda in its first steps following the annexation of Eastern Rumelia had failed to win over the Slavic populations that had opted for the Exarchate and embraced Bulgarian national legacies. As a result, the Serbian agents focused their attention on the populations that remained loyal to the Ecumenical Patriarchate,³ that is to say to the pro-Greek element. Along with the excessive views which had been expressed on several occasions by Serbian intellectuals and politicians, who even laid claim to Thessaloniki itself,⁴ such as Milutin Garašanin and Spiridon Gopčević, the Greek policy-makers had been convinced that Serbian activities were more detrimental than beneficial to Hellenism.

To the Serbs, on the other hand, the Greek government's vigorous opposition in the matter of the appointment of Serbian bishops was beyond understanding; as Serbia remained loyal to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Hence, the Serbian prelates could have prevented the Slavic flock of the Ottoman vilayets from acceding to the Bulgarian Exarchate. In general terms, though, the Serbs attributed this attitude to the arrogance and stubbornness of the Greeks, who dreamt of the restoration of the Byzantine Empire, and to their belief that they were the sole guardians of Orthodoxy.⁵

Kων/πολης (αντίγραφο) [American School of Classical Studies at Athens, Gennadius Library, Stephanos Dragoumis Papers (hereafter ASCSA, GL, SDP), Section II, Folder 10 – Balkan Entente (1886–1896), Subfolder 1, no. 1981, Athens, 13.8.1886, Stephanos Dragoumis to Kountouriotis (copy)].

³ Ίδρυμα Μουσείου Μακεδονικού Αγώνα/Κέντρο Έρευνας Μακεδονικής Ιστορίας και Τεκμηρίωσης (KEMIT), Αρχείο Ευάγγελου Κωφού, ΑΥΕ/1887, αρ. εγγ. 1401 (συνημμένο στο υπ' αρ. 2127, 2157 Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών προς Πρεσβεία Κων/πολης, 16.11.1887), 2.11.1887, Θεσσαλονίκη, Δοκός προς Στ. Δραγούμη [Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, Research Centre for Macedonian History and Documentation (KEMIT), Evangelos Kofos' Collection, AYE/1887, no. 1401 (attached to no. 2127, 2157 Foreign Ministry to Hellenic Legation in Constantinople, 16.11.1887), Dokos to Stephanos Dragoumis, Thessaloniki 2.11.1887].

⁴ Υπηρεσία Διπλωματικού και Ιστορικού Αρχείου, Κεντρική Υπηρεσία, Αρχείο Κεντρικής Υπηρεσίας, 1888, APXB3, αρ. 88, Βελιγράδι, 25.05.1888, Μουσικός προς Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών και αρ. 175, Βελιγράδι, 6.10.1888, Μουσικός προς Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών [Service of Diplomatic and Historical Archives, hereafter SDHA, Central Service Archives, CSA only, 1888, APXB3, no. 88. Belgrade, 25.5.1888, Mousikos to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no. 175, Belgrade, 6.10.1888, Mousikos to Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. GL, SDP, Section II, Folder 22 – Ambassadors' Reports and Letters, Subfolder 2, no. 154, Mousikos to Stephanos Dragoumis (copy), Belgrade, 13.9.1888.

⁵ Such views had been expressed by Stojan Novaković and Vladimir Karić. See more in Konstantin [pseudonym of Stojan Novaković], *Carigradska Patrijaršija i pravoslavlje u evropskoj Turskoj* [The Patriarchate of Constantinople and Orthodoxy in European Turkey] (Belgrade 1895), and Mihailo Vojvodić, ed., *Stojan Novaković i Vladimir Karić* (Belgrade: Clio, 2003). On the ecclesiastical conflicts see also Vojislav Pavlovic, "Orthodox Christianity and

Apart from that, it became obvious during the negotiations in the 1890s that there was considerable divergence as to the spirit of the potential agreement. The Greek side hoped that it would be part of a larger anti-Turkish alliance (including even military action in the long run),⁶ while the Serbs were interested mostly in counteracting Bulgarian propaganda in the vilayets of Kosovo, Monastir and Thessaloniki. But the Greek defeat in 1897 ruled out that possibility.

At the threshold of the twentieth century, the situation was partly different. Serbia had achieved several diplomatic successes in Macedonia and Old Serbia, such as the appointment of a Serbian bishop in Prizren (1896). Furthermore, in return for its neutral stance during the Greek-Turkish war of 1897, the Sublime Porte consented to the appointment of the Serbian Archimandrite Firmilian (Dražić) in the diocese of Skoplje and also gave permission for the establishment of Serbian schools in the vilayets of Monastir and Thessaloniki, and of a Serbian consulate in Serres. Upon the resumption of negotiations, in Athens in June 1899, the government of Vladan Djordjević was willing to bargain over those achievements (that is to say, to close the Serbian consulates in Monastir, Thessaloniki and Serres) in order to secure permanent presence of Serbian bishops in the dioceses of Prizren, Skoplje and Debar-Veles. But the Greek side insisted on the closure of the consulates prior to the appointment of Serbian prelates, and the negotiations ended in failure.

Following the heavy defeat in the Greek-Turkish war of 1897, Greece entered a phase of alienation and diplomatic isolation. Thus, the Greek governments sought to maintain friendly relations with the Ottoman Empire in order to be able to cope with the Slavic danger in Macedonia. In the following years a strong anti-Slavic sentiment was fostered in public opinion in Athens, while the stance of the Greek kingdom and the Ecumenical Patriarchate regarding the finalization of Firmilian's appointment aroused considerable discontent in Serbia.⁷ What probably was the only point of convergence between the two gov-

NationalRivalries. Relations between Serbia and the EcumenicalPatriarchate in the Vilayets of Kosovo and Monastir1878-1903". In *Greek-Serbian Relations in the Age of Nation Building*, Athens: 2016, 211–332.

⁶ ASCSA, GL, SDP, F. 28-29, subfolder 4, no. 1754, Dragoumis to Mavrokordatos, Athens, 4.8.1890 (highly confidential).

⁷ For more about Firmilian's case from the Serbian perspective, see Nićifor Dučić, Vaseljenska Patrijaršija i srpsko crkveno pitanje [The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Serbian Ecclesiastical Question] (Belgrade 1897), and Pavle Orlović [pseudonym of Svetislav Simić], Skopaljsko vladičansko pitanje, 1897–1902 [The Skoplje episcopal question] (Belgrade 1902), and, from the Greek point of view, see Dimitriou Philippidou, To Φιρμιλιάνειον Ζήτημα: ήτοι ο εκ Σερβίας κίνδυνος της Μακεδονίας και του Οικουμενικού Πατριαρχείου και Εθνολογική Μελέτη περί του Βιλαετίου Κοσσόβου μετά στατιστικών [The question of Firmilian, i.e. The Serbian Danger for Macedonia and the Ecumenical Patriarchate and an Ethnological Study on the Kosovo Vilayet including statistics] (Athens 1903).

ernments was their opposition to the idea of an autonomous Macedonia, which had been promoted by various Bulgarian circles.⁸

That was the framework of Greek-Serbian relations when the news of the assassination of the Serbian royal couple in the night of 29 May 1903 (May Coup) reached Athens. It goes without saying that the news made a deep impression on the Greek public. The brutality of the assassination was the main topic in the Athenian press, but it generally attributed the hideous crime to the arbitrariness of the regime, the young King Alexander's scandals and the moral degeneracy of the Obrenović dynasty in general. "The Obrenović went down" was the headline of the newspaper Akropolis.9"Humiliating and exhausting nations cannot go unpunished", "Peoples do not tolerate corrupt rulers" were some of the comments made in the Greek press,¹⁰ which described the return of the Karadjordjević dynasty to the throne as the beginning of a new era of order, stability and progress for the country. As the Greek minister to Belgrade indicated: "...the nation's dignity had been tarnished by various scandals of the Obrenović family... and this explains the rage with which the appalling crime against the ex-king was committed... the entire Serbian people is celebrating the end of an era of repression and humiliation and looks with certainty upon the new king whose maturity, experience and sweet-tempered character guarantee a better future and prosperity for the Serbian people."11 Greece quickly recognized the new situation in Serbia. King George I was among the European monarchs who sent congratulatory telegrams to Peter¹² and the Greek /minister to Serbia, Iakovos Argyropoulos, attended the coronation ceremony in September 1904,¹³ but these facts were not coupled with a renewed endeavour by the two countries to achieve further understanding.

A few months later, the *Ilinden* uprising, centred on the vilayet of Monastir, inaugurated a new phase of the Macedonian question. The Greek government, assuming that the Ottoman army would suppress the movement, maintained its composure.¹⁴ However, as a result of the turmoil, many Patriarchist

⁸ Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1964), 25–26.

⁹ Akropolis, 30 May 1903.

¹⁰ See also *Embros*, 30 May1903, and *Asty*, 30 May 1903.

¹¹ SDHA, CSA, 1903/6.1.1, no. 171, Argyropoulos to Theotokis, Belgrade, 16.6.1903.

¹² Dragoljub Živojinović, Kralj Petar I Karadjordjević, vol. II: U otadžbini 1903–1914 (Belgrade 2003), 35.

¹³ SDHA, CSA, 1904/59.4, no. 208, Argyropoulos to Romanos, Belgrade, 18.9.2004.

¹⁴ Spyridon Sfetas, "Η πορεία προς το Τλιντεν, ο αντίκτυπος της εξέγερσης του Τλιντεν στην Ελλάδα και οι απαρχές της ένοπλης φάσης του Μακεδονικού Αγώνα" ["The road to Ilinden: the impact of the Ilinden uprising on Greece and the early stages of the Macedonian armed struggle"], in Μακεδονικός Αγώνας: 100 χρόνια από το θάνατο του Παύλου Μελά, Εταιρεία Μακεδονικών

villages were forced to convert to the Exarchate, thus laying bare the danger that had arisen for the unredeemed Greeks of Macedonia.¹⁵ For the political elite in Athens, the *Ilinden* uprising was a clear message that the case of Macedonia would soon be lost unless action was taken.¹⁶

A similar position was also adopted by the new Serbian government, which after the May Coup had been absorbed in its internal affairs. From the Serbian point of view, the escalation of unrests and armed conflicts between Bulgarian *komitadjis* and Ottoman troops, potentially leading to a war between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, was the worst-case scenario. Unofficially, though, some Serbian political and military circles had already begun organizing *četas* (irregular companies). At that stage, recruiting and sending irregulars across the border served only one purpose: to actively show Serbia's interest in the Slavic population of Ottoman possession in Europe and to prevent Bulgaria from monopolizing the role of emancipator. The main exponent of such views was Svetislav Simić, a young diplomat and ardent supporter of Serbo-Bulgarian cooperation.¹⁷ Eventually, the Serbian government was not carried away by those circles that who believed that it was in the Serbian interest that Belgrade should support the insurgents, nor did it deliver demarches to the Sublime Porte.¹⁸

This position was dictated by the fact that a possible disruption of Serbo-Turkish relations would jeopardize the achievements of Serbian diplomacy in the ecclesiastical and educational fields, as well as by the fear that the turmoil would also spill over into the Kosovo vilayet with unpredictable consequences for its Serbian population. After all, both in Athens and Belgrade, the *Ilinden* uprising was interpreted as a Bulgarian irredentist movement. In autumn the insurrection was suppressed by the Ottoman army, and by the end of the year the Porte accepted a new scheme of reforms inspired by Austro-Hungary and Russia, also known as the *Mürzsteg Program*.

¹⁶ Kofos, Nationalism, 33.

Σπουδών [The Macedonian Struggle: 100 years from the demise of Pavlos Melas,], (Thessaloniki: Society for Macedonian Studies, 2006), 76–77.

¹⁵ Οι απαρχές του Μακεδονικού Αγώνα, 1903–1904. 100 έγγραφα από το Αρχείο του Υπουργείου των Εξωτερικών της Ελλάδος [The origins of the Macedonian Struggle 1903–1904. 100 documents from the Archive of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs], introduction by Vasilis Gounaris, edited and commented by P. Karambati et al. (Thessaloniki: Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, 1996), 139.

¹⁷ For more on Svetislav Simić's views on the question of Serbian-Bulgarian cooperation and the possibility of an autonomous Macedonia, see Vladimir Jovanović, "Svetislav Simić i Makedonski komiteti" [Svetislav Simić and Macedonian Committees], *Vardarski zbornik* I (1999), 53–68. Also see Uroš Šešum, *Srpska četnička akcija* (1897-1908). *Oružana diplomatija*, Matica Srpska, 2019.

¹⁸ Vladimir Jovanović, "Srbija i Ilidenski ustanak" [Serbia and the Ilinden Uprising], *Balcanica* XXIX (1998), 192–195.

In Greece, the reform program was welcomed with some relief insofar as the status quo in the region remained undisturbed and the possibility of an autonomous Macedonia, which in the eyes of the Greeks was equivalent to its ultimate union with Bulgaria, was removed.¹⁹ The program was also accepted by Serbia, on the assumption that its implementation would help to maintain peace and improve the everyday life of local population. Discontent, however, was created by the rejection of the Serbian demand for extending reforms to the vilayet of Kosovo. This fact gave credence to the claim that hiding behind the *Mürzsteg Program* was Vienna's desire to expand its economic and political influence in the region. The Serbian government understood and shared Greek apprehension about the activities of Bulgarian *komitadjis* in Macedonia, but the main source of concern for Belgrade was the possibility of a military intervention of a foreign power in Macedonia and Old Serbia, in this case the Habsburg Empire.²⁰

As a result, the friendly overtures of the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Athos Romanos, to the Serbian minister to Athens, Jovan Hristić, immediately after he took up his duties at the end of 1903 and beginning of 1904, went unheeded.²¹ Besides, in Serbia's view, apart from the essential reforms regarding the modernization of the Ottoman administration and the reorganization of the gendarmerie, it was also crucial to settle ecclesiastical issues of vital importance to the local population, which had always been the cause of friction between Athens and Belgrade.²² What the government in Belgrade sought was that the Serbs in the Ottoman Empire be recognized as a distinctive religious community and it resented the attitude of the Ecumenical Patriarch, Joachim III, who, in their view, was favouring nothing else but the Greek cause.²³ Therefore, it was no surprise that, in September 1903, the news that circulated in Athens about the Sultan's *irade* recognizing a Serbian *millet* evoked strong reactions in the Greek press, which spoke of the establishment of a *Serbian Exarchate*.²⁴

As far as this question was concerned, the Serbian and Romanian views coincided. Serbian diplomats were therefore paying special attention to the state of relations between Athens and Bucharest, which were deteriorating due to the efforts of the latter to secure recognition of the Koutsovlachs of Macedonia as a

¹⁹ For an overview of the issue of the Mürzsteg reform program, see *Miranda* Paximadopoulou-*Stavrinou*, Η διπλωματία των Δυνάμεων και οι μεταρρυθμίσεις στη Μακεδονία, 1903–1908 [Diplomacy of the Powers and the reforms in Macedonia, 1903–1908] (Athens: Sideris, 2009).

²⁰ See Wayne S. Vucinich, Serbia Between East and West: The events of 1903–1908 (Stanford University Press, 1954), 125–130.

²¹ Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–1914, vol. I-1, ed. Andrija Radenić (Belgrade 1991), nos. 453, 466, and vol. I-2, ed. Andrija Radenić (Belgrade 1998), no. 108.

²² Dokumenti, vol. I-2, no. 247.

²³ Bataković, "Serbian-Greek alliances", 57.

²⁴ Dokumenti, vol. I-1, nos. 281, 295, 320.

separate *millet*. It was believed in Belgrade that a possible Romanian success in this matter could set a positive precedent on which Serbian demands could also be based in the future.²⁵

In addition, Serbian foreign policy after the restoration of the Karadjordjević dynasty moved in the direction of a political rapprochement with the Slavic states of the Balkans, an idea which was increasingly gaining ground among Serbian policy-makers.²⁶ Thus in the spring of 1904, with the consent and support of Russia, the dense contacts between Serbia and Bulgaria resulted in the conclusion of a *Treaty of Friendship* and a *Treaty of Alliance* (March-April 1904). These agreements provided that the two states would defend their territorial integrity and national independence; advance the *Mürzsteg* reform program in the vilayets of Monastir, Thessaloniki and Kosovo, and make efforts for it to be extended to the vilayet of Adrianople; prevent the occupation of the four abovementioned districts by any foreign power, a provision which was meant against Austria-Hungary. The treaties also provided for several measures of socio-cultural and economic nature, while the ultimate goal of the two parties was the customs union between the Kingdom of Serbia and the Bulgarian Principality.²⁷

Even though the treaties had been kept secret, the Greek government soon found out their content. Paradoxically, the secrecy did not seriously affect Greek-Serbian relations. This was why the Greek minister to Belgrade, Iakovos Argyropoulos, reassured his government that the implementation of any agreement between Serbia and Bulgaria would eventually be hindered by the conflict of their interests in Macedonia,²⁸ while Greek officials had been constantly pointing out to their Serbian colleagues how hard it was to negotiate with the Bulgarians, stressing at the same time the need for a bilateral Greek-Serbian understanding.²⁹ As it turned out, the facts proved them right. By early 1906 the Serbs had come to the conclusion that the Serbo-Bulgarian rapprochement had been used by Sofia as a means of exerting pressure on the Ottoman Empire to

²⁵ Dokumenti, vol. I-2, nos. 247, 652.

²⁶ In late 1903 a circular of the foreign minister says: "Facing the same risks, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria should get rid of political atavism which causes... their eternal rivalry and begin thinking in terms of mutual agreement how to safeguard ... their common interests in the Balkan Peninsula." *Dokumenti*, vol. I-1, no. 387.

²⁷ See more in Vucinich, Serbia Between East and West, 136–144.

²⁸ SDHA, CSA, 1904-59-4, no. 211, Argyropoulos to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade, 19.9.1904.

²⁹ Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–1914, vol. II-3/II, ed. Liljana Aleksić-Pejković and Života Anić (Belgrade 2003), no. 392. Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–1914, vol. II-2/I, ed. Liljana Aleksić-Pejković and Života Anić (Belgrade 2006), no. 48.

make concessions in favour of Bulgaria. As the Serbian minister to Athens, Jovan Hristić, aptly put: "...he [the Sultan] is more afraid of Bulgarians than of us. That is why we have always paid the price of our rapprochement, while the Bulgarians have been using it to their own benefit."³⁰ In essence, however, the main reason why every attempt at a further rapprochement between Sofia and Belgrade became impossible was nothing else but the armed struggle in Macedonia.

According to Article 3 of the Mürzsteg reform program, it was possible to modify the boundaries of the administrative districts "with the view to a more regular grouping of the different nationalities".³¹ This provision, rather than appeasing the national rivalries between the Balkan states, had in fact prompted them to carry out even more vigorous propaganda so as to prove that their respective co-nationals made up a majority in the contested areas. Under the given circumstances, following the Ilinden uprising and the signing of a Turkish-Bulgarian convention in March 1904, which also provided for general amnesty granted by the Sultan, and the insurgents, prisoners and refugees were free to return to their homes, armed conflicts in Macedonia became inevitable.³² The circular of the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of November 1905 was highly indicative of a shift in the Serbian attitude towards Bulgaria due to these conflicts: "...Bulgarian bands attack Serbian schools and Serbian notables and ask of them to submit to Macedonian (read Bulgarian) komitadjis. Apart from the facts and actions which let on that the bands bearing the Macedonian name are purely Bulgarian bands, we also have in our hands written evidence (which we are sending to you) which indicate clearly and undoubtedly the character of the 'Macedonian' bands. [...] All Macedonian bands support and defend purely Bulgarian schools, and maintain their correspondence in Bulgarian and not in a Macedonian dialect. Additionally, they are in contact with Exarchist officials and force Serbian and Greek communities to convert to the Exarchate. Thus, all these facts and acts are indubitable proof that the Bulgarian bands call themselves Macedonian only to conceal the character of a purely Bulgarian movement and Bulgarian aspirations and that, to them, Macedonia's autonomy means: Bulgarization of Macedonia."33

³⁰ Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–1914, vol. II-1/I, ed. Liljana Aleksić-Pejković and Života Anić (Belgrade 2006), no. 329.

³¹ Douglas Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia (Thessaloniki: IMXA, 1966), 114.

³² Sfetas, "Η πορεία προς το Ίλιντεν", 82; Stavrinou, Η διπλωματία, 151–152.

³³ Dokumenti, vol. I-2, no. 556. Even Svetislav Simić himself, who maintained close contacts with the Bulgaro-Macedonian committees, confirmed the latter's adherence to the Bulgarian cause: "Now that the Macedonian Question has entered a political phase, the Exarchate's role has been taken over by the Internal Organization, whose duty is to strengthen and augment, with the means at its disposal, the Exarchate's achievements in the ecclesiastical and educa-

As far as the Greek struggle was concerned, on the other hand, initially the Serbs assessed that Greece was too weak to get involved in an undeclared and unconventional guerrilla war – as the Macedonian Struggle could be shortly described – which could only lead to unwanted complications.³⁴ Also, based on the outcome of the Greek-Turkish war in 1897, they did not think highly of the military virtues of the Greeks. But the Serbs realized that Greece was a factor to be reckoned with in the long run. This shift is reflected in a report of the Serbian minister in Athens in October 1905: "Although Greece is not ready in military terms, it still is an important factor. Greek population in Turkey must not be underestimated. We must take into consideration that many Greeks hold high positions in the Turkish services and therefore are in contact with imperial deputies and can exert influence upon them. We must also take into consideration that the Greek element is the most progressive and wealthiest among all Christian nationalities in Turkey, that they have a large amount of capital and that in many cities almost all trade is in their hands. Finally, and not only because of our co-nationals in Turkey, we must always bear in mind that the Patriarchate, despite many difficulties and serious blows, still remains a very important factor that must not be underestimated, and a great moral power exclusively in the service of the Greek idea."³⁵ We can also argue with certainty that the appearance of Greek guerrillas in Macedonia (known also as Makedonomachoi) took the Serbs by surprise. Therefore, apart from the fragmentation and divisions in the ranks of the Bulgaro-Macedonians, one more reason why the activities of the Bulgarian komitadjis in 1905–1906 had been limited was the emergence of Greek guerrillas.³⁶ In a bid to explain the successes of the Greek guerillas instead of "bands", Serbian diplomats suspected that there was, as a counterbalance to the Serbian-Bulgarian agreements of 1904, a secret Greek-Turkish treaty in force giving the Greeks the freedom to operate almost undisturbed.³⁷

Nevertheless, driven by the course of events, the Serbs were more and more convinced of the necessity of cooperation with the Greeks, at least on a local level. By the end of 1906, as the Serbian consul in Bucharest, Mihailo Ristić, pointed out regarding the guerrilla activities in Macedonia, there were two opposing groups, Bulgarians and Romanians on one side, and Greeks and Serbs

tional fields ... So far has proved that [the Internal Organization] is purely Bulgarian and a tool for the Bulgarization of Macedonia", *Dokumenti*, vol. I-3/II, no. 214.

³⁴ *Dokumenti*, vol. I-2, no. 86.

³⁵ Ibid. 466.

³⁶ Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–1914, vol. II-1/II, ed. Liljana Aleksić-Pejković and Života Anić (Belgrade 2006), no. 403.

³⁷ Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije 1903–1914, vol. II-3/I, ed. Liljana Aleksić-Pejković and Života Anić (Belgrade 2003), no. 60; *Dokumenti*, vol. II-2/II, ed. Liljana Aleksić-Pejković and Života Anić (Belgrade 2006), no. 381.

on the other.³⁸ Indeed, Greeks and Serbs have shown willingness to cooperate.³⁹ Timing, of course, was not coincidental. Both countries were subjected to external pressure. Greece had broken off diplomatic relations with Romania and had tense relations with Bulgaria due to the pogrom against the Greek communities in those two countries, while the Theotokis government had to cope with unrelenting pressure exerted by the Great Powers to suppress the guerrilla warfare in Macedonia. At the same time Serbia was forced to handle the tariff conflict with Austro-Hungary, also known as the *Customs War* (1906–1911). In these adverse political circumstances both countries proved remarkably resilient. Greek officials kept defending the Greek armed groups instead of "bands" in Macedonia as mere self-defence, and refused to depart from their policy on Macedonia. As the Serbian diplomat in Athens Jovan Jovanović observed, those who questioned this "guerrilla policy" risked being cut off not only from their own political parties, but from society itself.⁴⁰ Respectively, in Serbia all political parties sided with the Pašić government in order to withstand the Austrian pressure.⁴¹

In the summer of 1907, the secretary of the Serbian Consulate in Monastir, Sava Tomić, relayed the proposal of the Greek consul in Monastir, Nikolaos Xydokis, for reviving an earlier oral agreement on the zones of influence.⁴² Given the circumstances, though, the boundaries should delimit the field of action of Greek and Serbian bands in the *vilayet* of Monastir. In the Serbian view,

³⁸ Dokumenti, vol. II-2/II, no. 459.

³⁹ Various attempts at a Greek-Serbian approach had been made throughout the period of Macedonian Struggle. See *Dokumenti*, vol. I-2, no. 597, and vol. II-2/I, no. 48.

⁴⁰ Dokumenti, vol. II-2/II, no. 368.

⁴¹ Vladimir Ćorović, The Relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary in the 20th Century, trans. Dragan Bakić and Stojan Gavrilović (Belgrade 2018), 113.

⁴² In late 1901 the consuls of the two countries in Monastir (Bitolj), Stamatios Kiouze-Pezas and Mihailo Ristić reached an informal three-point agreement, according to which: a) the Greek consul undertook to support the Serbian consul in his efforts to combat Bulgarian propaganda north of Kruševo and Prilep, b) the Serbian consul undertook to support the Greek consul to combat Bulgarian propaganda south of Monastir (Bitolj), and c) both consuls undertook to support each other against the Bulgarians inside the zone Kruševo-Prilep-Monastir (Bitolj). It was a personal agreement which applied exclusively to the educational and ecclesiastical fields in the vilayet of Monastir. It is worth mentioning that the agreement was reached without the approval of the two governments and remained in force until Ristić's transfer to Skoplje in 1903. Arhiv Srbije, MID, PPo, 1901, 134 (II), no. 664 Mihajlo Ristić to Mihajlo Vujić, Bitolj, 25.11.1901 (copy). SDHA, CSA, 1901.67.3, no. 413, Kiouzes-Pezas to Romanos, Monastir, 18.6.1901 and no. 811 Kiouzes-Pezas to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Monastir, 25.9.1901. It is worth noting also that Pezas referred to this oral agreement as the "scholastic agreement". For the Pezas-Ristić agreement see also Krste Bitoski, Dejnosta na Pelagoniskata Mitropolija (1878–1912): Grčki religiozno-prosvetni i vooruženi akcii, Skopje, 1968, pp. 158–160.

the demarcation line had to be drawn between Kruševo and Prilep in such a way that the northern part of the Morichovo *kaza*, the entire plain of Prilep and part of the plain of Monastir should be incorporated into the Serbian zone. The following part from a report by the Serbian minister in Constantinople, Jovan Nenadović, is enlightening: "The Greeks are well aware that they have no support north of Prilep and Kruševo, and would be glad to start negotiations with us which would also help us consolidate our position in that region if we make several concessions south of this line, where the Slavic element undoubtedly prevails, but there are no conditions for our success."⁴³ The agreement was to be applied exclusively on local level and was not to bind the two parties beyond the confined boundaries. With this oral agreement, the Serbian side secured the areas where the Serbian irregular companies (*četas*) were already dominant, while the Greek forces could seamlessly move to the south of this line against the Bulgarian *komitadjis* and the pro-Romanian Koutsovlachs who turned towards the Bulgarian Exarchate.

The Serbs saw this agreement as a gesture of goodwill to the Greek side and the Patriarchate in exchange for the appointment of a Serbian *chorbishop* in Debar, with complete freedom of movement, as auxiliary bishop to the new Greek metropolitan (Parthenios) who was to succeed metropolitan Polykarpos.⁴⁴ At a time when Greece was facing diplomatic isolation, the Greek government saw this unofficial Greek-Serbian rapprochement as an opportunity to improve its standing on the Balkan scene.⁴⁵ Thereupon it attempted in the next few months to conclude a broader Greek-Serbian understanding based on the spirit of the 1899 negotiations while using the Serbian demands concerning the diocese of Debar-Veles as a starting point. However, the Serbian side had no real reason to enter a new round of negotiations as long as the question of a Serbian *chorbishop* in the province of Debar was still pending.⁴⁶

It seemed that the developments in the aforementioned issue hampered the broadening of the scope of the Pezas-Ristić agreement. The rumours of a Greek-Serbian alliance which had been spread in the spring of 1908⁴⁷ should be imputed to Bulgarian diplomacy whose aim was to vilify Greeks and Serbs and

⁴³ Dokumenti, vol. II-3/II, no. 587.

⁴⁴ Ibid. At about the same time the metropolitan of Debar and Veles, Polykarpos, resigned. Polykarpos was a pro-Serbian Greek clergyman and his resignation complicated things further.

⁴⁵ Dokumenti, vol. II-3/II, no. 443.

⁴⁶ About the diocese of Debar and Veles see also Athanasios A. Angelopoulos, "To επισκοπικόν ζήτημα της επαρχίας Δεβρών και Βελισσού" [The episcopal question of the Debar and Veles province] Makedonika 10 (1970), 273–284.

⁴⁷ F. R. Bridge, ed., Austro-Hungarian documents relating to the Macedonian struggle, 1896– 1912 (Thessaloniki 1976), no. 342.

justify a new wave of *komitadjis* in Macedonia.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the fact that both sides acknowledged the importance of a potential agreement and the absence of primary sources confirming clashes between Serbian and Greek guerrillas in the *vilayet* of Monastir may lead us to the conclusion that the two parties reached some form of compromise, probably a non-aggression agreement.

In any case, though, until the events of 1908 (the Young Turk revolution and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austro-Hungary), Greece had largely restored its image as a credible ally which it had lost after the defeat in the Greek-Turkish war in 1897. The reorganization of the Greek army, a difficult task that was carried out largely by the Theotokis government, and the dynamism shown by the Greek guerrillas during the armed struggle in Macedonia, contributed to this. The Serbs were following the struggle of the Cretans with sympathies, while the Greek press kept a pro-Serbian attitude during the Bosnian crisis.⁴⁹ Thus, despite the existing differences on ecclesiastical issues, and despite the fact that there were no close commercial and cultural ties between the two countries, relations between Athens and Belgrade were maintained at a high level.

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⁴⁸ Dokumenti, vol. III-1/II, nos. 541 and 555.

⁴⁹ The case of Antonios Spiliotopoulos and the newspaper *Panellion Kratos* (Panhellenic State) is most characteristic.

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Le révolutionnaire professionnel Tito à Moscou 1935–1936

Résumé : Josip Broz vint à Moscou en février 1935 pour parfaire son parcours de révolutionnaire au sein du Komintern, le passage obligé pour tous les cadres du Parti communiste yougoslave. Or, son séjour à Moscou n'avait rien d'habituel, car il y devint le confident du tout-puissant Département des cadres de l'Internationale communiste dans le Parti yougoslave. Grâce à l'appui du Département des cadres, qui avait la charge de contrôler les cadres des partis frères au sein du Komintern, Broz devint le numéro deux du Parti yougoslave et repartit de Moscou en octobre 1936 pour diriger l'action du Parti en Yougoslavie. Cette nouvelle fonction lui permit d'effectuer sa deuxième mission à savoir de contrôler l'action des cadres yougoslaves.

Mots clés : Josip Broz, Parti communiste yougoslave, Komintern, Moscou

osip Broz choisit Tito comme le nom d'emprunt qui le rendre fameux seulement à la sortie du prison y il purge la peine de 1928 à 1934 pour son activité séditieuse en tant que militant communiste dans le Royaume yougoslave. A la sortie de prison il fut confiné dans son village natal de Kumrovec. Or, le retour forcé de Josip dans son village natal de Kumrovec n'est que de courte durée. Au bout de quatre jours il décide de s'installer chez sa sœur Thérèse à Samobor, ville croate qui se trouve à 20 km de Zagreb, afin de renouer le contact avec le Parti communiste yougoslave (PCY). Il découvre alors que même dans la capitale croate, le principal centre industriel du pays, le parti n'existe plus. Selon ses propres mots, il y retrouve seulement différents petits groupes isolés les uns des autres et tous coupés de la direction à l'étranger.¹ Après cinq années de régime autoritaire du roi Alexandre, l'activité du parti est pratiquement arrêtée. Pendant cette période les descentes de police détruisent les structures du parti au point que son activité ne subsiste qu'à l'étranger, notamment à Moscou où le nombre des communistes yougoslaves en exil ne cesse d'augmenter. L'arrivée simultanée d'un nombre important d'émigrés politiques à Moscou et les échecs de l'action du parti sur le terrain intensifient considérablement les querelles internes au sein du Parti yougoslave, nécessitent même des interventions régulières du Komin-

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¹ Josip Broz Tito, *Autobiografska kazivanja* [Les récits autobiographiques] (Belgrade : Narodna knjiga, 1982), vol. I, 103.

tern. Qui plus est, au début des années trente le Komintern décide d'effectuer un contrôle des cadres étrangers présents en URSS. Dans cette première purge, bon nombre d'émigrés yougoslaves sont démis de leurs fonctions et éloignés de Moscou. De cette façon une césure s'opère aussi bien à l'intérieur des structures du parti au pays que dans la hiérarchie du parti à Moscou, laissant la place à des hommes nouveaux appartenant corps et âme au Komintern. C'est ainsi que les instances dirigeantes du Komintern nomment, en juin 1932, la nouvelle direction du PCY composée de Milan Gorkić, Vladimir Ćopić et Blagoje Parović.²

Ces nominations symbolisent le changement de génération et annoncent l'arrivée du nouvel homme fort du parti, Milan Gorkić (de son vrai nom Josip Čižinski), devenu depuis 1928 membre du Comité de contrôle du Komintern. Véritable « aparatchik », Gorkić disposait de protecteurs puissants, notamment Dimitri Manouilski, à la fois représentant de Staline au Komintern et chef incontesté du puissant Département des cadres, principal organe de la sécurité intérieure au sein de l'Internationale communiste. Avant de rejoindre la nouvelle direction du PCY Gorkić avait justement effectué une mission d'un an pour le compte du Département des cadres en Angleterre. Il y avait été envoyé comme instructeur du Komintern. Homme de confiance des organes de sécurité intérieure, Gorkić était l'homme du Komintern au sein de la nouvelle direction du PCY. Rompu aux luttes internes du monde stalinien, il est envoyé par le Komintern pour remettre de l'ordre dans la direction du Parti yougoslave. Il doit s'assurer que le parti suit à la lettre la ligne du Moscou. Désormais les communistes yougoslaves doivent appliquer sur le terrain, en Yougoslavie, les concepts théoriques et les instructions directes du Komintern, délaissant l'idée d'une analyse autonome de la situation dans le pays. Connaissant parfaitement le fonctionnement du monde stalinien, Gorkić veille à ne pas connaître le sort de ses prédécesseurs, faisant attention à ne jamais prendre une initiative inopportune qui pourrait être mal perçue par Moscou.³

Les collègues de Gorkić n'étaient légitimés, eux aussi, que par l'investiture reçue de Moscou. A l'instar de Gorkić, ils avaient quitté le pays depuis des années, Ćopić en 1925 et Parović en 1929. Tous deux ont étudié à l'école de Lénine à Moscou, la plus prestigieuse école à Moscou pour les cadres étrangers. Bref, ils sont de véritables cadres de l'Internationale communiste à laquelle leur allégeance allait en priorité. Vladimir Ćopić, avant de devenir cadre du Komintern, avait été un révolutionnaire croate avant la Grande guerre, pour participer ensuite à la révolution bolchevique. En tant que tel, il fut un des membres fondateurs du Parti communiste yougoslave. Toutefois, il est avant tout un intellec-

² Ivan Očak, Gorkić : život, rad i pogibija. Prilog biografiji [Gorkić : la vie, l'œuvre et la mort. Complément de biographie] (Zagreb : Globus, 1988), 152.

³ Branislav Gligorijević, *Kominterna i jugoslovensko i srpsko pitanje*, [Komintern et la question yougoslave et serbe] (Belgrade : Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1992), 252–253.

tuel, ancien étudiant en droit, proche de la fraction de gauche au sein du Parti yougoslave. Comme Gorkić il est aussi un homme de confiance du Département des cadres, pour lequel il avait effectué auparavant une mission en tant qu'instructeur en Tchécoslovaquie.⁴ La reprise en main du Parti yougoslave par les organes de sécurité du Komintern sera le fait de ces deux anciens du Département des cadres. Le troisième membre, Blagoje Parović est un ouvrier originaire d'Herzégovine. Homme de terrain, il est chargé au sein de la nouvelle direction du renouveau du parti dans la partie orientale du pays, la Serbie, la Vojvodine et la Macédoine.⁵ Cette nouvelle direction du parti est à l'œuvre depuis déjà deux ans, quand Josip sort de prison.

1. Le membre du Comité central du PCY

Lorsqu'en mars 1934 Josip se rend à Zagreb, l'effort de reconstruction du parti se heurte au problème majeur de liens avec le pays. La direction est à tel point éloignée des militants dans le pays que l'envoyé de la direction à Zagreb, Srdja Prica, parle même d'un fossé d'incompréhension et de suspicion séparant les uns des autres.⁶ La raison en est que tout homme ayant pris contact avec la direction du parti est repéré assez rapidement par les autorités yougoslaves. Le bruit se répand même à un moment qu'au sein de la direction se trouve un informateur, une « taupe » de la police. A la pression du régime s'ajoutent la méfiance et les soupçons dans les rangs du parti, paralysant son action.

Les tentatives de Prica de mettre sur pied une organisation locale n'en sont qu'à leur tout début lorsque Josip Broz se joint à ce processus de renouveau, y apportant sa marque personnelle. Il cherche à s'entourer d'hommes qu'il connaît déjà, de préférence des ouvriers, en se méfiant ouvertement des intellectuels. Mettant à profit son prestige d'ancien dirigeant local, il soutient Prica qui avait aussi fait partie de ses connaissances avant son emprisonnement. Une des premières décisions du comité local reconstitué est alors d'envoyer Broz à l'étranger pour établir un contact direct avec la direction du parti.⁷ Il est censé non seulement renouer des liens, mais surtout vérifier si au sein de la direction se trouve vraiment un espion de la police yougoslave. Il doit en quelque sorte s'assurer

⁴ Dragica Lazarević, « Vladimir Ćopić kao član privremenog rukovodstva KPJ » [Vladimir Ćopić en tant que membre de la direction temporaire du PCY], dans Život i djelo Vladimira Ćopića [La vie et l'œuvre de Vladimir Ćopić], éd. I. Kovačić (Rijeka : Centar za historiju radničkog pokreta i NOR-a Istre, Hrvatskog primorja i Gorskog kotara, 1978), 255.

⁵ Djordje O. Piljević, Č*ovek ideja i akcije* [L'homme d'idée et d'action] (Belgrade : Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 2001), 235.

⁶ Souvenirs de Prica, Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ) [Archives de Yougoslavie], Belgrade, 507, MG 2237, p. 25.

⁷ Lettre de Prica, et son rapport du 10 mai 1934, AJ, 507, Fonds Komintern (KI), 1934/99.

personnellement de la crédibilité de la Direction nommée par Moscou. Cependant, là aussi la méfiance réciproque est de mise. Alors que son départ est déjà annoncé en mai par Prica, l'invitation à se rendre à Vienne, où siège la direction du parti, n'arrive qu'en juillet. Tout porte à croire qu'il été indispensable d'obtenir au préalable l'accord de Moscou. Jusqu'alors le Komintern dispose relativement de peu d'informations sur Josip. Certes, son action contre les fractions lors de la conférence de Zagreb de 1928 et sa conduite au procès de la même année ont été dûment prises en compte. Rodoljub Čolaković, un de ses compagnons d'infortune au pénitencier de Maribor, arrivé en 1933 à Moscou relate en termes élogieux la conduite de Josip Broz en prison.⁸ Radomir Vujović, un autre codétenu de Maribor occupe alors des positions importantes au Komintern, et peut témoigner de la conduite de Josip, ainsi que de son activité en 1927/28, puisque Vujović était à l'époque secrétaire organisationnel du parti. Ces renseignements sont-ils suffisamment convaincants pour qu'en juillet 1934 Gorkić reçoive de Moscou la permission non seulement de le faire venir à Vienne, mais de le coopter au Comité central aussi, où faut-il y voir une initiative personnelle de sa part.

Gorkić, tout en scrutant attentivement les réactions de Moscou, excelle dans le seul exercice qu'il maîtrise à merveille, c'est-à-dire, la gestion des effectifs et la capacité de s'entourer d'hommes qui lui sont inféodés. Gorkić est indiscutablement l'homme fort du Parti yougoslave, mais aussi depuis longtemps il est coupé du pays et il a besoin de collaborateurs pouvant lui servir de relais sur le terrain. Dans un parti clandestin dont les communications sont souvent assez difficiles, et où le péril d'une infiltration policière est très grand, le choix des collaborateurs s'établit souvent sur la base de connaissances personnelles. Ainsi, en même temps que Josip, Gorkić décide de coopter au Comité central un autre homme de terrain, Adolf Munk.⁹ Ce dernier est une vieille connaissance de Gorkić qu'il connaît depuis 1919, lorsqu'ils avaient commencé leur parcours de jeunes communistes à Sarajevo : ils se côtoient encore lors de la rédaction d'une revue littéraire, toujours à Sarajevo, au début des années vingt.¹⁰

En revanche si Gorkić ne connaît pas personnellement Josip, en 1928 il a suivi et soutenu depuis Moscou son action dans la lutte contre les fractions et lors de son procès. La nomination de Josip répond à une consigne importante du

⁸ Rapport de Rodoljub Čolaković, AJ, KI, 1933/132.

⁹ Compte-rendu du Comité Central de PCY du 11 juillet 1934, dans Josip Broz Tito, *Sabrana djela* [Œuvres complètes : ci-après *Sabrana djela*], vol. II (Belgrade : IC Komunist et BIGZ ; Zagreb : Naprijed, 1983), 205 (digitalisé par l'Institut d'Histoire contemporaine à Belgrade : www.pisi.co.rs)

¹⁰ La caractéristique de Munk écrite par Gorkić, Vienne, le 1 mai 1936, Rossijskij gosudarstvennyj arhiv social'no-političeskoj istorii (RGASPI), Moscou, F. 495, op. 277, d. 188, pp. 17–19.

monde stalinien, c'est-à-dire le remplacement des intellectuels de la direction par une nouvelle génération d'ouvriers. De plus, il dispose d'un solide soutien dans le principal bassin industriel du pays, Zagreb, et il peut se prévaloir d'une conduite irréprochable dans les prisons yougoslaves. Pour Gorkić, Josip et Munk, sont la preuve vivante d'avoir renouvelé la direction du parti avec des hommes de terrain et des ouvriers. Il a toutes les raisons de penser que ces nouveaux venus ne pourront que lui être redevables, voire inféodés.

L'invitation de Vienne étant arrivée, Josip, sous un faux nom, prend le train le 24 juillet, en direction de Vienne, descend à proximité de la frontière qu'il franchit à pied, pour finalement reprendre le lendemain le train à Klagenfurt. Il connaît bien le pays et sa langue, pour l'avoir parcouru en quête de travail avant la Grande guerre : néanmoins, il lui faut établir le contact avec la direction. Les règles de la conspiration sont des plus strictes dans cette Autriche tiraillée par les crises économiques et politiques. Il arrive à Vienne le jour de l'assassinat du chancelier Engelbert Dollfuss par les nazis. L'Autriche du successeur de ce dernier, le chancelier Kurt Schuschnigg, reste fidèle à la dictature instaurée par son prédécesseur. Tout parti politique, et notamment le Parti communiste, est interdit. La direction du Parti yougoslave se trouve donc dans la clandestinité la plus absolue. Josip ne dispose que d'une seule adresse, où il est d'ailleurs accueilli et logé par les militants du parti. Ce n'est que le lendemain qu'il prend contact avec Gorkić, Ćopić et Parović. A cette occasion, à Vienne, la décision fut prise que, pour des raisons sécurité et selon les règles de conspiration dans le parti, Josip doit avoir un nom d'emprunt. Il alors choisit le nom qu'il le rendra fameux, et il devint ainsi pour ses camarades et pour l'histoire, Tito.

Parmi ces trois hommes Tito apprécie particulièrement Blagoje Parović, avec lequel il a travaillé dans le syndicat des corroyeurs et selliers et dans l'organisation locale du parti à Zagreb en 1927 et 1928. Néanmoins, les deux autres membres de la direction auront bien plus d'influence sur sa carrière, et notamment Gorkić, son nouveau mentor, qui lui fait comprendre immédiatement quel sera son rôle au sein du Comité central. Après un bref séjour d'un mois à Vienne, Gorkić le renvoie à Zagreb en sa nouvelle qualité de membre du Comité central, comme émissaire pour la partie occidentale du pays, c'est-à-dire pour la Slovénie et la Croatie. Le Comité central lui confie la même mission que jadis ses amis de Zagreb : assurer à nouveau et restaurer une communication directe et stable entre la direction du parti et le pays. Il a fort à faire vu l'extrême méfiance envers la direction parmi les communistes dans le pays. C'est pourquoi, lors de son premier séjour dans le pays en août et en septembre, il s'efforce de rétablir la confiance réciproque, tandis que son deuxième séjour en octobre est consacré à la préparation de la conférence générale du parti.

Cette IVe conférence, à laquelle Tito ne participe pas personnellement, a lieu les 24 et 25 décembre à Ljubljana. Réunissant les délégués de tout le pays, la conférence élit le nouveau Comité central. C'est donc la première fois depuis le dernier congrès du Parti communiste yougoslave en 1928 tenue à Dresde, qu'une réunion représentative du parti désigne le Comité central et son bureau politique (ou Politburo) composé de Gorkić, Parović, Tito, Munk, et Kamilo Horvatin.¹¹ Au sein du nouveau Politburo, Gorkić dispose du soutien de ses dernières recrues, ce qui lui est fort utile, car ses concurrents, anciens membres de la fraction de gauche y siègent aussi, et notamment, Kamilo Horvatin. En revanche, selon la décision du Comité, Ćopić, un rival sérieux, est envoyé à Moscou afin d'y occuper le poste du représentant du Parti yougoslave auprès du Komintern.

Les décisions prises par la conférence n'ont qu'une apparence de démocratie. On n'y vote que pour les hommes choisis par la direction, et ayant déjà obtenu l'aval du Komintern. Cette pratique stalinienne n'est pas du goût de Tito. Il est le seul au sein du Comité central à exiger que la conférence fasse son choix d'une manière autonome. Il est donc nécessaire qu'on lui explique l'importance de la discipline bolchevique. Quand bien même il se trouve lui-même élu au Comité central et même au bureau politique, il est évident qu'il doit parfaire son éducation bolchevique. Ćopić, arrivé à Moscou dans sa nouvelle qualité de représentant du PCY, propose le 11 décembre 1934 au Komintern que Tito vienne travailler pendant quelques mois en URSS.¹² Indépendamment de cette initiative de Ćopić, le Comité central décide le 29 décembre d'envoyer Tito à Moscou pour travailler dans l'Internationale syndicale.¹³

L'intéressé dit en 1938, lorsqu'il fut appelé à rédiger une déclaration sur ses liens avec les cadres du PCY, que ses amis de Zagreb après sa sortie de prison voulaient qu'il aille à Moscou pour suivre les cours dans l'école de Lénine et pour voir sa famille.¹⁴ Une fois Tito arrivé à Moscou il a dû remplir le formulaire obligatoire pour tout nouveau arrivée en URSS en précisant qu'il est censé être le chargé des cours à l'École de Lénine. Le formulaire contenait aussi la recommandation de Ćopić.¹⁵ En revanche, Gorkić, et avec lui le Comité central, prévoient un court séjour de Tito en URSS de six à huit mois, et une activité en accord avec son expérience de syndicaliste. Gorkić a, en effet, un autre candidat pour le poste de professeur à l'École de Lénine et le travail de référent politique du Komintern qui vont de pair, un intellectuel et futur proche collaborateur de

¹¹ Extrait du rapport de la délégation du Comité central à la IV^e conférence du PCY, dans Sabrana djela, vol. II, 226.

¹² Biographie de Broz écrite par Vladimir Ćopić, Moscou, le 11 décembre 1934, RGASPI, Le dossier personnel de Josip Broz, F. 495, d. 277, op. 21, p. 363.

¹³ Compte-rendu de la réunion du Comité Central, Vienne, le 29 décembre 1934, dans Sabrana djela, vol. II, 224.

¹⁴ Le dossier personnel de Josip Broz, RGASPI, F. 495, d. 277, op. 21, p. 276. Son épouse russe Pelagueïa (Pelagija) est retournée en URSS après son emprisonnement.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 284.

Tito, le Slovène, Edvard Kardelj.¹⁶ Or, le dernier mot sur l'emploi de Tito à Moscou revient aux instances des Komintern et Gorkić en est pleinement conscient. Il avance la candidature de Kardelj, mais il accepte aussi que Tito remplisse la fonction de référent politique au Komintern si tel devait être la décision de l'Internationale communiste.¹⁷

2. Dans les couloirs du Komintern

Tito arrive donc le 21 février 1935 à Moscou en provenance de Vienne avec un faux passeport autrichien au nom de Josef Gofmaher. Il est logé, comme d'ailleurs tous les cadres étrangers à l'hôtel Lux, au numéro 10 de la rue Gorki, aujourd'hui Tverskaya. Il s'agit d'un immeuble construit au début du XXe siècle dans le style de la sécession russe. Tito y est accueilli dans la chambre numéro 275 par Radomir Vujović, une vieille connaissance. Le confort est assez rudimentaire. Les toilettes sont à l'étage, ainsi que la cuisine commune. Les bains se trouvent dans la cour de l'immeuble. Ce type de logement, spartiate selon les critères d'aujourd'hui, est celui de tous les cadres des partis frères, y compris les membres de Comité exécutif de Komintern tels que Palmiro Togliatti, le leader italien, ou André Marty, représentant français, voir Georgi Dimitrov, le futur secrétaire général du Komintern. Dès son arrivée il voit Ćopić qui l'informe que son emploi et son avenir à Moscou dépendent de la vérification appelée « proverka », de la part du Département des cadres.

Cette procédure, d'une importance cruciale, consiste d'abord en la vérification du dossier de l'intéressé, constitué à partir des rapports dits « caractéristiques » rédigés par ses collègues du parti. Ces « caractéristiques » doivent répondre à toute une série de questions précises telles que : l'intéressé est-il ou a-t-il été membre d'une fraction, quel était son rôle dans les dissensions internes du parti, a-t-il fait l'objet de mesures disciplinaires de la part de son parti, etc. ? Les « caractéristiques » croisées sont en fait une forme implicite de délation très pratiquée dans le monde stalinien.¹⁸ Dans le cas de Tito il s'agissait des « caractéristiques » écrites par les trois principaux dirigeants du Parti yougoslave, c'est-àdire de Gorkić, Ćopić, et Parović. L'image de Tito qui se dégage de ces « caractéristiques » était celle d'un parfait organisateur, excellent meneur d'hommes, bref un véritable communiste. Parmi les avis de ses collègues, celui de Parović était particulièrement élogieux. Ce dernier arrive à Moscou en même temps que Tito en février 1935, pour informer le Komintern des résultats de la IVe conférence des communistes yougoslaves. Il est donc un témoin direct de la conduite de

¹⁶ Lettre de Gorkić à Ćopić, Vienne 16 janvier 1935, dans Sabrana djela, vol. II, 227.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ William J. Chase, Enemies within the Gates? The Comintern and the Stalinist Repression, 1934– 1939 (New Haven et Londres : Yale University Press, 2001), 22.

Tito, mais aussi la voix officielle du Parti yougoslave. Connaissant Tito avant son emprisonnement, il souligne particulièrement son combat contre les fractions et sa conduite lors de son procès en 1928. L'avis de Parović est particulièrement important parce qu'il est le dernier en date.¹⁹ Néanmoins, avant qu'aucune décision ne soit prise, Tito doit rédiger aussi son autobiographie détaillée, et se soumettre à un entretien prenant la forme d'un interrogatoire mené par les hommes du Département des cadres.²⁰

C'est pourquoi le 4 mars 1935 Tito rencontre Iakoubovitch,²¹ et Spiner, de son vrai nom Ivan Karaivanov, communiste bulgare. Le Département des cadres, principal organe de sécurité et de contrôle intérieur, tient à contrôler étroitement les cadres des partis frères travaillant dans la bureaucratie du Komintern. C'est indispensable aussi bien pour assurer la sécurité intérieure de l'Union soviétique que pour surveiller à travers eux la vie interne des partis frères. Ce système de contrôle multiforme est assuré au sommet par les dirigeants du Département, le plus souvent des cadres russes issus pour la plupart des organes de la sécurité intérieure et du contre-espionnage soviétique, tels que NKVD ou le GRU. Ils tiennent à jour les dossiers personnels des cadres des partis frères tout en surveillant leurs activités à travers les relais au sein de ces partis, tel Gorkić. Le même procédé est appliqué à Moscou par le biais des représentations des partis frères à Moscou, dans le cas du Parti yougoslave ce rôle fut assuré par Ćopić. Il faut souligner que les cadres des partis frères ne font pas partie des organes de sécurités soviétiques. Ils sont des relais censés assurer le contrôle aussi bien sur la vie interne des partis frères à l'étranger que parmi les émigrés politiques venus vivre et travailler en URSS.²²

Iakoubovitch et Spiner demandent à Tito de leur faire sa propre « caractéristique », ou tout simplement de de leur raconter sa vie, une sorte de deuxième autobiographie.²³ De cette façon il est tenu de présenter une nouvelle version du récit sur sa vie. La rédaction des autobiographies multiples était l'exercice préféré des autorités soviétiques. Les cadres du parti doivent en rédiger périodiquement,

¹⁹ Le dossier personnel de Josip Broz, RGASPI, F. 495, d. 277, op. 21, p. 356.

²⁰ Autobiographie de Josip écrite par ce dernier en février 1935, RGASPI, Le dossier personnel de Josip Broz, F. 495, d. 277, op. 21, pp. 290–297.

²¹ Nous n'avons pas pu obtenir plus de précisions sur l'identité de ce personnage dont tout porte à croire qu'il faisait partie des services de sécurité intérieure au l'USSR. Georgi Dimitrov dans ses mémoires parle en 1940 d'un certain Iakoubovitch, qui à l'époque était responsable du Comité d'arrondissement de VKP(b) à Moscou, ce qui signifie qu'il ne devait pas être étranger au travail des services de sécurité intérieure soviétiques. Georgi Dimitrov, *Journal*: 1933–1949 (Paris : Belin, 2005), 402.

²² Chase, Enemies within the Gates, 23.

²³ Compte-rendu de l'entretien de Josip avec Iakoubvitch et Spiner, Moscou, le 4 mars 1935, RGASPI, Le dossier personnel de Josip Broz, F. 495, d. 277, op. 21, vol. II, pp. 226–230.

et leurs dossiers personnels en abondent. Les différentes versions sont par la suite comparées par les autorités et les incohérences scrutées afin d'identifier les mauvaises graines parmi les membres des partis frères. Dans sa propre « caractéristique » Tito se présente comme ouvrier métallurgiste, mais il précise qu'au temps de la révolution de février 1917 il n'était pas à même de comprendre l'importance de l'évènement :

« A l'époque de la révolution de février j'ai parlé avec quelques ouvriers. Je ne sais pas s'ils étaient membres du parti ou non. Ils voulaient savoir de moi quel genre de prisonniers de guerre se trouvaient dans mon camp. Ils m'ont expliqué la question de la révolution russe. Je n'ai rien compris à l'époque même s'il s'agissait des mouvements socialistes, mais nous [les prisonniers de guerre] étions plus intéressés par le divertissement et le sport. »²⁴ Son récit par la suite suit les grandes lignes de sa vie n'apportant rien de nouveau à sa biographie telle qu'on la connait.

Iakoubovitch et Spiner invitent Tito à exprimer son opinion sur les anciens et les actuels membres du Politburo. L'exercice auquel il est obligé de se soumettre consiste en fait à établir des « caractéristiques » à son tour de ses collègues de Politburo, et se trouve être au moins autant une source d'informations sur lui-même que sur les personnes dont il parle. Ce sont en fait justement ces « caractéristiques » qui rendent sa « proverka » toute particulière. Ce sont de véritables petits portraits, car en plus de décrire leur orientation politique, Tito n'hésite pas à passer en revue la vie privée de ses collègues du Politburo. En effet, lorsqu'il rédige la « caractéristiques » de Gorkić, il dit :

« Dans sa vie privée je n'ai rien note de négatif. Son train de vie est assez modeste, il ne court pas après les femmes. Il n'a pas de famille. Mais il a une femme, je ne sais pas exactement où, quelque part en pays tchèque, une amie qu'il visite dès qu'il peut, pendant les vacances. Il quitte Vienne pendant deux ou trois jours et il se rend en pays tchèque. Cela ne s'est pas produit souvent. »²⁵

Ce type de discours assez précis englobant la sphère privée n'est pas présent dans les « caractéristiques » faites par ses collègues, qui se limitent à décrire l'engagement politique de leurs camarades.²⁶ La rédaction des « caractéristiques », voire la collaboration avec le Département des cadres en général, est non seulement une obligation mais un devoir pour les fonctionnaires du Komintern. Néanmoins, le zèle et la franchise de ses caractéristiques témoignent d'une disponibilité toute particulière de Tito. En se montrant particulièrement coopératif, Tito démontre une remarquable capacité d'adaptation aux usages du

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 213.

²⁶ Pero Simić, Svetac i magle. Tito i njegovo vreme u novim dokumentima Moskve i Beograda [Le saint et les brouillards. Tito et son temps dans les nouveaux documents de Moscou et de Belgrade] (Belgrade : Službeni list SCG, 2005), 70–73.

monde stalinien. C'est peut-être le moyen pour lui d'exprimer sa disponibilité pour un travail dans cet organe de contrôle intérieur du Komintern.

Une fois passée cette première épreuve, Tito doit, pour protéger sa véritable identité, choisir un pseudonyme sous lequel il sera connu par le Komintern. Le Département des cadres alors fournit une nouvelle identité à Tito qui devient Friedrich Walter. Entretemps, le 25 mars, le Comité central du Parti yougoslave accepte sa nomination comme référent politique au sécréterait balkanique de Komintern. Parović, de retour de Moscou, informe le Comité central de la décision du Komintern, qui non seulement donne son accord mais nomme Tito membre du bureau du parti à Moscou. Cette instance dirigeante du Parti yougoslave en URSS est toujours présidée par Ćopić en tant que représentant officiel du parti auprès du Komintern.²⁷ Lorsque sa situation paraît résolue, Tito disparaît pour une période de quelques semaines, officiellement parce qu'il part en congé. Il participe le 12 mars à la réunion du secrétariat balkanique et il réapparaît seulement le 21 avril lorsqu'il participe de nouveau à la réunion du secrétariat balkanique.²⁸ Entretemps, il n'y pas de trace de lui dans les archives du Komintern.

Pendant sa première permanence à Moscou, de février 1935 à octobre 1936, Tito est absent deux fois, en mars–avril 1935 et de novembre 1935 à mai 1936. Dans les deux cas on n'est pas en mesure d'affirmer avec certitude où il se trouve. En revanche, on peut constater qu'à chaque fois son retour est marqué par un avancement important dans la hiérarchie du Komintern. D'abord, il est officiellement cité en tant que référent yougoslave au sein du secrétariat balkanique le 11 mai 1935. Il remplace dans cette tâche Radomir Vujović, sa connaissance de l'époque de pénitencier de Maribor.²⁹ Le formulaire qu'il a rempli et qui contient les avis favorables de Copić et de Spiner, recommandant Tito pour le poste de chargé de cours à l'école de Lénine, porte la date du 27 mai 1935. Qui plus est, il est invité en mai 1935, à faire un rapport sur les dirigeants du Parti yougoslave faisant partie d'une enquête plus large menée par le Département des cadres.³⁰ En tant que référent pour la Yougoslavie, Tito doit à la fois fournir au Komintern des informations sur la situation dans le pays (il rédige en mai un rapport sur les élections yougoslaves tenues en 1935), mais aussi sur les cadres et la vie intérieure du Parti. La deuxième tâche relève de la compétence du Département des cadres, qui exerce son contrôle en s'appuyant sur des cadres

²⁷ Compte-rendu de la cellule communiste crée auprès du représentant de PCY auprès de Komintern, Moscou, le 12 mars 1935, RGASPI, F. 495, op. 70, d. 199, pp. 1–3.

²⁸ Compte-rendu de la réunion du secrétariat balkanique du Komintern, Moscou, le 21 avril 1935, dans *Sabrana djela*, vol. III, 155.

²⁹ Le dossier personnel de Josip Broz, RGASPI, F. 495, d. 277, op. 21, vol. II, p. 287.

³⁰ Procès-verbal de la réunion du secréterait balkanique du Komintern, dans Sabrana djela, vol. III, 159.

des partis frères. C'est pourquoi, Tito se présente en février 1936 aux étudiants yougoslaves du KUNMZ³¹ comme responsable des cadres balkaniques au Komintern.³² En août 1936 il est chargé de nouveau par le Département des cadres d'écrire des rapports sur les membres de la direction du Parti yougoslave.³³ De toute évidence Tito s'occupe des questions des cadres, autrement dit du contrôle intérieur, en tant qu'homme de confiance du Département des cadres parmi les communistes yougoslaves. Les recommandations de Copić, et en toute probabilité de Vujović, ainsi que le soutien de Spiner, dont il a su gagner la confiance lors de la « proverka », l'aident à devenir l'homme de confiance du Département des cadres.³⁴ Cependant, vu qu'il devient le relais du Département des cadres au sein du Parti yougoslave à Moscou seulement après son absence en avril 1935, on peut se demander si pendant cette période il n'a pas été soumis à d'ultimes vérifications de la part de cet organe du Komintern.³⁵ Les cadres du Komintern sont d'abord examinés par le contrôle intérieur afin qu'ensuite certains d'entre eux, choisis par le Département des cadres, exercent à leur tour la même fonction dans leurs partis.

L'histoire personnelle de Tito plaide en sa faveur pour assurer les activités propres au référent des cadres au sein de Parti yougoslave : ancien soldat ayant vécu la Révolution bolchevique en Russie, russophone, ayant même une famille en Russie, ouvrier, adversaire des fractions, bien intégré et estimé par les militants au pays, ayant tenu bon sous la pression policière et dans les geôles, bref il a le profil d'un révolutionnaire. Certes, les preuves formelles de son appartenance au Département des cadres n'existent pas, car ses archives sont toujours fermées. Néanmoins, son activité au Komintern porte tous les signes du « modus operandi » de cette instance, qui d'ailleurs s'exerce au grand jour, au vu de tout le monde. Les convocations à cette instance du Komintern sont une pratique quotidienne. Les détachements dans le Département des cadres, comme c'était le cas avec Ćopić en Tchécoslovaquie, se font officiellement. En revanche, les liens de Tito avec cette instance du Komintern sont de nature officieuse. Néanmoins, les

³¹ Cette école stalinienne, dont l'intitulé exact était, « L'université communiste pour des minorités nationales des pays occidentale », KUNMZ abréviation en russe, était une école pour des cadres des partis frères, qui après un séjour de deux ou trois années à l'école devaient retourner au pays pour mener le combat sur le terrain.

³² Vjenceslav Cenčić, *Enigma Kopinič* [L'énigme Kopinič], vol. I (Belgrade : IRO Rad, 1983), 44.

³³ Simić, Svetac i magle, 74–77.

³⁴ Ibid. 67.

³⁵ Pour l'hypothèse que le Département des cadres a soumis Tito à des vérifications ultérieures, je suis reconnaissant à Nikita Bondarev, qui a aimablement mis à ma disposition sont travail de maîtrise en manuscrit, « Moskovskij period v biografii Iosipa Broza Tito » (Moscou 2007), 144–149. Le travail de maîtrise a été ensuite publié en serbe : *Misterija Tito : moskovske godine* (Belgrade : Čigoja štampa, 2013).

tâches remplies par Tito pour le compte de Département des cadres ne prouvent pas son appartenance aux services secrets soviétiques. Son action reste dans le cadre du Komintern. Il n'y a pas de trace ni d'indications de ses liens avec le NKVD ou le GRU. Les dossiers des cadres yougoslaves ayant travaillé dans les services secrets soviétiques, soit à l'intérieur soit à l'extérieur de l'USSR, tels que Mustafa Golubić ou Josip Kopinič, contient la note suivante : « détaché aux services spécifiques. »³⁶ Aucune note de ce type n'existe pas dans le dossier de Tito, ce qui n'est pas une preuve définitive, mais indique néanmoins soit qu'il n'eût pas des liens avec services de sécurité soviétiques, au-delà du Département des cadres, ou le cas échéant qu'ils étaient de la nature toute particulière. Tito, à notre avis, était l'homme de confiance du Département des cadres, à l'instar d'un certain nombre de ses compatriotes avant lui, tel Ćopić, Radomir Vujović, voire Gorkić dans le Parti communiste yougoslave. Il n'est que la dernière recrue, qui occupe un poste d'importance en tant que confident et une source d'information, et en dernière instance un relais du pouvoir soviétique dans le Parti yougoslave. Dans la structure de ce département travaillent des hommes appartenant aux services de sécurité de l'URSS, comme Spiner, qui dirige un réseau d'hommes de confiance (tels que Tito) dans les partis frères. En tant que tel, Tito bénéficie en retour du soutien du Département des cadres qui lui permet d'assister à l'ouverture du VII° congrès du Komintern, qui se tient à Moscou de juillet à août 1935, car il ne fait pas partie de la délégation officielle du Parti yougoslave.³⁷

Gorkić l'a bien mis sur la liste des cadres yougoslaves présents au Congrès, mais seulement après le début du congrès : il a un statut particulier, celui de participant ne disposant pas du droit de vote.³⁸ Tito devient officiellement, le 30 juillet 1935, membre de la délégation yougoslave, et dès le premier août il est élu comme son secrétaire. La délégation doit proposer ses candidats aux instances dirigeantes du Komintern. Dans sa réunion du juillet 1934, le Politburo avait prévu de présenter la candidature de Gorkić pour le poste de membre du Comité exécutif.³⁹ De cette façon la place prépondérante de ce dernier au sein du Politburo reste inchangée depuis qu'en 1932 le Komintern l'a imposé aux communistes yougoslaves. La réunion plénière de la délégation yougoslave au Congrès, avec la participation des délégués venus du pays, des cadres du parti se trouvant à Moscou, des hommes travaillant au Komintern, mais aussi des émigrés politiques, choisit de présenter la candidature de Tito au poste de la plus haute

³⁶ Voir les dossiers de Golubić RGASPI, F. 495, d. 277, op. 1844, et de Kopinič, ibid., op. 16.

³⁷ La carte de Tito en tant que participant au VII^e Congrès du Komintern, RGASPI, Le dossier personnel de Josip Broz, F. 495, d. 277, op. 21, vol. II, p. 4a, 4b.

³⁸ Ubavka Vujošević, « Novi istorijski izvori o revolucionarnoj delatnosti Josipa Broza Tita u medjuratnom periodu » [Les nouvelles sources historiques sur l'activité de Josip Broz Tito dans l'entre-deux-guerres], *Istorija 20 veka* V/2 (1987), 29.

³⁹ Očak, Gorkić, 195.

responsabilité, tandis que Gorkić se trouve réduit au rang de substitut.⁴⁰ Cette décision de la délégation yougoslave équivaut en fait à une motion de censure envers l'homme imposé par le Komintern. C'est ainsi que la candidature de Tito est perçue par le Komintern. Or, Gorkić peut se prévaloir du soutien de Dimitri Manouilski, membre du Comité exécutif et homme de confiance de Staline. En conséquence le Komintern exige que Gorkić soit réinvesti en tant que candidat du Parti yougoslave au Comité exécutif.⁴¹ C'est finalement ce dernier qui est élu, mais seulement au poste de candidat du Comité exécutif. De cette façon, le Parti yougoslave subit un revers cinglant, car c'est la première fois que le Parti n'a pas de représentant au sein du Comité exécutif. L'image d'un parti rongé par les luttes de fractions et subissant des échecs cuisants sur le terrain se voit confirmée par les dissensions internes donnant lieu à des candidatures multiples. En conséquence les communistes yougoslaves perdent le peu de crédibilité qui leur reste au sein du Komintern.

Néanmoins la candidature de Tito est une indication supplémentaire de sa propension à faire des ascensions fulgurantes au sein du parti. Sa candidature s'explique par la continuité des clivages internes, et notamment par les réserves envers Gorkić en tant qu'homme privé d'assises sur le terrain. Imposé par Moscou jeune, - il n'avait en 1932, lorsqu'il devient l'homme fort du PCY, que 32 ans - Gorkić focalise sur sa personne les rancunes de tous les anciens hommes forts du parti. Il personnalise le renouveau des effectifs entamé en 1932, reléguant au deuxième plan les chefs des fractions et les figures historiques du parti, car fort du soutien de Moscou il est devenu immuable. C'est pourquoi on cherche à le confronter à une autre étoile montante du parti, à savoir Tito. Ce dernier rassemble sur sa personne toutes les caractéristiques requises pour être un contre candidat. Il est ouvrier, homme de terrain, bien connu désormais par la bureaucratie moscovite ainsi que par le contrôle intérieur du Komintern. Il est le seul homme neuf au sein de la direction disposant des attributs nécessaires pour faire carrière dans le monde stalinien. Sans doute la tentative de déstabilisation de Gorkić échoue-t-elle mais Tito acquiert un nouveau statut, celui d'un des prétendants possibles au poste clé du Parti yougoslave.

Remis en ordre de marche sous la direction de Gorkić, le parti doit avant tout s'atteler à améliorer son image et son statut au sein du Komintern. Pour ce faire il lui faut intensifier le travail sur le terrain. C'est pourquoi le 18 octobre 1935 la décision est prise que les meilleurs hommes doivent aller travailler clandestinement dans le pays. Ćopić et Tito quittent leurs postes au Komintern et intègrent de nouveau le Politburo, pour pouvoir guider sa représentation dans le pays, représentation censée assurer la direction au quotidien du travail clandes-

⁴⁰ Ibid. 196.

⁴¹ Compte-rendu de la délégation du PCY au VII^e congrès du Komintern, Moscou, le 19 août 1935, dans *Sabrana djela*, vol. III, 171.

tin.⁴² Mais le renouveau de l'action clandestine est arrêté avant même de commencer. En novembre 1935 la police yougoslave réussit, à la suite de plusieurs rafles, à démanteler les réseaux communistes dans la partie occidentale du pays. Son nom ayant été évoqué lors des interrogatoires, Tito fait de nouveau l'objet d'un mandat de recherche, et se voit obligé de repousser son départ. Il ne partira qu'en octobre 1936. On ne dispose que de peu d'information sur cette partie de son séjour à Moscou.

Selon les sources yougoslaves, il attend simplement un moment propice pour partir, travaille au bureau du représentant du parti,⁴³ profitant aussi de son séjour prolongé en URSS pour se reposer.⁴⁴ Cependant, il faut noter que Ćopić regagne Vienne et intègre le Politburo avant la fin de l'année 1935, tandis que Tito reste toujours à Moscou. Quelles sont les raisons de ce séjour prolongé à Moscou ?

Selon les sources soviétiques, il travaille de nouveau au secrétariat balkanique du premier décembre 1935 jusqu'au mois de mai 1936.⁴⁵ Cependant, il y peu de traces de son activité au Komintern pendant cette période. Le 20 janvier 1936 Wilhelm Pieck, responsable du secrétariat balkanique au sein du Komintern, écrit à Dimitrov un rapport sur la question des cadres des partis de sa responsabilité et cite Walter alias Tito, comme le référent politique du Parti yougoslave.⁴⁶ On sait aussi qu'il a rédigé, le 10 février 1936, la caractéristique de son ami Vujović, à la demande du Département des cadres.⁴⁷ Le même jour il fait une conférence aux étudiants yougoslaves du KUNMZ.⁴⁸ C'est à cette occasion qu'il se présente comme responsable des cadres balkaniques au Komintern.

Les indications fournies par Tito lui-même sur la période sont contradictoires. A plusieurs reprises, il parle longuement de son étroite et fructueuse collaboration avec Wilhelm Pieck, communiste allemand et membre du Comité exécutif, lorsque ce dernier dirigeait le secrétariat balkanique.⁴⁹ Or, lorsque Pieck dirigeait ce secrétariat balkanique, à savoir à partir du mois d'octobre 1935, selon les sources yougoslaves Tito n'y travaillait plus, voire il était au repos à la

⁴² Vujošević, « Novi istorijski izvori », 33.

⁴³ Vladimir Ćopić, ayant été intégré de nouveau à la direction en même que Josip, les deux hommes devaient regagner le pays pour y diriger le travail clandestin, le nouveau représentant de Parti communiste yougoslave auprès du Komintern était Ivan Gržetić, connu sous le nom de Fleischer.

⁴⁴ Vujošević, « Novi istorijski izvori », 34–35.

⁴⁵ Le dossier personnel de Josip Broz, RGASPI, F. 495, d. 277, op. 21, vol. II, p. 289.

⁴⁶ Le rapport de Pieck à Tito, le 20 janvier 1936, RGASPI, F. 495, op. 11, d. 6.

⁴⁷ La « caractéristique » de Vujović, dans Sabrana djela, vol. III, 174.

⁴⁸ Le compte-rendu de la réunion de la conférence donné aux étudiants yougoslaves du KUNMZ, Moscou, le 10 février 1936, dans Sabrana djela, vol. III, 3–5.

⁴⁹ Tito, Autobiografska kazivanja, vol. I, 129–131.

demande du Parti yougoslave qui repoussa sans cesse son départ pour Vienne d'abord et le pays ensuite.⁵⁰

A la suite du VIIe congrès, le Komintern est réorganisé. Les secrétariats régionaux sont transformés en secrétariats dirigés par les membres du Comité exécutif du Komintern dont Pieck fait partie. La réforme vise à donner plus de libertés aux partis frères, en diminuant l'ingérence de Moscou. En fait, il est surtout question de redimensionner le rôle du Komintern selon les souhaits de Staline. Il n'est plus question d'une révolution mondiale, mais de la défense de la patrie du communisme face au péril fasciste. Pour diriger une action bien moins ambitieuse et en partie décentralisée, Staline a besoin de structures réduites et plus maniables. La réduction du rôle du Komintern va de pair avec la diminution de ses effectifs et du nombre d'étrangers vivant en URSS, dont Staline se méfie énormément. C'est un secrétariat de ce type, plus compact et plus proche du pouvoir soviétique, que dirige Pieck et dans lequel Tito était supposé collaborer.

L'absence presque totale de traces de participation de Tito dans le travail du secrétariat de Pieck permet de s'interroger sur l'engagement de Tito dans les structures plus confidentielles du Komintern. Au sein du Komintern existe alors toute une série d'écoles spéciales, dont l'école militaro-politique qui prépare les cadres des partis frères à la guérilla urbaine et à la guerre de partisans. Cette « Académie des partisans » a son siège dans le village de Bakovka, près de Moscou, mais elle dispose d'antennes dans le centre de la ville et notamment dans le voisinage de l'actuelle station de métro « Novokuzneckaja ». La présence de Pieck à cette école est attestée, ainsi que la présence de cadres du Parti yougoslave.⁵¹ Il n'y a pas de section yougoslave au sein de cette école mais seulement des sections polonaise, espagnole et allemande. Il nous est paru légitime de se poser la question si la collaboration de Tito avec Pieck, sur laquelle le témoignage de Tito est inéquivoque,⁵² ne s'est pas déroulée dans le cadre de cette « Académie des partisans » plutôt que dans le secrétariat balkanique de Komintern. Au vu des prouesses de Tito en tant que commandant des partisans lors de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, on a le droit de se poser la question s'il a acquis les fondements de l'art de ce type de guerre dans la section allemande de « l'Académie des partisans », suivant les cours de son ami Pieck.

Les liens que Tito a su tisser avec le Département des cadres dans un premier temps, puis, dans un deuxième temps, vraisemblablement avec les structures confidentielles du Komintern, lui permettent de jouir de la confiance du pouvoir parallèle qui, dans le monde soviétique, se révèle souvent être le vrai centre de décision. Fort de leur soutien, Tito peut affronter la nouvelle crise dans le parti yougoslave. Les rafles de la police yougoslave, commencées

⁵⁰ La chronologie de l'activité de Tito dans Sabrana djela, vol. III, 260.

⁵¹ V. I. Pâtnickij, Osip Pâtnickij i Komintern (Minsk : Harvest, 2004), 271, 276.

⁵² Tito, Autobiografska kazivanja, vol. I, 133.

en novembre 1935, se poursuivent jusqu'en mars 1936, et conduisent en prison un quart de ses effectifs, à savoir 900 militants.⁵³ Il ne reste presque plus de contacts ou d'appartements sûrs dans le pays, tout est à reconstruire. Les divisions internes ne peuvent qu'être exacerbées par cette défaite cuisante. Les lignes de fracture traditionnelles entre les hommes de terrain et ceux de Moscou, et entre les différentes fractions, donnent lieu à un conflit ouvert lors de la conférence tenue en avril 1936 à Vienne, où se trouve à l'époque le siège de parti. Il faut noter que parmi les trois hommes forts nommés par Moscou en 1932, c'est-à-dire Gorkić, Ćopić et Parović, ce dernier a déjà été exclu de la direction pour cause d'entorses aux règles du travail clandestin.⁵⁴ C'est ainsi que lors de la conférence d'avril à Vienne seuls Ćopić et Gorkić sont présents.

Ce dernier en tant que l'homme fort du parti et, de facto, le responsable des structures du parti dans le pays, est désigné par Copić, et par les anciens membres de la fraction de gauche, comme principal responsable de l'échec subi lors des rafles policières.⁵⁵ En plus des revers subis dans le travail sur le terrain, le moment est venu de régler les comptes avec Gorkić, l'homme imposé par Moscou. La majorité des autres membres de la direction est issue de la fraction de gauche et du travail sur le terrain. La conférence était organisée sans l'accord préalable du Komintern, et sans la présence de son représentant. C'est là une entorse plus que grave à la discipline communiste et celle du Komintern. La teneur des discussions est perçue comme une attaque ad hominem contre le favori du Komintern, autrement dit comme la prolongation de la lutte des fractions. Le Komintern ne reconnaît comme valide aucune autre justification pour la tenue et les conclusions de la conférence. Edvard Kardelj nous a laissé un témoignage de première main sur les réactions de l'appareil du Komintern. Étant arrivé à Moscou et devenu le professeur à l'école de Lénine, il entend Pieck prononcer la phrase suivante : « Celui qui s'en prend à Gorkić s'oppose au Komintern. »

La réaction officielle ne se fait pas attendre. Le Comité exécutif du Komintern consacre sa conférence du 15 août 1936 à la situation dans le parti yougoslave. Avec la participation de Dimitrov, Manouilski, Pieck, ainsi que de Gorkić, Tito, et Parović, mais en l'absence de Ćopić, qui n'a pas eu le visa à temps pour venir, la conférence révoque les conclusions de la séance plénière du parti yougoslave d'avril. Gorkić, bien que sanctionné comme principal dirigeant du

⁵³ Tito, Autobiografska kazivanja, vol. I, 135.

⁵⁴ Revenant du VII^e congrès, Parović avait eu une liaison amoureuse avec une collaboratrice de l'ambassade soviétique à Budapest. N'ayant informé ni les autorités soviétiques ni le PCY de cette affaire, il s'était rendu coupable d'avoir mis en péril non seulement son action personnelle, mais aussi celle du parti et, qui plus est, avait pu compromettre la représentation diplomatique de l'Union soviétique. Lorsque l'affaire est découverte, il se voit écarté de la direction du parti à la demande des autorités soviétiques. Piljević, *Čovek od ideje i akcije*, 543.

⁵⁵ Čolaković, Kazivanje o jednom pokoljenju, vol. II (Sarajevo : Svjetlost, 1980), 517–520.

parti, garde la confiance du Comité exécutif du Komintern, et en conséquence Tito et Parović lui apportent eux aussi leur soutien, tandis que Ćopić est écarté du Comité central en tant que l'homme des fractions.⁵⁶ Gorkić reste donc le seul l'homme fort de parti yougoslave, mais le Comité exécutif nomme Pieck président de la commission chargée d'étudier la situation dans le parti et de proposer la composition de la future direction des communistes yougoslaves. Pieck décide en septembre que la direction opérationnelle du parti yougoslave doit désormais se trouver dans le pays, tandis qu'à l'étranger ne doit rester que la partie de la direction assurant la liaison avec Moscou. Cependant la composition de la direction est laissée à la discrétion du Département des cadres et du Comité exécutif du Komintern. Gorkić, en tant que principal responsable du parti yougoslave, suggère en octobre à Pieck et à Manouilski la marche à suivre pour sortir les communistes yougoslaves de l'impasse. Il leur propose que Tito se rende en Yougoslavie afin de recommencer, sans tarder, le travail sur le terrain en s'appuyant sur les deux instructeurs du parti, Rodoljub Čolaković et Sreten Žujović. Tous les deux ont été récemment envoyés en Yougoslavie après avoir parfait leur éducation communiste à Moscou.⁵⁷

Gorkić propose la composition de la nouvelle direction du parti yougoslave selon le même critère que précédemment, à savoir en se basant sur ses liens personnels avec les candidats potentiels. C'est ainsi que lorsqu'il quitte Vienne pour Moscou au printemps 1936, il laisse son ami personnel Munk comme chargé d'affaires à Vienne. Il souhaite le maintenir dans la même fonction tandis que Tito devenu entre-temps son protégé, devrait retrouver son rôle de toujours dans les schémas de Gorkić, celui de relais de la direction au pays. Pieck, faisant siennes les suggestions de Gorkić, convoque le 16 octobre Tito pour l'informer que jusqu'à la constitution de la nouvelle direction, la direction du parti lui est confiée en association avec Munk. Pendant que Gorkić continue d'œuvrer à Moscou pour officialiser son emprise définitive sur le parti, ses deux recrues de 1934 devant gérer pour lui les affaires du parti à Vienne et au pays. De plus Pieck charge Tito de relever Ćopić de toute fonction dès son arrivée à Vienne. On doit noter que Copić est le plus sérieux concurrent de Gorkić au sein du parti. Tito doit en plus s'appuyer dans son travail en Yougoslavie sur Čolaković, une autre connaissance de Gorkić de Sarajevo, mais aussi son compagnon d'infortune à lui du pénitencier du Maribor. Gorkić réussit à imposer ses choix à Pieck et Manouilski car il jouit du soutien de Moiseï Tchernomordik, responsable du

⁵⁶ Lettre du Gorkić, Josip et Parović à Manouilski et Pieck, Moscou, le 13 octobre 1936, RGASPI, F. 495, op. 11, d. 289, pp. 3–5.

⁵⁷ Vera Mujbegović et Ubavka Vujošević, « Die Kommunistische Partei Jugoslawiens und die Komintern. Dokumente zur "jugoslawischen Frage" 1936 », Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismus-forschung 1993, 188–192.

dossier balkanique au sein du Département des cadres, et de Henri Walecki, ancien chef du secrétariat balkanique.⁵⁸

Gorkić se réserve le poste du principal responsable, celui qui gère les contacts avec Moscou et de ce fait dirige effectivement le Parti communiste yougoslave. Depuis 1932 il a évincé de la direction tout concurrent en éliminant toutes les figures historiques du parti. Désormais la direction du parti ne peut être composée que des hommes de son choix. Lorsque Gorkić arrive finalement à Vienne en décembre 1936, il peut communiquer à Čolaković la composition du nouveau Politburo,⁵⁹ sans vraiment dissimuler sa satisfaction. De plus, Gorkić peut se prévaloir d'une position jusqu'alors inexistante dans le parti, à savoir celle de secrétaire général disposant du droit du veto.⁶⁰ Dans un parti de type stalinien ce poste permet d'assurer une conduite plus efficace des affaires en personnalisant la direction du parti, comme on peut le voir avec Georgi Dimitrov pour le Komintern, devenu son secrétaire général. Le Comité exécutif du Komintern nomme officiellement le nouveau Politburo le 7 janvier 1937. Son organisation est celle déjà préconisée par Pieck. Gorkić, en tant que secrétaire général, doit rester à l'étranger car il est personnellement responsable du parti yougoslave au Komintern. Tito, quant à lui, dirige le travail clandestin à l'intérieur du pays.⁶¹

Tito, en plus de devoir évincer de la direction les ennemis de Gorkić, est chargé dès son arrivée à Vienne en octobre 1936, de mettre en place le programme d'action établi par le Komintern. Cette feuille de route à caractère impératif met en évidence les priorités du Komintern : aide à l'Espagne révolutionnaire et lutte contre les contre-révolutionnaires trotskystes, en d'autres termes la purge du parti yougoslave. Tito est particulièrement bien qualifié pour réaliser ces tâches, étant l'homme de confiance du Département des cadres s'occupant au PCY à la fois de l'envoi de recrues pour les Brigades internationales et d'assurer le contrôle intérieur. C'est seulement dans un deuxième temps que Tito doit s'occuper des questions spécifiques à la Yougoslavie, telles que la mise en place d'un large front populaire et la création des partis communiste de Croatie et de Slovénie.⁶²

Tito quitta donc Moscou pour Vienne le 16 octobre 1936, après un séjour de vingt mois, mais cette fois-ci comme homme de confiance du tout puissant Département des cadres et aussi comme responsable de l'action au pays. Son ascension dans la hiérarchie du parti est une fois de plus remarquable. Il a su s'adapter et profiter de la politique du renouveau de parti menée depuis 1932 par

⁵⁸ Ubavka Vujošević, « Poslednja autobiografija Milana Gorkića, sekretara CK KPJ » [La dernière autobiographie de Milan Gorkić, secrétaire du Comité central du PCY], *Istorija 20 veka* XV/1 (1997), 127.

⁵⁹ Alojz Munk, Josip Broz, Rodoljub Čolaković, Sreten Žujović et Anton Leskošek.

⁶⁰ Čolaković, Kazivanja, vol. II, 696.

⁶¹ Mujbegović et Vujošević, « Die Kommunististiche Partei Jugoslawiens », 194, 195.

⁶² Ibid. 192–193.

Gorkić. Ce dernier, favori de Manouilski, se retrouve à la tête des communistes yougoslaves, épaulé par Tito, devenu entretemps homme de confiance du Département des cadres. Le premier détient la responsabilité de l'orientation politique du parti, tandis que le deuxième assure le contrôle intérieur, le recrutement et la gestion des effectifs sur le terrain. Les enseignements reçus à Moscou et les liens tissés avec le Département des cadres qualifient Tito pour assurer ce rôle inhérent à toute structure stalinienne. C'est ainsi que la métamorphose vécue par Tito est complète. Arrivé à Moscou comme homme de terrain opposé à ce que le Komintern choisisse les membres du Comité central, il en repart comme l'homme du Komintern chargé d'appliquer à la lettre ses instructions. Dans un parti stalinien, le yougoslave en occurrence, Tito était chef du contrôle intérieur. Lorsqu'il quitte Moscou Tito est de facto si ce n'est de jure numéro deux du parti. Un seul pas le sépare désormais de la position la plus importante, celle de secrétaire général. Cette dernière marche s'avèrera par la suite la plus difficile à franchir. Il y consacrera les quatre années suivantes. Avant de commencer cette longue marche, à la fois dans la clandestinité et dans les couloirs du Komintern, Tito va devoir remettre de l'ordre dans sa vie privée.

Une des raisons de sa venue à Moscou avait été de retrouver son fils et sa femme, Pelagueïa Beloussova. Après son arrivée en URSS, Beloussova avait placé leur fils Žarko dans des foyers pour les enfants de cadres du Parti soviétique et des partis frères. Lorsque Tito arrive en URSS il est obligé d'aller le chercher dans un foyer à Leningrad mais il ne le trouve pas, car le garçon a fugué comme il en a l'habitude. Il ne le verra que quelques jours plus tard, lorsqu'on le lui amène à l'hôtel Lux. Leur rencontre ne déborde pas d'affection, et il faudra un certain temps au petit pour s'habituer au père qu'il n'avait pas vu depuis sept ans, et dont il s'était séparé depuis l'âge de quatre ans. En été 1935 Pelagueïa vient à Moscou pour suivre un cours de préparation au Komintern et loge pendant deux jours chez Tito à l'hôtel Lux. Pendant cette période Tito se convainc que Pelagueïa n'a aucune intention de s'occuper de leur fils, voire qu'elle a peu de sentiment maternel. Dès lors Tito lui propose qu'ils divorcent car aucun autre lien, sauf leur fils, n'existait entre eux.⁶³ Il n'existe aucune trace d'une quelconque tentative de Pelagueïa de reprendre contact avec son fils ou son ancien mari. Le divorce est officiellement prononcé en avril 1936.64

Žarko était d'un caractère difficile, au point de friser la délinquance, même après que Tito l'a pris de nouveau sous son aile. C'est une raison de plus pour lui d'essayer de trouver un moyen pour que son fils ne soit pas confié à des foyers pour enfants. Le sort de son fils cause bien plus de souci à Tito que la fin de son

⁶³ Le rapport de Tito au Département des cadres sur ces relations avec Johanna König alias Lucie Bauer, Le dossier personnel de Josip Broz, RGASPI, F. 495, d. 277, op. 21, pp. 223–225.

⁶⁴ L'attestation du divorce entre Walter et Pelagueïa, Le dossier personnel de Josip Broz, RGASPI, F. 495, d. 277, op. 21, vol. III.

premier mariage, car il a déjà trouvé une nouvelle compagne en la personne de la communiste allemande, Lucie Bauer, de son vrai nom Johanna König.⁶⁵ Leur histoire d'amour commence à l'hôtel Lux, en automne 1935. Selon le témoignage de Tito sa décision de commencer une nouvelle relation est alors motivée surtout pour donner un foyer à son fils. Le principal intéressé dira néanmoins après la guerre qu'il a très peu côtoyé Lucie Bauer. Tito quant à lui est sincèrement épris de Lucie. C'est d'ailleurs Lucie qui l'aidera à surmonter les difficultés dues à la séparation et aux longues années passées en prison. Avant de rencontrer Lucie, Tito n'a pas cherché à remplacer Pelagueïa par une autre présence féminine. Notons qu'il n'est pas un adepte de la théorie de l'amour libre qui a alors cours dans les cercles communistes, et il se marie avec Lucie en octobre 1936, juste avant son départ pour l'étranger.

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History of Hellenic-Serbian (Yugoslav) Alliances from Karageorge to the Balkan Pact 1817–1954**

Abstract: The paper provides a review of efforts to make Serbian-Hellenic alliances and formal agreements since the last years of Karageorge's life within the context of the relations between Serbia and Greece, and later between Yugoslavia and Greece. The circumstances that led to the signing of six formal alliances have been analysed including their content and scope. Out of the six alliances, four were bilateral, and two were Balkan (1934, 1953/54). All of them have been reviewed both in the bilateral and Balkan context. The following agreements have been analysed: The Treaty of Alliance and the Military Treaty from 1867/68, The Treaty of Alliance of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Hellenic Kingdom and the Military Convention of June 1, 1913, The Pact of Friendship, Conciliation and Judicial Settlement between Yugoslavia and Greece of 1929, the Balkan Pact (the Balkan Entente) of 1934, The Treaty on the Balkan Union between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Hellenic Kingdom of January 1942, the Balkan Pact of 1953/54. The issues related to the struggle of Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria about Macedonia and the question of the Serbian Free Zone of Salonica have also been discussed, as well as mutual relations during the Great War and at the beginning of the Cold War.

Keywords: Serbian-Hellenic alliance, Treaty of Alliance of 1867/68, Treaty of Alliance of Serbia and Greece of 1913, Balkan Pact (Balkan Entente) of 1934, Balkan Pact of 1953/54

The one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the first formal Serbian-Hellenic alliance of 1867 was marked by exhibitions in Belgrade, Thessaloniki and Athens, and it offered a chance to rethink a series of Greek-Serbian and Greek-Yugoslav agreements on friendship and mutual alliance.¹ In the period from 1976 to 2003, the institutes for Balkan Studies in Belgrade and Thessa-

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¹ To date the most complete review of Serbian-Hellenic alliances from the 1860s until the First World War is Dušan T. Bataković, "The Serbian-Greek Alliances 1861–1918", in Paschalis M. Kitromilides and Sophia Matthaiou, eds., *Greek-Serbian Relations in the Age of Nation Building* (Athens: Section of Neohellenic Research/Institute of Historical Research of the National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2016), 21–64; see also S. G. Markovich, "Ellada kai Servia. 150 hronia symmahia" ["Greece and Serbia. 150 years of Co-operation"], *Kathimerini*, 27 August 2017.

loniki held six symposia on Serbian-Hellenic relations. Five of them dealt with topics that covered the political and cultural history of the nineteenth and twentieth century, and one was dedicated to the arts of Thessaloniki and the spiritual currents in the fourteenth century.² Another scholarly conference was organised by the Institute of Historical Research of the National Hellenic Research Foundation in 2010.³ In that way, the state of research of Serbian-Greek relations in the nineteenth and twentieth century has been the result of decades-long cooperation of the institutes in Belgrade, Thessaloniki and Athens.

The first unofficial alliance

One could take as the first unofficial modern alliance between Greeks and Serbs the agreement made in 1817 between Karadjordje (Karageorge) Petrović, the leader of the First Serbian Uprising (1804–1813), and the secret Pan-Hellenic society *Philike Hetairia* ("Society of Friends"). The identity of both ethnic groups was at that time still ethno-religious and very much based on Christian Orthodox traditions. Ethnic Greeks still adhered to Byzantine traditions, and still called themselves *Romaioi*, in other words – Romans. However, educated ethnic Greeks were under the influence of the ideas of the Enlightenment and Adamantios Korais, and they increasingly viewed themselves as members of a culture inextricably linked with ancient Hellas, and their identity as Hellenic rather than exclusively Eastern Roman (Byzantine). Hetairia was established in 1814 in Odessa and initially had "the basic characteristics of a Masonic Chris-

² The Institute for Balkan Studies in Thessaloniki organised the first meeting in Kavala in 1976, the third in Thessaloniki in 1982, the fifth in Thessaloniki and Volos in 1987, and the sixth meeting in Thessaloniki in 2003. The proceedings from the third and sixth meetings have been published as special issues of the journal Balkan Studies. The second and fourth meetings were organised by the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in Belgrade in 1980 and 1985. There are published collections of papers from every one of these meetings: 1. Synergasia Ellinon kao Servon kata tous epeleutherotikous agones 1804–1830/Saradnja izmedju Srba i Grka za vreme svojih oslobodilačkih pokreta 1804–1830 (Thessaloniki 1979); 2. Greek-Serbian Cooperation 1830–1908 (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1982); 3. Balkan Studies 24/2 (1983), Special issue: "The Collaboration between Greeks and Serbs from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century"; 4. L'art de Thessalonique et des pays balkaniques et les courants spirituels au XIV^e siècle: recueil des rapports du IV^e colloque serbo-grec [ed. Radovan Samardžić] (Belgrade : Institut des Études balkaniques, 1987); 5. Proceedings of Fifth Greek-Serbian Symposium (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1991); 6. Balkan Studies 45/1 (2004), Special issue: "Greek-Serbian Relations in the First Half of the 20th Century".

³ Paschalis Kitromilides and Sophia Matthaiou, eds., *Greek-Serbian Relations in the Age of Nation-Building* (Athens: Section of Neohellenic Research/Institute of Historical Research of the National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2016).

tian organisation".⁴ The envoy for Serbia became Georgios Olympios (Djordje Olimpije in Serbian), a participant in the First Serbian Uprising, known among Serbs as Kapetan (Captain) Jorgać. During the Uprising in Serbia, Karadjordje did not have much confidence in Greeks as intermediaries but, when he found himself in exile in Moldova and Russia, he became close to the hetairists. In 1816, during his stay in St. Petersburg, he noticed that Russian official circles had no inclination to support an uprising among Balkan Christians. Following the Congress of Vienna, a legitimistic mood prevailed in St. Petersburg. Therefore, the hetairists happened to be a very rare group that advocated an uprising of Balkan Christians.

In Jassy, the office of dragoman (translator) was held by Georgios Leventis. He formulated the idea of a concomitant uprising in Greece and Serbia. It was Olympios who introduced the leader of the First Serbian Uprising to the plans of Hetairia. At that time, Karadjordje lived in Hotin (Khotyn) in Bessarabia.⁵ He came to the garden of Galata, in the vicinity of Jassy, to the house of Constantine Ypsilantis. There he met Leventis three times and, in June 1817, was initiated into the secret society Hetairia. Filimon described what Karadjordje swore to fight for on that occasion: "He [Karadjordje] swore on his own and his people's behalf that he would be an eternal enemy of the tyrant [the Ottoman Empire], and would support Hellas, Serbia and all the Christians under the Turks, regardless of their ethnicity and creed, and that he would do everything to overthrow the tyrannical yoke."⁶ The hetairist Mihail Leonardo provided him with a passport and, in June 1817, took him to the border with Serbia.⁷ His transfer to Serbia was meant to provoke a new action that would be a signal for a general uprising of Balkan Christians. These plans failed when Karadjordje was murdered only a few days after his arrival in Serbia. The warmongering policy of Karadjordje and Hetairia was very much at odds with the plans of gradualism advocated by the Serbian Prince Miloš Obrenović (Milosh Obrenovich).

⁴ Dimitrije Djordjevic and Stephen Fischer-Galati, *The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 78.

⁵ Nikolai Todorov, Filiki eteriia i Bŭlgrarite (Sofia: BAN, 1965), 50; Ioannis Filimon, Dokimion istorikon peri tis ellinikis Epanastaseos, vol. 1 (Athens 1859), 7.

⁶ Srbija i Grčka u XIX veku. Odnosi Kara-Djordjevi i Miloševi sa Grcima. Prevod grčkih dokumenata iz Filimonove istorije grčkog ustanka (Belgrade 1907), 23. Filimon, Dokimon istorikon, vol. 1, 7–8.

⁷ Grgur Jakšić, "Prvi Srpsko-grčki savez (1867–1868)", *Iz novije srpske istorije* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1953), 39. Dušan Lukač, "Heterija i Kardjordje", in Synergasia Ellinon kao Servon kata tous apeleutherotikous agones 1804–1830/Saradnja izmedju Srba i Grka za vreme svojih oslobodilačkih pokreta 1804–1830 (Thessaloniki 1979), 153–159.

"Karadjordje paid the clash of the two approaches with his own head."⁸ He died a victim of the aspiration to mount a pan-Christian uprising among the Eastern Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire.

Ioannis Filimon (1798/1799–1874), historian and participant in the Greek Uprising of 1821 but also a hetairist, wrote A History of Philike Hetairia (1834) and A History of the Hellenic Uprising in three volumes (1859–1860).⁹ He described the shock felt among Serbian and Hellenic patriots after the death of Karadjordje: "That unfortunate act very much harmed Serbian and Greek interests. For Serbia, he was a great protector because he offered resistance to the Turks and made them afraid, and Hellas lost with him every hope of a future fight against the Turks. Due to this and quite naturally, Greeks were overwhelmed by sorrow after the death of this irreplaceable hero."¹⁰

From the spring of 1820, Hetaireia was led by Prince Alexander/Alexandros Ypsilantis (1792–1828). In January 1821, he sent a draft alliance treaty to Prince Miloš. It included ten articles, but the hetairist who carried it was caught in Ada Kale, taken to Constantinople and executed.¹¹ Although Prince Miloš staged no insurrection during the Greek War of Independence, he helped Greeks whom he viewed as Christian brethren. In practically autonomous Serbia under Miloš Obrenović, Turks still pursued slave trade, which Serbs viewed with deep disapproval. When Turks brought Greeks who had been taken as slaves during the Greek War of Independence, Prince Miloš would pay their ransom and set them all free. For this he received from Otto, King of the Hellenes, the Grand Cross of the Order of the Redeemer/Saviour.¹²

What connected Romeic Romans/Greeks and Serbs in the age of the Serbian and Greek uprisings was their adherence to the same religion. What will gradually develop as an obstacle between various Balkan nations, including Serbs and Greeks, would be the transformation of an ethnic into a national identity. In both the Principality/Kingdom of Serbia and the Hellenic Kingdom, it happened only in the second half of the nineteenth century.

⁸ Dimitrije Djordjević, *Nacionalne revolucije balkanskih naroda* 1804–1914 [National Revolutions of Balkan Peoples 1804–1914] (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1995), 28.

⁹ Ioannis Filimon, Dokimon istorikon peri tis Philikis Etaireias (Nauplio 1834); Ioannis Filimon, Dokimon istorikon peri tis ellinikis Epanastaseos, vol. 1–3 (Athens 1859–1860). Excerpts from this history were published in Serbian in 1907.

¹⁰ Srbija i Grčka u XIX veku, 23; Filimon, Dokimon istorikon, 10.

¹¹ Filimon, *Dokimon istorikon*, 40; the work was edited by A. J. Kumanudi, Filimon, *Dokimon istorikon peri tis ellinikis Epanastaseos*, vol. 1, 9–10.

¹² Tihomir R. Djordjević, *Iz Srbije kneza Miloša. Kulturne prilike od 1815. do 1839* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1983), 25; *Novine srbske* no. 11, 18 March 1839, 81.

The first formal alliance of Athens and Belgrade

During his second reign, the Serbian Prince Michael (Mihailo) Obrenović III (1860–1868) launched a comprehensive action focused on the liberation of Balkan Christians. It was already during the second reign of his father, Prince Miloš (1859–1860), that efforts were made to reach an alliance between the Principality of Serbia and the Hellenic Kingdom. In August 1860, an envoy of the Hellenic government called Palaiologos brought an offer aimed at making an alliance between Greece and Serbia against the Ottoman Empire, but Serbia declined because it was not yet ready to launch a military offensive.¹³ Sometime later, Ilija Garašanin (Iliya Garashanin 1812–1874) began working on the alliance. In March 1861, he submitted to Prince Michael a draft proposal of an agreement with Greece. Garašanin's view was that if the Hellenic Kingdom and Serbia remained peaceful, they would allow the European powers to make deals about the future of the Ottoman Empire without the Balkan states having a say in its fate.

At the same time, an offer for an alliance came from Otto, King of the Hellenes. On 19 April 1861, this offer was handed in Constantinople to Ilija Garašanin and Milan Petronijević by Markos Renieris (1815–1897), a Greek lawyer and historian, and an associate of the famous Greek historian Kostantinos Paparigopoulos (1815–1891). By June the documents that had been sent to Athens and Belgrade were harmonised. There were actually two documents: a draft convention between Serbia and Greece and an agreement on the alliance between Serbia, Greece, Romania and Montenegro. The draft included the obligation for both states to muster as many troops as possible; additionally, Greece was to arm as large a fleet as possible. The agreement was never signed, but both governments declared that they considered the draft as if it had been ratified and signed. It turned out that none of the signatories was able to equip a sufficiently strong army and that the great powers were against any military offensive of Serbia and Greece. The efforts to formalise this agreement in mid-1862 failed.¹⁴ During the talks on the agreement, a lot of time was spent on the issues of Bulgaria and Macedonia. An agreement was reached that Bulgarians should have their own government, and spheres of influence were defined in Macedonia. Serbia was supposed to deploy her agents down to the cities of Durazzo, Elbasan, Ohrid/Ohrida, Prilep, Veles/Velesa, Štip/Stip, Džuma and Kratovo. Greece was to develop her actions south of that line.¹⁵

¹³ Petar Milosavljević, "The Serbian-Greek Convention of 1861", in *Greek-Serbian Cooperation 1830–1908* (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1982), 84. Grgur Jakšić and Vojislav V. Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije za vlade kneza Mihaila (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1963), 45.

¹⁴ Ibid. 89–90.

¹⁵ Jakšić, "Prvi Srpsko-grčki savez", 42–43.

Both Cretan rebels and potential rebels that Serbia counted on who lived south of her borders had an ethno-religious Christian identity that was different from the identity of some political leaders in Belgrade and Athens. In the two Balkan capitals one could detect a spirit of nationalism as early as the 1840s. A part of the political elite and some intellectuals had been educated in the West or at least exposed to Western ideas, and they advocated new ideas of nationality in their homelands. Such ideas were not common among the Christian masses of the Ottoman Balkans. Their identity was still very much based on the Christian-Muslim binary opposition.

The agreement between Serbia and Greece was meant to be an agreement between the two states and not between the two nations. Yet, the impulse to make such an agreement had come from the national movements in Italian and German lands. It soon proved that both states had aspirations to become Balkan hegemons, and that it was not an easy task to reach an agreement on territorial divisions. Macedonia turned out to be a particularly difficult problem, as did Russia's clear message that she considered Bulgaria a part of her own sphere of influence.

In the background of the agreement, the Cretan Uprising was going on, and both governments were analysing the consequences it could have. The uprising of the Cretan Christians in the spring of 1866 attracted open sympathies for the rebels in Serbia. The defence of the Arkadi Monastery and the massacre of its defenders in November 1868 were received in Belgrade with great admiration and compassion. In December 1866/January 1867, religious services for those who lost their lives in Crete and the Arkadi Monastery were held in churches throughout Serbia. In February 1867, a special committee was formed in Belgrade to support Cretan refugees. In less than a month, the Committee was able to raise 30,000 golden francs and hand the funds to a Greek envoy in Vienna.¹⁶

Serbian officials encountered a problem in their efforts to identify the main person in Athens in charge of the Cretan Uprising. Confusion resulted from the policy of the Hellenic government, which could not openly support the Uprising and instead did so through associations or hetairias which acted independently of the government and were even based on political affiliations. The Serbian government could not discern the real level of influence of the hetairias on the government in Athens. In Serbia, foreign policy was firmly in the hands of Prince Michael and his Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ilija Garašanin, who held both offices from December 1861 until November 1867. At the same time, the Serbian diplomatic envoy at the Porte was Jovan Ristić. After the removal of Garašanin, he became Serbia's minister of foreign affairs.

¹⁶ Dimitrije Djordjevic, "Echo of the 1866 Cretan Uprising in Serbia", in *Proceedings of the Third Cretological Congress* (Athens 1975).

Prince Michael ambitiously planned to make a pan-Balkan union and an agreement with the Hellenic Kingdom was the key part of that plan.

The agreement was signed in Bad Voeslau near Vienna on August 14/26, 1867 by Petros Zanos and Milan Petronijević as plenipotentiaries of the two rulers - King George of Greece and Prince Michael of Serbia. The study of the text of this agreement has usually focused on its political content and neglected to examine its phrasing in terms of what it implied about Balkan identities. Article 9 of the agreement stipulates: "the High Contracting Parties promise to exert influence on the spirit of liberation of the Christians of European Turkey with which each of them is respectively more particularly linked. The parties will aspire to attract Christians to this alliance and to prepare them for armed struggle."17 In the wide area between Niš and Priština in the north and Epirus and Thessaly in the south, among local Christians existed not only an ethnic identity, but in many areas also a comprehensive pan-Orthodox Romeic identity.¹⁸ All the Orthodox Christians in that area were under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and therefore the formulation in Article 9 was more favourable for the Greek side because not only ethnic Greeks and Vlachs but also ethnic Albanians and some ethnic Slavs could easily be attracted to the Hellenic Kingdom through their Romeic identity or the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Ilija Garašanin had attended a Greek school in Zemun/Semlin in 1824–1826 and learned Greek there.¹⁹ He was a rare Serbian politician who was able to understand the possible implications of this wording, and he demanded a new formulation that would replace "with the Christian populations of European Turkey with which each of them is respectively more particularly linked" ["populations chrétiennes de la Turquie d'Europe avec lesqulles chacune d'Elles serait respectivement plus particulièrement liée."] with "wherever one [of the contracting parties] has an opportunity". Zanos, however, had no authority to make changes and the agreement was signed without any corrections.²⁰ The text of the agreement is a testimony to the existence of a religious identity in the

¹⁷ Jakšić, "Prvi Srpsko-grčki savez", 49. The texts in French of the Treaty of Voeslau of 14 [26] August 1867, and of the additional Protocol of Athens of 10 [22] January 1868, and of the Military Convention between Serbia and Greece of 16 [28] February 1868, have been published in Jakšić and Vučković, *Spoljna politika Srbije*, 510–519. English translations of the Treaty and the Military Convention, which are not quite accurate, are available in L. S. Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation. A History of the Movement Toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1964; 1st ed. 1942), 277–285.

¹⁸ For this, see the studies of Paschalis Kitromilides collected in Paschalis M. Kitromilides, An Orthodox Commonwealth. Symbolic Legacies and Cultural Encounters in Southeastern Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).

¹⁹ Dejvid Mekenzi, *Ilija Garašanin. Državnik i diplomata* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1987), 23–24; Dragoslav Stranjaković, *Ilija Garašanin* (Kragujevac: Jefimija, 2015), 37.

²⁰ Jakšić, "Prvi Srpsko-grčki savez", 50.

Balkans, which in many areas of the Ottoman Europe of that time was equally important and sometimes even more relevant than the ethnic one. This is also the only Hellenic-Serbian agreement that was signed "in the name of the Holy and Indivisible Trinity".

The agreement of 1867 stipulated that Serbia was to prepare 60,000 men by March 1868, and Greece was to prepare 30,000 men and a fleet "as readily as possible". It was, however, never implemented. Prince Michael ratified the agreement on October 5, 1867, and, on January 22, 1868, instruments of ratification were exchanged in Athens. Before that was done, the deadline for military preparations had been extended from March to September 1, 1868. This was done by a special protocol signed in Athens on January 10/22, 1868, by Brigadier Franjo Zach on behalf of Prince Michael and Mihail Antonopoulos on behalf of King George.²¹ The alliance was completed by a military convention signed by Brigadier Franjo Zach and Major Nikolaos Manos on February 16/28, 1868. The ruler of Serbia, Prince Michael, was, however, assassinated on May 29 (June 10), 1868, three months before the expiration of the deadline for the preparations of the two armies.

Following the assassination of Prince Michael, a three-member Regency ruled Serbia until Prince Milan came of legal age. The Regency gave a positive reply to an enquiry of the Hellenic government on Serbia's readiness to assist Greece in the Cretan Crisis of 1868. However, the issue of the alliance became more pressing for Serbia when the Herzegovina Uprising broke out in 1875, prompting the Eastern Crisis. At the beginning of 1876, when the discussions on a potential Serbian declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire reached their peak, Milutin Garašanin was sent to Athens. His mission was to ascertain if Greece still adhered to the Agreement of 1867. He was also supposed to sound out Greek public opinion and find out whether Serbia was to co-operate with the Military Committee in Greece.²² In March 1876, Garašanin met Prime Minister Alexandros Koumoundouros and Leonidas Voulgaris, the head of the Military Committee. He understood that the Hellenic government wished to remain neutral and recommended close relations with the Military Committee. Based on that recommendation, Vasa Toskić, himself of Greek origin, was sent to Athens. He brought funds amounting to 30,000 francs provided by the Serbian government for the Committee, but the war had already broken out before he was able to reach Athens.²³

²¹ Jakšić and Vučković, Spoljna politika Srbije, 395, 450–451.

²² Kliment Džambazovski, "The Mission of Milutin Garašanin and Vasa Toskić in Athens on the eve of the 1876 Serbian-Turkish War", in *Greek-Serbian Cooperation 1830–1908* (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1982), 142–143.

²³ Ibid. 143–147.

The Agreements of 1867–68 were never implemented. However, "Belgrade and Athens, despite occasional disagreement and distrust, established much closer bilateral relations, and the Greek and Serbian publics found out how close and interdependent the two peoples were."²⁴

New enthusiasm, 1882–1893

In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Serbian Orthodox Church in Serbia had an unusually favourable experience in gaining autonomy and full independence from the Patriarchate of Constantinople also known as the Great Church. All mutual decisions were made in agreement and by mutual consent. This was not the usual sequence of events in the process of gaining ecclesiastical autonomy and independence. The Great Church was in dispute even with the Hellenic Kingdom over its jurisdiction in 1833, and its relations with the Bulgarian Church, the so-called Exarchate, proclaimed in 1872, ended in an ecclesiastical schism which lasted until 1945. The Serbian Church in Serbia received autonomy from the Great Church in September 1831 by a concordat signed by Patriarch Constantine I of Constantinople. From then on, the "metropolitan of all Serbia" and bishops in Serbia were elected locally, and only the election of a new metropolitan was to be reported to the ecumenical patriarch.²⁵ Having gained political independence in 1878, the Serbian authorities asked to get autocephalous status for their national church. That was granted by the act of the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in October 1879 when Joachim III (1878–1884, 1901–1912) served as ecumenical patriarch. From that moment, the Serbian autocephalous church in Serbia was headed by "the Archbishop of Belgrade and Metropolitan of all Serbia". Filip Hristić (Christitch), the Serbian diplomatic representative at the Porte, noticed that the act of the Patriarchate "distinguished itself among all other acts of the same kind in that the Great Church proved much more generous and accommodating to us than to any other church in similar circumstances."26

The Congress of Berlin recognised the independence of Serbia, Romania and Montenegro. The Hellenic Kingdom did not take part in the congress, but the Ottoman Empire was asked to revise its borders in favour of Greece. In line with that, in 1881, the area of Arta in Epirus was ceded to Greece.²⁷ Serbia expanded its territory after the Congress of Berlin by obtaining four new districts:

²⁴ Bataković, "The Serbian-Greek Alliances", 49.

²⁵ Dr Djoko Slijepčević, Istorija srpske pravoslavne crkve, vol. 2: Od početaka XIX veka do kraja Drugog svetskog rata (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1991), 316–318.

²⁶ Ibid. 383.

²⁷ Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Modern Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 70.

Niš, Pirot, Vranje and Toplica. The territorial changes of 1878–81 brought the two countries closer in geographic terms. It also encouraged their subsequent territorial aspirations. Belgrade focused its attention towards Skoplje and further south, while Athens looked eagerly to Salonica and further north. To reach a mutual agreement, the two countries were to harmonise their territorial aspirations, and they had to agree in principle on a line of demarcation in the area between Skoplje and Salonica which was about 250 kilometres wide.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, that geographic zone had a tendency to become an increasingly sacralised area for both countries and their nascent nationalisms. After the signing of the Secret Convention with Austria-Hungary in 1881, Serbia had to abandon her aspirations to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and she shifted her ambitions to Kosovo and Macedonia. It was in Skoplje that, in 1346, the medieval emperor Dušan had been crowned, taking the title of the emperor "of Serbs and Greeks [Romeic Romans (Romaioi)]" but from a nationalist perspective the second part of Dušan's title was put aside, and Skoplje became a sacred Serbian town that was to be liberated. By the moment when, in 1900, the Serbian government commissioned a painting of the Coronation of Emperor Dušan from the Hungarian Serb Paja Jovanović (Paul Joanowitsch) for the 1900 Paris Exhibition, the process of sacralisation was almost complete.

Half a century earlier, the situation had been very different. In 1844, Serbia prepared a foreign and national policy programme now known as the *Nachertaniye* (the Draft). It was just a version of the plan devised by the Czech patriot and Polish agent Franjo Zach²⁸ (who later participated in the negotiations on the Serbian-Hellenic alliance of 1867/68), and it gives rather different insights into the aspirations of Serbia. The *Nachertaniye* implied that the lands that were to be annexed to the Principality of Serbia were Bosnia and Herzegovina and Northern Albania. Macedonia was not mentioned at all, although the text contained references to the medieval empire.²⁹

The Hellenic case was similar. The first head of state of modern Greece, Count Ioannis Kapodistrias, replied to the three Protecting Powers that the northern borders of the new state should go up to the line of the River Aoon–

²⁸ František (Franja) Zach (1807–1892) is the same person who later became a Serbian lieutenant colonel, colonel and general and who participated in the signing of the Serbian-Hellenic treaty of 1867/68 as the special envoy of Prince Michael.

²⁹ See Slobodan G. Marković, "Poreklo i dometi Saveta kneza Čartoriskog, Plana Františeka Zaha i Zah-Garašaninovog Načertanija", in Č. Popov, D. Živojinović and S. G. Markovich, eds., Dva veka moderne srpske diplomatije/Bicentenary of Modern Serbian Diplomacy (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies and Institute for European Studies, 2013), 120–123. See also Dušan T. Bataković, The Foreign Policy of Serbia (1844–1867). Ilija Garašanin's Načertanije (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2014).

Metsovon–Mount Olympus.³⁰ However, the views on this question significantly changed by the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1904, Captain Pavlos Melos was killed by Turkish troops at the age of 34 in the village of Statista. He immediately became a national hero and martyr who fell fighting for Hellenism in Macedonia. His death created "what even the chauvinist sections of the Greek press had failed to bring about – the awareness that Greece had interests in Macedonia."³¹ As Ioannis Kaliopoulos and Thanos Veremis have noticed: "Firmly believing in the righteousness of their cause and the Greekness of Macedonia due to 'historical right', and the 'phronema' of its Christian inhabitants, the generation of Pavlos Melas, Crown Prince Constantine and Eleftherios Venizelos pushed the Northern border of Greece deep into Macedonia – so deep that the new border was no longer a gateway leading to the 'promised land."³²

Pavle Popović, a Belgrade professor of Yugoslav literature and an unofficial envoy of the Serbian government in London during the Great War, made a periodisation of Serbian-Greek relations up to 1914. He identified four periods. The first was the time of Karadjordje, the second – the 1860s, and the third – 1882–1891.³³ As he noticed, it was in the third period that Bosnia and Herzegovina seemed lost forever for Serbia. "There remained only Macedonia, and Macedonia was of capital importance for Serbo-Greek relations, since by its deliverance from the Turk Greece and Serbia would acquire a common frontier."³⁴ Popović singled out two statesmen who at that time viewed a Balkan alliance as a matter of priority. In Serbia, it was Milan Piroćanac,³⁵ and in Greece, Charilaos Trikoupis (1832–1896).

It was during the war with the Ottoman Empire in 1876–77 that Prince Milan repeated many times to the Greek consul in Belgrade that a war alliance of Serbia and Greece could lead to the realisation of many interests that Greece

³⁰ John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, *Greece. The Modern Sequel. From 1821 to the Present* (London: Hurst and Company, 2002), 339.

³¹ Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia* 1897–1913 (Thessaloniki: Society for Macedonian Studies and Institute for Balkan Studies, 1993; 1st ed. 1966), 192.

³² Koliopoulos and Veremis, Greece. The Modern Sequel, 335–339.

³³ Pavle Popović, "Serbia and Greece", *The New Europe* no. 22, London, 15 March 1917, 265–276.

³⁴ Ibid. 268.

³⁵ In a work the Serbian statesman Milan Piroćanac (1837–1897) published at the end of his life, he clearly expressed appreciation of the Balkan Alliance: "The idea of a Balkan Community may not be an empty figment of imagination. It is the only sound thought even now, amidst these weeds of small-mindedness and overwhelming support for personal interests that have taken over Serbia after the death of Prince Michael." M. S. Piroćanac, *Knez Mihailo i zajednička radnja balkanskih naroda* (Belgrade: Državna štamparija Kraljevine Srbije, 1895), 93.

had in Macedonia. Prince (King from 1882) Milan spoke again about that with Greek diplomatic representatives in the period 1879–1885.³⁶ Since November 1880, the Hellenic Kingdom had a minister plenipotentiary in Belgrade. Until then, Greece had been diplomatically represented by a consul general.³⁷ In December 1880, the former war minister Tihomilj Nikolić was sent to Athens with a special mission. A step forward in the relations of the two countries was the signing of a trade agreement in May 1882.³⁸

During the crisis that followed the unification of Bulgaria in 1885, there were several suggestions about an agreement between Greece and Serbia. The main problem was that Serbia was not ready to attack the Ottoman Empire but rather wanted compensation from Bulgaria, while Athens had different plans. From April 1885 to April 1886, the prime minister of Greece was Theodoros Deligiannis. He attempted to make an agreement with Serbia both during and immediately after the Serbian-Bulgarian War, but his efforts bore no fruit. But, the idea of making an agreement survived many challenges. M. Laskaris noted that the idea of an understanding between Greece and Serbia "was destined to survive".³⁹ A novelty was that, from this moment, both countries viewed Bulgaria as their enemy, in contrast to the situation in 1867.

In 1886, St. Sava Society ("Društvo Sveti Sava") was formed in Belgrade. Its president was Svetomir Nikolajević, a Hellenophile and personal friend of King Milan. His mother-in-law was a Salonican Greek and modern Greek was spoken at her home.⁴⁰ King Milan confided to the Greek consul Nazos that he personally stood behind the establishment of the Society and supported it. Nikolajević believed that an agreement between the two nations could be achieved through associations and therefore began working with the Hellenic

³⁶ Evangelos Kofos, "Greek-Serbian Relations and the Question of Macedonia 1879–1896", in *Greek-Serbian Cooperation* 1830–1908 (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1982), 94–95.

³⁷ In 1868–1880 the Hellenic Kingdom had a consul-general in Belgrade. The first minister served in Belgrade until 1885, and then followed several *chargés d'affaires* until 1902. That year M. Argoropoulos was appointed minister and remained in that position until 1908. He was followed by the *chargé d'affaires* N. Deligiannis until 1912, and then by the minister Ioannis (Jean) Alexandropoulos (1912–1915). Ministers of the Kingdom of Serbia in Athens were General Sava Grujić (1883–1885), Ljubomir Kaljević (1886–1889), Vladan Djordjević (1891–1893), Jovan Djaja (1899), Stojan Bošković (1899–1902) and Svetomir Nikolajević (1903). From 1906, the minister in Athens was Jovan M. Jovanović. He was succeeded by Mateja Bošković (1907–1913) and Živojin Balugdžić (1913–1917).

³⁸ Vladimir Stojančević, "Politika srpskih vlada o srpsko-grčkim odnosima u periodu 1878– 1881", Godišnjak grada Beograda 40–41 (1993–1994), 60.

³⁹ M. Lascaris, "Greece and Serbia during the War of 1885", *The Slavonic and East European Review* 11/31 (July 1932), 99.

⁴⁰ Božidar S. Nikolajević, Iz minulih dana. Sećanja i dokumenti (Belgrade: SANU, 1986), 171.

Association for the Advancement of Hellenic Letters but also through I. Mousikos, the chargé d'affaires of the Hellenic Kingdom in Belgrade, and, in September and November 1888 the latter informed Athens about that. In a special letter, Nikolajević suggested border lines in Macedonia which were almost completely consistent with the borders that would be established twenty-five years later, after the Second Balkan War, as the borders between the Kingdom of Serbia and the Hellenic Kingdom. His efforts aimed at reaching a compromise between the aspirations of the two nations were challenged by pretensions over Salonica that Milutin Garašanin channelled through *Videlo*, the organ of the Progressive Party.⁴¹

The Porte viewed the activities of St. Sava Society with a lot of concern, but they were well-received among the Serbian national activists in Old Serbia and Macedonia, and many of them began appealing not to the Serbian government but to the Society. This led to the resistance of the Serbian consuls appointed in 1887. The abdication of King Milan in 1889 also brought about a conflict between the Society and the new authorities in Serbia. Finally, in 1891, the whole educational programme was placed under the direct control of the Serbian government.⁴²

In 1885, Milutin Garašanin, Serbian Prime Minister, defined Serbian policy in the Ottoman Empire. It was supposed to be based on three pillars: appointment of diplomatic representatives, launching educational and cultural propaganda, and facilitation of appointments of Serbian bishops through the Patriarchate of Constantinople.⁴³ Stojan Novaković, the Serbian minister in Constantinople since November 1886, was particularly active in the efforts to materialise this policy. He was recalled from that office in October 1891.⁴⁴ Novaković's main task was to suppress the influence of Bulgaria in Macedonia and to make efforts to strengthen Serbian influence among the Slavic population of that area. He was to realise two things quite soon. The first was that, in his efforts to establish Serbian schools and facilitate appointments of Serbian

⁴¹ Evangelos Kofos, "Greek-Serbian Relations and the Question of Macedonia 1879–1896", 97–98. Appended at the end of this article (pp. 105–106) is an English translation of the letter by Nikolajević to Mousikos of 15 November 1888.

⁴² For more on that see Mihailo Vojvodić, "Rad Društva 'Sveti Sava'", *Izazovi srpske spoljne politike* (1791–1918) (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 2007), 215–227.

⁴³ Vojislav Pavlović, "Orthodox Christianity and National Rivalries. Relations between Serbia and the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the *Vilayets* of Kosovo and Monastir 1878–1903", in Kitromilides and Matthaiou, eds., *Greek-Serbian Relations*, 224–225.

⁴⁴ On Novaković's reputation in Greece and his scholarly and diplomatic activities connected with Greece, see Athanasios Loupas, "Stojan Novaković i Grci. Grčke percepcije o Stojanu Novakoviću", in Mihailo Vojvodić and Aleksandar Kostić, eds., *Stojan Novaković. Povodom sto sedamdeset pet godina od rodjenja* (Belgrade: SANU, 2018), 127–136.

bishops, he could possibly count only on the support of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and even that support was to come only in terms of their joint activity against Bulgarian influence and the Bulgarian Church – the Exarchate. His second realisation was that there was a precondition for the full co-operation of Serbia and the Great Church, and that the precondition was the previous agreement and support of official Athens. On the basis of these findings, in August 1890, he initiated negotiations about an alliance of the two states with the Hellenic minister in Constantinople Mavrokodratos, but the negotiations did not result in any agreement.⁴⁵

In June 1891, a visit of the prominent Hellenic politician Trikoupis to Belgrade had no practical results because he was in the opposition. Still, it encouraged new initiatives in relations between Belgrade and Athens. James David Bourchier, a correspondent of *The Times* from South-East Europe, noticed that since 1888 there had been an entente between Serbia and Greece supported by Russia. He concluded: "The friendship between Servian and Greek has been immensely strengthened by M. Trikoupês's recent visit to Belgrade."⁴⁶ The former Serbian foreign minister Chedomille Mijatovich was even more enthusiastic, and he also identified a wider Balkan component in the visit of Trikoupis. In his article written for a London Liberal review, he noticed: "If a Balkan Confederation ever becomes a reality, it will be due to the Greek statesmen, and its history will commence from the day on which M. Tricoupis left Athens for Belgrade and Sofia."⁴⁷

When Trikoupis became prime minister for the sixth time (June 1892 – May 1893), negotiations on the alliance were renewed. At that moment, the Serbian minister in Athens was Dr Vladan Djordjević.⁴⁸ The talks between Greek and Serbian officials conducted in 1885, 1890, and 1892/1893 clearly demonstrated huge difficulties in terms of formulating a mutually acceptable line of demarcation in Macedonia, and not a single of these efforts led to a formal agreement.⁴⁹ New attempts made in June 1899 were again unsuccessful. On

⁴⁵ For more detail, see Mihailo Vojvodić, *Stojan Novaković i Vladimir Karić* (Belgrade: Clio, 2003), 80–110, and the chapter "Pregovori Srbije i Grčke o Makedoniji" in his *Izazovi srpske spoljne politike*, 320–333.

⁴⁶ James D. Bourchier, "A Balkan Confederation", *The Fortnightly Review* 50 (July–Dec. 1891), 367. Cf. Constantinos Svolopoulos, "Charilaos Trikoupis et l'entente balkanique: Réalités et hypothèses formulées à l'occasion de sa visite à Belgrade (juin 1891)", in *Greek-Serbian Cooperation* 1830–1908 (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1982), 69–74.

⁴⁷ Mijatovich, "M. Tricoupis and the Balkan Confederation", *The Speaker*, 27 June 1891, 762.

⁴⁸ His Christian name was Hippocrates and he was of Greek-Vlach origin.

⁴⁹ Slavenko Terzić, *Srbija i Grčka* (1856–1903). *Borba za Balkan* (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1992), 263–267, 301–303, 334–337; Bogdan Lj. Popović, *Diplomatska istorija Srbije* (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2010), 534.

that occasion, an envoy of King Alexander Obrenović, Mihailo Milićević, was sent to Athens. In the draft of the agreement, he asked Athens to support the appointment of Serbian bishops in Skoplje and Veles, while Athens demanded the abolition of Serbian consulates in Salonica, Serres and Monastir.⁵⁰ Serbian consulates had been opened in 1887 in Salonica and Skoplje, in 1889 in Priština and Monastir, and in 1897 in Serres.⁵¹

Reaching a mutually acceptable agreement became an increasingly difficult task in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. It was additionally complicated by separate interests that Athens and Belgrade had at the Porte. Since the 1880s, Belgrade needed two forms of support from the Porte: 1. against the Exarchate; and 2. for the confirmation of the appointments of Serbian bishops and consuls in Macedonia and Old Serbia. Athens needed the Porte's support in three areas: 1. to sustain the influence of the Exarchate; 2. to protect Hellenism throughout the Ottoman Empire; and 3. to maintain the privileges of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. This made the interests of the two governments intertwined with their relations with the Ottoman sultans and governments. Additionally, the great powers always watched their moves carefully. To reach an agreement, at least three preconditions needed to be met concomitantly by each side: 1. governments that were in favour of mutual agreement had to be in power at the same time in Belgrade and Athens; 2. the particular conditions had to be such that both sides were in a position to disregard their considerations toward the Ottoman Empire and the Porte; and 3. sufficient political stability had to exist in both countries to enable their governments not only to begin but also to complete the negotiations. The last prerequisite proved a rather difficult one. In the period 1881–1903, Serbia changed twenty-five and Greece twentytwo governments. The list of preconditions incapacitated even Trikoupis in his efforts to reach an agreement with Serbia at the time when he was Greek prime minister (1892–1893) and the then Serbian government wanted an agreement.

Both countries had the ambition to play key roles in the Balkans, but their real possibilities were different from their ambitions. When the Serbian minister in Athens, Dr Vladan Djordjević, told the Hellenic Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefanos Dragoumis that he hoped that "the Greek government would act promptly in appointing its minister in Belgrade", he received the reply that the financial situation of Greece was such that "we primarily have to see how to deal with it, and for that we need to save wherever possible". Djordjević fared no better with Serbia. In December 1893, he sent his last dispatch from Athens.

⁵⁰ Bataković, "The Serbian-Greek Alliances", 54–55; Terzić, Srbija i Grčka, 362–364.

⁵¹ Djordje N. Lopičić, "Kraći pregled konzularnih odnosa Srbije 1804–1918", in Popov, Živojinović and Markovich, eds., *Dva veka moderne srpske diplomatije*, 100; Mihailo Vojvodić, "Konzularna konvencija izmedju Srbije i Turske (1879–1896)", *Izazovi srpske spoljne politike*, 121–123.

The Serbian budget for 1894 had no allocation for the position of the Serbian minister in Athens.⁵²

Agreement of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Hellenic Kingdom in the triangle Belgrade-Athens-Sofia

From the emergence of modern Bulgaria in 1878, Serbia and Greece had to negotiate with this country. When, in March 1878, Imperial Russia imposed the provisions of the San Stefano Treaty on the Porte, an autonomous Bulgaria with very wide borders was created. That act threw the apple of discord among Balkan Christian states, which would continue to fight for their borders until 1945. The borders of the San Stefano Bulgaria were annulled four months later by the Congress of Berlin. But, in spite of that, the Bulgarian national movement continued to consider the borders drawn in March 1878 as the natural borders of Bulgaria, and they stretched from the Danube to the Aegean Sea and from the Black Sea to the Lake of Ohrid/a. Pirot, Vranje, Skopie/Skopia, Tetovo, Ohrid/a, Korcha/Korytsa (Korçë), Kostur/Kastoria, Kavala and Xanthi were all within the borders of this projected Bulgaria, along with Salonica, which was not included in but fully encircled by this territory. This scope of aspirations inevitably brought the Bulgarian national movement into a power struggle with both Serbian aspirations and modern Hellenism.

In ethnic and linguistic terms, Serbs were very close to Bulgarians. Western Bulgarian and Eastern Serbian dialects almost overlapped in places like Pirot, Velbuzhd or Pernik. From 1881 political parties could be officially formed in Serbia. The People's Radical Party became the most influential. "Fraternal relations" with Bulgaria were a part of its official programme. Article 7 also envisaged aspirations "for unity and political activities in cultural development" with this country. What the Radical Party made a part of its programme was also a popular view in Serbia throughout the nineteenth century. Everything turned upside down following the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885, which was unpopular in Serbia and created deep and lasting mistrust between the two nations.⁵³ Prompted by the personal ambitions of King Milan, the war ended in a bitter defeat for Serbia at the Battle of Slivnitsa.

King Milan once said to his close associate Vladan Djordjević: "In Serbia, Slivnitsa awoke awareness of Serbdom in Macedonia."⁵⁴ Be that as it may, Serbia and Bulgaria managed to come to an agreement in 1897, the so-called "Ugodba".

⁵² Vladan Djordjević, Srbija i Grčka 1891–1893. Prilog za istoriju srpske diplomacije pri kraju XIX veka (Belgrade: Srpska kraljevska akademija, 1923), 195, 300.

⁵³ Slobodan G. Markovich, Grof Čedomilj Mijatović. Viktorijanac medju Srbima (Belgrade: Pravni fakultet and Dosije, 2006), 134–140.

⁵⁴ Djordjević, Srbija i Grčka, 2.

As a diplomatic historian would note later, this first agreement "only heralded a rapprochement between our two close but conflicted countries". The next step was the Alliance Agreement of 1904, which "opened the prospects of an alliance and friendship".⁵⁵ Since 1906, when the Customs War began, and especially since 1908 and the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbian intellectual and political élite was increasingly focused on the Yugo-slav programme. It was only in this period that the Habsburg Monarchy began to be seen as the principal adversary of the Kingdom of Serbia. For this reason, it was important for Serbia to attract other Balkan counties to take part in an alliance against Austria-Hungary, but there was little interest in anything like that in Sofia and even less in Athens.

In October 1911, negotiations on making a Serbian-Bulgarian agreement were in progress. On that occasion, the minister plenipotentiary of Bulgaria in Rome, Dimitar Rizov, came to Belgrade. The main point of contention was the future border of the two states in the Slavic area of Macedonia. Finally, on March 13, 1912, the "Agreement on Alliance and Friendship between the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Bulgaria" was signed. The agreement was to be valid until 1920. There was an annex to the agreement. In its Article 2, Serbia promised that she would demand nothing beyond the defined line of demarcation. This was followed by a stipulation that the Russian tsar would determine the final borders.

Before the outbreak of the First Balkan War, the Hellenic Kingdom had an agreement with Bulgaria made on May 29, 1912, and Serbia had the alliance agreement with Bulgaria, and an agreement with Montenegro of October 23, 1908. She also had a military convention with Montenegro signed at the end of September 1912. Article 4 of the Military Convention set the deadline for declaring war against the Ottoman Empire at October 1. This led the diplomatic historian Bogdan Lj. Popović to describe this convention as "a war cry".⁵⁶ Montenegro also had an oral alliance agreement with Bulgaria made at the end of August 1912 about their joint war effort against Turkey. What follows from this is that Bulgaria was the only power that had agreements with all other allies: formal agreements with Serbia and Greece and an oral one with Montenegro. Bulgaria did not inform Greece about her negotiations with Serbia. In the summer of 1912, the Prime Minister of the Hellenic Kingdom Eleftherios Venizelos (1864–1936) was not able to get any information from Greek diplomats in Belgrade and Sofia either on the Military Convention between Serbia and Bulgaria of July 2 or on the decision of Montenegro to unilaterally attack the Ottoman

⁵⁵ Popović, Diplomatska istorija Srbije, 514.

⁵⁶ Ibid. 519.

Empire.⁵⁷ What he knew exactly cannot be discerned from the dispatches of Greek diplomats because he also had other sources. By the end of June, he was able to find out what was happening in the relations between Belgrade and Sofia through James David Bourchier, correspondent of *The Times*, who played an important role in reaching the agreement between Athens and Sofia,⁵⁸ but also through foreign diplomats.

The various Balkan capitals were in a state of turmoil on the eve of the Balkan Wars, and not only those of Christian Balkan countries. The so-called Young Turk nationalism began, and the Albanian national movement also became visible. Nationalism had already reached its mass phase in Balkan capitals one decade earlier. By the beginning of the Balkan Wars, national passions in the Balkan Christian states escalated further. Mark Mazower in his book on Salonica cites reports by international observers that the First Balkan War was a "war waged not only by the armies but by the nations themselves", and that the war objective was "the complete extermination of an alien population".⁵⁹

In September 1912, Mateja Bošković, the Serbian minister in Athens, began negotiations on a Serbian-Greek agreement but they were not finalised by the beginning of the First Balkan War on October 18, 1912. Venizelos feared that an alliance with Serbia could draw him into a conflict with Austria-Hungary. The circumstances were different when, in January 1913, he visited Belgrade. On that occasion, he spoke with Prime Minister Pašić (Pashich) and that was the beginning of talks aimed at making an alliance. Negotiations were accelerated after the assassination of King George of Greece in Salonica in March 1913.⁶⁰ The Preliminary Protocol of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Hellenic Kingdom was signed in Athens as late as May 5, 1913. That is the Protocol of Athens. After that, on June 1 (May 19) 1913, the Agreement on Alliance and the Military Convention were signed in Salonica, at the villa of Prince Nicholas. The Treaty of Alliance was signed by the Greek minister in Belgrade Ioannis Alexandropoulos and the Serbian minister in Athens Mateja Bošković.⁶¹ Ratification documents were exchanged in Athens on June 8/21, 1913.

⁵⁷ Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, "Greek-Serbian Relations 1912–1913: Communication Gap or Deliberate Policy", *Balkan Studies* 45 (2004), 24–26.

⁵⁸ Lady Grogan, *The Life of J. D. Bourchier* (London: Hurst & Blackett, 1926), 136–142. In July, Bourchier left the Balkans for holidays and returned to Sofia on 1 October 1912.

⁵⁹ Mark Mazower, Salonica, City of Ghosts. Christians, Muslims and Jews, 1430–1950 (London and New York: Harper Perennial, 2005; 1st ed. 2004), 334.

⁶⁰ Gardikas-Katsiadakis, "Greek-Serbian Relations", 29–30.

⁶¹ The Serbian text of the Treaty of Alliance and the Military Convention has been published by Miladin Milošević, *Srbija i Grčka 1914–1918*. *Iz istorije diplomatskih odnosa* (Zaječar: Zadužbina Nikola Pašić, 1997), 305–317.

The alliance determined the outcome and winners of the Second Balkan War. The Military Convention clearly stated in Article 8: "the final objective of military operations of allied Hellenic and Serbian armies is to destroy the Bulgarian forces."⁶² By signing the agreement with the Hellenic Kingdom, Serbia found herself in a very peculiar position of having at the same time two valid agreements that stipulated different demarcations lines: one with Bulgaria and one with the Hellenic Kingdom. It was not long before the former Balkan allies in the First Balkan War became bitter enemies. With the Serbian-Greek treaty, the Balkan Alliance of 1912 ceased to exist. The Alliance that was terminated was temporarily achieved in spite of numerous difficulties after more than half a century of various efforts begun in 1861.

The Military Convention between Serbia and Greece provoked decadelong enmity of Bulgaria towards Greece and Serbia (later Yugoslavia). The Treaty of Alliance of June 1, stipulated in Article 7 that the King of the Hellenes and his government would "provide all the necessary concessions and guarantees for a period of 50 years for the full freedom of Serbian export and import trade through the port of Salonica and by the railway line from Salonica to Skoplje and Bitolj [Monastir]. This freedom will be as wide as possible, under the condition that it is in line with full and intact exercise of Greek sovereignty".⁶³ On the basis of this article, an additional agreement was signed in Athens on May 10/23, 1914, entitled the "Greek-Serbian Agreement regarding Serbian Transit through Salonica" by which "the Serbian Free Zone of Salonica" was formed. The outbreak of the world war prevented the practical implementation of this agreement.

Owing to his insistence throughout the Great War that the Serbian-Hellenic Treaty of Alliance of 1913 had to be respected, Eleftherios Venizelos became the focal person of all subsequent narratives of Greek-Serbian co-operation. His many statements on this issue have often been quoted in various publications on Serbia. The two countries entered the First Balkan War without any written agreement. I would go as far as to conclude that it was precisely the lack of any written agreement that actually facilitated the mutual relations of the two states. Any written agreement would have to cover the issue of borders, and that would have included future demarcation lines. As the agreement between Serbia and Bulgaria clearly demonstrated, it was an impossible task to fully implement in practice such an agreement because the political events and courses of military operations always placed the signatory powers before situations that could not have been predicted in advance. Be that as it may, the Hellenic-Serbian alliance in practical terms was originally made not on the basis of an agreement

⁶² Milošević, Srbija i Grčka, 315.

⁶³ Ibid. 308.

but based on the fact that there was no written agreement but rather a common interest during the First Balkan War.

Why was it that, in the end, the alliance of modern Hellenes and Serbs prevailed in the Balkans rather than a triple alliance of Christian Balkan states or a Serbo-Bulgarian or a Hellenic-Bulgarian alliance? There seem to be at least two reasons. The first is that the overlapping of territorial aspirations that resulted from national euphoria was smaller between Serbia and Greece than in any other combination. The second is that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the apple of discord of Balkan nationalisms was the identity of the Macedonian Slavs.

If in 1867 Athenian politicians had correctly assessed that the Hellenic Kingdom was able to attract the Christians of Macedonia with the Romeic identity, irrespective of their ethnic origin and mother tongue, by the beginning of the twentieth century this became an almost impossible task. The phase of mass nationalism that reached Belgrade, Sofia and Athens by that time was less pronounced but increasingly present in Macedonia. Mass nationalism, and mutually antagonistic educational and ecclesiastical networks in Macedonia financed by the three states, undermined the Orthodox community in Macedonia. The creation of the Exarchate was a decisive move towards ethnophyletism. What followed in the last decades of the nineteenth century was a sort of etatisation of Bulgarian and Serbian local priests by their respective states and their ministries of education. Priests were not only expected to preach the Holy Bible; they were also seen as potential national activists. The Bulgarian state began this process earlier than the Serbian and by 1900 was approximately four times more efficient in its efforts than the Kingdom of Serbia.⁶⁴ The Hellenic Kingdom was equally involved and even the Kingdom of Romania followed suit. In this respect, Greece was even ready to enter into a dispute with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which had a more universal view on the Orthodox Commonwealth in the Balkans than various governments in Athens. By the beginning of the Balkan Wars, the final outcome of the activities of the three ethno-national Balkan Christian states in Macedonia was that a new binary opposition emerged, the one between the Slav and the modern Hellene. In this respect, a potential Hellenic-Serbian alliance was critically important to alleviate the effects of the new antagonism, since the wider Bulgarian aspirations in Macedonia based on the San Stefano Treaty were unlikely to result in any kind of compromise with Hellenism.

⁶⁴ In 1900 there were 785 Bulgarian schools in Macedonia, while Serbia, by the beginning of 1899, was able to establish 178 Serbian schools in the vilayets of Usküb, Monastir and Salonica. In 1901, there were 927 Greek schools in the vilayets of Salonica and Monastir. James David Bourchier, s. v. "Macedonia", *The Encyclopaedia Britannica*, The Eleventh Edition, vol. 17 (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1911), 219.

An unfinished process was the development of the identity of Macedonian Slavs. Dimitar Rizov was the diplomat who began negotiations with Serbia on a Serbian-Bulgarian alliance. He turned out to be very adamant about Bulgarian borders in Macedonia and was himself a Macedonian Slav. The memoirs of the famous Yugoslav and Croatian sculptor Ivan Meštrović provide a very interesting testimony on the dilemmas of the identity of this group. Rizov was the Bulgarian minister plenipotentiary in Rome. Just before the Balkan Wars, he told Ivan Meštrović: "Our folk used to be 'a Macedonian Christian', and later when Greek propaganda developed, he became 'a Macedonian Christian Slav'. To us it was all the same which Christian country would help us to liberate ourselves from the Turks. I was born in Bitolj [Monastir]. There were several gymnasia [grammar schools] in Bitolj: Turkish, Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian. To us Slavs it was all the same which of the Slavic gymnasia we would attend." In his realistic description of the fluid identity of Macedonian Slavs, Rizov clearly emphasises the opposition Slav-modern Hellene that developed by the beginning of the twentieth century among Macedonian Slavs. Therefore, their previous options were reduced, and they had to choose between Sofia and Belgrade. Rizov attended the Serbian gymnasium, but when he lost his scholarship he moved to the Bulgarian gymnasium and then to Sofia. "We say Macedonian Slavs, they say Bulgarians. And we got used to it. That is how I became a Bulgarian. Just as Kosta Stojanović and so many other Macedonians became Serbs in Belgrade." In his conversation with Meštrović, Rizov revealed another issue that caused antagonism between Sofia and Belgrade. It was "the Macedonian Party" in Sofia or, as he said: "We Macedonians hold key positions in Bulgaria, and it is therefore natural that we would want the whole of Macedonia to come to Bulgaria."65 In this way, a fluid local identity turned out to be an insurmountable barrier between Serbs and Bulgarians, since the political elites in both countries were able to convincingly claim them as theirs. After all, both countries were able to recruit Macedonia Slavs for their own purposes.

It is important to mention that, in the legal and political reasoning of Venizelos, the participation of Greece in the Great War was inseparably linked with the Protocol of Athens, in other words with the Serbian-Greek Treaty of Alliance of 1913. The agreement on the alliance was the fundamental document that Venizelos exploited as his justification to join the Entente Powers and, in the period 1915–17, adherence to the alliance with Serbia became his oft-repeated political slogan.

⁶⁵ Ivan Meštrović, Uspomene na političke ljude i dogadjaje (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 1969), 25–26.

Relations of Serbia and Greece during the Great War

The Great War was initiated by the Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia on July 28, 1914. When the Entente Powers found themselves at war with the Central Powers, Serbia automatically became a member of the Entente. With the exception of Montenegro, the other Balkan allies of Serbia from the First Balkan War (Greece, Romania and Bulgaria) remained neutral in 1914. This prompted both alliances to make all possible efforts to attract the three states to their side. In the case of the Hellenic Kingdom, it turned out that all three of its protecting powers from the 1830s made up the Entente. King Constantine, however, was the son-in-law of the German emperor. Two great powers that had indebted Bulgaria, the United Kingdom and Russia, were also members of the Triple Entente. But in Bulgaria's case, there was a similar situation since the king and an important part of the military élite considered that they could compensate their losses from the Second Balkan War by joining the Central Powers.

Relations between the Hellenic Kingdom and the Entente Powers were exacerbated by King Constantine's insistence that Greece should remain neutral. On the other hand, Eleftherios Venizelos, citing his 1913 agreement with Serbia, wanted to bring his country to the side of the Entente Powers in early 1915, and again at the beginning of October 1915. Faced with the opposition of the king, Venizelos had to resign twice: on March 6, and on October 5, 1915. In the latter case, he submitted his resignation at the moment when Bulgaria was just about to attack Serbia, which happened on October 14, 1915. In 1938, one of the wartime leaders of the pro-Entente opposition in Bulgaria, diplomat Kosta Todorov, commented on the second resignation of the Hellenic prime minister: "Nowadays there is no doubt that, had Venizelos remained in power, there would have been a possibility to prevent the intervention of Bulgaria."⁶⁶

In January 1916, France, citing its status of a protecting power of Greece from the 1830s, occupied the Ionian island of Corfu, which became the seat of the Serbian government and other Serbian officials during the Great War. It was also the place where, in January-February 1916, the Serbian Army was evacuated and reorganised after its exodus through Albania. Several Hellenic governments that followed after the resignation of Venizelos were under the full control of King Constantine, and they advocated a policy of neutrality and kept Greece neutral until 1917. In 1916, the Macedonian or Salonica Front was established and a reorganised Serbian Army was deployed there. In April 1916, the allies transferred the remaining Serbian Army that numbered 115,000 men to Salonica through the Corinth Canal.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ Kosta Todorov, Politička istorija savremene Bugarske (Belgrade 1938), 252.

⁶⁷ For more detail on the relations between the two states during the Great War, see Areti Tounda Fergadi, "The Serbian Troops on Corfu: the Problem of Transporting them to Thes-

Venizelos was tireless and, in September 1916, as an opposition politician, he again raised the question of the participation of Greece in the war. At the beginning of the next month, in Salonica, he proclaimed the Provisional Government of National Defence. This created the National Schism ("Ethnikos dihasmos") in Greece, which lasted until June 27, 1917, when the Entente Powers forced King Constantine to leave the throne, and immediately after that Venizelos got his third tenure as prime minister of the Hellenic Kingdom (June 1917 – November 4, 1920).

In the summer of 1917, the secretary of the Serbian Legation in Athens was Jovan Dučić, subsequently a famous Serbian writer and poet. In August 1917, he noted his impressions from the session of the Hellenic Parliament: "The last week in the Hellenic Parliament is considered here as a full manifestation of popular anger and indignation caused by the shame that the nation suffered from the previous regime due to its disregard of the treaty with Serbia and its rejection of all the traditions of friendship with the Powers that created Greece... as is already known, very touching ovations for Serbia took place. They seemed unprepared and spontaneous, and they very much satisfied the Hellenic Government."68 Venizelos delivered a speech before the Hellenic Parliament on August 13/26. He was applauded for saying: "Gentlemen, when we permitted Bulgaria's facilitated intervention in the war and her attack on Serbia - I have the right to proclaim it from this tribune with all the authority of my official position - we were flatly betraying our ally Serbia and not only Serbia - we were flatly betraying the vital interests of Greece and serving only the purely foreign interests of Germany." At the end of his speech, he posed a question: "Was the policy of the Crown a policy of benevolent neutrality to Serbia - or was it a policy of betrayal?" and that was followed by the general outcry: "Betrayal!"69

Venizelos's frequent references to the alliance with Serbia were a part of war propaganda but also his long-term view that the alliance with Serbia was in the interest of Greece. In November 1917, during his visit to London, he replied

saloniki and Greek Public Opinion on the Affair", in *Proceedings of the Fifth Greek-Serbian Symposium* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1991), 29–44; Dušan T. Bataković, "Serbia and Greece in the First World War. An Overview", *Balkan Studies* 45/1 (2004), 59– 80; Loukianos Hasiotis, *Ellinoservikes sheseis* 1913–1918. *Symmahikes proteraiotites kai politikes antipalotites* (Thessaloniki: Vanias, 2004), Serb. ed.: Lukijanos Hasiotis, *Srpsko-grčki odnosi*, 1913–1918. *Savezničke prednosti i politička rivalstva* (Belgrade and Novi Sad: RTS and Prometej, 2017).

⁶⁸ Jovan Dučić, *Diplomatski spisi*, ed. Miladin Milošević (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1991), 71 (Jovan Dučić, Secretary of the Serbian Legation, to the Royal Serbian Consulate General in Salonica, 16 August 1917).

⁶⁹ The Vindication of the General National Policy 1912–1917. A Report of the speeches delivered in the Greek Chamber, August 24 to 26, 1917, by E. Venizelos and others (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1918), 100.

in Mansion House to the welcome addresses by leading British statesmen and asked them to be understanding of what happened in Greece: "What, therefore, I ask you the people of this great country, is not to judge the Greek nation as responsible for the personal policy of the dethroned king, nor to consider the violation of the treaty with Serbia as reflecting upon us. (*Cheers.*) I can assure you that, during that protracted and painful crisis, the great majority of the Greek people never approved of that treacherous policy."⁷⁰ Venizelos repeated on quite a few occasions during the war how important the alliance with Serbia was to him.⁷¹

By strengthening the Entente troops on the Macedonian Front, the Hellenic Kingdom under Venizelos significantly contributed to the balance of forces along the 450-kilometres-long front. In September 1918, on the very eve of the successful break through the front line, the troops of the two opposite coalitions were almost equal in terms of numbers. The Central Powers had 626,000 German, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian soldiers, and the Entente forces numbered 628,000, of which 180,000 were French troops, 150,000 soldiers of the Serbian Army (including 20,000 Yugoslav volunteers), 135,000 Greeks, 120,000 Britons, 42,000 Italians, and 1,000 Albanians under Essad Pasha.⁷²

By bringing the Hellenic Kingdom to the ranks of the Entente, Venizelos secured the Greek victory against Bulgaria. The Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine of November 1919 put the final stamp on the accomplishments of the Hellenic-Serbian alliance. Greece was granted Western Thrace, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes incorporated an additional 2,500 km² of formerly Bulgarian territories. What the San Stefano Treaty had envisaged as 'Bulgaria of the three seas' remained only the Black Sea Bulgaria. This, however, created a long-standing antagonism of Bulgaria to Greece and Yugoslavia. It is indeed a paradox that all of this happened in the period when the Serbian-Bulgarian agreement of 1912 was supposed to be valid and implemented until the end of 1920.

The Greek-Yugoslav Pact of Friendship, the Serbian Free Zone in Salonica/Thessaloniki and a new atmosphere in the Balkans

After the Great War, the newly-established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Hellenic Kingdom maintained their alliance but had different foreign policy priorities. Greece was focused on what would happen with Hel-

⁷⁰ "England's Welcome to Venizelos", London: Publications of the Anglo-Hellenic League, no. 35 (1917), 15.

⁷¹ See Slobodan G. Markovich, "Elefterios Venizelos i Srbija", in Nikolaos E. Papadakis, Elefterios Venizelos. Grčka, Balkan i Evropa (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2009), 198–205.

⁷² Petar Opačić, Le Front de Salonique. Zeitinlik (Belgrade: Jugoslovenska revija, 1979), 95; Andrej Mitrović, Serbia's Great War 1914–1918 (London: Hurst and Company, 2007), 313.

lenism on the eastern shores of the Aegean Sea, while the policy of the new kingdom was focused on protecting its borders in the Adriatic Sea against Italy.⁷³

The ecclesiastical issues were once again resolved with mutual agreement between the Serbian Church and the Patriarchate of Constantinople. This time, the Serbian Church was recognised as having the highest possible status - that of a patriarchate. When the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was created, it included multiple Orthodox bishoprics under various Eastern Orthodox ecclesiastical jurisdictions. There were the Archbishopric of Serbia, the Patriarchate of Karlovci, and the Metropolitanate of Montenegro. However, some areas in the former Austria-Hungary were under the direct jurisdiction of the Great Church (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Vardar Macedonia) and others under the Metropolitanate of Bukovina and Dalmatia. This time, the Patriarchate of Constantinople again met the Serbian requests, and by its act of 1920 recognised the incorporation of the bishoprics under its jurisdiction into the realm of the autocephalous and united Serbian Church. In November 1921, the raising of the Serbian Church to the rank of Patriarchate (1920) was confirmed by the patriarch of Constantinople, followed by the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in February 1922. The recognition of its new rank by other autocephalous Orthodox churches ensued.⁷⁴ At the time of the negotiations, Constantinople was under the occupation of the Entente Powers.

In contrast to the ecclesiastical question which was traditionally resolved by mutual agreement, the project of the Serbian Free Zone in Salonica was not resolved easily. The issue was reactivated at the end of 1922. At that moment, Greece found herself in a very delicate situation due to her defeat in the Greek-Turkish War and, in November 1922, she began negotiations with Turkey in Lausanne which were completed in July 1923. In the backstage of these negotiations, Yugoslavia and Greece discussed the Free Zone issue. The "Convention on the Settlement of Yugoslav Goods Traded through the Port of Salonica" signed in Belgrade on May 10, 1923, was supposed to establish the zone. On February 24, 1924, the Parliament of the Kingdom of SCS approved the convention, but the Hellenic Parliament never ratified it. The convention envisaged a zone of 52,000 m2.⁷⁵

Instead of the expected advancement of mutual relations that was to result from the convention, what happened was a crisis in relations in 1924 after the Politis-Kalfov Protocol was signed in Geneva on September 24, 1924. By

⁷³ On mutual relations from 1919 to 1923, see Athanasios Loupas, "From Paris to Lausanne: Aspects of Greek-Yugoslav Relations during the First Interwar Years (1919–1923)", *Balcanica* 47 (2016), 263–284.

⁷⁴ Slijepčević, Istorija srpske pravoslavne crkve, vol. II, 558–560.

⁷⁵ Adrianos Papadrianos, "Slobodna zona u Solunu i grčko-jugoslovenski odnosi 1919– 1929. godine", MPhil thesis (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, 2005), 51–68.

this agreement the Greek side recognised the Slav population of Macedonia as Bulgarians. At the end of October 1924, Dr Vojislav Marinković (Voïslav Marinkovitch), Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of SCS, urged that a new protocol be signed, but Athens refused. Consequently, on November 17, 1924, the Kingdom of SCS sent a note to the Hellenic side in which it rejected the Treaty of Alliance of 1913.⁷⁶

Negotiations were resumed in February 1925, but the Greek side refused to accept additional Yugoslav demands and the negotiations were suspended on June 1, and resumed later that year. In June 1926, the talks on the Serbian Free Zone continued. At that time, the prime minister of the Hellenic Republic was General Theodoros Pangalos who had come to power through a coup d'état. He served as prime minister from June 1925 to July 1926, and then as president until August 1926. The new agreement of the two countries – "An Additional Agreement to the Belgrade Agreement of May 10, 1923" – was signed on August 17, 1926 in Athens during the last days of his dictatorship. Pangalos was ready to meet all the requests of the Yugoslav side and the Free Zone was defined as the territory of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and that was a breach of Article 7 of the Treaty of 1913. In return, the Yugoslav side signed the three-year "Agreement of Understanding and Friendship" between the two states, which was directed against Bulgaria. With the fall of Pangalos, both agreements were put aside since the Greek side never ratified them, and the new government rejected the agreement.⁷⁷ Efforts to reach an agreement during 1927 failed to materialise. The Yugoslav government was very much focused not only on making a new agreement but also on organisational issues. For this purpose, on May 6, 1927, the Ministerial Council of the Kingdom of SCS adopted the "Decree on the Organisation of the General Directorate of the Serbian Free Zone in Salonica."78

The renewal of the alliance was made first unofficially in 1928 and then formalized in 1929. At that moment, the Hellenic prime minister was Venizelos for the fourth time (July 1928 – May 1932). He initiated a policy of rapprochement with Italy, which was very unfavourably viewed in London, Paris and Belgrade. On September 23, 1928, Venizelos signed the Greek-Italian Pact of Friendship, Conciliation and Judicial Settlement. On that occasion, the Italian leader Mussolini offered to protect Greek sovereignty over Salonica in case of a

⁷⁶ Adrianos I. Papadrianos, "Greco-Serbian Talks towards the Conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance in May 1913 and the Beginning of Negotiations for the Establishment of a Serbian Free Zone in Thessaloniki", *Balkan Studies* 45/1 (2004), 43–44.

⁷⁷ Papadrianos, "Slobodna zona u Solunu", 95–105.

⁷⁸ Službene novine Kraljevine SHS [Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes], no. 112, 21 May 1927, 1–3.

foreign threat.⁷⁹ It was clear that this formulation alluded to Yugoslavia and, unsurprisingly, it was very poorly received in Belgrade. Venizelos hurried to explain his move to Paris, where he also met the Yugoslav minister of foreign affairs, Dr Vojislav Marinković. Immediately after that, he came to Belgrade on October 10/11, 1928. On that occasion, the leading Belgrade daily Politika republished an article that had been written by Venizelos in 1895.⁸⁰ Originally published in the journal Avgi in Chania, the piece advocated the appointment of a Serbian bishop in Prizren rather than a candidate of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which was a very uncommon view among Greek politicians of that time. The message of Politika was clear: a great friend of Serbs comes to Belgrade! But this was not enough to reach an agreement immediately. The private secretary of Eleftherios Venizelos, Stefanos Stefanou, left a testimony on what happened: "...the Yugoslavs remained cold and not very forthcoming until the great Greek politician came face to face with King Alexander in a closed room of a royal palace. Venizelos did not have to remind the King of his great efforts of the past to forge the Greek-Serbian alliance of 1914 and to uphold Greece's obligations towards that alliance. His living presence brought back memories that were capable of generating friendly emotions to the King and to counteract any hesitations and doubts from his side."81 During his stay in Belgrade, two agreements were signed on October 11, 1928. They dealt with the Serbian/Yugoslav Zone in Salonica and with the Salonica–Gevgeli railway line.

The subsequent negotiations resulted in a series of protocols. On March 17, 1929, in Geneva, the "Protocol regarding the Settlement of Financial Claims on the line Salonica–Djevdjelija (border)" was signed. It specified the claims of both sides regarding the railway line and the Hellenic government accepted an obligation to compensate the Kingdom of SCS in the amount of 20 million francs. In return, the Kingdom of SCS abandoned its ownership claims to the railway line, a demand on which it had previously been very insistent. Eight protocols were signed in Geneva and they were promulgated as the "Law on the Protocols and the Ways of Implementation of the Convention of May 10, 1923 on the Serbian Free Zone in Salonica". Having been sanctioned by both states,

⁷⁹ Ioannis D. Stefanidis, "Reconstructing Greece as a European State: Venizelos' Last Premiership, 1928–32", in Paschalis Kitromilides, ed., *Eleftherios Venizelos*. *The Trials of Statesmanship* (Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 217.

⁸⁰ "Venizelosovo prijateljstvo prema našem narodu od pre trideset i tri godine", *Politika* no. 7345, Belgrade, 11 Oct. 1928, 2.

⁸¹ Papadakis, Elefterios Venizelos. Grčka, Balkan, Evropa, 159; Nikolaos Emm. Papadakis, Eleftherios Venizelos. A Story of an Adventurous Life (Chania: National Research Foundation "Eleftherios K. Venizelos", 2016), 151.

the eight protocols came into force on April 17, 1929.⁸² The protocol on the railway line Salonica-Djevdjelija [Gevgeli] entered into force as a law on the day it was published in the Official Gazette of the Kingdom of SCS (June 12, 1929).⁸³ The Protocols of 1929 were signed by the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, Dr Kosta Kumanudi (Koumanoudi),⁸⁴ and the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexandros Karapanos (Carapanos), as the plenipotentiaries of King Alexander and the president of the Hellenic Republic.

Finally, the "Pact of Friendship, Conciliation and Judicial Settlement" between Yugoslavia and Greece was signed in Belgrade on March 27, 1929. The signatories were the same as in the case of the Geneva protocols. The exchange of the instruments of ratification took place in Athens on February 18, 1930.⁸⁵ The Pact was valid for five years upon ratification, with a possibility of being extended for another five years (Article 36).⁸⁶ This agreement was fundamentally different from all the previous Serbian-Hellenic agreements. Its aim, for the first time in the history of alliances of Belgrade and Athens, was not to obtain any territory but to consolidate the existing conditions and to prevent border changes.

Agreements with Italy and Yugoslavia opened up the possibility for Venizelos to make an agreement with Turkey, which he initiated immediately after his victory in the elections of 1928. The "Pact of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation and Arbitration" was signed between Turkey and Greece on October 30, 1930. The Pact confirmed that the Treaty of Lausanne represented the final territorial settlement between the two countries. Venizelos even nominated Ataturk for the Nobel Peace Prize, and the rapprochement of the two countries created possibilities for a new Balkan alliance. The conciliatory actions of Venizelos encouraged other similar initiatives. Leften Stavrianos quite correctly assessed

⁸² The texts of the eight protocols were published in Serbo-Croat and French in *Službene novine Kraljevine SHS* [Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes], no. 90, 17 April 1929, 537–580.

⁸³ The text of the Law on the Protocol was published in Serbo-Croat and French in *Službene novine Kraljevine SHS* [Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes], no. 136, 12 June 1929, 1053–1056.

⁸⁴ Kosta Kumanudi (Costas Koumanoudis) came from a family of Adrianople Greeks who had moved to Belgrade in the 1820s. On the role of this family in Serbian and Greek history, see Sophia Matthaiou, "The Greco-Serbian Identity of the Koumanoudis family", in Kitromilides and Matthaiou, eds., *Greek-Serbian Relations*, 179–194.

⁸⁵ The text of the agreement in Serbo-Croat and French ("Pacte d'amitié, de conciliation et de règlement judiciaire") was published in *Službene novine Kraljevine Jugoslavije* [Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia], no. 58, 13 March 1930, 487–497.

⁸⁶ Ibid. 497.

that "inter-Balkan relations were better at the end of 1929 than they had been in years".⁸⁷

This led to new initiatives, the most famous among them being the one undertaken by the former Greek prime minister Alexandros Papanastasiou (1876–1936), who organised Balkan conferences. Four such consecutive conferences were held between 1930 and 1933 in Athens (October 5–13, 1930), Istanbul (October 20–26, 1931), Bucharest (October 22–29, 1932) and Salonica/ Thessaloniki (November, 5–11, 1933). In May 1930, the International Bureau of Peace sent invitations for the first conference to the six ministers of foreign affairs of the Balkan countries. The first meeting was held in Athens. On that occasion, in the presence of high officials of Balkan states, the statute of the organisation named the Balkan Conference was adopted. The organs of the Conference became: assembly, council, secretariat, and national groups. Each country got 30 voters, but also experts, secretaries and observers. The conferences gathered unofficial representatives of Balkan states, who nonetheless acted through national groups that included politicians, but also scientists and representatives of expert and peace associations. The creation of Balkan historical institutes was inspired by the activities of the conferences. What these meetings of Balkan delegations demonstrated was that Bulgaria and its public opinion did not accept the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine as final.⁸⁸

The Balkan Entente (The Balkan Pact)

The greatest achievement of Balkan statesmen in the interwar period was probably the Balkan Pact or the Balkan Entente. The Entente resulted from the negotiations held in Geneva and Belgrade. It was initiated in Belgrade on February 4 and signed in Athens on February 9, 1934, between the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Turkey and the Kingdom of Romania. Its main initiators were King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Kemal Pasha Ataturk, but it was Venizelos who paved the way for the Pact with his friendship agreements with Yugoslavia (1929) and Turkey (1930). He was, however, in the opposition when the Pact was signed because he lost the elections of March 1933, when his sixth and last government fell (January–March 1933). In October 1934, the ministers of foreign affairs of the signatory countries adopted in Ankara the statute of the Balkan Entente. The Pact envisaged meetings of ministers of foreign affairs every six months and the existence of the Permanent Secretariate and the Provisional Advisory Committee. With all such bodies both the Little Entente and the Balkan Pact were forerunners of post-war European integration.

⁸⁷ Leften Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453* (London: Hurst and Company, 2000; 1st ed. 1958), 736.

⁸⁸ Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, 230–231; Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, 737–738.

The Pact was mostly interpreted as an alliance of anti-revisionist powers, but such an assessment is not fully justified. The pillars of the Pact were the new relations of Greece with Turkey, as well as the old relations of Greece with Serbia and Yugoslavia but also of Yugoslavia with Romania that had resulted from the Little Entente. Turkey shared no common interest with Greece and Yugoslavia regarding Bulgaria. A possibility was left, however, for Bulgaria to join the Pact and Yugoslavia was particularly interested in making this happen.⁸⁹ The weak aspect of the Pact was that its signatories were *de facto* obliged to enter a war only if one of them was at war with Bulgaria, since Turkey secured an exception that it had no obligation to declare war on the USSR, and Greece got subsequent guarantees that she was not obliged to enter a war against Italy.

The Pact, however, should be viewed within the context of the spirit of the League of Nations, and the spirit of Balkan reciprocity which was quite present during the first two years of the Pact. At the beginning of the 1930s, Balkan statesmen were tired of the prospect of new conflicts and a pact of this kind, although it contained implicit anti-Bulgarian connotations, was primarily focused on providing a longer period of stability and peace in the Balkans. It was quite different from the previous two Balkan alliances: the first one conceived in the 1860s and the second one from 1912. It was not made to provide its signatories with new territories, but to maintain the *status quo*. The previous two alliances were made to prepare for war, whereas the 1934 one was designed to preserve peace. When, in October 1934, King Alexander, one of its architects, was assassinated in Marseilles, the Pact suffered a serious blow. It was a paradox that it was precisely Yugoslavia that challenged the Pact by signing a unilateral agreement with Bulgaria in January 1937. In September 1940, Romania left the Pact.

Agreement on Balkan Union

The Hellenic Kingdom and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia were the only two Balkan states officially at war with the Axis Powers for the entire duration of the Second World War in the Balkans, from April 1941 until May 1945. Both governments found themselves exiled in London after the attack of the Third Reich and its allies in April 1941. British diplomats were interested in their mutual relations as early as October 1941. On that occasion, the chargé d'affaires of the Yugoslav Legation in London, Vladimir Marjanović, said to Sir Orme Sargent

⁸⁹ According to Kosta Todorov, a pro-Yugoslav Bulgarian politician and a friend of King Alexander's, King Alexander was ready to give back two towns in Eastern Serbia (Caribrod and Bosilegrad), ceded to Yugoslavia by Bulgaria under the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine, if Bulgaria accepted to join the pact. At the end of 1933 He even allowed Todorov to pass this information on to Sofia. Kosta Todorov, *Balkan Firebrand. The Autobiography of a Rebel, Soldier and Statesman* (Chicago and New York: Ziff-Davis Publishing Company, 1943), 253.

that the two governments "were in very cordial contacts. I emphasised that the basis of our policy in the Balkans was the cordial friendship and common action of Yugoslavia and Greece".⁹⁰ This statement was met with approval from his British collocutor.

The two governments in exile in London, the Hellenic and the Yugoslav, on January 15, 1942, made the Agreement on the Constitution of a Balkan union. The two governments were inspired by the motto "the Balkans to the Balkan peoples", and this was explicitly stated in the preamble. Several months later, in September 1942, at a meeting of the Yugoslav Royal Government in London, Momčilo Ninčić (Momchilo Ninchitch), Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, clarified that his ministry had "taken the initiative to make the agreement with Greece as a union that should be the beginning, basis and framework for a future union of Balkan states". He added that he was in contact with other allied governments and pointed out: "We have been cooperating particularly closely with Greece, but even with her we did not go into details about war objectives."⁹¹

The Agreement on Balkan Union was signed by the prime ministers of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Hellenic Kingdom, Slobodan Jovanović (Yovanovich) and Emmanouil Tsouderos. The Union was to have permanent organs with regular meetings: 1. regular meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs, and of two members of each government in the fields of economy and finance; 2. a permanent military organ with a joint general staff of the national armies; 3. permanent bureaus which would include three sections: political, economic and financial, and military; 4. the prime ministers would meet whenever needed; and, 5. parliaments would also collaborate. Article 10 envisaged the possibility of future accession "of other Balkan states ruled by governments freely and legally constituted".⁹² The exchange of instruments of ratification took place on February 28, 1942. It goes without saying that the agreement was made in London in the context of the British strategic policy in the Mediterranean, and since 1917, Greece had been considered, with occasional oscillations, as the main potential ally of Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean.

At the beginning of May 1942, the agreement was announced in the Yugoslav Official Gazette (*Službene novine*) and was therefore publicly known. On

⁹⁰ "Zabeleška" V[ladimira] M[ilanovića], London, 9.10.1941, in Bogdan Krizman, ed., *Jugoslavenske vlade u izbjeglištvu 1941–1943. Dokumenti* (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, and Zagreb: Globus, 1981), 215.

⁹¹ "Zapisnik sednice Ministarskog saveta od 22. septembra 1942", in Krizman, ed., Jugoslavenske vlade u izbjeglištvu, 399.

⁹² Službene novine Kraljevine Jugoslavije [Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia], no. 6–1, 30 April 1942. An English translation of the agreement was published by Stavrianos (Balkan Federation, 311–313) as early as 1942.

October 21, 1942, a member of the Yugoslav government, Srdjan Budisavljević, informed other cabinet members that Soviet Russia received negatively the agreement between the Greek and Yugoslav governments.⁹³ The two signatories had reached no agreement on Albania. Greece preferred the annexation of Albania's southern parts, and Yugoslavia advocated the preservation of old borders.

In March 1944 in London, King Peter II of Yugoslavia married Princess Alexandra of Greece, the daughter of King Alexander of the Hellenes (1917– 1920). The marriage was to cement the union, but the victory of Yugoslav communists in the civil war in Yugoslavia several months later and the change of regime in Yugoslavia prevented this.

Therefore, out of a series of mutual agreements between Belgrade and Athens, the most influential one remained the Protocol of Athens of 1913. Up to 1942, it always served as the basis when mutual friendship was mentioned. Not a single Greek statesman can rival Venizelos in his credit for mutual alliances between 1913 and 1934. What is even more fascinating is that the credit should be given to him regardless of whether he was formally in power or in the opposition when a particular agreement was signed. He continued the policy formulated by Trikoupis, not unlike Nikola Pašić and Slobodan Jovanović who continued the policy initiated by Prince Michael Obrenović, Milan Piroćanac and Svetomir Nikolajević.

The Balkan Pact

It is interesting to note that, in 1953–54, a kind of Balkan entente was renewed, but this time without Romania. Although, in the period 1944–48, Yugoslav communists were the most vocal supporters of the Soviet Union and very loud opponents of Western democracies, growing tensions gradually emerged between the communist nomenclatures in Moscow and Belgrade. Stalin was particularly upset by the regional ambitions of Yugoslav communists since they could undermine his own foreign policy designs in Eastern Europe. The mutual misunderstandings escalated. At the second conference of the Cominform in Bucharest, the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) was accused of a series of charges, and the accusations were made public on June 28, 1948, the date of the Battle of Kosovo – Vidovdan. CPY publicly denounced the allegations.⁹⁴ That brought about a radical disruption in the relations of the former axis Moscow-Belgrade. Yugoslav communists unexpectedly found themselves in almost total isolation both to the East and to the West. This desperate situation soon made them initiate closer relations with Western countries.

⁹³ Krizman, ed., Jugoslavenske vlade u izbjeglištvu, 436.

⁹⁴ Robert Lee Wolf, *The Balkans in Our Time* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 352–365.

Before that, Yugoslavia had been one of the main supporters of the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG) led by the Communist Party of Greece in the Greek Civil War.⁹⁵ DAG participated in this war against the officially recognised government of the Hellenic Kingdom in Athens. The Yugoslav involvement made the relations of Belgrade and Athens such that the years between 1945 and 1950 have been termed "grey years", and the position of the two countries was called a "small war". According to Milan Ristović, those five years "symbolized the lowest level of the relations in the modern history of the two countries and peoples."96 First the USSR denied support to DAG as a result of Stalin's policy of avoiding open confrontation with the United States of America. The USSR asked its satellites to follow its policy. This led Bulgaria and Albania to close their borders to Greece on May 13, 1949. Yugoslavia did the same eight days later. At the beginning of July, Josip Broz Tito declared that he was ready to cut any further assistance to the rebels in Greece.⁹⁷ That facilitated the rapprochement of Communist Yugoslavia with the West, and that also meant conciliation with the official government in Athens. The news of the conflict between communist Yugoslavia and the USSR and the whole Soviet bloc, including Bulgaria and Albania, was received with great relief in Athens. The united northern front of the enemies of Greece (Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania) ceased to exist, and there were no longer any united protectors of the Slavic minority in Macedonia (Bulgaria and Yugoslavia). As Evanthis Hatzivassiliou noticed, "the nightmare scenario was put aside".98

The final result of Yugoslavia' policy of rapprochement with the West was the new Balkan Pact between the Hellenic Kingdom, Turkey and Communist Yugoslavia. In 1953 and 1954, it was preceded by the accession of the Hellenic Kingdom and the Republic of Turkey to NATO in 1952. The first agreement was signed in Ankara on February 28, 1953. It was the Agreement on Friendship and Co-operation between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the Hellenic Kingdom and the Republic of Turkey, and it was signed by their ministers of foreign affairs: Koča Popović, Stefanos Stefanopoulos and Fuat Köprülü. Next year, on August 9, the same three ministers signed an expanded version of the agreement in Bled, Yugoslavia. The Ankara Agreement was to be valid for five years. It envisaged regular conferences of ministers of foreign affairs at least

⁹⁵ On the origins of the Greek Civil War, see Yannis Mourélos, "Les origines de la guerre civile en Grèce", *Balcanica* 49 (2019), 367–373.

⁹⁶ Milan Ristović, "Small War on the Yugoslav-Greek Border (1945–1950)", Balkan Studies 45/1 (2004), 96.

⁹⁷ Milan Ristović, Na pragu Hladnog rata. Jugoslavija i gradjanski rat u Grčkoj (1945–1949) (Belgrade: Filozofski fakultet, 2016), 325–326.

⁹⁸ Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, "From Adversity to Alliance: Greece, Yugoslavia and Balkan Strategy, 1944–1959", *Balkan Studies* 45/1 (2004), 126.

once a year, and co-operation between the general staffs of the signatory countries. The Agreement signed in Bled defined in Article 2 what the signatories would consider "as aggression": "any armed aggression against one or more of them to any part of their territory", and, in that case, they would provide assistance "individually and collectively, to the party or parties attacked". The agreement was to last twenty years, and the Permanent Council was introduced and was to meet two times per year.⁹⁹

The Pact was a means to strengthen the South-East flank of NATO. For communist Yugoslavia, this happened in the midst of her conflict with the USSR that had begun in 1948. It was a way to avert a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia. The Pact "remained a unique cold war 'anomaly", and the agreements turned out to be "a mere historical curiosity", although they had a positive impact on relations between Belgrade and Athens.¹⁰⁰

Over the course of 1955, the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus took place and the September pogrom of Greeks happened in Istanbul (the so-called "Septemvriana"). These events rendered the Pact meaningless. The rapprochement between Josip Broz Tito and Nikita Khrushchev in 1955 meant that the Yugoslav side lost its basic interest in the Pact. However, the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 renewed the Yugoslav interest in military co-operation with Greece as a NATO member. That was confirmed during the visit of the Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis (PM October 1955 – March 1958, and May 1958 – September 1961) to Belgrade in December 1956, and also in a series of meetings of high representatives of the two countries in 1957-58. At that moment, Yugoslav officials clearly expressed their view that Greek membership of the Western alliance was precious to them, and Josip Broz even urged Karamanlis that the Hellenic Republic should remain in NATO.¹⁰¹ From 1954 until 1959, the bilateral relations of the two countries were strengthened."In this period Greece was a desirable ally for Belgrade - an open window to the West which operated as a channel of communication of the Yugoslav regime with the Western world."102 In the subsequent period, the mutual relations were under the shadow of the "Macedonian Question", which was raised by the leadership of the People's Republic of Macedonia in Yugoslavia. The ministers of foreign

⁹⁹ The texts of the agreements have been published in: *Balkanski pakt 1953/1954. Zbornik dokumenata* (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 2005), 311–313, 722–726.

¹⁰⁰ Ristović, Na pragu Hladnog rata, 458.

¹⁰¹ Hatzivassiliou, "From Adversity to Alliance", 131–132.

¹⁰² Konstantinos Katsanos, "Predgovor", in Konstantinos Katsanos and Nada Pantelić, *Makedonsko pitanje u jugoslovensko-grčkim odnosima. Poverljivi dokumenti 1949–1967* (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije and Society for Macedonian Studies, 2012), 23, Greek ed.: Konstantinos Katsanos, *To Makedoniko stis sheseis Ellados-Giougkoslavias. Aporrita eggrafa 1949– 1967* (Thessaloniki: E.M.S., Ekdotikos Oikos Adelfon Kyriakidi a.e., 2012).

affairs of the two states, Evangelos Averoff and Koča Popović, had to make two gentlemen's agreements on avoiding this issue. The first was made in July 1960 and the second in December 1962 in Athens. The agreements did not overcome "the Macedonian Question", which remained the unresolved issue in their mutual relations between 1962 and 1967.¹⁰³ At the end of this period the introduction of the Colonels' Regime (1967–1974) in the Hellenic Kingdom brought about a serious crisis in the relations between Yugoslavia and Greece.

After the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (1961), Communist Yugoslavia shifted the focus of its foreign policy from the Balkans to Africa and Asia and followed this policy until the 1980s. In that way, the issue of Balkan relations lost its previous significance for Yugoslav communists. It was communist Romania that became their closest neighbour in the late 1960s, throughout the 1970s, and even in the 1980s. Relations with Athens were still regarded as relevant, but not as a top priority like in the 1950s.

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¹⁰³ Ibid. 37–38.

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Evolution of Economic Thought on Monetary Reform in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after the Great War**

- Abstract: This paper analyses the opinions of economists and policy makers on the monetary reform undertaken in the Kingdom of SCS after the Great War. The purpose of the analysis is to show how those opinions evolved in the situation of growing monetary instability. Immediately after the war it was believed that the pre-war gold parity of the national currency could be restored but, after several years burdened with the depreciation of the dinar and inflation, it became clear that monetary stabilization needed a new realistic approach. The opinions on this approach ranged from extremely regulatory to completely liberal ones. Early commitment to administrative measures was more the consequence of an extremely delicate and changing economic and political situation in which the State was in the early 1920s than renunciation of the liberal economic policy pursued in the Kingdom of Serbia before the Great War. When it became clear that the implementation of palliative administrative measures could not prevent the value of the dinar from falling, a pragmatic liberal approach prevailed. The major proponent of this approach among economists was Velimir Bajkić, and among policy makers, Finance Minister Milan Stojadinović and the Governor of the National Bank of the Kingdom of SCS Djordje Vajfert.
- Keywords: gold standard, currency depreciation, paper standard, monetary unification, monetary reform, Kingdom of SCS

Introduction

Monetary reform in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS) may be said to have begun on 12 December 1918 with the *Decision* of the Ministerial Council on marking the Austro-Hungarian crowns for their later substitution for the dinar-crown banknotes, and to have ended only on 28 June 1931 with the *Law on National Bank*, which proclaimed the legal stabilization of the dinar. During all this time, just as during the Great War, the convertibility of

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the dinar was suspended and it was just one of a number of European currencies on the paper standard.

The ultimate goal of the monetary reform was return to the gold standard. Art. 20 of the *Law on the National Bank of the Kingdom of SCS* of 26 January 1920 authorized the Bank to issue three times more banknotes than its metal base, and Art. XII of the Transitional Provisions of this *Law* provided for the reintroduction of the exchange of banknotes for monetary metal when the financial and economic situation, and the level of gold reserves, allowed it.

At the International Monetary and Financial Conference in Genoa, Italy, in 1922, the Kingdom of SCS, like most European countries, opted for a monetary system based on a gold exchange standard.¹ Two steps that had to be made in the framework of the monetary reform before returning to this modified concept of classical convertibility were: monetary unification and the stabilization of the exchange rate of the dinar. As far as the ultimate goal of the monetary reform was concerned, immediately after the Great War there were no major divergence in public opinion. It was generally thought that the pre-war gold parity of the dinar had to be restored. However, with the first signs of monetary stabilization after years of experience with inflation and depreciation of the dinar, the idea of returning to the old gold parity was abandoned.

Monetary reform was carried out in an extremely delicate and changing economic and political situation in which the State was in that period. This situation is illustrated by the fact that from the creation of the Kingdom of SCS on I December 1918 until the enactment of the *Law on the National Bank* on 28 June 1931, there was a succession of as many as twenty-five governments.² Before the achievement of the final goal of the monetary reform, it was believed in professional circles that policy decisions of two finance ministers, Vojislav Veljković and Milan Stojadinović, were of vital importance to the restoration of the monetary system and the stabilization of national currency.³

From 16 August 1919 to 19 February 1920, the office of finance minister was held by Vojislav Veljković, former Professor of Administrative Law at the Great School in Belgrade and member of the National Assembly before and after the Great War. He took office amidst monetary chaos in the newly-created State, which practically still did not have definitive borders or an operational legislature. Veljković had the determination, expertise and integrity to lay the foundations of the monetary system and conduct monetary unification within

¹ D. Gnjatović and Ž. Lazarević, *Prilozi finansijskoj istoriji Jugoistočne Evrope* (Belgrade 2011), 52.

² D. Mrdjenović, ed., Ustavi i vlade Kneževine Srbije, Kraljevine Srbije, Kraljevine SHS i Kraljevine Jugoslavije (1835–1941) (Belgrade 1988), 198–244.

³ Lj. St. Kosier, "Valutna reforma u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji", in *Valutna reforma u Jugoslaviji*, ed. Lj. St. Kosier (Belgrade and *Zagreb* 1930), 6.

an extremely short period of time.⁴ He submitted to the National Assembly the proposal for a legal solution by which the validity of the *Law on the Privileged National Bank of the Kingdom of Serbia* was extended to the whole of the Kingdom of SCS.⁵ His assistant at the Ministry of Finance was Velimir Bajkić, Professor of Finance and Statistics at the Faculty of Law in Belgrade, Director of Belgrade Trade Bank and the most influential economist in Serbia.⁶ Bajkić technically carried out the idea of a dinar-crown banknote that was used for the replacement of Austro-Hungarian crowns and their withdrawal from circulation. From 16 December 1922 to 12 April 1926 (with a short break from 27 July to 6 November 1924) the position of finance minister was held by Milan Stojadinović, Professor of Economics at the University of Belgrade and a prominent financial expert. He put an end to the practice of budget deficit financing and took measures for monetary stabilization. Later on, in the period from 1935 to 1939, he would serve as Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.⁷

On the causes of monetary instability

The first years after the Great War in the Kingdom of the SCS were a period of an abrupt increase in the quantity of money in circulation. The period was marked by a general price increase and a depreciation of the national currency. In 1923 prices were almost twenty times higher compared to 1913. While in 1913 the dinar was equal in worth to the Swiss franc in Zurich, ten years later, in January 1923, it was 27 times less worth than the Swiss franc (see Table1).

Immediately after the Great War, the issues most discussed by economists were directly related to the monetary problem: the quantity of Austro-

⁴ V. Matić, Serbian Finances/Finansije srpske (Belgrade 2014), 145.

⁵ On 26 January 1920, the National Assembly adopted the *Law on the National Bank of the Kingdom of SCS*, on the basis of which, on 1 February 1920, the Privileged National Bank of the Kingdom of Serbia was reorganized into the National Bank of the Kingdom of SCS.

⁶ B. Mijatović, "Pet života Velimira Bajkića", in *Velimir Bajkić, Izabrani spisi,* ed. B. Mijatović (Belgrade 2009), 9–16.

⁷ Milan Stojadinović pursued higher education in Belgrade, Berlin and Munich, earning, his doctoral degree from the University of Belgrade in 1912, with a dissertation on German budget. He was Director of General State Accounting at the Ministry of Finance of the Kingdom of SCS until 1919. Due to disagreement with the Finance Minister Vojislav Veljković and his assistant Velimir Bajkić over the way the currency reform should be conducted, he left the civil service and became Director of the British Trade Corporation in Belgrade until his appointment as Finance Minister in 1922. He was also President of Belgrade Stock Exchange from 1934 to 1941. L. Pejić, *Razvoj ekonomske misli u jugoslovnskim zemljama do prvog i u Jugoslaviji između dva rata* (Belgrade 1986), 153.

Hungarian crowns in circulation, the conditions for their withdrawal from circulation and the growing costs of living due to high inflation.⁸

In the fairly chaotic monetary situation, monetary instability was additionally fuelled by the uncontrolled inflow of Austro-Hungarian crowns. The Dual Monarchy had collapsed, but crown notes were still printed in Vienna and Budapest and released into circulation. In order to prevent further depreciation of the crown and establish a stable relation between the value of crown and dinar, on 12 December 1918, the Ministerial Council of the Kingdom of SCS issued an order to ban the inflow of new Austro-Hungarian crown notes (and Bulgarian levs) and to stamp the crown notes in circulation with official seals.

The Kingdom of SCS was thus the first of the successor states of the Dual Monarchy to carry out the nationalization of crown notes in its territory. This happened even before that became a legal obligation in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Treaties. The stamping of crown notes was carried out in Belgrade by 5 January and in the rest of the Kingdom of SCS by 31 January 1919. Owing to this operation, the amount of crown notes was established at 5.3 billion. However, the measures taken did not prevent further inflow of newlyprinted crown notes. Milorad Nedeljković, Professor of Political Economy at the Faculty of Law in Subotica, speaking of this problem in a lecture at the Law Association in Belgrade on 2 February 1919, claimed that after the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy, the Austro-Hungarian Bank continued to print more than one billion crowns a month.⁹ Miodrag Ugričić, adviser to the National Bank, would later claim that, the total amount of Austro-Hungarian banknotes in circulation rose from 2.5 billion to 35.5 billion crowns from the beginning to the end of the Great War, and that it increased by another 20 billion crowns from the end of the war until the liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Bank in late 1922.10

The public was very dissatisfied with the sloppy way in which the marking of crown notes was organized. The task had been entrusted to various authorities and they all had different seals that could easily be counterfeited. As a result, the amount of crown notes in circulation continued to increase steadily. Forced to find another way to stop the inflow of this impaired currency, the authorities decided to mark the already marked crown notes merely by sticking tags on them although it was clear that a certain quantity of newly-infiltrated notes stamped with counterfeited seals would also be tagged. The tagging of the stamped crown notes lasted from 26 November to 28 December 1919.

⁸ Besides the dinar of the Kingdom of Serbia and the crown of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, other currencies were in circulation as well: Bulgarian levs and Montenegrin perpers, but their quantity in circulation was relatively small.

⁹ M. Nedeljković, Pred rešenje našeg valutnog pitanja (Zagreb 1919), 5.

¹⁰ M. Ugričić, Novčani sistem Jugoslavije (Belgrade 1967), 90.

There was no explicit public information about the amount of crown notes that were eventually tagged. In the Report to the Board of Directors of 25 December 1919, Djordje Vajfert, Governor of the National Bank, estimated that before the Great War there had been barely 500 million crowns in the territories of Austro-Hungary subsequently incorporated into the Kingdom of SCS; he pointed out that the replacement of crown notes with new currency would inevitably trigger inflation because the circulation of these notes increased by "ten to twenty times" during and after the war.¹¹ Just two days before this Report was submitted, the daily *Pravda* gave an estimate that the amount of crown notes in circulation in the Kingdom of the SCS rose to "six to seven billion".¹²

At its meeting of 18 January 1920, the Ministerial Council made all important decisions regarding the restoration of the monetary system: the dinar would be the currency of the Kingdom of the SCS; the dinar would remain a monetary unit equal in value as the old dinar of the Kingdom of Serbia; Austro-Hungarian crowns, Bulgarian levs and Montenegrin perpers would be withdrawn from circulation and replaced with new banknotes to be produced in Zagreb, Prague and Paris; dinar notes issued by the Privileged National Bank of the Kingdom of Serbia would remain in circulation because "the old and the new dinar are equal in value"; the nominal value of new banknotes to be printed in Zagreb, Prague and Paris should be expressed both in dinars and in crowns "in order to make the transition to the new monetary unit easier to the people living in the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy that had become part of Yugoslavia, who are accustomed to counting in crowns."¹³

The withdrawal of Austro-Hungarian crown notes from circulation was announced on 1 February 1920, just a day after the *Law on the National Bank of the Kingdom of Serbs*, *Croats and Slovenes* was published in the *Official Gazette*. Then, on 3 February 1920, the *Rules of Withdrawal of Crown Notes* were published, in which the ratio of exchange of dinar and crown was set at 1:4. Also, it was stipulated that 20% of the crowns turned in for exchange would be retained and paid off at some point in the future. The withdrawal of the marked crown notes lasted from 16 February to 3 June 1920, and the unmarked smaller crown denominations were withdrawn from circulation in early 1921.¹⁴ Without going into analysis of the debate that arose in the Kingdom of the SCS regarding the ratio of exchanging four crowns for one dinar, it should be noted that the question is still open as to whether such terms of monetary unification were to the

¹¹ Narodna banka, Izveštaj Upravnog odbora od 25. decembra 1919 (Belgrade 1920), 10.

¹² "Zamena kruna", Pravda, 23 December 1919, 1.

¹³ D. Uzelac, Devizna politika Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1919–1929 (Belgrade 1931).

¹⁴ Narodna banka, Godišnji izveštaj 1920 (Belgrade 1921), XIII.

detriment of the crown holders or, on the contrary, the huge amount of Austro-Hungarian crown notes in circulation had a general detrimental effect.¹⁵

The monograph on the fifty years of the National Bank (1884–1934) published in 1935, contains the information that the State borrowed 1.28 billion dinars from the National Bank in order to replace crown notes with dinar-crown banknotes.¹⁶ This means that 5.12 billion crowns were withdrawn. Dinar-crown banknotes of the Kingdom of SCS and dinar banknotes of the Privileged National Bank of the Kingdom of Serbia were gradually replaced with dinar notes of the National Bank of the Kingdom of SCS (Yugoslavia from 1929) over the period from 1922 to 1934.

Once the problem of monetary unification was resolved, the attention of economists shifted to the problem of budget deficit as a generator of inflation. In the first years of post-war recovery, the State borrowed from the National Bank to meet ever-growing public expenditures (see Table 2). Fiscal years ended with deficits, and the monetization of the deficits was a constant source of inflation. At a conference devoted to curbing inflation in early September 1921, Milan Stojadinović, not yet finance minister at the time, explained that the continuous printing of dinar notes for the needs of the State led to a rise in prices. He argued that the value of national currency would necessarily fall as long as the State had a huge budget deficit financed by constant printing of new notes.¹⁷ He described the relationship between the increase in the quantity of money in circulation and the rise in prices as a vicious circle: "An increase in the amount of money causes an increase in prices, an increase in prices causes a new increase in monetary circulation."

¹⁵ Even today, some economic historians from the region of the former Yugoslavia contend that monetary unification was carried out to the detriment of the holders of Austro-Hungarian crowns: B. N. Kršev, "Monetarna politika i problem unifikacije novca u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca 1918–1923", *Civitas* 3 (2012), 113–124; M. Kolar-Dimitrijević, *Povijest novca u Hrvatskoj* (Zagreb 2013). Some, on the other hand, consider such views as unfounded because the exchange rate of 4:1 corresponded to the market rate of exchange of crown and dinar: I. M. Becić, *Finansijska politika Kraljevine SHS* 1918–1923 (Belgrade 2003); B. Mijatović, "Ekonomska politika i konjunktura u Jugoslaviji 1919–1925", *Godišnjak za društvenu istoriju* 3 (2013), 99–118; I. M. Becić, "Za dinar ili za krunu – ko je dobio ako izgubio?", *Istorija* 20. veka 2 (2013), 41–58; B. Mijatović, "Zamena austrijskih kruna za dinare 1920. godine", CLDS Radni dokumenti, 2014. Making objective judgments about this phenomenon is hampered by the lack of relevant statistical data on the quantity of crown notes in circulation and retail price movements in different parts of the Kingdom of SCS in the first few years after the Great War.

¹⁶ Narodna banka 1884–1934 (Belgrade 1934), 40.

¹⁷ M. Stojadinović, Borba protiv skupoće (Belgrade 1921), 26.

¹⁸ M. Stojadinović, "Finansijska politika i pitanje skupoće", *Novi život*, no. 4, 1921, 280, quoted in B. Mijatović, "Ekonomske ideje i dela Milana Stojadinovića u prvom periodu rada",

The State fought against inflation by introducing price ceilings for foodstuffs. Milan Stojadinović considered this policy as counterproductive and strongly criticized a decree which imposed price control on basic foodstuffs.¹⁹ He argued that any state intervention, contrary to the economic laws of supply and demand, only encouraged inflationary tendencies.²⁰

"There is in this Decree a contradiction between economic and human laws. This Decree undermines a very important economic law, which is called the law of supply and demand. According to this law, the price of a good will go up if demand for it increases, and drop if demand falls. Or, in other words, the greater the supply of a good, the more its price drops. Supply actually means the existence of a certain quantity of goods, while demand represents the need of people for the goods concerned. And if such supply and demand determine the price of foods, then we must wonder how come that some believe that prices can be determined by a single decree? Can a decree strengthen supply, or increase the amount of foods needed? Or, can it weaken demand, that is, reduce the human need for these foodstuffs?"²¹

The financing of budget deficit by printing money lasted until mid-1922. After that, there was no inflationary financing of government expenditures. On 28 September 1922, the Board of Directors of the National Bank issued a formal decision on terminating the approval of new loans to the State. On this occasion, Governor Djordje Vajfert gave an interview to the daily *Politika*. He said: "It is interesting that almost all our finance ministers tend to take the path they should not take. Whenever a financial gap needs to be closed, they run to the National Bank ... National Bank has completely different goals, not to sit and print banknotes for the account of the State." He also expressed satisfaction at the fact that the State made it clear that revenues should be provided from taxes, by reforming the tax system.²²

On 20 January 1924, in the framework of the general parliamentary debate on the government budget for fiscal 1924/25, Milan Stojadinović addressed the National Assembly with a report on state finances in the first years after the Great War. He spoke about the enormous financial needs of the State that could only be met with the assistance of the National Bank. He also pointed to vari-

CLDS Radni dokumenti, Belgrade 2012, 5.

¹⁹ "Uredba o suzbijanju skupoće životnih namirnica i nesavesne spekulacije", *Službene novine Kraljevine SHS*, no. 159, 1921.

²⁰ "The whole building of his economic views was based on solid fundamentals of classical economic thought, which meant liberal understanding of the world that believed in positive effects of competition for individuals and companies operating in a free environment." Mijatović, "Ekonomske ideje i dela Milana Stojadinovića", 9.

²¹ Stojadinović, Borba protiv skupoće, 8–9.

²² "Narodna banka neće više da štampa banke", Politika, 29 September 1922, 3.

ous inherited fiscal systems as yet another cause of budget deficit in the previous period – from I December 1918 to fiscal 1923/24, the State spent five billion dinars more than it realized in revenues (see Table 3), largely as a result of the lack of budgetary unity. Namely, Stojadinović explained that in the situation where different inherited fiscal systems were implemented, expenditures were divided into global sums to meet the basic public needs of the provinces and the central government regardless of the state of revenues collected. It was impossible therefore to plan the annual needs of the budget, so financial plans were made every month. He said that "monthly planning, however, always brings disorder into the State's financial sector. It prevents the normal course of state affairs and thus inflicts damage not only on finances, but also on the economy as a whole."²³

On palliative measures for preventing the depreciation of dinar

Inflationary growth in the quantity of money in circulation caused frequent changes in the dinar exchange rate, with a constant tendency of its deterioration. Before Milan Stojadinović took the post of finance minister, his predecessors Momčilo Ninčić, Velizar Janković, Kosta Stojanović and Kosta Kumanudi had tried to prevent the depreciation of the dinar by various restrictive policy measures. These measures were criticized constantly by prominent economists and bankers.

At the proposal of Momčilo Ninčić, the Kingdom of SCS's first finance minister, on 30 March 1919, *The Office for Foreign Exchange Control* was established"in order to maintain our money at a favourable international level".²⁴ This Office issued licences for the export of goods, with the obligation of the exporters to transfer the collected sums in foreign currency to the National Bank, which paid them an equivalent amount in domestic currency at an officially determined exchange rate. On the other hand, the Office sold foreign currency only to those persons who could prove that they imported commodities, machinery, raw materials or any other items that were needed for consumption or industrial, craft and agricultural production. Persons going abroad were allowed to take out of the country a maximum of 1000 French francs or an equivalent amount in another foreign currency.

Attempts to improve the exchange rate of the dinar by monopolizing the foreign exchange market were unsuccessful and were amply criticized by the professional public. One of the loudest critics was Slavko Šećerov, a prominent financial expert. He explained this failure by the fact that exporters evaded their obligations in various ways, and the State failed to provide enough foreign currency for importers.

²³ M. Stojadinović, Naš finansijski položaj (Belgrade 1924), 4.

²⁴ "Uredba Centrale za plaćanje u inostranstvu", Službene novine Kraljevine SHS, no. 59, 1919.

"Exporters, under various excuses, prolonged the transfer of foreign currency at agreed deadlines... Some did not meet their obligations at all, and some did not even turn in foreign currency, but they invested abroad the sums obtained for certain exported goods to buy another commodity, using such compensation deals as an excuse for avoiding depositing foreign currency. And if they did not succeed in this, they appeared in foreign exchange markets as buyers of foreign currency so as to be able to fulfil their obligations at home. This only aggravated further the exchange rate of the dinar."²⁵

Velizar Janković, Professor of Finances at the Commercial Academy in Belgrade, served as finance minister from 19 February to 17 May 1920. He did not criticize the existence of the Office for Foreign Exchange Control as such, he only thought that it was prevented from operating efficiently because of an inadequate legal framework. In his parliamentary speech delivered on 14 March 1920, he claimed that this Office could not serve its purpose of regulating trade in foreign currencies because "carrying foreign currency out of the country is prohibited for sums larger than 1000 French francs, while at the same time one can take out millions in checks."²⁶

A new regime in foreign currency trading was set by Kosta Stojanović, who served as finance minister from 18 August 1920 until his death on 4 January 1921. At his proposal, the Office for Foreign Exchange Control was dissolved and on 25 September 1920, *Regulation on Trading in Foreign Exchange* was adopted.²⁷ Under this Regulation, trade in foreign currencies was placed under a specific control regime of the Ministry of Finance. All exporters were obliged to bring into the country the foreign currency received for the exported goods through one of the authorized banks, and the authorized banks were obliged to purchase one-third of the deposited foreign currency for dinars and to transfer the purchased foreign currency to the State through the National Bank.

The dinar did not cease depreciating even after several months of implementation of *Regulation on Trading in Foreign Exchange*. Kosta Kumanudi, Professor at the Faculty of Law in Belgrade, who served as finance minister from 4 January 1921 to 17 December 1922, initially tried to save the dinar by introducing greater freedom in trading in foreign currencies. New *Regulation on Currencies and Foreign Exchange* of 20 March 1921 allowed free import of foreign currencies, and the *Amendments* to this Regulation of 27 June 1921 abolished all restrictions on trading in foreign currencies.²⁸ However, the dinar exchange rate

²⁵ S. Šećerov, Naše finansije 1918–1925 (Belgrade 1926), 111.

²⁶ Uzelac, Devizna politika, 124.

²⁷ "Uredba o regulisanju prometa sa devizama i valutama", *Službene novine Kraljevine SHS*, no. 221, 1920.

²⁸ "Uredba o valutama i devizama", Službene novine Kraljevine SHS, no. 115, 1921; "Izmene i dopune Uredbe o valutama i devizama", Službene ovine Kraljevine SHS, no. 156, 1921.

did not improve, which suggested that free trade in foreign currency was premature.²⁹ That is why Kumanudi opted for restrictions again. At his proposal, on 25 September 1921, the *Rules on Transactions in Foreign Exchange* were adopted, under which the National Bank was obliged to set up administrative bodies called Committees on Foreign Exchange tasked with controlling the operation of the banks authorized for dealing in foreign currency.³⁰

The sharpest critic of government intervention in currency trading was Milan Stojadinović. Before he succeeded Kosta Kumanudi as finance minister, he insisted that restrictive measures could not improve the dinar exchange rate. He repeatedly stated that the dinar would not stop depreciating unless its causes were eliminated, pinpointing budget deficit and deficit in foreign trade as the major causes of the depreciation (see Table 4). He criticized the institution of a state monopoly in trading in foreign currencies, pointing out that negative experience had already led to the abolishment of such monopolies in Greece, Germany and Italy.³¹ On the other hand, he did not mind the regime of government purchases of one-third of bank deposits in foreign currency in itself, which was retained under the Rules on Transactions in Foreign Exchange. He said that this regime would not have an impact on the exchange rate and that the dinar would recover one day, "perhaps even under the same Rules, since no Rules can determine a currency exchange rate".32 Indeed, the aforementioned Rules remained in force until the introduction of gold-exchange standard under the Law on the National Bank in 1931.

The stance of the central banking institution was to a large extent concurrent with the stance of Milan Stojadinović. Board of Directors of the National Bank had repeatedly warned the public of the harmfulness of frequent changes in the foreign exchange regime and insisted on the necessity of eliminating the causes of monetary instability. "It was explained that the dinar had constantly depreciated under all regulations, even under the free regime; it was said that it was also clear that again the transition from the freedom of trading to the regime of restrictions did not bring any improvement in the value of the dinar ... It was stressed that all these attempts to raise the exchange rate of the dinar artificially were doomed to failure in advance. Board of Directors claimed that the dinar would only grow stronger if the government budget did not run a deficit, if the production increased, if foreign trade balance was achieved."³³

²⁹ G. Nikolić, Kurs dinara i devizna politika Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1918–1941 (Belgrade 2003), 86–87.

³⁰ "Pravilnik o regulisanju prometa sa devizama i valutama", *Službene novine Kraljevine SHS*, no. 214, 1921.

³¹ Stojadinović, Borba protiv skupoće, 22.

³² M. Stojadinović, Naše valutne nevolje (Belgrade 1921), 40.

³³ Narodna banka, Godišnji izveštaj 1921 (Belgrade 1922), XIV.

The depreciation of the dinar was not stopped even after the adoption of the *Rules on Transactions in Foreign Exchange*. Kumanudi had accused the speculative behaviour of traders and bankers of weakening the exchange rate of the dinar. That is why he went to the other extreme and demanded that a new type of state monopoly be introduced in currency trading. Thus, a new *Regulation* was issued on 28 February 1922, requiring that every trader who needed to buy foreign currency for the payments of imported goods request prior approval from one of the National Bank's eleven Committees on Foreign Exchange. Under the same *Regulation*, private banks were completely forbidden from trading in foreign currencies.³⁴

Then, a warning came from the National Bank. It was argued that the Committees on Foreign Exchange were in fact given jurisdiction over deciding whether goods would be purchased abroad at all, because this purchase depended directly on whether the Committees would approve importers' request to purchase foreign exchange.³⁵

Banking Association in Belgrade saw this new foreign exchange regime as "a direct attack on the freedom of banking". It launched an extensive campaign against the implementation of this regime: "Banks have been denounced as enemies of this country, accused of finding the most favourable terrain for big profits... Such an absurd view culminated in February this year when the Ministry of Finance publicly accused certain Belgrade banks of making fictitious deals on the Belgrade Foreign Exchange Market in order to weaken our currency. The Board of the Banking Association, having noted, through a poll, that fictitious deals did not exist, took the attacked banks under protection and tried to convince the public that the Ministry of Finance was wrong. Success of our action was evident. It later became clear that those accusations were nothing but tactics to justify in advance the enactment of a more restrictive regulation, which was to introduce the state monopoly on currency trading."³⁶

The campaign of the Banking Association had put pressure on the National Bank to find ways to avoid the implementation of the disputed *Regulation*. After several meetings held at the National Bank and the Ministry of Finance, it was noted that Committees for Foreign Exchange, due to their workload, were technically unable to respond to the requirements of the *Regulation* of 28 February 1922. Therefore, the Ministry of Finance accepted to continue to implement the *Rules on Transactions in Foreign Exchange*, deciding arbitrarily which banks would be permitted to deal in foreign exchange again.

³⁴ Službene novine Kraljevine SHS, no. 45, 1922.

³⁵ Narodna banka, Godišnji izveštaj 1922 (Belgrade 1923), XXI.

³⁶ Udruženje banaka Beograd, Izveštaj Upravnog odbora o radu Udruženja od 1. decembra 1921. do 30. aprila 1922 (Belgrade 1922), 21.

Building foreign exchange reserves

The regulations on transactions in foreign currency introduced between 1919 and 1922 did not save the dinar from depreciation, but they helped building foreign exchange reserves.³⁷ The *Agreement on Commission Sales of Foreign Exchange* reached by the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank on 23 July 1921 had a similar effect. Although this was not the primary goal of the Agreement, its adoption created an institutional framework for building foreign exchange reserves, which would later be used to stabilize the internal and external value of the dinar.

Namely, before the signing of the Agreement, the Ministry of Finance occasionally purchased foreign exchange at a market rate in order to provide funds for payments abroad. National Bank warned that, if made under conditions of unfavourable exchange rates, these purchases had negative effects on government finances. In order to avoid such negative effects, the National Bank took on the obligation to buy foreign exchange and make payments abroad in the name and for the account of the State under the most favourable terms. Thus, the implementation of the *Rules on Transactions in Foreign Exchange* and the *Agreement on Commission Sales of Foreign Exchange* contributed considerably to the creation of foreign exchange reserves of the State even though this was not their primary goal.³⁸

On quantitative restrictions of the National Bank

Although the Kingdom of SCS had not implemented budget deficit financing since mid-1922, the amount of money in circulation continued to rise, and the dinar continued to depreciate. When the dinar appeared on the Zurich Foreign Exchange Market in May 1920, eight Swiss francs could be bought for 100 dinars. In January 1923, no more than 3.69 Swiss francs could be bought for 100 dinars.

Velimr Bajkić claimed that the National Bank was responsible for an increase of more than one billion dinars in the quantity of money in circulation in the second half of 1922 and early 1923. He spoke of the inflation that was caused by the private sector's growing demand for money which, in his opinion, was fuelled by the expansionist monetary policy of the National Bank. "That is the amount [more than a billion dinars] by which the National Bank's claims to

³⁷ Foreign exchange collected through the regime of government purchases of one-third of bank deposits in foreign currency was not sufficient for abundant interventions in foreign exchange markets. As a result, foreign Government loans as well as golden crowns from the liquidation mass of the Austro-Hungarian Bank had to be used, too. Nikolić, *Kurs dinara i devizna politika*, 89.

³⁸ Narodna banka, Godišnji izveštaj 1922 (Belgrade 1923), XXI.

its credits to the private sector increased; that is the amount of inflation on the National Bank's account. This inflation had the worst effect already at the end of 1922 and beginning of 1923. Hence, we have a phenomenon that exchange rates of foreign currencies reached their maximum in January 1923."³⁹

Indeed, in the years of economic recovery after the Great War, the private sector's monetary demand grew rapidly. National Bank mostly discounted bills of exchange and granted sparingly Lombard loans, secured by government bonds (see Table 5). During 1919, the National Bank discounted bills of exchange for 40.2 million dinars, whereas in April 1922 the amount of discounted bills of exchange rose to 900 million dinars. Due to a sharp decline in the exchange rate of the dinar on foreign markets, in the second quarter of 1922 the National Bank decided to introduce restrictive measures in crediting the private sector. Its Board of Directors decided on quantitative restrictions and revision of all loans in order to cancel the risky ones. The amount of already approved loans was reduced by 10%, strict censorship of bills of exchange was introduced and loan revision was carried out "of all those who do not conduct healthy business".⁴⁰

As a result of the restrictions on loans from the National Bank, the financial situation in the country deteriorated. When the demand for crediting the export of agricultural products increased in the second half of 1922, the National Bank was forced to give up the decision on limiting the amount of loans. As a result, its loans reached the amount of 1.43 billion dinars by the end of September 1922. Then the National Bank reimposed restrictive measures. From 1 January 1923, the amount of already approved loans was reduced by 10%, and the discounting of bills of exchange was completely suspended.⁴¹

Restrictive measures of the National Bank were met with strong opposition from industrialists and bankers. They believed that the growth of monetary circulation should not be stopped by limiting the operation of the private sector, but by reducing the government debt to the National Bank.⁴²

The policy of credit restrictions was also criticized by those economists who argued that the basic monetary policy instrument should be a discount rate rather than quantitative restrictions. Slavko Šećerov argued that the central bank should become the regulator of commercial banking through the mechanism of interest rates.⁴³ This opinion was shared by Dušan Uzelac, an expert in monetary issues and one of the National Bank directors.⁴⁴ As the National

³⁹ V. Bajkić, "Dinar", in Velimir Bajkić. Izabrani spisi, 11.

⁴º Narodna banka, Godišnji izveštaj 1922 (Belgrade 1923), XX–XXII.

⁴¹ Narodna banka 1884–1934 (Belgrade 1934), 15.

⁴² Udruženje banaka Beograd, *Izveštaj Upravnog odbora za 1922* (Belgrade 1923), 18.

⁴³ Šećerov, Naše finansije1918–1925, 110.

⁴⁴ Uzelac, Devizna politika, 17.

Bank did not alter the discount rate until 1931, this criticism could be heard throughout the 1920s.

Why was the discount rate not used as an instrument of monetary policy? It was assessed at the National Bank that the discount rate could not be an effective monetary policy instrument. It was considered that the goal of lowering the demand for discounting bills of exchange would not be achieved by raising the discount rate, since the difference between the National Bank's discount rate on bills and market interest rates on commercial bank loans was extremely high in the Kingdom of SCS.⁴⁵

On the paths to monetary stabilization

In his speech at the Conference on Curbing Inflation, held on 7 September 1921, Milan Stojadinović presented the basics of his liberal economic policy, which he would pursue as finance minister. His position could be seen from the following statement: "We must abandon monopolies, restrictions and regulations, and return to economic freedom."⁴⁶

Milan Stojadinović took up the post of finance minister on 16 December 1922 and, with a short break, held it until 1926. Only a week after he became finance minister, on 23 December 1922, the Ministerial Council accepted his proposal to abolish the state monopoly in foreign currency trading. Committees on Foreign Exchange were dissolved and the ban on commercial banks dealing in foreign exchange was lifted.

When making a proposal to abolish the state monopoly in foreign currency trading, Milan Stojadinović pointed to the damage this regime had inflicted on the economy.

"Based on the *Rules on Transactions in Foreign Exchange* of 25 September 1921, and the *Amendments* to these Rules of 25 February 1922, Committees on Foreign Exchange started to operate at the National Bank and its branch offices. They gave permits for the import of goods and for the purchase of foreign currency, and had control over the use of foreign exchange.

These committees, eleven of them, did not produce the desired result; while, on the other hand, they created a regime of individual permits, with all the consequences that this regime inevitably entails. In addition, substantial expenditures were needed to support them. It is my honour therefore to ask the Ministerial Council to decide that...

1. The Committees on Foreign Exchange should be dissolved;

⁴⁵ The National Bank's discount rate was 6%, and the market interest rate was twice and three times higher. Narodna banka, *Godišnji izveštaj 1922* (Belgrade 1923), XX.

⁴⁶ Stojadinović, Borba protiv skupoće, 11.

2. Banks authorized for transactions in foreign currencies should supply importers with foreign currency and other payment instruments for their needs, provided the latter are able to submit evidence of the use of these payment instruments for the purpose of import within 6 months."⁴⁷

The abolition of the state monopoly in trading in foreign currencies combined with restrictive monetary policy had positive effects on the dinar exchange rate. The severe restrictions on the loans of the National Bank put a stop to inflationary tendencies and the dinar began recovering in 1923. The recovery was then supported by the National Bank's interventions on foreign exchange markets, pursued at the request of Milan Stojadinović. Explaining the basic elements of the policy of monetary stabilization in his address to the National Assembly on 30 January 1924, Stojadinović underlined the significance of building foreign exchange reserves, and advocated a gradual appreciation of the dinar. He argued that the goal should not be an abrupt and fast appreciation, but a process of gradual monetary stabilization with movement towards the improvement of the dinar exchange rate. Thanks to the foreign exchange reserves piled up at the National Bank, he was able to intervene on foreign exchange markets for that purpose and in that direction.⁴⁸

The strengthening of the dinar in the course of the next year, 1924, was assisted by stopping the growth of public expenditures, establishing the balance of the government budget, and achieving an export growth and foreign trade surpluses. In addition, the National Bank's foreign exchange interventions at the request of Milan Stojadinović kept preventing major fluctuations in the dinar exchange rate, while being continuously directed towards its further strengthening. The interventions were made possible by a constant increase in gold and foreign exchange reserves at the National Bank. Expressed in their dinar equivalent, they amounted to 349.3 million dinars at the end of 1922, 437.3 million at the end of 1923, and 474.3 million at the end of 1924.⁴⁹

In June 1925, it was already possible to buy 9.17 Swiss francs for 100 dinars on the Zurich foreign exchange market; that is, one Swiss franc was worth 10.90 dinars. This means that compared to the Swiss franc the dinar was worth two and a half times more in June 1925 than in January 1923. The strengthening of the dinar, which hindered economic prosperity, did not cause too much criticism among the professional public. Milan Todorović, Professor of Finances at the Faculty of Law in Belgrade, even claimed that dinar strengthening could not

⁴⁷ The decision to dissolve Committees on Foreign Exchange came into force as early as 26 December 1922. "Uredba o ukidanju deviznih odbora", *Službene novine Kraljevine SHS*, no. 290, 1922.

⁴⁸ Stojadinović, Naš finansijski položaj, 26.

⁴⁹ Ministarstvo finansija Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1918–1938 (Belgrade 1939), 223.

have an adverse effect on economic activity. He explained that only the companies that were frivolously established in the period of economic boom after the Great War would be endangered by the strengthening of the national currency.⁵⁰

The transition period from inflation to deflation was mitigated by relatively high income from exports of agricultural products thanks to the rich harvests of 1923 and 1924. However, in the summer of 1925, there arose fears that further dinar strengthening could jeopardize the autumn export season. Addressing the National Assembly on 27 July 1925, Milan Stojadinović pointed to the dangers involved in further dinar strengthening and implicitly called for maintaining its exchange rate at the existing level. He abandoned the policy of "gradual correction of the dinar exchange rate", fearing the possible consequences of its further application, and added: "Our dinar now stands solid as a granite wall and we are no longer concerned that it may weaken, but we fear that it may strengthen even further. An abrupt strengthening of the dinar is as bad as its abrupt weakening."⁵¹

The value of the dinar would be maintained at 10.90 dinars for one Swiss franc over the next few years, until its legal stabilization in 1931. However, the policy of maintaining the dinar exchange rate by intervening from the foreign exchange reserves collected mainly through the regime of government purchases of one-third of bank deposits in foreign currency was criticized by the expert public. One of its most vociferous critics was Slavko Šećerov. He was of the opinion that the exchange rate of the dinar was unreal and that its value had been kept artificially high owing to the interventions from foreign exchange reserves. The value of the dinar, he said, would be completely different had it not been for such government interventions through the National Bank. He argued that the value of the dinar could not be considered stable as long as it had to be maintained by continuous interventions.⁵²

On dinar gold parity

The actual stabilization of the dinar opened the question of the final legal determination of its gold parity. At the International Financial and Monetary Conference in Genoa in 1922, it was recommended to European countries to set the return to the gold standard as the ultimate goal of their monetary reforms. Also, all countries were recommended to individually decide whether to stick to the old gold parity or to adopt a new parity approximating the exchange rate of their

⁵⁰ M. Todorović, "Bojazan od popravke dinara", Ekonomist 1 (1926), 1.

⁵¹ Ministarstvo finansija Kraljevine Jugoslavije, 223.

⁵² S. Šećerov, "Vrednost dinara i otplata duga Narodnoj Banci", in *Valutna reforma u Jugoslaviji*, ed. Ljubomir St. Kosier (Belgrade and Zagreb 1930), 18–19.

respective monetary units at the moment of return to the gold standard.⁵³ The experience with post-war inflation, the rapid decline in the purchasing power of the dinar at home and its weakening on foreign exchange markets abroad made its legal stabilization in accordance with its old gold parity almost senseless. This new reality was pointed out as early as 1924, in the Report of the Board of Directors of the Banking Association in Belgrade, which argued that the idea of returning to the old gold parity of the dinar seemed to be increasingly abandoned and that a request arose for national currency devaluation so that its new gold parity could be determined in keeping with its real exchange rate.⁵⁴

This new reality became especially visible when Finance Minister Milan Stojadinović gave up further dinar strengthening. Aware of the fact that the dinar was stabilized at the value which was several times lower than its old gold parity, on 27 July 1925 he presented the National Assembly with a proposal for the official devaluation of the national currency and the adoption of its new gold parity.

"Let us carry out legal stabilization and devaluation at the current dinar value, let us settle for the fate that the dinar will never be stronger than it is now and let us determine its gold parity at its present value."⁵⁵

The stance of the National Bank as regards the ultimate goal of the monetary reform evolved as a result of disruptions to which the dinar was exposed in the 1920s. When, in 1920, the Privileged National Bank of the Kingdom of Serbia had been reorganized into the National Bank of the Kingdom of SCS, it was still believed that it would be possible to return to the old gold parity, that conditions for the dinar to regain the old gold parity would arise as the economy recovered. In the National Bank's *Annual Report for 1920*, it was stated that "repair" of the dinar would take a long time and that it would only return to its old gold parity when both the State and the economy grew stronger, and when there were sufficient conditions for both.⁵⁶

However, in the situation where it first was necessary to overcome inflationary tendencies, and then to maintain actively, in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, the achieved level of internal and external value of the dinar, the perceptions of the reach of monetary stabilization policy had matured. The National Banks's *Annual Report for 1930* pointed to the fact that although all laws concerning the National Bank contained a provision imposing on it the duty to extend cheap loans, it had always been clear that its primary task was to keep the national currency stable. It stressed that, without any assistance, without any specific legal provisions, the coordinated work between the Ministry of Finance

⁵³ Articles VI and VII of the Resolution adopted at the International Monetary and Financial Conference in Genoa in 1922.

⁵⁴ Udruženje banaka Beograd, *Izveštaj Upravnog odbora za 1922* (Belgrade 1924), 13.

⁵⁵ Ministarstvo finansija Kraljevine Jugoslavije, 223.

⁵⁶ Narodna banka, Godišnji izveštaj za 1920 (Belgrade 1921), XV.

and the National Bank had resulted in monetary stabilization; thus, since 1925, there was a stable currency worth 26.5 milligrams of gold. It pointed out that this parity had not yet been established legally and that, when this was done, trust in the dinar, especially abroad, would undoubtedly be strengthened.⁵⁷

Epilogue

In 1928, the National Bank started preparations for the legal stabilization of the dinar. The project of a new monetary system was carried out by Bogdan Marković, a prominent expert in public and monetary finances who served as finance minister from 1926 to 1928.⁵⁸ His currency policy was fairly in line with the policy established previously by Milan Stojadinović. Addressing the National Assembly in his capacity as finance minister, Marković opted for "maintaining the dinar at its present value and preventing any fall or rise."⁵⁹

The basic principles of legal stabilization of the dinar were announced by the Board of Directors of the National Bank at the Shareholders Meeting of 8 July 1928. Firstly, gold parity of the dinar was to be determined in accordance with the value at which it had been stabilized. Secondly, a foreign loan had to be obtained in order to increase the country's foreign exchange reserves, so that the National Bank could maintain the dinar exchange rate on a stable level even when all foreign exchange restrictions were lifted, including the regime of government purchases of one-third of bank deposits in foreign currency. Thirdly, in order to reduce the quantity of money in circulation, the State should repay a part of its debt to the National Bank, which amounted to over four billion dinars and made up three-quarters of the money in circulation. The debt would be reduced by the amount of foreign loan obtained and by the revaluation of the National Bank's metal base. Fourthly, banknotes would be convertible into gold only for sums exceeding 10,000 dinars, and this obligation would apply for any amount for the purchase and sale of foreign exchange.⁶⁰

It was only after the National Bank's shareholders had accepted the basic principles of the legal stabilization of the dinar that a broad public debate on this issue opened. In the opinion of Velimir Bajkić, legal stabilization was profoundly significant because it meant the "transition from the stabilization that depended on the will of political power to the one based on law". He warned that

⁵⁷ Narodna banka Kraljevine Jugoslavije, Godišnji izveštaj za 1930 (Belgrade 1931), XXXV.

⁵⁸ In his capacity as Finance Minister, Marković travelled to London to try to obtain from the most famous Anglo-American banks a solid loan that would strengthen the country's foreign exchange reserves. His attempts were unsuccessful because Yugoslavia first had to settle the issue of debts to the Allies from the Great War.

⁵⁹ A. Fogelquist, Politics and Economic Policy in Yugoslavia 1918–1929 (Los Angeles 2011), 293.

⁶⁰ D. Gnjatović, V. Dugalić & B. Stojanović, *Istorija nacionalnog novca* (Belgrade 2003), 280.

it was necessary first to secure a legally determined minimum amount of foreign exchange reserves to cover one-third of banknotes in circulation and only then to proceed to legal stabilization.⁶¹ Dušan Uzelac emphasized the importance of the legal stabilization of the dinar for the country's international economic position. He believed that introduction of the gold exchange standard would facilitate the inflow of foreign capital into the Yugoslav economy, which would make it possible to reduce interest rates on commercial credits in the country.⁶² Miodrag Ugričić would explain later that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had carried out the legal stabilization of the dinar in accordance with the theoretical view of Gustav Kassel that the actual stabilization of a national currency should always precede its legal stabilization.⁶³

After the unsuccessful attempt made in 1928 to obtain a loan from Anglo-American banks in London for strengthening the foreign exchange reserves, the legal stabilization of the dinar was temporarily postponed. This ultimate goal of the monetary reform was achieved only in 1931, when the Kingdom of Yugoslavia managed to obtain a stabilization loan in France.

Tables

| face of the dinar on Zurich foreign exchange market 1919–1950 | | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|---|--|
| Year | Wholesale price indices (1913=100) | Exchange rate of dinar (Swiss francs for 100 dinars) on Zurich FOREX market | |
| 1919 | 523 | - | |
| 1920 | 1172 | 8.00 | |
| 1921 | 1036 | 6.68 | |
| 1922 | 1415 | 5.00 | |
| 1923 | 1970 | 3.69 (January, minimum quotation) | |
| 1924 | 2029 | 5.12 (June) | |
| 1925 | 1804 | 9.30 (August, maximum quotation) | |
| 1926 | 1526 | 9.12 | |
| 1927 | 1560 | 9.13 | |
| 1928 | 1562 | 9.13 | |
| 1929 | 1536 | 9.12 | |
| 1930 | 1322 | 9.12 | |

Table 1 Wholesale price indices in the Kingdom of SCS (Yugoslavia) and the exchange rate of the dinar on Zurich foreign exchange market 1919–1930

Source: G. Nikolić, Kurs dinara i devizna politika Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1918–1941 (Belgrade 2003), 167; D. Gnjatović, V. Dugalić and B. Stojanović, Istorija nacionalnog novca (Belgrade 2003), 263–272m

⁶¹ Bajkić, "Dinar", 124.

⁶² Uzelac, Devizna politika, 42.

⁶³ Ugričić, Novčani sistem Jugoslavije, 106.

 Table 2 Government debts to National Bank and quantity of money

 in circulation 1919–1930, million dinars

| Year | Government debt | Money in circulation |
|------|-----------------|----------------------|
| 1919 | 602 | 773 |
| 1920 | 3,283 | 3,441 |
| 1921 | 4,418 | 4,688 |
| 1922 | 4,517 | 4,868 |
| 1923 | 4,524 | 5,917 |
| 1924 | 4,521 | 6,001 |
| 1925 | 4,467 | 6,091 |
| 1926 | 4,414 | 5,811 |
| 1927 | 4,338 | 5,743 |
| 1928 | 4,202 | 5,528 |
| 1929 | 4,153 | 5,818 |
| 1930 | 4,021 | 5,396 |

Source: National Bank's Annual Reports for all years from 1919 to 1930

Table 3 Government revenues and expenditures of the Kingdom of SCS (Yugoslavia)1919–1930, million dinars

| Fiscal Year | Revenues | Expenditures | Balance |
|-------------|----------|--------------|---------|
| 1919/20 | 416 | 2,193 | -1,777 |
| 1920/21 | 3,844 | 4,815 | -931 |
| 1921/22 | 5,249 | 6,149 | -900 |
| 1922/23 | 7,132 | 8,131 | -1,000 |
| 1923/24 | 9,809 | 10,209 | -400 |
| 1924/25 | 10,838 | 10,540 | +298 |
| 1925/26 | 12,063 | 11,777 | +286 |
| 1926/27 | 11,606 | 11,592 | +14 |
| 1927/28 | 11,909 | 10,983 | +926 |
| 1928/29 | 11,386 | 11,146 | +240 |
| 1929/30 | 13,449 | 11,816 | +1,633 |

Source: Ministarstvo finansija Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1918–1938 (Belgrade 1939), 28–30

| Year | Exports | Imports | Balance |
|------|---------|---------|----------|
| 1919 | 686.8 | 2,982,1 | -1,295.3 |
| 1920 | 1,320.6 | 3,465.8 | -2,145.2 |
| 1921 | 2,460.7 | 4,122.1 | -1,661.4 |
| 1922 | 3,691.2 | 6,441.9 | -2,750.7 |
| 1923 | 8,048.8 | 8,309.6 | -260.8 |
| 1924 | 9,538.8 | 8,221.7 | 1,317.1 |
| 1925 | 8,904.5 | 8,752.9 | 151.6 |
| 1926 | 7,818.2 | 7,631.8 | 186.4 |
| 1927 | 6,400.1 | 7,286.3 | -886.2 |
| 1928 | 6,844.7 | 7,835.3 | -1,390.6 |
| 1929 | 7,921.7 | 7,594.7 | 327.0 |
| 1930 | 6,780.0 | 6,960.1 | 180.1 |

Table 4 Foreign trade of the Kingdom of SCS (Yugoslavia) 1919–1930, million dinars

Source: Statistika spoljne trgovine Kraljevine SHS za 1921 (Belgrade 1922); Statistika spoljne trgovine Kraljevine SHS za 1924 (Belgrade 1925); Statistika spoljne trgovine Kraljevine Jugoslavije za 1932 (Belgrade 1933)

| Year | Bills of exchange | Lombard loans | Total |
|------|-------------------|---------------|---------|
| 1919 | 40.2 | 4.3 | 44.5 |
| 1920 | 222.4 | 24.2 | 266.9 |
| 1921 | 557+7 | 40.2 | 597.9 |
| 1922 | 1,421.2 | 99.6 | 1,520.8 |
| 1923 | 1,333.7 | 190.0 | 1,523.7 |
| 1924 | 1,289.3 | 205.7 | 1,495.0 |
| 1925 | I,207.9 | 162.3 | 1,371.2 |
| 1926 | 1,241.9 | 239.1 | 1,481.1 |
| 1927 | 1,432.0 | 259.9 | 1,683.1 |
| 1928 | 1,470.5 | 253.8 | 1,724.3 |
| 1929 | 1,287.5 | 230.1 | 1,517.6 |
| 1930 | 1,433.7 | 203.5 | 1,637.2 |

Source: Narodna banka, Godišnji izveštaj za 1930 (Belgrade 1931), XXXIV

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"St. Bartholomew's Night" of Banja Luka

The Ustasha Crime against the Serbs in the Banja Luka Area on 7 February 1942

- Abstract: Based on the preserved and accessible sources from seven archives and from the relevant literature, the authors seek to reconstruct the causes, course and consequences of the crime committed by the Ustashas against the Serbs of the villages of Drakulić, Šargovac and Motike, and in the Rakovac mine, near Banja Luka on 7 February 1942. The authors attempt to point to the main instigators and perpetrators of the crime and to estimate the number of victims. For understanding the broader context of the events, they point out the ideological roots and main features of the genocidal policy pursued by the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) against the Serbs from 1941 to 1945. Special attention is paid to the events in the area of Banja Luka during 1941, because they provided the chronological and spatial context for the crime that followed in February 1942.
- Keywords: Independent State of Croatia (NDH), Ustasha, genocide, Serbs, Bosnian Krajina, Banja Luka, Drakulić, Šargovac, Motike, Rakovac

The Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska – NDH) was proclaimed on 10 April 1941, a few days after the attack of Germany and its allies on the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The ideological basis of the NDH and its policy of genocide against the Serbs was grounded in the political platform of the Croatian Party of Rights (*Stranka prava*) and the proselytism of the Roman Catholic Church. The ideology of annihilation of the Serbs in the territory which the Croatian nationalists and Roman-Catholic circles considered the Croatian historical territory was conceived in the second half of the nineteenth century. The Serbs were described as immigrants in the Croatian lands in which there could be no other "political" people/nation except Croats. At the same time, the Serbs were accused of being a tool in the hands of the Austrians and Hungarians against the Croats, as well as a tool of the "Greater Serbian" ideology and policies; moreover, the Orthodox Christian Serbs, who belonged

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to the Byzantine cultural circle, were regarded as a "foreign body" in the Croatian Roman Catholic territory.¹

The NDH pursued the policy of genocide against the Serbs in the territory it encompassed in April 1941, including the whole of annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the instigator of that policy was the ruling Ustasha movement. The nucleus of that movement was founded in Italy, in Bovegno near Brescia, in the second half of 1931.² "The Ustasha - the Croatian Revolutionary Organisation" developed its constitution in 1932. It set down as its goal the creation of a fully independent Croatian state "in all of its national and historical territory",³ where the Serbs would be "driven from their [Croat] sacred soil by force and deadly weapons".⁴

According to the May 1941 statistics from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Orthodox Serbs accounted for 1,925,000 out of some 6,300,000 inhabitants (or over 30% of the population).⁵ The German Plenipotentiary General in Zagreb, Glaise von Horstenau, recorded that the Croatian *Poglavnik* (Leader), Ante Pavelić, intended to kill 1,800,000 Orthodox Serbs, "at any cost and by all means" as early as April 1941.⁶ In early June 1941, Hitler himself told Pavelić that if the Croatian state wanted to last, it had to pursue an intolerant national policy for at least fifty years. At the beginning of July 1941, the intelligence service of the German Foreign Ministry reported to Berlin which stated that "wide circles" in Croatia believed that Serbs had no place in their country.⁷

The genocide against the Serbs in the NDH began as early as April 1941. It "destroyed all moral bonds that make one society a human community." The headquarters of the Italian Second Army reported in June 1941 that "Croatian ultranationalism, which is losing all sense of proportion, has established a re-

¹ For more, see Vasilije Krestić, *Genocidom do Velike Hrvatske* (Belgrade: Catena mundi, 20155); Dušan Berić, *Hrvatsko pravaštvo i Srbi*, I-II (Novi Sad: Orpheus, 2005); Milan Koljanin, "Ideologija i politika uništenja Srba u NDH", Vojnoistorijski glasnik 1 (2011), 66-91; Viktor Novak, *Magnum crimen: pola vijeka klerikalizma u Hrvatskoj*, I-II (Belgrade: Catena mundi, 2015).

² Bogdan Krizman, Ante Pavelić i ustaše (Zagreb: Globus, 19832), 83.

³ Fikreta Jelić-Butić, Ustaše i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska 1941-1945 (Zagreb: Sveučilišna naklada Liber and Školska knjiga, 19782), 21-22.

⁴ Filip Škiljan, Organizirana prisilna iseljavanja Srba iz NDH (Zagreb: Srpsko narodno vijeće, 2014), 31-32.

⁵ Jelić-Butić, Ustaše i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, 106; Koljanin, "Ideologija i politika uništenja Srba u NDH", 69-70; Jovan Mirković, "Zločini nad Srbima" u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj: fotomonografija (Belgrade: Svet knjige and Muzej žrtava genocida, 2014), 67-68.

⁶ Koljanin, "Ideologija i politika uništenja Srba u NDH", 81.

⁷ Vasa Kazimirović, NDH u svetlu nemačkih dokumenata i dnevnika Gleza fon Horstenau 1941-1944 (Belgrade: Nova knjiga and Narodna knjiga, 1987), 106-111.

gime of violence and terror, the intensity of which is constantly increasing. The political struggle is inspired by the religious struggle and integrated into it. (...) This Croatian political-religious struggle assumes truly wild aspects, in that the Ustashas get involved in a revenge and repression that can only be compared to the most obscure times of the Middle Ages."⁸ Glaise von Horstenau concluded that behind the Croatian determination to get rid of the Serbs once and for all, there was a "strong and devilishly skilfully fuelled religious intolerance - the constant effort of the Catholic Church to suppress and destroy the schismatics".⁹

The number of the murdered Serbs has never been established. In a Gestapo report dated 17 February 1942, compiled for Heinrich Himmler, it was stated that the Croats killed about 300,000 Serbs and that, because of these crimes, many Serbs fled to Serbia.¹⁰ George William Rendel, British Ministerto Yugoslavia (1941-43), wondered whether the "Serbs can forget the 600,000 killed by Croats."11 Major General Ernst Fick reported to Himmler on 16 March 1944 that the Ustashas had taken 600,000-700,000 of "politically different" people to camps and "slaughtered them in the Balkan way".12 Based on the reports he had received, Hermann Neubacher, Hitler's special envoy to the Balkans, estimated in his memoirs, originally published in German in 1956, that "the number of the slaughtered innocent, unarmed Serbs is about 750,000".13 Therefore, several hundred thousand people were killed in the NDH, including a large number of children, and the sadism and cruelty of the killings shocked the Nazi commanders, who wrote about it with contempt. With the exception of the German occupation authorities in Eastern Europe, the Croatian regime set up the largest concentration camps on the continent and started to carry out the Holocaust months before the Wannsee conference in January 1942.¹⁴

In the execution of their annihilation policy, the NDH and the Roman Catholic clergy paid special attention to the area of north-western Bosnia, i.e., Bosnian Krajina, in which Banja Luka was the regional centre. That area was part of the Vrbas Banovina, one of the nine large administrative divisions of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. According to the 1931 census, the Vrbas Banovina had

⁸ Milorad Ekmečić, Dugo kretanje izmedju klanja i oranja: istorija Srba u Novom veku 1492-1992 (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 2007), 446.

⁹ Kazimirović, NDH u svetlu nemačkih dokumenata, 109.

¹⁰ Ibid. 128-129.

¹¹ Vasilije Dj. Krestić and Mira Radojević, *Jasenovac* (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 2017), 53.

¹² Srbi u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj: izabrana dokumenta, eds. Nikola Živković and Petar Kačavenda (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1998), 262.

¹³ Herman Nojbaher, Specijalni zadatak Balkan (Belgrade: Službeni list SCG, 2005), 50.

¹⁴ Rory Yeomans, Visions of Annihilation: the Ustasha Regime and the Cultural Politics of Fascism 1941-1945 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013), vii.

1,037,382 inhabitants, of whom 600,529 were Orthodox Serbs (58%), 250,265 Muslims (24%) and 172,787 Roman Catholics (17%) - mostly Croats. The Banja Luka district had 98,002 inhabitants, of whom 58,730 Orthodox Serbs (60%), 26,696 Roman Catholics (27%) and 11,030 Muslims (11%). The city of Banja Luka had 22,165 inhabitants, of whom 8,039 Muslims (36%), 6,769 Orthodox Serbs (31%) and 6,486 Roman Catholics (29%).¹⁵ The Archbishop of Zagreb, Alojzije Stepinac, spoke in October 1939 about the planned colonisation of north-western Bosnia, adding that Bosnia would "soon be Croatian".¹⁶ With the capitulation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on 17 April 1941 and the division of its territory, the NDH set up its own authorities, the basic administrative unit of which was a velika [great] župa, which was divided into kotars (county). In June 1941, ten such *župas* were established, and the following month, the territory of NDH was divided into 22 velika župas. One of them was the Velika Župa of Sana and Luka, with its seat in Banja Luka, and it also included Prijedor, Sanski Most, Ključ and Kotor Varoš. Nonetheless, the key figure in the administrative structure of power in Banja Luka and Bosnian Krajina was Viktor Gutić,¹⁷ with the rank of stožernik, i.e. the head of the Ustasha stožer (headquarters) in Bosnian Krajina from April 1941 – he thus was the "liquidator of the former Vrbas Banovina".¹⁸ Gutić arrived in Banja Luka on 17 April 1941, just two days

¹⁵ Definitivni rezultati popisa stanovništva od 31. marta 1931. godine, vol. II: Prisutno stanovništvo po veroispovesti (Belgrade: Opšta državna statistika, 1938), 110; Perko Vojinović, Vrbaska banovina u političkom sistemu Kraljevine Jugoslavije (Banja Luka: Filozofski fakultet, 1997), 34-36.

¹⁶ Koljanin, "Ideologija i politika uništenja Srba u NDH", 69-70.

¹⁷ Viktor Gutić was born in 1901 in Banja Luka. He graduated in law from the University of Zagreb and then worked as a lawyer in Banja Luka. He was a member of the regional leadership of the Croatian Peasant Party, but became a supporter of Ante Pavelić after 1931. He served a prison sentence in Sremska Mitrovica for propagating Ustasha ideology and politics. He had no reputation in Banja Luka and was known only for his drinking and unpaid bills, and he was exposed to ridicule due to his homosexuality. After the proclamation of the NDH, he became the head of the Ustasha headquarters in Bosnian Krajina from April to August 1941, holding the levers of power in his hands and pursuing the state policy of genocide against the Serbs. He plundered the property of Serbs and Jews, and donated large sums of money acquired in this way to the Croatian Roman Catholic organisations. At the end of August, Pavelić transferred him to a higher position in the Ministry of the Interior of the NDH in Zagreb. From April to August 1942, he was a high-ranking official in Karlovac and then returned to Zagreb. After the collapse of the NDH, he fled to Italy via Austria, where he was arrested by the Western Allies and extradited to Yugoslavia. He was sentenced to death and hanged as a war criminal in Banja Luka in 1947. See Ustaški stožer za Bosansku Krajinu: studija Milana Vukmanovića i izbor iz gradje, eds. Verica M. Stošić and Vladan Vukliš (Banja Luka: Udruženje arhivskih radnika Republike Srpske and Arhiv Republike Srpske, 2017), 33-35.

¹⁸ Hrvatska Krajina, no. 25, Banja Luka, 15 June 1941, 1.

after parts of the German 183rd Division entered it.¹⁹ He was Head of the Ustasha Headquarters in Bosnian Croatia and the Committee for the former Vrbas Banovina, as the political-administrative body based in Banja Luka was called, until mid-August 1941, when he was transferred to Zagreb to a new position.²⁰ The term "Bosnian Croatia" referred to the whole of Bosnia, not only Bosnian Krajina (renamed "Croatian Krajina"), i.e. the former Vrbas Banovina.²¹ Gutić was "the main commander, organiser and instigator of all the crimes committed at that time in Banja Luka, Sanski Most, Prijedor and other places".²² Even before the Second World War, he had used to say that he was "thirsty for Serbian blood".²³

Besides Gutić and his Ustasha headquarters, the Roman Catholic monastery in Petrićevac was the other centre from which instructions were given for the persecution, killing and violence against the Serbs in Banja Luka and its outskirts.²⁴ The highest-ranking Roman Catholic prelate in Bosnian Krajina, Bishop of Banja Luka Jozo Garić, was an ardent supporter of *Stožernik* Gutić and his politics, assisting in conversion of Orthodox Serbs to Roman Catholicism.²⁵ His attitude was in line with Archbishop Stepinac's proclamation to the Roman Catholic clergy of 28 April 1941 to the effect that they should respond to the "sublime work of preserving and promoting the NDH", which was "a long-

¹⁹ Dušan Lukač, *Banja Luka i okolica u ratu i revoluciji* (Banja Luka: Savez udruženja boraca NOR-a Opštine Banja Luka, 1968), 90.

²⁰ Hrvatska Krajina, no. 49, Banja Luka, 10 August 1941, 1; Hrvatska Krajina, no. 50, Banja Luka, 13 August 1941, 2.

²¹ Ustaški stožer za Bosansku Krajinu, 35.

²² Arhiv Republike Srpske [Archives of the Republic of Srpska, hereafter ARS], Banja Luka, District Commission for Investigating the War Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators, 1941–1946 [Okružna komisija za ispitivanje ratnih zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača 1945-1946], no. 414/45, 30 November 1945.

²³ Arhiv Srpske pravoslavne crkve [Archives of the Serbian Orthodox Church], Belgrade, The Synodal Commission for Investigating the Ustasha Crimes in 1941–1945 [Sinodska komisija za istraživanje ustaških zločina 1941-1945], Reports of Refugees [Izveštaji izbeglih], The Banja Luka Diocese [Banjalučka eparhija], Document: Izveštaj protojereja Dušana M. Mačkića, paroha i arhijerejskog namjesnika banjalučkog, Vranjevo, Banat, 22 October 1941; Bojan Stojnić, Radovan Pilipović and Veljko Djurić Mišina, *Svjedočenja o zatiranju: prilozi za istoriju stradanja Srba Banjalučke eparhije 1941. godine* (Banja Luka: Arhiv Republike Srpske and Udruženje arhivskih radnika Republike Srpske; Belgrade: Muzej žrtava genocida, 2016), 75.

²⁴ ARS, District Commission for Investigating the War Crimes, Document: Report on the crimes in Banjaluka County, 13 November 1945.

²⁵ Ustaški stožer za Bosansku Krajinu, 82, 126.

dreamed and desired ideal", and fulfil "their duty to the young Croatian state".²⁶ Cordial relations between the Ustashas and the Roman Catholic clergy in Banja Luka and Bosnian Krajina were confirmed in mid-May 1941 when Gutić visited the Petrićevac monastery and praised the Franciscans for their pre-war cooperation with the Ustashas. He declared in front of the Roman Catholic friars: "Every Croat who stands up today for our most recent enemies is not only a bad Croat, but also an adversary and a hindrance to the premeditated, wellcalculated plan to cleanse our Croatia of unwanted elements."²⁷

In his confidential report to General Glaise von Horstenau of 14 June 1941, Captain Artur Hefner stated that Gutić had been the main initiator of the systematically committed crimes against the Serbs in Bosnian Krajina since April, adding: "All the Serbs who did not manage to hide in the woods or to cross the border were slaughtered without mercy. Thus, often neither women nor children were spared." Captain Hefner sent another report to General Horstenau on 7 August 1941: "Given that the Serbian population, absolutely the most numerous and exposed to the night-time bandit and murderous raids on the part of Ustashas, have been driven from their villages into the woods with no conditions for survival for a longer period, resistance has been bound to emerge, which is now being suppressed under the pretext of being a Serbian rebellion. But this is not at all about the Serbs fighting against the Croatian state, nor are they [Serbs] some chetniks or communists, but simply persecuted people driven to despair who would rather die with a weapon or even just a piece of wood or a stone in hand [...] than let themselves be slaughtered like cattle night after night, or starve in the woods."28

Pavelić had decided to make Banja Luka the "state centre" of the future Croatian state as early as late 1939.²⁹ The *Poglavnik* and Gutić talked on 23 May 1941 about Banja Luka as the capital city of the NDH. Pavelić "confirmed the decision made" and told Gutić that he knew the city well because he had resided there as a young man. The Italian envoy in Zagreb, Raffaello Casertano, reported on 24 May 1941 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome that there were rumours about the transfer of the seat of government to Banja Luka to avoid a possible rebellion in that region, because even the politicians failed to hide their concern about the growing dissatisfaction. On 25 May 1941, Gutić stated at a gathering in Banja Luka that "the capital and the surroundings should

²⁶ Novak, Magnum crimen, II, 37-39; Gojo Riste Dakina, Genocid nad Srbima u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj: budi katolik ili umri (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1995), 47-48.

²⁷ Hrvatska Krajina, no. 12, Banja Luka, 16 May 1941, 3.

²⁸ Kazimirović, NDH u svetlu nemačkih dokumenata, 112.

²⁹ Rafael Brčić, "Kombinacije ustaša o Banjoj Luci kao centru Nezavisne Države Hrvatske", in Banja Luka u novijoj istoriji (1878-1945): zbornik radova s naučnog skupa održanog u Banjoj Luci od 18-20. novembra 1976. godine (Sarajevo: Institut za istoriju, 1978), 654.

be cleansed of Serbs, Jews and Roma" to make room for government officials in the city and for Croats from abroad as well as construction workers in the surroundings.³⁰

General Fortner, commander of the German 718th Division headquartered in Banja Luka, opposed Gutić's actions against the Serbs because they strengthened the Serbian insurgent movement in Bosnian Krajina. In late July 1941, there were open arguments between Fortner and Gutić – the German general threatened to arrest Gutić and his associates. For that reason, Pavelić was forced to recall Gutić from Banja Luka and keep him in Zagreb as an official of the Ministry of the Interior (on 25 August 1941). On 17 September 1941, Lieutenant Mirko Beljan was appointed head of the Ustasha Headquarters in Banja Luka.³¹ However, Gutić remained quite influential in Banja Luka and Bosnian Krajina even after leaving for Zagreb, since the local authorities consisted of his trusted associates. Besides, even after August 1941, he continued to visit Banja Luka and spend some time there, as for example from December 1941 to April 1942.³²

Apart from the Ustasha Movement, it was the Roman Catholic Church that played an important role in the implementation of the policy aimed at the complete destruction of Serbs. At least 133 Roman Catholic priests took part in the atrocities committed against the Serbs in the NDH from 1941 to 1945 as organisers, 27 were personally involved in the crimes, whilst another 128 performed the rite of conversion of Orthodox Serbs to Catholicism. Pavelić decorated 219 Roman Catholic priests.³³ One of the most notorious perpetrators of atrocities against the Serbs was the Franciscan friar Miroslav Filipović, known as Fra Tomislav and also under the names of Vjekoslav and Mijo, or under the surname of Majstorović, but the most telling is his nickname "Fra Satan".³⁴

³⁰ Ustaški stožer za Bosansku Krajinu, 55, 57.

³¹ Hrvatska Krajina, no. 67, Banja Luka, 1 October 1941, 1; Lukač, Banja Luka i okolica, 106-107.

³² Ustaški stožer za Bosansku Krajinu, 100, 291.

³³ Dakina, Genocid nad Srbima, 61.

³⁴ Miroslav Filipović was born in Jajce in 1915. He attended the Roman Catholic schools in Visoko and Sarajevo, joined the Franciscan Order in 1932, receiving the name Fra Tomislav, and became a priest in 1939. He came to Banja Luka in mid-1940. He was a chaplain in the Petrićevac monastery and a pastor in the village of Šargovac near Banja Luka. He took part in the crimes against the Serbs in the villages of Drakulić, Šargovac and Motike on 7 February 1942, following which he joined the Ustashas and received the rank of an officer. It should be noted that the surname Majstorović, under which he became known after these crimes, was derived from the word *majstor* ("master" in the sense of a skilled practitioner), which was, according to another prominent Ustasha, Vjekoslav Maks Luburić, a reference to his prowess in massacring the Serbs. Fra Tomislav was one of the commanders in the system of the Jasenovac-Stara Gradiška concentration camp from June 1942 to March 1943. He

The armed resistance of Serbs which started in reaction to the Ustasha atrocities led to a regrouping of German troops. German military units left Banja Luka on 7 January 1942 to participate in the operations against the Serbian insurgents in Eastern Bosnia. On the initiative of Viktor Gutić, a battalion of the Poglavnik's Bodyguard Brigade, which was made up of Croats from Herzegovina, was brought from Zagreb to Banja Luka. The Italian Vice-Consul in Banja Luka, Oberto Fabbiani, wrote on 13 January 1942 that the Bishop of Banja Luka, Jozo Garić, publicly expressed his satisfaction that German soldiers had left the city. Fabbiani recorded that after the arrival of Ustashas from Zagreb a major cleansing of "outlaws" would be carried out – he was told that "this city needs to be cleansed of all those disloyal and suspicious elements that could launch an activity in favour of the rebels or against the current regime".³⁵ For that purpose, Pavelić sent his well-equipped and well-trained military unit under the command of Captain Nikola Zelić.³⁶

During January and February 1942, Gutić was in Banja Luka. He officially had no authority there because the local Ustasha *stožernik* was Mirko Beljan, while the head of the *Velika Župa* of Sana and Luka from July 1941 to April 1942 was Colonel Ladislav Aleman, a former Austro-Hungarian officer (he was later transferred to the Ministry of Home Guard in Zagreb). Even so, Gutić was the main decision-maker in Banja Luka and its surroundings. The decision to kill the Serbs in the villages of Drakulić, Šargovac and Motike was made in Gutić's house.³⁷ According to a German report, on 6 February 1942 a meeting was held in the Petrićevac monastery between Gutić, Ferdo Stilinović, Chairman of the Banja Luka Court, and many Roman Catholic priests, "among whom a certain priest Filipović, who then attended the slaughter itself".³⁸ Thus, Gutić, Miroslav Filipović and several other prominent Croats from Banja Luka made final arrangements for what was to follow on 7 February 1942 – it was decided to use cold weapons for the killing of Serbs as the gunfire could alarm the villagers and help them flee. On 7 February 1942, between three and four

personally participated in the slaughter of children and came to be known among the camp prisoners as "Fra Sotona" (Fra Satan). He later served in Mostar, Lika, Eastern and Central Bosnia, and he stayed in Banja Luka several times during the winter of 1944-1945. After the collapse of the NDH and the liberation of Yugoslavia, Miroslav Filipović-Majstorović was sentenced to death and executed as a war criminal in Zagreb in 1945. See Joža Horvat and Zdenko Štambuk, Dokumenti o protunarodnom radu i zločinima jednog dijela katoličkog klera (Zagreb: Štamparija Rožanski, 1946), 166; Novak, Magnum crimen I, 155-160; Ustaški stožer za Bosansku Krajinu, 96-97.

³⁵ Lukač, Banja Luka i okolica, 187-188.

³⁶ Mirković, Zločini nad Srbima, 159.

³⁷ Ustaški stožer za Bosansku Krajinu, 72, 291.

³⁸ Kazimirović, NDH u svetlu nemačkih dokumenata, 122.

o'clock in the morning, the Ustasha battalion surrounded the village and started the slaughter.³⁹

An account of the situation in Banja Luka and the preparations for the massacre of February 1942 was also given by Dušan Ivezić, a civil servant, on 25 December 1946 in Sarajevo before the State Commission for Investigating the War Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators (Državna komisija za utvrdjivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača). According to him, the instigator of the atrocities committed in Banja Luka and its outskirts was, in fact, Fra Kruno Brkić, the pre-war secretary of Bishop Garić. Fra Kruno Brkić was a supporter of Gutić. Distinctly sympathetic to the Ustasha movement, he showed his loyalty to the NDH in 1941 by paying reverence to Pavelić. The intimacy and friendship between Brkić and Gutić began when Gutić, in order to curry favour with the Roman Catholic Church, settled the debts of the Banja Luka Diocese to the First Croatian Savings Bank with the money he had collected as "contributions" of the Banja Luka Serbs. One of the prominent Serb merchants who was imprisoned and forced to "contribute" was Djoko Koljević. According to Dušan Ivezić, Fra Kruno Brkić proposed not just the destruction of the local Serbs, but also the settlement of Croat refugees from Herzegovina in their place. The rationale of such action was to cleanse the area in the vicinity of the Petrićevac Monastery from non-Catholic population. Moreover, Brkić came into conflict with some Muslim organisations which demanded the settlement of Muslim refugees in the same area. The decision to annihilate the Serbs was reached at a conference organised by Gutić in late January 1942.⁴⁰ There is further evidence for the preparations which had long preceded the execution of the crime. Jovo Mitrović, an eyewitness from Drakulić, testified that he had been informed by local Croats that the slaughter had been planned for the evening of 2 August 1941, but it had not taken place because no weapons had arrived from Banja Luka.41

³⁹ Lukač, Banja Luka i okolica, 188-189.

⁴⁰ Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia, hereafter AJ], Belgrade, The State Commission for Establishing the Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators [Državna komisija za utvrdjivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača], Fonds no. 110, Evidence Material [Dokazni materijali], Dossier nos. 4210–4227, fascicle 463, inv. no. 60288; Record made on 25 December 1946 before the State [Zemaljska] Commission for Investigating the Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators in Sarajevo, 1-2; Ibid., inv. no. 60303, Record on the Interrogation of Viktor Gutić. On that occasion, Gutić also referred to Fra Kruno Brkić as follows: "In 1941, he went with other Catholic priests to pay reverence to Pavelić and to give him his blessing for the newly-established state, by which the priests recognised the Ustasha state as their own."

⁴¹ Arhiv Bosne i Hercegovine [Archives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, hereafter ABiH], Sarajevo, The State Commission for Investigating War Crimes [Zemaljska komisija za utvrd-

The Croatian authorities, both local and regional, produced their own reports on the atrocities of 7 February 1942 against the Serb civilians in the Rakovac mine and in the villages of Drakulić, Šargovac and Motike. On 8 February 1942, the Banja Luka zdrug [the joint military force of the city] informed Zagreb that the Ustasha company of the Poglavnik's Bodyguard Battalion had killed 31 miners in the coal mine with pickaxes and about 500 people in the village of Motike afterwards. The *zdrug* requested that such arbitrary actions, undertaken without its approval, be prevented "because there is a danger that the remaining, still peaceful, civilians will join the rebels out of fear of violence".⁴² Two days later, the head of Banja Luka County reported to the police department in Banja Luka that Andrija Golub, the mayor of Budžak, had informed them that in the early morning of 7 February an Ustasha detachment had come from Banja Luka to the villages of Drakulić and Šargovac, and "killed all Greek-Easterners" [the Orthodox Christians] regardless of their gender and age. All families from about 150 households were killed. Probably 1300-1500 people were killed. The killing was done with axes." The report also stated that the corpses of the killed were lying around and that "people" were burying them, while some corpses were dragged by dogs and pigs. The livestock and grain were transported to Banja Luka and stored in the Ustasha and military warehouses.⁴³ The head of the Banja Luka district reported to the county police department on 10 February that he had learned from Marko Marić, the mayor of Saračica, that an Ustasha detachment had come to the village of Motike on Saturday, 7 February 1942, around six o'clock in the morning, and killed all the "Greek-Eastern" inhabitants from about fifty houses, "women and children alike. The killings were carried out partly with rifles and partly with knives, axes, etc." The exact number of victims was unknown, but Marić's estimate was 500-600 people. The inhabitants of Saračica had to surrender the remaining livestock, grain and other things to the Ustasha Battalion.44

On 11 February 1942, Colonel Aleman, the Veliki Żupan of Sana and Luka, sent a report on the situation in Banja Luka to the Vice-Prime Minister of the NDH, Džafer Kulenović. He reported that the Ustasha Battalion had arrived in Banja Luka a month earlier, and that its officers and non-commissioned officers had looked for accommodation. On that occasion, they had been very arrogant and surly both in front of government officials and of citizens. They had

jivanje ratnih zločina], Minutes [Zapisnici], Banja Luka County, box 3, Drakulić (village) 1945-1946, inv. nos. 16907-55461, Minute inv. no. 27766.

⁴² Vojni arhiv [Military Archives, hereafter VA], Belgrade, The Crimes in the NDH [Zločini u NDH], Daily reports on the situation in the cities in the NDH [Dnevni izvještaji o situaciji u gradovima NDH].

⁴³ VA, The Crimes in the NDH, 1, Report on the killings in the municipality of Budžak.

⁴⁴ Ibid., Report on the killings in the village of Motike.

made excessive demands and required immediate and complete compliance. The Ustasha Battalion patrolled the city, breaching the agreement reached with the military and civilian authorities in Banja Luka and interfering in their work. The actions of the patrolling Ustashas were cruel and unrestrained. Some people were arrested and some of the arrested disappeared – there was a reasonable suspicion that they had been killed.⁴⁵

On 7 February 1942, at four o'clock in the morning, ten members of the Ustasha Battalion took control of the Rakovac mine. Several workers of the "Greek-Eastern" faith, who were sleeping in mine barracks, were killed immediately. Another fifty Ustashas arrived at around eight o'clock and waited for the second shift workers. Upon their arrival, the Ustashas asked for their identifications and separated the "Greek-Easterners" from the others, tied their hands behinds their backs, took them outside the mine and "knocked them down by hitting them on the back of their heads with blunt tools. After knocking them down, they finished them off with pickaxes." The Ustashas did the same with the third shift miners after they had come out of the pit. "They killed 37 out of the total of 68 Greek-Eastern employees at the mine." But more of them were probably killed in the slaughter in the villages of Motike, Šargovac and Drakulić. After the crime in Rakovac, the same Ustasha unit, under the command of First Lieutenant Josip Mišlov⁴⁶ and accompanied by Fra Tomislav Filipović, continued the "slaughtering of the Greek-Easterners in Drakulić near Banja Luka. There, they gathered residents from a number of houses, carrying small children in their arms, and, having crowded them together, slaughtered them with axes and pickaxes. Around 1500 people were killed in that manner." One of the victims was a servant of the Croatian Minister of Transportation and Public Works, Hilmija Bešlagić. The Ustashas drove away the sleigh and the car of Minister Bešlagić. Another atrocity took place in the village of Šargovac. On their way back to the city, the Ustashas also slaughtered the inhabitants of the village of Motike, where about 70 families with some 715 members were killed. Colonel Aleman claimed that "the total number of victims in the slaughters committed was about 2300 people". The Croat inhabitants of the surrounding villages were ordered by the Ustashas to bury the bodies of the murdered villagers. On that occasion, they found some twenty severely injured survivors, who were then hospitalised

⁴⁵ Ibid., Report on the Situation in Banja Luka, 11 February 1942.

⁴⁶ Josip Mišlov was born in 1906 on the island of Ugljan near Zadar. He was a sailor, and in 1935 he underwent Ustasha training in the Lipari Islands, Italy. He was a company commander in the Second Battalion with the rank of first lieutenant. He was one of the most notorious perpetrators of the crime against the Serbs in the villages of Drakulić, Šargovac and Motike. For more, see Lazar Lukajić, *Fratri i ustaše kolju - zločini i svedoci: pokolj Srba u selima kod Banja Luke Drakuliću, Šargovcu i Motikama 7. februara i Piskavici i Ivanjskoj 5. i 12. februara 1942. godine* (Belgrade: Fond za istraživanje genocida, 2005), 30, 158-159.

in Banja Luka. After the crime, Aleman wrote, the Ustashas had taken away the plundered food, cattle and furniture and, according to the unverified information, sold some of the cattle to local butchers. Aleman also stressed that such actions raised the threat of retaliation against the Roman Catholic and Muslim population of the neighbouring villages on the part of "Chetnik-communist gangs". "A few days ago," he added, the same battalion had killed about 80 hostages arrested by the German military authorities.⁴⁷

"The Greek-Easterners in the villages where the slaughter took place were completely loyal and peaceful citizens. As these villages are surrounded by those inhabited by Croats, they were not even able to make any contact with the rebels. Therefore, it is not possible to suspect any illegal or insurgent actions on the part of the killed people, which the command of the Ustasha battalion has stated as the reason for its described action," Aleman did away conclusively with the explanations put forward by the responsible Ustashas. He also stated that the crime had caused huge excitement and resentment in all classes of Banja Luka citizens, who condemned in the harshest words the atrocity against the innocent population, fearing both the revenge of Serb Chetniks and further illegal actions of Ustashas (depending on their religious affiliation)." It is generally believed that the spiritual instigator of this carnage is Dr Viktor Gutić, a great prefect [veliki župan] assigned to the Ministry of Interior Affairs, currently in Banja Luka, in view of his previously proven outrages. It was established that he was in constant contact with the command of the Ustasha battalion and all the contempt and revolt of the citizens was directed to him." The citizens of Banja Luka had no hope for normalisation and improvement of the situation, Aleman asserted, as long as Viktor Gutić, his brother Blaž and his closest associate Stjepan Momčinović were in the city and had any influence on the authorities and institutions. Aleman asked Kulenović to remove them from the city and strip them of all possibility of interfering in local affairs. Due to the abovementioned and similar events which had taken place in the Velika Župa of Sana and Luka during Gutić's term as Stožernik and Commissioner for the former Vrbas Banovina, Colonel Aleman concluded, it was understandable why the Ustasha movement was not popular among local people.⁴⁸ Aleman's report was understood in Zagreb as a criticism levelled at Pavelić himself and his policy. Therefore, as early as 13 March 1942, he was dismissed by Poglavnik's order and placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Home Guard. At the end of the same month, Petar Gvozdić was appointed the new head of the Velika Župa of Sana and Luka.⁴⁹

On 11 February 1942, the head of the Ustasha and Supervisory Service for the Velika Župa of Sana and Luka sent a letter to Eugen Dido Kvaternik,

⁴⁷ VA, The Crimes in the NDH, 1, Report on the Situation in Banja Luka, 11 February 1942. ⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Lukač, Banja Luka i okolica, 193-195.

Commander of the Ustasha Supervisory Service in Zagreb, in which he provided another account of the most recent outrage. He also stated that the action was carried out by a company of Poglavnik's Second Bodyguard Battalion led by First Lieutenant Josip Mišlov and accompanied by Reverend Vjekoslav [Miroslav] Filipović, a priest from the Petrićevac monastery and now a captain in the Ustasha battalion. Around four o'clock in the morning of 7 February, about ten Ustashas came to the Rakovac mine, Several "Greek-Eastern" Christian workers were called out of the mine and the Ustashas took them away and murdered in the immediate vicinity. At eight o'clock in the morning, the rest of the Ustasha company arrived and they caught the first shift workers, who came to work, asked for their identifications, set the "Greek-Eastern" believers aside from the rest, took them away with their hands tied and killed nearby. "The killing was carried out by hitting individuals in the back of their head with blunt objects and finishing them off by hitting them in the head with pickaxes." Having murdered them all, they captured the third shift workers coming out of the mine pit and murdered them in the same way. The remaining workers were ordered to dig a pit and bury the slain miners."37 were buried and, according to the statements of some workers, up to 52 were killed." At three o'clock in the afternoon, the Ustashas arrived again at the mine and checked the identity of all workers, but this time no one was hurt. In the Rakovac mine, there were 68 Serb miners and those who survived took to the woods.⁵⁰ Anto Josipović, a Croat from Motike, who was a student and a mining intern at the time of the crime, testified on 1 December 1945. According to him, it was Franjo Petrović and Filipović-Majstorović (clad in Ustasha uniform) who asked the miners to produce their identifications. After the Serbs had been singled out, 36 were killed, and the manager ordered the rest to continue working.⁵¹

From Rakovac, the Ustashas proceeded to Drakulić, where those of them who were locals (Ivo Jurić, Stipe Golub and Šimun Pletikosa) showed them the houses of "Greek-Easterners", from which they took people out and killed them "one by one, men and women, and children too". Massacre was also carried out in the village of Šargovac and the number of victims was between 1,300 and 1,500. "The killing was done in the same way as in the Rakovac mine, only in these villages they used axes as well." On their way back, the Ustashas stopped by the village of Motike and slaughtered another 70 families in the same manner. The

⁵⁰ ARS, District Commission for Investigating the War Crimes, Document: Information about the Ustasha action in the villages of [Podaci o akciji ustaša u selima] Rakovac, Šargovac, Drakulić i Motike - Izvještaj R. Z. povjerenika i pouzdanika Ustaške i nadzorne službe za Veliku župu Sana i Luka na ruke Eugenu Kvaterniku zapovjedniku Zapovjedništva Ustaške nadzorne službe u Zagrebu, 11 February 1942.

⁵¹ ABiH, The State Commission for Investigating War Crimes, Minutes, Banja Luka County, box 8, Minute inv. no. 27758.

Ustashas ordered the Croat inhabitants to bury the killed ones – the burying began the same day and ended on 10 February. "There were corpses eaten by pigs and dogs." The Ustashas then returned to the three villages and pillaged food, cattle, poultry and furniture.⁵²

The motive for this "action" could not be established, apart from the allegation that the "Greek-Easterners" had supplied the Chetniks with explosives used for the destruction of railways, and that some of the villagers had fled into the woods and joined the Chetniks. However, the author of the report claimed that the "Greek-Easterners" were peaceful and not assisting the Chetniks, since they were completely surrounded by Croat villages. The report stated that such behaviour of the Ustashas and their interfering in the powers of local authorities caused great indignation and panic among the people, including the surrounding Croat villagers who feared Chetnik retaliation. It was deemed necessary to put a stop to the arbitrariness of the Ustashas in the interest of peace and order, and also because it was ultimately detrimental to the standing of the Ustasha movement.⁵³

Several local Croats gave their testimonies about the abovementioned atrocities. Ante Josipović said on 11 February 1942 that 70 families were killed in Motike and that only the family of Trifun Brković survived because they hid in the basement. Ivo Jurić, a local Ustasha perpetrator, testified on the same day that the Ustashas "called people to come out of the house one by one and usually killed them behind the house, hitting them in the head with an axe. They then carried the children who remained in the house out and gather them together and kill them too by hitting them in the head with an axe." Another local Ustasha from Šargovac, Andrija Golub, confirmed Jurić's account: "The killing was carried out in such a way that they were usually hit in the head with a blunt object and then beaten down, the blunt object appearing to be an axe. They [Ustashas] finished the killing there quickly and went towards Drakulić. They first stopped at the house of Djuro Glamočanin and that's where they started killing. They gathered all Greek-Easterners from the whole village, men as well as women and children, and killed them. I think they finished the job in Drakulić by 12 o'clock and then they went to Sargovac, where they did the same thing. All Greek-Easterners were killed one by one, starting from a day-old child up, men and women alike." Some resistance was offered in a single house in Drakulić, but the Ustashas overpowered the people and killed them after having tortured them.⁵⁴

⁵² ARS, District Commission for Investigating the War Crimes, Document: Information about the Ustasha action in the villages of [Podaci o akciji ustaša u selima] Rakovac, Šargovac, Drakulić i Motike, 11 February 1942.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Lukač, Banja Luka i okolica, 189-191.

The Ustasha guides were also Ante Pletikosa, Stipo Jurić and Mirko Jurić,⁵⁵ and Ante Marić, Antun Holić, Niko Kovačević and Ilija Kovačević in Motike.⁵⁶ The surviving witnesses similarly described the course of events in a statement given on 17 July 1946 in Drakulić. According to them, it all started at five o'clock in the morning of 7 February 1942. At the house of Djuro Glamočanin, Miroslav Filipović (Fra Tomislav) took a six-month-old child in his arms and, after giving an encouraging speech to the Ustashas, cut his head off. By eleven o'clock in the morning more than 700 people had been killed near their homes with cold weapons. Some 70 people, including many children, were burned alive in the barn of Mitar Mihajlović. After two or three months, the Ustasha authorities settled Croats from Herzegovina and the Livno, Duvno and Glamoč area in the houses of the murdered Serbs, and they remained in Drakulić until the end of the war.⁵⁷

On 23 February 1942, the German security police commander also reported on the massacre of Serbs: "The Poglavnik's bodyguards slaughtered the miners of the Orthodox faith from all three shifts. The number of the killed varies between 31 and 63 people. In the village of Drakulić everyone was killed, from a baby in a crib to a 90-year-old man. The village of Motike was dealt with in the same way. There was also a bloodbath in the village of Šargovac. The murders were committed on orders of the Catholic priest Filipović and two sons of Marko Pletikosa from Budžak. People from 124 households were killed – a total of 1,500 people in one day. In the barn of the peasant Mitrović, 50 people were set on fire. In Drakulić, all families with the surname of Glamočanin were killed, and in Šargovac, it is said that 53 children from the public school were killed. Small children were impaled on bayonets by the Ustashas..."⁷⁵⁸

A head of the Banja Luka district reported to the Banja Luka police department on 25 February that the population of the "Greek-Eastern faith" in the villages around the city had been peaceful prior to the Ustasha outrage. But, on 7 February 1942, about 100 members of the Ustasha battalion, including Filipović-Majstorović from the Petrićevac monastery, slaughtered the Serbs in the Rakovac mine and in the villages of Drakulić, Šargovac and Motike; "about 1,600-1,700 Greek-Eastern men, women and children were killed with axes and ... knives". It was noticed that, since then, Serb villagers sought refuge in the woods and the remaining ones were so frightened that they did not stay in

⁵⁵ Horvat and Štambuk, *Dokumenti*, 167-168.

⁵⁶ Lukajić, Fratri i ustaše kolju, 168.

⁵⁷ AJ, 110, Evidence Material, Dossiers nos. 4210–4227, fascicle 463, Minute no. 7, inv. no. 55461, Document: Zapisnik sastavljen 17. jula 1946. god. u Drakulićima, srez banjalučki, po Zemaljskoj komisiji za utvrdjivanje zločina okupatora i njegovih pomagača, 1-2.

⁵⁸ Godišnjak Muzeja žrtava genocida – tematski broj. Dragoje Lukić – roditelj pokošenog naraštaja (Belgrade: Muzej žrtava genocida, 2008), 122.

their houses during the night, but rather slept in barns, pigsties and elsewhere. The feeling of depression, insecurity and fear also spread among the Croats and Muslims, and there was a great interest in the results of the investigation and the punishment of the perpetrators.⁵⁹ On 28 February 1942 the Ustasha Supervisory Service [*Ustaška Nadzorna Služba*] from Zagreb ordered the Banja Luka police department to arrest Fra Tomislav Filipović from the Petrićevac monastery. Three days later, this task was assigned to Mirko Matijević and Dragutin Grgić, who reported the next day that they had not found Fra Tomislav – they had learned that he had set off with a group of Poglavnik's bodyguards in the direction of Bosanska Gradiška.⁶⁰

Another report also detailed how an Ustasha company under the command of First Lieutenant Josip Mišlov, together with Friar Vjekoslav Filipović, took control of the Rakovac mine, separated 37 Serb miners from the rest and killed them with pickaxes in a nearby field. Then the village of Drakulić was besieged, where about 1,430 Serbs were murdered. After the slaughter in Drakulić, the Ustashas committed the same crime in Motike and Sargovac. A native of Motike, Mile Kasipović, acted as their guide in his native village, where 672 Serbs from 90 households were killed; 114 Serbs from 18 households were slain in Sargovac, while ten people escaped. The same report gave a total number of 2,216 murdered Serb civilians, men, women and children. It should also be noted that Eugen Dido Kvaternik promoted Miroslav Filipović (Fra Tomislav) to the rank of Ustasha captain and sent him to the Jasenovac concentration camp, where he became a commander under the name of Miroslav Majstorović.⁶¹ A note made by the political department of the German Embassy in Zagreb also confirmed the course of events near Banja Luka: "An Ustasha detachment under the command of two officers and the Franciscan Friar Filipović is conducting a cleansing operation in Motike, Drakulić and Šargovac in which over 880 people of the Orthodox religion were killed, of whom 53 school children from Šargovac..."62

On 24 April 1942, the district authorities in Banja Luka had information that there were large quantities of grain as well as cattle in the "cleared area", and decided to give the poor residents and refugees in Banja Luka part of the property left behind the murdered Serbs.⁶³ Thirty-three horses and 261 head of cattle were confiscated from all three villages; 157 head of cattle were given to the city slaughterhouse for the purpose of feeding the population; 102 Croats

⁵⁹ VA, The Crimes in the NDH, 3 Report from Banja Luka [Izvještaji Glavnom stožeru, Izvještaj iz Banjaluke].

⁶⁰ VA, The Crimes in the NDH, 1, Arrest of Priest Tomislav Filipović.

⁶¹ Mirković, Zločini nad Srbima, 159.

⁶² Srbi u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj, 214; Mirković, Zločini nad Srbima, 159.

⁶³ Lukač, Banja Luka i okolica, 191.

and Muslims from Banja Luka and the surrounding villages were each given a head of cattle.⁶⁴

Very few Serbs survived the slaughter in the villages of Drakulić, Motike and Sargovac. The survivors were protected by some Croatian families from the neighbouring villages, for example that of Jozo Lipovac. Mile Todorinović described his ordeal as follows: "I came to my house and it was deserted; only cows were mooing in the barn. When I came out of the house, I heard some squeaking. I came closer and found a heap of bodies - some 70 men, children, women, about a hundred metres from my house. One of them was sitting and sobbing. I came closer and called him, but he didn't understand me. He was cut in the cerebellum. I recognised him - Sredić Stojan. He had a shoe on one foot and the other one was bare. It seemed to me that one little corpse was my youngest daughter and then I fainted. After a while I got up and went away. They were still moaning and calling out. The snow was red all around for about fifteen metres. I set off because the Ustashas were coming, singing their song."65 Mile Todorinović, one of the survivors from Drakulić, testified on 30 July 1945 that Ivan Gagula, a Croat commissioner (povjerenik) for Drakulić, told Fatima Grbić in May 1942 that they had killed the Serbs "so that they wouldn't spread". According to the testimony of Desa Jokić, Gagula managed the property of the killed Serbs. On one occasion, Gagula asked Desa Jokić how she had stayed alive, cursing her Serbian mother. He not only refused to give her any grain, he intended to kill her, but was prevented by "some agent".66

Jovo Vukobrad, who found himself in the village of Budžak, where he brought some hay, provided another testimony. He was anxious and asked Marko Lipovac, a Croat, if he had seen the column of Ustashas heading towards Drakulić. Lipovac hid Vukobrad and a few others, telling them: "Hide in my barn, all your families have been killed. The Ustashas are slaughtering and killing one by one." This group of people spent six days in his barn and then Lipovac went to the abbot of the Petrićevac monastery to ask him if there was any chance to save the survivors. The abbot replied: "Our Poglavnik is doing everything with God's approval, and the Church has blessed all that has been done and it [Church] will not regard that as a sin, so there is no other way for those who have remained than to meet the same fate as the others who happened to be in the village on the day of the massacre."⁶⁷

The news about the February 1942 massacre reached Belgrade through the Serb refugees who gave statements to the Commissariat for Refugees and Displaced Persons. Milorad Novaković gave such a statement as early as 19

⁶⁴ Lukajić, Fratri i ustaše kolju, 319-323.

⁶⁵ Lukač, Banja Luka i okolica, 190-191.

⁶⁶ ARS, District Commission for Investigating the War Crimes.

⁶⁷ Horvat and Štambuk, Dokumenti, 166-167.

February, estimating the number of victims at "about 2,800 Serbs, maybe more. Certainly not less".⁶⁸ Djordje Bajić, a caterer from Banja Luka who fled to Belgrade in April 1942, had witnessed the Ustashas drive the plundered cattle to the city. He claimed that the leader of the Banja Luka Muslims, Hilmija Bešlagić, interceded with Pavelić and thus prevented the crimes to assume even larger scale. The Serbs in Banja Luka and its surroundings were protected, at least temporarily, but they were forced to convert to Roman Catholicism.⁶⁹ In mid-March 1942, the head of the Serbian collaborationist regime, Milan Nedić, was informed of the atrocities near Banja Luka by the intelligence department of the headquarters of his armed forces.⁷⁰

After the war, the newly-established communist authorities in Yugoslavia also investigated these crimes. On 25 August 1945, the Intelligence Section of the Command of the Banja Luka Military District sent a report to the headquarters of the Sixth Yugoslav Army which stated that the main organiser of the savage killings had been Viktor Gutić. According to still incomplete information, 1,089 Serbs were killed in February 1942 near Banja Luka, of whom 529 were murdered in Drakulić, 426 in Saračica, 98 in Šargovac and 29 in Kobatovci. Along with Gutić, Filipović-Majstorović, Stipe Golub from Petrićevac, Andrija Golub from Šargovac and Viktor Nanut from Budžak were the ringleaders, while the bulk of executioners came from the Poglavnik's Bodyguard Battalion "deployed in Banja Luka at the request of the abovementioned organisers".⁷¹

A later inquiry (9 November 1945) into these atrocities collected information about 2,300 murdered Serbs, "men, women and children", in Drakulić, Šargovac and Motike.⁷² Four days later, the District Commission for Investigating the War Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Collaborators (*Okružna komisija za ispitivanje ratnih zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača*) had another report that the Serbs in these villages "were killed, slaughtered, impaled on bayonets, from babies in cribs to old men and women of 90 years of age". In the execution of the crime "a group of seven Ustashas, whose names are still unknown, were the most bloodthirsty". The Commission was informed that the slaughter had been committed on the order of a Roman Catholic priest, Filipović, and

⁶⁸ Arhiv Srbije [Archives of Serbia], Belgrade, Commissariat for the Refugees and Displaced Persons, 1941–1944 [Komesarijat za izbeglice i preseljenike 1941-1944] G-2, Refugees' Statements [Izjave izbeglica], Banja Luka District [Okrug Banja Luka], 1941-1944, fascicle 4, R. 65/1942.

⁶⁹ Ibid., R. 38/1942.

⁷⁰ Ibid., R. 34/1942.

⁷¹ ARS, District Commission for Investigating the War Crimes, Document: Izvještaj Komande banjalučkog vojnog područja, Obavještajne sekcije, Štabu Šeste armije, Obaveštajnom odeljenju, 25 August 1945.

⁷² Ibid., Document: Izvještaj Sreskom narodnom odboru, 9 November 1945.

two sons of Marko Pletikosa from Budžak. All members of 124 households in Drakulić were killed. "The number of the murdered people cannot be known

Drakulić were killed. "The number of the murdered people cannot be known definitely. According to the official data, about 1,750 souls were killed." Ustasha Colonel Tatek bragged that some 1,500 people had been killed. The report also specified that some 50 people were forced into the barn of the Mitrović family in Drakulić, which was then set on fire and the people were burned to death.⁷³ Djordje Brković from Drakulić testified that 70 people were forced into the barn of Mitar Mihajlović and burned alive.⁷⁴ These 70 people were mostly members of the Mitrović, Vuković and Mihajlović families.75 Eighteen inhabitants of Drakulić managed to escape.⁷⁶ Among them was Lenka Kuruzović with five children; she later went insane.⁷⁷ Local Croats also took part in the crime in Šargovac, killing children and women "with whatever they could get: with logs, axes, pitchforks and various other tools". It appears that among the miners killed in Rakovac was a Croat who could not prove that he was a Roman Catholic. A member of the Croatian Cabinet, Hilmija Bešlagić, who was in Banja Luka in those days and whose servant was also killed, went to Zagreb immediately and, as it seems, prevented further mass murders which were expected in Banja Luka.78

On the eve of the crime, none of the local Croats revealed to their Serb neighbours what was about to happen to them. At 4 p.m. on 6 February 1942, the village of Motike was blocked by the so-called "Legion of Motike population", who welcomed the Ustasha troops and remained in positions, making sure that none of the Serbs escaped. This group consisted of local armed Croat residents.⁷⁹ The District Commission for Investigating the War Crimes had an incomplete list of 23 local Croats who had participated in the crime in the three

⁷³ Ibid., Document: Report on the crimes in Banja Luka County, 13 November 1945.

⁷⁴ Ustaški stožer za Bosansku Krajinu, 259.

⁷⁵ AJ, 110, Evidence Material, Dossiers nos. 4210–4227, fascicle 463, Minute no. 7, inv. no. 55461, Document: Zapisnik sastavljen 17. jula 1946 god. u Drakulićima, srez banjalučki, po Zemaljskoj komisiji za utvrdjivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača, 1.

⁷⁶ ARS, District Commission for Investigating the War Crimes, Document: Report on the crimes in Banja Luka County, 13 November 1945.

⁷⁷ Arhiv Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti [Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts], Belgrade, Document: Saslušanja srpskih izbeglica na razmišljanje članovima Savetodavnog odbora, Akcija franjevaca.

⁷⁸ ARS, District Commission for Investigating the War Crimes, Document: Report on the crimes in Banja Luka County, 13 November 1945.

⁷⁹ AJ, 110, Evidence Material, Dossiers nos. 4849–4900, fascicle 492, J–542, Dossier no. 4889, F–24379, inv. no. 55478, Document: Zapisnik sastavljen 26. jula 1946. godine u Pavlovcu, srez banjalučki po Zemaljskoj komisiji za utvrdjivanje ratnih zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača; Lukajić, *Fratri i ustaše kolju*, 154, 158, 190.

villages near Banja Luka. One of them was Marko Gagula who personally killed Dane Vukobrat.⁸⁰ The Banja Luka district committee sought intelligence information on Captain Zelić, Lieutenant Tatek and a certain Dragec.⁸¹ On 15 May 1946, the Banja Luka district prosecutor indicted 18 local Croats before the district court for having, inter alia, participated in the slaughter of more than 2,300 Serb civilians in the Rakovac mine and the villages of Drakulić, Šargovac and Motike.⁸² The first on the list was the 49-year-old Andrija Golub from Šargovac, who had become a member of the Ustasha organisation in 1938 and, after the proclamation of the NDH, the mayor of the Budžak municipality. In that capacity, he was one of the main organisers of the crime, together with Viktor Gutić and "a priest Filipović". After the massacre, he distributed the property of the victims, keeping a large part for himself. Before the war, he had been tried by the Banja Luka District Court and sentenced to eight months in prison for "spreading banned propaganda".⁸³ The 40-year-old Ilija Popović, a miner and father of four, was one of the most savage perpetrators. Together with another Ustasha, he killed the whole family of Risto Vasić and then the Savanovićs; he cut off Mihajlo Prnjavorac's head and threw it to the pigs, and he also beheaded the Brković brothers, Djordje and Pavle, with an axe; he killed Djordje's wife, sister-in-law and children.⁸⁴ Branko Brković, hidden in a barn, witnessed the massacre of his own family, including a one-year-old child. Among the perpetrators, he recognised Ilija Popović, Ante Pletikosa, Šime Golub and Stipo Golub. Some of the victims were first shot and then massacred with axes and blunt objects.⁸⁵ The names of 39 witnesses were listed in the indictment and its conclusion was as follows: "The event that took place on 7 February 1942 in the villages of Drakulić, Motike and Sargovac in the immediate surroundings of the city of Banja Luka is a rare example in the history of mankind. It is very reminiscent of St. Bartholomew's Night in Paris when the Huguenot population of Greater Paris was killed. But judging by the mass massacre and the way in which it was carried out, what happened in the mentioned villages exceeds the wildest fantasy and shows what a savage and systematically stirred up crowd is able to do." The cause of the crime was alleged to be the idea emerging after the establishment of

⁸⁰ ARS, District Commission for Investigating the War Crimes.

⁸¹ ARS, District Commission for Investigating the War Crimes, Document no. 439/45, 12 December 1945.

⁸² AJ, 110, Evidence Material, Document: Banja Luka District, Group indictments and verdicts, Public Prosecutor of Banja Luka District, no. I: 995-46, E: 816-46, 15 May 1946, Banja Luka, 1.

⁸³ Ibid. 1-2.

⁸⁴ Ibid. 2-5.

⁸⁵ ABiH, The State Commission for Investigating the War Crimes, Minutes, Banja Luka County, box 6, Document: Motike (selo) 1945, inv. no. 17051-27776, Minute no. 249, 1945.

the NDH that the Serbs from those villages "had driven a wedge in the Croatian – Catholic area". It was emphasised in that regard that it had been the "Ustasha slaughterer priest Filipović" who had "constantly stirred up the Catholic masses against their Serb neighbours".⁸⁶

The role of Miroslav Filipović(-Majstorović) - Fra Tomislav from the Petrićevac monastery - in the described atrocities deserves further attention. Besides being one of the main instigators and organisers of the slaughter, Fra Tomislav personally took part in the killings.⁸⁷ According to the post-war testimony of the teacher Dobrila Martinović, herself a Croat and Roman Catholic, Fra Tomislav and twelve Ustashas entered her class in the elementary school in Sargovac and asked her to call a Serb child to her desk. Not knowing what was going on, she picked an eleven-year-old girl who "was slaughtered in front of the other children, the teacher and the Ustashas" by the friar. The children started to scream and cry. The Serb children were taken out and murdered in front of the school, as witnessed by another teacher, Mara Šunjić, also a Croat and Roman Catholic. The entry in the school log book says that the Serb children "died on 7 February 1942".⁸⁸ There were 53 children, all pupils of the elementary school in Šargovac. But Bishop Garić justified Fra Tomislav, as reported by the Italian Vice-Consul Fabbiani on 4 March 1942. Garić said that the friar "went over to the wounded to take confessions" and "to bring the last religious consolation to the wounded".⁸⁹ Josip Loparević from the Petrićevac monastery also testified that Fra Tomislav had participated in the slaughter in the villages near Banja Luka, after which he left the monastery and joined the Ustashas, where he received a rank. "As a commander" in the Jasenovac concentration camp, "he committed mass murders and crimes against the prisoners".90 A letter of Petar Pajić, a Roman Catholic priest from Vrbanjci near Kotor Varoš, confirming Fra Tomislav's crimes near Banja Luka, was sent to Franjo Kralik, the editor of the Catholic weekly in Sarajevo. It reads:"We have sinned horribly by shedding innocent blood and plundering. Just imagine! They slaughtered a huge Vlach [Serb] village of Motike and Drakulić. About 2,400 people died. They slaughtered pregnant women and children in wombs. I shudder and grieve. Before the slaughter,

⁸⁶ AJ, 110, Evidence Material, Document: Banja Luka District, Group indictments and verdicts [Grupne optužnice i presude], Public Prosecutor [Javni tužilac okruga] of Banja Luka District, no. I: 995-46, E: 816-46, 15 May 1946, Banja Luka, 7.

⁸⁷ Horvat and Štambuk, *Dokumenti*, 166; Lukač, Banja Luka i okolica, 192-193.

⁸⁸ ARS, Elementary School in Šargovac. School log book [Narodna osnovna škola u Šargovcu, Dnevnik iz osnovne škole]; Lukajić, *Fratri i ustaše kolju*, 111-112; Dušan Lukač, *Tri genocida nad Srbima u XX veku* (Belgrade: Balkanološki institut SANU, 1998), 174-175.

⁸⁹ Lukač, Banja Luka i okolica, 191-193.

⁹⁰ ARS, District Commission for Investigating the War Crimes, Document no. 414/45, 30 November 1945.

they came by the Petrićevac Monastery. They ate there, had dinner, whatever. Then, under the command of Filipović they went to Drakulić. He alone killed 57 people with an axe. He was all covered in blood. And then he handed the axe to someone else ... Mass graves are in front of the houses. Our villagers from the neighbouring villages – Catholics took away blooded pillows...⁷⁹¹

After the war Fra Tomislav admitted that he had been "a pastor" of the Poglavnik's Second Bodyguard Battalion and that "one night with the battalion (...) he went into action. (...) I saw Ustasha soldiers coming back from the slaughter covered in blood, it was later said that 2,000 people were killed on that occasion."⁹² He admitted to Vojdrag Berčić⁹³ that he participated in the crimes, adding: "Well, my dear Sir, it wasn't just me who did it. Everyone was killing whoever they could and everyone is lying if they say they weren't killing." He defended himself at the trial that he had slaughtered children so that "they would not become criminals when they grow up". One of the Ustashas who committed the crimes on 7 February 1942 confirmed that Fra Tomislav had participated in the atrocities and that he loved to slaughter children.⁹⁴

It is estimated that during Filipović's command in Jasenovac from the end of June to the end of October 1942, between 20,000 and 30,000 people were killed there, and he admitted that he had murdered some hundred prisoners himself.⁹⁵ One of the surviving prisoners left his testimony: "Friar Filipović behaved nicely and pleasantly, except during slaughters. Then he would become unbelievable. [...] He would go out every night to lead the slaughter and return at dawn with his cassock completely covered in blood. None of the murderers possessed his stamina. One day, while he was having lunch, one of the Ustashas approached him and whispered something in his ear. The Ustasha then headed to the camp fence and returned with a prisoner. Fra Filipović got up and killed him. The unfortunate man fell to the floor. The friar sat down again and, calmly finishing his meal, shouted: bring in the undertaker."⁹⁶ At the hearing held on 25 June 1945, Fra Tomislav invoked the claim of Ljubo Miloš, one of the commanders of the Jasenovac concentration camp, that during the four years of the

⁹¹ Godišnjak Muzeja žrtava genocida – tematski broj, 123.

⁹² *Zločini u logoru Jasenovac* (Zagreb: Zemaljska komisija Hrvatske za utvrdjivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača, 1946), 67.

⁹³ In his capacity as military court investigator, Vojdrag Berčić, a communist partisan and a lawyer, interrogated many Ustasha criminals in liberated Zagreb, including Fra Tomislav. Decades later Berčić directed a documentary about the February 1942 massacre in Banja Luka under the title De hoc tristissimo eventu – O ovom pretužnom dogadjaju (1981).

⁹⁴ Lukajić, Fratri i ustaše kolju, 119-120, 302-304.

⁹⁵ Zločini u logoru Jasenovac, 67; Novak, Magnum crimen, I, 158-160.

⁹⁶ Marko Aurelio Riveli, Nadbiskup genocida (Nikšić: Jasen, 19992), 97-98.

war "about half a million Serbs" had been killed and died in the fighting in the NDH.⁹⁷

Viktor Gutić was also tried after having been arrested in Italy and extradited to Yugoslavia. At the hearing held on 22 September 1946, he said that he was "aware that at the beginning of February 1942, a slaughter was committed in the village of Drakulić during one night and that it was carried out by Ustashas from the Poglavnik's Bodyguard Battalion on the initiative of Fra Tomislav Filipović, a priest from Petrićevac." He said he had not been aware that those Ustashas would go [to the village], and he had found out about the massacre next day at 12 o'clock.⁹⁸ Gutić was indicted for that crime on 25 December 1946. He was charged with the "intent to destroy the Serbian people" and organising a mass slaughter of the Serbs in the villages near Banja Luka together with his closest associates in the city, although he no longer had direct authority over that territory. He won over the Poglavnik's Second Bodyguard Battalion for the execution of the crime. Thirty-three Serbs were killed then, all miners from Rakovac, "and then almost all the Serb residents in Drakulić and a large part [of the Serb population] in Motike and Šargovac, so that the number of victims was over 2,000 people."99 Viktor Gutić was sentenced to death by hanging on 11 February 1947 and executed as a war criminal in Banja Luka.¹⁰⁰

The leadership of the NDH intended to make Banja Luka the capital of the Croatian state, or at least to move some of the state institutions to that city. Their motive was the geographical position of Banja Luka in the centre of the NDH and the need to strengthen the Croatian position in Bosnian Krajina and the whole of Bosnia, which was made difficult on account of the Serbian insurgency as a reaction to the Ustasha crimes. Quite simply, the population structure of Banja Luka and its surroundings needed to be changed. The Ustasha Stožernik Viktor Gutić, the most powerful NDH official in that area, was a crucial figure in planning and enforcing the policy of extermination of Serbs in Banja Luka and Bosnian Krajina during the spring and summer of 1941; even after leaving Banja Luka to assume a new position in Zagreb in late August 1941, he often returned to the city and still played a major role in the crimes against the Serbs. The local NDH authorities indicated that Gutić had been the most responsible for the crime committed against the Serb civilians in the Rakovac mine and the villages of Drakulić, Šargovac and Motike on 7 February 1942. Importantly, the

⁹⁷ Krestić and Radojević, Jasenovac, 85.

⁹⁸ Ustaški stožer za Bosansku Krajinu, 231.

⁹⁹ Ibid. 259.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. 317.

Roman Catholic clergy in Banja Luka and Bosnian Krajina not just acquiesced in the genocidal policy against the Serbs, but also endorsed it, as evidenced by the attitude of the Banja Luka Bishop Jozo Garić and Fra Kruno Brkić. Particularly gruesome was the participation of Miroslav Filipović-Majstorović (Fra Tomislav) from the Petrićevac Monastery in the slaughter. On the other hand, the role of Gutić's successor as Ustasha Stožernik in Banja Luka, Mirko Beljan, and that of Captain Nikola Zelić, commander of the Second Battalion of Pavelic's Bodyguard Brigade, has not been fully elucidated, since the reports mostly mention Lieutenant Josip Mišlov. What is more certain is that the atrocities of 7 February 1942 were thoroughly prepared, primarily by Croats from Banja Luka and its surroundings, and that the Poglavnik, Ante Pavelić, lent his support by sending his elite military unit from Zagreb, the members of which were from Herzegovina. However, two central figures in the Banja Luka "St. Bartholomew's Night" in 1942 were Gutić and Filipović. For Gutić, this crime was the culmination of his entire policy since April 1941, while for Filipović, it was only the beginning of his criminal career, which reached its peak during his taking charge of the Jasenovac concentration camp. Although Gutić managed, at least temporarily, to take refuge in Italy in 1945, Filipović failed to use one of the "rat canals" through which the Roman Catholic Church evacuated a considerable number of NDH officials, including war criminals.¹⁰¹ Both of them met with justice in the end, but the members of Poglavnik's Second Bodyguard Battalion, the chief perpetrators of the crime, managed to escape, except those of them who were liquidated by the partisans on the Yugoslav-Austrian border towards the end of the war.

During the Second World War, the Ustashas committed a large number of mass crimes against the Serbs both in concentration camps and on numerous execution sites across the NDH. By the number of Serb victims, the following sites stand out: Garavice near Bihać (1941), Šušnjar near Sanski Most (1941), Prebilovci near Čapljina (1941) and Stari Brod near Višegrad, i.e., Rogatica (1942). However, there is not a site, with the possible exception of large concentration camps such as the Gospić-Jadovno-Pag complex and Jasenovac, on which that many Serbs were killed in a single day as in the villages of Drakulić, Motike and Šargovac and in the Rakovac mine, near Banja Luka, on 7 February 1942. Moreover, these victims were completely loyal to the Croatian state and did nothing whatsoever to provoke the use of violence against them. The peculiarity of the crime committed near Banja Luka also lay in the fact that so many people were slaughtered with cold weapons: axes, pickaxes, knives, bayonets, pitchforks, logs and other sharp and blunt objects, and a number of victims were

¹⁰¹ For more, see Mark Aarons and John Loftus, *Pacovski kanali: kako je Vatikan, krijumčareći naciste iz Evrope, izdao Sovjetima obaveštajce sa Zapada* (Belgrade: Glosarijum and Arsvalea, 1991).

burned alive. During the crime, only a few shots were heard, as the Ustashas mostly shot those people who were trying to escape. The fact that the premeditated crime was a closely guarded secret and that it was well-prepared, that the Serbs were taken by surprise because they did not expect the use of violence against them, having been loyal and peaceful villagers, accounted for the absence of any resistance during the whole day, with the exception of a single household. However, after having learned of the crime, a number of Serbs from the Banja Luka area joined the Serb insurgents in Bosanska Krajina.

On the basis of various reports and testimonies, it may be concluded that the Ustashas killed about 2,370 Serbs in the Rakovac mine and in the villages of Drakulić, Šargovac and Motike, although 2,315 people have been identified by name and surname: 1,363 from Drakulić, 679 from Motike, 257 from Šargovac, as well as 16 miners who were from other villages (five from Pavlovac, four from Bistrica, four from Čokori and three from Piskavica). Among the victims there were 551 children, the youngest 11 of them were born in 1942, 45 children were born in 1941, 82 children in 1940. Some women and girls were raped before being killed.¹⁰²

After the Second World War, dignitaries of the Roman Catholic Church in Yugoslavia did not speak publicly about the genocide committed against the Serbs in the NDH, or the role of their clergy of Croatian nationality. It was the Bishop of Banja Luka Alfred Pichler, himself of German origin, who had the courage to state the following in his Christmas message in 1963: "In the last war, in this country, our brothers of the Orthodox faith died because they were Orthodox. Those who killed them had a Catholic baptism certificate in their pocket. They were called Catholics. These Christians killed other people, also Christians, because they were not Croats and Catholics. We painfully acknowledge this terrible delusion of those people who went astray and we beg our brothers of the Orthodox faith to forgive [us] just as Christ on the cross forgave everyone."103 However, contemporary Croatian historiography is rife with revisionism the purpose of which is to deny the crimes of 1941–1945 in the NDH, let alone the genocide committed against the Serbs, Jews and Roma in an effort to rehabilitate the NDH. This is not done only by marginal groups, but also by scholars from some of the main Croatian institutions. Rarely has anyone gone so far "in the banalisation of evil and the trivialisation of crime" as those Croatian revisionists have.¹⁰⁴ Perhaps the most striking example has been the attempt of a Roman Catholic priest, Fra Martin Planinić, to present Miro-

¹⁰² Lukajić, Fratri i ustaše kolju, 8, 88, 266, 270, 327-338, 342-402.

¹⁰³ Rastislav V. Petrović, *Genocid s blagoslovom Vatikana: izjave Srba izbeglica* (Belgrade: Fond "Nikola Tesla" za pomoć Srbima van Srbije, 1992), 102.

¹⁰⁴ Mirjana Kasapović, "Genocid u NDH: umanjivanje, banaliziranje i poricanje zločina", *Politička misao* 55/1 (2018), 7, 10-13.

slav Filipović-Majstorović (Fra Tomislav) as an innocent victim of slander.¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, the efforts of the Croatian revisionists to diminish, or completely deny, the atrocities committed in the NDH have produced, to a large extent, the opposite effect - they have drawn the attention of the world academic community to the genocide against the Serbs, Jews and Roma in the NDH hitherto considered a "lesser-known genocide", which received "a relatively limited attention in Western historiography".¹⁰⁶

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¹⁰⁵ Martin Planinić, Fra Tomislav Filipović žrtva klevete (Šuica: Tomislavgradske ratne novine, 1992).

¹⁰⁶ Kasapović, "Genocid u NDH", 25.

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The Shift in Yugoslav-Albanian Relations: The Establishment of Ties between Albania and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija (1966–1969)

- Abstract: The intra-party conflict in Yugoslavia in 1966 resulted in a fundamental shift in the attitude of the Yugoslav leadership toward the Albanian national minority, which was also reflected in the country's foreign policy orientation. The normalization of relations with Albania was set as one of the objectives of Yugoslav foreign policy. Yugoslavia stopped responding to the anti-Yugoslav statements of Albanian officials and launched a series of cooperation initiatives with Albania. The Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija was assigned a special role in the normalization of relations with Tirana and, with the consent of Belgrade, an exchange of publications, visits of cultural-artistic associations and contacts between the cultural institutions of Kosovo and Metohija and Albania ensued. This policy resulted in the establishment of direct cultural, economic and political ties between the governments of Albania and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, into which the Yugoslav political leadership no longer had any insight.
- Keywords: Yugoslavia, Albania, Kosovo and Metohija, Josip Broz, Marko Nikezić, Enver Hoxha, Fadil Hoxha

Introduction

The ousting of the most influential Serbian communist in Yugoslavia, Aleksandar Ranković, in 1966 marked a turning point in the history of the country. Yugoslavia's leader Josip Broz and his closest associates Edvard Kardelj and Vladimir Bakarić began to move towards the gradual disintegration of the Yugoslav federation, seeing Serbia as the main obstacle to their intentions.^I The new situation had particular implications for the Autonomous Province

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¹ B. Petranović and M. Zečević, Agonija dve Jugoslavije (Šabac: Zaslon, 1991), 302; Lj. Dimić, Istorija srpske državnosti, vol. 3: Srbija u Jugoslaviji (Novi Sad: SANU, 2001), 404–457; M. Gatalović, Burna vremena: Kosovo i Metohija u državnoj politici Jugoslavije 1966–1969 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2018), 44–73; R. Vidačić, O korenima separatizma i terorizma na Kosovu (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2000), 146, 148, 149.

of Kosovo and Metohija, where local Albanian leaders, with the support of the leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), began to oust Serb employees from state institutions and state-owned companies.² A confidential memo of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania on the situation in Yugoslavia dated October 1967 states that the "Bakarić-Kardelj group demands the achievement of national independence for the republics, eventually leading to their secession from Yugoslavia". The report stresses that "this group enjoys the support of the pro-Tito leadership of Kosovo, which wants to secede from Serbia."³ The new alliance in the Yugoslav communist party came to the fore during the debate about making changes to the constitutions of Serbia and Yugoslavia, in which Josip Broz supported the demands of the Albanian leaders from Kosovo. The constitutional amendments of 1968 and 1969 substantially reduced Serbia's sovereignty in its autonomous provinces, granting them many elements of statehood.⁴

At a meeting of the Presidency of the LCY held on 31 October 1968 to discuss constitutional changes, the most influential Slovenian communist Edvard Kardelj stated that "the position of the Kosovo Albanians, given their large number and compactness, cannot be compared with that of the other national minorities in the world." He added that small national minorities, such as the Italian minority in Istria, could not have the right to self-determination, but that the "Kosovo situation is different" and as such warranted the question of "whether Kosovo should be a part of Yugoslavia or of Albania". Kardelj went on to propose a thawing of relations with Albania and removing the existing border between Kosovo and Metohija and Albania: "We must strive for changing inter-

² For more detail on the court cases against Serbs employed in the police service and firing Serbs from state-owned companies in Kosovo and Metohija in 1966–1967, see Arhiv Srbije [Archives of Serbia] (AS), F(onds) DJ-2, b(ox) 22, Documentation of the Executive Council of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia (EC CC LCS) concerning the 4th Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (CC LCY), Appendix: The number of employees in the Secretariat for Interior Affairs in SR Serbia on 1 August 1966; Arkivi Qendror Shtetëror (AQSH), F 14, Arkivi i Partisë – Struktura (APSTR), v(iti) 1967, d(osja) 267/2, Nga burimet tona inforhemi per Jugosllavine, 17. IV 1967, njësia arkivore (n.a.) 10; B. Dimitrijević, "Intelligence and Security Services in Tito's Yugoslavia 1944–1966", Istorija 20. veka 2 (2019), 25, 26.

³ AQSH, f. 14, APSTR, v. 1967, d. 267/2, Nga burimet tona inforhemi per Jugosllavine, 17. X 1967, n.a. 44.

⁴ Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia] (AJ), F 837, Office of the President of the Republic, II–2/364, Reception of the delegation of the Provincial Committee of LCS for Kosovo and Metohija, Note on the conversation between President Tito and members of the Provincial Committee of LC of Kosmet, Belgrade, 24 October 1968, 12–13; *Izmene u saveznom ustavu* (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1969), 86–87, 96; *Službeni list Socijalističke autonomne pokrajine Kosova*, 1969, 169–185.

national relations in the Balkans, establishing friendly relations with Albania, removing borders in their current form, and creating a different climate to make this border an administrative demarcation line rather than a border splitting a single nation."⁵

At the meeting, the leader of the League of Communists of Croatia, Vladimir Bakarić, said that the idea of Kosovo's autonomy had emerged in 1944 as a sort of recompense for the fact that, due to the international situation, this territory could not be incorporated into Albania. Bakarić concluded that the autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija needed to be strengthened to make the unification of Albanians a feasible long-term goal: "I believe that the autonomy needs to be developed to make the local Albanian population an active centre for the evolution of the Albanian nation with a prospect of further integration with the Albanians of Albania. To that end, we need to promote brotherhood and unity and regulate the settlement dynamic of Kosmet."⁶ Serbian party officials did not oppose Kardelj's and Bakarić's proposals aimed at the Albanization of Kosovo. Having ousted Ranković, Broz put the leadership of Serbia in an inferior position to the other republic-level leaderships, and the League of Communists of Serbia (LCS) even lost authority over the party organizations of Kosovo and Metohija and Vojvodina despite their formally being part of LCS.⁷

However, there was an obstacle to the plans of Broz, Kardelj and Bakarić for Kosovo and Metohija: the constant anti-Yugoslav campaign in Albania, which in the 1960s became an everyday media phenomenon. Besides Yugoslavia's foreign policy orientation, the campaign targeted its internal organization and social life. The Albanian press routinely reported an alleged spike in serious crime among minors in Yugoslavia, presenting it as "a typical result of the Titoist regime". The reports focused on the difficult position of Yugoslav workers, and Radio Tirana reported that workers in Yugoslavia were being "denied fundamental human rights, the right to work and participate in social production", interpreting this as a "consequence of the revisionist policy of Tito's clique".⁸

⁵ AJ, 507, CC LCY, Extended Bureau of the Presidency of CC LCY, III–K.2/2, Stenographic minutes of the Extended meeting of the Bureau of the Presidency of CC LCY of 31 October 1968, 24–26.

⁶ Ibid. 38–39.

⁷ On the attitude of Albanian officials from Kosovo and Metohija towards the leadership of Serbia in this period, see AS, DJ-2, b. 11, Stenographic minutes of the joint meeting of the CC LCS Presidency and the EC CC LCY of 12 April 1968; Vidačić, *O korenima*, 146.

⁸ Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova [Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (DAMSP), Politicka arhiva [Political archive] (PA)–1967, Albania, f. 1, d. 2, Note of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (SSFA) on Albanian attacks on Yugoslavia in the period between 9 January and 18 March 1967, 23 March 1967, a(rchival) i(tem) 2–3.

Albanian newspapers had a section devoted to "degeneration and corruption in Yugoslavia" and the impoverishment of its population. The press routinely wrote about growing unemployment, strikes, and price hikes in Yugoslavia.⁹ Leading Albanian officials criticized Yugoslavia during the visits of foreign delegations and party congresses even when discussing domestic affairs. At a reception for the Chinese ambassador on 30 September 1965, Enver Hoxha said that "American imperialism was mobilizing its agents on the international scene, from Khrushchevian and Titoist leaders to the Pope in the Vatican." At a rally in Beijing on 30 April 1966, Mehmet Shehu attacked "Khrushchevian and Titoist leaders" and did so again two weeks later, after his return from China, claiming that the "Titoist clique represents a special diversion battalion of American imperialism".¹⁰ The allegation that Yugoslavia was the "fifth column" of American capitalism was an important element of the Albanian foreign policy platform, which Tirana also insisted on within its policy of rapprochement with China.¹¹

Enver Hoxha described the Brioni Plenum as a "struggle between Serbs and Croat-Slovenians for domination in the country, which also had an impact on the position of Kosovo and Metohija" and a "showdown between different capitalist groups".¹² At the rally held in Tirana on 9 July 1966, Enver Hoxha said: "Yugoslavia has never been a socialist country." The chief of the Party of Labour of Albania (PLA) did not mince words in his allegations against Yugoslavia: "Yugoslavia is ruled by a criminal gang; it has long had a fascist regime and the deepest dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and the country is steeped in chaos and total degeneration."¹³

⁹ DAMSP, PA–1967, Albania, f. 1, d. 2, Note of the SSFA on the attacks of PR Albania on Yugoslavia in the period between 5 October 1966 and 8 January 1967, 16 January 1967, a.i. 2.

¹⁰ DAMSP, PA–1967, Albania, f. 1, d. 2, SSFA Documentation pertaining to the state of relations between SFR Yugoslavia and PR Albania in the course of 1965 and 1966, 24 February 1967, a.i. 1–2.

¹¹ E. Biberaj, Albania and China: A Study of an Unequal Alliance (Tirana: Albanian Institute for International Studies, 2014), 55.

¹² AQSH, f. 10, Enver Hoxha, g. II, n. III, v. 1966, d. 185, Shënime dorëshkim të Shokut Enver Hoxha "Mbi gjëndjen aktuale në Kosovë", mbi barbarizmate klikës Tito-Rankoviç kundreje shqiptarëve të Kosovës, 19 September 1966.

¹³ DAMSP, PA–1967, Albania, f. 1, d. 2, SSFA Documentation pertaining to the state of relations between SFR Yugoslavia and PR Albania in the course of 1965 and 1966, 24 February 1967, a.i. 3.

The policy of "extending the hand of reconciliation": Yugoslavia's new approach to Albania

Unlike in the 1950s, when the Yugoslav communists publicly condemned the regime of Enver Hoxha, the anti-Yugoslav campaign in Albania in the 1960s did not prompt negative responses from Belgrade and Priština. This shift in the attitude towards Albania was indicated already in 1964 when Yugoslavia came into the possession of evidence about Enver Hoxha's post-1948 suppression of old PLA cadres. These documents, which revealed the ruthless methods of the Albanian dictator, were serialized in the Priština-based weekly *Jedinstvo*. The editorial board of *Rilindja*, Priština's Albanian-language daily, refused to publish the documents.¹⁴

The Yugoslav initiative for thawing relations with Albania was launched in 1966, after the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs recommended in its foreign policy guidelines that Yugoslavia should "not heed" the constant attacks from Albania and should "treat the Albanian side in a calm and placatory tone to gradually normalize relations between the two countries".¹⁵

Although State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Marko Nikezić was aware of the proportions of the anti-Yugoslav campaign in Albania, his statements and moves in this period suggest that reconciliation with Albania had become one of the imperatives of the Yugoslav policy in the Balkans. On 26 January 1967, his speech in the Federal Assembly about relations with Albania included the following statement: "I would like to reaffirm the readiness of our government to improve relations and resolve practical issues of mutual interest." His deputy Miša Pavlović delivered a speech more or less to the same effect.¹⁶

On 8 March 1967, the Federal Executive Council (the main Yugoslav executive body or government) decided to continue initiating practical measures in its cooperation with Albania to normalize the two countries' relations. On 25 October 1967, the Foreign Policy Committee of the Federal Assembly expressed support for these decisions, concluding that the improvement of relations with Albania needed to be the "long-term direction" of Yugoslav policy.¹⁷ The effort to improve relations with Albania was also underlined in the conclusions of the Federal Executive Council's Committee for Foreign and International Relations

¹⁴ DAMSP, PA–1965, Albania, f. 1, d. 3, Note of the SSFA, 13 January 1965.

¹⁵ DAMSP, PA–1967, Albania, f 1, d. 2, Information on the state of relations between SFR Yugoslavia and PR Albania, 14 February 1967.

¹⁶ DAMSP, PA–1967, Albania, f 1, d. 2, Documentation pertaining to the state of relations between SFR Yugoslavia and PR Albania in the course of 1965 and 1966, Official Yugoslav statements on Albania, 7.

¹⁷ DAMSP, PA–1968, Albania, f. 1, d. 2, Information of the SSFA on the current state of Yugoslav-Albanian relations, 23 February 1968.

of October 1967 and in the conclusions of the Commission for International Relations of the LCY.¹⁸

At a meeting of the Party's Commission for Questions of International Relations on 21 September 1967, the leading Albanian official in Yugoslavia, Fadil Hoxha, spoke of relations with Albania in a conciliatory tone: "We need to be patient and prove our goodwill because, comrades, to be fair, we have been quarrelling since 1948." The leading Albanian official in Kosovo and Metohija noted that some "encouraging steps" had been made recently in the cooperation with the "Motherland", as he called Albania, such as book exchange and reciprocal visits of cultural delegations.¹⁹ Since the matter was a delicate one and given the PLA's constant attacks against the Yugoslav leadership, it seems reasonable to ask if Fadil Hoxha could have given such a response without first ensuring the consent of Josip Broz.

In line with the policy of "extending the hand of reconciliation", in 1967 and 1967 Yugoslavia launched a series of initiatives for resolving particular questions and practical issues of mutual interest. Some of these initiatives were based on the Albanian suggestions of 1955 and 1956, when relations between the two countries had temporarily headed towards normalization. In addition, Yugoslavia sent invitations to Albanian officials to participate in international conferences and sports events held in Yugoslavia, but the Albanian side did not accept them.²⁰

Over the course of 1966 and 1967, Albania agreed to sign bilateral treaties which it judged would be useful. The two countries signed protocols on commodity exchange, the Agreement on Road Traffic, and the Veterinary Conventions. The news of the Albanian acceptance of Yugoslav initiatives for bilateral agreements was welcomed at the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (SSFA), because they were used to paint the picture of an "upward trend" in relations with Albania.²¹ Cooperation was established regarding the situation

¹⁸ Arhiv Kosova [Archives of Kosovo] (AK), F(onds) Lidhja e Komunistëve të Kosovës, Provincial LCS Committee for Kosovo and Metohija. Some problems in relations between SFR Yugoslavia and PR Albania, Priština, January 1968; Gatalović, *Burna vremena*, 260.

¹⁹ AJ, 507, CC LCY, XXIIIA–K.3/1, Stenographic minutes of the meeting of the Commission for Inter-national and Inter-republic Relations of 21 September 1967, 49.

²⁰ DAMSP, PA–1967, Albania, f. 1, d. 2, SSFA Documentation pertaining to the state of relations between SFR Yugoslavia and PR Albania in the course of 1965 and 1966, 24 February 1967, 9–10.

²¹ DAMSP, PA–1967, Albania, f. 2, d. 20, Report of SFRY Legation in Tirana to SSFA, 21 September 1967.

on the border and waterways, i.e., the profitable exploitation of the potentials of Lake Scutari and the rivers Bojana and Crni Drim.²²

The agreements on cooperation in tourism made between the two countries in 1966 and 1967 show that the Yugoslav leadership was willing to make concessions to Albania even at the cost of their own country's diplomatic humiliation. At the initiative of Yugoslavia, on 30 July 1966, an agreement on cooperation in the field of tourism was signed, stipulating that day trips to Albania could be organized for third-party tourists visiting Yugoslavia. However, the Albanian authorities refused to include a stipulation that would allow Yugoslav nationals to visit Albania, arguing that such a move would pose a "threat" to Albanian national security. In the ensuing period, Yugoslav nationals continued to be banned from entering Albania, but Yugoslav travel agencies offered and organized day trips to Albania for foreign tourists vacationing on the Adriatic coast, promoting Albania among international visitors and bringing it profit.

In January 1967, a Yugoslav delegation visited Tirana to sign a new agreement on cooperation in tourism for the current year. On this occasion, the Yugoslav side asked Tirana to lift its entry ban on Yugoslav nationals. However, the Albanian side said that such a move was "out of the question" and reiterated its position that Yugoslav nationals would "pose a threat to Albania's national security". The Yugoslav representative in Tirana, Miodrag Krdžić, was against the new treaty on cooperation in tourism. He informed the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs that signing the agreement would be an unnecessary concession to Albania, which would be at odds with the fundamental principles of international relations, particularly in the light of the anti-Yugoslav campaign in the country.²³

Against the advice of Krdžić, on I February 1967, Yugoslavia made a new agreement on tourism with Albania for the current year, although the entry ban for Yugoslav nationals of non-Albanian descent remained in force.²⁴ Foreign tourists were sent to Albania by bus from Dubrovnik and seaside resorts in Montenegro. In mid-1967, the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs received reports that there were anti-Yugoslav slogans along the full length of the road from the Yugoslav-Albanian border to Tirana (the road travelled by the visiting tourists). Once they reached their destination in Albania, anti-Yugoslav pamphlets in English and German were given out to the tourists who had come for

²² AJ, F 596, Federal Secretariat for the Economy, 1968, f. 61, Yugoslav-Albanian Commission for Water Management.

²³ DAMSP, PA–1967, Albania, f. 2, d. 10, SFRY Legation in Tirana to SSFA, telegram, 21 January 1967.

²⁴ DAMSP, PA–1967, Albania, f. 2, d. 10, Contract between the companies Albturist, Tirana, and Putnik, Belgrade, concerning the organization of day trips for transit tourists, 1 February 1967.

a day trip from Yugoslavia. Albanian tourist guides were tasked with the dissemination of these pamphlets and they tucked them into tourist guidebooks.²⁵ By sending international tourists from its resorts to visit Albania, Yugoslavia not only sponsored Albanian tourism but also risked its own reputation among foreign visitors. Identical agreements on cooperation in the field of tourism, which placed Yugoslavia in a humiliating position, were signed in 1968 and 1969.²⁶

The preferential treatment of Enver Hoxha's Albania by the Yugoslav authorities in 1966–1969 becomes particularly conspicuous when compared with the attitude of Yugoslavia towards Bulgaria. While the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs did not respond to the regular anti-Yugoslav and anti-Serbian statements of Enver Hoxha and the Albanian press and instead extended the arm of reconciliation to Tirana, in the case of Bulgaria, the Yugoslav authorities showed zero tolerance of any broaching of historically contentious topics. In January 1968, professors from Priština took part in a conference in Tirana, which was used by the Albanian authorities to declare territorial pretensions to Kosovo and Metohija. This elicited no response from the Yugoslav State Secretariat, unlike the commemoration of the centenary of the Treaty of San Stefano in the Bulgarian press, which led the Yugoslav side to deliver a letter of protest to the Bulgarian ambassador.²⁷

The Albanian rejection of the Yugoslav offer to normalize relations

Despite having signed several bilateral treaties that brought practical benefits to Albania, Tirana did not soften its hostile policy towards Yugoslavia. On 11 January 1967, the vice-president of the Albanian government, Adil Çarçani, described the situation in Yugoslavia as "a confirmation of the inevitable fall of imperialism."²⁸ The Albanian media eagerly reported the failure of the economic reform in Yugoslavia, portraying it as "a restoration of capitalism".²⁹

The anti-Yugoslav campaign intensified in 1967, and Enver Hoxha increasingly mentioned the question of Kosovo and Metohija in his attacks on Yugoslavia. During his tour of the Shkoder area and the territories of the Kel-

²⁵ DAMSP, PA–1967, Albania, f. 1, d. 2, Information of the SSFA on anti-Yugoslav propaganda to foreign tourists visiting Albania through the Yugoslav Atlas travel agency.

²⁶ DAMSP, PA–1969, Albania, f. 2, d. 14.

 ²⁷ Dj. Tripković, "Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi 50-ih i 60-ih godina 20. veka", *Tokovi istorije* 1-2 (2009), 100.

²⁸ DAMSP, PA–1967, Albania, f. 1, d. 2, Note of the SSFA on Albanian attacks on Yugoslavia in the period between 9 January and 18 March 1967, 23 March 1967, a.i. 2–3.

²⁹ AK, Lidhja e Komunistëve të Kosovës, Provincial LCS Committee for Kosovo and Metohija. Some problems in relations between SFR Yugoslavia and PR Albania, Pristina, January 1968, 36–40.

mendi tribe, Hoxha said: "Yugoslavia is now capitalist; the Titoists have sold out to imperialism. Our Kosovar brothers had never bowed before the kings of Serbia and they will not forget their homeland, language and customs under Tito's stick."³⁰

Enver Hoxha accused the Yugoslav government of pursuing a discriminatory policy against Albanians: "The Titoist demagoguery cannot paper over Kosovo's open wounds. Her immortal mother Albania pays homage to the illustrious girl Galica, who spent twenty years heroically fighting against Serbian and Montenegrin chauvinists for national independence. Tito's clique continues to pursue its chauvinist and discriminatory policy against Albanians in Yugoslavia."³¹

The peculiar situation in the two countries' relations came to the fore after the earthquake near the Albanian-Yugoslav border on 30 November 1967. Both countries suffered human casualties and material damage, and the Red Cross organizations of Yugoslavia and Albania offered to help each other in rebuilding houses and caring for victims. On 19 December, the Belgrade daily *Politika* published a photograph of Enver Hoxha visiting the town of Dibra, which had suffered damage in the earthquake, along with a text promoting a positive attitude towards the leader of the PLA. On the other hand, the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs learned that on the very same occasion Enver Hoxha had lambasted the Yugoslav leadership, accusing the "Titoist clique" of having done nothing to help the victims "because the Albanian parts in Yugoslavia had suffered the heaviest damage in the earthquake".³²

In April and May 1968, the Albanian press published thirteen attacks on Yugoslavia; commenting on domestic and international matters, Enver Hoxha hardly missed an opportunity to mention Yugoslavia in a negative context. At the joint session of the Presidency and Executive Committee of the LCY held on 11 March 1968, it was concluded that Kosovo was the focus of the Albanian

³⁰ AQSH, f. 10, Enver Hoxha, g. III, n. IV, v. 1967, d. 300, Takim i shokut Enver Hoxha marrë me datën 2 shtator 1967 me popullin e katundit rrapsh-stare të rrethit të Shkodrës dhe me përfaqessues të malësisë së kelmendit, 18–20.

³¹ AK, Lidhja e Komunistëve të Kosovës, Provincial LCS Committee for Kosovo and Metohija. Some problems in relations between SFR Yugoslavia and PR Albania, Pristina, January 1968.

³² DAMSP, PA–1967, Albania, f. 2, d. 9, Note of the SSFA on the correspondence between the Yugoslav and Albanian Red Cross organizations after the earthquake in the Yugoslav-Albanian border area on 30 November 1967, 21 December 1967; A , Lidhja e Komunistëve të Kosovës, Provincial LCS Committee for Kosovo and Metohija. Some problems in relations between SFR Yugoslavia and PR Albania, Pristina, January 1968.

foreign policy and that Tirana was showing territorial pretensions to the Yugoslav and Serbian province.³³

The failure of the Yugoslav attempt to normalize relations with Albania was noted in diplomatic circles and the Western press. In November 1967, the London *Times* published an article by its Vienna-based reporter about the "Albanian rejection of Yugoslav attempts to create better relations between the two countries",³⁴ At the joint session of the Presidency and the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the LCY in March 1968, it was concluded that the efforts of the Yugoslav leadership to normalize relations with Albania had "yielded paltry results", with the exception of the stabilization of the situation on the border.³⁵

Unlike the temporary thaw of relations in 1955, which was gradual and cautious on both sides, in 1966 and 1967, the Yugoslav government suddenly and unilaterally initiated reconciliation with Albania, disregarding the anti-Yugoslav campaign in the country. While the speeches of Enver Hoxha sounded as if the two countries were in a state of war, the Yugoslav authorities offered to sign bilateral treaties with Albania, some of which essentially represented financial aid to Albania. The most convincing explanation for this Yugoslav policy towards Albania can be found in internal political factors. The events in Yugoslavia suggest that Yugoslav-Albanian relations in 1966–1968 were not shaped by the strategy of the Yugoslav leadership towards Albania but by their strategy towards Serbia. The Albanian leadership's attacks against Yugoslavia and Broz were one of the obstacles to the Albanization of Kosovo and Metohija. Therefore, attacks from Albania began to be hushed up by Yugoslav officials, while the efforts of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs led to the signing of several bilateral agreements that could be used as "proof" to the Yugoslav public that relations between the two countries had an upward trend.

The political campaign that ensued after the Brioni Plenum paved the way for the internationalization of the question of Kosovo and the position of Albanians in Serbia. One of the main allegations that the Yugoslav officials (including Josip Broz) levied against Ranković was that the Directorate of State Security implemented a "ruthless regime" against the Albanian population of Kosovo and Metohija, which de facto meant that the Yugoslav communists

³³ AJ, 507, CC LCY, III/130, Joint meeting of the Presidency and EC CC LCY on 11 March 1968, Appendix 1, 21.

³⁴ DAMSP, PA–1967, Great Britain, f. 213, d. 3, SFRY Embassy in London to SSFA, encrypted telegram, 1 December 1967.

³⁵ AJ, 507, CC LCY, III/130, Joint meeting of the Presidency and EC CC LCY on 11 March 1968, Appendix 1, 20.

had accused their own authorities of harsh treatment of the Albanian national minority.³⁶

This allegation did not go unnoticed in European political circles, and international media soon began publishing texts on the difficult position of Albanians in Yugoslavia. A commentary broadcast on Radio Prague on 13 February 1968 mentioned a territorial dispute between Yugoslavia and Albania, adding that Yugoslavia had "with some of its moves given arguments in favour of the Albanian view on Kosovo." To support the latter claim, the so-called Prizren Trial (1956) was brought up and the "prosecution of officials of Albanian nationality," leading to the spread of misinformation that had been circulating beyond the borders of Yugoslavia since the Brioni Plenum.³⁷

A text published on 1 February 1968 in the Swiss paper *La Tribune de Geneve* described Albanian-Yugoslav relations as follows: "The ideological quarrel between Albania and Yugoslavia is fuelled by nationalism and a territorial dispute. The Albanians have certainly been victimized by Serbian officials."³⁸ Although the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs mentioned the involvement of the Albanian secret service and some Western intelligence agencies in these reports, the texts were in fact based on a new political narrative in Yugoslavia planted by the LCY after the Brioni Plenum.³⁹

An important factor in spreading Albanian propaganda in the West was the Albanian emigration. Unlike the Yugoslav authorities, which saw Serbian and Croatian émigrés as a threat to the political system, Enver Hoxha's Albania put aside its ideological hostility and in the 1960s began using the Albanian nationalist and anti-communist emigration for bolstering its aspirations towards Kosovo and Metohija. The émigré paper *Albanian Resistance* was published in Paris; it fully supported the 1968 protests in Priština, describing them as "pro-

³⁶ AJ, F 837, KPR, II–2/316, Reception of the delegation of Kosovo and Metohija, Note on the reception 4–19 March 1967; AS, DJ-2, b. 22, Assessment of aberrations in the Secretariat for Interior Affairs and State Security services, their causes, ideological roots and consequences, and proposed measures for overcoming them.

³⁷ DAMSP, PA–1968, Albania, f. 1, d. 2, Information of the SSFA on the current state of Yugoslav-Albanian relations, 23 February 1968, 7.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ The post-Brioni narrative about "Ranković's oppression of Albanians in 1945–1966" was so strong that in the following decades this claim became firmly embedded in the consciousness of the Albanian intellectual elite. See AS, DJ-2, b. 22, Assessment of aberrations in the Secretariat for Interior Affairs and State Security services; Hajredin Hodža, *Afirmacija albanske nacionalnosti u Jugoslaviji. Staljinistički nacionalizam i iredentizam u Albaniji* (Priština: Rilindja,1984), 77; A. Demjaha, "Kosovski sukob: unutrašnja perspektiva", *Nova srpska politička misao* 3-4 (1999), 82.

tests of a youth who have been enslaved for the whole 55 years" and who are "fully aware that their true homeland is Albania."40

The result of the Yugoslav initiative: connecting Tirana and Priština

While Yugoslavia continued to be a constant target for the attacks of the Albanian press and leadership, a fundamental shift occurred in the relations between Tirana and the province-level political and intellectual elite in Kosovo and Metohija. According to the guidelines of Secretariate for Foreign Affairs, led by Marko Nikezić at the time, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija was supposed to play an important role in connecting Yugoslavia and Albania. Nikezić believed that cultural cooperation between Kosovo and Metohija and Albania should be encouraged, including exchanging publications, procuring books from Albania, organizing visits of cultural-artistic associations, and establishing ties between cultural associations of Kosovo and Metohija and Albania.⁴¹

Enver Hoxha harboured a bitter personal animosity towards Josip Broz and initially described the concessions of the Yugoslav regime to the Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija as a "sham", in which "Broz pretended to be the saviour of Albanians in Kosovo and blamed Ranković for everything bad."⁴² Even so, Hoxha chose to take advantage of Belgrade's initiative for cultural and economic cooperation between Albania and Kosovo and Metohija.

The Albanian authorities accepted Priština's invitation to cultural and educational cooperation and, for their part, began inviting intellectuals from Kosovo and Metohija to attend cultural events and academic conferences in Albania. Tirana's explanation for this shift was that it was "what the Albanians masses wanted".⁴³ A delegation of university teachers and scholars of the Institute of Albanology in Priština visited Tirana in late 1967. On this occasion, it was agreed to continue similar contacts and to begin printing schoolbooks for the needs of curricula in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija in Albania.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ DAMSP, PA–1969, Albania, f. 1, d. 3, Note of the SSFA on the activities of Albanian emigration abroad, 5 March 1969.

⁴¹ DAMSP, PA–1967, Albania, f. 1, d. 2, Information on the state of relations between SFR Yugoslavia and PR Albania, 14 February 1967, 9, 10.

⁴² AQSH, f. 10, Enver Hoxha, g. II, n. III, v. 1966, d. 185, Shënime dorëshkim të Shokut Enver Hoxha "Mbi gjëndjen aktuale në Kosovë", mbi barbarizmate klikës Tito-Rankoviç kundreje shqiptarëve të Kosovës, 19 September 1966.

⁴³ DAMSP, PA–1968, Albania, f. 1, d. 2, Information of the SSFA on the current state of Yugoslav-Albanian relations, 23 February 1968, 3.

⁴⁴ DAMSP, PA–1969, Albania, f. 1, d. 11, SFRY Legation in Tirana to SSFA, encrypted telegram, 12 June 1969.

According to the testimony of Enver Hoxha's wife Nexhmije Hoxha, in the second half of the 1960s, the leadership of Kosovo and Metohija intimated to Tirana that the closest possible relations between Albania and the province should be established "while Tito was still alive" and that the status of the Kosovo Albanians in Yugoslavia after his death was uncertain. Nexhmije Hoxha also said that, regardless of his unwavering fight against Titoism, Enver Hoxha had been aware of the political benefit which Tito's regime had brought to the Kosovo Albanians: "Enver judged that, as a Croatian nationalist, Tito was very interested in using the Kosovo Albanians in Yugoslavia as a counterbalance to the Serbs."⁴⁵ According to this statement, in the late 1960s, Tirana became aware to a certain extent that the Yugoslav political leadership was using the autonomy of Kosovo as a leverage to weaken Serbia.

The general agreement on cultural and educational cooperation of 1967 came to fruition in July 1968, when the newspaper *Rilindja* signed a contract with the Albanian company Artex for the purchase of books, music records and educational material in Albania for the needs of Albanian students in schools in Kosovo and Metohija. The terms of the contract had not been sent to the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, and the diplomatic mission of the SFRY in Tirana called Belgrade's attention to the fact that foreign diplomats in Tirana were "at a loss" to understand why Yugoslavia was allowing schoolbooks intended for its citizens to be imported from a country that was pursuing a bitter anti-Yugoslav campaign.⁴⁶

In January 1968, the Provincial Committee of the LCS concluded that more attention should be paid to local border traffic between the Province and Albania and that more direct contacts with businessmen from Albania should be secured.⁴⁷

An opportunity for a larger-scale meeting was the fifth centenary of the death of Djuradj Kastriot Skenderbeg (Alb. Gjergj Kastrioti Skënderbeu), which Albania marked with a series of cultural and academic events in 1968. Tirana sent a formal invitation to the Assembly of AP Kosovo and Metohija, asking the Province to dispatch a large political, cultural and academic delegation and sending its regards to "the representatives of all Albanian areas in Yugoslavia". The authorities of Kosovo and Metohija decided to send a delegation

⁴⁵ N. Hoxha, Kosova e lirë (Gjirokastër: Argjiro, 2015), 53.

⁴⁶ DAMSP, PA–1969, Albania, f. 1, d. 11, SFRY Legation in Tirana to SSFA, encrypted telegram, 12 June 1969.

⁴⁷ AK, Lidhja e Komunistëve të Kosovës, 1968, Provincial LCS Committee for Kosovo and Metohija. Some problems in relations between SFR Yugoslavia and PR Albania, Pristina, January 1968, 30.

of Priština university professors and intellectuals led by Idriz Ajeti, Anton Çeta, Fehmi Agani, Syrja Pupovci and Zef Mirdita.⁴⁸

According to a report of the Yugoslav Legation in Tirana, the Albanian government used the world congress of Albanologists held on 11–18 January 1968 as an opportunity to spread nationalist propaganda and demonstrate territorial pretensions toward Yugoslavia. The delegation from Priština had preferential treatment at the congress and, at one point, it was separated from other participants and taken to a reception room to be received by the entire PLA Politburo. In his conversation with the Priština delegation, Enver Hoxha said that the practice of reprinting imported Albanian books in Kosovo and Metohija should be continued and that, in the light of political considerations, he would not object to having his picture removed from the reprinted books. He also said that he was aware of Priština's initiative to have some Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija sent to universities in Albania, adding that Albania was prepared to offer 200–300 scholarships for this purpose, provided that the authorities of Kosovo and Metohija manage to get the Yugoslav political leadership to approve the project. Albanian leaders stressed that they were not speaking to the Priština Albanologists as "politicians" and "officials" but as "Albanians". The delegation of Priština Albanologists spent the following few days in Albania touring the country's larger towns.⁴⁹

The Hungarian diplomatic representativer in Tirana informed the Yugoslav Legation about a conversation between the Albanian historian Aleks Buda and the delegation of Hungarian Albanologists at the congress. Aleks Buda claimed that Albania was working on collecting documentation that would "prove that Kosovo and Metohija were part of Albanian territory" and allow it to "demand the incorporation of this territory into Albania".⁵⁰ The Hungarian Legation concluded that it had been no accident that the Albanians had communicated their plan for staking territorial claims on Yugoslavia to the Hungarian Albanologists. The Albanian government had hoped to find out if, given the significant size of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia, Hungary harboured similar territorial aspirations. The Yugoslav Legation did not rule out the possibility that the same idea had been mentioned to the Bulgarian delegation.⁵¹

⁴⁸ E. Myftari, Kosova dhe Enver Hoxha (Tirana: Botimet Princi, 2016), 66–69; Gatalović, Burna vremena, 265, 338.

⁴⁹ DAMSP, PA–1968, Albania, f. 1, d. 2, SFRY Legation in Tirana to SSFA, telegram, 25 January 1968; S. Syla, "Qëndrimi i Shqipërisë ndaj demonstrative në Kosovë më 1968", *Studime Historike* 3-4 (2012), 284.

⁵⁰ DAMSP, PA–1968, Albania, f. 1, d. 2, Information of the SSFA on the current state of Yugoslav-Albanian relations, 23 February 1968.

⁵¹ DAMSP, PA–1968, Albania, f. 1, d. 13, SFRY Legation in Tirana to SSFA, telegram, 14 February 1968.

On 11 May 1968, a symposium was held in Priština to mark the 500th anniversary of Skenderbeg's death. Three days earlier, a delegation of the University of Tirana had arrived in Kosovo and Metohija; its members were Aleks Buda, Ndreçi Plasari, Bujar Hoxha, Dorka Damo, Thoma Murzaku, and Mediha Shuteriqi.⁵² The history professor Aleks Buda had caught the eye of the Yugoslav authorities three months earlier with his statement that Albania would ask to annex Kosovo. The State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs was displeased that it had learned of his participation in the conference in Priština from the press and that it had not been informed by the authorities of Kosovo and Metohija of this visit in a timely manner. The Secretariat sent an official letter to the Executive Council (government) of Kosovo and Metohija asking to be informed of any similar visits from Albania in the future and to receive a report after the visit ended.⁵³ The Yugoslav diplomatic mission in Albania was unhappy with the behaviour of AP Kosovo and Metohija's organs, criticizing them for having concealed their contacts with Albania. In a telegram dated 11 June 1969, the envoy Hrnjak stated that the institutions and organs of Kosovo and Metohija had kept the Secretariat and other institutions underinformed of the agreements and conclusions they had reached with the Albanian side.⁵⁴

Hrnjak's telegram revealed the fear of the SFRY Legation in Tirana that Priština and Tirana had established parallel bilateral relations beyond the full control of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs. Vojin Lukić, formerly the head of the federal-level Secretariat for Interior Affairs, said that the report of the diplomatic mission in Tirana had expressly informed the political leaderships of Serbia and the federation about "direct and unusual ties between Kosovo and Albania" and the growing interference and influence of Albania's policies in the academic, cultural and educational life of Kosovo, but that they had tolerated this development.⁵⁵

The establishment of direct political relations between Priština and Tirana led to the temporary suspension of Albania's anti-Yugoslav campaign in the autumn of 1968, at the time when the constitutional changes that would bolster the autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija were being prepared. According to the findings of the historian Ana Lalaj, Enver Hoxha's easing of anti-Yugoslav

⁵² A. Lalaj, "1968-1969. Shkrirja e akujve në bashkëpunimin kulturor shiqipëri-kosove", *Studime Historike* 3-4 (2015), 250; Myftari, *Kosova dhe Enver Hoxha*, 70; Gatalović, *Burna vremena*, 338.

⁵³ DAMSP, PA–1968, Albania, f. 1, d. 8, SSFA to EC of AP of Kosovo and Metohija, 24 May 1968.

⁵⁴ DAMSP, PA–1969, Albania, f. 1, d. 11, SFRY Legation in Tirana to SSFA, encrypted telegram, 11 June 1969.

⁵⁵ V. Lukić, Sećanja i saznanja. Aleksandar Ranković i Brionski plenum (Titograd: Novica Jovović, 1989), 219.

propaganda in the second half of 1968 was the result of Fadil Hoxha's direct intervention. He had informed Enver Hoxha that constitutional amendments that would bolster the autonomy of Kosovo were being planned and that Tirana's anti-Yugoslav statements could hamper this process. As a result, Albania temporarily stopped its attacks on Tito and Yugoslavia.⁵⁶

A striking characteristic of the Albanian demonstrations in Kosovo and Metohija on 27 November 1968 was the absence of reactions from Albania. While in the previous period the Albanian press had written extensively about various aspects of life in Yugoslavia and paid particularly close attention to the position of Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija, not a single article was published about the protests in Priština. It was not until late December 1968 that Hysni Kapo, at a rally of Albanian-Chinese friendship, mentioned the Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija, praising their "freedom-loving tradition".⁵⁷ In the following months, the Albanian media also eased their anti-Yugoslav campaign to an extent.

On 5 December 1968, Enver Hoxha compiled his notes on the violent protests in Kosovo. The text begins with a denial of Tirana's involvement in the protests and a refutation of the allegations that Albania had spies in the territory of Yugoslavia.⁵⁸ Hoxha recorded that the "Kosovars were proud" and that they would "not be subjugated by Tito's regime", which he had previously accused of a terrorist policy towards Albanians: "Ranković's crimes are well known. Tito wanted to put out the fire, but the fire has now been kindled and no one can put it out."⁵⁹ Some Albanian historians believe that these notes were in fact made later and that they were dated 5 December 1968 to relativize Enver Hoxha's silence about the November protests in Kosovo.

Albania's silence regarding the protests was variously interpreted in diplomatic circles. Hrnjak, the Yugoslav envoy in Tirana, was of the opinion that the Albanian diplomats had been amiable with their Yugoslav interlocutors and the Albanian press had scaled back its animosity only for the duration of the trial against the organizers of the protests. Hrnjak concluded that, having achieved their objective and secured more lenient sentences for the organizers, the Alba-

⁵⁶ A. Lalaj, "Ngjashmëri dhe pangjashmëri në lëvizjes e 1968-s (Një vështrim krahasues me demonstratat e shqiptarëve në Prishtinë, Tetovë dhe Shqipëri)", *Studime Historike* 3-4 (2018), 251–253.

⁵⁷ For more detail, see A. Životić, "Jugoslavija, Albanija i Čehoslovačka kriza (1968–1971)", *Tokovi istorije* 3 (2012), 77.

 ⁵⁸ AQSH, f. 10, Enver Hoxha, g. II, n. III, v. 1968, d. 238, Shënime dorëshkim të Shokut Enver Hoxha date 5. 12. 1968 "Demonstratat e Shqiptarëve në Kosovë".
 ⁵⁹ Ibid.

nians "immediately launched another offensive" and the anti-Yugoslav campaign again intensified in the second half of 1969.⁶⁰

The secretary of the Romanian Legacy in Tirana, Micu, believed that the Albanian leadership had refrained from commenting on the protests to "avoid exacerbating the position of the members of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia".⁶¹ The Hungarian envoy Mátrai thought that the Albanian press had not reported on the protests because the Albanian government had been involved in them. After Mátrai told him this, Hrnjak responded that he did not know to what extent the Albanian government had been involved but that Albania's anti-Yugoslav campaign had certainly influenced the mood of the protesters.⁶² Tirana's policy had been so strongly targeted against Yugoslavia in the previous period that the dominant belief in European diplomatic circles was that Albania had indeed been involved in organizing the protests.⁶³

The possibility that Tirana and the Priština leadership had an oral agreement about the temporary suspension of the anti-Yugoslav campaign during the preparation of the constitutional amendments is also suggested by the conversation between Enver Hoxha and Rexhep Duraku of 1 March 1969. On this occasion, Enver stressed several times that Albania had not been involved in the events of 27 November in Priština and asked Duraku to relay this information to Fadil Hoxha. However, the Albanian leader did conclude with satisfaction that all global media had reported the protests and that the question of Kosovo had become an international concern.⁶⁴

A useful source for understanding the relations between Albania and the Kosovo leadership in the late 1960s is the minutes of the conversation of Enver Hoxha with Rexhep Duraku, who headed a delegation of family members of Albanian WWII People's Heroes from Kosovo in early March 1969. At the beginning of the meeting, Enver Hoxha warned his interlocutor that Tito did not genuinely want to make concessions to Kosovo Albanians but that he had been "forced" to do so.⁶⁵ Speaking of Broz with disdain, the Albanian leader

⁶⁰ DAMSP, PA–1969, Albania, f. 1, d. 1, SFRY Legation in Tirana to SSFA, encrypted telegram, 11 July 1969.

⁶¹ DAMSP, PA–1969, Albania, f. 1, d. 11, SFRY Legation in Tirana to SSFA, encrypted telegram, 25 February 1969.

⁶² DAMSP, PA–1969, Albania, f. 1, d. 11, SFRY Legation in Tirana to SSFA, encrypted telegram, 4 March 1969.

⁶³ E. Çeku, "Kosova during 1960–1970 and Albania's position", Thesis Kosova 2 (2009), 27, 28.

⁶⁴ AQSH, f. 10, Enver Hoxha, g. III, n. IV, v. 1969, d. 337/1. Bisedë e shokut Enver Hoxha, më datën 1.3.1969 me patriotin plak Kosovar Rexhep Duraku, babai i dëshmorit Emin Duraku, 1. III 1969, 19.

⁶⁵ AQSH, f. 10, Enver Hoxha, g. III, n. IV, v. 1969, d. 337/1. Bisedë e shokut Enver Hoxha, më datën 1.3.1969 me patriotin plak Kosovar Rexhep Duraku, babai i dëshmorit Emin Duraku,

showed strong personal sympathy towards Fadil Hoxha, the most influential Albanian official in Yugoslavia. Enver said that he had worked with many incumbent Kosovo officials before the Second World War in Albania and that, out of all of them, he "only trusted Fadil". This was explained by the view that "Fadil Hoxha loved the people of Kosovo" and that "the people of Kosovo loved him". He added that Fadil Hoxha and he had a common goal: that "the people of Kosovo should win."⁶⁶

Enver Hoxha said that he was aware of the peculiar position of the Kosovo leadership, which could not publicly criticize Tito like the regime in Tirana was doing. He even said that he "had not been angry" even when Fadil Hoxha criticized him at some conference because he "understood his position".⁶⁷

Rexhep Duraku promised to pass on all of this to Fadil and then asked the Albanian leader for help in procuring armaments: "Things are looking up but one thing is missing. It's the armament problem. We have no idea how things will unfold in the future and we have no weapons." Enver replied that this would be "rectified" and that the German and Italian fascists had also seemed "indestructible" but had been ultimately defeated.⁶⁸ It is unclear if Rexhep Duraku mentioned "the armament problem" to Enver Hoxha of his own accord or if he was conveying a message of the provincial leadership in Priština.

The unofficial political contacts between Priština and Tirana were given constitutional grounds in 1969. The Constitutional Act of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo of 24 February 1969 authorized the province to conduct affairs in the field of international relations.⁶⁹ The constitutional amendments of 1968 and 1969, which largely made Kosovo and Metohija the Albanian national territory in Yugoslavia, show that the parallel bilateral relations of Priština and Tirana enjoyed the support of Josip Broz and the Yugoslav leadership. In late 1968, Marko Nikezić – who had facilitated the spread of Albania's influence in Kosovo and Metohija through the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs – was appointed chairman of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, the most important political office at the republic level in Yugoslavia.

^{1.} III 1969, n.a. 9.

⁶⁶ AQSH, f. 10, Enver Hoxha, g. III, n. IV, v. 1969, d. 337/1. Bisedë e shokut Enver Hoxha, më datën 1.3.1969 me patriotin plak Kosovar Rexhep Duraku, babai i dëshmorit Emin Duraku, 1. III 1969, 13.

⁶⁷ AQSH, f. 10, Enver Hoxha, g. III, n. IV, v. 1969, d. 337/1. Bisedë e shokut Enver Hoxha, më datën 1.3.1969 me patriotin plak Kosovar Rexhep Duraku, babai i dëshmorit Emin Duraku, 1. III 1969, 19.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Službeni list Socijalističke autonomne pokrajine Kosova, 1969, 176.

Firmly supported by the policies of Josip Broz, the Albanian officials from Kosovo and Metohija also communicated with Tirana through the Albanian Legacy in Belgrade. In September 1970, Fadil Hoxha, a member of the Presidency of the LCY, told the Albanian *chargé d'affaires* in Yugoslavia Lik Seiti that in the case of an armed attack of any country against Albania he "would personally serve as Enver Hoxha's loyal soldier" and that "no Albanian from Kosovo would ever fight against Albania".⁷⁰

Conclusion

The proclaimed objective of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs – that Yugoslavia should get closer to Albania through the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija – did not come to fruition and the relations of the two countries failed to be normalized. At the same time, Yugoslavia allowed Albania to exert its influence in a part of Yugoslav territory, leading to the establishment of special links between Albanian and Kosovo political representatives into which the Yugoslav and Serbian authorities had no insight. While Yugoslav citizens were banned from entering Albania, citizens and officials of Albanian nationality had no trouble securing visas for Albania, where they could visit their relatives, and often met with top-ranking Albanian officials.⁷¹

The initiative of the Yugoslav authorities to expand relations Priština– Tirana was but one in a series of moves at odds with the established diplomatic practice and the purpose of foreign policy – to protect national interests. The facilitated cultural, economic and political ties between Priština and Enver Hoxha's anti-Yugoslav regime additionally weakened Serbia's and Yugoslavia's ability to protect their sovereignty in Kosovo and Metohija.

This policy towards Albania was criticized only by the Yugoslav representatives in Tirana and some employees of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs; the leadership of Yugoslavia continued to encourage the rapprochement between Kosovo and Metohija and Albania. In late 1968, Broz rewarded Marko Nikezić, the head of Yugoslav diplomacy, by appointing him chairman of the League of Communists of Serbia. In early 1969, the Constitutional Act of Kosovo was promulgated, giving the province powers in the field of international re-

⁷⁰ Seiti passed on this message to Enver Hoxha on 19 September 1971. For more detail, see AQSH, f. 10, Enver Hoxha, g. III, n. IV, v. 1969, d. 387/1; Takimi i sekretarit të parë të KQ të PPSH, shokut Enver Hoxha me të ngarkuarin me punë të Republikës Popullore të Shqipërisë në Jugosllavi, Lik Seitin, në Tiranë, në datën 19. 9. 1970; E. Çeku, Kosovo and Diplomacy since World War II. Yugoslavia, Albania and the Path to Kosovan Independence (London–New York: IB Taurus, 2015), 117.

⁷¹ DAMSP, PA–1969, Albania, f. 1, d. 2, Information of the SSFA on Yugoslav-Albanian relations, 20 October 1969.

lations. The Albanian officials who had covertly communicated with Tirana in the previous period were appointed to the highest political and administrative positions in the country. By creating a problem for Serbia in Kosovo, Broz weakened its capacity to withstand and oppose separatist tendencies in other parts of Yugoslavia.

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Yugoslav-Greek Relations from the End of the Second World War to 1990

Chronology, Phases, Problems and Achievements**

Abstract: Yugoslav-Greek relations from the end of WWII to the breakup of Yugoslavia and went through several phases. A short period of interlude when the diplomatic relations were re-established 1945/1946 was followed by a much longer one (1946–1950) of conflict due to the Yugoslav support to the Communists in the Greek Civil War. A pragmatic approach to the issue of both parties resulted in a prolonged period (1950–1967) of working relations that culminated in the signing of tripartite treaties with Turkey, Treaty of Ankara (1953) and Bled Agreements (1954). Even though the treaties lost most of their importance after the reconciliation between Belgrade and Moscow in 1955/1956, and the Cyprus crisis, they created a climate of correct relations between two neighbouring states marked by reciprocal visits on the highest level. The coup d'état of April 1967 brought to power a dictatorship in Greece (1967-1974) and thus inaugurated a new period of tensions in bilateral relations. The last period 1974–1990 was characterized by good working relations between Belgrade and Athens mainly due to the Greece's efforts to integrate the European Economic Community (EEC) that supposed good relations with its neighbours. The issue of relations of Athens with Socialist Republic of Macedonia, first as a part of Socialst Yugoslavia, and then, after the collapse of the Federation, as the independent country, proved to be the last problem for Yugoslavia and a lasting one for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as it used to be known after 1990.

Keyword: Greece, Yugoslavia, bilateral relations, Greek Civil War, Greek dictatorship 1967– 1974, Macedonia

From the end of the Second World War to the end of the Cold War, relations between the neighbouring countries of Yugoslavia and Greece (and in the Yugoslav context, relations between the Serbian and the Greek people) had several conspicuously different periods and were anything but linear and simple. The curve of these relations shows major fluctuations in intensity, breadth and form. Their rise or fall to the point of paralysis was the result of a complex set of political circumstances and processes that have left a deep mark on some se-

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quences in the post-war global, European and Balkan history. The most crucial of these was the ideological-political break among the Allied countries – USA, Great Britain and USSR, which, in the vortex of the Cold War, drew many other countries into one or the other ideological bloc that emerged in the second half of the 1940s. Thus, the relations between the Yugoslav and Greek "sides" in this period of Balkan history were also marked by the fact that (now in a changed political and ideological context) the "Serbian factor" continued to exist as part of the Yugoslav federation, although it was – from the Greek point of view – always in the centre of interest and often identified as the dominant one.

At the end of the Second World War, the Balkan neighbours struggled with various roles, all of the adverse effects brought by the new political and ideological alignment during the war (when both Yugoslavia and Greece suffered brutal occupations at the hands of Germany, Italy and their allies), the fragmentation of their territories, the creation of collaborationist governments, exploitation of economic and human resources, oppressive measures and the suppression of all forms of resistance, the policy of denationalization, etc. From April 1941 (in the Greek case, until May and the retreat from Crete), the political and military leaderships of both counties were in exile under the protection of their British allies.¹ The occupation policies implemented in Greece and Yugoslavia led to the emergence of powerful resistance movements with ideologically different affiliations. This "polycentrism" in both countries laid the ground for internal divisions which would evolve into civil armed conflicts (in Yugoslavia, from late autumn 1941, the Partisan-Chetnik conflict; in Greece, with the start of the "first round" of the Civil War in 1943 between the left-wing EAM/ELAS and the anti-communist EDES, and the "second round" after the liberation of December 1944/January 1945).²

¹ On the occupation policy, resistance and collaboration in Greece, see Klaus Olshausen, Zwischenspiel auf dem Balkan. Die deutsche Politik gegenüber Jugoslawien und Greichenland von März bis Juli 1941 (Stuttgart 1973); Martin van Creveld, Hitler's Strategy 1940–1941: The Balkan Clue (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Ferdo Čulinović, Okupatorska podjela Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1970); Branko Petranović, Revolucija i kontrarevolucija u Jugoslaviji, 1941–1945, 2 vols. (Belgrade: Rad, 1983); Hagen Fleischer, Im Kreuzschaten der Mächte. Griechenland (1941–1944). Okkupation-Resistance-Kollaboration, 2 vols. (Frankfurt a. M., Bern and New York: Peter Lang, 1986); Mark Mazower, Inside Hitler's Greece. The Experience of Occupation, 1941–1944 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993); Heinz A. Richter, Griechenland 1940–1950: Die Zeit der Bürgerkriege (Mainz and Ruhpolding: Verlag Franz Philipp Rutzen, 2012), 19–23, 34.

² Milan Ristović, "The Third Reich's 'New Order' Planning and Practice in the Balkans 1941–1944: Serbian and Greek Cases", in *Macedonia and Thrace*, 1941–1944. Occupation-*Resistance-Liberation*, International Conference, Thessaloniki 9–11 December 1994 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1998), 33–49.

On the margins of the Second World War, attempts have been recorded of the representatives of these two governments in exile to lay the groundwork for closer political and economic cooperation in the future. The Yugoslav-Greek "union" of February 1942 was part of the more comprehensive plan of the British government for the post-war reconstruction of the Balkans and Central Europe, but it failed to have any real effect.³ There were attempts to establish cooperation between the two anti-communist movements (Draža Mihailović's Yugoslav Army in the Homeland (Jugoslovenska vojska u otadžbini, JVO) and EDES led by Colonel Napoleon Zervas).⁴ However, a far more significant event was the mission of the high representative of the People's Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) Svetozar Vuksanović Tempo at the headquarters of EAM-ELAS in Thessaly (1943). Their cooperation was to result in the creation of a joint "Balkan command" (including the Albanian communist movement). The initiative met with disapproval, primarily from the British allies, and was abandoned after being criticized by the Central Command of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (Narodnooslobodilačka vojska Jugoslavije, NOVJ). Tempo's criticism of the tactic of EAM-ELAS and their policy of dependence on the British, and the suggestion to radicalize and revolutionize it "after the Yugoslav example", with opening the "Macedonian Question", was met with little enthusiasm on the Greek side.5

The approaching end of the war reopened old and opened new dilemmas in these relations, both concerning internal organization (restoring the monarchy, establishing a republican system of "people's democracy" after the Soviet model, the relationship between communist and bourgeois parties, the issue of the collaborationist "war legacy", rebuilding, etc.) and the international positioning of these counties in the new international context. Factors of decisive importance were the will and interests of major Allied powers, which influenced the future direction that the contemporary history of the two countries would take: the so-called Percentages Agreement (Moscow, October 1944) between Stalin and Churchill (as well as Churchill and Roosevelt's previous agreement on an

³ See Detlef Brandes, Großbritanien und seine osteuropäische Allierten 1939–1943 (Munich: R. Oldenburg Verlag, 1988), 452–456; Veselin Djuretić, Vlada na bespuću. Internacionalizacija jugoslovenskih protivrječnosti na političkoj pozornici Drugog svjetskog rata (Belgrade: ISI and Narodna knjiga, 1982), 122–123; Milan Ristović, Turska osmatračnica (Belgrade: Čigoja, 2013), 135–147.

⁴ Arhiv Vojske Srbije [Archives of the Armed Forces of Serbia] (AVS), Arhiva neprijateljskih jedinica, b. 347, no. 14/3. On 5 February 1944, Mihailović authorized Captain Mihailo Vemić to represent him in contacts with Zervas.

⁵ Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, *Revolucija koja teče*, vol. 3 (Zagreb: Globus, 1982), 14, 15, 101–106.

"exchange" of interests with the Soviets: Romania for Greece), regardless of their "informality" and how the agreement on the "spheres of interest" was reached, cemented the foundations of the ideological-political division in the Balkans.⁶ While in the Yugoslav case, a complete "transfer of power" took place in 1945, when the Communist Party of Yugoslavia assumed control of all mechanisms of power and created a system of "people's democracy" in Yugoslavia, a part of the Soviet sphere of influence, the situation in Greece was very different.⁷

Bridging severed ties (1944/5-1946)

The clashes that began in early December 1944, due to the police intervention during the left-wing protests in Greece, opened the "second round" of the civil war. The British troops joined the struggle between EAM-ELAS and the rightwing forces. The revolt of EAM-ELAS was quashed in January, and the Treaty of Varkiza of February 1945 was to end the conflict and become a step forward in a peaceful political transition (resolving the issue of the king's return, organizing elections). The Yugoslav stance on the *Dekemvriana* (December events) in Athens was reserved, with no public displays of either sympathy or antipathy. It was influenced by the local situation (the war operations on the Syrmian (Srem) Front, organization of new government organs, clashes with the remaining political rivals), the warnings of the British allies (Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean, the British representative at the Central Command of the People's Liberation Army), and Stalin's passivity. The Greek communists' pleas for assistance, primarily in armaments, did not receive a positive reply from the leadership of NOVJ and CPY.⁸

After the Treaty of Varkiza, however, Yugoslavia received and organized accommodation for several thousand (4000–5000) émigré members of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and EAM-ELAS, who had refused to accept the terms of the treaty. The Greek commune in Buljkes, near Novi Sad, quickly became one of the key points of contention between Belgrade and Athens until

⁶ Elisabeth Barker, Britanska politika prema Jugoistočnoj Evropi u Drugom svjetskom ratu (transl. from the English original British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War) (Zagreb: Globus, 1978), 228, 229.

⁷ Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Modern Greece, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 125–144; John O. Iatrides, ed., Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1981).

⁸ Richter, *Griechenland 1940–1950*, 141–163; Milan Ristović, "L'insurrection de décembre à Athènes: Intervention britannique et réaction yougoslave", *Balcanica* XXXVII (2006), 271–282.

its dissolution in September 1949.⁹ At the same time, a conflict emerged between KKE and Slavo-Macedonian organizations (SNOF, NOF, MAO),¹⁰ which drew in Yugoslav communists, primarily those from the CPY branch in the People's Republic of Macedonia; this clash was to have far-reaching effects on the relations of the two communist parties and, later on, on the left-wing Democratic Army of Greece during the Greek Civil War.¹¹

The process of restoring diplomatic relations between the two governments was unfolding at the same time and - rather less conspicuously - the process of establishing cooperation between the two communist parties. The first post-war Yugoslav minister in Athens, Izidor Cankar, was appointed by a decree of the king's regents on 11 May 1945 but did not arrive in Greece until September; the Greek minister plenipotentiary Alexandros Dalietos arrived in Belgrade in November 1945. Both were recalled from their positions after the relations soured in 1946 and diplomatic relations were reduced to the chargé d'affaires level (Serif Sehović and Kalutzis respectively).¹² Using diplomatic channels and the press, the two governments accused each other of violating minority rights and persecuting leftists (Yugoslavia) or of meddling in internal affairs, supporting communists who were undermining legitimate authority, separatism, and territorial aspirations (Greece). In the brief period of "White Terror", the prelude to the civil war (which broke out in the spring of 1946, when a group of former ELAS members attacked a police station in the town of Litochoro near Mount Olympus), the Yugoslav side supported the position of the KKE and a part of the leadership around its secretary-general, Nikos Zachariadis, on the boycott of the February elections.¹³

⁹ Milan Ristović, Το περιαμα Μπουλκες. «Ηελληνικη Δημοκρατια» στιν Γιουοσλαβια 1945–1949 (Thessaloniki: Αδελφων Κυριακιδηα, 2006); Serbian ed.: Eksperiment Buljkes. Grčka utopija u Jugoslaviji 1945–1949 (Novi Sad: Platoneum, 2007).

¹⁰ SNOF – Slavomakedonski narodnooslobodilački front [Slavo-Macedonian People's Liberation Front]; NOF – Narodnooslobodilački front [People's Liberation Front]; MAO – Makedonska antifašistička organizacija [Macedonian Anti-Fascist Organization].

¹¹ Andrew Rososs, "Incompatible Allies: Greek Communism and Macedonian Nationalism in the Civil War in Greece, 1943–1949", *The Journal of Modern History* 69/1 (1997), 42–76; Risto Kirjazovski, *Makedonski nacionalni institucii vo Egejskiot del na Makedonija* (1941–1961) (Skopje: Institut za nacionalna istorija, 1987); Spyridon Sfetas, "Autonomist Movements of the Slavophones in 1944", *Balkan Studies* 36/2 (1995), 313; Milan Ristović, *Na pragu Hladnog rata: Jugoslavija i gradjanski rat u Grčkoj* (1945–1949) (Belgrade: Filozofski fakultet u Beogradu, 2016), 64–70 ff.

¹² Ristović, Na pragu Hladnog rata, 174–175.

¹³ Ibid. 103–105.

The Balkan frontier guards of a divided world: 1946–1949/50

At the outbreak of the Cold War, post-1945 Yugoslavia, a member of the system of people's democracy and the Soviet model in the Balkans, and Greece with its restored monarchy and rule of right-wing, anti-communist parties, found themselves at the opposite ends of the ideological barrier. Relations between the two countries reached their lowest point with their sharply divergent positions on the civil war (third round) in Greece. In February 1947, with the activation of the Truman Doctrine, the depth of this rift received a clear geostrategic and military confirmation.¹⁴ During the years of the civil war (until the summer of 1948), Yugoslavia was the most reliable political, logistic and military pillar of support to the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG) and its survival depended on it in many respects. DAG's operations were largely focused on the Greek borderlands with the neighbouring countries with communist systems, and its ranks, particularly in the last stage of the war, included many Slavo-Macedonians.¹⁵ Providing armaments, medical supplies, lines of communication, food, and clothing; organizing humanitarian aid; medical treatment of DAG's wounded combatants in Yugoslav territory; providing accommodation for refugees (civilians, children) and military training - all this was just a fragment of the aid that made its way to DAG from or through Yugoslavia.¹⁶ In late August 1947, a part of the KKE Politburo (Ioannidis and Roussos) relocated to Belgrade, while

¹⁴ Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope (New York: New American Library, 1965), 115–120. On the effects of the Truman Doctrine, see V. Kontis, H αγγλοαμερικανικη πολιτικη καο το ελλινικο προβλημα 1945–1949 (Thessaloniki: Παρατηρητης, 1986); John V. Kofas, Intervention and Underdevelopment. Greece during the Cold War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988); Ristović, Na pragu Hladnog rata, 169–201.

¹⁵ Notable examples of the extensive and growing literature on the Greek Civil War include Dominiqe Eudes, Les Kapetanios. La guerre civile grecque de 1943–1949 (Paris: Fayard, 1970); Matthias Esche, Die Kommunistische Partei Griechenlands 1941–1949. Ein Beitrag zur Politik der KKE vom Beginn der Resistance bis zum Ende des Bürgerkriegs (Munich and Vienna: Oldenburg, 1982); Giorgos Margaritis, Ιστοριατονελλενικονεμφυλουπολεμου 1946–1949 (Athens: Βιβλοραμα, 2005); Οελλινικος Εμφυλιος Πολεμος. Μια αποτιμηςη. Πολιτικες, ιδεολογικες, ιστοριογραφικες προεκτασεις (Athens: Ειληνικα Γραμματα, 2007); Richter, Griechenland 1940–1950.

¹⁶ Milan Ristović, "Το ζητημα της γιουγκοσλαβικης στρατιωτικης βοηθειας προς τον Δημοκρατικο Στρατο Ελλαδας, 1946–1949", in *Ο ελληνικος Εμφυλιος Πολεμος. Μια αποτιμηση. Πολιτικες, ιδεολογικες, ιστοριογραφικες προεκτασεις.* ed. Y. Mourelos (Athens: Ελληνικα Γραμματα, 2007); Idem, "Helping the Good Greeks': Yugoslav Humanitarian Aid to the Greek Leftist Movement 1945/1949", in Bearing Gifts to Greeks. Humanitarian Aid to Greece in the 1940s, ed. Richard Clogg (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 212–118; Idem, Ένα μακρυ ταξιδι. Τα παιδια του «παιδομαζωματος» στη Γιουγκοσλαβια 1948–1960 (Thessaloniki: Επικεντρο, 2008).

Zachariadis, Secretary-General of KKE, and Markos Vafeiadis, Commanderin-Chief of DAG, spent shorter or longer periods in the city.¹⁷ The frontier was the scene of constant incidents that involved members of Yugoslav frontier forces (People's Defence Corps of Yugoslavia or KNOJ) and Greek governmentcontrolled units, with many casualties on both sides. Members of former anticommunist and collaborationist formations and deserters from the Yugoslav Army fled across the border to Greece, while civilian refugees from border areas (along with members of DAG and KKE) crossed the border to the north.¹⁸

The proclamation of the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece at the very end of 1947 meant that Yugoslavia now faced the temptation of recognizing its legitimacy while maintaining formal diplomatic relations with the government in Athens, but a synchronized diplomatic pressure of the Western powers prevented this. Compared to other neighbouring countries and "people's democracies" (Bulgaria, Albania, Romania, etc.), the intensity and scope of its assistance to DAG and KKE can be seen as part of the growing self-awareness of the Yugoslav government and party leadership as the strongest and most prominent member in the family of communist countries on the southern frontier towards "capitalism and imperialism".¹⁹

Albeit reduced in scope, this assistance continued even after Stalin's directive of February 1948 "to end the matter of Greece".²⁰ The conflict with the USSR and other bloc members led to a rift between KKE and CPY. The removal of Markos from the position of DAG's commander-in-chief and "prime minister", increasingly bitter accusations of "Yugoslav insincerity" and "aid sabotage", along with Yugoslav counter-accusations that KKE's policy towards the Slavo-Macedonians had been wrong and that it had launched anti-Yugoslav propaganda, etc., resulted in late August in the suspension of relations,²¹ closing down the border and severing assistance. That was one of the prerequisites for thawing relations with the West during Yugoslavia's total blockade by the Cominform

¹⁷ Ristović, Na pragu Hladnog rata, 136–138.

¹⁸ Milan Ristović, "Small War on the Yugoslav-Greek Border 1945–1950", *Balkan Studies* 1 (2004), 95–108; Idem, "In the Shadow of the Civil War. Yugoslav Political Emigration in Greece 1944–1950", in *The Serbian (Yugoslav)-Greek Relations in the First Half of the Twentieth Century/Srpsko (jugoslovensko)-grčki odnosi u prvoj polovini dvadesetog veka* (Belgrade 2016), 197–218.

¹⁹ Ristović, Na pragu Hladnog rata, 238–258.

²⁰ For the decision to continue providing assistance to DAG after Stalin's criticism, see Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia] (AJ), Arhiva Josipa Broza-Tita (AJBT), I-2-a/35, Minutes of the meeting of the CPY leadership, KKE Secretary-General Nikos Zachariadis, and Yannis Ioannidis, 21 February 1948.

²¹ For these disputes, see the Yugoslav documents published by R. Kirjazovski, *Makedoncite i odnosite na KPJ I KPG 1945–1949*. Oficijalni dokumenti (Skopje 1995).

countries and its escape from almost complete isolation.²² The leadership of DAG and KKE in emigration accused Yugoslavia of "backstabbing". Conversely, after the end of the war in Greece, the official Yugoslav propaganda used publications, films and newspaper articles to deny these allegations, underlining its crucial role in assisting DAG and accusing the KKE leadership and Zachariadis of "ingratitude" and "misguided tactics".²³ In this context, other important questions included the intersection of the Yugoslav and Greek policies in their Balkan, European and global environment (the position of the Western powers, the Soviet factor, other Balkan countries, international organizations...). In this propaganda dispute, an inevitable segment was the conspicuous presence of different views on the *Macedonian Question*, the Slavo-Macedonian factor in KKE and DAG, and the influence of Greek political émigrés in Yugoslavia.

From normalizing relations to being allies: 1950–1967

As much as the Yugoslav side cared about distancing itself from its previous active support to the Greek communists and DAG, Athens was no less concerned about normalizing relations with its northern neighbour. Pragmatism pushed ideological differences aside, at least for a while, and removed the main point of contention between the two counties from their focus: the Macedonian Question. Due to very different understandings of this problem, it was a constant threat, which occasionally resurfaced as a setback in their good relations. The rise of the coalition of liberal Venizelists and the Centre Union Party led by Georgios Papandreou in 1950, which replaced the right-wing Tsaldaris government and his People's Party, favoured the improvement of relations. Four years after the withdrawal of Izidor Cankar, in December 1950, the new minister Radoš Jovanović arrived in the Greek capital; by the end of the same year, the Greek minister plenipotentiary Spyros Capetanidis came to Belgrade and, late that year, the respective diplomatic missions were raised to the rank of embassies.²⁴ The re-establishment of severed political, economic and transport links began; the question of the status of the Yugoslav Free Zone in Thessaloniki was

²² On the severance of cooperation, see Ristović, Na pragu Hladnog rata, 309–329.

²³ See I. D. Mihailidis, Τα προσωπατου Ιανου. Οι ελληνογιουγκοσλαβικεσ σχεσεις τις παραμοωες του ελληνικου Εμφυλιου Πολεμου (1944–1946) (Athens: Πατακη, 2004); Vasilis K. Gounaris, Εγνωμενων Κοινωνικων Φρονηματων, Κοινωνικες και αλλεσ οψεις τον αντικομμοθωισμου στη Μακεδονια του Εμφιλιου Πολεμου (Thessaloniki: Επικεντρο, 2005). On the Yugoslav "propaganda view" of Greece, see Ristović, Na pragu Hladnog rata, 423–452.

²⁴ Arhiv Minstarstva inostranih poslova [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (AMIP), Politička arhiva [Political Archive] (PA), Greece, f. 30, 22, 4224171, 2 December 1950; f. 30, d 25, 423976, 27 December 1950. The Yugoslav mission was raised to the rank of an embassy in December 1952.

broached; on the frontier normalized. In July 1952, a Greek parliamentary delegation arrived in Belgrade, and on 28 November, the Yugoslav president received a Greek military delegation. Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952, a move which the Yugoslav leadership saw as a sign – as specified in a confidential document – of the growing American influence in the Mediterranean, "indicating, among other things, cooperation with Yugoslavia as a factor in the consolidation of the government's position and the strengthening of Greek national independence". The new situation "objectively demands cooperation with Yugoslavia in the military field". In this context, in Greece, there was now "understanding for cooperation to an extent that corresponds to our view… not to create any military pacts… but to develop cooperation and understanding in all fields of international relations".²⁵

After the accelerated diplomatic activities between Belgrade, Athens and Ankara, with the support of the US, the tripartite Treaty of Ankara (officially the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation, 28 February 1953) and the Bled Agreement (9 August 1954) were signed.²⁶ In view of the different political and ideological systems of the signatories, these accords were a unique experiment that would not be seen in Europe until the end of the Cold War. Due to the signatories' political differences as well as the nature and the context in which the Balkan Pact emerged, it was ridden with too many ambiguities and obscurities and, as such, doomed to fail from its very inception. Over the course of 1955 and 1956, Yugoslavia re-established its relations with the USSR, which had been frozen since the late 1940s. Athens and Ankara, as well as their Western allies, were apprehensive about the Yugoslav rapprochement with Moscow. On the other side, unresolved Greek-Turkish issues, primarily those associated with the (future) status of Cyprus, undermined the stability of the Balkan Pact. Embedded into its very fabric, these two "viruses", along with the inevitable impact of the unstable international environment of the Cold War in the 1950s, led to the marginalization and, eventually, dissolution of the Pact.²⁷ However, despite

²⁵ Balkanski pakt. Zbornik dokumenata iz Arhiva Vojnoistorijskog instituta, Arhiva Ministarstva inostranih poslova i Arhiva Josipa Broza (1952–1960) (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 2005).

²⁶ See Ugovor o prijateljstvu i saradnji između FNRJ, Kraljevine Grčke i Republike Turske, Ankara 28. Februar 1953; Balkanski pakt: Ugovor o savezu, političkoj saradnji i uzajamnoj pomoći između Jugoslavije, Grčke i Turske, Bled 9. Avgust 1954, in Momir Stojković, ed., Balkanski ugovorni odnosi, vol. III: 1946–1996 (Belgrade: JO Službeni list SRJ and Međunarodna politika, 1999), 235–240, 258–262.

²⁷ After the signing of the Pact in Ankara, the British Ambassador in Ankara, A. Know, told his Yugoslav colleague Pavićević that the idea of signing the pact was good but that "the Balkan Pact needed to establish a link with NATO to form an interrupted chain of defence". This would, however, be impossible as long as there was the Trieste problem as an obstacle to the realization of the Balkan Pact; AMIP, PA, 1953, R 69, d 14, 417295, Pavićević (Ankara)

being short-lived and having little practical impact, this alliance had a beneficial effect on the relations among the Balkan countries, particularly those between Athens and Belgrade.

The intensity and high level of relations between Belgrade and Athens are evidenced by the chronology of visits and meetings between the leading figures of the two countries. In late May 1954, Josip Broz Tito made an official visit to Greece; the Greek royal couple returned the visit in early September 1955. In 1956, Tito met King Paul and Prime Minister Karamanlis in Corfu. In September the same year, he received a delegation of the Greek Orthodox Church headed by Archbishop Dorotheos. In early November, Primer Minister Karamanlis and Minister Evangelos Averoff made an official visit to Yugoslavia. In July 1957, the Greek royal couple came to the island of Brioni; in 1958, the speaker of the Greek Parliament Rodopoulos visited Belgrade; and in early March 1959, Tito travelled to Rhodes. Karamanlis came to Yugoslavia again in late May 1960. Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou came to Yugoslavia on an official visit in February 1966. In the same period, several high-ranking Yugoslav delegations travelled to Greece. In the early 1960s, the relations soured with the opening of the Macedonian Question and then the issues of the status of the Ortodox Church in the Peoples Republic of Macedonia (later: Socialist Republic-SR), the language used in shared documents, the position of Greek émigrés in Yugoslavia, etc. This dynamic of relations came to an end in 1967 after the coup and establishment of the military junta in Greece.

A new "winter" in Greco-Yugoslav relations: 1967–1974

The military coup of 21 April 1967 by a group of officers led by Georgios Papadopoulos, Nikolaos Makarezos and Stylianos Pattakos represented the culmination of the political crisis that had lasted a few years and the conflicts between the leading political figures and parties, the court and the political elite, along with economic troubles and worsening relations in the region.²⁸ A few weeks

to SIP, 24 December 1953. Cavendish Cannon, the US ambassador in Athens, informed Ambassador Jovanović about the view of the NATO leadership that "no military Balkan Pact was possible at the moment" due to the resistance of Nordic countries and Italy. The US government and NATO Command were attempting to form the European Defence Union as soon as possible and to consolidate NATO, and "hence the Balkan Pact was not to create any new problems", but that his government believed that the Treaty of Ankara was important and supported the cooperation of the three countries, but that "the ground needed to be prepared" before a military agreement could be made; AMIP, PA, Greece, 1954, f 27, d 2, 43398, Jovanović (Athens) to SIP, 17 March 1954; AMIP, PA, R 69, 1954, d 25, highly confidential 18105, SIP to YU Embassy in Athens and Ankara, November 1954.

²⁸ D. H. Close, Greece since 1945. Politics, Economy and Society (London, New York and Toronto: Longman, 2002), 107–110.

before the scheduled elections,²⁹ a far-right nationalist junta put their plan into motion and "cut" the crisis and introduced a dictatorship, which would last seven years and leave multiple international consequences, including the deterioration of Greece's relations with Yugoslavia.³⁰ The coup thus put an end to the positive trend in their relations. Up to the end of 1968, relations between Belgrade and Athens went through a period of almost complete cooling to a gradual and cautious "feeling of the pulse" to the level of guarded normalization. This situation would last, with occasional ups and downs, until the fall of the junta in 1974. Concurrently with international relations, the Yugoslav side maintained intense contacts with the Greek opposition, both its part which operated in the difficult circumstances in the country and its most prominent members and groups of various ideological persuasions that fought against the military dictatorship from abroad.³¹ In the first months after the takeover, the leaders of the junta and the regime-controlled press warned the Greek people of the "danger from the north" and the "Slavic threat" mixed with communism, while highlighting the uniqueness of the Greek nation and its Orthodox faith. The increased presence of Greek troops on the frontier and arrests and expulsions of Yugoslav nationals contributed to the deterioration of relations.³² The coup also exacerbated the situation in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. All of this together led to negative public assessments of the situation in Greece and the distancing of the Yugoslav government from any kind of official contacts with the new regime in Athens that could potentially be interpreted as acceptance of the new situation or legitimizing the junta.³³

²⁹ The elections were scheduled for 28 May 1967; AMIP, PA, Greece, 1967, f 40, d 15, strictly confidential 413141, Ambassador Javorski's report on his conversation with Prime Minister Kanellopoulos, 11 April 1967.

³⁰ Close, Greece since 1945, 115–118.

³¹ See Milan Ristović, "Yugoslavia and Greek Political Emigration during Military Dictatorship, 1967–1974", in *O Κονσταντινος Καραμανλης στον εικοστο αιονα – Konstantinos Karamanlis in the Twentieth Century*. Conference, Zappeion, Athens 5–9 June 2007, vol. 1 (Athens: Ιδρυμα "Κονσταντινος Καραμανλης", 2008), 260–277.

³² A few Yugoslav nationals were arrested in Athens, including the official representative of *Jadrolinija* and two Greek employees of the Yugoslav Embassy: the translator A. Leftarakis and the attorney Ioannis Kokorelis. The list of "agents of enemy intelligence services" included four female Yugoslav nationals married to Greek men; AMIP, PA, Greece, 1967, f 42, d 2, strictly confidential 417399, Javorski to DSIP, 16 May 1967. The prominent football manager Stjepan Bobek was also forced to leave Greece; AJ, AJBT, 193/1, DSIP, no. 414456, II Directorate, Memo on the measures taken by DSIP in relation to the military coup in Greece, 3 May 1967.

³³ Ibid. See also AMIP, PA, Greece, 1967, f 41, d 1, strictly confidential 41445, Memo on the measures, 3 May 1967.

On 28 May, the counselor to the Yugoslav state secretary for foreign affairs, Srdjan Prica, summoned the Greek ambassador Nikolaos Cambalouris and presented him with a démarche: "... due to the actions of the Greek authorities toward SFRY, our representatives and citizens... (on account of) the suspension of local border traffic... the arrests of the representatives of Jadrolin*ija...* (and) two other nationals, hampering the work of representative branches, discrimination of the representative of Tanjug, confiscation of press material intended for our Embassy".³⁴ For his part, the Greek ambassador delivered a protest about the demonstrations in front of the Greek Consulate General in Skopje. The Yugoslav president, the Foreign Policy Committee of the Federal Assembly, the state secretary for foreign affairs, and all political organizations also expressed concerns about the events taking place in the southern neighbour. The Yugoslav press published sharp condemnations of the dictatorship, with the censures of Leon Davičo (reporter of the Politika daily) and A. Partonić (reporter of the Borba daily, who had been denied an extension of his residence permit in Greece) being particularly stern.³⁵ The new Greek regime suspended the agreement on local border traffic, claiming that it facilitated the activities of Greek political émigrés living in the Yugoslav borderlands. The Yugoslav State Secretary Marko Nikezić explained that this move on the part of the Greek government represented "...a confirmation of the assessment that the events in Greece could not fail to have adverse effects on the relations between the two countries, in the Balkans, and even beyond".36 Mihailo Javorski, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Athens, believed that there was a difference between the more moderate and pragmatic-minded civilian representatives in the Greek government (Prime Minister Kollias and Foreign Minister Gouras), who were in favour of good relations with Yugoslavia. Colonel Papadopoulos, a minister with the presidency of the government and one of the regime's chief ideologues, advocated the most radical anti-communist stance. For him and the Interior Minister Pattakos, Yugoslavia was much more dangerous than the Eastern European countries that were members of the Warsaw Pact due to its increased ideological and political "elasticity" and the assertiveness of Yugoslav communists. They saw it as "the old Pan-Slavic threat in a different guise", now reframed as communism. At the beginning of the military regime, Papadopoulos hinted at the possibility of a unilateral and total "freezing of relations" with all socialist countries, mentioning the suspension of relations with Yugoslavia but noting that this depend-

³⁴ He was in Belgrade from January 1965 to September 1967.

³⁵ AMIP, PA, Greece, 1967, f 42, d 2, strictly confidential 422354, II directorate to SFRY Embassy in Athens, 1 June 1967.

³⁶ AJ, AJBT, 416341, strictly confidential, 559/1, Office of the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 18 May 1967, Memo on the conversation of State Secretary M. Nikezić and Greek Ambassador N. Cambalouris, 15 May 1967.

ed on Yugoslavia "which needed Greece and not vice versa, as has been shown over the years".³⁷

According to the Yugoslav State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (DSIP, from the early 1970s renamed as the Federal Secretariat of Foreign Affairs – SSIP), the crisis that resulted from the Arab-Israeli War³⁸ strengthened the position of the generals' regime in Athens because the West alleviated its pressure on it. The new situation meant that Yugoslav policy also needed to be adapted. Further refusal to maintain contacts with the junta representatives became "in-adequate". The recommendation was as follows: the Yugoslav ambassador was "nevertheless to visit the new minister of foreign affairs, but among the last", while bilateral relations were to be continued through "purely practical matters". The Yugoslav representatives were advised to keep in mind that, "regardless of its regime change", Greece was a neighbouring country and "represented a constant in our foreign affairs."

The pro-junta press referred to Yugoslavia as a state with territorial pretensions towards Greece, and the uncanonical proclamation of the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church was met with a negative reaction from Athens. In the second half of 1967, the situation was appeased in some statements of Greek officials from the civilian part of the government and the occasional absence of Yugoslav topics in the Greek press. The renewed conflicts in Cyprus were an opportunity to re-establish contacts between the Yugoslav ambassador and Pipinelis, the new minister of foreign affairs in the Greek government.⁴⁰

The Yugoslav diplomats serving in European countries also established contacts with the Greek political emigration but, in this case, they were advised to assume a cautious position and not to become involved "...in any illegal activities or arrangements... aimed at toppling the current regime", citing the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.⁴¹

³⁷ AMIP, PA, Greece, 1967, f 42, d 2, strictly confidential 422354, head of II Directorate Zvonko Lucić to SFRY Embassy in Athens, 1 June 1967.

³⁸ Arab-Israeli War, also known as the Six-Day War, June 1967. See Martin Gilbert, *Jerusalem in the Twentieth Century* (London: Pimlico, 1996), 272–297.

³⁹ See ibid., n. 38. See also AMIP, PA, Greece, 1967, f 42, d 2, strictly confidential 425018, DSIP Memo to the embassies in Eastern European countries, 12 July 1967.

⁴⁰ In Cyprus, the junta had a reliable yet problematic ally in the leader of the extremist guerrilla organisation EOKA, General Grivas. During and shortly after WWII, Grivas headed the paramilitary anti-communist group known as Organization X or Chites (Χίτες).

⁴¹ AMIP, PA, Greece, 1967, f 42, d 3, strictly confidential 427224, DSIP, II Directorate to SFRY embassies in Europe, 9 August 1967; M. Ristović, "Yugoslavia and Greek Political Emigration 1967–1974", in *Konstantine Karamanlis in the Twentieth Century*, 260–278.

In early 1968, the situation of the Greek civil opposition, after the failed counter-coup of King Constantine on 13 December 1967⁴² and talks with Mavros, an official of the Centre Union, was seen by the Yugoslav Embassy as "being without prospects" and "unclear"; all hopes rested on disunity in the regime's ranks and international pressure, above all that of the United States. The position of the opposition was judged to be difficult: Papandreou, father and son were under police surveillance, as was the former Prime Minister Kanellopoulos. Mavros was planning to go abroad, make contacts with the king and Karamanlis, and confer with them about the possible responses to the proclamation of a new constitution to suit the interests of the generals' regime.⁴³ On 10 January, the Nobel laureate Georgios Seferis⁴⁴ visited Javorski; in an act of defiance, Seferis had refused to publish his works in Greece as long as the dictatorship was in power and rejected offers to leave the country. The release of Andreas Papandreou and the composer Mikis Theodorakis, the leader of Lambrakis Democratic Youth who had ties with KKE, was seen as a manoeuvre which the regime had been forced to make to avoid two political trials that would have certainly been highly publicized both at home and abroad.⁴⁵

In early 1968, Ambassador Javorski concluded that, due to the problems of US and NATO with the Greek regime, the USSR was toying with the possibility of making this situation permanent, but was reserved on account of the opinion that any action on its part could accelerate a compromise between the junta and the West.⁴⁶

In an attempt to restore relations between the Yugoslav and Greek communist parties, the Yugoslavs were particularly reserved toward the part of the KKE leadership in exile in the USSR and other Eastern European countries. This "faction" was seen as an instrument in the hands of Soviet policy. The rift between the Greek communists was believed to be harmful to the prospects of the struggle against the junta. Contacts with Partsalidis's group, seen as more independent and less dogmatic than Koligiannis's, were intensified. The course

⁴² AJ, AJBT, I-3-a/31-20, Information on Greece after the generals' coup, 28 July 1967; AMIP, PA, Greece, 1967, f 41, d 5, strictly confidential 442538, DSIP, Directorate for international organizations to the Permanent Mission of SFRY in the UN, Embassy assessment of the king's counter-coup, 19 December 1967.

⁴³ AMIP, PA, Greece, 1968, f 41, d 1, strictly confidential 4169, Javorski (Athens) to DSIP, 6 January 1968.

⁴⁴ Seferis received the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1963.

⁴⁵ AMIP, PA, Greece, 1968, f 40, d 1, strictly confidential 4368, SFRY Embassy (Athens) to DSIP, 10. I 1968; Milan Ristović, "Mikis Teodorakis, Tito i jugoslovenski drugovi. Iz istorije odnosa grčke levice i Jugoslavije 1967–1970", *Tokovi istorije* 3-4 (2004), 55–72.

⁴⁶ AMIP, PA, Greece, 1968, f. 41, d 1. strictly confidential, 43033, Javorski (Athens) to DS-SIP, 22 January 1968.

of relations was influenced by the views on the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia espoused by the members of different groups within KKE. Koligiannis supported the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia (ČSSR), while twelve members of the KKE Central Committee condemned the Soviet intervention. In late October, S. Zographos, a member of the KKE Politburo (Partsalidis's group), arrived in Belgrade and reported the view that the intervention of the Warsaw Pact was a highly unexpected and unwelcome surprise which added to the increasingly deeper rift within KKE.⁴⁷

In 1968, contacts were intensified with the Greek political émigrés in Europe, the US and Canada. On 11 March 1968, the secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy in Paris Martinović talked with Andreas Papandreou, who informed him that he had formed the "Panhellenic Liberation Movement" (PAK). In late May, the State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs advised its representatives not to avoid contacts with the Greek political emigration but to take care not to seem as interfering in the internal affairs of Greece or as if Yugoslavia was planning any kind of intervention. A special warning was that they were to exclude the possibility of more extensive material aid or participation in any kind of subversive anti-regime activity. In addition, in cooperating with the left, its internal factions, the infiltration of Greek and other intelligence services and possible provocations were to be borne in mind.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had led, Athens reported, to "growing sympathy" for Yugoslavia in the ranks of the junta.⁴⁸ Belgrade welcomed the official "Greek recognition of our view regarding the occupation of ČSSR (and) understanding for our position and the (expressed) wish to promote cooperation". This was an opportunity to expand contacts with the members of the Greek government, "including Prime Minister Papadopoulos", the start of economic exchange and possibly the exchange of military missions, the renewal of the joint commission, tourist and cultural cooperation. A new "rectification" of the tone regarding the *Macedonian Question* was deemed necessary. Belgrade

⁴⁷ AJ, A CK SKJ, KMOV, Greece, IX-33/I-718-779, 1959–1970, k 7, confidential no. 013/ III-1534, Memo on the conversation of D. Kunc, head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Contacts of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia with S. Zographis, member of the KKE Politburo, 28 October 1968. The plenum of CC KKE held in Ljubljana and Trieste in late April 1969, where a group of younger officials led by A. Brilakis received the majority vote of support. In September 1969, Stane Dolanc, a member of the Executive Bureau of the Presidency of the LCY, promised help to the secretary of Executive Committee EDA N. Karras and the secretary of the KKE Buro B. Drakopoulos, and generally gave his consent to the opening of a KKE branch in Yugoslavia; ibid., Confidential 1705-881, Information on the visit of the KKE delegation to Belgrade, 12 October 1969.

⁴⁸ AMIP, PA, Greece, 1968, f 42, d 4, strictly confidential 437258, Javorski (Athens) to DSIP, 12 October 1968.

instructed Javorski not to focus on this topic in his meeting with Papadopoulos since it could be seen as exacerbating relations.

In December 1968, the Greek police for foreigners arrested the assistant of the Yugoslav military envoy, Lt. Col. Čerović, and his wife, after they were tricked by a police provocateur. Ambassador Javorski interceded with Minister Pipinelis, the affair was hushed up, and Čerović was recalled from Athens.⁴⁹ After Greece was expelled from the Council of Europe and Karamanlis condemned the junta, the isolation of the regime in Athens became even more pronounced. The Greek government tried to partially compensate for the new situation by expanding its economic cooperation with the USSR. In these unfavourable circumstances for the junta, Yugoslavia was "the easiest and most acceptable partner".

On the third anniversary of the junta's rise to power, in April 1970, the Yugoslav Secretariat of Foreign Affairs concluded that, regardless of the antidemocratic and anti-communist nature of the generals' regime, anything that could negatively impact mutual trust between the countries should be avoided; that "... controversial questions should not impede the development of relations in other fields"; and that the government in Athens would be willing to develop relations only insofar as it suited "... their national and bloc interests". It particularly stressed that in bilateral relations it should be made clear that the "policy of the (Yugoslav) federal government toward Greece... was a shared policy formulated with the participation of all Yugoslav republics."50 This was meant to refute allegations heard in talks with Greek interlocutors that the views of the Yugoslav federal government were not fully consistent with those of the republic-level government in Skopje, and that the pressure of Skopje on Belgrade was the cause of the "misunderstanding" about the Macedonian Question.⁵¹ The statement of an MP from SR Macedonia (Naum Pejov) in the Federal Parliament about the position of Slavo-Macedonians in Greece led Athens to issue a new protest and launch a new propaganda campaign, including allegations of certain territorial pretensions on the part of Yugoslavia.⁵² The new worsening in relations in the first half of 1971 was the result of attacks on Yugoslavia in a part of the Greek press, especially in Thessaloniki-based papers, and protests of the Greek govern-

⁴⁹ AMIP, PA, Greece, 1970, f 51, d 25, DSIP, strictly confidential 490, The case of Lieutenant Colonel Čerović, assistant to the military attaché, 7 January 1969.

⁵⁰ AMIP, PA, Greece, 1970, f 53 d 5, strictly confidential 46902, 17 April 1970. "Nacrt platforme za nasu dalju aktivnost prema Grčkoj".

⁵¹ See, e.g., AMIP, PA, Greece, 1971, f 40 d 2, confidential 410497, Memo on the conversation of the Deputy State Secretary A. Vratuša with the Greek Ambassador S. Tetenes, 22 March 1971, 24 March 1971.

⁵² AMIP, PA, Greece, 1940, f 53, d 5, strictly confidential 43160, DSIP to Executive Council of SR Macedonia, 27 January 1970.

ment about the statements made by republic-level officials of SR Macedonia, Greek-language broadcasts on Radio Skopje, the writings of Skopje historians and newspapers, and the showing of the movie "Crno seme" (Black Seed).⁵³ Regardless of positive advances in economic cooperation, it was stressed that "the most difficult problem in our relations (remains) ... the position of the Macedonian national minority". On this matter, the military regime had continued to pursue the same policy "as all previous Greek governments", and any Yugoslav interest was seen as "interference in internal affairs" and a sign of "covert territorial revendication", with an insistence on not broaching this question.⁵⁴

In October 1970, Anton Vratuša, the Yugoslav Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, talked with his Greek colleague Palamas in New York about the relations between the two countries. In June 1971, at the airport in Athens, Palamas briefly met the chief of Yugoslav diplomacy Mirko Tepavac.⁵⁵ On 23 November 1970, Pattakos received Ambassador Vučinić. The conversation was formal and the Yugoslav ambassador underlined the Greek government's improper treatment of Yugoslavia as an "Eastern European country" and the deterioration of the two countries' relations since the ascension of the "new government". As a gesture of goodwill, Pattakos promised to relocate a juvenile correctional facility from the island of Vido, where a mausoleum to the Serbian soldiers fallen in the First World War is located, and to open the island to visitors.⁵⁶ The promise was well-received in Belgrade and seen as establishing "balance" in the relations between Greece and Yugoslavia at the time when an official Greek delegation visited Bulgaria.⁵⁷ In late July 1971, Ambassador Vučinić discussed economic relations with Minister Makarezos. One of the questions on the agenda was

⁵³ A film by Kiril Cenevski, a Skopje-based director, was awarded first prize at the Festival of Yugoslav Film in Pula (1971). The plot of the movie takes place in 1945, at a military camp on an unnamed Greek island; the internees of the camp are leftist members of the army, including one Slavo-Macedonian, who suffers brutal torture; on the protests of the Greek government against the screening of this film, see AMIP, PA, Greece, 1972, f 40 d 14, confidential 45796, SSIP, II Directorate, Information on the film "Crno seme", 4 January 1972; AMIP, PA, Greece, 1971, f 40 d 2, confidential 410497, 24 March 1971; AMIP, PA, Greece, 1971, f 41,d 7, strictly confidential 410185, DSIP to Executive Council of SR Macedonia, 26 March 1971.

⁵⁴ AMIP, PA, Greece, 1971, f 41, d 1, strictly confidential 410186, DSIP, Yugoslav-Greek relations, 16 April 1971.

⁵⁵ AMIP, PA, Greece, 1970, f 52, d 5, strictly confidential 439993, SSIP to IV SR Macedonia, Information on the Conversation of A. Vratuša with Palamas in New York, 28 October 1970; ibid., Greece 1971, f 40, d 1, Federal Executive Council. Visit of Deputy State Secretary of the Greek MFA Christos Xanthopoulos-Palamas to Yugoslavia, 8–10 October 1971.

⁵⁶ AMIP, PA, Greece 1970, f 53, d 5, SFRY Embassy Athens (Vučinić) to DSIP, strictly confidential 44350, 25 November 1970.

⁵⁷ AMIP, PA, Greece, 1970, f 56, d 6, strictly confidential 444512, N. Mandić (DSIP, Directorate for Europe) to Executive Council of SR Macedonia, 8 December 1970.

the construction of an oil pipeline Thessaloniki-Skopje and an oil refinery in Skopje, a matter previously mentioned to the Yugoslav government by Tom Papas, an American businessman of Greek descent. In mid-1968, Papas had visited Belgrade to assess the prospects for cooperation with the representatives of Yugoslav oil companies.⁵⁸ Deputy Secretary Palamas made his first (and also highest-ranking) visit to Belgrade from 8 to 10 September 1971, at the time when Greece managed to emerge from its isolation in the Balkans (Palamas's trip to Sofia, the visit of the Romanian minister Mănescu to Athens, establishing diplomatic relations with Albania, an exchange of messages with Ankara).⁵⁹ Tepavac and Palamas met again on 11 October in New York.

The political and economic crisis in Yugoslavia and developments in Croatia were highly publicized in the Greek regime-controlled press, which used this opportunity to write extensively about the failure of the Yugoslav experiment, the dangers of a revival of nationalism, and the economic problems of Tito's regime.⁶⁰ The crisis was described as "latent" and interpreted as a reason for Yugoslavia's increased need for cooperation with Greece. According to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, this view was the result of the much-improved position of the Greek regime, which the leading Western powers, led by their own interests, "had accepted... as reality". The USSR was also making "efforts to improve relations, especially on the economic level... while leaving political manifestations to Bulgaria and Romania". The Greek government was prepared to develop cooperation with Yugoslavia in a limited number of fields (commodity exchange, the regulation of the Vardar, road transport). It had a firmly negative position on all questions associated with the Macedonian Question (local border traffic, construction of the Thessaloniki-Skopje oil pipeline, liberalization of visas, tourism, and cultural cooperation with SR Macedonia). The Yugoslav Ministry proposed a tactic that had no chance of bringing a positive result: that the focus in bilateral relations in the coming period, including economic relations, should be on a more intense involvement of SR Macedonia. This approach was expected to secure an increased interest of Greek businessmen and indirectly to alleviate reservations toward Yugoslavia and the Macedonian Question.⁶¹

⁵⁸ AMIP, PA, Greece, 1971, f 42, d 2, strictly confidential 427429, DSIP to Executive Council of SR Macedonia, 29 July 1971; ibid., Greece, 1968, f 42, d 4, Ambassador M. Javorski (Athens) to Executive Council of SR Serbia. Report on the meeting with Tom Papas, 22 May 1968.

⁵⁹ AMIP, PA, Greece, 1971, f 41, d 7, strictly confidential 437074, N. Mandić (DSIP) to Executive Council of SR Macedonia, 11- X 1971.

⁶⁰ AMIP, PA, Greece, 1971, f 40, d 5, confidential 445512, SSIP to Council for International Relations of the Parliament of SR Croatia, 21 December 1971.

⁶¹ AMIP, PA, Greece 1970, f 38, d 7, 445275, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, II Directorate, Information on Greece and Yugoslav-Greek relations, 29 December 1972.

The Greek request for its warships to visit Yugoslav ports was refused in February 1972, with the explanation that the visit was unacceptable due to the deteriorating military-political situation in the Mediterranean (allowing the US Sixth Fleet to use bases, the events concerning Cyprus) and the role of Greece in the crisis. Another reason was the visit of Soviet ships to Split and the visit of Marshal Grechko, the Soviet Minister of Defence.⁶² Given the amicable relations between Archbishop Makarios and President Tito, in early March 1972 Palamas asked Ambassador Vučinić to inform Belgrade of his assurances that the Greek government had not wanted to engineer the overthrow of the Cypriot president with its actions. The intention was to "make him more flexible and allow ... an agreement with the Turkish community and unblock Greco-Turkish relations." He accused Makarios of being the most responsible for complicating these relations, warning him that he "might become an object in the Soviet game, a development that Greece would hardly be indifferent to".

The change in the junta leadership (the replacement of Regent Zoitakis) was seen in Belgrade as part of an internal showdown and struggle for power, in which Patakis proved more adroit.⁶³ The regime was becoming more involved in the crisis in Cyprus and the cracks in the junta leadership were becoming more evident; freedom of the press was suppressed and economic problems were surfacing. The Yugoslav side also highlighted the situation in the opposition. Despite the agreement on the cooperation of left- and right-wing resistance organizations signed on I February 1971 in Paris (Patriotic Front, Democratic Defence - Free Greeks and Defenders of Freedom), which did not include Papandreou's PAK, discord became the most serious obstacle to any meaningful actions against the regime.⁶⁴ In October 1972, mass arrests of communists ensued (Parcalidis, Drakopoulos, and thirty-three others), who were accused of terrorism and plotting to break away a part of the national territory. Like some earlier arrests of resistance members, despite their "internal purpose", these were seen in Belgrade as a gesture intended for the US and Vice-President S. Agnew.⁶⁵ In mid-1972, the student movement emerged as a new prospective factor of democratic defence and the instigator of a new dynamic of anti-junta resistance. The attempt to quash the increasingly relevant student protests brought together the university leadership, the Ministries of Education and Internal Affairs, and the

⁶² AMIP, PA, Greece, 1972, f 40, d 5, confidential 46500, Federal Secretariat for National Defense to SSIP, 21 February 1972.

⁶³ AMIP, PA, Greece, 1972, f 38, d 1, confidential 411364/72, Embassy in Athens (Vučinić) to SSIP, 27 March 1972.

⁶⁴ AMIP, PA, Greece, 1972, f 38, d 2, strictly confidential 435390, Embassy in Athens to SSIP, 30 September 1972.

⁶⁵ AMIP, PA, Greece, 1972, f 41, d 1, confidential 439479, Embassy in Athens (Vučinić) to SSIP, 1 November 1972.

very top of the country's leadership. Police measures and arrests proved unsuccessful, as did the verbal acceptance of student demands and small concessions regarding academic requirements.⁶⁶

In March 1973, the students of the University of Athens took control of the Faculty of Law; in May, the crew of the destroyer Velos mutinied; a wide conspiracy was uncovered in the Navy.⁶⁷ The abolition of the monarchy added little to the consolidation of the regime. What followed was a rigidly controlled and referendum with Papadopoulos as the only candidate, who thereby secured an eight-year presidential term, promising to call elections. The uncertainty was exacerbated by the ever-sharper clash within the regime between the "radicals" (Pattakos, Ladas, Gantonas, and Lekas) and the "moderates" (Papadopoulos and his brothers, Makarezos). The mass student uprising in November at the Athens Polytechnic, joined by workers and students in other towns, and the regime's brutal response (heavy deployment of police and tanks in the streets) were a bloody prologue to the last chapter in the rule of the junta. States of emergency and martial courts were introduced. Having put down the uprising, Papadopoulos ended the state of emergency in the country but not in Athens. The Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked its diplomatic missions throughout the world to urgently (no later than 28 November) send opinions and commentaries of the official circles, along with views and assessments of the situation that had resulted from the student uprising and the regime's response, "...which can have significant long-term consequences on the political situation and Greece and some impact on the relations of some NATO members and especially the USA with this country."68

However, the military coup d'état led by generals Dimitrios Ioannidis and Phaedon Gizikas took place. The putschists overthrew and arrested Papadopoulos, dissolved the government, and re-introduced a nation-wide state of emergency. In the new, hastily assembled cabinet, the Minister of Foreign Affairs became Spiridon Tetenes, the former Greek ambassador in Belgrade.⁶⁹ The

⁶⁶ AMIP, PA, Greece, 1972, f 38, d 1, confidential 444015, AMIP, PA Greece, f 38, d 1, Embassy in Athens to SSIP, 6 December 1972; ibid., f 36, d 9, strictly confidential 49374, Activities of the student movement, 22 February 1973.

⁶⁷ AMIP, PA, Greece 1973, f 37, d 1, strictly confidential 422834, Embassy in Athens to SSIP (II Directorate), The case of the destroyer "Velos", 28 May 1973; ibid., confidential 424361, Memo on the conversation of Ambassador Vučinić in Athens with Stephanopoulos, the former prime minister, 29 May 1973.

⁶⁸ AMIP, PA, Greece 1973, f 37, d 3, confidential 449896, SSIP to embassies, 22 November 1973.

⁶⁹ AMIP, PA, Greece 1973, f 37, d 4, confidential 428463, SSIP to I Directorate, Information on the coup in Greece, 27 November 1973; AMIP, PA, Greece 1973, f 37, d 5, strictly confidential 454743, SSIP to Embassy in Athens, 20 December 1973; AMIP, PA, Greece 1973, f 37, d 5, confidential 454183, SFRY Embassy in Ankara to SSIP, 12 December 1974.

first contact with the new foreign minister was seen as "more constructive and positive." Tetenes "proved himself willing to discuss certain specific questions... including the Macedonian." The attitude of the Yugoslav diplomacy towards the new government in Athens suggests that it (too) was accepted as an unwanted and unpleasant neighbour but one with which some kind of cooperation had to be established.⁷⁰ The question of extending the agreement about the Free zone of Thessaloniki was broached in February. In May, the Yugoslav federal government concluded that the chances of reaching a new agreement on the Thessaloniki zone were null, and that the very existence of the zone had become an anachronism in international law and that its abolishment was inevitable. Filing a complaint with the court in The Hague was not advisable "either politically or legally ... or for practical reasons" because there were no grounds for a positive outcome of such a case.⁷¹

The defeat of the junta in July and August after the coup against Makarios in Cyprus and the Turkish invasion and occupation of a part of the island led to its downfall. The collapse of the dictatorship was welcomed by the Yugoslav public with enthusiasm and relief. The position of the Yugoslav leadership on this new change in Athens during the interim government and at the beginning of Karamanlis's premiership was positive yet cautious. Karamanlis's resolve to get the army under the government's control and purge it of the officers who had been the key figures of the dictatorship and his arrest of the former leaders of the junta was seen as an important step on the road to restoring democracy.⁷² In the comments on the November elections, the dominant opinion was that Karamanlis's victory had not been unexpected because he had shown his ability to purge the country of the remnants of the military regime in a "relatively non-violent and constructive climate". The elections were not about ideology but about "the practical efficacy of the figures whose authority and concept can lead the country out of the dictatorship and away from the brink of disaster, where it had precariously stood mere months ago."73 The restoration of democracy in Greece opened a new chapter in Greco-Yugoslav relations.

⁷⁰ AMIP, PA, Greece 1974, f 41, d 5, strictly confidential 444951, Embassy in Athens to SSIP, Yugoslav-Greek relations in 1973, 14 February 1974.

⁷¹ AMIP, PA, Greece 1974, f 37, d 4, strictly confidential 423613, Federal Executive Council to SSIP, Belgrade, 14 May 1974.

⁷² AMIP, PA, Greece 1974, f 41, d 3, confidential 451141, Embassy in Athens (Čalovski) to SSIP, 23 October 1974.

⁷³ AMIP, PA, Greece 1974, f 41, d 4, confidential 458507, General Consulate of SFRY in Thessaloniki to SSIP, 20 November 1974.

A new context: 1974–1990

The Karamanlis government worked to improve relations with Greece's Balkan neighbours, especially Yugoslavia and Romania, but its diplomatic efforts were primarily directed at achieving the central objective – accession to the European Economic Community (EEC), which was successfully achieved on 1 January 1981.⁷⁴ After the November elections and the landslide victory of Karamanlis's Nea Demokratia, the full normalization of relations with Yugoslavia began in December 1974 with the visit of the Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Miloš Minić to Athens.⁷⁵ In June 1975, Karamanlis made an official visit to Yugoslavia.⁷⁶ Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito visited Greece in May 1976. The intensification of political relations was continued with Karamanlis's visit to Yugoslavia in 1979 – his last meeting with Tito.⁷⁷ In 1980, he met with Cvijetin Mijatović in Belgrade. The defence ministers of the two countries, Evangelos Averoff and Nikola Ljubičić, and foreign ministers Io-annis Ralis and Josip Vrhovac, also exchanged visits.⁷⁸

In this period, delegations of the most influential Greek parties made official visits to Belgrade: the Centre Union (headed by I. Mavros) and PASOK (led by Andreas Papandreou) in September 1978,⁷⁹ Stane Dolanc, Secretary of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, visited Athens. Several bilateral agreements were signed: on cultural and educational cooperation, traffic and transport, but economic exchange remained rather limited. The number of Yugoslav tourists in Greece increased. However, the list of points of contention did not become much shorter. The new Yugoslav constitution of 1974 had allowed more space for the republics to take up independent positions in foreign policy matters. This, of course, implied a more active role of the republic-level leadership of SR Macedonia and increased insistence on various aspects of the *Macedonian Question* in relations with Greece (and Bulgaria). The other side emphasized the "Hellenic exclusivity

⁷⁴ Clogg, A Concise History, 243.

⁷⁵ AMIP, I Directorate, confidential 461165 dated 25 December 1974.

⁷⁶ AMIP, I Directorate, strictly confidential 428091, 9 June 1975, Memo on the conversation between President of SFRY Josip Broz Tito and Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis.

 ⁷⁷ AMIP, I Directorate, 24 March 1979, Contribution to the agenda for the conversation of V. Djuranović, Chairman of the Federal Executive Council, with K. Karamanlis.

⁷⁸ AMIP, f 44, Cabinet of the President of the Presidency of the Federal Executive Council and the Federal Assembly, confidential 453381 dated 8 October 1976. Memo on the conversation of Deputy Chairman of the Federal Executive Council and the Federal Assembly Minić with Evangelos Averoff, Minister of Defence of Greece, 7 October 1976.

⁷⁹ AMIP, f 42, Federal conference of SSNRJ, Working group for international relations and cooperation, 6 no. 63-398/1-76, Belgrade 8 June 1976; Information on the visit of the delegation of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) from 1 to 4 March 1976.

of Macedonia", with state-supported archaeology playing a prominent role after the spectacular discoveries in Vergina (1977); the ensuing events included the founding of the Museum of the Macedonian Struggle in Thessaloniki (1982), the celebration of the Year of the Macedonian Struggle (1984); the broaching of the question of the role of KKE and Slavo-Macedonian fighters in DAG in the civil war in the political debates among Greek political parties.⁸⁰

The opening chapter of the Yugoslav crisis in the second half of the 1980s coincided with Greece's intensified European integration but also with the constitutional crisis and Karamanlis's resignation, after which PASOK formed a second cabinet. In 1987, a conflict with Turkey broke out in the Aegean, leading the two countries to the brink of war. However, the crisis was neutralized with the signing of the Davos Declaration in 1988. At the same time, the collapse of the Yugoslav federation was gathering momentum with the dissolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, growing separatism, the awakening and growing of nationalism, economic troubles, and clashes among the political elite. In Greece, these processes were followed with attention and concern. After the secession of Slovenia and Croatia, the former Socialist Republic of Macedonia declared independence on 17 September 1991 under a new name – the Republic of Macedonia. Greece's "new-old" northern neighbour emerged on this "redesigned" political map of Europe. The new situation catapulted the Macedonian Question into the centre of the traumatic relations between Athens and Skopje, without the previous "mediation" of the Yugoslav federal government.⁸¹ The disappearance of the Yugoslav state now also placed the relations between the Serbian and Greek peoples into new bilateral and international frameworks, as evidenced by the developments of the 1990s. In Serbia, owing to a "historical reflex", Greece is still referred to as a "neighbouring country." Regardless of this geographic fallacy, relations between the two states lost none of their neighbourly nature and importance. These relations – political, humanitarian, official and private – ties between private individuals) qualitatively defied the patterns and moulds of the links commonly shared between two countries, resisting the challenges of a very turbulent period. They represent a very important and ambitious historiographic research task that needs to be approached seriously and analytically.

⁸⁰ See Adamantios Skordos, Griechenlands Makedonische Frage. Bürgerkrieg und Geschichtspolitik im Südosten Europas 1945–1992 (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2012), 269–325.

⁸¹ Ibid. 359–377.

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
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IN MEMORIAM



Dinko Davidov (1930–2019)

Dinko Davidov was born in Sivac, near Sombor. Having completed the elementary school in Stapar and the grammar school in Belgrade, he began his studies in art history at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade, from which he graduated in 1955. He took his PhD degree under France Stele at the Faculty of Philosophy in Ljubljana in 1965. In 1960 he was appointed as curator of the Print Collection of the Gallery of Matica Srpska in Novi Sad until 1978, when he joined the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SASA) in Belgrade. He was a member of the editorial board of the Matica Srpska journal for fine arts (*Zbornik Matice Srpske za likovne umetnosti*) from its start in 1965 until 1990, and the author of the permanent display of the memorial museum *Hristofor Žefarović and his Times* at the Monastery of Bodjani (1975). He was elected corresponding member of the SASA in 2000 and full member in 2006, and served as director of its Gallery from 2001 to 2009. He chaired the SASA Board for Szentandre/Sentandreja and was editor of its series *Sentandrejski zbornik*.

Dinko Davidov published his first articles in the culture sections of the students' periodicals such as Narodni student and Vidici (1952–53), contributing theatre, book and art exhibition reviews as well as travel accounts ("Climb on Olympus", "Impressions from Delphi"). His early interests ranged from Pivo Karamatijević and Sava Šumanović to Vincent Van Gogh and the letters he wrote to his brother, from Ivo Andrić's notes on Goya to icons on glass and contemporary art in America. While serving as curator of the Matica Srpska Gallery, he began to compile a register of copper engravings made by Serbian printmakers from Szentendre in Hungary to the Serbian Monastery of Hilandar on Mt Athos. As a grantee of the Hungarian Ministry of Culture, he made a tour of the churches under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Eparchy of Buda and put together a proposal for the exhibition Icons from the Serbian Churches in Hungary, which was included in the Protocol of Cooperation between Yugoslavia and Hungary in 1971. In 1973, the 192 icons from Hungary were put on display successively at the Matica Srpska Gallery in Novi Sad, the National Museum in Belgrade and the Museum of Applied Arts in Budapest. In the Eparchy of Srem he collected some 200 icons painted by mostly anonymous painters, known as zographs, who worked in the traditional style of Orthodox religious painting. The icons were transferred to the Matica Srpska Gallery and underwent conservation treatment. The resulting exhibition, Icons of Serbian 18th-Century Zographs, was shown in Belgrade and Zagreb in 1977. Strongly advocating the restoration of the Orthodox monasteries on Fruška Gora ravaged by the Ustasha during the Second World War, he gave lectures, published articles and wrote scripts for documentaries, which were censored or tacitly banned. Denounced as an anti-communist, he left Novi Sad.

Having joined the Institute for Balkan Studies SASA, he directed the project Common and Distinctive Features in the Visual Expression of the Balkan Peoples from the 17th to the 19th Century. He took part in the founding of the SASA's Board for Szentendre under the auspices of the Hungarian and Serbian Academies of Sciences. In the annual scholarly review of the Institute for Balkan Studies, Balcanica, he published texts on the Serbian community in Komarno/ Komarom, the Orthodox population of Vasarhely, the vedutas and plans of Esztergom and Timisoara, the Serbian community of the Taban neighbourhood of Buda, or the cult of St Nahum in the Eparchy of Buda. Focused particularly on the stylistic transition from Late Byzantine to Baroque expression, he studied the influence of Russian/Ukrainian art on Serbian eighteenth-century religious painting. Well-acquainted with its wall and icon painting and relying on his research in the Archives of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, he identified prints of the Kiev-Pechersk Laura school of painting which served as models. He drew attention to their importance and the role played by the painters Vasilii Romanovich and Iov Vasilievich in the Metropolitanate of Karlovci/ Karlowitz ("On Russian/Ukrainian-Serbian artistic ties", "Kievan influences on


Serbian art", "Icons of the church of St Nicholas in Stari Slankamen" and "Jovan Popović's Baroque iconostasis in Aleksandrovo"). He paid particular attention to some developments in Serbian art after the Great Migration of Serbs from the Ottoman Empire to the Habsburg Monarchy in 1690, including Zaharija Orfelin's engravings in the book on the life of Peter I the Great, the cult of the Holy Prince Lazar and his image in Serbian prints, the sections of society that commissioned and supported printmaking.

Dinko Davidov's books, studies and texts in exhibition catalogues are indispensable points of reference for all interested in the Serbian art of the eighteenth century. His overall contribution to culture and scholarship earned him the Jakov Ignjatović Award of the Serbian Culture Community in Budapest, Zlatni beočug Award of the Culture and Education Community of Belgrade, the Vuk Foundation Award and the Rača Charter of the Rača Heritage Foundation. His book *Spomenici Budimske eparhije* [Monuments of the Eparchy of Buda] was awarded the Srpska Književna Zadruga Award, and his *Hilandarska grafika*, the October Award of the City of Belgrade (1990).

In one of his last books about mass migrations of Serbs, Davidov wrote that migrations, and thus those that took place in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, are never futile. It is owing to them that a most beautiful and most valuable portion of the Serbian literary and artistic heritage has survived, including a few thousand zograph icons which will always communicate the very last signs of the antiquity of post-Byzantine painting and the early signs of the youth of the pre-Baroque epoch.

Ljiljana N. Stošić

IN MEMORIAM



Veselin A. Djuretić (1933–2020)


7 eselin A. Djuretić, a retired fellow of the Institute for Balkan Studies, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, was born in the Montenegrin village of Mojanovići, Banovina of Zeta, Kingdom of Yugoslavia (today a settlement in Golubovci, an urban municipality of the City of Podgorica, the capital of Montenegro). He attended the elementary school in Golubovci, and the four-grade grammar school in Titograd (after the Second World War and revolutionary takeover, Podgorica was renamed after Josip Broz Tito). Having graduated from the Teachers' School in Nikšić, he served for three and a half years as a teacher in the counties of Bijelo Polje and Titograd, Socialist Republic of Montenegro, Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. He took part in three federal-level and one local campaigns of voluntary public works. He graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Sarajevo, Department of the History of Yugoslav Peoples with General History (Group 3) (1956–1961), and took his master's degree from the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Belgrade, Department of History, Department of the History of the Socialist Revolution in Yugoslavia (1962–1964), with the thesis "The creation and development of the first organs of power in Bosnia and Herzegovina". He completed a one-year specialist studies in Soviet history ("Organs of revolutionary power at the time of the October Revolution and civil war") at Moscow State University (1965-

1966). In May 1969, he received his doctoral degree from the University of Sarajevo, Faculty of Philosophy, with the thesis "Historical development of people's power in Bosnia and Herzegovina until the Second AVNOJ Session". Djuretić joined the Institute for the Study of the History of the Workers' Movement (subsequently Institute for Contemporary History) in Sarajevo (1961–1970), whose scholarship holder he had been as a student, and then the Institute for the Study of the Workers' Movement (subsequently Institute for Contemporary History) in Belgrade (1971–1982). He moved to the Institute for Balkan Studies SASA in 1983, remaining its member until his retirement in 2001. He was promoted to the highest scholarly rank (principal research fellow) in 1982, by the decision of the scholarly staff of the Institute for Contemporary History, which was confirmed by the Commission for Scientific Ranks of the Science Community of Serbia in 1985. At the Institute for Balkan Studies, he was assigned to the tasks of an principal fellow. Dr Djuretić initially was concerned with recent periods of national history. At the Institute for Balkan Studies, his area of interest was the history of Yugoslavia's international relations, and he served as director of the subproject "History of the Balkan peoples", part of the project "History of the Balkan Peoples and their Cultures" (from 1995).

As can be seen from his biography, Veselin Djuretić was well versed in the method of the then-ruling school of historiography, and in the social structure established and built after the Second World War. He was a prolific writer, as evidenced by his ample bibliography. He was particularly known for his openness, outspokenness and readiness to publish his research results at a time when such exposure required considerable intellectual courage, which did not go without consequences, such as the expulsion from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, whose member he had been for thirty odd years (from 1954), serving also as a member of ideological commissions more than once. His book The Allies and the Yugoslav War Drama (1985) put forth a different perspective on the past of Yugoslavia and the Serbian people from the one hitherto offered by a historiography whose Diamat foundations had been laid immediately after the Second World War, as in other East European countries where communist parties took absolute power. Unlike the official historiography's black-and-white picture of the past based on ideological propaganda and Marxism-Leninism, Djuretić made an attempt to paint a more nuanced picture of the events of the Second World War based on documentary sources. The backbone of his interpretation may be said to be the position of the Serbian people in occupied Yugoslavia: "the relation of both [resistance] movements to reality was determined by the hostile relation of the occupiers to Serbs as a people". He sought to demonstrate that the "Serbian resistance manifested itself as something of a four-layer existential dialectic". It was from that perspective that he offered an overview of the roles played by all armed formations in which Serbs participated (it should be borne in mind, of course, that a vast part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia's active and reserve officers corps as well as common soldiers spent the war years as POWs in German captivity). Djuretić emphasized that one should not lose sight of the fact that many had been mobilized or joined Tito's military formations only after King Peter called on them to do so, referring to them as "the king's partisans". Thus, unlike romanticized biographies in official encyclopaedias or family myths, he raised the extremely delicate question of the actual role of every individual in the war, i.e., in which military formation and until when a person had really been. Djuretić contended that "all Serbian wartime positions were objectively antifascist", but also that Josip Broz Tito, whom he saw in a manipulative light, had used "Russophile Serbs and others in the name of internationalism, and institutionalized the divisions within a single ethnic and linguistic entity, thereby laying a basis for the subsequent destruction of both Yugoslavia and the Serbian people". Djuretić had the courage to make his views known and to defend them with arguments against any authority whose views were, for one reason or another, different from his. We remember him as a man of energy and dedication to work, always ready to discuss history and politics, never holding back from engaging in public debates when he knew it would mean deconstructing propaganda models or felt it his duty to right the wrongs.

Boris Milosavljević

IN MEMORIAM



Miodrag Mića Stojanović (1934–2020)

Miodrag Mića Stojanović, classical philologist, neo-Hellenic and Balkan studies scholar, senior fellow of the Institute for Balkan Studies, professor at the Faculty of Philology in Belgrade and the first chair of its newly-created Department of Neo-Hellenic Studies passed away this August. Professor Stojanović was the author of a large number of works in the field of Balkan Studies and Modern Greek literature, and of literary translations from Modern Greek.

The passing of the dear colleague and friend brings back the memory of an unusual man of proverbially good humour, optimism and inexhaustible relish for life and work. Far from the stereotypical image of people from academia, the intellectual setting that marked his entire career, Professor Miodrag Stojanović – or simply Mića, the informal and endearing name most naturally associated with him – will also be remembered by a distinctive sense of verbal humour, a creative play with humorous possibilities of the Serbian language, which was an inimitable feature of his whole presence and manner.

Born in Malo Krčmare near Rača Kragujevačka, Professor Stojanović gained his first knowledge of philology and developed love of classical antiquity at the Gymnasium of Kragujevac, the school with the longest tradition of classical languages teaching in Serbia. His university studies of classical philology, a natural continuation of his secondary-school interests, were marked by a powerful influence of Miloš N. Djurić, Milan Budimir and Franjo Barišić, doyens of Serbian classical scholarship. Noticed while still a student, Mića Stojanović published his first works even before graduation (1957), at the encouragement and under the watchful eye of his mentor, the great Uncle Miša, Miloš N. Djurić, who recognized in his talented student an inclination towards comparative studies and the specific question of reception of classical antiquity in the Serbian literature of the modern period. What therefore emerged as the most natural subject of research was the figure of Dositej Obradović - the understudied question of classical influences or the scope of the role of Greek and Roman classical antiquity in Dositej's Enlightenment-inspired programme. This largely pioneering research resulted in his master's thesis "The Classical Legacy in D. Obradović's 'Sobranije''' (1962) and the doctoral dissertation "Dositej and Classical Antiguity" (1965). His subsequent thorough study of domestic and foreign archival sources (Vienna, 1966 and 1967) resulted in the enlarged monograph of the same title (1971). The book on Dositej opened a new chapter in the study of classical influences on the work of the great figure of the Serbian Enlightenment and basically unravelled the concrete question of classical and modern sources of Dositej's collection of fables, establishing the exact measure of originality of the domestic adaptation, created as a hybrid of a number of classical and modern models.

In 1971, after ten years as a teacher of classical languages at Belgrade's 4th and 5th Gymnasiums (1960–70), Miodrag Stojanović joined the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, rising through all scholarly ranks from research associate to principal research fellow (1984). That was a period of his prolific scholarly work in the broad field of classical studies, notably the Hellenic, Byzantine and neo-Hellenic legacy in Serbian literature and culture (D. Obradović, Karadjordje, Vuk Karadžić, B. Radičević, St. Novaković, I. Andrić, J. Dučić). As director of the Institute's project "Linguistic and literary connectedness of the Balkan peoples" (1979–1997), Stojanović increasingly devoted attention to issues of literary and historical interaction between the Serbian and Greek cultural traditions of the modern period, the Balkan Enlightenment, mutual poetic influences of the two national cultures, and especially Serbian and Greek insurgent poetry, the subject-matter of his voluminous synthesis Haiduks and Klephts in Folk Poetry (1984). This book contextualized in a novel way the distinctive folklore genre of Balkan insurgent poetry born in the period of Turcocracy, shedding light on the hitherto littleknown and little-studied links and analogies, as well as the differences between the two traditions of oral poetry created in two parts of the Ottoman Empire. A particular value of the book was its extensive Appendix containing the author's translations of klephtic songs, which for the most part were their first translations into Serbian. A revised and enlarged collection of klephtic poetry translated by Miodrag Stojanović appeared as a separate book, An Anthology of *Modern Greek Folk Poetry* (1991; supplemented with further translations and re-published under the title *The Bridge of Arta* in 2002). One of the qualities of the translated *klephtika* is that they follow the original metre, the iambic fifteensyllable verse of modern Greek folk poetry. Rendered in the supple and dynamic Serbian fifteen-syllable verse adeptly fashioned in the style of folk poetry – a pioneering experiment in the history of poetry translation into Serbian – the haiduk verses of Stojanović's translation, with their diction, lexis and rhythm, strike one as if they were created by an anonymous folklore lyre, as if they were native heroic poems. The *Anthology* was awarded by the Association of Translators of Greece as the best translation of Greek literary works into foreign languages in 1991–92. It should also be noted that Miodrag Stojanović organized three scholarly conferences: *Classical Studies among the Serbs* (Belgrade and Novi Sad 1987), *Svetozar Marković and Lyuben Karavelov* (Svetozarevo 1990), and *Rigas Velestinlis and the Balkan Peoples* (Belgrade 1998), and was the editor of the proceedings of the conference on classical studies among the Serbs (1989).

With the establishment of the Department of Neo-Hellenic Studies at the Faculty of Philology in Belgrade in 1995, Miodrag Mića Stojanović assumed the position of its first Chair and Professor of Balkan Studies and Modern Greek Language and Literature. The complexity of designing and carrying out the new Department's curriculum brought new and specific duties. This period in his career produced A Textbook of Modern Greek Language (1997) and A Greek-Serbian Dictionary (1999), standard university textbooks which filled the gap in the body of Serbian technical literature in the field of neo-Hellenic philology, grammar and lexicography. With his proverbial enthusiasm and almost parental care, Professor Mića Stojanović devoted himself to the first generations of talented students, initiating them into, among other things, the secrets of the art of translation. As the moving force of the Department's translation workshop, founded at his initiative, he took part in preparing and stylistically and poetically editing the collective translation of the whole lyric oeuvre of the Greek Nobellaureate Giorgos Seferis (2000), which is only one in a series of titles produced by the lively and fruitful activity of the neo-Hellenic translation workshop.

In our last phone conversation this spring, Professor Mića Stojanović showed his habitual cheer and enterprising spirit. In spite of his age and the increasingly angsty atmosphere of the pandemic crisis, the conversation was marked by optimism and revolved around literary and publication plans for the coming months. Like many times before, Professor was true to his sense of serene self-irony, referring in passing to his "last journey" – "via Šumadija", as he put it in his jocular manner – because, at his express wish, it was to end in his native village of Malo Krčmare. No one could know then that only a few months later the pandemic would hasten his last journey to the native country.

Darko Todorović

REVIEWS

Xavier Delamarre, Dictionnaire de la langue gauloise. Une approche linguistique du vieux celtique continental. Paris : Éditions Errance, 2018, 440 p.

Compte-rendu par Danilo Savić*

La première édition du *Dictionnaire de la langue gauloise* remonte à 2000. Suite à son épuisement, l'auteur a préparé en 2003 la deuxième édition, corrigée et augmentée. La troisième édition, dont il est question ici, est une réimpression de celle de 2003. Pourtant, on trouve utile de signaler dans ce compte rendu l'apport du présent dictionnaire à la recherche sur les Balkans anciens – notamment par anticipation de la synthèse de l'onomastique gauloise annoncée par l'auteur dans l'avant-propos de ce livre (p. 13).

Dans l'introduction (p. 5–10) est formulé l'objectif du dictionnaire : rassembler et exposer de façon systématique le vocabulaire gaulois, négligé dans les études antérieures. Le terme « gaulois » comprend ici l'intégralité de la langue celtique parlée en Europe continentale, sauf le dialecte celtibère de l'Espagne contemporaine. L'auteur considère que la langue celtique parlée en Grande-Bretagne à cette époque est une variante du gaulois et il inclut son matériel dans l'analyse du lexique, en notant que cela n'est pas couramment admis (p. 5, n. 2). Comme sources principales du lexique sont nommées les inscriptions en langue gauloise, l'anthroponymie gauloise (dans des inscriptions gauloises et latines), la toponymie des territoires celtiques, ancienne et récente, les vestiges du gaulois dans d'autres langues classiques ou dans les langues romanes, et les gloses explicitement attestées comme gauloises. Ensuite, l'auteur discute la méthodologie pour l'étude du gaulois face aux autres langues d'attestation fragmentaire. L'introduction est suivie des avant-propos à la deuxième et à la troisième édition (p. 11-13) et de la liste d'abréviations bibliographiques et linguistiques (p. 15-28). La partie principale du livre est le lexique, contenant plus de 900 entrées (p. 29-330). Chaque entrée contient des attestations gauloises du mot ou thème en question, des correspondances connues ailleurs en celtique et en indo-européen, ainsi qu'une analyse étymologique. En se référant aux publications pertinentes, l'auteur donne aussi quelques textes gaulois, traduits en français

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quand cela est possible (p. 331-334). Trois annexes utiles ont été ajoutées à la deuxième édition : la première est une esquisse de morphologie nominale (p. 342-346), la seconde traite de l'anthroponymie gauloise et latine, mais liste également les homonymes latins et gaulois, avec les équivalents probables (p. 347–350), et la dernière consiste en quelques notes sur la composition des noms propres gaulois (p. 351-352). Bien que le matériel y soit présenté de manière succincte, il fournit au lecteur un outil complémentaire au lexique. La classification des données dans les indices à la fin du dictionnaire est très pratique. En effet, le matériel onomastique du gaulois est réparti en trois parties : noms de personnes (p. 355-375), noms de lieux (p. 376-386) et noms de rivières (p. 387-388). Nous disposons également d'une liste de mots romans issus du gaulois (p. 389-390). Cela est suivi de l'index des formes citées dans d'autres langues celtiques (p. 391–405), d'autres langues indo-européennes (p. 405-421) et non indo-européennes (p. 422). Les correspondances du gaulois avec d'autres langues celtiques sont brièvement explicitées (p. 423). Finalement, le vocabulaire gaulois est réparti en champs sémantiques (p. 424-430). Le dictionnaire est terminé par les ajouts et les corrections spécifiques à la deuxième édition (p. 431–440).

Grâce à la structure claire des entrées et particulièrement au matériel ajouté dans les annexes, ce livre rend accessible le lexique gaulois non seulement aux linguistes, mais aussi aux chercheurs provenant d'autres disciplines. Ce dictionnaire réunit un matériel riche et représente, depuis sa première parution, une mise à jour de nos connaissances du gaulois. Nous n'avons que deux remarques à faire en ce qui concerne le contenu en général. Vu la provenance disparate des sources, au sens chronologique et géographique, soulignée par l'auteur luimême (p. 5–6), l'introduction gagnerait à les situer dans un cadre historique. Par ailleurs, l'emploi de plusieurs alphabets pour écrire le gaulois mériterait peut-être quelques lignes de discussion, soit dans l'introduction, soit dans les annexes. N'étant pas celtisant, nous n'oserons commenter que quelques entrées portant sur le domaine balkanique, en particulier sur l'Illyricum.

Le relevé d'attestations gauloises s.v. bardos 'barde, poète' (p. 67) inclut le nom propre Σκενόβαρδος. Il s'agit en fait d'un individu de provenance dalmate ou pannonienne, mentionné par Dion Cassius (55.33.2). Son nom trouve plutôt un équivalent dans Scenobarbus, attesté plusieurs fois dans le territoire des Dalmates, où la forme simple Scenus est fréquente aussi.1 L'élément -barbus, probablement une latinisation de -βαρδος, suscite la comparaison avec des mots désignant la barbe, par ex. latin barba ou vieux slave brada, dont l'origine n'est pas indo-européenne. Pourtant, il ne faut pas exclure l'intégration des noms d'origine celtique dans l'anthroponymie des Dalmates et des Pannoniens. Ceci est très probablement le cas des noms propres masculins Liccaius et Licco auxquels l'auteur accorde une étymologie celtique s.v. lica, licca 'pierre plate, dalle' (p. 201). L'élément licca- est rangé avec les formes du celtique insulaire, vieil irlandais lecc 'pierre plate', gallois llech 'id.', breton lec'h 'id,, remontant à indo-européen *plk-eh_- 'surface plate' (cf. grec πλάξ 'surface plate, pierre plate, table'). Contrairement aux autres noms dérivés de lic(c)a-, qui ont un dossier gaulois solide, Liccaius et Licco sont propres surtout aux tribus pannoniennes et, dans une moindre mesure, aux tribus dalmates.² À notre connaissance ils ne

¹ Pour *Scenobarbus, Scenus* et les noms apparentés, voir le bilan dans R. Katičić, « Das mitteldalmatische Namengebiet », *Živa antika* 12 (1963), 255–292.

² Voir l'article de R. Katičić, « Die neusten Forschungen über die einheimische Sprachschicht in den illyrischen Provinzen », dans Simpozijum o teritorijalnom i hronološkom razgraničenju Ilira u praistorijsko doba održan 15. i 16. maja 1964, éd. A. Benac (Sarajevo : Naučno društvo SR Bosne i Hercegovine, 1964), 9–58.

sont pas attestés dans les pays celtiques, ce qui nous fait penser qu'il s'agit de formations pannoniennes d'un nom d'origine celtique. Leur distribution géographique parle en faveur de cette idée : les deux noms sont absents des régions maritimes de Dalmatie, mais apparaissent fréquemment à l'intérieur des terres, en Bosnie centrale et dans la vallée de la Save, c'est-à-dire dans la zone de contact entre les Pannoniens et les Celtes. Une origine celtique est également envisageable pour le nom propre Teuta et ses dérivés présents en Illyricum, particulièrement à Dyrrachium, dans la région méridionale proprement dite « illyrienne », qui correspond approximativement au Monténégro et au nord de l'Albanie. Le dossier gaulois s.v. teuta, touta 'tribu, peuple' (p. 295) est assez long. Ce lexème est présent ailleurs en celtique, par ex. vieil irlandais túath 'tribu, peuple, et dans d'autres langues indo-européennes, par ex. osque touto 'cité', gotique biuda peuple, lituanien tautà id. Dans le relevé de formes indo-européennes l'auteur inclut deux noms propres « illyriens, Teutana, Teuticus ». Nous ne réussissons pas à trouver d'attestation épigraphique ni littéraire de la forme Teutana, bien qu'elle soit souvent mentionnée dans la recherche précédente.³ Il faudrait plutôt parler de Teuta et Teuticus. C'est surtout le contexte dans lequel apparaît Teuticus qui suggère une origine celtique. Tite-Live (44.31.9)⁴ mentionne Teuticus et Bellus, émissaires du roi illyrien

Gentius aux Romains en 168. av. J-C. Bellus peut bel et bien provenir de l'onomastique celtique, comme le montrent les éléments s.v. belo-, bello- 'fort, puissant' (p. 72). Il est d'ailleurs préférable d'y voir un nom dérivé de ce thème, que de l'expliquer à l'aide de l'adjectif latin bellus 'beau' qui ne figure pas dans l'onomastique latine. Ni Bellus ni Teuticus n'apparaissent ailleurs en onomastique proprement dite « illyrienne ». Teuta est le nom de la fameuse reine des Illyriens (fin du 3^{ème} siècle av. J-C), connue dans les sources littéraires. Mais le dossier paléo-balkanique de Teuta et de ses dérivés est maigre. On connaît quelques attestations dans des inscriptions grecques de Dyrrachium (Τευταια, Τεμιτευτα, etc.),⁵ nous avons Teuta à Župča chez les Daesitiates,⁶ un génitif singulier Teutmeitis à Delminium,7 et Licinius Teuda à Bihać chez les Iapodes⁸ (si cette dernière forme est effectivement apparentée). Cette distribution ne permet pas de confirmer avec certitude l'origine celtique de *Teuta* dans l'onomastique paléo-balkanique. Il faut d'ailleurs noter que l'ancienneté des noms du type Teuta en Illyricum n'est pas parfaitement assurée non plus. Elle repose sur l'hypothèse de la parenté proche entre Teuta et quelques théonymes attestés dans les inscriptions en langue messapienne, parlée en Apulie entre le 6^{ème} et le 2^{ème} siècles av. J-C. Mais cette hypothèse est maintenant obsolète.9 Par ailleurs, les traces de la présence celtique dans les Balkans se situent plus au sud de ce qui était couramment admis antérieurement.¹⁰ Il serait donc tout

⁸ CIL III 14326.

³ Voir notamment la bibliographie s.v. *Teuta(na)* dans C. de Simone, « L'elemento non greco nelle iscrizioni di Durazzo ed Apollonia », dans Grecs et Illyriens dans les inscriptions en langue grecque d'Epidamne-Dyrrhachion et d'Apollonia d'Illyrie. Actes de la Table ronde internationale (Clermont-Ferrand, 19-21 octobre 1989), éd. P. Cabanes (Paris : Recherche sur les Civilisations, 1993), 35–75.

⁴ C'est grâce à la suggestion de Svetlana Loma (Université de Belgrade) que nous avons fait attention aux noms propres dans cet endroit chez Tite-Live.

⁵ De Simone, « L'elemento non greco », 64–65.

⁶ ILJug 1591.

⁷ CIL III 12812.

⁹ Voir J. Matzinger, *Messapisch* (Wiesbaden : Reichert, 2019), 50.

¹⁰ Sur ce point, voir l'analyse convaincante de

S. Loma, « Domorodačko stanovništvo Ko-

à fait possible de mentionner l'hypothèse d'une origine celtique pour *Teuta* et ses dérivés dans l'onomastique paléo-balkanique.

Grâce à la qualité des analyses du dictionnaire, il était déjà possible de remettre en question l'origine de deux noms généralement admis comme paléo-balkaniques.¹¹

¹¹ Pour une remise en question similaire, voir l'article de D. Stifter, « On the linguistic situation of Roman period Ig », dans *Personal Names in the Western Roman World*, Proceedings of a Workshop convened by Torsten Meißner, José Luis García Ramón and Paolo Naturellement, les remarques que nous apportons ici ne touchent qu'une partie infime de la densité des données présentes dans cet ouvrage. Bien organisé et ouvert aux non linguistes, ce livre demeure une source indispensable à l'étude du gaulois et de ses traces dispersées à travers l'Empire romain. Nos quelques commentaires quant aux faits balkaniques ne cherchent qu'à mettre en évidence l'apport des données celtiques, surtout celui de l'onomastique gauloise, pour l'étude des peuples et des langues non celtiques d'Illyricum.

IOANNA IORDANOU, VENICE'S SECRET SERVICE: ORGANISING INTELLIGENCE IN THE RENAISSANCE. OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2019, 256 p.

Reviewed by Jelica Vujović*

Historian Ioanna Iordanou, the author of the book presented here, is Senior Lecturer in Human Resource Management (Coaching and Mentoring) at the Oxford Brookes Business School. She is also engaged as a Research Consultant for the European Coaching and Mentoring Council (EMCC). Her research interests are focused on economic and business history, organization studies and management education, intelligence and espionage in the early modern period and the phenomenon of proto-modern organizations and entities in the pre-industrial world.

The central theme of her study Venice's Secret Service: Organising Intelligence in the Renaissance, structured into six chapters, is the intelligence apparatus in the Republic of Venice from about 1500 to about 1630, when it was led by the Council of Ten, a governing body in charge of state security since its founding in 1310. The author conducted extensive archival research in Venice, Florence, Rome, Simancas and London, supplementing her study of the original material with concepts and theories from related sciences, taking into account historiographical research on Venetian spies and secret agents conducted by the Italian historian Paolo Preto, notably his *I servizi segreti di Venezia*:

sova i Metohije u rimsko doba u svetlu antroponimije » [Population indigène du Kosovo et de la Métochie à l'époque romaine à la lumière de l'anthroponymie], *Kosovo i Metohija u civilizacijskim tokovima,* t. 3 : *Istorija, istorija umetnosti,* éd. M. Atlagić (Kosovska Mitrovica: (2010): 19–40. (Titre et texte originellement en cyrillique.)

Poccetti, held at Pembroke College, Cambridge, 16–18 September 2011, éd. T. Meißner (Berlin : curach bhán publications, 2012), 247–265. Dans cette étude, D. Stifter réfute la celticité antérieurement proposée d'une partie de répertoire onomastique d'Ig.

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Spionaggio e controspionaggio ai tempi della Serenissima (Milan: Il Saggiatore, 1994).

The first chapter - "Venice and Venetian Intelligence in the European Panorama" shows that intensified rivalries between European countries after the great geographical discoveries, the invention of the printing press, wars and territorial expansion of the Ottoman Empire prompted some of them (Italian city-states, Spain, Tudor England, Bourbon France, the Ottoman Empire) to set out to improve mechanisms of information gathering, and intelligence and counterintelligence activities. Spain under King Philip II was quite successful in such efforts, but still failed to create a systematic intelligence organization, based on management structures determining and controlling the ways in which people worked and communicated with each other. Only the Republic of Venice, supported by its advanced state bureaucracy, succeeded.

The second chapter - "State Secrecy: A Venetian Virtue" - examines the institutional context in which the Venetian state intelligence organization was formed and developed. Iordanou argues that studying secrecy (especially official state secrets) only as a strategy for retaining knowledge and information cannot result in an exhaustive interpretation of the social dynamics it creates during the data exchange process that should be protected. The Council of Ten, through several formal decrees, set out how their representatives and patricians in general should behave and, from the fourteenth century, called on all commoners to secretly denounce anyone or anything that posed a potential threat to state stability and security. The author underlines that these facts are indicative not only of how ubiquitous the culture of secrecy was in early modern Venetian society but also, what she considers to be even more important, that secrecy enabled and encouraged social interactions which would not be possible otherwise.

In the third chapter – "Renaissance Venice's Intelligence Organization" – Iordanou describes the pyramidal structure of the organization. Explaining in detail the importance of correspondence as the primary way of communication in the early modern period, especially over long distances, with special emphasis on encrypted correspondence without which it was practically impossible to preserve information of vital importance to the state, she argues that the Council of Ten had in its hands a powerful mode of management involving complex processes of issuing, sending, receiving and executing orders and the "accountability" of executors of operations (ambassadors, governors, other officials) through written reports. In her attempt to identify the characteristics of the proto-modern state bureaucracy, Iordanou draws on Max Weber, who defined an organization as any social structure governed by an authority based on generally accepted rules and regulations, which, in this case, were issued by the Council of Ten.

"Venice's Department of Cryptology", the fourth chapter, provides an account of the evolution of cryptology in Renaissance Venice, from the domain of "science and art" to a separate independent profession, thanks to the systematic evolvement of diplomacy and the activity of encryption and decryption masters operating in the Doge's Palace in that period. Iordanou gives three reasons why no other Italian and European country (except Spain in the reign of Philip II) was able to establish a professional cryptology service of the size and organizational structure of that of the Republic of Venice in the early modern period. The first reason is related to the already mentioned transformation of cryptology. The second was the existence of an internal school of professional cryptology initiated by the Council of Ten as specialist training of secretaries and all other officials. As the third reason, Iordanou states that the Department of Cryptology was a branch of the Venetian secret service and, as such, was subject to the same organizational rules. Reliance on theoretical knowledge and practical skills,

professional ethics, internal control and discipline, professional development and work organization are some of the characteristics of the profession defined by sociologists and historians, which, according to her, characterize the profession of cryptologist whose development was encouraged by Renaissance Venice. Although they have been linked almost exclusively to the industrial requirements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, primarily due to the lack of institutional frameworks in which professions could develop (in pre-industrial times these were only churches and universities), Iordanou emphasizes that professionalization, just like the concept of organization and managerial practice, existed long before there was a term to define it.

The fifth chapter, "Venice's Secret Agents", concentrates on those who put the intelligence ideas of the Council of Ten into practice. They came from all strata of Venetian society (ambassadors, governors, merchants, wealthy Jews, commoners). But, in situations where diplomatic etiquette prevented ambassadors, governors and even merchants of patrician descent from participating in intelligence operations, the Council of Ten recruited paid agents, who were willing to embark on dangerous spy missions. Because of the pejorative meaning of the word "spy", the Venetian government also used the terms "confidant" or "explorator". The author concludes that the lack of professionalization, which was most visible in the parallel use of all these terms despite the difference in meaning, is the reason why contemporary historians have problems with the precise definition of the term "spy".

The last chapter, "Extraordinary Measures", discusses the "additional ways" of preserving numerous land and overseas possessions which the Venetian government intensified during the sixteenth century, in line with its neutral policy towards foreign countries that it began to pursue at the time. Iordanou states that the Council of Ten, ignoring a public outcry that may have been sparked by the cruelty of some of these measures, routinely legalized such acts in the name of the necessity of preventing the enemy from obtaining confidential information about Venetian affairs. Pointing to counterintelligence activities as one of the most relevant functions of the Venetian secret service, the author identifies the range of these extraordinary measures from extreme - such as assassination, to milder ones - such as intercepting letters.

Benno Gammerl, Subjects, Citizens and Others. Administering Ethnic Heterogeneity in the British and Habsburg Empires, 1867–1918. New York – Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2018, 300 p.

Reviewed by Anja Nikolić*

Benno Gammerl is lecturer in history at Goldsmiths, University of London. His main research interests have so far been imperial history and the contemporary history of homosexuality in Germany. His work on imperial history has been focused mostly on the British and Habsburg Empires and how they administered ethnically heterogeneous groups within their imperial boundaries. His monograph *Subjects, Citizens and* Others. Administering Ethnic Heterogeneity in the British and Habsburg Empires, 1867– 1918 is a thoroughly reworked version of the book Untertanen, Staatsbürger und Andere. Der Umgang mit ethnischer Heterogenität im Britischen Weltreich und im Habsburgerreich which emerged from his doctoral dissertation in 2010.

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Apart from the introductory and concluding chapters, the monograph is organized into five parts in which the author discusses the approach of the two empires to ethnic diversity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Focusing on the question of nationality and citizenship, he explores how they influence the "management" of ethnic heterogeneity in the British and Habsburg Empires. Aware of the vastness of the theme, he chooses to present the perspective of the imperial administrative and political elites and their attitude towards ethnic heterogeneity (p. 3). Given the nature of his main sources - legislations, consular reports, parliamentary debate records - any other perspective could hardly be possible. Since the theme is very broad both geographically and chronologically, the introduction, which raises the questions the author endeavours to answer in the rest of the book, is followed by case studies as a basis for a comparative look at how the two empires handled ethnic diversity between 1867 and 1918.

The focus of the first chapter is on Canada and Hungary. They achieved a level of autonomy from London and Vienna respectively in 1867, which explains Gammerl's choice to set the lower chronological boundary of his monograph at this particular year. Focusing on two political units so far away from one another that they are seldom viewed in the same context, the author seeks to recognize similarities. It is through comparison that he succeeds in making a link between the two geographically remote units and, in that way, to depict all the complexity of handling ethnic heterogeneity. Gammerl observes that both Canada and Hungary tried to assert their distinctive position within the imperial dominion of Britain and Austria-Hungary. Recognizing the racial question in Canada, and the strong presence of other ethnic groups in Hungary as the key problem, Grammerl describes similar mechanisms used to enforce the policy of nationalization. This chapter points out

the remarkably negative treatment of the native population in Canada and the process of Magyarization of other ethnic groups in Hungary. The author uses this example to challenge the usual understanding of the dynamic between nation and empire, and seeks to show how they can coexist.

The second chapter offers another specific case study, of India and Austria, a comparative look that seems more difficult to justify. The author argues that the governments of both sought to present themselves as supranational institutions (p. 96). The analysis starts from Austria, i.e. Cisleithania, the Austrian part of the Dual Monarchy. Recognizing its tremendous ethnic and linguistic diversity, Grammerl is aware that such a state of affairs inevitably led to debate. Providing examples of legislation as well as of a "revolt" against ethnic neutrality, the author points to language as the key factor in ethnic differentiation. In India, on the other hand, the central issue was racial, as it was in the case of Canada. The chapter provides interesting examples of how these differences were managed. The first comparative analysis is meant to show how ethnic heterogeneity was dealt with by the national principle, this second how it was managed by the state principle, while the third case study seeks to show the imperial way of handling the differences.

The third case study juxtaposes Bosnia-Herzegovina with British East Africa. Gammerl sees Bosnia-Herzegovina as a Habsburg colonial domain (p. 119), without dressing up the nature of the Austro-Hungarian regime in the Balkans or tending to adopt the discourse that "glorifies" the Habsburg administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to Gammerl, the attempt to inaugurate a "Bosnian" nation which would smooth away religious differences was the Habsburg administration's first attempt at "administering" ethnic differences. The concept of a "Bosnian" nation was eventually abandoned. The author contends that the promulgation of the Bosnian

constitution in 1910 took Bosnia from the imperial to the state principle of dealing with diversity, a view which is open to debate. In British East Africa, on the other hand, legislation encouraged racist policies.

The three comparative case studies are followed by two chapters which also take a comparative perspective, this time on Austria-Hungary and Britain as a whole, seeking to answer the questions raised in the introduction, especially in the light of the previous three chapters. Gammerl tracks the course of British legislation and the modes in which the empire's subjects from the colonies were denied British citizenship. Taking a much broader perspective than the one used in the three case studies, Gammerl seeks to arrive at some conclusions as to how the two empires operated and how they dealt with ethnic diversity in their respective territories.

Gammerl endeavours not to yield to the conventional portrayal of the two empires. This can best be seen from the way in which he discusses the Austro-Hungarian administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Given the vast geographical area and a large time span encompassed by Gammerl's work, it should be noted that his account of Bosnia-Herzegovina and British East Africa would have been better had he used the source materials from local archives. This is a minor criticism compared with the undertaking of writing this book. The list of sources and literature is impressive and that alone is very useful to all researchers concerned with similar topics. The comparative approach gives the author the opportunity to add weight to his propositions and to answer important questions by establishing a link between geographically distant territories which are rarely viewed in the same context. Gammerl's monograph is a significant contribution to the field of comparative and imperial history. The comparative case studies that constitute the bulk of the book raise very interesting and very pertinent questions and the author seems to provide satisfactory answers.

Andrea Ungari, La Guerra del Re. Monarchia, Sistema politico e Forze armate nella Grande Guerra. Milan: Lune Editrice, 2018, 272 p.

Reviewed by Konstantin Dragaš*

Andrea Ungari, professor at the Guillermo Marconi University in Rome, in his latest study examines relations between military and civilian authorities in Italy during the First World War and the role played by the king Victor Emmanuel III. He explores the scope, limitations and real power of the royal government during the crisis of the Italian political system in 1914–1918 caused by Italy's entry into the Great War. At the same time, he studies the influence of the executive and military authorities - above all the Government and the Supreme Command - on the course of the war, as well as the contradictions of the Italian liberal system which, during this period, were an inevitable factor in final victory.

The first chapter – "La Monarchia nell'Italia liberale" – underlines the importance of the Albertinian Statute (1848) for the development of the Italian constitutional system and the contribution of this historical document to the delimitation of powers, rights and duties of the executive, legislative and military branches in Italy throughout the nineteenth century. The kings of the House of Savoy decisively interfered in foreign policy and the organization of the armed forces, overstepping their constitutional powers. In order to preserve

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the reputation of the Crown, they often opposed plans for reducing budget and expenditures for the army and military reforms. After Cavour's death in 1861, the lead in foreign policy shifted to King Victor Emmanuel II, as he began to play an active role and monopolize the field. Ungari raises the question as to whether such a system can be called a parliamentary monarchy, and defines it as a "hybrid mixture of constitutionalism and parliamentarism", in which the king, encountering weak or no government opposition to his plans, often confused or misinterpreted the limits of his powers. Having learned a lesson from his father's tragic experience and educated in the rationalist spirit, Victor Emmanuel III sought to be a democratic and constitutional king. He found support for his reforms in an understanding he reached with Giovanni Giolitti, the most prominent Italian politician at the turn of the century. During the reign of Victor Emmanuel III, military expenditures increased by more than 30%. In foreign policy, he moved towards Britain and France and away from Austro-Hungary, which he considered a potential enemy from the moment Franz Joseph had avoided visiting Rome after Umberto I's visited Vienna. The visit to the Russian court, his affection for the Slavic world, as well as personal interest in Serbia played a role in rapprochement to the Triple Entente. The author emphasizes that the refusal to renew the military convention with Germany (1901), various diplomatic problems with Austria-Hungary and two Moroccan crises contributed to Victor Emmanuel III's stronger commitment to building Italy as a world power. It is interesting to note that he occasionally was favourably disposed towards the Socialists, and that initially he was not in favour of Italy's military campaign in Libya (Tripolitania).

In the second chapter – "La scelta del Re" – Ungari argues that the king's choice (supported by the majority in the government) to declare neutrality in 1914, thus disregarding the exiting alliance with Central

Powers, stemmed from the fear that a war with Britain and France would mean the destruction of the Italian ports and navy. On the other hand, his readiness to consider the possibility of going to war against Germany and Austro-Hungary stemmed from the fear that Italy could be excluded from a future peace conference, regardless of the outcome of the war. The coming of the War brought the change of the Chief of General Staff in July 1914 since Alberto Pollio was succeeded by Luigi Cadorna. Thus, a period of frictions between the Supreme Command and the government begun. Due to unpreparedness of the army, the first conflict that broke out was the one between Cadorna (who called for urgent general mobilization) and Domenico Grandi, war minister (who advocated a reduction of financial resources for the army). Until the spring of 1915, the king did not intervene in that conflict. The appointment of Vittorio Zupelli as War Minister (the first minister from Istria) and Paolo Carcano as Minister of the Treasury marked the beginning of a fateful change in the relationship between the military and civil authorities. Ungari points out that the House of Savoy could not afford to have bearers of the 1848 political programme, mostly republicans, as proponents of Italy's entry into the war. Victor Emmanuel III passed confidential military reports on the movement of Austro-Hungarian troops to Britain and Russia. Queen Elena, as a friend of Charles Delme-Radcliffe's wife, head of the British military mission in Italy, influenced her husband to give up pacifism. Until Ungari's study, this topic has been neglected in Italian historiography. As the correspondence between Antonio Salandra, head of the Italian government and Sydney Sonnino, Minister for Foreign Affairs, from February 1915 shows, without the explicit consent of the king as the highest constitutional authority, it was not possible to sever ties with the Triple Alliance, despite considerable support for such a decision in the army. The king proved to

be a constitutional ruler, because he did not want the decision to go to war to be made by crown only. Despite ideological divisions, Giolitti, Salandra, Martini or other political actors refused to act so that all the responsibility for Italy's potential entry into the war on the side of the Entente would have fallen on the crown. The king's threat of abdication was aimed at swaying public opinion in favour of entering the war. Giolitti encouraged him in making that decision, above all with the goal of fulfilling Italy's international political obligations.

The third and fourth chapters _ "L'azione di Vittorio Emanuele III nella 'guerra italiana' 1915" and "Monarchia, Sistema politico e Forze armate alla prova della Guerra" - relate the king's departure from his Roman residence, Villa Italia, and his permanence on the front during Salandra's and Paolo Boselli's governments. The king left Rome without pomp and ceremony and spent more than two years in Udine, living a soldierly modest life, which gave rise to the myth of the soldier-king (re soldato). Ungari notices that his leaving Rome had a negative impact on domestic political life, despite the king's wish to stay out of political quarrels. Ungari's conclusions on the liberal governments led by Salandra and Boselli and their relations with the Supreme Command and the king is based on their correspondence. Two opposing views emerged - the king, like Cadorna, believed that the civilian authorities should not interfere in the manner of conducting military operations, war tactics and deployment of units. He kept Salandra and Boselli governments out of political intrigues, and calmed disagreements between Sonnino, Leonida Bissolati and Cadorna. The parliament was "Giolittian" thus pacifist, and in order to counter the decisions of the government, some deputies voted for a stricter war policy on the Trento-Isonzo-Veneto front, without real insight in the dynamics of the war.

The king paid great attention to Britain, financially the strongest political centre in Europe. He showed personal interest in sending of Italian troops to the Salonica front and the situation on the battlefields with Austria-Hungary, paying great attention to the procurement of loans, military equipment and material assistance from abroad. Some ambassadors, such as the British ambassador Rennell Rodd, had good personal reactions with Vittorio Emanuele II. The author points out that the king's distrust of the parliamentary system, fuelled by numerous dispatches, letters and notes from his ministers and diplomats (such as those sent by marquis Imperiali, Italian ambassador in London), grew during the war.

Ungari stresses that the actions of the Government and the decisions of the Supreme Command were often marked by internal political contradictions. Mutual misunderstanding often stemmed from personal animosities, uncontrolled desire for domination and fear that the outcome of the war might be attributed to some undeserving factor (either an allied country or a domestic power holder). Ideological rivalries also played a part. These conflicts arose as a consequence of long-lasting disputes and problematic perceptions of the sphere of responsibilities of particular authorities.

In the chapter on the difficult year 1917, Ungari describes the conflict between Bissolati and Sonnino. Bissolati as the Minister responsible for furnishing the Amy with war material and provisions advocated full cooperation with the Allies, especially regarding full engagement on the northern front and even the revision of the London Agreement of 1915, while Sonnino was adamantly opposed. In the summer of 1917, the British War Cabinet encouraged the plan for a major offensive against Austria-Hungary on the Italian front, in order to create the conditions for a credible proposal for a separate peace as soon as possible. Or, Sonnino was against concluding a separate peace. It is interesting to note that Lloyd George considered that Italian pretensions to Trieste and its surroundings did not clash with Britain's

intention to preserve Austria-Hungary in some form after the war. However, Allied aid of 100 cannons arrived in October 1917. Ungari points out that Bissolati, Sonnino, Cadorna and Victor Emmanuel III were four key figures who, despite the lack of parliamentary support for their plans, pushed Italy further into the war.

In the last chapter, "Dal Piave a Versailles", the author studies the background of the Italian defeat at Caporetto, and the connection between the 1917 Inter-Allied Conference in Rome and the aftermath of Cadorna's removal. Ungari shows that there were changes in the relationship between the Government and the Supreme Command after Cadorna was relieved of his duty. The appointment of Armando Diaz as Chief of Staff did not mean calming tensions. For example, after the victory at the Battle of Vittorio Veneto in 1918, Orlando and Sonnino demanded a lightning offensive against Austria-Hungary. Their decision, consequentially, required a new royal intervention in calming down "passions". Ungari points out that the king's role was to maintain the balance of power in a complicated historical situation. He also writes

about the character of Sonnino's foreign policy underlying the fact that the king was not acquainted with many of his decisions. Thus, Sonnino demanded that the territorial aspirations of the Allies at the expense of the Austria-Hungary be reduced, while defending the territorial clauses of the London Agreement. Fearing secret agreements between the Allies and Austria-Hungary at the expense of Italy, Victor Emmanuel III advocated a conciliatory policy towards the South Slavs, even though, as diplomatic documents show, he counted on separating Croatia and Slovenia from Serbia. He also protested against the handover of the city of Smyrna to Greece, since it was initially promised to Italy. He perceptively foresaw the strengthening of the Catholic and Socialist movements in the country after 1918, but he remained dissatisfied with the treatment of Italy at the Versailles Peace Conference. At the same time, as an opponent of a radical change in the election law for the Senate, the king agreed to extending voting rights to women. All these changes, concludes Ungari, would accelerate the postwar rise of fascism.

Stefan Gužvica, Before Tito. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia during the Great Purge (1936–1940). Tallinn: TLU Press, 2020, 224 p.

Reviewed by Rastko Lompar*

The Stalinist purges in the Soviet Union remain an important yet controversial topic in historiography. Seemingly limited to a single country – the Soviet Union, they in fact are an important transnational phenomenon, both due to the fact that the NKVD bullets took the lives of many foreign communists, and that scant news of the purges rippled over the world stoking fears in the hearts of communists and anti-communists alike. Just like during the later Soviet interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1968 respectively, the news of the purges spread quickly and caused an international uproar. The grinning commissar standing over mass graves with a still smoking Mosin-Nagant revolver became the poster child for anticommunism in the late 30s. However, those that perished were relegated to oblivion, and only after the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 were some rehabilitated.

The book by Stefan Gužvica deals precisely with this important topic, as the

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author researches the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) during the Great Purge (1936–1940). He writes about a small party, forced into exile and still recovering from the police crackdown in Yugoslavia, engulfed in power struggles and plagued by the tutorship of the Comintern. The Purge left a lasting mark on the CPY, taking the lives of its many members and the secretary general Josip Čižinski/Milan Gorkić in 1937. What followed was an interregnum of sorts during which, as per Gužvica, four groups fought and schemed in order to reach the top position in the party. Eventually the future dictator of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, prevailed. Although the life and times of Tito are by no means under-researched, the author rightly concludes that there still is room for improvement. In fact, due to the importance Josip Broz acquired later, party history during the Great Purge has often been interpreted teleologically. The author identifies two currents within the "heroic" narrative of Tito's ascension to power: one, championed by socialist historians, downplayed the roles of other contenders and described his path to party leadership as linear, whereas the other, championed by contemporary critics of Yugoslav communism, sees Tito as a devious mastermind who schemed his way to the top. Gužvica therefore attempts to decentralize the narrative by highlighting various formal and informal actors and groups which fought over Gorkić's legacy. He also ascribes agency to Tito's opponents such as Labud Kusovac. Kamilo Horvatin and Petko Miletić and does not use them merely as a backdrop to his rise. This approach constitutes both the major heuristic and interpretative result of the book, as the author expands on the initial archival work of N. Bondarev and others, whilst drawing attention to the transnational aspect of the internal struggle within the CPY. Drawing on intimate knowledge of the literature about international communism, Gužvica was able to place groups and "factions" within the CPY in the framework of the

so-called left and right wings of the communist movement. Therefore, he significantly improved the understanding of the concept of factions within the CPY and helped the readers navigate through the rather confusing theoretical maze of conflicting ideas and strategies.

However, whilst being aware of the two currents of the teleological narrative, Gužvica remains very close to the former, and the book sometimes reads more like a defence of Tito than an impartial study. Gužvica convincingly proves that the role Tito's denunciations played in the demise of many Yugoslav communists was exaggerated in the works of Pero Simić, as sometimes years passed before the Soviet authorities acted on them. However, the author attempts to defend and clear Tito of any wrongdoing at every turn, without giving the same benefit of the doubt to his adversaries. A great example of the double standard can be found in the description of the denunciations Yugoslav communists wrote against each other. Rather than describing them as a morally repugnant, yet obligatory part of the life of professional revolutionaries, who were forced to spy on their colleagues, the author attempts to prove (mostly in the case of Tito) that the denunciations were a genuine and valiant attempt at forging party unity. So, when describing "innocent reports" written by Tito in 1935 and 1936, he rejects the term denunciation outright; when writing about Kamilo Horvatin's negative reports on Tito, however, he correctly defines them as denunciations (cf. pp. 112–113 and 133). Similar examples are found throughout the book. Although one could agree that Tito was not the allpowerful string puller behind the scenes, but rather an intelligent man adept at reading the warning signs during the Purge, that does not free him from responsibility for the ill fate of many of his comrades. Tito's rise to power was by no means a product of an immaculate conception.

The book is based on extensive research in Serbian and Russian archives and a vast body of literature. The fact that the book is exclusively based on sources from the communist parties, although understandable, has on few occasions led the author astray. Had he consulted sources from the Yugoslav police, he could have avoided taking Stalinist paranoia about police agents and spies within the party ranks for granted (cf. pp. 47–50). The Yugoslav kingdom was limited in the sphere of foreign political espionage, and therefore usually relied on the initiative and capabilities of diplomatic personnel abroad. In the light of police and security service practices in interwar Yugoslavia, the notion that several Yugoslav communists were turned into double agents and sent to the USSR (without an embassy to oversee their activities) to spy on the Soviet government in 1929 seems quite improbable at best. It is quite questionable whether there were paid double agents abroad at all. The most thoroughly analysed Yugoslav foreign espionage network organized in Berlin in

the late 1930s by the military attaché V. Vauhnik did not include a single paid operative. Despite a thorough bibliography, some key works about the interwar Yugoslav communist party are missing. Most notably the official party history (*Istorija saveza komunista Jugoslavije*), but also other important work by B. Gligorijević, K. Nikolić, B. Petranović, S. Cvetković and others.

In conclusion, the book is well written and easy to follow. It is both thorough in narration and unencumbered by unnecessary examples. The readers are drawn into a world of conflicting agendas and characters, as they follow the main protagonists who battle over a party in crisis. The ominous shadow of Stalin and his NKVD looms over them, threatening not only their positions within the party but also their very lives. Overall, the book is a well-researched and well-conceived attempt at shedding light on an often overlooked, yet quite important part of the history of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

Catherine Horel, *L'amiral Horthy*. Régent de Hongrie. Paris: Perrin Editions, 2014, 467 p.

Reviewed by Andjelija Miladinović Radonjić*

The contrasted history of Hungary in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is embodied in the controversial figure of Admiral Miklós Horthy, the hero of the book by Catherine Horel, a renowned French specialist of the history of countries that were a part of Habsbourg Empire. In the foreword, Horel deals with specific issues of Hungarian historiography such as available archives and biographical tradition. She points out that Hungarian history has often been instrumentalized and that the biographical genre has only recently experienced some changes. The dominant narrative on the nineteenth-century Hungary is focused on the differces between István Széchenyi and Lajos Kossuth. Horel uses the river Danube as a vivid metaphor: just like the country is divided physically by the river, so is Hungarian historical consciousness divided between the *labanc* – allies of Austria personified by Széchenyi, generally Catholic, and the *kuruc* – rebels, generally Protestants, foes of Austria such as Kossuth. Since the end of the seventeenth century, this distinction has grown stronger, becoming ever powerful

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in the national consciousness, so the main problem was achieving the synthesis of these two currents.

The book is divided into three parts. The first part is concerned with the life of Admiral Horthy in the period of his education and service in the Austrian-Hungarian Navy until 1918. The Horthies were a Transilvanian nobility and they took part in the ever-shifting political life of Austria-Hungary. Miklós Horthy, a young officer who dreamt of embarking on a world tour, likening himself to Ulysses, showed a great deal of loyalty and admiration for Emperor Franz Joseph. Horel shows that this period was crucial for Horthy's political and ideological views. Although his first years as a naval officer are relatively poorly documented, she succeeds in constructing a demythologized narrative of Admiral Horthy's naval career, from its beginning in Pula until the end of the First World War.

The second part deals with Admiral Horthy as head of the Hungarian state in the interwar period. Horel pinpoints the main problems which Hungary faced in the aftermath of the Great War: the political turmoil of 1918 and 1919, the Treaty of Trianon, the issue of restoration, repression against the communists, socialists and Jews. She engages in thorough research on the mechanisms that created the myth of Horthy as the saviour of Hungary. Horel explores propaganda methods used and highlights the moment of shifting the focus from sea to land as crucial in the creation of the myth. The exaltation of the land meets several objectives: it constantly reminds of the amputation of territories considered as being Hungarian, it denies the contribution the Jews have made to the national community by refocusing it on the patriotic rural world. She draws parallels with Petain's propaganda and regime and provides an important insight into the events that paved the way for Hungary's entry into the Second World War and examines Horthy's role in the genocide of the Jewish population.

The third part of the book deals with Horthy's life in exile, in Germany and Portugal, the Nuremberg trials, and his legacy. The occupation of Hungary by the Nazis and Horthy's arrest followed by the arrival of Soviet army was a disaster for Horthy and his family. Their fortune turned in 1945 owing to a prevailing anti-communist climate, the backing of the circle of political emigrees that the Horthy family joined and the support of the former US ambassador John F. Montgomery. During his exile years in Portugal, Horthy wrote his memoirs under the name Nikolaus von Horthy, which provide an account of the events from his youth until the end of the Second World War. This is one of many historical sources that Horel puts to the test with her sharp focus and critical analysis and succeeds in demystify its apologetic tendencies.

The final chapter explores the ways in which the memory of Admiral Horthy found its way into the political currents and collective memory of Hungary after his death. His reburial in his hometown Kenders is pinpointed as the key moment in which the post-communist narrative began to shape the apologetic and revisionist cult of Admiral Horthy. Horel concludes the book by stating that Horthy, contrary to the myth built around his personality, is neither a conquerer like Árpád, nor a legislator like Saint Stephen. Nor is he a founder like Széchenyi, and even less a rebel like Rákóczi, Thököly or Kossuth. She also states the paradox, the reforms for which he gets praise, so-called, "sacrifice of Horthy", is annihilated by Hungary's entry into the Second World War. She sees his life as a long series of defeats disguised as victories: even though his desire to save Hungary was genuine, his desire for power was far greater, and so he is not a hero, much less a king or a saint. The German occupation of 19 March 1944 is a revealer of the degree of anti-Semitism in society for which Horthy bears, among other things, the responsibility. Horel also uses these conclusions to warn of the dangers

that lie with the hagiographical approach to this controversial figure that hides revisionism and political agendas behind it. Therefore, this critical study not only sheds more light on Admiral Horthy's figure but also places it into a broader perspective of the past, present, and future of Hungary, thanks to Horel's impeccable work.

Horel's detailed knowledge of Hungarian history and the interwar period alongside her thorough research and critical approach resulted in a very important study. The image of Admiral Horthy shifted from demonization by the communist regime to exaltation which culminated with the admiral's reburial in Kenderes in September 1993, during the period of democratic transition. The author disagrees with the conclusions of both communist and revisionist historians, and underlines the dangers of revisionist tendencies in the contemporary Hungarian government; Horel explores all mechanisms of this revival in the climate of anti-communist obsession.

Ethem Çeku, Kosovo and Diplomacy Since World War II: Yugoslavia, Albania and the Path to Kosovan Independence. London – New York: IB Taurus 2016, 206 p.

Reviewed by Igor Vukadinović*

The book of the historian Ethem Çeku Kosovo and Diplomacy Since World War II: Yugoslavia, Albania and the Path to Kosovan Independence provides a historical account of the Kosovo and Metohija question and the Albanian national movement in Yugoslavia between 1945 and 1980. It is focused particularly on the diplomatic aspect of the issue and on an analysis of the state policies of Yugoslavia and Albania, and follows the role of major foreign political players in this matter. The book is intended primarily for Western readers and evinces the author's effort to elicit empathy and solidarity with the Albanian national movement in Kosovo.

The book is organized into nine chapters combining chronological and thematic approaches. The first chapter offers a brief overview of the Balkan policies of the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain during the Second World War. The second chapter analyses various plans for Kosovo and Metohija within the framework of special relations between Yugoslavia and Albania and the negotiations of the two communist leaderships about the unification of their countries between 1945 and 1948. The third chapter follows the evolution of the Kosovo and Metohija question from the outbreak of the conflict between Yugoslavia and the Cominform in 1948 to the split between Tirana and Moscow in 1960. The fourth chapter is devoted to the constitutional status of Kosovo and Metohija from the end of the Second World War to the adoption of the 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia. The following three chapters deal with the growing internal crisis in Yugoslavia in the 1960s and 1970s and the establishment of closer ties between Albania and the leadership in Priština, which was a symptom of the Yugoslav crisis. The last two chapters are devoted to the violent demonstrations in Kosovo in 1981, which Çeku sees as the highpoint of the Albanian national movement and the turning point of the Kosovo question. This interpretation of the demonstrations may in part be explained by the personal perception of the author, who was their active participant.

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One of the strengths of the book is the use of a broad range of sources. Apart from documents from major Albanian archives, the author used source materials from the Archives of Kosovo and Metohija in Priština, the Archives of Yugoslavia in Belgrade and the Russian State Archives of Socio-Political History in Moscow. The book provides some important information that has until recently been little known or unknown to the broader scholarly public, such as Soviet diplomats' reports on Albania's stance on the Kosovo question in the 1950s or the messages the leading Albanian politician in Yugoslavia Fadil Hoxha sent to the leader of Albania Enver Hoxha through the Albanian ambassador to Yugoslavia in 1970. The author perceptively covers shifts in Tirana's foreign policy and does not fail to notice the emergence of West Germany as an actor in the Kosovo question in the early 1980s, which he vividly pictures by referring to Enver Hoxha's bewilderment at why a country that has no diplomatic relations with Albania would support national demands of Albanians in Yugoslavia.

On the other hand, the book is marked by the author's insistence on the narrative of "inequality of Albanians in Yugoslavia" and the Belgrade regime's brutal attitude towards Kosovo and Metohija. As a result, the readers are deprived of some important historical information and not infrequently encounter claims that cannot be considered as being true to fact.

The unprecedented step made by the establishment of territorial autonomy in Kosovo and Metohija after the Second World War has not been sufficiently studied. In his analysis of the legal and constitutional acts passed after the war, the author fails to mention that the Autonomous Oblast (Province) of Kosovo and Metohija was granted powers in the economy, education, the judiciary and internal affairs, but instead merely emphasizes the hierarchical subordination of provincial authorities to those of the republic.

The author insists repeatedly on the thesis about the "anti-Albanian policy" of Serbia and Yugoslavia in the first post-war years, although it was then that the Yugoslav communist regime intentionally displaced tens of thousands of Kosovo-and-Metohija Serbs from their homes and made decisions which favoured the Albanization of minority communities, such as imposing compulsory schooling in Albanian on Turkish children or the change of surnames on members of the Slavic community in the Gora region. The thesis about "Serbian domination" in the political life of Kosovo and Metohija is made to seem plausible by omitting the fact that Albanians accounted for more than 70% of deputies in the People's Committee of Kosovo and Metohija and more than 70% of members of the Provincial Executive Committee which was headed by Fadil Hoxha for the whole eighteen post-war years. In the conclusion of the fourth chapter, Çeku claims that the 1946 Constitution of Yugoslavia treated Kosovo and Metohija as "oblast", which is not true.

The author also puts forth the claim that the economic development of the Kosovo-and-Metohija autonomy was "minimal" until 1968, that the region was bypassed in terms of investment and that it was only after the downfall of Aleksandar Ranković that the provincial economy could begin to prosper. In reality, however, in 1957 the Yugoslav political leadership launched ambitious economic projects in Kosovo and Metohija, which brought about its transformation. The rate of economic growth the province reached between 1957 and 1965 was never reached again in the twentieth century. The popular myth about "Ranković oppressing Albanians" has never been put to serious scrutiny but has instead been uncritically accepted as a starting point in making assessments of an era, which is the reason why the fast-paced development of a network of institutions of higher education in the province between 1958 and 1966 is also left unmentioned by the author.

Although the Albanian national movement in Yugoslavia is one of the book's focuses, the author provides little information about its structure, modes of operation and protagonists, occasionally misleading readers into believing that the latter were people who spent decades in prison for their beliefs, such as Adem Demaci. In that way, readers are left unaware of the fact that the leaders of the Albanian national programme in Kosovo and Metohija in the 1960s and 1970s were not "persecuted members of an underground resistance" but in fact the most influential party functionaries and intellectuals employed in state institutions who, with the support of Josip Broz and the Yugoslav political leadership, elevated the

autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija to the status of a federal unit with its own constitution, supreme court and powers in the area of defence and international relations.

Kosovo and Diplomacy Since World War II: Yugoslavia, Albania and the Path to Kosovan Independence is a useful handbook for research concerned with the diplomatic history of the Kosovo-and-Metohija issue, the policy of Enver Hoxha's Albania on the issue, and the history of European diplomacy in the Cold War era. The parts of the book that deal with the history of Kosovo and Metohija and Yugoslav state policy are marked by the author's propagandistic slant, which takes away some of its scholarly value.

Thanos Veremis, A Modern History of the Balkans. Nationalism and Identity in Southeast Europe. London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2017, xi + 226 p.

Reviewed by Dušan Fundić*

The recently published book of Thanos Veremis is a condensed overview of a little more than the last two centuries of Balkan history. Veremis, Professor Emeritus of Political History at the University of Athens, founding member and former President of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and visiting professor at Princeton, Oxford and London School of Economics, is a prolific historian, whose better-known works include Modern Greece: A History since 1821 (2010). The book reviewed here is structured into three parts whose titles - "The Balkans from the Nineteenth to the Twenty First Century: the Building and Dismantling of Nation States", "The Balkans in Comparative Perspective", and "Unfinished Business" - clearly show the main directions in which he takes his research.

Discussing the relationship between the influence of great powers and the dynamic

of the Balkan states' internal development, the author identifies the phenomena and processes he perceives as decisive for the outcomes and contemporary problems of the Balkan region. In that sense, he attributes responsibility for the state of affairs in Balkan politics and relations between the countries to the incompetence and irresponsibility of foreign and local political actors alike. Veremis focuses primarily on the most important developments in the political history of Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania, offering a comparative perspective and an overview of their foreign policy orientations.

By the end of the eighteenth century the Orthodox Christians of South-East Europe were inheritors of three cultural traditions:

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Greek. Latin and Slavic. Common to them was that they were engaged in trade and sought to evade Ottoman tax collectors. Also, Ottoman rule provided a single frame for all of them, despite differences, with the tradition of knowledge transmission and education within Orthodox churches. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula became acquainted with the ideas of the French Revolution more directly, through the French rule of the Illyrian Provinces (parts of Croatia and Dalmatia) and the Ionian Islands, through various proponents of "French ideas": diplomats, agents, local liberals and revolutionaries as the human factor in the promotion of revolutionary ideas and concepts, the Balkan mercantile diaspora in Central Europe, and the phenomenon defined by Veremis as "tradition of local radicalism", until the early 1820s, exemplified by Riga Velestinlis. In the author's view, exposure to these ideas paved the way for the shaping of national identities and states in the Balkans along with the struggle against Ottoman rule which marked the nineteenth century.

Veremis's overview of the history of the Balkans states is balanced and offers a wellfounded selection of key events and actors. He draws particular attention to the fact that the states of South-East Europe were built on the ruins of two empires, the Habsburg and the Ottoman, and that they spent a good part of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in mutual rivalries. On the other hand, to make it clear that modern Balkan history cannot be reduced to a string of conflicts and wars, Veremis points to a series of attempts at alliances and cooperation and provides examples of "multilateralism" between neighbours. He looks at the efforts to overcome rivalries, from the Balkan Pact (1934) of Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece to the period of communism and the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

The particularly important chapters on nationalisms and identities in the Balkans, mostly unstable economies and the role of

the military in the domestic politics of Balkan states are concluded with a look at the views of Western authors on the south-eastern part of Europe. Veremis places particular emphasis on the economic instability of nineteenth-century states which, following the penetration of Western capital, declared bankruptcy one after another, from the Ottoman Empire (1881), Greece (1893) and Serbia (1896) to Bulgaria (1902), indicating difficulties in their development. The section devoted to the Balkan economy in the second half of the twentieth century takes a look at the differences between and consequences of Yugoslav self-management, socialist countries, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania, and Greek capitalism. The part of the book dealing with economic issues contains a few useful tables which make it easier for the reader to understand the author's line of argument which is concluded with the observation that the future of the Peninsula will to a great extent depend on the fiscal policy of Germany and the EU.

A major strength of Veremis's book is his response to various tropes about the Balkans that prevail among Western publics. Following the emergence of a Eurocentric perspective on the Balkans since the work of Edward Gibbon, an eighteenth-century British Enlightenment historian, whose influential book on the history of the Roman Empire described the Balkans as a "dark" part of the Byzantine world, Veremis argues that such a perspective has been strengthened by more recent but not much different work of Samuel Huntington. Huntington saw the Orthodox and Muslim cultural worlds as contrasting with the "more European" Catholic and Protestant countries. Veremis also points to the oversimplified media presentation of the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

The last part of the book is devoted to the Greek-Macedonian dispute, Kosovo's self-proclaimed independence and the "Dayton" Bosnia and Herzegovina. Veremis points to inept and insufficiently effective policies of Western countries, including US involvement in the disintegration of Yugoslavia under the veneer of support for multicultural democracies. The outcome was the creation of two EU-financed Western protectorates that can hardly be described as multicultural. The involvement of Western diplomacies is criticized as largely indecisive and insufficiently concerned about its longterm consequences. It is important to know that the book was published a year before the Prespa Agreement (2018) concluded between the governments in Skopje and Athens which settled the issue of the name of Greece's northern neighbour, now known as the Republic of North Macedonia. Can this be described as the "flexible strategy that will not depend entirely on foreign priorities" that Veremis favours, in the conclusion of his book, as the approach to resolving Balkan issues?

The book ends with a "Chronology", a list of the major events that took place between 1774, the year taken as the beginning of the Eastern Question, and 2016, the year of the Brexit referendum which, along with other difficulties of the EU, is seen as a sign of the protracted wait of the rest of the Balkan countries in the antechamber of membership. Some shortcomings of the book include the occasionally imprecise or/ and inconsistent spelling of personal and geographic names. The virtual absence of Montenegro is conspicuous. Apart from its role in the Balkan Wars, no further information about it is given. These shortcomings notwithstanding, this book raises a number of interesting questions and offers original interpretations and answers both to students and to professional historians of Balkan history.

Thede Kahl and Ioana Nechiti, *The Boyash in Hungary. A Comparative Study among the Arĝeleni and Munĉeni Communities.* Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2019, 235 p.

Reviewed by Annemarie Sorescu-Marinković*

The Boyash (Bayash) are an ethnic group living today in scattered communities across the Balkans, Central and Eastern Europe, but also in the Americas. They speak Romanian, preserve the memory of a common traditional occupation (woodwork), and are usually considered Roma by the majority population. The last two decades have seen an explosion of interest in this ethnic group, partly triggered by the publication, in 2005, of the volume The Bayash in the Balkans. Identity of an Ethnic Community, by the Institute for Balkan Studies in Belgrade and under the editorship of Biljana Sikimić. Today, researchers already talk about a new emerging discipline, Bayash studies, which has by now gathered an impressive corpus of studies. The present volume, The Boyash

in Hungary. A Comparative Study among the Argeleni and Munĉeni Communities, authored by Thede Kahl and Ioana Nechiti, is a valuable addition to this growing body of study.

The volume, which is the first in the series edited by the Vanishing Languages and Cultural Heritage Commission of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, is a thorough dialectological and linguistic comparison of the Romanian linguistic varieties spoken by two subgroups of the Boyash in Hungary: *Arĝeleni* and *Munĉeni*. It must be highlighted that the *Arĝelean* variety is the one undergoing standardization, as Hungary has

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emerged as the only country which offers education in the language of the Boyash minority group. The volume analyses the two Romanian varieties and their sociolinguistic situation on the basis of field recordings collected between 2010 and 2014 among Boyash speakers in two villages of Southern Hungary, Alsószentmárton and Gilvánfa, and in the city of Pécs.

The book is divided into five main chapters: 1) Introduction; 2) Current state of knowledge; 3) The field research; 4) Corpus: Text examples from the field recordings; and 5) Culture, language, identity.

The first chapter contains a brief introduction to the history of Roma, Boyash and Rudari migration, with a focus on their slavery and serfdom in Wallachia, Transylvania and Moldova, and the extensive sedentarization measures taken in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The authors explain why Hungary occupies a special place in the configuration of Roma communities, which can be divided today into three main linguistic groups: Hungarian-speaking Romungros, Hungarian- and Romani-speaking Vlach Gypsies and Romanian-speaking Boyash, the first being the most numerous (more than 70% of the total Roma population in Hungary) and the last - the least numerous (only 6%). According to Kahl and Nechiti, "the idea that the Boyash are a homogeneous population can no longer be sustained" (p. 12), as they are "miscegenated descendants of the Gypsy miners and gold workers, the sedentary (Romanian) population and escaped state and monastery slaves, although less subject to state laws and probably with the possibility of interethnic marriages" (p. 13). In view of Maria Theresia's prohibition of marriages within the group, the occurrence of visible signs of miscegenation of the Boyash is hardly surprising, as the authors put it.

The Introduction continues with a historical overview of the Baranya region, and zooms on the Hungarian part of the region, where the communities under scrutiny live. After 1971, three Boyash subgroups, *Arĝeleni, Munĉeni* and *Tiszani*, have formed the majority of Roma in the southern rural areas of Baranya, close to the Croatian border. However, according to recent sociolinguistic research, their Romanian varieties have undergone major and dramatic changes in the last decades, and are today used only functionally, in the private domain and as an affective language.

The second chapter - Current state of knowledge - summarizes the linguistic scholarship on the Boyash in Europe, and the authors rightfully note that, basically, "scholars in Roma studies have no great interest in the Romanian language and experts in Romanian studies none in the language of the Roma" (p. 18). Moreover, they make the daring claim that, "had we been talking about sedentary groups who could not be linked with the Gypsies at all, traditional Romanian dialectology would have taken a greater interest in the language of the Boyash" (p. 18), showing also that the leading compendiums of Romanian dialectology do not even mention the Boyash Romanian varieties. Pointing, though, to notable exceptions of individual scholars devoted to the study of the language and identity of the Boyash, Kahl and Nechiti notice that there are still major gaps in the linguistic knowledge of these archaic Romanian varieties.

The third chapter – The field research – presents the aims and methods of the study, describes the three places under scrutiny, offers details on the interviewees, the phonetic transcription of the recorded material, and presents a large collection of field photographs. Alsószentmárton, a small isolated village of 1,156 residents, is inhabited almost entirely by Boyash, who identify themselves as Munĉeni and call their language țîgăniv or tîgîníu. The second village, Gilvánfa, as opposed to the first, is much smaller (381 inhabitants), but the Boyash there are less isolated from Hungarians. Their language, which they call l'imbă dă băĭáş, is highly endangered, since even the older generation

speak mostly Hungarian. Pécs, the administrative and economic centre of Baranya county, with a total of 156,049 inhabitants, is home to a dispersed Boyash community, and the state of their language is similar to that of the Boyash in Gilvánfa.

The fourth chapter of the book is comprised of a rich corpus of transcribed texts recorded in the abovementioned places, accompanied by an English translation, and grouped according to several topics, such as: origins and history, customs and rituals, fairy tales, linguistic identity, language standardization, and everyday life. The printed edition of the book comes with an enclosed USB card, with the video recordings of the interviews, which can also be found online on the website of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, www.oeaw.ac.at.

The fifth and most consistent chapter of the book - Culture, language, identity which covers almost 100 pages, makes the core of the volume and offers a thorough sociolinguistic analysis of the presented material. First, the authors delve into the history of the three Boyash settlements, from the beginning of the twentieth century, through the two world wars and the communist regime, up to the present. Second, the authors discuss the rich series of ethnonyms and exonyms of the group, stressing the flexibility of the Boyash in declaring a Roma or Gypsy identity depending on the situation, and the fact that identification with Romanians and their culture exists, although "almost no one calls himself/herself Romanian" (p. 118). As shown further, the Boyash in Hungary do not hold their own language in high regard and many describe it as mangled or inadequate. On the basis of the analysed interviews, the authors discern that a distinct identity is being built, which dissociates between the Boyash and the Roma groups, on the one hand, and between Argeleni and Munĉeni. on the other.

The authors notice considerable variations in the way the Boyash varieties are used in Hungary, depending on the distribution area of the speakers, which justifies the use of the term idiolects. Moreover, an important factor for the maintenance of these varieties is the type of settlement the Boyash used to live in. Namely: "Until recently they lived in monolingual, closed societies and so in a context where the learning of another language brought no significant benefit to the community" (p. 126), while today all the Boyash speak the language of the majority population, Hungarian. The authors offer details about the process of standardization of Boyash (establishing a spelling system, publication of the first textbooks, song collections, dictionaries, etc.), and show that the greatest obstacle to standardize these varieties is the opposition of the speakers themselves, who "denounce themselves speaking a language that is neither Romanian, nor Hungarian" (p. 131), coupled with the separate and uncoordinated efforts of the two groups in Baranya. Kahl and Nechiti consider that both varieties are endangered, but while the Munĉan variety is assessed as being at stage two of shift on a three-stage process of language extinction, during which "the language of the majority increasingly spreads into the language of minority, while the latter is used mostly within the family by the elderly" (p. 134), the Argelean variety is considered to be at stage three, which is characterized by "the loss of vocabulary and the inability to create new words, as the majority language has definitely replaced the minority language" (p. 134). However, mention is made of the fact that, during the last three decades, the Argelean variety has enjoyed greater prestige than the Munĉan and that, if one of the varieties should reverse language shift, it would most probably be the Argelean, which is already used in schools. After a short overview of phenomena of bilingualism and plurilingualism, an exhaustive comparative grammar of the two varieties follows.

In short, The Boyash in Hungary is much more than a comparative study among the Argeleni and Munĉeni communities, as the subtitle modestly announces. It is a systematic and comprehensive work which explores issues that go beyond the strict interest of dialectology, uncovering the sophisticated sociolinguistic situation of the Romanian Boyash varieties spoken in Hungary. Apart from the intrinsic value, the volume has a special relevance in that, being written in English, it helps bridging the knowledge on the Boyash in Europe, as this new discipline has so frequently been hindered by the fact that studies written in national languages of Central and Eastern Europe were not readily available to the entire research community.

Yaron Matras and Anton Tenser, eds., *The Palgrave Handbook of Romani* Language and Linguistics. Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, 596 p.

Reviewed by Mirjana Mirić* and Svetlana Ćirković*

The Romani language represents a fascinating object of inquiry within several linguistics disciplines. As it has long been a primarily oral language, without a widely accepted standard, Romani displays a high degree of cross-dialect variation at all levels of linguistic structure, which makes it interesting for descriptive and historical linguistics, as well as dialectology. Given its syntactic structure and "rich inflectional and derivational morphology and a relatively high degree of synthesis" (Elšík, p. 157), Romani is particularly appealing to researchers taking a typological perspective. Additionally, Romani is suitable for analyses within contact linguistics, being characterized as a language in permanent contact as Romani speakers are at least bilingual and from an early age acquire one or more languages they are in contact with, with Romani bilingualism (or multilingualism) being unidirectional since only rarely do the speakers of the majority languages acquire Romani (Matras & Adamou, p. 329). In this respect, language contact has been an important factor that has shaped the historical development and contemporary state of Romani. From the sociolinguistic perspective, Romani is characterized as a "functionally limited, dominated language" (Halwachs, p. 430), with specific functional distribution of the linguistic repertoires.

Although mainly a spoken language, due to the modern technologies and prolific work of Romani contemporary authors and translations into Romani, this language is gaining new domains of usage in the written form, which triggers research of written practices across various disciplines.

The Palgrave Handbook of Romani Language and Linguistics is a breakthrough in contemporary Romani linguistics as it manages to include all the aforementioned topics and disciplines. It offers a unique synthesis of knowledge on the Romani language and linguistics, gathering experts in these fields and encompassing a wide range of theoretical concepts and methods within various disciplines. Relying on relevant literature, the individual contributions make the handbook as a whole quite informative and comprehensive, while accompanied by novel research, theoretical concepts and methodological approaches offer state-of-the-art insight into what constitutes Romani linguistics today. Additionally, the presented analyses are systematic and abundant in (linguistic) details, and the contributions are written in a clear and coherent way.

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The linguistic structure oriented contributions present a cross-dialectal perspective, pointing out the Indo-Aryan legacy and the "structural core consisting of language-specific typological features" (Elšík & Beníšek, p. 390) shared by (almost) all contemporary Romani dialects, as well as cross- and interdialectal variation at all levels of linguistic structure, showing the effects of migrations and the impact of languages that Romani has been in contact with. Where relevant, comparisons are made with the Modern Indo-Aryan languages or European languages, while some features are analysed from a more diachronic perspective in comparison to the Old or Middle Indo-Aryan language, seeking to provide a better understanding of their origin. The other, more interdisciplinary-oriented contributions provide insight into the contemporary state of Romani linguistic repertoires and their usage across different domains, as well as recent findings on linguistic policies regarding Romani and its vitality.

Following a concise, yet inspiring overview of the field in the first chapter (Introduction), written by Yaron Matras and Anton Tenser, the handbook is divided into five parts comprising 17 chapters, followed by Author, Dialect and Subject Indexes. After a brief introduction, a concise survey of the relevant literature is provided in each chapter, including the observations coming from recent studies. Then follow the well-structured sections on the particular topic of the chapter, to conclude with relevant desiderata for further research. Where possible, authors emphasize which data and concepts have not been satisfactorily explained yet or still await a discussion, showing that the field of Romani linguistics is far from being exhausted.

Part I of the handbook (*History*) encompasses two chapters dealing with the diachronic dimension of research on Romani.

The chapter *The Historical Origins of Romani* (Chapter 2, pp. 13–47), written by Michael Beníšek, is a comprehensive historical linguistics overview, which shows the importance of linguistic evidence in establishing the origin of Romani as an Indo-Aryan language, as well as in reconstructing previous stages of its development. The main part of the chapter outlines the major inherited Indo-Aryan features in Romani, with relevant comparisons of present-day Romani features with the ones in New Indo-Aryan languages, as well as the features which continued from the Old and Middle Indo-Aryan. The features are analysed at different levels of linguistic structure, with a focus on phonology, nominal and verbal morphosyntax, and pronominal forms. It is illustrated in detail which inherited features have been preserved in contemporary Romani, which ones have undergone change and which ones have been generally lost. Highly relevant is also the discussion of methodological issues of the Early and Late Proto Romani reconstruction, as well as the issue of the 'departure'. Relying on linguistic evidence, the author notes that "the departure of Proto-Romani speakers from the Indian subcontinent must have taken place no earlier and no later than during the second half of the first millennium CE" (p. 26), challenging the view which claims that Romani people originated in warrior clans that resisted the Islamic invasion of India after 1000 CE.

The chapter Historical Sources on the Romani Language (Chapter 3, pp. 49-81) by Ignasi-Xavier Adiego, offers insight into the testimonies on the Romani language which first appeared in the 16th century and continued to be a scarce source of information on Romani until the end of the 18th century, when their number and scientific orientation significantly increased. In addition to overviewing the details about the earliest manuscripts, which typically contained lists of words in Romani, occasionally accompanied by translations and short sentences, the author summarizes their descriptions from the scholarly literature, focusing on the critical assessment of the dialectal

classification of the recorded varieties. It is also highlighted that a scientific approach with a solid methodology has been applied in the manuscripts as of the second half of the 18th century, with comparative studies focusing mainly on the connection between Romani and Indo-Aryan languages. After crediting Büttner and Váli (and secondarily ab Hortis) as the first scholars to mention the genetic relationship between Romani and Indo-Aryan languages, Adiego surveys Rüdiger's study (1782) as the first one which presented evidence for this relationship, based on Sinte material.

Part II (*Structure*) encompasses four chapters devoted to different levels of Romani language structure.

In Romani Lexicon (Chapter 4, pp. 85-117), Andrea Scala focuses on the historical aspects, showing that the Romani lexicon may serve as an important repository of data on the history of Romani people since the loanwords "represent historical traces of use for reconstructing the migrations of Romani people" (p. 89). In his description of the inherited Indo-Aryan layer (comprising app. 700 Romani roots), the author discusses the stability of the words in the lexicon across three factors: word frequency, cognitive salience and cultural centrality. Additionally, other Romani lexicon layers of loanwords are discussed, namely Iranian (app. 60 loanwords), Armenian (app. 30 indisputable loanwords), Greek (at least 200 loanwords), as well as layers containing numerous German and Slavic loanwords. The layers are discussed as regards the semantic spheres and word classes the words belong to, the degree to which they are present in various dialects, as well as the type and degree of their morphological adaptation in Romani. In addition, some internal strategies of the new lexicon production are touched upon. Significantly original is the case study which uses lexicon to demonstrate that the Piedmontese Sinti of Southern France (FPS) and the Italian Piedmontese Sinti (IPS)

likely represent two different groups, as FPS has many German loanwords, unlike IPS.

The following chapter Romani Phonology (Chapter 5, pp. 119–153) is authored by Márton A. Baló, who describes in detail the complex sound system of Romani, based on data extracted from the Romani Morpho-Syntax database (RMS). In addition to presenting the core vowel and consonant inventory shared across dialects, the chapter describes dialect-specific modification processes which have affected the Romani sound system, and provides insight into the sets of additional contact-induced phonemes. In the domain of processes affecting the vowel system, the author analyses centralization, lengthening, reduction, hiatus, diphthongisation, fronting and backing processes, as well as the $/o/ \sim /u/$ alternation. Among the processes affecting the consonant system, the author discusses the aspiration, voiced consonants, the continuation of the historical retroflex cluster, velarisation, semi-vowels, the distribution of /h/ and /x/. affrication and de-affrication, sibilants, gemination, palatalisation and de-palatalisation. Furthermore, the author analyses other phonological processes, syllable structure, as well as stress, showing that a dominant stress pattern still preserved in the inherited words is word-final, with attested changes in the dialects in contact with languages where initial or penultimate stress dominates, usually affecting loanwords.

The chapter on *Romani Morphology* (Chapter 6, pp. 155–186) written by Viktor Elšík, represents a well-structured and elaborated survey of Romani morphological issues. In order to account for both widespread structures and dialectal variation, the data are taken from various descriptions of Romani dialects, studies on Romani morphology and original, unpublished data on the Central Romani. A diachronic perspective is provided to a certain extent, with information on the relevant morphological structures attested in Proto-Romani. As Romani has rich inflectional and derivational morphology, the main part of the paper is devoted to their overview. Regarding inflectional morphology, the author offers details on the categories relevant in the domain of verbal and nominal inflection, and also touches upon adjectival and degree inflection. As the Romani lexicon contains numerous loanwords, several types of xenoclitic integration of loanwords are discussed and illustrated. Regarding word-formation, derivational morphology is observed as the most common type, although compounding and conversion are also exemplified.

In the chapter Romani Syntactic Typology (Chapter 7, pp. 187-227) the authors Evangelia Adamou and Yaron Matras describe selected syntactic-typological features of Romani, relying on a variety of data extracted from the RMS responses to the questionnaire, the free-speech recordings available in the RMS database and Pangloss Collection. They show that the distribution of typological features is influenced by contact with non-Indic languages, which is evident in the shared innovations induced by contact with Byzantine Greek and the dialect specific innovations triggered by contact with other European languages. As for particular features, Romani noun phrase is mainly discussed as regards its linear word order and agreement. The verb phrase alignment is looked at across three types of constructions: intransitive, monotransitive and ditransitive. As for the word order in main clauses, the authors emphasize that Romani does not rely on word order to encode the functions of core arguments, but rather information structuring determines the word order in the verb phrase and demonstrate that "discourse-pragmatic functions allow making some general predictions about the occurrence of SV and VS which relativize the impression of free or extremely flexible word order rules" (p. 197). Furthermore, details are provided on the complex clauses, focusing on the word order and the complementizers with which they are introduced, with dialectal variation thoroughly illustrated. Finally, the chapter deals with the structural means employed to encode semantic roles, local and temporal relations.

Part III of the handbook (*Contact*) gathers five chapters which point to theoretical and methodological approaches in the domain of contact linguistics, but also focus on particular languages and language groups which have highly influenced Romani in the post-Greek period. The Para-Romani is also discussed as an idiom structurally most distant from Romani.

In the chapter The Impact of Turkish on Romani (Chapter 8, pp. 231-260), Victor A. Friedman analyses the Turkish influence on Romani in those Romani dialects which were spoken within the borders of the Ottoman Empire, among which the dialects of the Balkan group, South Vlax, Kaspičan, Varna Gadžikano, Sepeči, Skopje Arli, Agia Varvara, Romani dialects in Macedonia and eastern Bulgaria. Employing data from the ROMLEX Lexical Database, as well as from his own extensive fieldwork studies and published papers on Romani and its structure, the author concludes that the distribution of Romani dialects which exhibits Turkish features allows for establishing the northern linguistic boundary in the Balkan Peninsula. The impact of Turkish is mostly observed in the lexicon, while the least influence is present at the phonological level. At the morpho-syntactic level, Turkish has influenced mainly those dialects with which it was in immediate contact or whose co-territorial national state languages were once influenced by Turkish.

In the chapter *The Impact of Slavic Languages on Romani* (Chapter 9, pp. 261–301), Anna-Maria Meyer deals with the influence of Slavic languages, which is most evident in the Northeastern, Northern Central, Southern Central and South Balkan I, as well as different Vlax Romani dialects. Given the long history of contact between the Slavic languages and Romani, it is not always possible to determine which one served as the donor language for a particular Romani feature. Employing the RMS database, the author analyses Slavic features at all levels of linguistic structure. The impact of Slavic is most obvious in the lexicon, while the most widespread contact phenomena at the phonetic-phonological level influence individual sounds and processes affecting vowels and consonants shift in stress, and numerous foreign sounds taken over through lexical borrowing. The changes in the morphological structure of Romani are due to the presence or absence of certain linguistic features in the Slavic languages. For instance, the definite article has been lost in some of the Romani varieties in contact with articleless Slavic languages and aspectual prefixes from Slavic have been adapted to the Romani verbal system. The impact of particular Slavic languages is reflected in the analytic perfect, 'new infinitive', generalisation of reflexive pronoun pe(s) for all grammatical persons, and borrowing of modal verbs. At the syntactic level, Slavic conjunctions and prepositions have been frequently borrowed, and the potentially shared features such as object doubling, conditional sentences and negation draw particular attention.

The chapter The Impact of Hungarian on Romani (Chapter 10, pp. 303–328) suggests that the most obvious impact of Hungarian is in the South Central Romani and some varieties of North Vlax Romani. The authors Zuzana Bodnárová and Jakob Wiedner emphasize that the Romani dialects are mostly affected by colloquial Hungarian, as well as Hungarian dialects. Using data from the existing linguistic studies, the authors point out the characteristics of the phonological, morphological, syntactic and lexical system affected by Hungarian. The impact is observable especially at the lexical level, but also at the levels of phonology, morphology and syntax. In the syntactic structure of Romani, the word order, the usage of grammatical cases, which correspond to the Hungarian patterns, extensive borrowing of Hungarian coordinators and

subordinators are considered to be influenced by Hungarian.

In the chapter Romani and Contact Linguistics (Chapter 11, pp. 329-352), the authors Yaron Matras and Evangelia Adamou provide a remarkable overview of studies on the contact-induced changes in Romani, which contributed to the development of concepts, methods and theories in the domain of contact linguistics. The study of contact phenomena was initiated in the 19th century by Slovene philologist Franz Miklosich, while recent research covers the topics of Indo-Aryan genealogical heritage, the usage of Romani words in the slang of other languages, mixed languages, and structural borrowing in various Romani dialects. As the authors emphasize, little attention has been paid to the sociolinguistic research, as well as the study of discourse-related aspects of contacts in Romani. In addition to the descriptive approaches, the modern research of the contact phenomena in Romani includes the revision of the existing concepts of borrowing and adaptation at the morphological level, the processes of language shift, development of the varieties known as "Para-Romani", as well as the understanding of the pattern-replication. This contribution points to language contacts in the period before Romani people came to Europe (Proto-Romani) and with Byzantine-Greek (Early Romani), which defined the structure of present-day Romani varieties to a large extent. As Romani varieties have been influenced by different European languages, the authors provide a brief survey of typical influences at all levels of linguistic structure.

In his contribution on the *Para-Romani* Varieties (Chapter 12, pp. 353–386), Peter Bakker thoroughly examines the phenomenon which Romani linguistics labelled 'Romani mixed dialects', i.e. linguistic varieties which preserve Romani vocabulary, but have completely lost the original grammatical system. The analysed Para-Romani features are illustrated by examples taken from Basque Romani, Catalan Romani, Calo, Angloromani, Scandoromani, Danish/ Low German Para-Romani (documented in Denmark), Dortika (in Greece), Turkish Para-Romani and Para-Romani in Hungary. Unlike other Romani varieties, which share the verb inflection, overt case marking and adjectival inflection for gender, number and case, none of the Para-Romani varieties employs the Romani inflection. The phonology, morphology and syntax of the Para-Romani varieties are identical to the co-territorial languages. According to the available data, around a dozen Para-Romani varieties exist, and the number of speakers does not exceed 100,000 people.

Part IV of the handbook (*Variation*) contains three chapters which enhance our understanding of the extents and parameters of variation in Romani from different perspectives, namely – diachronic and diatopic variation reflected in a remarkable degree of cross-dialect variation, sociolinguistic variation affecting language policy and planning, and finally, the variation in the practices of translating the *Bible* and religious texts across time, space and local social environments.

The chapter Romani Dialectology (Chapter 13, pp. 389-427), written by Viktor Elšík and Michael Beníšek, offers an up-to date survey of the Romani dialect groups. Departing from a general consensus that dialectological classification ought to be based exclusively on the linguistic structure of the varieties, the authors differentiate the following 12 dialect groups: South Balkan, North Balkan, Apennine, Slovene, South Central, North Central, Transylvanian, Vlax, Ukrainian, Northeastern, Northwestern, and Iberian Romani. Reference is made to the previous classifications, the areal distribution of the dialect groups is provided, language contact influences are mentioned, and typical idiosyncratic features, i.e. innovations at all levels of linguistic structure are listed and exemplified. Furthermore, two competing models of Romani crossdialectal variation are effectively presented,

namely the genealogical ('tree' or 'dialect branching') model and the diffusion ('wave') model.

In the following chapter on Language Policy and Planning in Romani (Chapter 14, pp. 429-457), Dieter W. Halwachs covers several urgent sociolinguistic topics. Although Romani is characterized as a "functionally restricted, dominated language" (p. 430), it is demonstrated that its limited functionality does not make Romani an endangered language as often stated in international databases such as UNESCO's Atlas of World's Languages in Danger or Ethnologue. Furthermore, Romani language policies and planning (LPP) at the international level aims at developing the Romani standard, especially orthography, being subject to many controversies. At the regional and local levels, two main LLP strategies can be observed. The 'top-down' strategy pursues the 'dominance / majority' approach, typically standardizing a variety of a numerically or politically dominant group (e.g. in Serbia, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania). In practice, the objectives of this strategy clearly differ from the results achieved in reality, as, among other issues, imposing a standard in education often results in confronting children with a variety different from their mother tongue, as illustrated by the situation in Romania. On the other hand, the 'bottom-up' strategy follows the 'plurality' approach, with the initiatives taken at the local level, allowing several varieties to be standardized and used in school. This approach has more realistic goals, focused on language maintenance, which is more effective when implemented in education and extra-curricular activities, as illustrated by the case of Burgenland Romani in Austria.

In the chapter Romani Bible Translation and the Use of Romani in Religious Contexts (Chapter 15, pp. 459–486), Wilco van den Heuvel deals with Romani Bible translations from a historical perspective, but also touches upon challenges in translation. The first translation of the Bible was published in 1837. While the 19th century translations are characterized by the use of Para-Romani varieties (Caló in Spain, Sinti as spoken in northern Italy and in Germany), in the 20th century, various other Romani varieties are used, such as Vlax/ non-Vlax, Erli dialect of Balkan Romani, Gurbet spoken in Bosnia, Baltic Romani, Lovari, Finnish Romani and Kalderash. In the period after 1990, we witness an expansion of the Bible and religious texts translations. The challenges in translation are fundamentally affected by questions 'for whom' and 'for what purpose'. For instance, when Romani lacks lexical equivalents for some of the lexemes of the source language from which the Bible is being translated, the following strategies are observed: the use of various loanwords (from the language of wider communication), creation of a new Romani word, on the basis of the existing Romani lexicon, and the extension of the meaning of an existing Romani word. Furthermore, Romani Bible translations employ different orthographic solutions. In spite of the attempts to establish an international orthographic standard, the orthographic variants of different Romani varieties used in Romani Bible translations represent a mixture of international writing conventions and features of the orthographies of regional languages of wider communication. As many users of the Bible and the religious texts in Romani are illiterate in Romani, the printed and published translations have often been accompanied by their audio-visual versions.

Part V of the handbook (*Language Use*) comprises three chapters on the use of Romani. By applying various methodological approaches, such as the analysis of the documented oral samples, linguistic experiments, corpus-based research of the digital media and internet, as well as printed Romani texts, the authors cover a wide range of topics, such as Romani language acquisition, domains of language usage important for the research on intergenerational language transmission, standardization of Romani,

as well as Romani literacy and literature in Romani.

In the chapter Romani in Child-Directed Speech (Chapter 16, pp. 489-514), Pavel Kubaník addresses the input that children receive in their surroundings, which is crucial for language socialization. The issue is investigated in some of the communities in which Romani is used as a dominant language of socialization (Central Romani in the Czech Republic), in communities in which Romani is not used or its usage is reduced in the communication with children (Central Romani used by Slovak migrants in the Czech Republic), as well as in communities which employ Para-Romani varieties (Caló in Spain and Anglo-Romani in Britain). The study shows that the use of Romani varies not only geographically and historically, but also in the social practices. The research on Romani at different children's age points towards their actual linguistic competence, as well as cognitive difficulties that children speaking Romani as their first language encounter in the communities in which a different language is dominant.

The chapter Romani on the Internet (Chapter 17, pp. 515-537), written by Daniele Viktor Leggio, offers an original insight into the visibility of Romani in the modern digital media and its usage in the contemporary means of communication. Analysing the use of Romani on Web 1.0 (Websites, Forums, Chat rooms) and Web 2.0 (Wikipedia, YouTube, Facebook) platforms, the author observes the difference in the use of language by Romani activists and nonactivists. Activists adjust their language to the institutional literacy practices, to the extent possible in case of a non-standardized language. However, insisting on the use of the standardized Romani is not considered crucial. Institutional and vernacular literacy practices are blurred, although the institutional one remains the main means of interaction between Romani activists and their audience. On the other hand, the virtual

world of Romani non-activists is the space in which users replicate the offline practice, using the whole range of linguistic repertoires reflecting their individual identities. As Leggio concludes: "The coexistence and acceptance by language users of such a plurality of literacy practices is a confirmation of how linguistic pluralism can positively support previously spoken-only languages in new domains" (p. 532).

Sofiya Zahova in her chapter on Romani Language Literature (Chapter 18, pp. 539-569) distinguishes between Romani literature and Romani language literature. While the former encompasses literary creations written by Roma in Romani or other languages, the latter refers to works written in Romani, but also written by non-Roma and translated into Romani. The first works written in Romani were published in the interwar period (1918–1939), and the literature in Romani has expanded after 1989. The author surveys the historical development of the Romani language literature and emphasizes that the production in all periods was marked by the state policies towards Roma or minority groups in general. This chapter also discusses the literary genres of Romani language literature. According to the author, although it is possible to discuss the frequent genres, a strict classification is not applicable to the Romani language literature. Folklore material, poetry and short stories,

as the most frequent genres, were published in Romani or as bilingual/multilingual editions, whereas memoires, oral history and children literature were almost exclusively published in Romani, with the accompanying translations. This chapter mentions the challenges that Romani language literature encounters with regard to the distribution, reception and the availability of literature.

On the whole, The Palgrave Handbook of Romani Language and Linguistics offers an impressive interdisciplinary and up-todate insight into the Romani language and linguistics. In addition to providing a relevant and thorough synthesis of the previous scholarship, as well as emphasizing important gaps to be filled by future research, the authors draw on a multitude of sources, such as the data available in the Romani-Morphosyntax Database, ROMLEX Lexical Database, early historical sources, Romani literature, or the data coming from their own and others' empirical research and prolific field work. The handbook is, therefore, a most valuable read for different kinds of audience: from those interested in general and interdisciplinary linguistic studies, which could benefit from the well documented phenomena in Romani, up to the international experts in various fields of Romani linguistics and scholars in other fields. The handbook will certainly represent an essential reference point for future research.

Boris Milosavljević, *Beogradski rodoslovi* (Genealogies of Belgrade Families). Belgrade: Balkanološki institut SANU, 2020, 444 p.

Reviewed by Vojislav G. Pavlović*

The book Genealogies of Belgrade Families by Dr Boris Milosavljević, a senior research associate at the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, offers many important lineages which, in some cases, span the period from the War of the Holy League (1683–1699)

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to the present. As the author explains, the reference to Belgrade in the title was inspired by the fact that Belgrade has been the capital of the modern Serbian state since its inception under Karadjordje at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Even though some families, including the ruling ones, were tied to one part of Serbia or another by origin or by official duties, the elites of nineteenth-century society became increasingly tied to Belgrade as the capital and seat of government. The book mostly deals with the families whose members were "noble civil servants", relatives of ruling houses, descendants of civilian and military administrators, oborknezes, vojvodas, and members of the Governing Council. Among the figures occurring in the genealogies are descendants of almost all princely and royal regents and prime ministers, presidents and members of the Governing Council, princely representatives, presidents and members of the Council of Ministers, leading statesmen and generals. Persons from that world are well known because they are historical figures, but once they left the historical stage, their community or social group sank into oblivion. As the author puts it ironically, in the Serbian post-war social sciences and humanities, they became a well-hidden minority.

The monograph is the result of decades of research based on extensive source material, mostly from private family archives, which have been inaccessible because many of the families found themselves on the "wrong side of history" after the communist revolution in Yugoslavia. Access to family archives provided a reliable basis for this book, which makes an unquestionable contribution to a better understanding of social and political life in the Principality and then Kingdom of Serbia, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and then of Yugoslavia, but it also sheds light on the life of the Serbian emigration after the Second World

War. The book discusses the importance of genealogical studies for historiography and the issue of trustworthiness of genealogies in view of the existence of false, unverifiable, mythic genealogies. Some methodological issues pointed out by the author deserve attention. Genealogical research and compiling family trees and histories do not follow the rules of the deductive but of the inductive method, even though, in this case, the two approaches arrive at the same result at a certain stage. It should also be noted that, unlike much of the earlier work that dealt with the history of elites in Serbia, the author's methodological approach is not ideologically predicated. This adds weight to the fact that he gives in-depth thought to methodological issues, shedding light on social and political life in Serbia in the nineteenth and twentieth century, seeking particularly to capture its subtle nuances.

Especially relevant to Balkan studies are the genealogies that show connections between families from various parts of South-East Europe. The genealogies of the descendants of Prince Miloš Obrenović through his daughters show the ties of this ruling house and their relatives with prominent Serbian, Hungarian or Romanian families that lived in the Habsburg Monarchy, Imperial Russia, the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. Kinship ties between the Serbian, and Yugoslav, Karadjordjević dynasty and the Petrović Njegoš dynasty, the ruling house of the Principality and then Kingdom of Montenegro, and the royal houses of the Kingdom of Romania and the Kingdom of Greece are well known. Dynastic genealogies constitute only the initial but indispensable and overarching point of reference for the research presented here. If close and distant relatives of the ruling families and other family charts are taken into account, there emerges an intricate network of kinship ties. What these genealogies also testify to are intricate elite networks in the Balkans and South-East Europe. The author rightly argues that, notwithstanding all distinctive

features of individual regions and states, the world presented in the genealogies was in many ways similar to the world that could be found in other contemporary European countries (from Britain to Russia). This book, a testament to an authentic scholarly effort involving decades of single-handed work, is something of an encyclopaedia which will be an unavoidable point of reference to all researchers whose work is based on unbiased critical interpretation of documentary, memoiristic and diaristic source material.

Instructions for authors

Submissions & Deadlines

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Balcanica publishes original scholarly papers and book reviews. Manuscripts should be submitted by email to balcanica@bi.sanu.ac.rs.

Submission Deadline

Balcanica receives submissions throughout the calendar year but only manuscripts submitted by the month of May will be considered for publication in the current year's issue.

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Language

Accepted languages are English and French. Non-native speaking authors are strongly encouraged to have their manuscripts read and corrected by a competent language editor before submission. Texts should be grammatically correct and in a good writing style.

Article Length

Articles should not exceed 10,000 words. Longer papers will be considered for publication only exceptionally.

Formatting

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